Ships accident - Damage survey and countermeasures

after a collision-Prevention of further damage

It is important while navigating ship the officer of the watch understands practical
procedures to avoid collision guided by masters standing orders. These procedures
are only indicative, not exhaustive in nature and one must always be guided by
practices of good seamanship.Call attention of other ships that are in adjacent waters
by turning on deck lights, putting up the lights or shaped objects to show not under
command, using VHF, and other possible means.
Prevention of further damage
Upon collision with another ship, Go Astern as early as possible to limit the damage
and to avoid further contact.
But if the bow of the vessel has penetrated into the side shell of the other vessel,
reverse the engine only after an initial damage assessment as one of the vessels
may suddenly lose her buoyancy and sink, or cause/increase oil pollution.

Damage survey and measures against flooding

Survey the degree of damages of the hull by sounding all compartments likely to be
affected by the collision. Limit any flooding by using available means onboard.
(1) If the leakage is small, wooden plugs, blankets, tarpaulin, cement boxes or the
like can be used to reduce the flooding rate.
(2) An increase in draft due to flooding can cause flooding through openings that are
usually above waterlines, to which serious attention must be given.
(3) If high rate flooding is likely to cause the vessel to sink, an intentional stranding
should be considered.
(4) In case of a leakage in the fore peak tank, proceed with reduced speed so that
excessive pressure on the collision bulkhead is kept to a minimum, and move the
vessel to safer waters . Ballast aft tanks if possible to regain freeboard forward.

Salvage contract and evacuation

Follow the Companys instructions to conclude a salvage contract, for which
communication must be established between the Company and the vessel as soon as
possible after the accident.
When there is imminent danger, where is absolutely no time to wait for the
Companys decision, however, the Master may request salvage using his professional
judgment. In this case, the Master must confirm that the contract is based on
the Lloyds Open Form (LOF)even at the worst case, and Avoid having salvers start
the operation without confirming the conditions of the contract.
If danger is imminent to human lives onboard the vessel, every effort should be done
to evacuate everyone from the vessel.
The Master shall request the salvage by all available means prior to the evacuation to
show that the vessel side has no intention to abandon the hull and cargo.

Life saving and rescue of other ship

(1) If there is no urgent danger to the vessel, stay near the other ship to take all
necessary measures to save human lives and assist in possible rescue attempt of the
other vessel.
(2) If the other vessel has sunk or is likely to sink, do the very best to save human
lives immediately by lowering lifeboats or other possible means.
(3) If it is unavoidable to discontinue the search although there are still persons
reported lost from the other ship, obtain consent of the other ship or the Rescue
Coordination Centre. Enter the fact in the deck logbook.
(4) Handling an accident resulting in injury or death of the vessels crew should be

dealt mentioned in the Emergency Procedures for Human Casualty

Handling oil spills

In cases of an oil spill or threat of such a spill, should be dealt with utmost
importance ,reference is to be made from SOPEP

Reporting
If the accident is likely to cause obstruction to marine traffic, the Master shall report
the matter to the nearest office of the Maritime Safety Agency while in Japanese
territorial waters, or the Coast Guard or the like, if the vessel is in territorial waters
of countries other than Japan.

Reserving damage claim right

Although an error through negligence for an accident is decided by a trial or a marine
accidental inquiry, be sure to submit a claim letter to the other ship regardless of the
causes of the accident, and request the Master of the other ship to sign the letter.
The claim letter should be sent swiftly by any available route including if necessary
electronic means.
If the other ship sends the claim letter to the vessel, never insert or accept a wording
that may be interpreted as admission of liability.
If it is unavoidable to sign the claim letter from the other ship, sign the document
affixing the following remark, I received your claim notice without prejudice or This is
not an admission of liability or similar wording.

Investigation and recording the facts

The Master shall investigate the event by interviewing all persons concerned and try
to establish all facts leading up to the event. The Master should convene a meeting
to collect all types of information from crew members to grasp the fact of the
collision which should be consistent with the evidential records/documents on board.
The following documentation/records shall be secured:
Time records of course recorder.
Time records of telegraph logger.

Position records.
Engine revolution records.
Voyage Data Recorder
ECDIS data
Other documentary evidence.
The Master shall make records after investigation of the above and prepare extracts
of the respective log books.

Evidence and data

The Master shall try to obtain the signed statement or testimony about the accident
from third parties, such as pilot and other persons who were onboard or near the
vessel when the accident occurred, if it is possible and the Master deems it
advantageous to the Company.
Prepare copies of the related charts, deck logbook, course recorder, bell book, etc.,
taking advantage of the opportunity, since the competent authorities often demand
the submission of the originals of such documents

Dealing with visitors

Various persons concerned, such as the officer of competent authorities, surveyors,
lawyers and underwriters, visit the vessel to probe conditions of the collision. In such
cases, the Master shall give the gangway strict instructions not to permit access to
anybody until specifically authorized by him to do so.
The Master shall not admit any person except competent authorities or persons
permitted by the Company. If there is doubt a visitors authorization to board the
vessel, the Company shall be contacted before access is granted.
When any crew member is questioned about the accident by competent authorities in
a port outside Japan, The Master shall request the presence of a lawyer representing
the Company and an interpreter if possible.
Such representatives will be arranged by the Company. In order to allow the required
time for the necessary arrangements, the Master must inform the Company as early
as possible after it is known that such an inquiry will be made. For an accident
related to P&I matters, a local P&I representative shall be arranged.

The Master shall not permit interviews by a lawyer or surveyor nominated by the
opposing vessel without permission of the Company.
When such lawyers and surveyors visit the vessel directly, decline interviews with
them, saying as everything is left to the lawyer nominated by the vessel, please
discuss with him.
Even when instructions for an interview are given from the Company, due care shall
be taken not to give statements which may be unfavorable to the vessel or the
Company. Such interviews shall be limited to the Master and Officer of the Watch
only. Especially, logbook and records should by no means be shown to a lawyer or
surveyor nominated by the opposing vessel.

Cautions in preparation of documents

1) The following attention should be taken for entry into the Deck Log Book:
To write the Plain Fact and to mention points favorable to vessel in detail.
Each Officer of the watch shall make entry in his own handwriting.
To check the uniformity of logging with Engine Log Book
2) The following attention should be given for entry into the Sea Protest:
To write the Fact briefly. Details of the development of the event are not necessary.
Not to write definite time and place, but enter approximate time and place only.
Cause and detailed condition of the collision should not be entered but write matters
which are positive and favorable to the vessel.

Navigation after a collision

For a collision during a voyage, the Company will decide how to handle the matter
depending on the extent of the damage, including :
1. Temporary repairs by the crew or, if required, with assistance from external
Sources.
2. Requirements for inspection by Class.
3. Proceeding to the nearest port for repairs (Self-navigation),

4. Navigation to the port of destination (Self-navigation), or

5. Arrangement of salvage (Towing).
Note:
The Master shall survey the extent of damage conditions as detailed as possible to
judge whether there are any obstructions to continued navigation, and report
immediately to the Company. The vessel shall follow instructions given by local
authorities.
If SOLAS-related equipment (Life-saving equipment, such as Lifeboats in particular)
is damaged, inform the Company immediately. The vessel shall not leave a port until
the damaged equipment is repaired by an authorized person or replaced.

Arrangement of survey
(1) The Company will arrange surveys [Class survey, Damage survey, Joint (WP)
survey with the opponent party, and P&I representatives] as required after
consultation with the Insurance company.
(2) Where the vessel is in a foreign port, the Company will arrange necessary
surveys, divers and others through local representatives or agent.
(3) In case of an independent accident of the vessel only, for example, a collision
with a floating object on the high seas which causes or is likely to cause deformation
of shell plating or similar damages, the Master must survey the hull as carefully as
possible and report to the Company as soon as possible. The Company will discuss
the situation with the Classification Society in question and discuss the further
handling of the situation.
(4) In case of an accident involving liability problems between the opposing parties,
for example, a collision accident with another ship, the degree and extent of damage
of each ship must be confirmed, which generally requires surveys by fair and neutral
organizations.
(5) Deal with any surveyors coming onboard as per Article 11 Dealing with Visitors
above.

Securing seaworthiness
When the vessel enters a port after a collision, a Seaworthiness Certificate, if

required must be obtained from the classification society before departure.

If the certificate is furnished on condition that
The damage to be repaired upon arrival at XXXX,
try to have the surveyor revise the expression on the certificate to The damage to be
re-surveyed upon arrival in XXXX (or in a port on the way to XXXX) for
recommendation of necessary repairs as the first port in Japan may not always have
sufficient capability for the required repairs. In any case, the Master must
immediately send a copy of the certificate to the Company.
As a general guidance, the seaworthiness is lost by a damage opening the hull,
dented or buckled inner strength members, or a dent on the hull 50 mm or more in
depth.

Anchor & chain damage handled as GENERAL AVERAGE

When anchor and chain damage resulted from the following causes, they can
be covered by insurance as 'General Average' sacrifices loss. The Master shall
in such cases secure witness statement from external sources if Possible.
a. When the anchor and chain were damaged by Dropping in an emergency
in order to avoid an Urgent Danger such as Collision with another ship at
sea.
b. When the weather suddenly changed to extraordinary Rough Weather
while the vessel was in port and the anchor chains were cut intentionally as
an urgent measure to avoid a danger because there was not sufficient time
to heave the anchor.
c. When the Main Engine was started in order to avoid an Urgent Danger at
anchor, knowing that the anchor could be sacrificed, and consequently, the
anchor and chain were cut by an excessive force applied to them.
Damage to the anchor and chain resulting when Re-floating the stranded
vessel by making use of the holding power of the anchor. Note:
To effect the 'General Average', the anchor must have been abnormally used
for common safety. Therefore, the following cases do NOT effect the general
average.
Ex.1 As the vessel was carried away by a strong current while maneuvering
the vessel at an anchorage, it was anchored in order to avoid grounding, and
as a result, the chain was cut. (This is not regarded as an abnormal use of
the anchor)
Ex.2 An abrupt storm was encountered while anchoring and vessel tried to
shift to a safe anchorage, but the chain got entangled with an obstacle on the
seabed and could not be heaved. In order to avoid a common danger, the
chain was cut and vessel shifted to a safe anchorage. (Principle of the
general average: There can be no sacrifice of an already destroyed
substance.)
http://shipsbusiness.com/damage-of-anchor.html

LOSS OF ANCHOR
January 25, 2013 by Officer of the Watch 1 Comment

A vessel lost one anchor and four lengths of chain cable during anchor handling. During the
vessels previous drydocking, a number of chain cable lengths had been renewed on port and
starboard side, including a number of Kenter shackles (joining shackles) as found necessary,
due to wastage in excess of allowable limits. The remaining part of the anchor chain cable
lengths and Kenter shackles were at that time found to be in satisfactory condition.

One anchor and four lengths of chain cable had to be replaced, including Kenter shackles. The
probable cause of the damage was the fracture of a Kenter shackle. According to available
information, the loss of anchor and chain cable lengths was attributed to the fracture of one of
the Kenter shackles that had not been renewed in drydock.
The

intricate

shape

of

the

various

parts illustrates

how

large

forces

are

to

be

transferred through relatively small contact areas, and proper design and well machined
faces and corners are very important for the durability of such shackle.
Experience has shown that a number of anchors and chain cable lengths have been lost due to
failure of Kenter shackles, where fatigue cracks have developed from poorly designed machined
faces and corners.

In the above case it is assumed that the failure may be attributed to mishandling of the Kenter
shackle during opening/fitting operation. Since in most cases Kenter shackles on old anchor
chains are rusty/frozen, and opening up and reassembly requires the use of heating or
mechanical force, cracks are likely to develop and should result in replacement rather than reuse.
When a chain cable length is replaced due to wear and tear, the Kenter shackle(s) are normally
worn as well and should be replaced.

Lessons learned: Loss of Anchor

MARS Report No. 72
The Nautical Institute has issued MARS Report No. 72 regarding incident resulting in
loss of anchor due to heavy movements during bad weather.
A few hours after leaving port the weather conditions deteriorated and the Master reduced
speed, taking all necessary precautions for navigation in bad weather. Some time later the
weather improved and the Master had the crew check the forecastle for any damage and the
lashing and anchor stowage. All was found in order. The same day, the chief officer went
forward on safety rounds and both anchors were once again found in the proper stowage
position and secured. Later that day the weather turned bad again until the late morning of the
next day. At that time the starboard side anchor was found missing while the chain, including
the swivel and the end link, was still onboard.
What went wrong
A tongue type stopper is fitted such that the horizontal link of the chain rests on the tongue,
thus taking the weight of anchor chain and the anchor, when the anchor is fully housed. It is
believed the anchor, although lashed and secured with turnbuckle, was not fully resting on the
chain stopper. This is supported by the fact that the anchor had been found loose some time
earlier and the turnbuckle was re-tightened. If the anchor was fully housed and properly resting
on the stopper, the lashing would not have been found loose. So the anchor, hanging slightly,
was subject to heavy movements due to bad weather. This caused the pin of the D-shackle to
be lost, resulting in the loss of anchor.
After the incident, corrective action was taken such that the anchor chain was properly resting
on the stopper when the anchor was in the fully stowed position. Also, the locking pin on the Dshackle has been welded to avoid accidental release.

The anchor as secured

(Image Credit: The Nautical Institute)

http://www.safety4sea.com/lessons-learned-loss-of-anchor-18351

201372 Loss of anchor

A few hours after leaving port the weather conditions deteriorated and the Master reduced speed, taking all
necessary precautions for navigation in bad weather. Some time later the weather improved and the Master
had the crew check the forecastle for any damage and the lashing and anchor stowage. All was found in
order. The same day, the chief officer went forward on safety rounds and both anchors were once again
found in the proper stowage position and secured. Later that day the weather turned bad again until the late
morning of the next day. At that time the starboard side anchor was found missing while the chain, including
the swivel and the end link, was still onboard.
What went wrong
A tongue type stopper is fitted such that the horizontal link of the chain rests on the tongue, thus taking the
weight of anchor chain and the anchor, when the anchor is fully housed. It is believed the anchor, although
lashed and secured with turnbuckle, was not fully resting on the chain stopper. This is supported by the fact
that the anchor had been found loose some time earlier and the turnbuckle was re-tightened. If the anchor

was fully housed and properly resting on the stopper, the lashing would not have been found loose. So the
anchor, hanging slightly, was subject to heavy movements due to bad weather. This caused the pin of the Dshackle to be lost, resulting in the loss of anchor.
After the incident, corrective action was taken such that the anchor chain was properly resting on the
stopper when the anchor was in the fully stowed position. Also, the locking pin on the D-shackle has been
welded to avoid accidental release.
Editors note: While it is indeed important to have the anchor chain snug to the stopper, all other gear such
as the turnbuckles should also be snugged up so as to hold the anchor fast against the anchor pocket.

Anchor as secured

Missing starboard anchor

Comment from Mr Vilas Salukhe MNI, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia published in February 2014 issue
of Seaways
In my opinion the conclusions drawn need to be reviewed. The function of the chain chopper, whether of the
tongue type or the guillotine type, serves to stop the chain as its name implies. This stopper is to be used
when the vessel rides on the anchor. When anchored, the stopper is dropped on the chain and the locking
pin is put in place.
When the wind force increases, the stopper transfers the force on the chain to the vessels hull. This force is
not absorbed by the brake or the gear of the windlass. When the vessel is at sea, the anchor should be
housed tight against the hull with a minimum of three points of contact between the anchor shank, flukes
and the vessels hull. The anchor should then be secured with a devils claw (a two-pronged hook with
threaded spindle and wheel) and /or a lashing wire and a turnbuckle that tensions the anchor chain up
against the hull. The chain stopper does not play any part in securing the anchor tight against the hull, as it
doesnt produce any upward tension in the chain to secure the anchor. The loss of the anchor cited in this
MARS report could be due to improper contact between the anchor and the hull of the vessel which can
work the anchor loose in rough weather.

http://www.nautinst.org/en/forums/mars/mars-2013.cfm/201372

Dam Safety: Investigating

Failures of Post-Tensioned
Anchors
09/01/2009

This article has been evaluated and edited in accordance with reviews conducted
by two or more professionals who have relevant expertise. These peer reviewers
judge manuscripts for technical accuracy, usefulness, and overall importance
within the hydroelectric industry.
By Malte O. Cederstrom, Vattenfall
Vattenfall AB, Sweden's largest power producer and Europe's fifth largest,
operates 53 large hydropower plants in Sweden. The 33 terawatt-hours of
hydroelectricity generated by these plants, along with Vattenfalls nuclear power,
account for about half of the country's power production. Vattenfall places great

importance on its dam safety activities, which include research, emergency

preparedness, surveillance, safety evaluations, and system-wide programs of
safety upgrades.
Several of Vattenfall's concrete dams are stabilized with post-tensioned anchors.
Surveillance of these dams includes a regular check on the functionality of the
anchors. In 2002, a load test of anchors at the 120-MW Alvkarleby hydro project
on the Dalalven River, 170 kilometers north of Stockholm, revealed that seven of
the 78 anchors in the intake canal wall had ruptured. Diagnosing the cause of the
failures proved to be a lengthy process involving the design engineer, the
manufacturer, the installer, and laboratory specialists performing chemical and
metallurgical analysis. As a result of the investigation, Vattenfall installed a
different type of anchor throughout the facility and no longer relies on the
remaining anchors.
Installing the anchors at Alvkarleby
The Alvkarleby plant was constructed in the beginning of the 20th century and
began producing power in 1915. The original plant had five generating units and
a total capacity of 70 MW. The development included a 200-meter-long intake
canal partially blasted in rock and partially lined with concrete walls. The
concrete walls were cast in 10- to-15-meter-wide monoliths ranging in height
from 3 to 16 meters. Drainage pipes were installed in the walls, and the
expansion joints were sealed to prevent leakage.
In the late 1980s, Vattenfall added a new 50-MW unit and refurbished the old
units. To accommodate the increased turbine flow, the intake walls were raised
and reinforced. Design loads considered in raising the walls included water
pressure, uplift, ice, and load rejection. The left wall was raised about 0.6 meter,
and a 0.3-meter thickness of concrete was cast on the inside of the wall, with
reinforcement bars connecting the new concrete, old concrete, and rock.
To further stabilize the wall, Vattenfall contracted with a construction company to
install 78 36-millimeter post-tensioned anchors in holes drilled through the old
concrete and 6 to 8 meters of the underlying rock (see Figure 1). The holes were
tested for watertightness before installation of the anchors and, if leaks were
detected, were pressure-filled with grout and redrilled. After refilling the holes
with grout, the contractor fixed the anchors in the holes, grouted the 5-meter
anchoring zone, and allowed the grout to cure. The upper anchor plate was then
grouted into place and allowed to cure, and the anchor was tensioned to a force
of 720 kiloNewtons. The tension force applied to the anchors was 66 percent of
the nominal yield strength and 58 percent of the nominal ultimate strength for
the anchor material. During installation, the anchors' elongation was also
measured at various loads and compared with expected values. Before the
installation, the anchors were wrapped in a corrosion-protecting band that would
allow some movement inside the concrete. This would enable Vattenfall's dam

safety engineers to measure the actual force in each anchor in the future. Finally,
the hole was grouted and the top of the anchor was treated for corrosion
protection and capped.
Discovery and initial investigations of failures
After installation, Vattenfall established a program to sample the anchors'
performance at five-year intervals. Tests consisted of measuring the force needed
to just release the nut. In 2002, the test revealed seven broken anchors. At the
same time, the engineers realized that the anchors had been installed with
plastic caps, which needed to be replaced with steel. They also noted that the top
corrosion protection seemed to be of poor quality. Over the following two years,
three more anchors ruptured; two during a test. All of the fractures developed
less than 2 meters from the anchor's top, and most less than 1 meter from it.

The Alvkarleby hydroelectric plant has been in service since 1915. The intake canal wall
failures occurred is behind the bridge.
After the initial discovery, Vattenfall contacted the design consultant, contractor
who delivered and installed the anchors, and supplier. The installation contractor
sent two of the failed anchors to an independent metallurgical laboratory, where
they were examined microscopically and subjected to strength tests. The fracture
surfaces were corroded, making visual assessment difficult. The laboratory
reported that the fracture surface appeared both ductile and trans-crystalline and
that the fracture appeared to have been instantaneous. On one surface, a
crescent-shaped initiation point was evident. The yield point and rupture strength
in the material were 3 to 5 percent lower than the European standard values of
1,080 megapascals and 1,230 megapascals, respectively. The laboratory report
indicated that the probable cause of failure was an overload, such as a sudden
high water level.
The design consultant, who was not aware of the laboratory findings, also
suggested a sudden water level increase as a possible cause, along with ice
loading, bending of the anchor at the plate, and material weakness in the anchor
bar. Finally, the anchor supplier mentioned that welding often leads to ruptures in
this type of high-strength material.

Pursuing a better explanation

After reviewing the initial reports, Vattenfall's dam safety engineers decided a
more detailed investigation was needed in order to prevent similar incidents in
the future. The team of four engineers assigned to the investigation brought
expertise in metallurgy, concrete, design, and dam safety. In conducting the
investigation, they used Vattenfall's metallurgical and concrete laboratories in
Alvkarleby, as well as other laboratories. The investigations included chemical
and metallographic analyses, magnetic particle testing, penetrant testing,
ultrasonic inspection, impact testing, and grease analysis.
Chemical and metallographic analyses
Ruptured anchors were subjected to a chemical analysis using optical emission
spectroscopy. The analysis indicated that the constituent elements in the steel
fell within published industry standards, with the exception of a slightly lowerthan-standard manganese content. The microstructure of one of the anchors also
was studied under an optical microscope and was consistent with the chemical
analysis.
Vattenfall's laboratory staff also performed nondestructive testing on the
ruptured anchors, including ultrasonic testing of the end of the bars and dye
penetration tests and magnetic particle inspection of the surface of the ruptured
anchors. None of these tests revealed cracks in the anchors. At the same time,
laboratory staff performed a separate test of the ultrasonic method on an
intentionally cracked bar. The test showed that the method did not have the
sensitivity to detect flaws of the size believed to have initiated the ruptures.
To evaluate the brittleness of the steel and the transition temperature, the
laboratory also performed a notched-bar impact test on samples from one of the
anchors at temperatures from -10 degrees Celsius (C) to 25 degrees C. The
resulting test values were 2 to 3 Joules, much lower than the expected value of at
least 30 Joules for common construction steel alloys. The low test values indicate
a high degree of brittleness.
Grease analysis
During installation, the anchors were covered by a special anti-corrosive grease
and wrapping, in addition to the corrosion protection provided by the grout.
Oxidation of the grease would increase the amount of free acid present. Grease
samples from three failed anchors were analyzed and found to be more acidic
than a sample of unused grease provided by the supplier. However, the test
values were not consistent enough or high enough to support the theory of
embrittlement due to deterioration of the grease.
Load tests
To verify the strength tests made on small specimens in the initial phase of the
investigation, a laboratory was engaged to perform uniaxial load tests on two of
the ruptured anchors. Rupture occurred at 1,159 and 1,136 kiloNewtons, or 7 and

10 percent lower than the European standard. The characteristics of the fracture
surfaces produced during the tests were similar to those observed on the in
situfractures. On at least one of the samples, a crescent-shaped initiation zone,
similar to the in situ fractures, was visible.
Investigating a fracture surface in detail
The anchor having the fracture surface least affected by corrosion was chosen for
detailed microscopic investigation. A stereomicroscope photograph clearly
showed the crescent-shaped. 3.2-millimeter by 0.8-millimeter initiation zone, as
well as rust stains. The initiation zone showed signs of oxidation and was sharply
delineated from the remainder of the fracture surface. The sharp difference
between the initiation zone and the remaining area allowed the investigators to
rule out fatigue, which would have resulted in crack propagation lines. Failure due
to overloading would have been marked by deformation, which was not
detectable in the sample investigated. Finally, the absence of visible grain
boundaries in the area of the fracture showed that coating by brittle phases in
the grain boundaries, such as cementite or sulphide of iron, was not the cause.
A more detailed microscopic view showed significant details of the boundary
between the initiation zone and the remainder of the fracture surface. A structure
just inside the initial fracture zone contained needle-shaped separated crystals,
such as would be formed by precipitation from a liquid or gas phase.
These crystals could not have been formed during the steel manufacture process,
because the subsequent hot-rolling of the bar would destroy them. The
investigators concluded that the crystals were the result of water entering the
crack, and therefore that the crack formed after the anchor came into use.
Reviewing possible sources of failure
The various professionals queried about the failures raised several possible
explanations, including ice loading, transient water pressures due to a plant trip,
bending, and damage during welding. Vattenfall's investigative team considered
each of these but did not find a persuasive case for any of them, based on the
laboratory results and other project data. Overloads, due to either ice pressure or
plant tripping, should have left evidence in the form of deformation in the
fracture surfaces. Vattenfall also had performed calculations for ice loading and
physical model and full-scale tests for loading during a plant trip and found that
the resulting loads did not exceed the actual force of the tensioned anchors.
Regarding ice loads, at least some of the ruptures occurred during ice-free
periods. Ice formation is normally prevented in the intake canal, although no
records existed to confirm this for the period of outage for refurbishment.

Anchor bars also may be subject to bending, caused for example by an anchor
plate that is installed at an incorrect angle. However, the spherical surface of the
nuts used should have prevented bending by this mechanism. In addition, the
ruptures were too far from the nuts to support this explanation.
Welding damage also was considered an unlikely explanation, since there was no
record of welding at the time of installation. The protective wrapping should also
have protected the anchors against welding sparks, and the fractured surfaces
showed no sign of welding damage.
It was apparent that the ruptures had occurred well after the installation and
tensioning of the anchors. Generally, explanations for this type of failure could be
either fatigue or environmentally induced cracking of the material under stress.
The investigative team rejected the fatigue hypothesis because the loads acting
on the anchors did not vary significantly over time and because of the absence of
stop lines on the crack surface.
Pinpointing the cause
As a result of the investigations, particularly the investigation of the fracture
surface under a scanning electron microscope, the team concluded that the most
likely cause of the failure was environmentally assisted cracking. Environmentally
assisted cracking could be brought about by either hydrogen-induced brittleness
or stress corrosion. The hydrogen theory was based on the fact that, over time,
additives to the concrete grout develop free hydrogen, which has a high rate of
diffusion into concrete and steel. Increased hydrogen content in a high-carbon
steel could cause the steel to rupture. The time to rupture would depend on the
kind of steel, hydrogen content, and stresses. However, the grease analysis had
not shown significantly elevated levels of free hydrogen. Therefore, the
investigators believed that the anchors had not undergone prolonged exposure
to free hydrogen. Furthermore, hydrogen embrittlement would not have been
limited to the top 2 meters of the anchors, where all of the ruptures occurred.
The explanation for the ruptures finally adopted by the investigative team was
stress-induced corrosion, in combination with the high degree of brittleness of
the steel. The visible oxidation in the initiation area pointed to corrosion, and the
brittleness and relatively low steel strength explained the material's low
resistance to stress corrosion. The anchors initially had been installed with a
plastic cap to keep grease in and water out. However, the caps proved to provide
inadequate corrosion protection. Inadequate protection at the top of the anchors
might explain the location of the ruptures in the top 2 meters of each anchor.
Lessons learned from the investigations
As a result of the anchor failures and subsequent investigations, Vattenfall
installed steel cables to replace all the anchors at Alvkarleby. The remaining
anchors were left in place but were assumed ineffective in stability calculations.

Vattenfall now checks the few anchors of the same type installed in its other
dams by pulling with a jack until the nut is just released.
The investigations also brought new insights about methods of testing anchors in
dams. When the ruptures were discovered, Vattenfall was testing anchors by
measuring the actual load in a sample of anchors with a hydraulic jack. A solution
used at some other plants was to install additional test anchors in the dam, which
were used for testing but not considered in stability evaluations or design.
Vattenfall also experimented with ultrasonic testing but found in the Alvkarleby
tests that the method could not detect some small but potentially serious
fractures. Vattenfall has joined a research effort with CEATI Dam Safety Interest
Group to find new and better methods for anchor testing.
Correcting the situation
At the conclusion of the investigations, Vattenfall's dam safety engineers
recognized that the ruptured anchors should not be replaced in kind and the
remaining anchors should not be relied upon for stability. Three main alternatives
were considered for meeting safety criteria: installing new anchors and
strengthening the existing concrete; constructing supporting walls; and complete
replacement of the dam. Although there was a strong interest within the
company in alternatives that did not involve anchors, the first option was clearly
the most economical. The supporting walls were aesthetically undesirable,
particularly because the Alvkarleby plant is a tourist attraction and is known as a
facility with few negative environmental effects. There was also little space for
such supports. The cost of a complete dam replacement was much higher than
that of the other alternatives, especially considering the cost of lost generation.
Concrete test results from the investigation showed that the existing concrete in
the dam was in poor to very poor condition. The situation provided an
opportunity to apply the results of one of Vattenfall's recent research efforts. This
research project had focused on using concrete grout injections to increase the
life of aging structures. The grout composition and the specific installation
techniques used at Alvkarleby were based on lessons learned through the
research. Grout was injected into holes drilled at 1-meter intervals along the
dam. After completing the grouting, the contractor drilled holes for the new
anchors and the drill cores were saved for analysis. The analysis of the cores
showed that the grout injection had substantially improved the condition of the
concrete.
The new anchors comprised 40 steel tendons, each consisting of 12 12millimeter-diameter wires. The wires were split apart in the lowest 5 meters to
improve the anchoring. Above the anchor zone, the wires were coated in
protective grease and placed inside plastic pipes that would allow the wire to
move freely when tensioned. The anchor holes were filled with grout and the

tendons lowered into the grout. After the grout had cured, the anchors were
tensioned to 1,500 kiloNewtons.
The ruptured anchors were replaced in 2004, and the remaining new cables were
installed in 2005. Vattenfall plans to select a sample group of anchors for testing
at five-year intervals. The expected life of the new anchors is about 50 years, and
there is ample space to install new ones when needed.
Reference
Cederstrom, Malte, Per-Erik Thorsall, Bengt Hildenwall, and Stig-Bjorn Westberg,
"Incident with Loss of Seven Post-Tensioned 72 Ton Anchors in a Dam," Dam
Safety 2005 Proceedings, Association of State Dam Safety Officials, Lexington,
Ky., 2005.

http://www.hydroworld.com/articles/print/volume-17/issue-4/articles/damsafety-investigating-failures-of-post-tensioned-anchors.html