E.

DUE PROCESS AND EMINENT DOMAIN

SOLICITOR GENERAL v AYALA LAND
600 SCRA 617, G.R. No. 177056, 18 SEPT 2009
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner that seeks the reversal and setting aside the
decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC,
which denied the motion for reconsideration of the
petitioner. The RTC ruled that the respondents Ayala
Land, Robinsons Land, Shangri-La Plaza, and SM Prime
Holdings have no obligation to provide the parking
spaces in their malls free of charge.
Senate Committee Report No. 225 (SCR 225), after a
joint investigation by the Senate Committees on Trade
and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights,
recommended that charging parking fees is against RA
7394 or the Consumer Act and against PD 1096 or the
National Building Code, and that PD 1096 should be
amended to prohibit mall operators from imposing
parking fees.
After the release of SCR 225, Respondent SM received
information that the DPWH Sec. and the local building
officials of Manila, Quezon City, and Las Pias intended
to institute, through the OSG, an action to enjoin
respondent SM Prime and similar establishments from
collecting parking fees, and to impose upon said
establishments penal sanctions under PD 1096, and its
IRR. Respondent SM filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief against the said officials. The OSG subsequently
filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief against the
respondents.
The Makati RTC consolidated the two cases and
rendered judgment in favour of the respondents. The
RTC pronounced that the National Building Code (PD
1069) does not impose that parking spaces provided by
the mall owners shall be free of charge. Parking spaces
in shopping malls are privately owned and for their use,
the mall operators collect fees. Should parking spaces
be made free, this right of mall owners shall be gone.
This, without just compensation.
Further, loss of
effective control over their property will ensue which is
frowned upon by law.
RTC: FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the Court declares
that the respondents are not obligated to provide parking
spaces in their malls for the use of their patrons or public
in general, free of charge.
CA: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
appeals are DENIED. Accordingly, appealed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in affirming the RTCs ruling
that respondents are not obliged to provide free parking
spaces to their patrons or to the public.
HELD: The Court finds no merit in the present Petition.
The explicit directive of the afore-quoted statutory and
regulatory provisions, garnered from a plain reading

thereof, is that respondents, as operators/lessors of

neighborhood shopping centers, should provide parking
and loading spaces, in accordance with the minimum
ratio of one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor
area.
There is nothing therein pertaining to the
collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by
respondents. In fact, the term parking fees cannot
even be found at all in the entire Code and its IRR.
Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and
unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without any attempt at interpretation.
From the RTC all the way to this Court, the OSG
repeatedly referred to Republic v. Gonzales and City of
Ozamis v. Lumapas to support its position that the State
has the power to regulate parking spaces to promote the
health, safety, and welfare of the public. The OSG failed
to consider the differences in the factual and legal
backgrounds of these two cases from the present case.
Both cases were on regulating parking on public
property (on streets). In City of Ozamis, the Court
authorized the collection by the City of minimal fees for
the parking of vehicles along the streets.
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that the power to
regulate and control the use, occupancy, and
maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it
the power to impose fees and, conversely, to control,
partially or, as in this case, absolutely, the imposition of
such fees. The present case does not involve public
officials to impose regulatory fees, but it is about the
imposition of parking fees by mall operators.
The OSG is actually invoking police power to justify the
regulation by the State, through the DPWH Sec. and
local building officials, of privately-owned parking
facilities, including the collection by the owners of such
facilities of parking fees from the public for the use
thereof. In totally prohibiting respondents from collecting
parking fees from the public for the use of the mall
parking facilities, the State would be acting beyond the
bounds of police power.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property
for public use, the State is no longer exercising police
power but eminent domain. The latter enables the State
to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use
upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
The State is not only requiring that respondents devote a
portion of the latters properties for use as parking
spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public
access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already
an excessive intrusion into the property rights of
respondents. Not only are they being deprived of the
right to use a portion of their properties as they wish,
they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or
even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the
maintenance and operation of the required parking
facilities.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on

Certiorari is hereby DENIED.

SPOUSES ORTEGA v CITY OF CEBU

602 SCRA 301, G.R. No. 181562-63, 02 OCT 2009
FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari filed by petitioners Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega
(Spouses Ortega) and petitioner City of Cebu (Cebu
City) assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in the similarly consolidated petition.
Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega are the owners of
a parcel of land situated in Hippodromo, Cebu City.
Approximately half of it is occupied by informal settlers.
On 24 Sept. 1990, the petitioners filed an ejectment case
against the squatters before the MTC of Cebu City,
which rendered decision in favor of the petitioner
spouses. The case eventually reached the Supreme
Court, which affirmed the decision of the MTC. The
decision of the MTC became final and executory, and a
writ of execution was issued on February 1, 1994.
On May 23, 1994, the Cebu City Council enacted City
Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to the City Mayor to
expropriate 1/2 (2,856 m2) of the petitioners land, and
appropriating for that purpose. The amount will be
charged against Continuing Appropriation, repurchase of
lots for various projects. The value of the land was
determined by the Cebu City Appraisal Committee in
Resolution No. 19 dated April 15, 1994. Pursuant to the
ordinance, the city filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain
before the Cebu RTC against the petitioner spouses.
RTC (1): On 13 March 1998, the RTC issued an order
declaring that Cebu City has the lawful right to take the
property subject of the instant case, for public use or
purpose described in the complaint upon payment of just
compensation. This allows the city to invoke the power
of eminent domain.
RTC (2): Upon recommendation of the City Assessors
Office, the RTC issued another Order dated 21 May
1999, fixing the value of the land subject to expropriation
at P11,000.00 per m2 and ordering Cebu City to pay the
petitioner spouses the sum of P31,416,000.00 as just
compensation for the expropriated portion of the
property.
The Cebu RTCs decision became final and executory
because of Cebu Citys failure to perfect an appeal on
time, and a Writ of Execution was issued on 17
September1999 to enforce the courts judgment. Upon
motion of the petitioner spouses, the RTC issued an
Order dated March 11, 2002 for execution or
garnishment.
The City filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution,
Modification of Judgment and Withdrawal of the Case,
contending that the price set by the RTC as just
compensation to be paid to the petitioner spouses

exceeds the reach of its intended beneficiaries for its

socialized housing program. The motion was denied by
the Cebu RTC. Cebu Citys Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise denied.
By virtue of the RTC order, dated 02 July 2003, the
Sheriff served a Notice of Garnishment to Philippine
Postal Bank, 2 Cebu City branches, garnishing Cebu
Citys bank deposit therein.
Cebu City filed the instant Petition for Certiorari before
the CA. Cebu City filed before the RTC a Motion to
Dissolve, Quash or Recall the Writ of Garnishment,
contending that Account No. 101-8918-334 mentioned in
Ordinance No. 1519 is not actually an existing bank
account and that the garnishment of Cebu Citys bank
account with Philippine Postal Bank was illegal, because
government funds and properties may not be seized
under writ of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgment, on obvious reason of public policy. The Cebu
RTC issued an Order dated March 8, 2004, denying said
motion. Cebu Citys Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied. The petitioner spouses filed an Ex-Parte Motion
to Direct the New Manager of Philippine Postal Bank to
Release to the Sheriff the Garnished Amount, which was
granted by the RTC. The City Government filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, but the same was denied.
CA: WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises
considered, the instant Petitions for Certiorari are hereby
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the RTC
are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE insofar as they
denied Cebu Citys Motion to Stay Execution, but they
are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as they denied Cebu
Citys Motion to Modify Judgment and Withdraw from the
Expropriation Proceedings. Furthermore, the assailed
Orders of the RTC dated March 8, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP
NO. 00147 are hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Let
the Decision of the RTC be executed in a manner
prescribed by applicable law and jurisprudence.
ISSUE: Is determining the amount of just compensation
in the exercise of the power of eminent domain a
prerogative of the judiciary?
HELD: It is well settled in jurisprudence that the
determination of just compensation is a judicial
prerogative.
The determination of just compensation in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may
not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
statue, decree, or executive order can mandate that its
own determination shall prevail over the courts findings.