LADLAD vs COMELEC

Ladlad is composed of lesbians, gays, bisexuals or transgendered individuals.

- It applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006
- It was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial
membership base
- In 2009, it again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC
- It argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented
sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation
and gender identity
COMELEC dismissed the petition on moral grounds
- Cited Romans 1:26, 27
- ANG LADLAD collides with Art 695, 1306 of CC which defines nuisance
- Also, it stated that if the petition be granted, we will be exposing our youth to
an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith
LADLAD sought consideration, 3 commissioners voted to overturn the first resolution
while 3 other voted to deny
- The Chairman upheld the first resolution
- Filed another petition and sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary
mandatory injunction against the COMELEC
OSG was ordered to file its Comment on behalf of the COMELEC
CHR filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae
- It opined that the denial of the petition on moral grounds violated the
standards and principles of the Constitution, UDHR and the ICCPR.
COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation
WON LADLADS APPLICATION WAS VALIDLY DENIED
No. The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's application for registration on the ground that
the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it
associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what
our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters."[
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its
rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine.
Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve
or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or nonreligious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not
provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those
whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and
perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not
difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure - religious beliefs, convictions about
the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the
Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted
into the realm of law.
We also find the COMELEC's reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst
A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof
beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlad's registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest.
Equal Protection

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of

Ang Ladlad's initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the
Philippines.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration

Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor
shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never
interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC's act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other

law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different

circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG's position that
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.
We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or
differentiated treatment.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise,
international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to
bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling
with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights
norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal
systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of
conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and
promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of nondiscrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the
UDHR and the ICCPR.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general
application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or
ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee
has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include
"sexual orientation."
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility
of giving effect to the Philippines' international law obligations, the blanket invocation
of international law is not the panacea for all social ills.
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this
case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and
religious communities are divided in opinion.
The Petition is hereby GRANTED

STAR PAPER vs SIMBOL

Petitioner Star Paper is a corporation engaged in tradingprincipally of paper
products
- Ongsitco (Manager); Chua (Managing Director)
- Respondents Simbo, Comia and Estrella were all regular employees of the
company
Simbol was employed by the company in October 1993 and met Dayrit whom he
married in 1998.
- Prior to their marriage, Ongsitco advised them that should they decide to get
married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy promulgated
in 1995
- Simbol resigned (June 1998) pursuant to the policy
Comia was hired by the company in February 1997 and met Howard whom she met in
2000. Likewise, they were advised that pursuant to the company policy, one must
resign.
- Comia resigned in June 2000
Estrella was hired in July 1994 and met Zuniga, a married man, who got Estrella
pregnant. The company could have terminated her services due to immorality but she
opted to resign in December 1999.
Respondents then offered a different version of their dismissal.
- Simbol and Comia alleged that they did not resign voluntarily but were
compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy
- Estrella alleged that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuniga who
misrepresented himself as a married but separated man
o After she got pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated
o She severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal
o She met an accident and was advised to recuperate for 21 days but
when she returned to work, her name was on-hold at the gate and was
denied entry
o A memorandum stated that she was dismissed for immoral conduct
o She was not given the chance to explain; the management asked her
to write an explanation but was still dismissed
Respondents filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal,
separation pay and attorneys fees. They averred that the company policy is illegal
and contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code. They also contended that they were
dismissed due to their union membership
Labor Arbiter: dismissed for lack of merit

- Policy was decreed pursuant to management prerogative

NLRC: affirmed the decision of LA
CA: reversed NLRC
- Dismissal was illegal
WON THE COMPANY POLICY IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TOWARDS
MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY OF EMPLOYEES AND OF ART. 136 OF THE LABOR CODE
Yes. The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation protecting labor.
The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not
get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a
woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of her marriage.
It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in the
same company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy. Companies
adopt these policies to prevent the hiring of unqualified persons based on their status
as a relative, rather than upon their ability.
These policies focus upon the potential employment problems arising from the
perception of favoritism exhibited towards relatives. With more women entering the
workforce, employers are also enacting employment policies specifically prohibiting
spouses from working for the same company. We note that two types of employment
policies involve spouses: policies banning only spouses from working in the same
company (no-spouse employment policies), and those banning all immediate family
members, including spouses, from working in the same company (anti-nepotism
employment policies).
The courts that have broadly construed the term "marital status" rule that it
encompassed the identity, occupation and employment of one's spouse. They strike
down the no-spouse employment policies based on the broad legislative intent of the
state statute. They reason that the no-spouse employment policy violate the marital
status provision because it arbitrarily discriminates against all spouses of present
employees without regard to the actual effect on the individual's qualifications or work
performance.
These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the
employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than the general
perception that spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect the business.

They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational qualification invalidates
a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current employment of the other
spouse in the same office.
We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification justifies an
employer's no-spouse rule, the exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly by these
state courts. There must be a compelling business necessity for which no alternative
exists other than the discriminatory practice.
To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors:
(1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation
of the job involved; and,
(2) That there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting
the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.
We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.
It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were
found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee.
The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be
less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer
can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the
expense of an employee's right to security of tenure.
The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it
creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way
it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the
discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a
legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the
employee's right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of
married persons working together in one company.
Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business
necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management
prerogative.

YRASEGUI vs PHIL AIRLINES

Petitioner Yrasegui was a former international flight steward of PAL. He stands 5 feet
and 8 inches with a large body frame and the ideal weight is 166 lbs as mandated by
the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.
- His weight problem dates back to 1984
- He failed to meet the companys weight standards so he was prompted to a
vacation leave without pay (first- Dec.29 1984- March 4, 1985) (second- Mar.5,
1985-November 1985)
- He then met the required weight and was allowed to return to work
- His weight problem reoccurred so he again went on leave without pay from
Oct 17, 1988-February 1989
On April 26, 1989, he weighed 209 pounds (43 lbs. over his ideal weight) so he was
removed from flight duty in line with company policy
- He was formally requested to trim down his weight and report for weight checks
on several dates
- Upon weight checks, he gained more pounds so his off-duty status was retained
- He was visited by PAL Line Administrator Dizon to check on his progress but he
gained 2 more pounds from his previous weight
- He made a commitment to reduce weight in a letter addressed to cabin Crew
Group Manager Barrios
- Despite the lapse of a 90-day period given to him to reach his ideal weight, he
remained overweight.
- He was still given a month more to comply with the weight requirement but he
failed to report for weight checks
Petitioner was formally warned that repeated refusal to report for weight check would
be dealt accordingly.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge
for violation of company standards on weight requirements. He was given 10 days to
file his answer.
Petitioner submitted his Answer (December 1992)
- Did not deny being overweight
- Claimed that his violation was condoned since PAL has taken no action
regarding this case since 1988
- Also claimed that PAL discriminated against him because the company has not
been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated
A clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he was undergoing a
weight reduction program to lose weight.

June 15, 1993, he was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his
ideal weight and considering that utmost leniency was extended to him for almost 5
years, his services were considered terminated effective immediately.
Labor Arbiter: petitioner was illegally dismissed
- Weight standards are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of the
petitioner but such did not hamper the performance of his duties
NLRC: affirmed LA
- "Obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably regardless of the
amount of food intake, is a disease in itself."
- As a consequence, there can be no intentional defiance or serious misconduct
by petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight.
CA: reversed NLRC
WON PETITIONERS OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL
WON PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED
WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR
PROMOTED
The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) of the Labor
Code.
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that
they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job.
Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with
his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards.
By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and after an
employee is hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a
job applicant must initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because
an employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job in order to keep
his job.
Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that obesity is a
"physical abnormality and/or illness."
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner's claims that
obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly
shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination,
and self-discipline.

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely
transport its passengers.
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards
for cabin crew is flight safety. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have the
necessary strength to open emergency doors, the agility to attend to passengers in
cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules.
On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important
factors to consider in case of emergency.
Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. The biggest
problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding passengers
from evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call for it. Being overweight
necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds are what
cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes.
Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL were
made known to him prior to his employment. In fact, never did he question the
authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his weight. Bona fides
exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be
done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan.
Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL.
We agree with the CA that "[t]he element of discrimination came into play in this case
as a secondary position for the private respondent in order to escape the
consequence of dismissal that being overweight entailed.
There is nothing on the records which could support the finding of discriminatory
treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed
cabin attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must
be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated and the differential treatment
petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other employees.
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus
annul their findings.
The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.
Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act
"social justice," or based on "equity."
In both instances, it is required that the dismissal
(1) was not for serious misconduct; and
(2) does not reflect on the moral character of the employee.