/';-=09

)(8*=-0/']

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VI

VARI

um

A JOURNAL FOR MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND

THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES
REVUE CONSACRE LA PHILOSOPHIE MDIVALE ET
LA VIE INTELLECTUELLE DU MOYEN GE
ZEITSCHRIFT FR PHILOSOPHIE UND GEISTES LEBEN
IM MITTELALTER

VOLUME

11,

1973

OPorw>

VAN GORCUM - ASSEN - NETHERLANDS

Reprinted with permission of

Van Gorcum, Assen by
SWETS

& ZEITLINGER
LISSE - 1985

189.235.178.250

B.V.

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vi

vari

um
A JOURNAL FOR MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY AND
THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES
inparticular
totheprofaneside ofmediaevivarium
isdevoted
valphilosophy
andtheintellectual
lifeoftheMiddleAges.

editors

publishers
published

- L. M. de Rijk,(Leyden)
- J.Engels,
C. J.de Vogel,(Utrecht)
(Utrecht)H. A. G. Braakhuis,
(Nijmegen).
oftheEditorial
Board:Prof.L. M. de Rijk,WitteSingel
Secretary
The Netherlands.
71, Leyden,
- Assen,TheNetherlands.
VanGorcum

ca 160pagesyearly.
Twiceyearly,
MayandNovember;
tovivarium
submitted
Contributions
shouldbe written
preferably
in English,
Frenchor German.
shouldbe typeThe manuscripts
written
anddoublespaced,exceptforlongquotations
andfootnotes.Adequatemargins
(ijinch) shouldbe leftat each edge
ofthesheet.Footnotes
shouldbe numbered
continuously
throughat thefootofthepage
outeacharticle.Theymaybe placedeither
orattheendofthetext.
receive2$off-prints
free.
Contributors
REVUE CONSACRE LA PHILOSOPHIE
MDIVALE ET LA VIE INTELLECTUELLE
DU MOYEN GE
aux aspects profanes
estconsacr
toutspcialement
vivarium
etdela vieintellectuelle
dumoyen
mdivale
delaphilosophie
ge.
ZEITSCHRIFT FR PHILOSOPHIE UND GEISTESLEBEN IM MITTELALTER
denprofanenAspektendermittelaltervivarium
istbesonders
und des geistigen
lichenPhilosophie
Lebensdes Mittelalters
gewidmet.

189.235.178.250

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME XI (1973)

rpdp. orbn
Utrecht

in Theoduli
AnonymiTeutonici commentum
e
codice
Utrecht
editum(1)
U.B.
,
292
eglogam

L. M. de RijK
Leiden

The Developmentof Suppostitinaturalis in

MediaevalLogic(2)

43

j. v. brown
Univ.of Windsor
,
U.S.A

Abstractionand the Object of the Human

Intellect
toHenryofGhent
according

80

L. M. de RijK
Leiden

A Note on Aganafas(?) Thesaurusphiloso

phorum

10

JOHN M. RiST
Toronto

s Aimsin theProslogion.. .
Noteson Anselm'

109

Wilton DESMENSE MagisterWillelmus

, Regulaede mediissyllabis 119
Utrecht
e. j. ash wort h
Univ.of Waterloo
U.S.A.

TheDoctrineofExponibiliain theFifteenth
and
Sixteenth
Centuries

REVIEWS

137
168

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in Theodoli
Anonymi Teutonici commentimi
eclogam
e codice Utrecht, U.B. 22 editum (l)

RPD P. ORBN

P RAEFATIO
vertentibusTheodolicloga1 incerti auctoris, saeculi IX vel X2,
nnisad complura commenta conscribenda occasionem dedit, quae
ProfessorBettyNye Quinn recenter edisseruitet copiosa biblio.
graphiaaffecit^
In isto scripto Betty Nye Quinn septem genera commentorumin
+ eclogamcomposita distinxit,scilicet: "i. BernardusTraiectenTheodoli
sis, 2. AlexanderNeckam(?), 3. AnonymusTeutonicus, 4. Independent
commentaries, 5. Minor commentaries,6. StephanusPatringtonus
(?),
1 Quodadbibliographiam
videBetty
etfortunm
huius
ps.Theodolus.
NyeQuinn,
pertinet,
poematis
andRenaissance
Latin
and
: Mediaeval
Translations
etCommentariorum
In: Catalogus
Translationum
Lists
andGuides.
Vol.II. TheCath.Univ.ofAmerica
Annotated
Commentaries.
Press,
WashingcumBNQsignificabitur.
ton,1971,nominatim
posthac
p. 383n. 1etp. 384n..Hocstudium
memoramus
:
Adcomplendam
hanc
bibliographiam
porro
instruxit
dr.Joannes
Osternacher.
recensuit
etprolegomenis
Theoduli
prof.
Ripariae
prope
eclogam
cum"Osternacher,
Lentiam
1902"significabitur;
[= Linz],1902; hocstudium
posthac
imitatus
esse
Urfahr
locos
Theodulus
Latinos
etsacrorum
videatur.
auctores
Bibliorun'
Quos
J.Osternacher,
Lentiam,
;
1907
prope
vonUtrecht.
In: Achtzehnter
Bernhards
derTheodulhandschrift
Rekonstruktion
JahresJ.Osternacher,
bericht
Petrinum,
1915:,
Kollegium
p. 7-24;
frltere
derGesellschaft
derEcloga
In: NeuesArchiv
Theodul.
Dieberlieferung
J.Osternacher,
XL= 1915/16,
deutsche
331-376;
Geschichtskunde,
p.
" den
"Theoduli
desBernhardus
Kommentar
Gedicht
Ultraiectensis.
ber
dasmittelalterliche
clogaund
J.Frey,
zuMnster
Paulinische
dasknigliche
In:84.Jahresbericht
ber
i.W.,Mnster,
1904,
Gymnasium
p. 3-19;
EditioPrinceps.
inTheodulum.
Commentum
Bernhardts
M. Y. Jacobs,
Hill,1963;Bernardi
Chapel
critice
utipse
inTheodolum
a Professore
R. B. C. Huygens
Ultraiectensis
commentum
editum,
nobis
exeunte
anno1973praesto
refert,
erit;
deConrad
deHirsau
surThodule
etleCommentaire
surleDialogus
auctores
Notes
R. B. C. Huygens,
super
XIII= 1954,p.420-428;
deBernard
In:Latomus
d'Utrecht.
Utrecht,
Hirsau,
Conrad
auctores2.
Accessus
adauctores
R. B. C. Huygens,
, Bernard
Dialogus
super
Leiden,
1970;
LIX= 1970,p. 10-112,
In:Neophilologus
Lesnoms
dequelques
manuels
scolaires
mdivaux.
J.Engels,
Traiectensi
Bernardo
nominatim
U.B.292pererrorem
Utrecht,
ascripsit.
p. 107n. 3,quicodicem
2 VideBNQ,p.384.
3 BNQ,p. 383-408.
4 Deorthographia
videBNQ,p. 383,n. 1.
"Theodolus"
nominis
proTheodulus
I

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j. Odo Picardus"1. Secundum investigationesProfessons Betty Nye

Quinn commentumAnonymiTeutonici in duodecim codicibus traditum
est2, quorum unus in Bibliotheca universitatis Ultraiectensis sive
Traiectensis3exstat, scilicet Ms. Utrecht, U.B. 292, ff. ir-6ir. Hunc
quidem codicem edendum hic suscipimus,cuius descriptionovissimain
invenituret a nobis adhuc completur:
catalogo bibliothecaeuniversitatis4
Ms. Utrecht,Bibliotheekder Rijksuniversiteit,292.
Chartaceus, in 40, 163 ff., s. XV. Involucrumcorii vitulini cum
aerea clave. Folia membranacea quattuor integumentialia manu
scripta. In f. iv integumentihae notationesinveniuntur:Hs. 1M2,
Aevummedium.Scriptores
ecclesiast. N. 11y et - scriptorio lapide
exaratae- Kast 1 Pl. MN0. 2, T 292, quarum notae Hs. 1M2 et
Kast 1 Pl.M N. 2 ad positum huius codicis pertinent, scilicet
armarium i, tabula M, N. 2, et notae Aevummedium.Scriptores
ecclesiast.N. j et T. 292* huius codicis numeri sunt in duobus
diversis catalogis (vide infra). In f. 2r integumentihaec verba
exstant: "Pertinet ad Carthusienses extra Traiectum". F. 4 v
integumentietiam duas notas ad numroshuius codicis in catalogis
diversis (vide infra) perhibitos attinentesexhibet: N. 243.0 et
N. 282.0. Codex ipse miscellaneus, gothica cursiva, disperse
initialibus simplicibus rubris. In f. i39r tabula signorm ann.
1419-1474 continens cyclum solarem, litteras dominicales, intervallum,aureumnumerum6invenitur: cuisustabulaeconsensuannum
1419 fortasse terminm
post quem exarandi huius codicis videre
possimus.
Hie codex Ultraiectensis antequam ad bibliothecam universitatis
transient,Carthusiensimonasterioextra muros Ultraiectenses"Nieuwlicht" propriusfuit (vide supra), de quo monasteriorecentissimeDr. J.
P. Gumbertuberrimedisseruit?.Anno 1^81 bibliothecaecollegiorumet
i BNQ,p. 383.
2 BNQ,p.398-400.
3 Circaquaesti
nominis
"Traiectum"
vel"Ultraiectum"
videJ.A. Huisman,
onem
Utrecht
imMeriIn:Beitrge
zurGeschichte
derdeutschen
undLiteratur
87 = 1965/3,
garto.
Sprache
p. 381s.
^ [P.A.Tiele]Catalogus
manu
Bibliothecae
universitatis
codicum
[Utrechtscriptorum
Rheno-Trajectinae.
DenHaag,1887],
Vol.I,p.94.
s Littera
T de T.292notaestproP. A. Tiele,quivolumen
biblioprimm
supradicti
catalogi
thecae
universitatis
edidit.
6 Circahaecindicia
videH. Grotefend,
Taschenbuch
derZeitrechnung
kalendarii
mediaevalis
des
erweiterte
deutschen
Mittelalters
und
derNeuzeit.
Zehnte
vonDr.Th.Ulrich.
Auflage
herausgegeben
Handbook
C.R.Cheney,
. London,
Hannover,
i960,p. 130SS.;
forStudents
ofDates
History
ofEnglish
1970,
p.83SS.
7 DieUtrechter
im
und
Bcher
Kartuser
ihre
Diss.Teildruck.
Leiden,
frhen
fnfzehnten
Jahrhundert.
2

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monasteriorumUltraiectensium,in quibus monasteriiCarthusiensis,in

unam bibliothecam municipalem congregatae sunt: haec bibliotheca
primo constitua est in St. Catharijnekerk,Lange Nieuwstraatet anno
i 84 in St. Janskerk1.
In cuius bibliothecae municipalis primo catalogo hic codex Theodoli
numerum243 obtinuit: "Theodolus de Veritateet Falsitate.N. 243. o"2.
Saeculo duodevicesimoineunte catalogusalter componi coeptus est3, in
quo hie codex Theodoli numerum282 accepit: "Theodolus de Veritate
et Falsitate. N. 282.o "4. Posthac bibliothecae huius custodes diversi
catalogums systematicummanu scriptum composuerunt, cuius ff.
continentet f. 42 v
ecclesiasticos
30r-8rAevummedium
, Scriptores
[etrecens
cod.
chart,
hune codicem sic describit: "117:
quart. Theodulus de
veritate et falsitates. cloga c. commentario satis proliqo et glosis
interlin.". Huic inedito catalogo manu scripto denique supradictus
universitatis
Bibliothecae
Rheno-Trajectinae
Cataloguscodicummanuscriptorum
numerus
Theodoli
nostro
292 datus est.
successit,in quo codici
Hic codex 292 haec quattuoropera complectitur:
etfalsitate,cum glossisinterlinear,et commen1. Theodolus, De veritate
-6
"Notandum
i
1
Inc.
:
ff.
.
tario,
primo circa inicium"etc.6
2. Quaestionesde iure canonico
, ff. 62-121. Inc.: "Quotuplex est extur
communicacio et quot modis infligi
"Omnia
Inc.:
ff.
122-129.
,
3. Algorismus
que a primeva rerum origine
etc.8
processerunt"
, ff. 130-163V. Cum figuris.Inc.: "Cognicio
4. Computuscyrometralis
desabbayes
etprieurs.
Vol.II.Mcon,
1972.VideetL. H. Cottineau,
topo-bibliographique
Rpertoire
col.3247.
1939,
1 VideJ.F. vanSomeren,
itsbibliotheek.
enkunstschatten
Haargeschiedenis
De Utrechtscbe
Universite
deVroedschap
'omby
vr
. Utrecht,
1880
1581,besloot
1909,p. i: "... den8enNovember
nochzijnde,
deCollgien
endeConventen
omdairof
deboucken,
onder
inventaris
ofteeysschen
inde
vielhetoogop de St.Catharijnekerk
maleen'
temgen
. . . Aanvankelijk
eenbiblioteque
Februri
demaand
desjaars1^84
. . inofomstreeks
Nieuwstraat";
Lange
p. 2: . .ensmaakten.
tezien".
inhetkoorderSt.Janskerk
debibliotheek
devoldoening
gevestigd
2 Catalogus
Dreunen,
AcadeExofficina
Meinardi
Batavorum.
Bibliothecae
ectinae.
Trajecti
Uhraj
anno1670,p. 100.
miaetypographi
ordinarii,
3 VideJ.F. vanSomeren,
stuk
vandecatalogus
. . . waspasin171
., p. 38: "... heteerste
op.cit
.
gereed.
* Bibliothecae
Utrecht,
1718,
prior.
p. 457
catalogi
pars
Ultrajectinae
5 Catalogus
derUtrechtse
der
vandeBibliotheek
systematisch
ingericht.
Hogeschooly
handschriften
6 Vide[P.A.Tiele]Catalogus
universitatis
Vol.
Bibliothecae
manu
codicum
Rheno-Trajectinae.
scriptorum
I,p.947 Vide[P.A.Tiele]Catalogus
universitatis
Vol.
Bibliothecae
manu
codicum
Rheno-Trajectinae.
scriptorum
Bibliothecae
universitatis
manu
codicum
scriptorum
I, p. 94s.;[A.Hulshof-B.
Kruitwagen]
Catalogus
Vol.II,p. 39.
1909],
[Utrecht,
Rheno-Trajectinae.
- B.Kruitwagen]
8 Vide[P.A.Tiele]op.cit.,p. 9g;[A.Hulshof
op.cit.,p. 39.
3

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veritatisde pausis temporumcirca motum solis et lune" etc.1 Expl. :

"... et ergo hominessoient se aliter et aliter regere secundumquod
luna est in alio et alio signo".
In hoc codice 292 textusTheodolieclogae344 versus2complectituret
compluribus locis (vide ibidem) a textu huius Eclogae in editione
Professons Osternacher, 1902, recenso differt. Quas distinctiones
textuales Theodolieclogae in codice 292 plerumque cum Littera Odonis
Picardi3 congruere conspicuum est, quae quidem Theodolieclogaecum
commentotraditaeab AlexandroNeckm*valde affinisest.
In sua introductionebrevi AnonymusTeutonicus quattuor causas*
distinguit,scilicet materialem,formalem,efficientemet finalem.Brevitatis gratia solum duas causas pertractat: causa materialis ab auctore
huius commenti disputado6 inter falsitatemet veritatem dicitur, ad
causam efficientemautem auctor Eclogae Catho vel episcopus quidam
Atheniensis? refertur. Post causas titulus huius libri etymologice
explicatur et commemoraturpars philosophiae, ad quam hoc opus
pertinet,scilicet Ethicam.
Deinde auctor textmEclogae( "Litteram") dividit8in partemprohemialem (vv. 1-36), in qua tempus compilationisindicatur (vv. 1-2) et
personae interse disputaturaedescribuntur(vv. 3-36), scilicet Alathiaet
Pseustiscum mediatriceFronest, et in partemexecutivam(vv. 37-344)
duas distinctionesprincipalescontinentem,quarumprimadisputationem
inter Pseustim et Alathiam complectitur (vv. 37-180) et secunda
invocationemdeorum per Pseustim, invocationem Alathiae ad Deum,
procursum disputationis,deditionem Pseustios et Fronesios epilogm
(vv. 181-344). Divisione breviter designata versus Eclogae minutatim

explicantur.
Commentumcodicis 292 duplex est, consistensi in glossis interlinearibus superimpositis inter regulas textus Eclogae carptim per-

1 Vide[P.A.Tiele]op.cit.,p. 9$.
2 VideBNQ,p. 383.
3 QuodadOdonem
Picardum
videBNQ,p.404-408.
pertinet,
4VideBNQ,p. 390,404.
s Cf.BNQ,p. 398.
6 Quodadgenus
litterale
velaltercationis
inMedio
Aevopertinet,
videH.Walther,
Das
disputationis
inderlateinischen
Literatur
desMittelalters.
undUntersuchungen
zurlateinischen
Streitgedicht
Quellen
desMittelalters
V,2,Mnchen,
Philologie
1920.
7 VideBNQ,p. 384s.
8 Cf.BNQ,p.383,n.i .
9 Circa
horum
trium
nominum
videBNQ,p. 383,n.2-3.
orthographiam
propriorum
4

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tractati, 2 in commento continuo post quodque fragmentmEclogae

sequenti, cuius commentifundamentapartimglossae interlinearessunt.
Textus Eclogae in commento continuo simplicitersic explanatur,
ut Historia biblica locis ad verbumallatis ducibus summatiminnotescat
et cum Fabulis Graeco-Latinaemythologiaepaucioribus tarnenlocis ad
verbum allatis comparetur. Commentum cuiusque fragmentiEclogae
brevi summario Fabulae vel Historiae inchoatur, exinde rei veritatem
huius Fabulae dsigntet postremo interpretationeallegorica et saepe
etiam morali huius partispoematis terminatur.Interpretadoallegorica
ex una partead Christum,eius Evangeliumet sequaces, beatamvirginem
Mariam, Deum, vitamaeternamet spiritumpertinet,ex altera parte ad
diabolum, Antichristum,Iudaeos, haereticos, Vetus Testamentm,
mundumet carnem. Membra interpretationsmoralis hinc magistervel
doctor bonus, pater subtilisbonusque, scholaris1diligenslaboransbonus
fideliset virtuosus,sapientes,prudentes,bonae doctrinae, vir, virtutes
sunt, illinc discipulus vel filius inoboediens, scholaris piger malus
infidelis, rudes, invidentes prudentibus et doctrinis, peccata, vitia,
peccatores et mulier.
Hoc commentum continuum Anonymi Teutonici a Bernardi
Ultraiectensiset Odonis Picardi magis doctis et laboriosis commends
multumdifferrequilibet pertractansfacilevidebit. CommentumAnonymi Teutonici enim notae simplicisrudisque est, in quo vix ulla quaestio
theoretica, scientifica, theologica vel artis grammaticae disputatur;
genus scribendi,ut legend patebit, hoc opus evidenterad usum discipulorumnatu minorumpropositumesse ostendit2.
TEXTUS
de ventateetj alsitate
[f. ir] Theodolus
i [EJtiopum terras iam fervida torruit estas,
In cancro solis dum volvitur aureus axis.
Notandumprimo circa iniciumhuius libri quod eius suntquatuor cause,
scilicet materialisformalisefficienset finalis.De formaliet finalicausis
causa brevitatissupersedendumest. Sed causa materialissive subiectum
i Cf.BNQ,p.398.
2 Professori
maximas
in perficienda
benevolo
haceditione
J.Engels
gratias
ago,cuiusauxilio
adsidue
frui
potui.
s

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ponitur: disputacio inter veritatemet falsitatem,ut cognita veritate

abiciaturfalsitas et heresis repellatur. Causa efficienssecundum aliquos
diciturfuisseCatho et secundumalios episcopus quidam Atheniensis,et
non est vis de isto iuxta illud Senece rNon te moveat dicentisauctoritas,
sed quid dicat advertito11. Notandum quod tytulus huius libri est
, editusvel edita a quodam theologo de veritate
Incipiteglogevel Theodolus
et falsitate. Nam dicitur ab eghe, quod est "capra" et logos "sermo",
"
dicitura theos
, quod est "deus et
quasi caprinussermo2. Item Theodolus
dolos "fraus", quia libellus ille de veritatetractat,que est Deus, et de
falsitate3.Item notandumquod sciencia huius libri subordinaturEthyce,
id est Morali, quia de moribusxpistianorumtractat.Sequiturtextus4.
Accedendo igitur ad textm dividitur iste liber in partem prohemialemet excecutivam.Parsexcecutiva incipitibi : primus cretheiss.
Prima pars adhuc dividitur.Nam primo ostendittempus compilacionis
huius liberi, 2 inducit personas de veritateet falsitatedisputantes.2a
pars ibi: compuleratque6.
Primo duo versustripliciterpossuntexponi, scilicet litteralitervel
historialiteret duobus modis allegorice. Unde sensus litteralis est
quod iste libellus erat compositus, quando sol fuit in cancro, signo
Sodyaci, circa festumViti?. Et quando sol est in primispunctiscancri,
tunc servatursolsticium estivale. Et secundum hanc lecturam Littera
sic exponenda est: dum aureus axis, id est superior ascensus solis in
celo, VOLVITURin cancro, id est in ilio signo Sodyaci. iam fervida
estas, id est calor solis intensus,torruit, id est combussit,terras, id
est patrias,ethyopum, id est taliumhominumnigrorumpropterhabitacionem solis propinquam.
Item secundum primum allegoricum sensum Littera potest sic
construi: dum aureus axis solis, id est Xpistus qui est verus sol,
volvitur, id est vertitur,in cancro, id est in utero beate Marie
virginis. iam fervida estas torruit, id est convertit,terras, id est
corda terrena,ethyopum, id estpeccatorum. Unde Xpistus convenienter
dicitur axis. Nam sicud axis est instrumentumligneum, super quod
1 Mrtius
Brae.
Bracarensis
omnia
Form.
Claude
W.Barlow.
2,49s.(ed.Martini
, edidit
episcopi
opera
NewHavenLondon-Oxford,
195^0).
2 VideOdonem
= Theodolus,
cum
f.41*
Odonis
Antoine
Picardum,
commentoy
Ecloga
Picardi,
ed.M.Y.Jacobs,
27mai1491,Polain
Caillaut,
Ultraiect.,
3683,BNQ,p.405;Bernardm
p.
3 VideOdonem
f.4r.
Picardum,
4 Hoclocofortasse
duoversus
secuti
utincod.Guelferb.
212(18$Helmst.),
f.133v.
sunt,
primi
5 Versus
37.
6 Versus
3.
7 Scilicet
Kal.Iulias.
a.d.decimum
septimum
6

189.235.178.250

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ponitur pondus [f. iv] bige, ita Xpistus portavitcriminanostra, ut ibi

rVere languores nostros ipse tulit1, ergo solus torcular calcavi et de
gentibusnon eratvirmem12,dicit Ysayas. Eciam bene dicituraureus.
Nam sicud AURumpecedit cetera metalla, sic eciam Xpistushumanam
naturam.Item sicud AURumnon corrumpiturputrefaccione,ita divinitas,
.
que fuit unita carni, non corrumpebatur,ut patet primo Decretalium*
dicitur
sicud
sol
illumint
bene
ita
Eciam Xpistus
sol, quia
naturaliter,
rEratlux vera,
ubi
ut
Io.
dicitur
illumint
i,
tualiter,
spiri
patet
Xpistus
que illumintomnem hominem venientemin hunc mundum1*.Eciam
uterusMarie bene comparaturcancro. Nam CANcerest quidam piseis,
facit gressum retrogradum.Cum sol fuit in cancro, id est in ilio
signo, facitgressumretrogradum,quia tunc iterum incipit descendere.
Sic eciam Maria virgo more cancri filiumconcepii. Nam filius eius
conceptus est et incarnatusper gressumretrogradum,id est miraculose
contracommunemcursumnature. Eciam peccato res
et supernaturaliter
bene comparanturETHYOPibus,quia sicud ETHYOPessunt homines nigi
et horribilemprebent videntibusaspectum, sic eciam peccatores denigrati labe peccati.
Item secundum alium sensum allegoricum sic potest exponi.
dum aureus axis, id est bona doctrina vel lex solis, id est Xpisti,
volvitur, id est vertitur,in cancro, id est gressu retrogrado,scilicet
. fervida estas, id est fervida sectahereticorum,
ante NovumTestamentm
TORRUIT,id est pervertit,terras, id est corda, ethyopum, id est
hominum nigrorum per peccatum, supple falsam informacionem.
Sequitur compuleratque suas.
amenitates
amena capellas
sub
suas
3 Compuleratque
tylie
erat
scilicet
quidam
Natus ab Athenis pastor
cognomine Pseustis.
abutraque
abscondit
idesttalisanimalis
parte
pulchri
cui corpusa texit utrimque
Pellis pantere
elevatas penetravit
colorata erectasy
colore
vario
et rgidas
Discolor
perflavit fistula buccas
idestminaverat

1 Is. SA'
2 Is.63,3.
3 VideDecretales
Tri
iuris
canonici
IX, Lib.I, Tit.I, Desumma
, II,
aitate,
cap.i (ed.Corpus
Gregorii
col.;).
1881],
[Leipzig,
Joh.
1,9.
a. cuicorpusOdoPicardus,
1902.
f.6r; corpuscuiOsternacher
7

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00:13:29 AM

scissuras
sonum
Emittens sonitum per mille foramina vocum.
remote
nutriebat
nonmultum
quendam
uvium
Ad fontem
iuxta
pascebat oves Alathia, [f. 2r]
, stirpe
progenie
pulchra valde
de
David
decora
nimis
semine
regis
Virgo
scilicet
aquam
regis
habens cytharam fluvii percussit ad undam.
Cuius
ad modum
steterat
stagni
fluvius tanta dulcedine captus
Substiterat
dulciter
canentis melodiam repercussorii
propendendo
Auscultando quasi modulantis
carmina plectri
ovium
Ipseque balantum grex obliviscitur esum.
Hic autor consequenter describit personas et dividitur, quia primo
describit personam pro falsitatedisputantem, 2 describit personam
pro veritate disputantemibi ad fontem iuxta. Et dicit quod pastor
quidam erat nomine pseustis natus ab athenis, cuius corpus erat
talis animalis. Qui pastor minavit et
tectum pelle panthere, i.
duxit capras suas sub AMENitateTYLiE et habens quandam fistulaiti
perflavit earnbuccis suis emittens sonum per mille foramina. Tunc
ibi ad fontem describensperque disputantempro ventate dicit quod
non multum remote a predicto PASTORe iuxta fontem quendam
custodivit quedam virgo valde pulchra oves suas, cuius nomen erat
alathia, que nata fuit de semine david regis. sta virgo HABuit
cytharam, quam PERCUtiens ad aquam fluvii stetit fluvius ad
modum stagniauscultando melodyamCYTHARe. Similiteroves, quas
virgo ista custodivit, pre nimia dulcedine CYTHARepastum suum
OBLiviscebanTUR.
Pro sensu allegorico huius Fabule notandum quod iste persone
disputantesbene comparanturPASTORibus,quia PASTOResfrequenter
contenduntet verbisdisputacionesmultiplicandEt per istumPASTORem
PSEUSTimallegqrice possimusintelligeredyabolumvel falsumpredicatorem. pseustis enim interpretatur"falsitas"vel "stansin falsitate".Que
interpretacio competit dyabolo et falsis predicatoribus. Iste pastor
pseustis, i. dyabolus, natus est ab athenis, i. ab immortalitate.
athenis enim interpretatur"immortalisi. Dyabolus est immortalisita
quod numquam moritur, i. numquam cesst temptarebonos homines
et falsissuis suggescionibusinvadere. Corpus istius dyaboli tectum est
8

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00:13:29 AM

circumquaque pelle panthere, nam sicud pellis panthere. i.

talis animalis pulchri, diversis coloribus est colorata, sic dyabolus
Habens diversos colores decipiendi homines, ipsis immittens varias
suggesciones diversis coloribus coloratas. Iste inquam dyabolus vel
pseustis minat CAPrAS,i. peccatores seducit, qui bene comparantur
CAPris.Nam ut CAPrA[f. 2V] est animal inter cetera ammalia fetidissisub
mum, ita fetentin conspectu Dei peccatores. Minat autem CAPrAS
AMENitatesTYLiE. TYLia enim est arbor valde pulchra, habens muitos
floreset nullum fructumproducens. Sic pseustis, i. dyabolus vel falsus
predicator,falsitatedisputt,que falsitasnullumfructumgeritet dulor
ei inesse videtur.Iste enim pseustis emittit verba per mille
ymaginarius
foramina FiSTULeet socios suos et falsospredicatoresper mille, i. per
varias mundi regiones ad decipiendum. Item per istamviRGinem,que
ALATHiA
vocatur, possumus intelligerecatholicam ecclesiam. Ilia enim
ALATHiA
vocatur, i. alens nos in doctriniset scienciis et virtute. Nam
tur. sta virgo NATa est ex strirpe david
ALATHiA"veritas"interpreta
regis. Est enim sancta mater ecclesia filiamagni david, i. Xpisti. Ista
predicta virgo custodii vel pascit oves, i. simplices homines, iuxta
FLUVium,i. in mundo, qui frequenterfluctutsicud aqua FLUvialis.
Item ista virgo habe cytharam, i. decernprecepta Dei. Nam cythara
musicum habens decern cordas principales,per quas
est instrumentum
EMirrit
decern precepta
predicatores ad predicandum fidelibushominibus decern precepta. Item iste fluvius captus dulcedine cytharc
stat auscultando melodyam eius, i. homines audientes DULCEDiNEm
cordarum,i. decern preceptorum,tandem auscultan eorum dulceDiNEm, et oves OBLiviscunTUResum, i. homines postponuntvanitates
huius mundi.
rancore ire
commotus
sustinuerat
doloris
felle
sed
motus
Non
tulerat
Pseustis,
14
montculosecurus
Littoris alterius proclamat ab aggere tutus.
nonpotentibus
sc.ovibus
luds
obquam
causam
respndete
fatuissima
"Cur
, Alathia, canis rebus stultissima mutis?
sc.sittibpossibilitas
victoriam
delectat
disputare
optineas
certare
mecum
Si iuvat , ut vincas
,
po testas esta :

8TOsternacher
a. estom.OdoPicardus,/.
, 1902.
9

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00:13:29 AM

veniat
possessionem
Fistola nostra tuum, si vincas, sedata in usum ;
sc.Alathia
sc.tuam
conveniamus similem
superata
dabis cytharam ; legem coeamus in equam".
Vieta
Hie autor ostenditquomodo pseustis invehitcontra alathiaiti dicens:
PSEUSTISvidens alathiaiti tam dulciter ovibus suis predicare et
muitos homines ab antiqua lege ad [f. 3r] novam revocare, alta voce
dolendo CLAMAbaTstans ab una parte fluvii et dixit "O stultissima
alathia, quare canis et predicas rebus mutis et simplicibus, non
potentibus tibi respondere? s enim te delectat honorem reportareet
optinere vietoriam, prepara te ad disputandum mecum. Ego enim
potero tibi respondere. Edam honestum est, ut istam condicionem
inEAMUSquod si tu vinas me, fistola mea cedat in usum tuum et ego
dimittameam sequendo legem tuam.si autem victa fueris,consimiliter
cytharam tuam dimittassequendo legem meam".
Notandum quod moraliteret allegorice per PSEUSTimsic invehentem contra alathiaiti virgunculam simplicem possumus intelligere
falsosreprehensores,qui audientesbonas doctrinasprudenciuminvident
eis. Et quanto rudiores sunt tales reprehensores,tanto plus invehunt
contra sapientes. Contra quos dicitur rSciencia non habet inimicum,
1. Item autor innuitistamdoctrinam,
nisi ignorantem1
quod nullusvolens
cum
de
alio
facili
irasci
licet
audiat
debet,
disputare
inepta ab alio, sed
morose procedere debet, linde Propheta rIrasciminiet nolitepeccare"!2.
Item Metrista rNon est prudentiscito per verbulagentis perdere vim
mentis,sed talia tradereventisi.
Sequitur [textusp:
se.Alathiarespondet
verba
tua ad iram
velcommovent
provocant
20 Illa
refert : "Nec dicta movent
, nec
muera mitigant
velalliciunt
premia mulcent
1 Cf.H. Walther,
= Proverbia
Proverbia
latinitatis
medii
aevi.Lateinische
und
sententiaeque
Sprichwrter
Sentenzen
desMittelalters
inalphabetischer
IV,275-906.
Anordnung.
[Vol.I-V,Gttingen,
1963-1967],
2 Ps.4,; Eph.
4,26.
3 Cf.H. Walther,
= Lateinische
Proverbia
Lateinische
, III,17699;J.Werner,
Sprichwrter
Sprichwrter
und
desMittelalters
ausHandschriften
Sinnsprche
19662,
gesammelt.
Heidelberg,
p. 79,168.
siVINCAS
CEDAT
OdoPicarduSyf.
Osternacher
8r;cedetsivincis
, 1902.
b om.cod.;textus
vide
e.g.cod.,
f. 4V.
IO

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00:13:29 AM

interimquantum
sc.Aathiam
pena
ajcior
Me
tua nunc adeo , quamavulnere mordeor uno :
vertatur
fidedignus
disputado
cadatb
nisi
testis0
sedulus
,
Quo res
cumque
sc. nostre
disputacioni
assit,
sc.tePseustimrecognoscis
sc.Alathiam
fateris.
vicisse
Si victus fueris, non me
Hic ostenditquomodo AlathiaresponditPseusti dicens:
"O Pseustis, NEC blandimentatua nec muera tua mitigantme,
ut deviam a via veritatis in erroremtuum. Verumtarnenmordior uno
vulnere, scilicet si contingatnos invicemdisputare,qualiter disputado
finiaturvel materiase habeat, si victus fueris, non recognosceste esse
victum, nisi disputacioninostre testis vel mediator assit sollicitus".
Nota quod autor innuitduo documenta. Primmest quod propter
blandimenta nemo mutabit constanciam, sed diligenter perseverabit
usque in finem,iuxta illud Apostoli rQui perseveraveritin finem,salvus
eri11.Item Boecius rRerum exitus finismetitur"12.Secundum est quod
nullus propter muera vel blandimentaa via veritatisdeclinabit aut a
iusticia. linde rIustusut palma florebitin domo Domini"^.
Item notandum quod per Alathiam sic respondentemintelligere
possumus sanctam matrem ecclesiam, que constans est in fide nec
mutabilispropteraliqua blandimentavel muera, [f. 3V]
iudicium veritatis
variar
i
mutari nescit sentencia verid,
is
auferre se.greg
pecudes
calorem
et
relevare
simul
gregem,
mediatricesc.disputantibus
resideat
nobis."
Nostra venit Fronesis; sedeat pro iudice
fortuna transmisit
cognosco
respondit
eam
sors
Pseustis ad hec 2 "Video
optulit
quod
velvoluntrie
sponte
ultro.
1 Mat.10,22
24,13.
2 Boethius,
Cons.
II,Pr.1,47.
3 Ps.9I,I3S.
quoniam
"Sed
24
quia
ecce vadare
En
adaquare

a QUAM
OdoPicarduSyf.
8V;quiaOstemacher
, 1902.
b aditOdoPicar
dus
. f.8v Ostemacher
, 1902.
c nisitestis
nisiOstemacher
OdoPicardus,
, 1902.
f. 8V;testis
d veriOdoPicarduSyf.
Ostemacher
, 1902.
9T;COEPTI
II

189.235.178.250

00:13:29 AM

sc.pronostra
veni
disputacione
hora diei,
Hue ades, o Fro nesi, nam sufficit
nostreamittas
negocia disputacioni
Ut tua iam nostro postponas seria ludo".
Hic autor consequentertangitpersonammediatriceminter PSEUSTimet
Alathiamdicens:
Alathia volens inducere personam mediatricem alloquebatur sic
PSEUSTim"O PSEUSTIS,quia sentencia veritatisnon querit mutari nec
abscondi, quia Veritas non querit angulum, viDEas ergo iam mater
Vel Vadareet RELEVANOSTRAFRONESISVENITGREGEMSUUmADAQUARE
RE CALOREMgregs per aquam. Igitur si placeat tibi quod ipsa esset
mediatrix in nostra disputacione, ut nemo nostrum possit negare
victoriam alterius. .
Super quibus pseustis respondit"O Alathia,iam
video quod fortunanobis sponte istamFRONESimdestinavit".Et statim
hiis dictis pseustis se vertebatad FRONESimdicens "O fronesis, bene
venias; supplico tibi, ut assisnostredisputacioni,quia una hora diei pro
nostradisputacionenobis sufficit", quasi sic diceret "In brevi tempore
devincamAlathiam,quia iuvenis et simplex virguneulaest".
Notandumquod allegorice per istamFRONESimintelligerepossumus
veramsapienciam,que Xpistusest, ut dicit Apostolus1. Sed per Alathiam
allegorice possumus intelligere prophetas et fideles, qui proclamaveruntet adhuc proclamantad istam FRONESim,i. sapienciam, scilicet
Xpistum, adventm suum cum magno gaudio exspectantes. sta enim
fronesis, puta sapiencia patris, venit adaquare vel vadare gregem
suum in aqua, scilicet in fontebaptismi,sieud dicit in Euvangelio rNisi
quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu saneto, non intrabit regnum
celorum"12.Item Apostolus rIte in orbem universum baptisantes in
nominepatriset filiiet spiritussancii-^. Hec eciam fronesis, i. sapiencia
patris, venit CALOREM,i. ardorem Inferni,relevare, quia a tempore
primorum parentum usque ad mortem Xpisti tam fideles quam infideles ad Infernadescenderunt. Sed ista fronesis, i. sapiencia patris,
puta Xpistus, per suam personam RELEVAvitcalorem, i. ardorem
ovium, i. fidelium,quos a morteperpetualiberavit.Hec eciam sapiencia
[f. 4rl patris, i. Xpistus, erat illa fronesis, que fuitmediatrixhumni
generis et patris in divinis et iudicatrix, quia ipse Xpistus veniet in
novissimo die iudicare vivos et mortuos. Item per PSEUSTimpossumus
1 Cf.i Cor.1,24.30.
2 Joh.
3
3 Mat.28,19.
12

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00:13:29 AM

intelligere dyabolum, scilicet Luciferum et sequaces suos, qui dixit

"Ponam sedem meam in aquilonem et ero similis Altissimo"1,propter
deiectus est.
quod in profundssima
i. iliamediatrix
licet
Tunc
mater
Fronesis
:
me
30
"Adaquato
grege quamvis
festinare
precepisset
Accelerare domum iussisset uterque parentum,
esitem puniciones aliquantulum
exspectato
Nona dubitem penas
, si quicquam tardo
, paratas,
letanter
sustinebo
sc.penasexspectans leticias vestre
disputacionis
Leta feram talesb presumens gaudia
litis."
Hie autor ostenditquomodo persona mediatrix,puta fronesis, exhibuit
se benivolam ad istam disputacionemaudiendam. Et est sentenciaquod
fronesis acquiescens precibus utriusque, scilicet tam Pseustis quam
Alathie, alloquitur utramque personam dicens "O Pseustis et Alathia,
ego fronesis verba eleccionis vestre intellexi, scilicet quomodo me
mediatricemet iudicatricemelegistis.Igiturpro nunc precibusvestriset
eleccioni acquiescam, licet PARENTesmei volueruntme redire et statim
grege adaquato ad domum festinare.Attamennon dubito de hoc,
quin si quicquam TARDavero,penAmsatisgravemincurran!.Illamtamen
libens et LETAnssustineam,quia expecto gaudia vestrelitis".
Notandum quod innuitur talis doctrina quod quilibet bonus et
fidelis licet fuerit occupatus in aliquo arduo negocio, si videat alios
discordare, pacificabiteos. Nam in preceptis Decalogi diciturrDiliges
proximumtuumsicut te ipsum12.Item allegorice per istamFRONESimut
supra intelligitursapiencia patris, que est Xpistus Iesus, qui venit in
hunc mundum,ut esset mediator interpatrem suum et mundum,inter
ecclesiam et heresim. Que quidem sapiencia patris, scilicet Xpistus,
proposuit quod post ADAQUAcionemgregs, i. post redempcionem
ovium suarum, rediret ad patrem suum, unde venerat, ut ipsemet
testaturin Euvangelio dicens "Veni a patre et iterum vado ad eum"3.
Super quo dicit Propheta rEgo dormivi et soporatussum et exsurrexi,
1 Cf.Is.14,13s.
2 Mat.19,19.
3 C.Joh.
16,28.
a nonOdoPicardus
Osternacher
, 1902.
,f.10r;NEC
b talisOdoPicardus
autem
interiore
innostro
, /902.Rima
, sc.talis-litis,
,f 10rOsternacher
neglecta
TALES
codice
invenitur.
IB

189.235.178.250

00:13:29 AM

quia Dominus suscepit me11. Item Psalmista rA summo celo egressio

eius et occursus eius usque ad summum eius"12.Item hec sapiencia
patris, puta Xpistus, PRESUMpsitet expectavit gaudia litis sustinens
lete penas, quia ipse, ut patetper Apotolm,rVelutovis ad occisionem
ductusest13 non recalcitrans,sed LETesustinensamarissimampenAmpro
naturahumana.Unde ipse maximamcaritatemet dileccionem habuit ad
homines, ut dicit in Euvangelio "Maiorem caritatemnemo habuit, ut
animam suam", i. vitam [f. 4V] suam, "ponat pro amicis suis"*. Ipse
enim bene PRESUMpsitgaudia litis, nam non DUBiTavitde victoria
futura.Unde Propheta rIn te, Domine, speravi, non confundarin eternum"|5.Item rNon timebo milia populi circumdantisme"16.Hec eciam
sapiencia, puta Xpistus, non DUBiTabatpenas, si quicquam TARDasset,
quia si ipse TARDassetita quod non venissetin mundum,nobis parata
fuissetmaxima pena, scilicet dampnacio sempiterna.
sc.es vir
sc.Alathiasequenti
primus
argue
34 "Perge prior, Pseusti, quia masculus ; ilia
sequaci
disputadovestra
procedei ordine quaternarius
sita in ordine vestro,
Equabit studio. Tetras
et
illiusphilosophi
diem
prolong
rogo
numerus.
Sol
,
obsecro,
augeat
Pitagore
tempus".
Hic ostenditautor que persona habebit locum proponendi et arguendi
primum,dicens quod Fronesismediatrixvolens dare persone disputanti
pro falsitateprimumlocum proponendisic dixit"O pseustis, quia tu es
vir, primo proponas Alathie et ipsa respondebittibi". Deinde precepit
quod uterque in sua disputacione procedere debet metrice secundum
NUMERumquaternarium,qui vocatur pitagorcus eo quod PiTAGORas
ille philosophus aut musicus una vice transiensiuxta quendam fluvium
audivittres mallios fabrilesdiscordare. Qui rogavit4m malliumapponi,
ut fieret concordancia?. Tunc Fronesis supplicai, ut sol velit diem
1 Ps.3,6.
2 Ps.18,7.
3 Act.
Ap.8,32,-cf.Is.1,7.
4 Ci.Joh.
15,13.
5 Ps.30,270,i.
0 ft.3,7.
7 VideMacr.
f.iov.
Somn.
Picardum,
Scip.2,1,9ss.; Odonem
a TETRAS
SITOdoPicardus
, 1902.
,/. 10V;sittetrasOsternacher
H

189.235.178.250

00:13:29 AM

prolongare,sicut rogavit Karolus rex1 prolongaridiem contra infideles,

et prolongatusfuit.
Notandum quod moraliterpseustis merito primmlocum proponendi tenebit, quia masculus fuit: modo masculus dignior est
femella, quia rvir est caput mulieris12,ut patet in Decretis.Eciam vir
. Item notandumquod per
prior erat muliere, ut probaturprimo Genesis
in
Littera
de
NUMERumquaternarium, quo
dicitur,quatuor Euvangeliste
lex
sub
quibus
Euvangelica pendet. Ipsi enim docent
intelliguntur,
omnem veritatem,ut dicit Apostolus3.
Item nota quod per hoc quod persone falsitatis,puta pseusti, datur
primuslocus proponendi,allegorice intelligiturquod antequam lex erat
Euvangelica, vita tenebrarumviguit super terram. Item antequam lux
4. Ergo persone teneesset, tenebre fuerunt, ut patet primo Genesis
Fronesis OBSECRat
Item
debetur
locus.
brarum, puta pseusti,
primus
diem prolongari,i. sapiencia patris,que Xpistusest, OBSECRat,ut sol, i.
pater in divinis,prolongetnobis diem, i. tempus et spacium penitencie
et post hanc vitam tempus eterne leticie.
Sequitur textus [f. T]:
illerex
Crethensibus
regionibus
primo
Saturnus venit* ab oris
s
Cretheis
37 [P] rimu
mundum
universumordinans
Aurea per cunetas disponens scula terras,
velpater
sc.hominum prodecessorb
nec quisquam tempore maior.
ei
Nullus
genitor
generosa propago.
Ipso gaudet avo [superum]0
Hic est 2a pars principalis, in qua autor ostendit quomodo Pseustis
primo proponit argumentumsuum, et bipartiturLittera. Nam primo
facitquod dictumest, 2 ostenditquomodo Pseustisvidensse non posse
evadere, dat se victumibi: egregiam sobolem*.
1 VidePs.-Turp.
ouchronique
etRotholandi
Karoli
Historia
XXVI(ed.C. MeredithHist.
Magni
Jones,
etpublis
revus
Textes
duPseudo-Turpin.
Paris,
1936,
49manuscrits.
p. 208s.).
d'aprs
2 Gratiani
col.124).
decretum
I,[Leipzig,
citata,
1879],
V,cap.13(editio
XXXIII,
II,Causa
Quaest.
3 Cf.Col.i ,; Gai.2,.14.
4Gen.1,2.
5 Versus
333.
a SATURNUS
SATURNUS
Osternacher
11T;VENIT
VENIT
OdoPicardusyf.
, 1902.
b prodecessor,
andIrish
Sources
British
Latin
WordList
Medieval
vide
Revised
, prepared
byR.E.
from
s.v.prodecessor.
Latham.
, I96$y
London-Oxford
c superum
cod.
OdoPicardus,
, 1902; suberunt
f. 1lr Osternacher

189.235.178.250

00:13:29 AM

Primo dicit sic quod Pseustis incipiens a primo homine sue legis,
puta saturno, sic ayt "saturnus primus hominum venit a regione
CRETHEnsigubernanstotum SECULumAUREumet in bono statu disponens terras, quem nullus precessit genitor nec postea in mundum
venit maior eo, quare nobilis successio hominum et deorum merito
congratulatur".
Notandum quod autor in hiis versibusinnuitistam Fabulam, quam
1 rcitt, saturnus fuit
eciam Ysidorus in 8V0 Ethiniologiarum
rorigo
2, cui unavice in
deorum"1
sompnoapparut quod ipse geniturusessetunum
filium, qui expelleret ipsum a regno suo. Quare saturnus precepit
uxori sue, que vocabatr Obs, quod ipsa quidquid pareret, presentaret
sibi. Uxor vero primo peperit Neptunum,quem videns saturnus misit
in mare, et sic factus est deus aquarum. 2 peperit Plutonem, quem
videnssaturnus sepelivitin terram,et factusest deus Inferni.30 autem
peperit lovem, qui natus arrisitmatri sic quod ipsa piette mota misit
lovem ad nutriendumsecrete et dixit saturno se peperisse lapidem
albescum, qui diciturgadir, quem saturnus devoravit.Iupitercrevitin
virumet factusvir surrexitin patremauferendotestculos eius. Quibus
proiectis in mare de spuma eorum nata est Affrodita,dea pulcherrima:
afjrosenim Grece, Latine dicitur "spuma"*.Que dea alio nomine Venus
dicitur. Iupiter patrem suum a regno expellebat, qui expulsus fugitin
Ytaliams.
Nota quod rei Veritashuius Fabule est quod saturnus fuit rex
crete. Nam creta est quedam provincia Grecie, ut dicit Ysidorus 8V0
, a qua provinciasaturnus fuitexpulsus a filiosuo love.
Ethimologiarum6
Quo expulso Iupiter rexit CRETam.
Item notandumquod sensus allegoricusuno modo potest dari. Iste
saturnus fuit rorigo deorum"1?,i. saturnus est summusplanetarum,
qui planete a gentilibuspro diis adorantur. Iste saturnus habet tres
filios, scilicet Plutonem lovem etcetera, [f. v] i. saturnus planeta
omnibus orbibus planetaruminferioribusse suam influenciaminfundi
t.
Item Iupiter expellebat SATURNumetcetera, i. Iupiter planeta influenciam saturn frugifactivamet mortificativamobtemperai. Nota
1 Et.8,1i,3oss.
2 Isid.Et.8,11,30.
3 VideHyg.Fab.139,1.2;
Vat.III,i,io.
Fulg.Mit.1,2;Mythogr.
Cf.Isid.Et.8,11,76.
s VideOv.Fasti
i,23jss.
6 VideEt.14,6,1$.
7 Isid.Et.8,11,30.
l6

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secundumYsidorum1stella saturn est maxime frigida,quia remotissima est a sole, qui est fonstocius caloris.
Vel per SATURNumallegorice possumus intelligere tempus antiquum. Nam Saturnus dicitur quasi "saturannus"2. Tempus enim annis
saturatur. Et per lovem intelligimustempusgracie. Iupiterergo expellei. tempusgracieammovittempusantiquum.Et saturnus
bat SATURNum,
devoravitlapidem, i. antiquumtempusomnia devoravit,quia omne tam
fidelesquam infidelesad Infernadescenderunt.
Item per SATURNum optime possumus intelligere patrem in
divinis, qui tres habuit filios sub tribus temporibus. Quorum primus
missus est ad aquas, scilicet Noe, qui tempore diluvii, quod erat ante
tempus legis, reservatus est miseracione divina in aquis. 2US filius
missusest ad terramscilicet Pluto, i. Moyses temporelegis missusest in
mundumad gubernandumpopulum Dei. 3USvero filiusfuitCristus,qui
natusarrisitmatri,scilicet gloriosissimevirginiMarie, que mota piette
misitipsum ad nutriendum,scilicet in Egiptum,qui postea reversusest
a manu Pharaonis ad Iudeam. Tandem ascendit super omnes celos
regnaturusin scula seculorum.
delectabili
Adam
inhabitator
in
viridi
homo
fuit
41 Incola
paradyso,
primus
noxialem
devipera quousqueconsulente i. pomum
sc.Eva
venenum
suadente
donee
,
Coniuge viperium
cumilio istigeneri
humano
veneno
propinandopociones mortalitatis
gustavit
miscendo pocula mortis.
cunctis
Hausit eo
et
commiserunt
se.primit
s. Adam
veldeliquereEva
diemtotaposteritas
sc.presentem
Sentit adhuc
, quod commisere parentes.
proles
Hic Alathia volens incipere a primo HOMine sue ipsius legis, scilicet
A.dam,ponit Historiam correspondentemfabule Pseustis in precedenti
. In primo
parte posite. Et ostenditHistoria talis, ut patet primo Genesis
rDeus creavit celum et terram"1
3, mare et omnia, que in eis sunt, et
muitosangelos, interquos unum excellentissimumtam in pulchritudine
quam in agnicione nomine Lucifer*,i. lucem ferenss.Qui quadam vice
1 VideEt.s,30,7,-cf.Mythogr.
f.nv.
Vat.III,1,4;OdoPicardus,
2 Cf.Varr.
L.L.>64;Isid.Et.8,11,30.
3 Gen.1,1.
4 VideIs.14,12-15;
scholastica
, Lib.Gen.,
12,8s.;Petr.Com.Historia
cap.21(PL198,col.
Apoc.
1072).
5 Cf.Isid.Et.3,71,18.
17

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videns in speculo Trinitatisquod quedam creatura, que a Deo coniungeretur,nascituraesset, crediditquod ipse utique esset illa, ex quo tam
formosus erat pre aliis, et statimsuperbiensdixit ad se ipsum "Ponam
sedem meam in aquilonem et ero similisAltissimo"1. Quod cum dixisset,
eiectus est in Infernumet factusest nigerrimus.Dominus autem volens
lapsum recuperare et ilium locum replere, unde eiectus erat, dixit ad
suam Trinitatem "Faciamushominemad ymaginemnostram2,et inspiramus in eum spiraculum vite^". Et factus est Adam rde limo terre"1*.
Quo facto dixit Dominus rNon est bonum hominem esse solum.
Faciamus ei adiutorium similem sibfs. Et misit Deus sompnum in
t. Quam presentans
Adam accipiendo unam costem, unde Evam formavi
Ac ille respondens
vocabitur
ista?"
dixit
Ade
"O
Adam, quomodo
[f. 6r]
dixit "Domine, virago"6, quasi de viro acta?, factavel sumpta8,rquamobrem relinquet homo patrem et matrem et adherebit uxori sue et
9. Isto facto duxit eos in paradysumet
erunt duo, sed in carne unum"1
dixit ""Cresciteet multiplicaminiet repleteterram110. Et deditlicenciam
eis commedendi de quolibet fructu paradysi preterquam de fructu
arboris rseiende boni et mali111,dicens "Quandocumque gustaveritisde
fructusciencie mali et boni, mortimoriemini"12.Dyabolusautemvidens
hominempossidere locum, unde erat eiectus, commotuslivore mutavit
se in serpentemet accedens Evam dixit rCur precepitvobis Deus, ut non
3 Cui Eva respondit"De fructu
commederetisde omnifructuparadysi?"11
arborissciencie boni et mali non gustabimus,ne fortemoriamur"1*.Cui
serpens "Nequaquam morte moriemini,si commederitisde hoc fructu,
sed scietisbonum et malum sicut Dominus vesterns. Quod audiens Eva
statim abstraxit pomum et commedit. Similiter fecit virm suum
commedere de eodem. Et statim cognoverunt se stare nudos pomo
1 Cf.Is. 14,13s.
2 Cf.Gen.1,26.
3 Cf.Gen.2,7.
*
Gen.2,7.
s Gen.2,18.
6 Cf.Gen.2,23.
7 VidePetr.Com.Historia
Lib.Gen.,
scholastica,
cap.i8 (PL 198,col.1070).
8 VideGen.2,23.
9 Gen.2,24.
10Gen.1,28.
11Gen.2,17.
12Cf.Gen.2,17.
13Gen.3,1.
14Cf.Gen.3,3.
15Cf.Gen.3,4s.
I8

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gustato. Et consuentes perizomata de foliis arboris texeruntse. Tunc

postea Deus ambulans post meridiem in paradysovocavit Adam dicens
rAdam,ubi es tu?11 Qui respondensdixit rVocem tuam audivi et timui
eo quod nudus essem et abscondi me"12.Cui Deus rQuis enim indicavit
tibi quod nudus esses, nisi quod de ligno, de quo preceperam tibi ne
commederes, commedisti?"3. Respondit Adam "Domine, mulier quam
dedisti mihi sociam, me decepit"*. Dixit autem ad mulierem rQuare
fecisti?1*.Que respondensdixit rSerpensme decepit16. Et ayt Dominus
ad serpentemrQuia fecistihoc, maledictuseris interomnia animanciaet
bestias terre, et terram commedas cunctis diebus vite tue"1
7. Deinde
dixit mulieri rMultiplicaboerumpnastuas et in dolore paries filios tuos
et eris sub potestateviri et ipse dominabiturtui18.Dixit autem Dominus
Ade rQuia audivistivocem uxoris tue, maledictaerit terrain opere tuo,
in laboribus commedes cunctis diebus vite tue earn, spinas et tribuios
germinabittibi et in sudore vultustui vescerispane, donec revertarisin
terram,de qua sumptus es, quia cinis es et in cineremreverteris1?.
Notandum quod moraliterhic innuiturquod per fraudemmulieris
adhuc [f.6v] omni die decipiunturviri, linde rAdam SampsonemLoth
David et Salomonem/feminadecepit. Quis modo tutuserit?110
Item notandum quod allegorice per serpentem intelligimusdyabolum, per Evam carnem,per Adam animam,per pomumdelectacionem
mundanam.Serpensenim, i. dyabolus,presentatEve, i. carni,pomum,i.
delectacionemmundi,ut Eva, i. caro, trahatAdam, i. animam,eciam ad
pomum, i. ad delectacionem mundi, et sic ambo privanturparadyso.
ConveniuntFabula et Historia in isto. Nam saturnus primus11deorum
fuit,Adam primus HOMinumfuit; saturnus expulsus de regno, Adam
de PARADYSO.

1 Gen.3,9.
2 Gen.
3,10.
3 Gen.3,11.
4 Cf.Gen.3,12.
5 Gen.3,13.
6 Gen.3,13.
7 Gen.3,14.
8 Gen.3, 16.
9 Gen.3,i7ss.
10Cf.H. Walther,
- Initia
Latinorum
acversuum
medii
aeviposterions
Initia
carminum
. Alphabetisches
derVersannge
mittellateinischer
Verzeichnis
Proverbiay
1959,o2; H. Walther,
Gttingen,
Dichtungen.
Lateinische
I, 19; J.Werner,
, p. 20,42.
Sprichwrter
11Versus
37.
19

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quinonpotuit
sustinere
sc.inmundo
prosperitatem
illeliusSaturni
auri
45 Splendorem tanti non passus
Iupiter
iniectis
sc.
Saturnum
effugavit
defensoriis
crudeliter armis.
Expulit illatis patrem
est
similitudo
deformis talimetallo seculi secuta
Discolora
argento mundi successit ymago
contulitsc.Iovi
deorum
regnum
Et iam primtm ddit illi
curia divm.
Hic Pseustisponit aliam Fabulam et dicit:
"iupiter videns patrem suum regere AUReum MUNDum non
potuit sustinere splendorem tanti auri, quapropter patrem suum
Saturnumcrudeliter expulit a regno et factusest mundus discolor
argento, i. peior quam ante fuit, et postea curia deorum recepit
lovem in deum".
Notandum secundum poetas1 tempore Saturni mundus fuit ita
virtuosusquod a poetis dicebatur AUReus, sed postea de die in diem
peioratus est, ut vult Iheremias qui dicit rAurum mutatum est in
scoream12.
Item notandumquod secundum fabulas^iupiter fuitfiliusSaturni,
cum
claudere deberet diem suum extremum,convocavitfamiliares
qui
et amicos suos supplicans eis ferventer,quatenus eo mortuo
corpus
suum sepelire vellent secrete, ut impostrumab hominibusnon inveniretur. Quo mortuoamici sui sepeliverunteum secrete interduos muros.
Et percipientes Crethenses lovem esse mortuum, quia tante fuerat
reputacionisin vita sua, fmulos et amicos eius coegerunt, ut corpus
Iovis demonstrarenteis. Qui coacti duxeruntCrethensesad locum, ubi
erat sepultus iupiter et fodientesibidem non inveneruntcorpus Iovis,
sed unum caput, quod reputabant [f. 7r] esse caput gigantis et non
Iovis. Et dixeruntlovem esse ad celum translatumet ibidem glorificatum, et sic gentilescolueruntlovem pro deo.
Notandumquod allegorice per lovem sic sepultumet non inventum
possumus intelligere Xpistum, qui venit in hunc MUNDum,genitus a
Saturno, i. a patre suo in divinis, iuxta illud EuvangelisterEgo hodie
1 VideOv.Met.i,89ss.;Verg.
2,38.
Georg.
2 Is.1,22.
* VideBernardm
ed.M.Y. Jacobs,
Ultraiect.,
p. 29.
a discolorOdoPicardus,/.
12v;decolorOsternacher,
902.
20

189.235.178.250

00:13:29 AM

genui te"11.Iste iupiter, i. Xpistus Iesus, alteravitMUNDiimet abscidit

genitalia Saturni patrs sui, i. Xpistus abscidit et removit veterem
legem, scilicet Moysis patrs sui. Item iupiter convocavitamicos suos,
antequam moreretur, i. Xpistus convocavit apostolos et discpulos
amicos suos in ultima cena. Item iupiter per amicos suos sepultusest, i.
Xpistus post mortem suam sepultus est per Nicodemum2 et alios
amicos, ut patet Matheipenultimo capitulo3. Item iupiter sepultus est
interduos murossecrete, i. Xpistussepultusfuitad locum secretum,ubi
interduos muros,
priusnumquamalius sepeliebatur,testeSacrascriptum*,
i. supra sepulchrumeius ponebaturlapis magnusvalde. Item Crethenses
fodientescirca sepulchrumnon inveneruntlovem, i. Maria Magdalena
et alii querentes Iesum in monumentoin dominica die ante ortum solis
non invenerunteum, sed caput gigantis,i. sudarium.Item curia deorum
recepit lovem in deum, i. iupiter translatusest ad celum, hoc est
postquam Xpistus resurrexita mortuis potenter ascendit super omnes
celos et ibi glorificatusest.
homo
exilium
paradyso i. primus
patitur expulsus
eiectus
de
sede
49 Exulat
pia prothoplaustus
vel
in
i. Adam
pulverem
qui
veldignitatem
variai statum
se.humane
estcinis
perdicionem
in cinerem
nature mutt honorem.
Ac cinis
dampnaremurligno
Ne tarnen eterni temeremur stipite pomi,
intrare
se.
i.paradysi ianuas
presumentes
paradysum
gladius
prohibet
igneus
volentes.
Flammeus ante fores vetat ensis adire
Postquam Pseustisproposuitfabulose quomodo primushomo sue legis,
puta Saturnus,expulsusest a regnosuo, hic AlathiarespondetPseustiper
veram Historiam, quomodo primus homo sue legis, puta Adam, expulsus est de paradyso. Et est sentencia quod postquam primus homo,
scilicet Adam, gustavit de pomo vetito, eiectus est et expulsus a
paradyso. Et posuit Deus angelm suum ante fores paradysi cum
gladio igneo ad custodiendum,[f. yY] ne aliquis secundario gustaretde

1 Ps.2,7; Act.
; Hebr.
i9
Ap.13,33
2 VideJoh.
3,iss.
3 Mat.ijyjss.
4 Luc.23,5-3.
21

189.235.178.250

00:13:29 AM

fructu rligni vite"11,quia si Adam secundario commedisset de fructu,

numquam humane nature fuissetspes.
Notandum quod moraliterper Adam sic EiECTum intelligi potest
quilibet miser, qui dum promovetur ad altum statum, opponit se suis
superioribus non potens reverenciaset honores sustinere.Ideo Deus
frequentermutt homines talem in pulverem et proicit eos a sede
maiestatis,ut patet Luceprimo capitulo rDeposuit potentes de sede et
exaltavithumiles"12.
Item allegorice per POMumistud, per quod Adam eiectus est de
paradyso,possumusintelligereverumfructumvite, scilicet sacramentum
altaris, quod est sumptumde rlignovite13, i. de ligno snete crucis. Et
per Adam possumus intelligere quemlibet peccatorem inobedientem
allegorice. Nam sicud Adam propter hoc quod gustavitde isto pomo,
eiectus est de paradyso, sic eciam peccatores inobedientes indigne
gustantes de hoc pomo,, scilicet sacramento altaris, eiciuntur et expelluntur de paradyso voluptatis,i. de regno celorum. Unde Euvangelista "Qui commederit carnem meam et biberit sanguinem meum
indigne, reus erit iehenne mortis"*. Et ergo dicit Apostolus rProbet
autem se ipsum homo1s . Item MetristarEsca salutarisque sacrisponitur
aris, I si capitur digne, capientem servat ab igne; si male sumatur,
capienti pena paratur"16.
asscribitur
rado sacricandi
prima
debetur
causa
litandi :
53 Egregio Cicropi
inquirity
scrutatur intestina cuminstrumento
Cicropsilliusbestie
ferreo
Ille
bovis
primo rimatura viscera ferro
se.Cicrops
successio
continuavit
sacrificio talideo ordinavit
Iovi statuit , que posteritas celebravit.
Sacra
civitatem iuvamen
dea
construxittalem
prestititsicvocata
nomine Pallas.
Condidit Athenas
, adiuvit
nobili

viro

1 Gert.
2,9.
2 Luc.i,2.
3 Gen.2,9.
4 Ct.Jon.
eti Cor.i 1,27.
6,54.56
s i Cor.ii, 28.
6 Cf.H. Walther,
Initia
H. Walther,
Proverbia
, I, 7201a.
, 34;
a RIMATUR
OdoFicar
I02.
Osternacher,
dus,
J.14r;rimatus
22

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Hic Pseustisponit aliam Fabulam et est talis quod quondam erat quidam
rex dives et nobilis nomine cicrops, qui magnamfecitreverenciamdiis
suis et primo invenitmodum mactandibestias, quas immolavitio vi et
aliis diis. Et illum usum posteritas et tota sua successio postea continuavi^ Iste rex cicrops construxit athenas, i. illam civitatem, per
adiutoriumPALLAdis.
Nota quod ex Littera ista Fabula elicitur, quam eciam rcitt
Ovidius1. cicrops erat vir magne potencie nobilis et dives, qui dos
suos habuit in magna reverenciaet inter ceteros plus dilexit iovem, ob
cuius amorem quandam civitatem in Grecia, nomine ATHENe,-arum,
[f. 8r] construxit.In qua templmedificavit, in quo positus erat Iupiter
tamquam principalis deus et multi alii, videlicet Neptunus pallas
etcetera. Quo factointerNeptunumet PALLAdemoriebaturlis quisnam
eorum NOMeN imponeret civitati. Et ex consensu communi eligerunt
quod quilibet cum virgasua ad terrampercuteretet a cuius persecussione
monstrumvel miraculummagis utile nasceretur,ille NOMeNimponeret
civitati. Cum igitur Neptunus masculus erat, primo cum virga sua
percussit ad terram et statm prosilivit de terra pulcherrimusequus
armatus, significansbella civitatis futura. Deinde sors cecidit supra
PALLAdem,que cum percussit ad terram cum virga sua, prosilivitde
terraoliva viridiset fructfera,
significanspacem civitatisfuturam.Quo
facto omnes dii in unum conveneruntdeliberantes quidnam istorum
esset utilius. Concludentestandemquod pax esset utilior quam bellum,
attribueruntPALLAdi,ut ipsa civitatinomen imponeret. Que dedit sibi
dictumNOMeNATHENe,-arum propter perpetuitatemdeorum et pacis
eterne. Hoc facto cicrops ymaginatusest quomodo posset diis suis
reverenciamfacere et invenitusum mactandi animalia bruta et immolandi illa diis suis, quod eciam statuit fieriab omnibussuccessoribussuis.
Notandumquod allegorice per dictumciCROPemintelligimusipsum
Xpistum, qui primo invenitusum mactandi corpora et ea omnipotenti
Deo immolandi,ut patet autoritateApostoli "Quia se ipsum exinanivit
pro nobis et factus est obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem
crucis"2. Hanc dietam immolacionem et usum mactandi tenuerunt
successoressui, puta mrtires,qui corpora sua ad supplicia tradiderunt,
ut cantatnostramaterecclesias.
1 Met.
lyss.
2 Cf.Philipp.
2,7s.
3 Cf.Antiphonarium
Insecundis
Romanm
Ant."Isti
, Commune
martyrm,
plurimorum
vesperis,
Romanm
sunt
sancti
accommodatum
sexta
. Editio
vesperarum
praecipue
officio
qui"(ed.Antiphonarium
ordine
auctior
etcorrectior
1765J,
p.676).
disposita
meliorique
[Amsterdam,
23

189.235.178.250

00:13:29 AM

Item per Neptunum allegorice intelligimus Adam et antiquum

tempus, per PALLAdemvero intelligimusgloriosam Virginemet novum
tempus. Unde Neptunus percussitcum virgasua ad terramet prosilivit
equus armatus,significansbella, i. Adam allegorice significatus
per Neptunum percussit ad pomum vetitum, unde maximum bellum ortum
fuitin antiquo tempore interDeum et hominem. Sed postquam pallas,
i. beata Virgo, percussit ad terram, tune prosilivit de terra oliva
nobis pacem futuram,quia tunc orta est
i. Xpistus,significans
fructifera,
eternalispax et eciam temporalis,autoritate LucerGloria in excelsis Deo
et in terra pax hominibus bone voluntatis11.Item Apostolus rPacem
meam do vobis, pacem meam relinquo vobis12. Et quod hec pax prosilivitde terra,patet per ProphetamdicentemrVeritasde terraorta est"13.
Item CICROPS[f. 8V] iste condidit athenas, i. civitatemmagnam,
hoc est Xpistus condidit illam novam civitatem Iherusalem, de qua
dicit Propheta rVidi civitatemsanctamIherusalemnovam descendentem
de celo14 etcetera. Et intelligiturper istam civitatemIherusalem que
sursum est ceiestis patria. Item civitas NOMeN sumpsit ex percussione
PALLAdis,i. Marie virginis,per quam omnia bella sunt remota et pax
facta est inter patrem et hominem,et ista civitasvocatur athene quasi
immortalis,quia immortalis et incorruptibilisest.
parentum
primorum
primognitos
sacricat coramDeo
fructuum
de semine frugum.
57 Immolt ante Deum Cayn
sc.excellens
sc.Cayn
gratum
sacricium
ddit acceptabile mu nus
Frater Abel iustus
immolacio
voluntrie
ojferensse.meliorem
:
talis
decet
ferens
hostia
agnum
Sponte
Xpistum.
clamai
occidit
mortem
se.Cayn
pro
vindicta
velnecemsc.fratri
occisi
gladiovel ruit
Ense cadit
fuera
fratris; loquitur
post
sanguis.8.
Hic ponituralia Historia,que eciam recitaturin Genesi
s, et est talis:
de
erat
Adam
expulsus
paradyso, cognovit uxorem
Postquam
1 Luc.2,14.
2 Joh.
14,27.
3 Ps.84,12.
4 Apoc.
21,2.
5 Gen.
4,ss.
a sanguis
Oster
OdoPicar
nacher,
1902.
dus,
f. 1$T;mortis
24

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suam, que peperit primogenitumsuum, scilicet cayn. 2o cognovit

uxorem, et peperit abel. Erat autem cayn agrcola, abel vero pastor
deo et offerrent
ovium. Istos autem filiosinstruxitAdam, ut sacrificarent
abel
de
FRUGibus
MUNera
suis.
DEo
semper de
Contigit ergo quod
primogenitissui gregis pinguioribus et melioribus obtulit, cayn de
peioribusFRUGibus.Quare Dominus respexit ad MUNeraipsius abel et
non ad MUNerafratrissui cayn. Unde consuetumerat mactarepecudes
et comburere. Cuius autemfumusascendit,signumerat quod sacrificium
fuit ACCEPTABiLE
deo, et cuius fumus descendit, reputabaturinfelix.
Cum ergo abel et cayn obtulerunt MUNera sua, frequenterfumus
MUNerisabel ascendebat,sed fumusMUNeriscayn descendit. Quapropsuum abel interficerecogitabat.Et una
ter cayn ira commotusFRATRem
Et cum essent in agro, survice dixit sibi rFrater,egrediamurforas"11.
suum et eum interferii2.Quo factoDominus
rexitcayn contraFRATRem
dixit ad cayn rUbi est Abel fratertuus?"^ Et respondensdixit rNescio.
Numquid ego sum custos fratrismei?1*, quasi diceret "Non". Tunc
dixit Deus ad cayn rQuid fecistiquod vox sanguinisfratristui clamatad
s : Domine, vindica me? rErgo maledictus eris super
me de terra"1
terram,que aperuitos suum et suscepitsanguinemfratristui. De manu
tua vagus et profugus eris super terram"16.Et cayn iam cadens in
desperacionem dixit ad Dominum rMaior est iniquitas mea quam ut
veniam merear"1?.Et sic cayn [f. 9r] recessit a facie Dei profuguset
exul versus Orientem in regionem Edona, ubi postea interfectusest.
Notandum allegorice per istum cayn intelligimus populum
Iudaicum, per abel vero xpistum. Unde populus Iudaicus videns
xpistumfidelemet iusTum, sicud abel fuit,studuittotis viribussuis ira
commotusqualiter xpistuminterficeret,eo quod vidit quod sacrificium
xpisti, scilicet Novi Testamenti,erat acceptabile deo et holocaustum
Iudaicum incepit evanescere coram deo. Quare populus Iudaicus dixit
scilicet extra Iherusalem ad locum Calvarie, ubi
rEgrediamurforas"18,
i.
cayn,
Iudaycuspopulus, interfecitabel, i. xpistum. Tunc Dominus
i Gen.
4,8.
2 Ct.Gen.
4"
3 Gen.
4,9.
4 Gen.
4,9.
5 Gen.
4,10.
6 Gen.
4,i is.
7 Gen.
4,13.
8 Gen.
4,8.
a Edon= Eden
Gen.
, vide
4, 16.
25

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00:13:29 AM

LOQuebaTURad cayn, scilicet ad ldeos, per signaque tunc apparuerunt

et facta fueruntcoram Iudeis, quia terra tremuit, sol obscuratus est,
velum templi scissumest1 et sic de multisaliis. Item tunc Deus dixit ad
cayn rVox sanguinisfratristui clamavit ad me de terra"12,
per quod
intelligiturquod in presencia Pylati populus Iudaycus sumpsit hoc
verbum rSanguinis super nos et super filios nostros"1*.Item cayn
recepii malediccionem, ut esset exul et profugusin terra, i. populus
Iudaicus post mortem xpist missus est in exilium et dispersusest per
totam terram.
ab
natus
rancores
Archadia deorum excitt
Archas celestes provocat iras,
Lichaonisintravitilledeus hospitatus
domos
invasit Iupiter
suas
edes
Quando
hospes,
mutavit
sc.
Lichaonem
Iupiter
decipere
Iovis.
Exuit
nomena
Failere
temptando
sc.Lichaonis
campis
in
arvis.
svit
os
et
hominis,
lupus asper
Corpus
talisvir
6 1 Lichaon

ergo

Hic Pseustisproponitaliam Fabulam et est sentenciaquod olim erat rex

quidam nomine lichaon, qui commovitiovem in iRAm,quia ipse solet
interficereHOSPitESsuos de nocte. Quare iupiter volens rei veritatem
percipere intravitdomum su Am et Hospitatusest ibidem. Et postquam
perceperatveritatem,mutavitLiCHAONemin Lupum.
Notandum quod innuitur Fabula, quam eciam rcitt Ovidius
Methamorphosios
primo*, lichaon erat vir magne potencie natus ab
ARCHAdiaet ita maliciosus quod sua malicia apud deos amplius non
poterat tollerari, quia de nocte mercatores peregrinos HOSPitESsuos
interficereconsuevit secrete propter bona sua et carnes eorum salsare,
quas ddit Hospitibus suis commedendum, sic quod tandem iupiter
volens percipere rei veritatemipsius mutavitse in HOMiNemet in specie
mercatoris sepedictiviri domum intravitet ibidem [f. 9V] Hospitatusest.
lichaon autem percepii quodammodo quod in Hospicio suo deum
haberet. Verumtamendubitavitet ymaginatusest quod veliet TEMPTAre
1 Cf.Mat.27,5:1
; Luc.2$,45s.
2 Gen.
4, 10.
3 Mat.2j,2.
4 Met.i,i6SS.
a NOMEN
15V;numen
OdoPicardus,/.
Osternacher>
1902.
26

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an esset deus an non. Cum ergo tempus cene appropinquasset,dietus

LiCHAONHospitibus ad mensm sedentibus carnes humanas bullitas
commedendum distribuit. iupiter ergo considerans illas carnes esse
humanasrennuit eas commedere et finxitse esse infirmum,petens ab
tatem ad lectum perduci. Postquam ergo hospes
HOSPitEob infirmi
consideravit eum dormire, accessit ipsum secrete eum interficere
proponens. iupiter autem iam vigilansinsurrexitsibi et pugnanssecum
eum devicit et devictum mutavitin Lupum maledicens sibi ita quod
cunctis diebus vite sue exularet per campos et nemora in malicia sua.
Notandum quod allegorice per istum LiCHAONemintelligimus
dyabolum, per iovem vero Xpistum. Unde iste lichaon solet interficere de nocte HOSPitES,i. iste dyabolus in nocte in tenebris, que
fuerunta lapsu primorumparentumusque ad mortem Xpisti, spoliavit
HOSPitES,i. homines, et interfeciteos, quia traxiteos ad Infernum.Iste
lichaon bulivit carnes humanas,i. dyabolusnaturamhumanampunivit
rcum carbonibusdesolatoriis11. iupiter autem nequiens istammaliciam
amplius tollerare mutavitse in HOMiNem, i. Xpistus Iesus volens humanamnaturamab eternadampnacioneliberareassumpsithumanitatem.
lichaon autem percipiensquod deum haberet in Hospicio suo, de quo
tarnendubitabat,i. dyaboluspercipiens XpistumIesum descendisse per
incarnacionem dubitavit an esset verus Messyas, quare ipsum tribus
vieibus temptAvit,autoritateEuvangelistedicentis rDuctus est Iesus in
desertm, ut temptaretura dyabolo12. Item tenetur quod lichaon
accessit iovem volens eum interficere.Intelligiturquod Xpisto crucifixo
dyabolusaccessit eum proponensanimamsuam traheread Infernum.Sed
iupiter insurrexitlichaon, i. Xpistus Iesus descendit ad Infernaet
pugnans cum dyabolo devicit eum, nam tunc porte Infernisunt contracteet anime mercatorum, i. antiquorumpatrum,suntredempte.
mundo
maculato
illevir
in
cultor
Enoch
iusticie
orbe,
,
65
polluto
mundo
vectus
, decetero
postea
Raptus de terra nulli comparuit ultra,
velpugilis
diem
novissimum
, sc.Enoch
delis servus
secundum.
fidens adletha
Iudicis adventm
illepropheta
veldyabolum
se.existente
preibit
Antixpistum
contra socio
Leviathan
precedei Elya. [f. ior]
1 Ps.119,4.
2 Mat.4,1.
27

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Hic Alathia ponit aliam Historiam et est sentencia quod enoch vir
iustus et pius fuitverus cultor Dei in orbe, qui proptervirtutessuas
raptus est a terra virtute divina in paradysumet postea numquam
apPARUiT alicui in mundo, sed expectavit secundum adventm
iudicis, scilicet Xpisti, disputaturusuna cum elya contra leviathan,
i. Antixpistumvel dyabolum.
Notandum quod in Littera innuiturista Historia quod enoch fuit
vir iustus et mire castitatisin omnibus operibus suis, sed Deus videns
mundum esse maliciosum noluit in eo servum suum diucius habitare.
Quare recepii eum de terra et vectus est virtute divina cum carne
vivus in paradyso. Quare subvectuselyas igneo curruad locum, in quo
residet enoch, sic quod isti duo enoch et elyas expectantadventm
Antixpistipredicatori contra ipsum pro ecclesia Dei, ut rcitt Hieronymus1et eciam satis patet per prophetas2.Unde Antixpistusintrabit
mundumsub specie veri Messye in illis partibus,in quibus Xpistus erat
natus. Ibi enim perambulabitmundumet precipue seducet ldeos. Nam
illi putabuntipsum esse veraciterfiliumDei verumMessyamet adherebunt sibi cum multisxpistianis.Nam ipse, ut patet ex Scriptural
, seducet
divites cum muneribus, quoniam illi frequentersunt avari et cupidi.
Pauperes autem seducet miniset verbis horribilibus,innocentes autem
cum miraculorumoperibus. Ipse enim laborabit sequi vestigia Xpisti
aperiendo oculos cecorum et reformando membra claudorum et
mortuorumcorpora suscitando. Et tunc coMPARebunTiamdicti duo
predicando contra Antixpistumet reformandoecclesiam Dei, quia pro
tunc ecclesia stabit in maxima tribulacione sicut testatur Propheta
"Iactabitur navcula Petri in profundummaris"4, i. ecclesia in tribulaciones. Et sic sepedicti duo convertentpopulos ad fidem,sed non ad
plenum quousque Antixpistusplenariefueritcorruptus.Nam ipse finget
se mori et 3a die resurgereet per tantumtempus,per quantumXpistus
ambulavitcum discipulispost resurreccionemeius, ipse videbiturquasi
sub specie fantasmatisambulare. Postea vero discipulissuis congregatis
videbitur ascendere et postquam venerit ad aerem, sanctus Michael
virtutedivina resistetsibi, et percucieturulcione divina quod ruet in
terramet rumpeturin quatuorpartes,ut dicit Propheta.Et verificabitur
1 Hieron.
InMalach.
Christianorum).
4,.6;InMatheum
II,p. 81,reg.1i6ss.(ed.Corpus
2 VideMal.4,5s.; Joel
11,1417,11;Marc.
9,12;Luc.1,17.
2,31;Mat.
3 Cf.Rom.
16,18;i Tim.
6,9.
4 Cf.Mat.14,24.
5 Cf.Apoc.
i2,7s.
28

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pro tunc verbum Euvangeliste dicentis "In die ilia salvabiturluda"1

[f. iov], quia tunc veracitervidebuntIudei ad oculos se esse deceptos et
festinabuntad baptismumet confitebunturcognoscentes errores suos.
istud verbum EuvangelisterEritunus pastor et
Tunc enim verificabitur
unum ovile"12.Et tunc amplius non erit lex Iudaica. Quod istud sit
verum, patet albescum per Hugonem de Sancto Victore in libro De
misseet per plures alios sacre theologie doctores.
misteriis
Notandum quod per Antixpistumallegorice possumus intelligere
quemlibet hereticum, qui contra matrem ecclesiam innocentes
laborat seducere et venenum inter bonos seminare, sicud patet de
ypocritiset quibusdamaliis. Sed per enoch et ELYAm,qui fratressuntet
unius condicionis, allegorice intelligimusfraternamsocietatem religiosorum verbum Dei predicanciumcontra hereticos et perambulancium
mundum,autoritate Psalmiste rIn omnem terramexivit sonus eorum13
etcetera, quam quidem fraternitatemsancta mater ecclesia pro sui
illuminacionecontra hereticam pravitatemstatuit.
omnia degluti
mari
ab
Occeano
Venit
69
submergens cuncta vorago,
vitam
est
dedit se.diluvii submersum
terra locum
suseeperat
vixerat
omne.
Tellus cessit
,
quod
periit
aque
sc.fuit vivus
Deucalionem
naturam
humanam
illevir
nemo superstes,
Deucalion homines
, preter quem
missis
,
postterga
sua lapidibus
renovavit uxore
proiectis
revocavita
Cum Pirra iactis
coniuge saxis.
Hic Pseustisponit aliam Fabulam et est sentenciaLitterequod olim erat
quoddam maximum diluvium AQUArumascendencium super omnes
montes, per quod universi homines fuerunt submers, sed duo,
scilicet DEUCALIONet PIRRAuxor eius, fueruntpreservatine submergerenturin quadam navicula. Et per iamdictos duos tota natura humana
per lapidumproieccionempost tergaest reformata.
Nota hic innuiturista Fabula, quam eciam rcitt Ovidius Methamorphosios
primo*. Mundus quondam erat ita maliciosus quod lupiter
1 Cf.Hierem.
23,633,16.
2 Joh.10,16.
3 Ps.18,5"; Rom.
10,18.
* Met.i,3iss.
a renovavit
l6v Osternacher
OdoPicardus,/.
, 1902.
29

189.235.178.250

00:13:29 AM

deus deorum voluit eum destruere. Super quo consulens deos et

deas dixit "Quidnam videtur vobis melius et minus periculosum, per
quod destruemusmundum?Nam si per ignem,forteincendereturaer et
consequenter celi et omnes celicole comburerentur.Ergo pocius per
AQUAm destruemus mundum". Quare Iupiter supplicavit fratri suo
Neptuno deo AQiiArum,ut ipse veliet sibi concedere aquas suas, per
quas mundus destruendusperirei. Neptunus vero acquiescens precibus
fratrissui Iovis aquas concessitsibi. Sed quia ilio temporedeucalion et
pirra [f. iir] uxor eius fueruntmultum devoti deos et deas in magna
reverencia habentes, idcirco quedam dea nomine Themis, de qua
dicitur in Claudianox, sciens mundum periturum istis deucalioni et
piRRe revelavitin sompno quod mane surgerent,ad quendam fluvium
festinarent,ubi naviculam invenirentstantem,quam intrare deberent.
deucalion vero et pirra surgentesperrexeruntad fluviumet intraverunt naviculam. Quo facto aqua maxime crevit et navcula cum
AQuis ascendit ita quod aque maris et fluviorumascenderunt super
omnes montes excepto monte Bernasiia sic quod omnes homines
submers fueruntDEUCALiONeet pirra dumtaxat exceptis, qui vacillanteshue et illue per aquas tandemad montemBernasiiavenerunt.Et
exeuntes naviculam montem ilium ascenderunt, in quo quoddam
templminveneruntantiquissimum,et in eo stabatymagopredicte dee,
scilicet Themidis, sub cuius titulo templmerat fundatum.deucalion
autem et pirra flectentesgenua sua istamdeam adoraveruntdevotissime
sibi supplicantes, quatenus ipsa dignaretureis manifestareper quod
reparariposset humanumgenus. Themis vero condescendens dictorum
precibus dixit "Exite templmet presingitevos et capita vestravelate et
proicite ossa magne parentis vestre post terga et natura humana
reformabitur"2.Hoc audito templm exiverunt, sed in exitu pirra
dixit "O deucalion, quid est quod hec dea nobis suadit? Nam videtur
mihi malum et nephandum. Pocius enim debemus venerari parentes
quam vilipendere. Ergo non videtur bonum quod ipsa dixit". Cui
deucalion respondit "O pirra, sic non est intelligendum,quia per
istam magnamparentemnotavitThemis terram, que est mater nostra,
nam de ea factisumuset factinutrimuret perituriin terramrevertemur.
Et per ossa parentisintellexitlapides"3. Quo facto velaveruntcapita sua
1 Deraptu
Pros.
1,107I2I9*
2 Cf.Ov.Met.
i,38iss.
3 Cf.Ov.Met.
i,39iss.
* Bernasii
= Parnas(s)i
.
3

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et recipientes lapides proiecerunt illos post terga, et a proieccione

DEUCALiONis
prosilieruntviri et a proieccione PiRRemulieresprocreate
sunt. Et statimaqua decrevitad pristinammultitudinemet sic humana
naturareformataest.
Notandum quod secundum rei veritatem deucalion et pirra
fuerunthomines diviteset mirabiliterpostea depauperati,qui consilium
habueruntcum amicis suis qualiter possent ad statum pristinumpervenire. Et dictum est eis pro Consiliosanioriquod proicerentlapides, i.
ponerentlapides ad labores et sic recuperarentdivicias.
Item notandum quod allegorice per DEUCALiONEmintelligimus
XpistumIesum et per piRRAmsponsamsuam beatam [f. i iv] Virginem.
linde sicud ex precepto deorum et dearum deucalion et pirra
intraveruntnaviculamet AQUAm,sic Xpistus Iesus et Maria intraverunt
istum mundumper aquas, i. maximas tribulaciones,et preservatisunt
ab omn periculo, ut humana natura per ipsos reformaretur,que
totalitersuBMERsafuitper aquas, i. tribulacioneset dolores, qui cum
lapsu primorum parentum originem sumpserunt usque ad mortem
Xpisti durantes. Et sic per proieccionem lapidis post terga, i. per
Testamenti
abieccionem Veteris
, et introduccionemNovihumananaturaest
sicud
Item
primus transitusextra naviculam deucalions et
reparata.
PiRRe,per quem prima salvacio incepit,factusest ad montemBarnasum,
sic primanostrasalvacio ortum sumpsitin monte Calvarie extra Iherusalem, ubi Xpistuspassus est pro nobis.
vindicta
aquas dimersit maris
Dei
fontes disrupit abyssi
Ulcio
73
digna
sc.numerum
,
locis

i. octohominesillevir preservan
arche.
Noe
servants in nartibus
Octavum
A.
sustineant
decetero
periculum
ne talem paciantur scula cladem,
Ammodo
arcuscelestis
aeris manifestatur
hominum
nubes
oculis
Visibus humanis per nubila
panditur yris.
Hic ponituralia Historia et est sentencia Littere:
Cum deus misit aquam super terramad perdendumhomines, noe
cum uxore sua et tres filii eius cum suis uxoribus reservatisunt et ut
amplius genus HUMANumnon paciatur consimile periculum, positum
est signum in NUBibus aeris, puta arcus celestis qui vocatur yris, ut
postquam pateat illud signum,infratrigintaannos non est timendumde
tali diluvio communi.
31

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Nota quod sicud scribitur in Genesi1quod tempore ipsius noe

omnis terra repleta fuitmalicia, sed noe graciam invenitapud DEum,
quare deus dixit sibi "O noe, finis universe carnis venit coram te,
repleta est terra iniquitate et ego disperdamearn. Fac tibi ARCHAmde
levigatismansionesin ea facienset erit archa in longitudinetrecento
rum cubitorum et latitudine quadraginta, in altitudine triginta"2.Et
subiunxitdicens rFenestramin archa facies,ostium autem eius pones a
latere deorsum et ecce ego adducam aquas diluvii super terram, ut
interficiamomnem carnem, in qua spiritusvite est. Ponam fedusmeum
tecum et ingredierisARCHAmtu cum filiis tuis, uxor tua et uxores
filiorum[f. i 2r] tuorum et ex cunctisanimantibusuniverse carnis bina
induces in ARCHAm,ut vivanttecum, masculini sexus et feminini,de
volucribusautemiuxtagenussuum et de iumentis.Tolles eciam tecum ex
omnibus escis1*, ret ecce post dies septem ego pluam super terram
quadraginta diebus et quadraginta noctibus et delebo omnem substanciam,quam feci super facieterre1*.Erat autem noe tempore diluvii
s
sexingentorumannorum. Item scribiturulterius in Genesi quod noe
ingressusest ARCHAmcum uxore sua, filiiset uxoribus suorumfiliorum
et cum ceteris animantibussicut preceperat sibi deus. Et post septem
dies facta est pluvia super terram quadraginta diebus et noctibus sic
quod aqua elevata est quindecim cubitis super omnes montes. Et
steteratterrasic sub aquis centumdiebus et quadragintaita quod omnis
creatura de carne genita submersa est tam reptilia quam volucres celi
preteripsum noe cum suis. Et tunc, sicud patet Genesistricsimoprimo
capitulo6, aqua reversa est et decrevit post dies predictos ita quod
archa noe requievit super montem. Et qualiter tunc noe corvum
emisit, patebit infra.
Notandum quod moraliter per noe et suos possumus intelligere
homines virtuosos,qui permissionedivina preservanturab inundacione
aquarum, i. temptacionumet tribulacionum,et intrantARCHAmcum
sanctiset adducuntsecum de cunctisanimantibus,i. virtutibuspotentibus vivificare,ut fiatcreacio nove creaturedei, scilicet anime.
Item allegorice per noe intelligiturXpistus Iesus et per ARCHAm
uterus gloriose Virginis. linde Xpistus Iesus tempore diluvii, i. ante1 Gen.
6,ss.
2 Cf.Gen.
6,i3SS.
3 Gen.
6.i6ss.
4 Gen.7,4.
5 Gen.7,13s.
6 Gen.8,3ss.
32

189.235.178.250

00:13:29 AM

quam totus mundussubmergeretur,propter peccata sua fecit archaii,

scilicet uterum gloriose virginisMarie, rde lignis levigatis11,i. bonis
moribusornatam. Et in illa archa, i. utero, requievit noe, i. Xpistus.
Et per ARCHAmpreservatasunt de cunctis animantibus,i. liberati sunt
homines suffcienter.
Itemnotandumquod in Litterahabeturarcha quod est capsa cista
vel navissuperius tecta, ab archus-a, -um,a i. strictus.Pro quo notandum
quod legitur de triplici archa. Una erat archa testamenti,in qua
ponebanturtabule, in quibus scriptumfuit testamentmpreceptorum
dei. Et postea ponebatur urna aurea piena manna in testificacionem
quod dedit panem Iudeis de celo. Eciam in ea ponebatur virga Aaron.
Et ista archa testamentifuitfactade metallo. Alia fuitarcha Noe, de
qua diciturin Littera, et illa fuitlignea. 3a archa fuituterus gloriose
virginisMarie, linde ""Temporibustres esse tribuscognovimusarchas: /
primaNoe, Moysi fuitaltera, 3a Xpisti. / Lignea prima, 2a metallea, 3a
neutra^, j Octo prior, tria posteriortulit, [f. i2v altera solum. / Lege
carens, sub lege manens, hec lege soluta. / Hanc pelagus tulit, hanc
populus, hanc spiritusalmus"12.
Sequiturtextus:
77 Ydeos lepores puer exagitat Ganimedes,
Quem Iovis arreptum devexit adc ethera sursum
Armiger; ablato divm concesserat ordo
Nomen pincerne, quod possedit prius Hebe.
Hie Pseustisponitaliam Fabulam et est sentenciaquod quidam puer erat
pulcher valde nomine Ganimedes, qui solebat practicam venature
frequenterexercere et precipue in quadam silva, que YDEa dicebatur,
iuxta civitatem Troyanam. quem propter sui pulchritudinemaquila
iovis sursum devexit ad celos, ubi tota curia deorum concesst sibi ut
esset pincerna, quod officiumhebe filiaIunonissolebat ante habere
Notandumquod in Litterainnuiturtalis Fabula, quam eciam rcitt
decimos. ganimedes fuitiuvenisformosusvalde
Ovidius Methamorphosios
1 Gen.6,14.
2 Cf.H. Walther,
Initia,
19165.
3 Met.10,iss.
a archus
= art
212(185Heimst.),
cod.Gueferb.
us,vide
f. 144r
b neutra
OdoPicardus,f.
SBelm
cod.Mnchen
ljy.
$243,
J.l66r;ventris
c inOdoPicardus,/.
l8TOsternacher
, 1902.
33

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00:13:29 AM

et filiuscuiusdam regis Troyani, qui summe dilexit artem venatoriam

continue venans per campos et nemora et precipue per silvam YDEam
iuxta Toyanamcivitatem.Iupiterautem vidensformositatemet nobilitatem ipsius ganimeds misitaquilam suam, qui vocaturpoetice armiger
de mundo sursum ad iovem. Et
ut tolleret GANiMEDEm
vel ARMiGERa,
factumest ita. Ganimedesvero veniensad io vem summeplacuit sibi et
ceterisdiis, quare concordabantunanimiterquod vellent sibi dare unum
officiumsaltem honestum, scilicet quod esset pincerna, quod prius
habuit hebe. Quapropter luno uxor iovis irascebatur.
Notandum quod moraliter per istum GANiMEDEmpossumus intelligere quemlibet scolarem1 diligentemvel laycum sollicitum,qui ad
modum ganimeds non debet ociari, sed semper venari, ut tandem
veniat aquila, i. sapiencia vel sciencia, tamquam ARMiGERaarmans
animas,ut tandemsursum per cognicionemvehatur.
Item allegorice per istum GANiMEDEm
intelligere possumusquemlibet hominem sanctum abstractuma conversacione scolari, qui loca
petit solitariarsicud passer solitariusin tecto"12.Et per io vem possumus
intelligere omnipotentemDeum, per aquilam vero spiritum sanctum,
linde Iupiter videns formositatemganimeds, i. Deus omnipotens
videns bonam vitam saneti hominis, mittit aquilam suam, i. sanctum
spiritum,ut tollat eum sursum ad celos.
Sequiturtextus[f. 13r]:
81 Corvum perfdie dampnant animalia queque,
Nuncius inclusis quia noluit esse salutis.
sponte
Ore columba suo ramum virentibus ultrob
talismons
est
testis
testis.
Detulerat foliis ; superest Armenia

Hic ponitur alia Historia, cuius sentencia est quod cuncta animalia
reptibilia dampnant et odiunt ipsum corvum propter infidelitatem
suam, quia ipse missus ab archa Noe ad inquirendum utrum aque
recessissenta terra, mansit et requievit supra cadavera mortuorumsic
Noe coLUMBAmad
quod non reversus est ad archam. Quare emisit
1 VideBNQ,p. 398.
* Ps.101,8.
viriDENTiBUS
OdoPicardus,/.
1902.
Osternacher,
i8v;viridantibus
b ULTRO
8V; introOste
OdoPicarduSyf.
1902.
mcher,
34

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00:13:29 AM

videndum utrum aque recessissent,que fidelis reversa est ad archam

portans ramum de quadam oliva in ore suo signantempacem federis
inter Deum et genus humanuni, linde oliva pacem significaiin Scriptum1, et istudARMENiemons TESTatur.
Nota quod sicud scribitur Genesis13o capitulo2, postquam aqua
recessisseta terra, Noe aperiens fenestramin archa sua emisit corvum
ad inquirendumutrumrecessissentaque a terra,corvus autem egressus
invenit cadavera3 mortuorum, in quibus requievit sic quod non est
reversus ad archam, propter quod omnia animalia odiunt ipsum

corvum. Unde dicit Ovidius 2 Methamorphosios

quod ante tempus
emissionisab inicio mundicorvus fiieratalbi colors, sed propterinfidelitatemsuam factusest nigricolors. Postea vero emisitNoe coLUMBAm,
que reversa est portans in ore suo RAMunculuMolive, per quem
significabaturpax inter Deum et genus humanum. Qui RAMunculus,
secundumquod doctores*dicunt, plantatusest in monte antedicto, ubi
adhuc archa Noe reservatur,quia ibi primo requievit. Hoc facto Noe
apperuit tectum arche et nunc locutus est Dominus ad eum "Egrediamini super nequaquam maledictam terram propter homines, non
percuciam omnem animam sicut feci"6. Tunc egressitsuper terramet
dixit eis rCrescite et multiplicabiminiet replete terram. Terror vester
et tremorsit super cuncta animalia terre et super omnes volucres celi
cum universis que moventura in terra1?. Cui concordat hoc verbum
r
propheticum Omnia subiecisti sub pedibus18 etcetera. Et dixit Deus
r
ultra Quicumque effuderit sanguinerai humanum, sanguis eius
fundetur^.Ecce ego statuam pactum meum vobiscum et cum semine
vestro10et nequaquam ultra interficieturomnis caro aquis diluvii"111.
"In signumfederisinter me et vos ponam eum in nubibusceli"12. Item
1 Cf.Walafr.
ordin
Glossa
Strab.
., Lib.Gen.,
cap.8,8(PL113,col.109).
2 Gen.8,6ss.
3 Cf.Petr.Com.Historia
Glossa
Strab.
scholastica
, Lib.Gen.,
cap.34(PL198,col.108^);Walafr.
Lib.Gen.,
ordin.,
cap.8,7(PL113,col.109).
4 Met.
2,540s.
5 Cf.Petr.
Lib.Gen.,
Com.Historia
scholastica,
cap.34(PL198,col.io8$).
6 Cf.Gen.
8,21.
7 Gen.9,is.
8 Ps.8,8.
9 Gen.
9,6.
10Gen.9,9.
11Gen.9,11.
12Cf.Gen.
9,12s.
a moriuntur
212(85Helmst
. 9,2.
cod.Guelferb.
cod.
; moventur
.),/.144v Gen
3S

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sicud scribitur Genesisdecimo octavo capitulo, Noe vixit post diluvium

trecentis annis et quinquaginta [f. 13V] et in universo noningentiset
quinquaginta annis1. Item secundum doctores2 mundus steterat ante
diluvium per duo milia annorum et sexingentos annos, ut testatur
Iosophus histeriographus.Et eciam patet in versibusAuroreTempus ab
. Et in
hoc Adama Iosapho testantefuerunt/anni sexentimiliabinafereb_|3
Unde
rEmisitc
emissis.
eodem ponunturversus de corvo et columba
corvum, redditum negatd ille, columbam / emisitc: redditum missa
columba facit1*.
Item notandum quod, moraliter per corvum intelligimusquemlibet scolarem infidelemet pigrum, quoniam dum missus est ab archa
Noe, i. a domo patris,ut proficiatet cum fructurevertatur,iste invenit
cadavera, i. bonos mercellos medonis et vini, sic quod obliviscitur
archam patris et fruiturdeliriis suis non curans revertiquam diu possit
requiescere super illa cadavera. Per coLUMBAmintelligiturbonus et
fidelis scolaris, qui dum mittitur ab archa patris, proficit et cum
maximo fructurevertitur portans ramos olive, i. scienciarumet pacis
suorum parentum.
Item per istam archam allegorice intelligi potest celestis patria,a
qua CORVUSniger missus est, videlicet Lucifer,quia sicud corvus erat
primo albi coloris et postea nigerrimiet sicud corvus non est reversus
ad archamNoe, sic Lucifernumquamrevertipotestad archamcelestem.
Sed per coLUMBAmallegorice intelligimusXpistum Iesum missum ab
archa celesti, scilicet de gremio patris, ut ipse letificarethumanam
naturam. Et sicud columba reversa est cum ramo olive, sic Xpistus
Iesus reversusest cum ligno snete crucis ascendensad archamcelestem,
in die ascensionis representansNoe, id est suo patri in divinis,ramum
olive, id est lignumcrucis, ad designandumpacem et concordiam inter
patrem et humanam[naturam]e.
Sequitur[textus]f:
1 VideGen.
9,28s.
2 VidePetr.
scholastica
Com.Historia
, Lib.Gen.,
cap.33(PL198,col.1084).
3 Aurora
Genesis
595s.
, Liber
4 Aurora
62$s.
Genesis
, Liber
a tempus
= Aurora
A Verse
onthe
Biblia
Petri
Aurora
adhocabAdam
Commentary
igae
versificata.
Liber
Genesis
Dame
Press
, 2965],
595.
Bible.
Ed.PaulE.Beichner
/-//,
University
, [Vol.
ofNotre
b milia
Genesis
duoAurora
, Liber
596.
pene
c emittit
Liber
Genesis
625-626.
Aurora,
d corvum
625.
Genesis
Liber
Noenonredit
Aurora,
212(l 85Helmst.),
.
om.cod.
etcod.Guelferb.
vide
f. 14$*
; naturam
supra
t om.
vide
cod.
4V.
; textus
e.g.cod.,f.
36

189.235.178.250

00:13:29 AM

gigantesab humoproductrice geniti

Surrexere
viri
terra genitrice creati.
85
sc.illisviris unum propositum
fugare deosetdeas
Pellere celcolas fuit omnibus
una
voluntas.
omnes i.faberIovis illosgigantes
sc.unuscongregaise.alium
Mns cumult montem, sedtotumMulciber hostem
choruscacionis
Inferni deiecit
ignedeorsum
deiectum Vulcani trusit in antrum, [f. i4r]
Fulmine
Hic ponitur alia Fabula Speustis et dicit quod quidam viri magni,
scilicet gigantes, suRREXERuntde terra, quibus omnibus fuit una
voluntas pellere et fugaredeos et deas, et cuMULAveruntMONtem
supra montem, sed MULCiBERfaber Iovis cognoscens istam nequiciam
trusit istosgigantesin antrum vuLCANeia,i. in Infernum.
Nota quod secundum Ovidium Methamorphosios
primo1 per proieccionem lapidis ipsius Dulcaneonis et Pirre procREATisunt gigantes
magni, qui cogitantes et recordantes quomodo Iupiter per aquam
diluvii omnes predecessores suos destruxit preter Dulcanionem et
Pirram,proposueruntillud vindicarein deos et congregaveruntMONtes
supra montes credentessic ascendere celum et omnes deos et celcolas
fabrumsuum, ut istis
eff'ugare.Quod videns Iupiter misit MULCiBERum
cum
maximo
fulmine deiect
descendens
resisterei
bus
.
Qui
giganti
omnes istos in antrum vuLCANei,i. in Infernum.
Item nota quod moraliter per istos gigantes volentes ascendere
celum tam scolares quam lyeos presumptuosos, qui scolares volunt
ascendere ad statum magisteriiet layci ad statum honoris, et penitis
sunt indigni. Quod percipiens Iupiter, i. Deus, proicit eos ad status
inferiores,contraquod dicit EuvangelistarQui se exaltat,humiliabitur"12.
Et alibi "Homo non capiat primumlocum in mensa, ne maior veniat et
dicat: Amice, surged. Item MetristarTe non exalta! Nimiumqui tendit
in alta, hic fitmultociensde dominantecliens1*.
Item allegorice per istos gigantes intelligimushomines, qui per
divicias temporales cumulantes MONtem super montem, i. denarium
super denarium, volunt ascendere ad statum honoris, sed tandem
Iupiter, i. Deus, mittitfabrumsuum MULCiBERum,i. dyabolum, cum
1 Met.
i,399ss.
2 Luc.14,11 18,14.
3 Cf.Luc.14,8s.
4 Cf.H.Walther,
Proverbia
, V,31118.
a CULCANEI
cod.
37

189.235.178.250

00:13:29 AM

fulmine, i. cum flammisigneis, scilicet post mortem, et TRudiT eos

in antrum vuLCANei, scilicet in Infernum.Quare dicit Psalmista rSi
noli cor apponere11.
divicie tibi affluant,
Vel aliter allegorice per istos gigantes sic ascendentes notamus
Antexpistum,qui propont ascendere celos ad modm illorum gigantm, et quando ascenderit usque in altum, veniet mulciber faber
Iovis,i. sanctusMichael, et TRudeTAntexpistumin antrum vuLCANei,i.
in Infernum.
culmine
Babilonie
successio
in
arce
Ade
Babilonis
summa
Posteritas
89
polum attingere
Turrim construxit, que celum tangere possit.
dispersio
linguarum
Excitt iama Deum : confusio fit labiorum.
recessit ab urbe
inBabilonia Babilon
nomen
excidit urbi. [f. i4v]
ibi
non
,
Disperguntur
Hic ponitur alia Historia et est sentencia quod successio vel progenies
primi parentis,puta ade, edificavitquandam turrim in BABiLONia,ut
per earn ascenderei celos. Propter quod deus iratus misit in earn
coNFUSionem labiorum sic quod DisPERse sunt lingue eorum et in
perpetuum terra non amittit illud nomen, quod est BABiLONiavel
BABILON.
Notandum sicud scribiturGenesisdecimo octavo capitulo2, Caym
fuitunus triumfiliorumNoe, qui genuitquendam filiumnomine Chus3.
Ipse autem ulterius genuit filiumnomine Neenroth*, qui existens vir
fuitvenator*.Et una vice ambulans
fortisrobustuset potens in BABiLONia
de Oriente cum quibusdam aliis sequassibus dixit rFaciamuslateres et
coquamus eos igne6 et coNSTRuamusnobis civitatemet turrim, cuius
cacumen pertingatad celum, et celebremusnomen nostrum,antequam
Et secundumaliquos istud fecerunt
DisPERGamuRbin universasterras"1?.
1 Ps.61,11.
2 Gen.
io,iss.
3 Cf.Gen.
10,6.
4 Cf.Gen.10,9.
5 Cf.Gen.
10,9.
6 Gen.11,3.
7 Gen.11,4.
a IRA
20rOsternacher,
212(185Heimst.),/.
cod.Guelferb.
1902.
14$rOdoPicardus,f.
b dividamur
11>4.
Gen.
38

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00:13:29 AM

ideo quia memores illius diluvii, quo predecessores sui submersi

fuerunt, voluerunt hoc vindicare. Inde quare edificabant turrim
credentes sic impedire opera de. Alii dicunt1, et forte melius, quod
edificabantturrim ad hune finemquod si postea deus diluviummitteret
super terram,possent unanimiterascendere turrim et sic fugereaquas
diluvii, deus autem videns istud descendit,ut videretillam civitatemet
turrim, quas coNSTRUxerunTrfilii ADAm12,sicut habenturin Biblia
linde solet queri, quare Biblia dicit rfiliiADAm12et non "filiiNoe". Et
eciam dicitur in textu posteritas ade et non "Noe". Ad quod respondetur quod hoc est ideo, quia Noe numquam legiturtransgressusfuisse
preceptum Domini sicud ADAm et quia isti coNSTRuentes turrim
3,
fueruntfiliiinobediencie et peccati. Ergo pocius vocanturrfiliiAdam"1
fuerat
et
inobediencie
"filii
vocarentur
Noe".
qui pater
peccati
quam
Dixit igitur deus rVenite, descendamus et coNFundamus ibi linguas
Et
eorum, ut non audiat unusquisquevocem proximisui nec intelligatf1*.
factumest ita, quia dispers suntper universamterram,et adeo confusi
quod alter alteriusverba non intellexit,quia uni petenti sementumvel
lapides alter portavitlignumvel aquam et econverso, ita quod dimiserunt opus nec poterant proficere ulterius, sed confusi recesserunt,
propter quod vocatum est nomen turris babilon vel BABiLONia.
BABeLSenim interpretaturconfusio. linde diciturquod lingue illorum
divise suntin septuagintaduo ydeomata.
Item notandumquod per diete turris coNSTRUCtoresintelligimus
scolares, qui sine fundamentovolunt ascendere et promoveriad sciencias alciores, et quia fundamentumeorum debile est, totum redigitur in
pulverem. Et per linguas eorum in tantum sunt confusi quod ex
verecundia se tollunt a facie et conversacione clericorum nescientes
congrue exprimere mentis conceptum, quibus bene remanet hoc
nomen babilon, quod interpretaturconfusio.
ade intelligimus[f. i $T] Iudeam,
Item allegorice per posTERiTAtem
que est progenies inobediencie autoritate Prophete dicentis rNoluit
intelligere ut bene ageret16. Ista Iudea visa est et nititur edificare
turrim, i. legem, contra deum. Quod percipiens deus descendit et
1 Cf.Petr.Com.Historia
scholastica
Strab.
Glossa
, Lib.Gen.,
cap.38(PL 198,col.1089);Walafr.
orditi.
yLib.Gen.,
cap.11,3(PL113,col.114).
2 Gen.11,1.
3 Gen
. 11,.
4 Gen.11,7.
5 Cf.Gen.11,9.
6 ft.3.439

189.235.178.250

00:13:29 AM

divisit eos per universumorbem et de liberiate facti sunt servi et sic

remansiteis nomen BABeLdupliciter. Primo in quantum dispers sunt
in universummundumet de liberiate servifacti, 2 quando dixeruntin
r
passione Xpisti Sanguis eius super nos et super flios nostros11,quod
hodierna die et quamdiu mundus stabit sencient, quia omnes iudei,
quotquot sunt, paciunturdigeriam,scilicet emoridema, in malediccionem eorum.
choru
scaciones
fobri
Fulmina
93
Cyclopes Iovis imperio fabricant^
Peonis
sc.medico interfecto ad mortem indicavit pater
morti
decrevit
Peone
percusso
Apollo.
iam i. a suoregno
rancore
se.deorum fugatus
Mox deitate
sua superum spoliatus in ira
illiusregis sollicitudinem
gregis
acceptavit exercendam
Admethi curam
pecorume suscepit agendam.
Hic ponitur alia Fabula Pseustis et est sentencia quod postquam chiclopes fabri iovis cum fulminc interfeceruntBEONEm ex precepto
io vis, venit appollo pater peons et interfecitomnes istos ciclopes,
scilicet fabros, et ideo appollo spoliatus est regno suo et fugatusad
curiam admethi regis, ubi per totam vitam suam custodivitPECORa.
Nota secundumOvidium2quod peon fueritperitissimusmagisterin
medicina, qui quodam tempore ambulans quadam silva ad colligendum
herbas medicine vidit quendam pastorempugnare contra basiliscum. Et
ammiratus peon quomodo iste pastor stare posset tam diu contra
basiliscum, qui serpens venosissimusest, et appropinquansvidit quod
pastor habuit quoddam sertumdvel coronam in capite suo de floribus
diversis contextum. Cogitavit ergo peon quod istorum fiorum virtute
pastor ledi non posset a serpente. Quapropter peon retroveniens
secrete detrusitsertumcum bculo de capite pastoriset attraxitsibi, et
statimmortuusest pastor. Quapropter peon recepit omnes floresillius
serti et singulatim quemlibet florem posuit ad os mortui sic quod
tandem,dum tetigitos pastoriscum uno flore,surrexitpastora mortuis.
1 Mat
. lj,2.
2 Met.2,63SS.,
-cf.Mythogr.
Vat.II,128.
a emoridem
=haemorrhoidem.
FABRICANTES
21rOsternacher,
OdoPicardus,j.
1902.
c PECORI
Osternacher
OdoPicardus,
, 1902.
J. 21T;pecoris
d certum
cod.
40

189.235.178.250

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Et gavisuspeon valde retinuitilium floremet colligens continue flores

eiusdem speciei incepit practicare in medicinis sic quod cum illis
floribussanavit languidos ab omnibus infirmitatibussuis et mortuos
resuscitavi^ Iupiter ergo invidensisti peon misit ciclopes fabrossuos
ad interficiendum
PEONEm,qui descendentes cum FULMiNesuo interfecerunt ipsum. Quapropter iratus appollo pater peons interfecit
omnes istos ciclopes fabros iovis. Quod dum vidit Iupiter, fugavit
APOLLinema regno suo, qui errando venit ad curiam admethi regis,
ubi postea per totamvitamcustodivitPECORa.
Notandum quod per istum PEONEm,cui Iupiter invidebat,intelligere possumus moraliter quemlibet clericum intelligentem, qui
frequenter invidetur ab aliis minus peritis propter scienciam suam.
linde rSciencia non habet inimicumnisi ignorantem"1^
[f. iv]. Et hoc
apollo vindicat, i. Deus, destituens illos invidentes8-a cognicione
scienciarum.
Item allegorice per PEONEm intelligitur Xpistus Iesus verus
medicus salutis, qui tam in morte quam in vita, tam corporaliterquam
suis. Ipse enim mutos
spiritualiter sanavit languidos ab infirmitatibus
facitloqui, surdosaudire et mortuosresurgere.Quod percipiensIupiter
et ciclopes, i. principes Iudeorum et Iudei, laboraveruntpro morte
ipsius, scilicet quomodo possent eum interficere,et tandem venientes
cum FULMiNe,i. impetuositatesua, interfeceruntXpistum. Quod percipiens apollo pater peons, i. Deus omnipotens pater, noluit ista
transirsine vindicta. Quare interfecitistos ciclopes, i. ldeos, et hoc
duplici pena, primo quia dispersi sunt per universummundum et facti
sunt servi, et post hanc vitam habebunt dampnacionem sempiternam
autoritate Euvangeliste dicentis rNisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et
spiritu sancto, non intrabit in regnum celorum12. Quod confirmans
r
Apostolus dicit Oportet vos nasci denuo13, i. de novo vel secundario,
per aquam baptismi. Et quando dicitur quod appollo fugatusest a
regno suo, intelligiturquod Deus recessit et avertit faciem suam a
Iudeis tamquaminfidelibus,et errandovenitad curiamadmethi regis, i.
erravitvel vertitfaciemsuam ad regentesse secundum metham sobrietatis et castitatiset aliarumvirttum.
1 Cf.H. Walther,
Proverbia
, IV,27590e.
2Joh.3,.
JJoh.3,7.
a invidens
cod.
41

189.235.178.250

00:13:29 AM

terra preceptosillevir
suam
paterna recedere sc. uxorem
Abraham patrio discedere Saram
97 Limite iussus
i. a se
prolis
sine
sobolis
sibi concipiende.
Assumpsit
spe
sc.postlongatempora lassatis
senio nascitur i. verus
sc.Ysaac
heres,
Tandem
confectis etate creatur herilis
nutrit
filium
graviter
portabat
Filius et lactat, sua quema natura gravabat.
Hic ponitur alia Historia et est sentencia quod postquam preceptum
erat ABRAHeut a PATRiasua recEDEREt,sumpsitsecum saram uxorem
suam adhuc sterilem, que postea facta est fertiliset contra naturaiti
ETATisconcepit et peperit Fiuum.
Nota sicud scribitur Genesis1decimo octavo capitulo, Sem filius
Noe genuit ipsum Arfaxat. Arfaxatautem genuit in xxxv0 anno Sale.
Sale autem genuit in xxx anno Hebar. Hebar autem genuit Phalet.
Phalet autem genuit Reu. Reu autem genuit Saruch. Saruch autem
genuit Nathor. Nathor autem genuit Thare. Thare autem genuit
Abraham,Nathor et Aaron. Deinde, sicud scribiturGenesisdecimo nono
capitulo2,Aarongenuitipsum Loth, Abrahamautem et Nathorduxerunt
uxores : uxor enim Abrahevocata est Sarayet uxor ipsius NathorMelca. 3
Sarayautem fuitsterilisnec potuitimpregnan,propterquod Abrahamin
tantumdoluit quod dixit sibi Deus rEgrederede terratua et de cognacione tua et de domo patristui et veni in terram,quam,monstravero tibi et
faciam te in gentem magnamet benedicam [f. i6r] tibi et magnificabo
nomen tuum et maledicam maledicentibustibi"14.Egressusest Abraham
et recepii Loth secum filiumfratrissui et Sarayuxorem suam et venerunt
in terramCanaan. Abrahamautem transiensultravenitad locum Sychem
et, ut patet vicsimo capitulo,tunc dixit sibi Dominus rSeminituo dabo
terram hanc"1*.Et transgrediensAbraham montem habentem a parte
Orientali monticulum Hay et a parte Occidentali monticulumBethel
edificavitunum altare.
Continuabitur
Utrecht.
Instituutvoor Laat Latijn
1 Gen.i i,ioss.
2 Gen.11,27.
3 Cf.Gen.11,29.
4 Gen.12,iss.
5 Gen.12,7.
a quam
OdoPicardus
nache
r,1902.
,f.22TOster
42

189.235.178.250

00:13:29 AM

The Development

of Suppositio

in Mediaeval

naturalis

Logic

L. M. DE RIJK

II FOURTEENTH CENTURY NATURAL SUPPOSITION AS

ATEMPORAL (OMNITEMPORAL) SUPPOSITION
i -

Statusquaestionis

the investigationsin the firstpart of thisarticle1the conclusion

was
From drawn that in the thirteenthcenturydoctrine of supposition
natural (or habitual, or absolute)2 suppositionwas considered the
naturalcapacityof a termto standforsomethingpartakingin the essence
(or : universalnature) signifiedby that term; accidental suppositionwas
the term's actual being taken for something in virtue of the term's
combinationwith some other term in either a phrase or a proposition,
or of its having a special meaning in a special social context. Briefly
stated: natural suppositionwas decidedly non-contextual,whereas all
kindsof accidental suppositionwere of the contextualtype.
Two characteristicsof the thirteenthcentury doctrine of suppositionare to be noticed:
(a) accidental supposition,being contextual, does not always imply a
context
propositional
natural
(b)
supposition, being something midway significanoand
), seems to enervatethe clear-cut
(as opposed to significano
suppositio
distinctionall thirteenthcenturylogicians made between suppositio
and significatio.
ad a Thirteenthcenturylogicians turn out to consider the proposition
as just one of the possible contexts of a term, not as the only one
required fora term's havingsupposition.
ad b The introductionof naturalsuppositionwas due to the peculiar
1 L. M. deRijk,TheDevelopment
inMediaeval
naturalis
as
, I Natural
ofSuppositio
Logic
Supposition
inthis
Non-Contextual
9 (1971),pp.71-107;
Journal
esp.102ff.
Supposition,
2 Forthese
seebelow,
alternative
andother
names,
pp.49f.and72f.
43

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

fact that those logicians apparently held it to be indispensable to

distinguishbetween a word's havingsignification(viz. its representing
some universalnature) and its capacityto standforindividualspartaking
in this universalnature (c.q. the universalnatureparticipated,taken as
such), which capacity was the direct, or natural, counterpartof its
This naturalcapacitymustbe seen as a referenceto a
havingsignification.
which
context,
possible
supplies an adjunct to limit, or restrict, the
term's original capacity (c.q. which causes its having an unrestricted
exercise of its naturalcapacity).
As is well known, when studyingthe problems of signification
fourteenthcentury logicians showed an increasing interest in the
contextualapproach to language. Their investigationswere focussedon
as thebasic requirements
and the Veritas
locutionis
the congruitas
propositions
(exigentie)for statingthe actual meaning of terms. Their theories of
suppositionmay be taken as n attemptto specifythe truthconditions
for (mostlyaffirmative)
categoricalpropositions.Thus, the variouskinds
of supposition were characterizedby fourteenthcenturylogicians by
. Consequently,theywere bound to
means of implications(consequentie)1
the
on
as the onlypossible context
stress
most
the
proposition
explicit
lay
in which a termcould have supposition.
The most obvious conclusion from the theoretical point of view
would be that natural supposition, being of the non-contextualtype,
had to disappear in fourteenthcenturylogic. To my mind, it certainly
had - as certainlyas it never should have appeared. However, it did
occur in thosedays,not onlyin the Realisttraditionbut witha logicianas
JohnBuridanas well.
It is the aim of this article to discuss the reinterpretationof natural
suppositionand the controversiesit provoked, and is still provokingup
to the presentday2.
2-

Propositionalcontext as an indispensablerequirementfora term's

suppositionin 14th centurylogic
In fourteenthcenturylogic suppositionis a propertyof a termonlywhen
it is used in a proposition.This requirementis commonlyaccepted by all
1 Seeforexample
Saint
Vincent
Ferrer's
DesupposiVincent
; IvoThomas,
Ferrer,
op.cit.pp.19ff.
therules
AnAnnual
Review
in: Dominican
s (19^2),pp.88-102,
Studies,
4.22;4.23;
tionibus,
Seealsobelow,
ypp.91-92).
pp.49ff.
4-3iS'21; S'41and6.4(op.cit.
2 SeeE. M.Barth,
ofthis
inthefirst
mentioned
work
9 (1971),p. 71,n.i),
(vivarium
study,
part
passim.
44

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

fourteenthcenturylogicians,by the so-called Realistsas well as by their

adversaries,the so-called Nominalists or Conceptualists. I give some
quotationsfromthe anti-RealistSchool :
a William of Ockham (c. 1285-1349):
Summa
Quae est
logicaeI, cap. 63, ed. Boehner:... resttdicerede suppositione.
nisi
in
sed
.
conveniens
termino,
numquam propostitene
proprietas
b Albertof Saxony (c. 1316-1390) :
de quahieintendo,
est
II 1 (Paris,B. N. Lat.18.430,f. i7vb):Suppositio
Logica
perutilis
vel
in
vel
usus
termini
pro
pro
aliquibus
accipitur
aliquo
qui
acceptio
cathegorici
propositione.
c Marsilius of Inghen (d. 1396):
in
est acceptiotermini
De suppositionibus
(MunichC.L.M. 7709, f. ir): Suppositio
verifide quo,velde quibus,talisterminus
proaliquo,velproaliquibus,
propositione
caturmediante
copulatalispropositionis.
Some logiciansof the Realist School are no less explicit on this score in
theirdefinitions
:
a WaltherBurley( 127 -?1345) :
intendo
I i, ed. Boehner:... in hoc tractatu
tractatus
artislogicae
De puntate
longior
eiscompetunt
secundum
de quibusdam
terminorum,
quaesolum
proprietatibus
perscrutari
termini
communiter
acceptaestproprietas
propositionis Suppositio
quodsunt
partes
est
dicta
inpropositione
ad aliumterminm
proprietas
proprie
comparati Suppositio
adpraedicatum
subiecti
termini
comparati.
b John Wyclif (c. 1320-1384):
extra
: ... sciendum
quodnullusterminus
cap. 12,p. 397Sqq. ed. Dziewicki1
Logicat
est significatio
termini
sed solumin oratione
orationem
Suppositio
supponit
Et est
ad aliudextremum.
in comparatione
propositionis,
qui estextremum
cathegorici
velpredicatum.
inpropositione
subiectum
extremum
c Vincent Ferrer O.P. (1 350-1419):
ad
subiecti
estproprietas
ed. Fages:suppositio
dialeticis
Desuppositionibus
, cap.2,p. 8l8"19
in
comparati2.
propositione
predicatum
1 Johannis
andPrague
MSS.by
theVienna
editedfrom
deLogica
Tractatus
, nowfirst
Wyclif
Vol.I, London
Dziewicki.
Michael
1893.
Henry
2 ed.Fages,
Tomepremier
Vincent
deSaint
Ferrier.
O.P.: Oeuvres
comprenant
p. 8. Le PreFages
divers
etlesSermons
LesTraits
ouOpuscules
(18
Pangyriques
jusqu'la Ftede1'Expectation
dialecticis
Paris1909.TheDe supposicionibus
(!) is found
pp. 3-88.Thecolophon
Dcembre),
ordinis
Vincencii
reverendi
runsas follows:
memorie,
, recolende
fratris
suppociciones
magisti
Expliciunt
- Fages*
edition
Valencie
M0CCCLXXll
. DeoGracias.
, annoDomini
, quascompilavit
predicatorum
contains
misreadings.
many
4S

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

This much is certain,that all fourteenthcenturylogiciansonly speak of

a term's suppositionwhenit is usedin a proposition.
As a matterof fact, I
knowofno fourteenthcenturylogicianwho admitsofa non-propositional
supposition1.
The disappearance of natural supposition as taken in the sense
thirteenthcenturylogic used to give it cannotbetterbe clarifiedthanby
quoting Ferrer's explanations on account of the requirement of the
propositionalcontext:
in propositione
nam
Ibid.,pp. 83i-9*7:Diciturautem"ad predicatimi
comparati",
et cognoscitur
enimdiversa
secundum
suppositio
primosumitur
per predicatimi:
diversehabentur
Aliamenimsuppositionem
subiecti2.
habet
predicata
suppositiones
'homo
estspecies'
subiectum
inistapropositione
estanimal1
, aliaminista'/lomo
t et aliam
'
inistalhomo
a significatione,
estbisillabum
lindeexhoc suppositio
distinguitur
que
sed
subiecto
non
ad
ut
termino
competit
comparatur predicatum magisconvenit
absolute
Etsicpatetquidsitproprie
considerato.
suppositio
Ex predictis
Primm
estquodsuppositio
habentur
et
specificatur
quinqumanifeste.
determinatur
perpredicatum Ex quo patetquodmalesumuntur
speciessupposisedvelsecundum
tionsnonsumendo
velsignificata
easex partepredicati,
vel
supposita
tale.
aliquidhuiusmodi
For Ferrersuppositionis alien to a term when taken by itself( terminus
absoluteconsider
atus). So Peter of Spain's natural supposition as the
is clearlyruled out by this Realist
of
a
terminus
perse sumptus*
supposition
logician.
The same may be said of all of his contemporaries.For all of them
and
accidentalisy
any supposition,when propositional,eo ipsois suppositio
the division of suppositioninto natural and accidental suppositionhas
become senseless, as, henceforth,suppositionaturalisis bound to be
in terminis.
So we need not wonder that most
considered a contradictio
fourteenthcenturylogicians,such as Ockham, Burley,Albertof Saxony,
Marsilius of Inghen*, and Thomas Manievelt5, do not mention at all
naturalisin theirtractson supposition.However, two at least,
suppositio
Buridan
and Vincent Ferrer, do discuss natural supposition as a
John
genuine kind of suppositionin theirtracts,and several other writersdo
use or at least mentionit in otherworks (such as their Commentarieson
1 However,
inthefifteenth
ofthethirteenth
natural
century
type
reappeared
supposition
century
Albertist
seebelow,
tradition;
pp.68-74.
2 Ferrer
: Tertium
term
: ibid.
ofa predicate
estquodprediquodhabetur
rejects
anysupposition
catum
nonsupponit
(ed.Pages,
p. 10).
3 SeePeter
ofSpain,
VI4, ed.De Rijk(Assen
Tractatus
vivarium
article,
1972),andmyfirst
9
(*970PP-72ff.
I have
inErfurt,
Desuppositionibus
owntract
seenMarsilius*
Q. 30,ff.12ir-i27v.
5 I have
inVienna,
Desuppositionibus
V.P.L.
tract
seenThomas'
4698,ff.28r-32r.
46

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

the Sentences).Therefore, Boehner's simple remark1 that natural

supposition was dropped by the logicians after Peter of Spain is not
correct.
The intricate question is: how did they come to maintain or
reintroducenaturalsuppositionand what was the sense of theirsuppositio
naturalist
3 - Natural suppositionin the frameworkof 14th centuryphilosophy
of science2.
A major objective of Mediaeval Nominalism was that of grounding
knowledge on the world of concrete particulars. As Scott rightly
remarks3,it was crucial to the Nominalist programto explain in detail
the relationshipbetween a language that depended heavilyon abstract
general termsand a world composed wholly of concrete beings. More
specificallyfor our question: the Nominalists had to show that the
truth of every proposition containing universal terms is completely
, concrete
,
beings
dependent on the referenceof its terms to particular
since they held the generalrule thata categoricalpropositionis true if,
and only if, its subject and predicate termsstandfor ( supponunt
pro) the
same particularentities*.On the other hand, a propositionis taken to
be false when its terms referto differentthingsor if one of its terms
refersto nothing,thatis, in the Nominalistview, to nothingexistentat
'
the time the proposition is written or uttered, e.g. homoest animaV
utteredat the time no man exists.
It is self-evidentthat the logicians of the Realist traditionhad no
trouble with propositionsof demonstrativescience such as : omnishomo
'
habettresngulosequalesduobusredis , 'tonitruus
estanimaV, omnistriangulus
>s.
estsonus
Jactusin nubibus
Let us take as an example Vincent Ferrer's expositions of the

1 Medieval
Manchester
ofItsDevelopment,
AnOutline
19^2,p. 33.
Logic.
2 Seeforthisproblem
article
Buridan
OnTheObjects
areatheexcellent
byT. K. Scott
Jr,
John
Of
I owe
A Journal
ofMediaeval
Studies
in:speculum,
Science
Demonstrative
40 (196^),pp.654-673.
oftheproblem.
much
tohisclear
expositions
3 op.cit.
yp.6$y.
4 ForOckham,
ForBuridan,
I ed.Boehner,
StBonaventure
seehisSumma
, chs.70-74.
1951
logicae
Buridani
cum
Solertissimi
Viri
totius
seePerutile
expoDorp
preclarissima
Joannis
logice
Joannis
compendium
Frankfurt-Main
Minerva
A. Moody,
sition
1965),Ch.IV.SeealsoErnest
, Venice
1499(reprint
inMediaeval
Truth
andConsequence
, Amsterdam
1953,pp.34ff.
Logic
5 Cp.below,
ff.
go
pp.
47

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

matter1
. He definessuppositionas a propertyof the subject as compared
with the predicate in a proposition2. Therefore, its division runs
3. Well, the resultis a
modes of thatcomparatio
parallelwiththe different
accidentalis
naturalisand suppostilo
divisioninto suppostilo
, but both types
fromtheirthirteenthcenturynamesakes*
.
are quite different
seuessentia
ed. FagesS:Natura
communem
importata
perterminm
Cap. 3, p. i42*-37
Unomodosecundum
rationem
propriam;
accipiveletiamconsideran.
dupliciter
potest
essequodhabetin hoc et in ilio. Sic ergo... suppositio
statim
alio modosecundum
itaquodsupet suppositionem
naturalem
debetdividiin suppositionem
accidentalem,
communis
dicaturquandoterminus
sibi
accipitur
respectu
predicati
positionaturalis
' tunc
- quemadmodum
estinistapropositione
: 'homo
estanimal
convenientis
essentialiter
;
sumitur
absolutepro sua essentiaseu
huiusmodi
enimres per terminm
importata
- ; suppositio
dicatur
veroaccidentalis
natura6
quandoterminus
accipitur
respectu
: 'homo
stude
convenientis
sibiaccidentaliter
, sicutest in istapropositione
; tunc
predicati
sumitur
enimresseunatura
proessequodhabetinhoc
importata
pertalemterminm
convenit.
accidentaliter
velinilio,quodtamen
Afterthe definitionof accidental supposition and its subdivisioninto
personaland simple suppositionour authorconcludes thispassage:
nondiversificatur
ed#Fages:Ex hismanifeste
Ibid,
yp. 1^18-28
patetquodsuppositio
omne
cum
subiectum
illudquodsubiectum
suumsignifisecundum
supponit,
supponat
illudpro quo subiectum
secundum
catum
. . ., sed diversificatur
suppositio
supponit
suumsignificatum
absuumsignificatimi.
Quiasubiectum
(1) proeiusessentia
supponit
- , vel (2) proesse quodhabetin
essentialem7
soluta- et sic habetsuppositionem
- , vel (3) proessequod
- et tunc(habet)suppositionem
personalem
singularibus
habetinanima,et siehabetsuppositionem
simplicem Undeclarepatetessesolum
et personalem.
scilicetnaturalem,
tresspeciessuppositionis,
simplicem
fromthirteenthcenturylogic are manifest:
The differences
natural
the
latter's
(1)
suppositionis the suppositionof a termwhen it is
taken by itself, i.e. when the term does not have any relation to an
1 Fortheedition,
seeabovep.4$,n.2. SeealsoIvoThomas,
op.cit.(above,
p. 44,n. 1). For
deSanVincente
seeBiografia
Ferrer
Vincent
more
about
information
some
Ferrer,
, Direccin
y escritos
O.P.yFr.Vincente
Forcada
M.deGarganta
delosPadres
e introducciones
Fr.Jos
O.P.,Biblioteca
that
natural
isnotfound
benoticed
in
Madrid
deautores
cristianos,
1956.- Itshould
supposition
's
John
WyclifLogica.
2 Seeabove,
ed.Fages,
estpropria
p. 14:Suppositio
suppositions),
p. 45; cp.ch.3 (Dedivisione
adpredicatum.
subiecti
secundum
quodcomparatur
passio
3 Seeabove,
subquoddiversimode
p. 14:Ideosecundum
accipitur
p.46; cp.ch.3 ed.Fages,
debet
divisio
attendi.
incomparatione
adpredicatum,
iectum
principaliter
suppositionis
4 I think
hisnatural
derived
from
insaying
iswrong
Scott
(op.cit.,p.669)thatBuridan
supposition
Seebelow,
ofSpain.
ofPeter
theSummulae
p. 67.
logicales
s Fages'
intypography
andinterpunction.
israther
careless
text
printed
6 Fages
seunturm.
essentiam
haspersuam
wrongly
7 = naturalem.
48

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

adjunct and, accordingly,meets with no limitationof its capabilityof

denotingwhatsoever; Ferrer's naturalsupposition,on the contrary,is
the suppositiona term has when the propositionalcontext in which it
occurs as a subject term causes its havingthat supposition.
(2) Ferrer's naturalsuppositionas well as the thirteenthcenturyone is
called after natura, but in thirteenthcenturylogic the word ' natural9
refersto the nature of the termqua term(being its very capabilityof
- and his
- the
contemporaries
denoting), whereas with Ferrer
is referredto : eius essentiaabsoluta, Ferrer
nature of the thingsignified
he
this
and
calls
supposition natural or essential(see the text
says,
.
quoted)1
So it was easy for Ferrer to explain the kind of supposition in
demonstrativepropositionsof the type mentioned above (p. 47). The
subject termof those propositionshas naturalor essentialsupposition,or
as Ferrer calls it in his chapter four, demonstrative
supposition. In that
chapterhe explains this kind of suppositionagain and gives fourgeneral
rules partly in the form of consequentie
by means of which natural
some
is
I
characterized
.
quotationsfromthischapter:
supposition
give
naturalis
estproprietas
termini
comSuppositio
Cap.4, ed. Fages,pp. 17-43; p. 1730-36
sibi essentialiter
convenientis.
munisacceptirespectupredicatiessentialis
essentialiter
convenire
subiectoquandopredicatum
Tunc autemdico predicatum
' - velsaltem
estrationalis
ad essentiam
subiecti- ut'homo
,
predicapertinet
' quando
ut ' homo
estrisibilis
vel 'asinus(est)
tumconsequitur
subiecti,
principiaessentialia
etsimilibus
Inomnibus
enimhispropositionibus
subiecta
rudibilis'
supposisupponunt
tionenaturali
in qua subiectum
naturaliter
verificatur
. . . omnispropositio
pro
[p. i 832-33]
supponit,
subiecti
inferioribus
....
omnibus
naturalem
suntvidende
. . . Sednunccircasuppositionem
quatuor
[p. i9l8-2o13]
regule
inaliquapropositione
Quarum
primaestista:quandocumque
predicamentum
generales.
talispropositionis
inaliquomododicendiperse,semper
de subiecto
dicitur
subiectum
et
econverso.
naturaliter,
supponit
de primomododicendiperse, ut ' homoestanimal
',
', 'homoestrationalis
Exemplum
lineahabet
habet
tres
lineas1
de secundo:homo
est
duopuncta'' triangulus
etc.Exemplum
'
'
'
a terre
lumine
estpar velimpar
, lineaestrectavelcurva*
risibilis'numerus
, privatum
'
est
non
ad
de
Tertius
modus
:
obiectu2
etc.
propositum Exemplum quarto
eclipsatur

interiit
est abhominabilis
, iustusplacetDeo' 'peccator
2, umortuus
expiravi
Uinterfectus
naturalis
maxime
estapprobata
Undesuppositio
scientiis
demonstrativis
, que, ut
Deo'
inomnibus
suisargumentationibus
modis
PrimoPosteriorum,
utuntur
dicitPhilosophus
dicendiper se.
4 SoFerrer's
Lambert
ofAuxerre's
resembles
natural
seemyfirst
supposition
simple
supposition;
article,
p.98.
2 Fages
hasobiecto.
wrongly
49

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

necessitas
naturalem.
Namsicutponuntur
Exquopatetmanifeste
suppositionem
ponendi
dicuntur
scientie
demonstrative,
demonstrativi,
que
sillogismi
proprie
argumentationes
.... et sic etiamponuntur
eius, que dicuntur
propositiones
propriepropositiones
fuitutponatur
conveniens
eius;
demonstrative, - itamultum
propria
suppositio
Attamen
demonstrativa
et ea que
naturalis.
hecautem
quiascientia
suppositio
appellatur
a demonstratione
demonstrative
.... ideopropria
sibiappropriantur,
dicuntur,
suppositio
etiamdemonstrativa
scientiedemonstrative,
suppositio,
potest
que diciturnaturalis
appellari.
cognomine
Next our author gives an alternative(and puerile in a sense, he adds)
formulationof the firstrule, which is of some interestin connection
with what is read in Albertof Saxony's Perutilis
logica:
dariclarior
etquodammodo
ed.Fages: . . . . adhucpotest
doctrina,
Ferrer,
cap.4,p. o1*-*
materiasubiectum
propositionis
positeitbnaturali
puerilis,scilicetquod cuiuslibet
naturalis
estquandopredicatum
Ratioestquoniam
materia
estde
naturaliter.
supponit
velproprium
eius.
essesubiecti
in utroque
Albertof Saxony,Logicaperutilis
III, 10: Propositionum
participantium
de consimili
subiectoet consimili
et eodemordine,idestpropositionum
termino
naturali Etillepropositiones
esseinmateria
dicuntur
quedamducuntur
predicato,
in materia
naturali
idemquod subiectum
quodpredicatum
que sic se habent
significai
de ipsosubiecto
: velestpropositio
inquasuperius
et nonpotestverenegative
predicari
vel
vel
diffinitio
suo
diffinitionis
dediffinito,
catur
de
suo
de
diffinito,pars
inferiori,
predi
velidemde seipso.
However, unlike Ferrer,Albertdoes not speak of naturalsuppositionin
this connection. For that matter,as far as I know, he never speaks of

naturalsuppositionin his works1.

Ferrer's second general rule with its explanationruns as follows:
cuiussubiectum
habet
ed. Fages:Secundaregula:omnispropositio
Ibid.yp. 2o2I-35
estuniversaliter
seu demonstratvam,
naturalem
vera,scilicetproomni
suppositionem
demonstrativa
et proomnibus
suppositis ; dicide omniinscientia
requirit
tempore
et
universalitatem
temporum
suppositorum.
The thirdand fourthgeneral rules stressthe atemporal (omnitemporal)
characterof Ferrer'snaturalsuppositionagain:
esthec: a propositione
de tertio
e(#Fages:Tertiaregulaprincipalis
lbid.y
p. 365-10
ad
de
secundo
adiacente
adiacente
cuiussubiectum
naturaliter,
propositionem
supponit
'
estrisibilis
lindenonsequitur*homo
est
valetconsequentia.
; ergohomo
; neque
numquam
*
est*
non
similiter
cadens
valet:
est
ltonitruus
valet: pluviaestaquaguttatim
; ergopluvia ;
' etitadealiis
est
tonitruus
in
;
nubibus;
ergo
sonusjactus
cuiussubiectum
estista:nullapropositio
Quartaregulaprincipalis
supponit
[p.4232-33]
existentiam
terminorum.
adsuiveritatem
naturaliter,
requirit
1 Cp.below,
p. 64.
SO

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00:13:37 AM

The authorexplainsthatin the case of naturalsuppositionthereis a true

union of the absolute, universal natures signifiedby the subject and
predicate terms,the actual existence of which in some particularbeing
is not relevantto the truthof the proposition:
ed. Fages:Ratio reguleest quoniamad veritatem
Ibid.,p. 423^-432
propositionis
sufficit
vera unio extremorum:
hoc enimsolumsignificai
affirmative
propositio
Sedinomnipropositione
affirmativa
cuiussubiectum
affirmativa.
et
naturaliter,
supponit
rebusnonexistentibus
salvaripotest
huiusmodi
res
unio,quiainomnitalipropositione
absolute
remimportatam
importata
perpredicatum
respicit
persubiectum,
quibusut
estexiste
sicextraneum
re.Etideo,siresperhuiusmodi
nonexistant,
terminos
importate
adhucintereospoteritsalvariveraunitas
etsufficit
adveritatem
querequiritur
propositionisaffirmative.
Et perconsequens
ex
his
formari
vera,etiamrebus
propositio
potest
nonexistentibus.
Thus Ferrer considersnaturalsuppositionthe kind of suppositionmost
appropriateto demonstrativesciences. It appears that for Ferrer in a
demonstrativepropositionwith a subject termwhich has no referenceto
anyparticularbeing, thereis a trueunion ( veraunio) of S and P, not in the
world of particularbeings, of course, nor just in human thinking(in
which case Ferrerwould speak of simple supposition),but in something
like Absolute
whateverthatmaybe. It should be stressed in this
Reality1,
connection that Ferrer's terms having natural supposition do have
reference,indeed, to thingswhich possibly exist at all times ( proomni
et pro omnibussuppositis
), the only thing required being the
tempore
see
our
universalitas
temporum;
quotationabove, p. o.
It is self-evidentthat the logicians of the anti-Realisttraditionwho were
eagerlyinvolvedin exorcisingall abstractentitiesof whateversort,could
not help takingthe Realist explanationof demonstrativeproposition(like
Ferrer's) forsheer nonsense. Since concrete particularswere commonly
held2to be the only proper claimantsto existence,the anti-Realistsset
themselvesthe taskto establishthe objectivityof knowledgein concrete
particularbeing and nowhere else. In theirview all universalknowledge
was ultimatelyknowledge of concrete particularbeings.3 Of course,
as a general theory of reference the doctrine of supposition was of
outstandinginterestwithinthe scope of the anti-Realistprogram.
1 in omnitalipropositione
resimportata
remimportatam
absolute
respicit
perpredicatum
per
seeourlastquotation.
subiectum;
2 Itshould
benoticed
that
theRealists,
inhisrejection
ofanyPlatonic
Aristotle
too,followed
- they
I amafraid
but- likeAristotle
indrawing
failed
theinevitable
himself,
World,
consequencesfrom
it.
3 Seeabove,
thearticle
p.47,andespecially
byScott
(quoted
p.47,n.2),pp.6^7ff.
s*

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00:13:37 AM

The crucial point lay in the propositionsof demonstrativescience,

true, i.e. true at all possible times.
which are supposed to be necessarily
However, theyjust have the formof categoricalpropositionsof present

est sonusj actusin nubibus'

tense, e.g. omnishomoest animal' 'tonitruus
For thisreason, the anti-Realisttraditionhad to take themforfalseifno
man happens to exist (c.q. if no thunderhappens to be) at the time at
which the propositionis writtenor uttered. Puttingit in a general way
the problem was: how is the necessityof science to be grounded in
contingentparticularbeings?
As is well known, Ockham tried to solve it by regardingall catdemonstrativepropositionsas disguisedhypothetical
egorical affirmative
(omnishomoestanimaV= 'si esthomo est animal9
as
such
,
1;
propositions,
as
of
be
the
can
such
indeed,
implications
regarded trulyindependent
state of affairsat any time (i.e. nullohomineexistente).
Buridanopposes this view, since he insiststhat the termsof every
proposition,the hypotheticalincluded, must referto concrete particulars. For him, what is signifiedby a proposition is no abstract entity
but ratherthe particsignificabile2
(such as Gregoryof Rimini's complexe
.
ular beingsforwhich the termsof the propositionstand (supponunty
The next section will deal with Buridan's discussionof the problem
concerningdemonstrativepropositions.
4-

Buridan's use of naturalsuppositionas omnitemporalsupposition

In his Summula Tract IV, JohnBuridanmentionsnaturalsuppositionin

a usual subdivision(soletdividi) of common supposition:
incommudividitur
: Suppositio
Summula
IV,3 (B.N.Lat.14.716,f.4orb~va)
personalis
1 Summa
III2,cap. (Bologna
edition
1498).
logicae
2 Seeforthis
andGabriel
Theories
term
H. Elie,Lecomplexe
Nuchelmans,
, Paris1937,
of
signicabile
oftheBearers
ofTruth
andFalsity,
Amsterdam
andMedieval
I Ancient
the
Conceptions
proposition.
1973,
PP-227-271.
3 SeeScott,
op.cit.,pp.660-662.
* Itwasprinted
onit; torthis
withJohannes
in 1499at Venice
Dorps commentary
together
isfound
inParis,
work
which
seeabove,p. 47, n. 4. I haveuseda copyofBuridan's
edition,
with
an
Lat.
B.
N.
together
Nationale,
14.716
XIV),
anonymous
(s.
commentary.
Cp.
Bibliothque
isnotjustanadapted
of
Buridan's
Summula
that
edition
benoticed
oursection
below,
g.- Itshould
I andthegreater
said.Tract
Summule
afterwards
ofSpain's
Tractatus
Peter
logicales
), asisoften
(called
IIIisalready
Tract
a rather
free
of
whereas
IIrunparallel
toPeter's
ofTract
work,
adaptation
part
differences
from
IVandV (Desuppositionibus
Peter's
text.TheTracts
etc.)showsuchimportant
ofit. Tract
VIisanadaptation
anadaptation
ofPeter's
beconsidered
work
cannot
that
Peter's
they
Peter's
IX(Dedemonstratodowith
Tract
tract.
Delocis.
VII(Defallaciis
Tract
tract
) hasnothing
inPeter's
work.
tionibus
) hasnoparallel
2

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

ut 'homo',et
terminus
Communi
nemet discretam.
communis,
supponit
suppositione
* vel lhichomo'
' Sortes
ut
. Iterum
terminus
discreta
discretus,
suppositione
supponit
et
fit
in
terminm
communis
dividitur
absolutum,
absoltam,
per
que
suppositio
theanonymous
onthis
relativum,
relativam,
follows
[then
commentary
quefitperterminm
lemma]
et accidentalem.
soletdividiin naturalem
communis
Suppositio
[f.4ova]Suppositio
indifferenter
vocatur
naturalis
secundum
pro omnibus
pro
supponit
quam1terminus
et futuris.
tampropresentibus
(Et hacsupquampreteritis
quibuspotestsupponere,
vocatur
secundum
accidentalis
inscientiis
utimur
demonstrad
vis)2.Suppositio
positione
vel
et
et
solum
terminus
pro
presentibus
preteritis,
pro
presentibus
supponit
quam
etetiammaxime
utuntur
insermonibus
Ethacsuppositione
utimur
futuris.
hystorialibus
sophistes.
The occurrence of naturalsuppositionin Buridan's Summulais the more
strikingas manyof his contemporariesdo not mentionit at all in their
compendia of logic (Ockham, Burley, Albert of Saxony, Marsilius of
Inghen, Thomas Manlefelt). In the Summulano furtherexposition is
given than that natural supposition is the one used in demonstrative
science.
As a matterof fact,Buridanhimselfused it forthatpurpose. In his
4
commentaryon Aristotle's NicomacheanEthics natural supposition is
adduced in order to explain the logical possibilityof demonstrative
propositionswhose subject termsdo not referto an existentparticularat
the time the propositionis uttered.
In Eth. Nicom
. VI, 1139 b 22-24 Aristotlecharacterizesscientific
as
knowledge being of the universal,necessaryand eternal. In Robert of
Lincoln's translationwe read :
si
VI 3, 1139b 18-24:Scientia
Eth.Nicom.
quidemigiturquidest,hincmanifestum,
non
seimus
enim
Omnes
non
et
similitudines.
certificare sequi
suspicamur
quod
oportet
autemaliter,cumextraspeculari
aliterse habere.Contingentia
fiant,
contingenter
velsi suntvelnonsunt.Exnecessitate
latent
ergo.Exnecessitate
ergoscibile,eternum
etincorruptibilia.
autemingenita
eterna
omniaeterna,
enimentiasimpliciter
Buridandevotes an extensive quest'ioto this passage in his Commentary
1 tobeunderstood
iliasecundum
quam.
2 supplied
edition.
from
theprinted
3 sophistice
MS.
* Questiones
Fans1489;Paris1518;(Jxiord
editions:
X libros
1637;and
Ethicorum,
super
printed
inTextus
Aristotelis
Ethicorum
Ethics
ontheNicomachean
with
Mrtius
Magistri's
expositions
together
in eundem
et
commentario
cumfamiliarissimo
translationem
iuxtaantiquam
ad Nicomachum
doctissimorum
ad mentem
ac dubiiscircalitteram
emergentibus
questionibus
compendiosis
Le Maistre
wasa fifteenth
Paris1496.Mrtius
etJohannis
Martini
virorum
Buridani,
Maistri
Paris1489andtheMS.B. N.Lat.
Nominalist
French
(d. 1482).- I haveusedtheedition
century
16.128.
53

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

omnescibilesit eternum1.
It has been studied
(questio 6 of Book VI) : Utrum
cit
Theodore
Kermit
Scott
.
(op.
pp. 662-669), who used
thoroughlyby
the copy preservedin Paris, B.N. Lat. 16.128 (s. XIV). I recapitulatehis
resultsas faras theyconcernnaturalsupposition.
As to the problem whether everythingknowable is eternal the
crucial point is the relation between the necessarytruthrequired for
propositionsin demonstrativescience, and the contingentexistence of
the thingsknown. Buridan firstdiscusses several other solutions of the
problem. Amongthem is that of Ockham, who held the view that all
(affirmative)demonstrativepropositions,althoughcategorical in form,
must be regarded as disguised hypotheticais. Thus the proposition:
thunder
is a soundin theclouds' (' tonitruum
estsonusfactusin nubibus
') is
true even if there is no thunderat the time the propositionis uttered,
since it mustbe interpretedas : 'if thereis thunder
, thenit is a soundin the
clouds'. And in this way affirmativescience may be obtained of nonentities,for in the above propositionsadequation of the intellectto the
thing (which sufficesfor havingtruth) is preserved,when the intellect
does not understandthat a vacuum is a place, but that if it existed, it
wouldbe a place :
inX Ethic.
Arist.
ed. Paris1489,VIq. 6,f. 14va:Istidicunt
Questiones
quodde hiisque
non sunt,formari
sed tarnen
affirmative,
perpetueveritatis
possuntpropositiones
vel'sitonitruum
estlocus1
est
Ut'sivacuum
est
estsonus
innubibus*
.
, ipsum
, ipsum
ypothetice.
scientia
In
habere
affirmativa.
dictis
Etitadenon-existentibus
enim
potest
propositioniadremsufficiens
adveritatem,
intellectus
bussalvatur
intellectus
non
adequatio
quoniam
sitlocus,sedquodsi esset,essetlocus.Etitalicetinrevacuum
quodvacuum
intelligit
nonsitlocus,tameninre,sivacuum
esset,essetlocus
de talibus
rebusnondebemus
istiquodinscientia
Ideodicunt
propositiones
intelligere
sedypotetice.
licetcathegorice
Verbigratia,
brevitatis,
proponantur
gratia
cathegorice,
' tonitruum
' innondebeoistampropositionem
estsonus
in LibroMetheorum
in nubibus
sedypotetice,
scilicet
, vel
quod'sitonitruum
quianonessetscibilis,
telligere
cathegorice,
'.
innubibus
tonitruum
est
estsonus
, ipsum
quandocumque
Buridan believes that such a great controversyamong the ones holding
these opinions sprangfroma lack of logic. All of themfailedto see that
names which signifythingswithoutconsignifying
any determinatetime,
For one can forma
and
future
thingsindifferently.
signifypresent,past
of
a
from
the
in
the
intellect
of
concept
thingand the
composite
' concept
a time, past or futureas well as present,such as in saying: Caesar was'
1 A complete
is found
in: Philosophy
ofthisquestio
translation
In The
J.Walsh
byJames
English
Traditions
edited
and
andJames
Middle
The
Islamic,
Christian,
byArthur
Jewish
Hyman
Ages.
J.
10.
andLondon
NewYork,
1967,
Evanston,
Walsh,
pp.705^7

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

cCaesar will be . So a term

may sometimes stand for past and future
:
thingsjust as forpresentones indifferently
interopinantes
Et credoquodtantafuitortacontroversia
ex defectu
Ibid.i4va-vb:
res
nomina
Videtur
enim
michi
nullum
quod
que
significant
consignificando
logice.
respresentes,
indifferenter
et futuras.
Nec
determinatum,
pretritas
tempus
significant
remnullum
Unde
determinatum.
mirum,
tempus
quiapossum
intelligere
cointelligendo
interconceptum
rei et conceptum
ita
componere
temporis,
possum
apudintellectum
'
ut dicendo:4Cesar
velfuturi
sicutpresents,
fui, Cesareri. Et itanonest
preteriti
et futuris
sicutpropreseninconveniens
terminm
propreteritis
supponere
aliquando
tibus.
Thus Buridan appears to hold that in the case of demonstrativepropositions, this view of the logic of names may solve our problem. They
do not make an assertionabout any particulartime, but about all times.
The termsof such propositionsare regarded to stand for all thingsthat
theysignify,i.e. can possiblydenote, regardlessof the particulartime of
their (possible) existence. It is here that Buridan has recourse to the
older logicians1. He thinks that they recognized this in distinguishing
between accidental and natural supposition. A term is said to have
accidentalsuppositionifit standsforthingsexistingat some determinate
time, whereas a term havingnaturalsuppositionstandsfor all concrete
thingsit signifies(all its supposita),regardlessof whether they exist at
the presenttime, existed in the past, or will exist in the future.This is
the kind of suppositionused in demonstrativescience :
communis
: Duplexenimsecundum
Ibid., f. i 4vl>
antiquos
supposilogicosesttermini
estquandoterminus
Accidentalis
solumsupponit
et accidentalis.
tio,scilicetnaturalis
naturalis
indiffeautemestquandosupponit
alicuius
determinati
temporis,
prosuppositis
sivepreterita
sivefutura.
sivesintpresentia
Ethac
suissuppositis,
renter
proomnibus
Aliter
ostendentem
demonstrationem
scientie
demonstrative.
utuntur
per
suppositione
de triangulis
scientiam
habettresetc.,nonhaberemus
futuris;
quodest
quodtriangulus
utdictum
fuit.
inconveniens,
Buridan holds that Aristotlein the firstBook of the Posterior
Analytics
gives the understandingof the universalproposition where the terms
1 Itmay
Buridan
that
inhisPrologue
toourwork
that
he
inthis
connection
benoticed
says
explicitly
inthefield
ofethics
: Inhocautem
totherecent
theolder
ones,
opusculo
especially
opinions
prefers
meiiudicii
sententiis
etauctoritatibus
doctorum
etineptitudinem
meam
inexperientiam
propter
etiam
Pluries
adherebo.
quantumcumque
apparentibus,
magis
quamnovisrationibus,
antiquorum
noviter
sententiis
rationibus
enimmeinveni
emergentibus,
antiquorum
numquam,
deceptum
vonSachsen.
Albert
SeinLebensgang
undsein
inmoralibus.
Heidingsfelder,
Cp.Georg
specialiter
zurGeschichte
desAristoteles,
Ethik
derPhilosophie
des
zurNicomachischen
Kommentar
Beitrge
such
undUntersuchungen
Texte
Mittelalters.
22,3-4,Munich
1927,p. 91.- Forthelogicians
seebelow,
asmeant
byBuridan,
pp.67-68.
SS

189.235.178.250

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have natural supposition, that animal is predicated of every man; for

call somethingman, it is true to call it animal. So the
ij it is true to
9
omnishomo
est animal is a universal one according to
proposition
natural suppositionin the sense: if whatever it is true to call manand
wheneverit is true to call it man,thenit is also true to call it animal. In
thismanner,i.e. accordingto naturalsupposition,the termsalwaysrefer
as to the time at which they
to particularbeings, althoughindifferently
exist
:
(ed)
possibly
dat1intellectum
de omni
PrimoPoste
riorum
Ibid.: Et Aristotiles
, ubi
propositionis
dicitur
habent
dietamsuppositionem
termini
naturalem,
animal,
quoddeomnihomine
estilluddicereanimal
estdicerealiquidhominem
; etsiverealterum,
, verum
quiasiverum
' homo
vel 1omnishomoest
estanimaV
Hoc est dictuquodistapropositio
et alterum.
' est deomni
si quiequidestverumdicere
naturalem:
secundum
animal
suppositionem
est
verum
dicere
et
dicere
hominem,
hominem, quandocumque
ipsumettuncsitverum
*referendo
innubibus
estsonus
Etitahecestvera: 4tonitruum
animal.
singula
singulis.
Hence it appears that Buridan does not reject the interpretationof a
categorical proposition of demonstrativescience as the corresponding
hypothetical.However, he insiststhat as long as such a proposition is
understood as the corresponding hypothetical, knowledge of the
propositioncannotproperlybe said to be knowledgeof particularbeings.
In his view, a categorical proposition whose terms have natural
supposition,do afforddirectreferenceto concreteparticularbeings,i.e.
not onlyto those of the presenttime, but of all timesin pastand future.
If one would remarkthatBuridan's own position is quite the same
as Ockham's, since Buridan,too, attributesa hypotheticalsense to the
categorical proposition under discussion, our author answers that the
two opinions differin their way of expressing (in modoloquendi).The
differenceis thatOckham and his followersdo not concede the categorical propositionqua categorical,while Buridandoes :
Voscoinciditis
cumopinione
diceretaliquis: "Domine,
Ibid.: Sedstatim
precedente,
sensum
etitaaliiconcedeVos
scibili
dicte
ypoteticum,
assignatis
quoniam propositioni
et scibiles".
necessarias
bantde talibuspropositiones
Respondeo
quodforte
ypoteticas,
sed
in
intendebant
secundum
hecopinioet illaeandem
sententiam2, differunt
logicam
rebuspropositionem
in predictis
cathemodoloquendi.Primienimnonconcedimi
earnesseverasecundum
concedo
insensucathegorico.
suppositionem
Egoautem
goricam
declaratur
Nec oportet,si sensusalicuiuspropositionis
naturalem.
per ypoteticam,
essetypotetica.
Sicenimomnis
sitypotetica.
hociliapropositio
propositio
quodpropter
So Buridan takes the natural supposition used by the older logicians
1 Anal.
I 4,73a 21ff.
Post.
2 Scott
scientiam.
hastheconfusing
reading
$6

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

(iantiquilogici) as an omnitemporal
supposition, which causes a term to
stand for all its possible suppositaindifferently,
whether theyare in the
present,past, or future.
g - A 14th centurydiscussionof Buridan's naturalsupposition
In a Parisianmanuscript(B.N. Lat. 14.716) datingfromthe second part
of the fourteenthcenturyBuridan's Summulahas been preservedtogether
with a commentaryon it by an anonymous master1.Unlike Johannes
Dorp, whose commentarywas printed togetherwith Buridan's text in
the Venice editions2,this anonymous commentatorgives an extensive
discussionof Buridan's naturalsupposition. I give the complete text of
this discussion.
B.N.Lat.14.716,ff.4ova-4irb:
dividitsuppositionem
in
1.1 Istaest quartapars.In qua actornoster3
communem
et accidentalem
et posteadeclaratmembra.Et patetin
naturalem
suppositionem
littera.
istampartem
1.2. Contra
arguitur.
inordine
adcopulam
suepropositionis.
1. 2. i . Quilibet
terminus
supponit
Ergonullaest
est bona*.Etantecedens
naturalis*.
patet(per) diffinitionem
suppositio
Consequentia
suppositionis.
1.2.2. Secundosic. Si aliquisterminus
naturaliter,
supponeret
sequiturquod ista
' secundum
essetvera' rosaest
istamsuppositionem,
supposito
quodnullarosa
propositio
deestfalsum
et nonestitasicutperearnasseritur
esse.Consequentia
sit.Consequens
ista
clarator.
naturaliter,
Quiarosaestvelfuit,ergosi li 'rosa'supponat
quod
sequitur
' est
'rosaest
vera,supposito
presenti.
propositio
quodnullarosasitintempore
suntdiverse
naturali
Adevidentiam
istius
estnotandum
partis
quoddeistasuppositione
oppiniones.
rationibus.
2. Quidam
talemsuppositionem6
esseetprobant
pluribus
ponunt
'
actumanime,intellectus
2.1. Primaestquodverbasignificantia
'
etc., sicut intelligo
'
'
suissignificatis
ad supponendum
terminos
etc.,ampliant
que
pro omnibus
significo
Connaturaliter.
vel erunt.Ergorespectu
illorumtermini
sunt,fuerunt
supponunt
est bona?,quiaterminm
nonestaliudquamipsumsupponaturaliter
supponere
sequentia
vel erunt,ut patetin textu.
nerepro omnibus
suissignificatis
que sunt,fuerunt,
1
1
tur
communi
Et
eodem
modo
concedi
ter.
potestarguide istoverbopotest
Consequens
etdealiisterminis,
.
<ut>'possibile1
velsimiles,
sic. Namterminus
2.2. Secundo
peristas[40^] dictiones,
quiconfunditur
1 Itisfound
11iva.
onff.Ira2 Forthis
seeabove,
work,
p.47,n.4.
3 Buridan
ismeant,
notPeter
ofSpain.
Seeabove,
p. 2,n.4.
4 corrected
materialis.
from
5 bona
nota
MS.
scripsi
0 propositionem
MS.
7 bona
notaMS.
scripsi
SI

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'eternaliter
'
naturaliter.
', sempersupponimi
j perpetuo
Ergosempereritaliqua suppositionaturalis.
bona1est.Etantecedens
Consequentia
patet,quia supponimi
proomnibussuissignificatis
velerunt.Namsupposito
que sunt,fuerunt,
quodSortescurrat
per
et statur
totamhoram
(?) tempore
; licet
presentem
presenti
preciseprohorapresent
currit
est
currit,
possitconcediquodSortessemper
quiainomnitempore
quianullum
nisipresenset perconsequens2
curritin omnitemporepresenti,
tempus
numquam
tamen
conceditur
eternaliter
velperpetuo
currit
nisihocessetverum
currit,
quodSortes
vel
erit.
est,
fuit,
proquolibet
tempore
quod
2.3. Tertiosic. Nisialiquisterminus
naturaliter,
supponeret
sequitur
quodistaesset
*
' et
3 estsonus
falsa: tonitruum
luminis
in soleseusolis
'
j actusin nubibus
'yrisestreexio
inLibro
estfalsum,
conceduntur
Metheorum
etabaliis
quiadictepropositiones
Consequens
tonitruum
sitet quod
valet,quiaegosuppono
philosophis.
Consequentia
quodnullum
nonsupponant
naturaliter
sedsolumpro
propositionum
yrisnonsit.Si ergosubiecta
manifeste
presentibus,
sequitur
quodpronullosupponunt.
: ' triangulus
habettresngulos
2.4. Quartosic. Si geometer
per istampropositionem
'
duobus
deomnitriangulo
velerit,etnonsolum
rectis
habetscientiam
est,fuit,
equales
qui
'
de presentibus,
naturaliter.
(est) bona*.Et
supponit
Consequentia
ergoli triangulus1
si
alicui
sit
antecedens
patet,quia
geometre modofactademonstratio
propositionis
tresannosfiunt
nonoportet
istigeometre
de
(et) infra
pluresnovitriangulis,
predicte
illishaberenovm
essedeintentione
Ethocvidetur
demonstrationem.
Primo
Philosophi
dicentis
dicoquodnonestinaliquosicetinaliquonon
: deomniquidem
Posteriorum6
necaliquando
sicetaliquando
non?etc.w
Possibleestessepropositionem
cuiuscopulanullum
i.. Quintosicarguitur.
tempus
et in talipropositione
termini
connotaret;
naturaliter;
supponerent
ergoest aliqua
Maiornotaest,(quia),utexfidecredimus,
naturalis.
Deuspossetanichilare
suppositio
omnetempusceterisomnibus
remanentibus
; quo factoadhucpossibileessetistam
est' vel 'Deusest1;et tamencopulatalis
veram8esse: 'nullum
propositionem
tempus
nullum
Etminor
connotaret.
propositionis
tempus
patetde se. Namintalipropositione
'
1
suissignificatis,
noncogitando
tempus
supponeret
proomnibus
aliquodtempus.
2.6. Sextosic. Non9circumscriptum
videturquod quedamcopulapossit
miraculum
est de se, solam
imponisinealiquaconnotatione
temporis.
Copulaenim,quantum
terminorum
et
est
ut videtur
velie
compositionem
purumsincathegoreuma,
significai
in PrimoPeryermenias10.
Philosophus
verbum
absolute
a connotatione
sic. Licetnullum
2.7. Septimo
potestimponi
temporis,
verbum
tamenpotestimponi
Etin ordinead tale
tempus
aliquod
quodlibet
significans.
verbum
terminus
suissignificatis
naturaliter,
supponeret
quiasupponeret
proomnibus
velerunt.Ergoetc.
(41ra)quesunt,fuerunt,
1 bona
notaMS.
scripsi
2 perconsequens
MS.
scripsi
potest
3 tonitruum
= tonitruus
= classical
Latin
tonitrus.
4 bona
notaMS.
scripsi
5 trianguli
circuii
MS.
scripsi
6 Anal.
I 4,73a 28-29.
Post.
7 etaliquando
nonscripsi
necaliquando
necMS.
8 veram
naturalem
MS.
scripsi
9 nonscripsi
namMS.
10Deinterpr.
3,16b 23-2$.
s8

189.235.178.250

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Our anonymousauthor explicitlysays that this view of natural supposition is Buridan's. He thinksit veryprobable, and assumes thatpropo
sitions such as manis an animal' are to be interpretedaccording the
subject term's havingnaturalsupposition.He adds thatin some Bull this
propositionwas understoodin thisway:
Et est multum
ut notavi,linde
f. 41ra: staopinioest actorisnostri1.
probabilis,
et suppositionem
istaconcederetur
necessaria
istamoppinionem
:
secundum
simpliciter
insuabulla.
'homo
estanimal'
albus2
. EtistomodoCardinalis
intelligebat
To sum up our anonymous*commentson Buridan's naturalsupposition,
we see thatall argumentsadduced in supportof thiskind of supposition
stress its omnitemporalcharacter: that a term has natural supposition
means nothing else but that it stands for all its supposits, viz. those
which exist, those which have existed and those which will exist (see
'
text quoted, nr. 2.1.). Terms which are distributedby eternaliter',
9
4
have naturalsupposition (2.2). Scientific
perpetuoand the like
always
as
thunder
is
a soundin theclouds'which are foundin
such
propositions
Aristotle cannot be assumed to be true unless natural supposition
exists (2.3). The fourthargument(2.4) is thatadduced by Buridanin his
EthicsCommentary3.The fifth,sixth,and seventhargument(2.^; 2.6;
2.7) underlinethe omnitemporalcharacterof naturalsupposition.They
fitin verywell with what Buridansaysin his EthicsCommentary*.
Next our anonymousauthoradds some Notabilia.
Notabilia
nonponitur
estquodabaliismodernis
huiusmodi
3 Sednotandum
quianon
suppositio,
ser
monis.
ternecipsaestdevirtute
utiturea communi
estquodtalissuppositio
notandum
4 Secundo
dupliciterpotest
ymaginari.
in ordinead verbumaliquod,vel ad predicatum,
4.1 Primomodoquod terminus
vel erunt,et sic supponit
suissignificatis
pro omnibus
que sunt,fuerunt,
supponat
non
terminus
ab omnibus
talissuppositio.
Etistomodo
conceditur
Namaliquando
naturaliter.
vel
etiam
omnibus
suis
solum(supponit)
erunt,
fuerunt,
sunt,
ymmo
que
pro
significatis
erunt,ymmosecundum
esse,licetnumquam
aliquosterminus
pro illisque possunt
esse.Ut in ista
licetnonpossunt
proillisque possunt
supponit
aliquando
ymaginari,
*
'chimera
* et li ' vacuum
1chimera
li
inatur'
vel
'vacuum
:
ymag
ymaginatur1
propositione
esse.
esse,licetnonpossint
proillisquepossunt
supponunt
ymaginari
1 Seeabove,
n.3.
P.7,
2 Issuing
Bullsof
So wehaveseveral
bullswasnotreserved
to PopesonlyinMediaeval
times.
albus
a mannered
Cardinalis
Cardinal
Nicholas
ofCusa.Therefore
weneednotconsider
expression
=
Albensis
forCardinalis
mistake
asa copyist's
Onemight
beinclined
albus
forPope.
totake
Cardinalis
= theCardinal
of
whowasbishop
ofAlba
Albiensis
theCardinal
whowasbishop
; orforCardinalis
I have
asyetinidentifying
notsucceeded
thisman.
Alby.
3 beeabove,
p. ca..
*
Seeabove,
p. 54.
S9

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huiusmodi
sic,videlicet
4-2 Secundomodopotestymaginari
suppositio
quodterminus
suissignificatis
naturaliter
et proomnibus
vel
sunt,fuerunt,
supponat
que
quandoque
estsonus
inpropositione
Utinista:'tonitruum
actus
innubibus1
erunt
meredepresenti.
, li
j
' tonitruum
'
Et
et
isto
futuris.
modo
non
supponeret
propresentibus,
preteritis
oportet
cumipsanonsitde virtute
sermonis.
maxime
suppositionem
ponere,
predictam
solvirationes
alterius
Etperhocpossunt
oppinionis1.
et secundam
rationes:quandosic, diciturquodrespectu
illarum
S.1-.2Ad primam
vel
benesupponunt
suis
Et
dictionum
erunt.
hoc
non
fuerunt,
sunt,
pro
que
significatis
estcontra
ad copulam.
dicta,quiahocestinordine
sic: nisialiquisterminus
eie.",dicoquodisteproposi.3. Adtertiam
quandodicitur
sintfalse,supposito
tions: 4tonitruum
... etc.' de virtute
sermonis
quod nullumtonisubhocsensu: quando
abAristotile
truum
sitet quodyrisnonsit.Sedponuntur
(cum)innubibus,
estvelfuitvelerit,ipsumestvelfuitveleritsonusfactus
et
quetonitruum
luminis
solis.
quando
(cum)queyrisestvelfuitvelerit,st(vel)fuitveleritreflexio
etc.",concedoillud.
g.4 Adquartam:
sigeometre
'
' in
hocnonsequitur
.41Sedpropter
predicta
triangulus
quiaisteterminus
propositionesupponat
vel
licet
illis
omnes
Sedsi
pro quesunt,fuerunt, erunt,
tringulos
significet.
dealiquaconclusione
habetur
verascientia
scientia
de
demonstrata
omnibus
(habeatur),
pereiussubiectum.
significatis
et per quos3primo
.42Vel potestdici quod hoc est quia per casuspremissos2
demonstratur
suppositoquod omnes
predictaconclusio,ipsa possetdemonstran,
vel
de
facto
Et
essent.
ideononoportetfieri
iam
sunt,
fuerunt,
erunt,
qui
trianguli
demonstrationem.
novam
est esse propositionem
sic: possibile
etc.",potest
g.gi Ad quintam
quandodicitur
ratioarguitde
dici quod hoc nonest verumnaturaliter
loquendo,(4irl))modo*1*
i.
potentia
supernatural
esset,adhuccopuleconno.2 Aliter
tempus
possetdiciquod,supposito
quodnullum
rent
ordine
adcopulam.
et
in
tarent
sic
termini
suppone
tempus
ymaginabile
licet
ratione
dici
verbalis,
sic,
.6 Adsextam
copula
copulationis
quando potest quod
solamunionem
tarnen
ipsanonpotestabsolvia connotatione
temporis
quia
significet,
ipsa(m)habeta modosignificandi
gramaticali.
ad significandum
diciturquod si talisterminus
omne
.j Ad ultimam
imponeretur
suissignificatis
inordinead ipsumbenesupponerent
tunctermini
proomnibus
tempus,
velerunt.
Ethocnonestcontra
dicta,quiahocpriusfuitconcessum.
fuerunt,
quesunt,
We learn from the author's Notabilia that some other contemporary
logicians reject naturalsuppositionas not of common use nor being by
sermonis
virtueof speech (de virtute
), a heavychargeagainstan Ockhamist,
indeed (text quoted, nr. 3). Next follows an interestingremarkto the
extent that all logicians accept natural supposition if it is meant as
omnitemporal and even atemporal, in which latter case according to
some logiciansit even mayreferto impossiblethings,suchas a chimaera.

1 are used
This seems to be the case when special verbssuch as imaginar
1 viz.those
andhisadherents
adduced
(ournr.2.1-2.7).
byBuridan
2 premissas
MS.
3 quasMS.
60

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

; see the text quoted, nr.

(in ordinead verbum
aliquod vel ad predicatum
the
of
Buridan's
view object, that if in a
However,
4.1).
opponents

of
such
as
thunderis a soundin the
proposition merely present tense,
term
for
the
stands
all
its
clouds',
subject
suppositswhich exist, have
existed, and will exist, then natural suppositionneed not be assumed,
especially since it is not based on speech (cum ipsa non sit de virtute
sermonis;nr. 4.2).
From thispoint of view Buridan's arguments2.1-2.7 are enervated
(S-i-.j). His arguments2.1 and 2.2 are explained as being in favourof
the former sense of 'suppositionaturalis
', which is in common use
to
nr.
his
4.1). Buridan's third argument
opponents (see
according
the
Ockhamist
is
refuted
(2.3)
by
interpretationof demonstrative
propositions,which must be regarded1as disguisedhypothetical (.3).
His fourthargument(2.4) is rejected by the statementthat once true
knowledgeabout one conclusion is obtained, all other utterancesof this
conclusion are implicitlycontained (^.41). This seems to referto the
Ockhamists' failingto distinguishbetween what in modernparlanceis
termed type-sentenceand token-sentence,to the extent that for them
the proposition being a token-sentenceidentical tokens are the same
proposition2.An alternativerefutation(.42) of the same argumentof
Buridan's seems to go in the same direction. Buridan's fifthargument
(2.) which appeals to theological sentencesis ruled out because of its
supernaturalcharacter (5.51); alternatively(5.52) the argumentmight
be enervatedin the same way as happened in 4. 1. The sixth argument
(2.6) is rejected, since the copula's connotation of time is always
involved by the grammaticalmodussignificandi
(.6). Finally,Buridan's
last argument(2.7) is rejected (.7) in the same way as his firstand
second ones (2 . 1 and 2. 2) were by the opponent's counter-argument
4. 1.
However, our anonymous author thinks that Buridan and his
adherentscan easily reject the objections adduced at the head of the
article (ournrs. 1.21 and 1.22).
faciliter
solvere
radones
aliamoppinionem
Ibid.,f.4irb: Sedtenentes
possunt
priusfactas.
diffinitio
solumdeturde sup6.1 Ad primam,
quod predicta
suppositionis
negatur
positionaccidentali.
1 Seeabove,
p. C4.
2 Ockham
attacked
Holkot
wasseverely
Deus
I, q. 6 (Utrum
byRobert
(Disputatio
quodlibetalis
Holkot
onthisaccount.
eventookitforaninadmissible
scire
concession
to
posset
plura
quam
seit))
a sortofabstract
sincehesupposed
ittoinvolve
SeeErnest
AQuodA. Moody,
Platonism,
entity.
Holkot
Problem
libetal
O.P.onthe
andBelief
in: Speculum
Question
ofthe
Objects
39
ofRobert
ofKnowledge
(1964),pp.3-74,
esp.p. 69.
6l

189.235.178.250

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1est
'rosaest
6.2 Adaliam,concedoquodhecpropositio
vera,supposito
quodnullarosa
si
estfalsa,quiali
naturaliter.
Sed ipsade virtute
sermonis
sit,et hoc rosasupponat
*rosa
*de virtute
sermonis
accidental
iter.
supponit
His second answer (6.2) is interestingin that he seems to agree that
natural supposition and the ideal of virtussermonis
are incompatible,
indeed.
6 - Was Buridanthe reintroducerof naturalsupposition?
As we have seen above (pp. 3 if.), Buridan adduces the doctrine of
naturalsuppositionheld by the older logicians (<antiquilogici) in support
of his own view of the matter.This appeal to the older logicians seems
to point indeed to Buridanas the reintroducerof natural suppositionin
fourteenthcenturylogic. The aim of this section will be to substantiate
this surmise by a comparison of Buridan's view with those of his
contemporariesand to show that Buridan's reintroductionof natural
of this concept.
suppositioninvolveda reinterpretation
Unlike Buridanthe other commentatorson Eth. Nicom.VI, 1139 b
19-24 did not introducenaturalsuppositionwhen discussingthe question
knowableis eternal. I take as an example Geraldus
of whethereverything
Odonis O.F.M. (d. 1349), who wrote a commentaryon the NicomacheanEthicsbefore 1329 when he was elected Magister Generalis of
the Order. I quote fromthe editionprintedin Venice in 1goo. 1
Gerald discusses our question in Book VI, q. 7. He apparently
or esse
grounds the eternalityof the knowable on its esse obiectivum
obiectaleywhich is explicitly contradistinguishedfrom existentialeternality2:
Ad evidentiam
hic de scientiaet scibili
eorumque dicuntur
Op. cit.yf. i24rftr-rb:
Etarguitur
Sed oppositum3
omnescibilesiteternum.
utrum
quod non
queritur
dicitPhilosophus
intextu....
eternitate
suntduo.Primum
Adquestionem
dicenda
quodnonomnescibileesteternum
eternitate
tudinarie
simili
propriesumpta.Secundum
quodomnescibileest eternum
dieta.
vel estexistential
vel habens
esteternum,
Primum
probo.Quia omnequodproprie
velexistentie Sednonomnescibile
existentis
etproprietas
velconditio
existentiam5
1 Sententi
Aristotelis
cum
Odonis
libros
Ethicorum
textu
Geraldi
a etexpositio
eiusdem.
cum
super
questionibus
2 Thisviewiscomparable
Tnomae
ofAscoli
ofJames
O.F.M.and,tosome
tothose
O.F.M., Peter
toGregory
ofRimini's
.
extent,
complexe
signicabile
3 viz.otthecounter
arguments.
4 i.e. God.
5 creatures.
62

189.235.178.250

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esthuiusmodi,
nonestcommensurabiis
suecoste*
; istud
quodpatetde istoscibili: 'diameter
enimestscibiledatoquodnecdiameter
neccostasintinexistentia.
Quarenonomne
scibileesteternum
tum.
proprie
sump
etsinefineetimmutabiliter
Secundum
verum,
probo.Quiaomnequodestsineprincipio
estsimilitudinarie
in
est
simile
eternoproprie
hoc
eternum;
patet,quia
sumpto
quia
caretprincipio
et fineet mutabilitate,
et habetaliqualeesse,quamvis
nonexistentiale
esse.Sedessescibileesthuiusmodi,
utvequiainsuoesseobiectali1
quodconcipimus
habet
finem
scibile
omne
rum,nonest mutabile
Quare2
neque
eque principium.
esteternum.
similitudinarie
Ethecfuitintentio
[etptalisimilitudine
Philosophi.
In his answer to an objection our author stressesagain that this kind of
eternalityis not of the existentialtype:
dicoquodBoetius
Ibid., f. 124rl):Adsecundum
deeternitate
existentiali
nature
loquitur
etdetalieternitate
nonomnescibileesseeternum.
concedimus
intellectualis,
For thatmatterlike otherRealistsGerald findsno difficulty,
of course, in
the
of
knowable
on
a
sort
of Third
the
(scibile)
eternality
grounding
World Entity,whateverthatmightbe. Therefore,we have to directour
attentionratherto authorsof the Nominalisticposition.
The firstto draw our attentionis Albertof Saxony,who also wrote
an ExpositiosuperdecernlibrosEthicorum
Aristotilis
which has not been
Albert
printed yet*. However,
intendedly keeps far from raising and
are
told
in
his Prologue to the works:
as
we
discussingdubia,
necinsistam
discussioni
dubitationum
vel
que circaaliquasex ipsisconclusionibus
Talesnamquedubitati
onesprolixius
occurrere.
earummediis6
possent
quamrequirat
debent
pertractari?.
operisintentio
presents
Add to this that, unlike Buridan's, Albert's work has not the formof
questionesso that an extensive discussion of the eternal status of the
knowableis not obvious. However, thereis some interestin the question
of whether
Albert discusses our problem, since he cannot agree on this
matterwith his fellow NominalistBuridan (viz. in reintroducingnatural
1 obiectuali
ed.
2 quare
scripsi
quiaed.
3 seclusi.
4 Formanuscript
seeG.Heidingsfelder,
op.cit.(above,
p. ss*n. i), pp.6-68.
s quoted
op.cit.,p. 82.
byHeidingsfelder,
6 = premisses.
7 Cp. theopening
ofthework:Iuxtasententias
sentence
antiquorum
expositorum
quilibros
Aristotilis
etPoliticorum,
scilicet
Yconomicorum
morales,
Ethicorum,
commentaverunt,
prolixe
sententias
deofavente
brevius
dictorum
librorum
Asa matter
offact
Albert
compilabo.
compiled
theshorter
ontheEthics.
ofBurley's
SeeHeidingsfelder,
version
commentary
op.cit.,p. 86.Burley
a more
alsowrote
extensive
oftheNicomachean
onthesixfirst
books
ashetells
Ethics,
commentary
himself
inthededication
deBury
ofDurham.
toBishop
Richard
Seeibid.
63

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

supposition),nor with the Realist Walther Burley,who apparentlywas

his favouritepredecessor,as is known1.The latterwrote his commentary
on the Ethicsbetween 1333 and 134^ and it is this work that was
followed slavishlyby Albertof Saxony3.Therefore,I thinkit not useful
to take Albert's Commentaryinto consideration^.
As a matterof fact,in his LogicaperutilisAlbertdoes not mentionat
'
all naturalsupposition,and demonstrativepropositionssuch as tonitruum
'
estsonus
factusin nubibusare said to have personalsupposition:
in
Tractatus
subiectum
dubitatur
II, cap. : Septimo
supponat
perutilis,
qualiter
Logica
nonest'.Octavodubitatur
istapropositione
: ' vacuum
subiectum
supponat
quomodo
estsonus
'rosaestpulcherrima
istiuspropositionis
: 1tonitruum
factusin aere',similiter:
, supposito
forum'
quodnullarosasit.
1vacuum
' vacuum
' in ista
non
hieterminus
propositione:
Adseptimum:
supponat
qualiter
dicoquod
Et si tudiceres:Proquo supponit?",
est', dicoquodsupponit
personaliter.
Seddiceres:ergode pronomine
potestessevacuum.
proistoquodymaginari
supponit
esthicterminus
illudi
demonstrante
verificabilis
est.
'vacuum'",
potestdiciquodverum
de possibilicumista
de inesse,sed per propositionem
Sed nonper propositionem
1
additione
essevacuum'
.
, utdicendo:hoc
potest
ymaginari
'ymaginari'
'
' : ' tonitruum
'
innubibus
Adoctavum
dico: tonitruum
estsonus
factus
supponit
personaliter,
ly
tonitruum
non
eo
nullum
sit
; sed
pro quodest,sedproeo quodfuit
positoadhucquod
velpotest
istum
demonstrante
illud.Nonoportet
terminm
esse,etetiamdepronomine
'tonitruum'
mediante
verbo
mediante
hoc verboVs',sed sufficit
hoc
verifican
quod,
'
'
esse'
fuitvel erivel'potest
essevel
inpropositione
Terminus
proeo quodfuit,velerit,velpotest
potest
supponere
Et
sic
in
tali
terminus
ampliativus. dico
ponatur
propositione
absquequod
ymaginari,
'tonitruum
innubibus'
istiuspropositionis
estsonus
factus
supponit
persoquodsubiectum
velerit,velpotest
essevelymaginari.
Sedquiaperpropositionem
naliter
proeoquodfuit,
sinetermino
denotatur
ampliativo,
proeo quodest,cumsit de predicato
supponere
diceretur
estfalsa,supposito
tonitruum
sit.Similiter
predicta
propositio
quodnullum
'rosa'in'rosaestpulcherrima
de istotermino
, positoquodnullarosasit.
forum'
So quite a gao can be noticed between Buridan'sand Albert'sviews of the
suppositionof the subject termsof demonstrativepropositions.For that
matter,anotherNominalist,Marsiliusof Inghen(d. 1396), does not join
Buridaneither.
In his SummulaMarsilius seems to ignore natural suppositionas a
subdivision of supposition. For that matter, such propositions as
vacuumes are consideredfalse since the
subject termstandsfor nothing
):
(pro nullo supponit
1 SeeHeidingsfelder,
op.cit., pp.83-90.
2 Ibid.
, p. Sg.
3 Ibid.
ypp.83n.,esp.99-107.
I havenocopyofitatmydisposal.
5 quoted
after
B.N.Lat.18.430.
6+

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00:13:37 AM

Summula
C.L.M.7709,f. ir: Suppositio
estacceptio
termini
inpropositione
, Munich
pro
vel
de
vel
talis
de
terminus
verificatur
mediante
aliquo, proaliquibus, quo,
quibus,
'homo
ut in hacpropositione
curri'y 'homo'
copulatalispropositionis,
supponit
pro
verificatur
mediante
hac copula.
quolibethominequi est,quia de quolibetistorum
Ex istadiffinitione
infertur
isteterminus
communiter
quod si nichilcurrat,
4homo
in
ista
curri1
communis
nullo
positus
propositione
pro
supponit,
quia tuncde
nulloverificatur
entemundi
mediante
copulaistiuspropositionis,
quia,
quocumque
tunchecestfalsa.Etconsimiliter
inista:'kymera
estkjmera
subiectum
demonstrato,
' etsicdeconsimilibus.pro
nullosupponit,
necinista:1Antichristus
est' aut' vacuum
est
;
Marsilius' view of this matter is more clarified in his Sententie
on the Sentences
Marsilius once mentions
commentary.In his Questiones
naturalsuppositionas used in common usage (In III Sent. q. 13 art. 2 :
utrumin triduo2Christus
Jueritverehomosicutfuit in vita)*. It should be
noticed thatthisview of naturalsuppositionis Buridan's:
f. 442va: Tertiusmodus(sc. dicendi)est communis
scholeparisiensi,
dicensquod
intriduo
nonfuithomo.
Christus
Secundoestnotandum
naturalem
quodsecundum
suppositionem
potestconcediquod
hecfuitintriduo
vera:' Christus
esthomo'
secundum
acciden, que tarnen
suppositionem
veraineodemtriduo,
talemnonfuisset
ad triduum
nonfuerit
quia,licetperrespectum
naturalis
turcumtermini
homoanteet post.Et suppositio
attendi
homo,fuittarnen
indifferenter
cuiuslibet
differentie
Immosic quilibet
accipiuntur
respectu
temporis.
velantenativitatem
veredicitur
homoetiampostmortem
homo,quiaadsuppositionem
non requiritur
verificatio
talisterminorum
ad tempus
naturalem
perrespectum
presens
sedperrespectum
velindifferens,
adtempus
absolutum
scilicet
quodestvelquodfuitvel
invulgato
dicitur
eritpresens.
in
sermone
etiam
Quomodo
flos,
quodrosaestpulcerrimus
nulla
rosa
existente.
hyeme
Our authoragrees with the ParisianSchool that Christwas not a man in
. At the end of this question
the three days before the resurrection*
Marsilius mentions (the Buridanian) natural supposition again, as a
means to answer our question in the affirmative
:
aliiquodChristus
intriduoeratChristus
f.446vto
: Aliterdicunt
secundum
suppositionulla
rosa
conceditur
existente
secundum
nemnaturalem,
quam
quodrosaestrosa,quia
fuitrosa.Namsuppositio
naturalis
ad nullam
crtam
differentiam
determinai.
temporis
Eteo modopossetconcediquodintriduo
verum
eratdicere' Christus
esthomo',
quiafuit
fuithecvera:Christus
estintriduo
mortis
ibi
homo;nontarnen
homo',
quia restringitur
1 currit
estterminus
MS.
scripsi
2 i.e.inthethree
between
hisdeath
andhisresurrection.
days
3 Questiones
Marsilii
libros
Sententi
Minerva
Frankfurt
am
arum,
ioi(reprint
Strassburg
super
quatuor
Main1966),ff.442rb-447ra.
4 op.cit.
Welearnfrom
studii
yconclusiof.443ra.
Bacon,
Roger
Compendium
theologie
p. 2l
inhisdays
a great
that
students
heldthetruth
ofpro191
(Aberdeen
sqq.ed.Rashdall
1)
many
as*Christ
inthe
andhisresurrection
such
wasa man
three
between
hisdeath
.
days
positions

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

illudChristo
noncompetebat.
Nec etiam
ad triduum
essehominem
mortis,
proquo
' estinferius
4
ad'hominem*
eratChristus
.
Christus
proutChristus
proiliotriduo
Even identitypropositionsare false when their subject terms referto
nothingexistentat the time the propositionis uttered:
'
intriduo
: Contra.Tu dicis: ,,inista:*Christus
ff.446vb-447ra
fuitChristus
predicatur
tioestvera."
idemde se; ergoproposi
nonvalet.UndeillaregulaBoetii: *nullaestverior
illa
quodconsequentia
Respondetur
subiectosupponente
etc.'1intelligitur
[447ra]Non enimest istavera:
pro
aliquo.

1chimera
ibiidemde
estDeusquiestmalus'
estchimera1
, quamvis
, necista: Deusquiestmalus
' Christus
'
hic
terminus
in
de
Modo
triduo
presenti
pro
copule
respectu
seipsopredicetur.
nullosupposuit.
'
FinallyMarsiliussaysthatthe famousParisianarticle concerning homoest
9
animal (compare above, p. 9 and note 2) can only be maintainedif it is
takenaccordingto naturalsupposition:
estanimal',
'homo
f.447ra:Adhocautemquoddicitur
respondequodhecestnecessaria
si
de necessitate
illam
necessariam
turquodarticulus
parisiensis ponen
intelligatur
- loquitur
secundum
naturalem,
suppositionem
quianecesseesthominem
cathegorica
fuisseanimal.
' Christus
estChristus'
Eteodemmodoconcedipossetquodhecessetnecessaria
futdictum
est.2
From the above said the conclusionmaybe drawn thatin the Nominalist
tradition Buridan keeps a peculiar position in reintroducingnatural
supposition. His fellow Nominalists apparently did not join him in
appealing to the older logicians' doctrine of supposition to get a substitutefor Ockham's theoryof the categoricalpropositionas a disguised
hypotheticalwhich was intended to explain how demonstrativeprop.
ositions are possible whose subject terms refer to non-existents3
Neither Albertof Saxonynor Marsiliusof Inghenseem to have approved
of Buridan's solution, which is questionable, indeed, in that natural
suppositionsuch as interpretedby Buridan can hardlyevade the objection that it would involve some sort of omnitemporalor atemporal
entity.Justlike Buridan had rejected Ockham's view in the name of
pure Nominalism, Albert and Marsiliusmust oppose to the Buridanian
solution of the question as coming too close to the Realist view. A
1 SeePeter
Tractatus
ofSpain,
ed.De Rijk.
p. 21817*18
2 Itshould
Christi
mortis
thatPeter
benoticed
ofAilly,
thetriduum
when
(InHISent,,
discussing
amMain1968),doesnot
Frankfurt
Minerva
ed.Strassburg
dubium,
1490,reprint
q. i H,second
asa possibility
tosolve
theproblem.
mention
natural
supposition
3 Seeabove,
pp.2and4.
66

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

specimenof theNominalistcriticismon Buridan'spositionis foundin the

anonymouscommentaryon Buridan's Summula1.
In this connection the question whetherScott is rightin assuming
that Buridan derived his natural supposition from Peter of Spain's
Tractatus(called afterwardsSummule
)2 is of some interest.Scott
logicales
refersto Peter's definitionin his sixth Tract:
naturalis
estacceptio
termini
communis
ed. De Rijk*
: Suppositio
Tractatus
VI,4, p. 8i2_s
se
natus
ut
'Ao/no'
de
a
est
natura
sua
omnibus
participan*
per
sumptus
quibusaptus
pro
etquisuntetquierunt.
hominibus
proomnibus
quifuerunt
supponit
ofa common
is thetaking
Natural
termforeverything
bywhichit [tobe
supposition
is
of
a
nature
to
be
nature
suchas the
understood
: theuniversal
it]
partaken,
by
signified
forallmenwhowereand
toitsnatures
hassupposition
common
term4manaccording
whoareandwhowillbe.
In the previousarticleI have triedto show thatPeter's naturalsupposition
must be taken as the natural capacity of a common term to stand for
somethingpartakingin the universalnaturesignifiedby thatterm,not its
actual standing for something when used in a proposition. Peter's
naturalsuppositionwas of the non-contextualtype, accidental supposition being the acceptance of a common term for all those thingsits
adjunct (or: contextualsituation) determines6.
is contextual.It is the
Well, Buridan's naturalsuppositiondefinitely
kind of suppositiona common term has when it is used as the subject
termin demonstrativepropositions,not apartfromany contextas is the
case with Peter's. Therefore we cannot say that Buridanjust derived
. The formerapparently
his natural supposition from Peter's Tractatus
had to reinterpretthe thirteenthcenturyview of natural supposition.
naturalis
?. These antiqui
Buridanrefersto the older logicians' suppositio
logici, I think, are his thirteenthcentury predecessors. If so, the
referencecan be taken as a clue to Buridan's initiativeon this score.
However, one mightsuppose thatthe phraseantiquilogiciwould referto
some contemporaneouslogicians of the via antiqua, i.e. of the Realist
School, as distinguishedfrom the Modernior Nominalists.In that case
1 Seeabove,
pp.7-61.
2 Seethearticle
mentioned
(above,
p.47,n. 2),pp.669-670.
3 Forthisedition,
seebelow,
p. 69,n. 1.
4 Using
natus
reads
dequibus
est
Scott(op.cit.,p. 670,n. 43)wrongly
edition
Bocheski's
aptus
predicari.
s i.e.itsnature
ofMan
notthenature
ascommon
; seeabove,
term,
p.49.
6 Seethefirst
article
ofthis
; 102-106.
study,
pp.73-80
7 Seeabove,
p. .
J

189.235.178.250

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some logician of the Realist School could have reinterpretedthe older

view of natural supposition. But this surmise has against itself the
complete absence of natural supposition in the logical works dating
frombetween c. 1300-c. 13701.
This much seems to be certain: Buridan's natural supposition
which was introducedin order to solve the Nominalistproblem of the
fromPeter of Spain's.
statusof scientificpropositions,is quite different
It was neverthelessrejected or ignoredby Buridan'sfellow Nominalists,
who were rightlysuspicious of his unintendedbut unmistakableconcession to the Realist view.
However, there seems to be some differencebetween Buridan's and
Ferrer's view of natural supposition. The formeris a Nominalistand
tries to avoid the assumptionof anymetaphysicalentityapartfromconcrete particularbeing in thisworld. Accordingly,a termhas, or hasnot,
Buridan's naturalsuppositionregardlessof the tense of the proposition,
to the extentthatall (possible) timesat whichparticularbeingsmaybe in
existenceare included; forthatreasonit can best be termedomnitemporal
.
On the otherhand,Ferrer's naturalsuppositionis of the Realist type,in
that it involves a metaphysicalentitywhich as a universale
is time-less
rather than omnitemporal. Therefore his natural supposition may be
termed atemporal.This distinctionis ratheracademic, indeed, and may
between Buridan's position in this matterand
clarifythe close affinity
that of the Realists, and the objections he met on this account on the
part of his fellow Nominalists.
Our next section will show that the fifteenthcenturyAlbertist
School, presumablythe most eager championof the via antiqua, restored
the thirteenthcenturyview of natural supposition taken as non-contextualby a faithfulinterpretationof Peter of Spain's Tractatus.
7 - The restorationof natural suppositionas a non-contextualone in
i$th centuryAlbertism
As is known, in the fifteenthcentury controversywith Ockhamism
there developed a movementwithinthe via antiqua, especiallyin Paris
(1407) and Cologne (1423), which is characterizedas Albertism. In
fact John de Nova Domo renovatedthe interestin Albert the Great's
1 Vincent
it wouldbetter
the
workdates
Ferrer's
from
hand,
1372.- Ontheother
explain
inthework
oftheRealist
ofthefourteenth
ofnatural
Vincent
century
type
supposition
appearance
score
hasasyetnotbeenevidenced.
School
onthis
since
aninfluence
ofBuridan
ontheRealist
Ferrer,
68

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

philosophical and theological doctrines and with his followers he

adaptedand elaboratedtheMaster'sviewsofthose doctrinalitems which
were subjectsci the eager debates of those days.
One of the adherents of the Albertist School is the Dutchman
Gerardof Harderwijk(near Zwolle ; d. i 03), who wrote a commentary
on logic accordingto Albert'sdoctrine( secundum
doctrinam
Alberti
Magni),
He turnsout to be a valuable source of informationforfifteenth
century
developmentof logic.
Gerard gives extensive comments on Peter of Spain's tract on
supposition.I quote his explanationsof Peter's text concerningnatural
supposition.Peter's text runs as follows:
alianaturalis,
: Suppositionumcommunium
TractatusW
aliaacciden1,4,p.8iI_5ed.
DeRijk1
naturalis
estacceptiotermini
communis
tals. Suppositio
a quibusaptus
proomnibus
ut 'homo*
de naturasua supponit
natusest participari,
per se sumptus
pro omnibus
sunt
fuerunt
et
et
hominibus
erunt.2
qui
qui
qui
on the so-called Parva
Gerard's commentsare foundin his Commentaries
this
lemma
as
of
runs
follows
His
.
:
logicalia*
exposition
naturalis
Commentario
ed. Cologne1488,Tract.VII, f. 8vl)4:Id est: suppositio
est
inexistens
termino
habetpienam
communi
per quamipse aptitudinem
proprietas
sive inferioribus
iuxtaliberampotentiam
se suisparticipantibuss
communicandi
sue
dicit
'/io/no'
idest
sue
.
modo
nature,
Quo
quod
perse sumptus
supponit
significations
etfuturo
de quoinpresenti,
naturaliter
estille
preterito,
predicabilis
proomnihomine
'/jomo'.
terminus
Gerard is right in explaining Peter's natural supposition as a noncontextualone, i.e. the suppositionof a common termwhen it is taken
by itself.6Its counterpartis accidental supposition, which is defined,
accordingly,as contextual, especiallypropositional:
communis
estacceptiotermini
accidentalis
Ibid.: Suppositio
prohisproquibusexigit
secundum
et virtutem
idestmodusaccipiendi
termini
suumadiunctum,
potentiam
in propositione
ei adiuncte.Quo modoterminus
trahens
determinationis
supponit
suorum
secundum
adiunctorum.
modossupponendi
diversos
exigentiam
1 Peter
called
afterwards
Trac
Summule
First
tatus,
logicales.
Portugalensis),
Hispanus
ofSpain(Petrus
TheNetherlands,
with
anIntroduction,
from
theManuscripts
Critical
Edition
Assen,
1972.
2 Foran interpretation
seethefirst
natural
ofPeter's
supposition,
partofthisstudy,
quoted
above,
p.43,n.1.
3 I haveusedthetextprinted
in Cologne
Commentarla
in
1488:Gerardus
Harderwickensis,
Zellprope
Thesection
ontheproprietates
Petri
Summulas
1488.Ulricus
Lyfkirchen)
(Coloniae
Hispani
iumPetri
inomnes
tractatus
iunctis
nonnullis
is headed
: Commentarii
terminorum
logical
parvorum
Hispani
inUniversitte
Coloniensi
continentes
Modernorum
Burse
Laurentiane
incipiuntjeliciter.
processum
4 foliation
mine.
5 participibus
(!)ea.
6 Seethefirst
and102-107
ofthis
; seealsoabove,
pp.43-44.
study,
pp.72-80
part
69

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

Then follow seven dubia. I give Gerard's answersto some of the objections to the firstdubium:
se sumptus
dicendum
extraorationem
secundum
Ibid.,f. i8ra:
quod terminus
modus
in
nec
suus
fundatur
actuali
correlatione
naturaliter,
supponendi
supponit
sicutpotentia
naturalis
in natura
ad appositum2,
sed aptitudinali,
innascitur
suppositi1
se et, licetperearnipsaresnaturalis
inclinetur
ad actum,non
secundum
reinaturali
sedtantum
actum
tarnen
actuali,
respectu
aptitudinali.
respicit
in ordinead adiunctum
ideoaccidentalis
termino
limitans
et
.... dicitur
quiaconvenit
communem.
terminm
restringens
This view of naturalsuppositionis, of course, quite incompatiblewith
Buridan's, who explicitlyregardsnaturalsuppositionas a propositional
one, as we have seen above. The thirddubiumis ofoutstandinginterestin
this connection:
inpropositions
dubium
est: Anterminus
Ibid.: Tertium
naturaliter.
Et
potestsupponere
in
ista
estanimaV
videtur
: 'homo
subiectum
naturapropositione
quodsic,quia
supponit
fieri
inpropositione.
Etsimiliter
hie: 'homo
estrisibilis'
liter; ergopotest
The opponent turns out to take naturalsuppositionin the Buridanian
sense; see the furtherexplanation:
1estterminus se
: quiainillis'homo
: Probatur
exquoilledue
Ibid,
yf. 18ra-rl)
per sumptus
in
et
in
secundo
sunt
modo
tatis.
persei
propositiones primo
estde natura
subiecti
et intrinsecum;
Secundosic. In illispropositionibus
predicatum
naturalis
: quiapredicatum
estde diffinitione
; antecedens
probatur
ergoestsuppositio
etnatura
suntidem.
subiecti
; ergodenatura,
quiadiffinitio
'homo
'homo
*
estanimaV
illis
[i8rl)]Tertiosic.Inistapropositione
accipitur
proomnibus
naturaliter , quiahomoquiest,
a3quibusestaptusnatusparticipan;
ergosupponit
etquierit,eritanimal
fuitanimal,
estanimal,
estde
; etsimilimododicendum
quifuit,
' et
est
in
alia
materia
ista'homo
estrisibilis
naturali.
qualibet que
Gerard rejects the fourteenthcenturyview of natural suppositionand
insistson the non-contextualcharacterof naturalsupposition:
naturalis
estabsoluta,
ut
Ibid.,f. i8rb: Solutio.Nonveraratioest,quia suppositio
termini
stantis
in propositione
sedsuppositio
estrespectiva.
statim
Undeterdicetur,
nonaccipitur
suesignificationis
minusinpropositione
secundum
sed
absolute,
potentiam
ordinis
secundum
teneatur
utsit
ipsiusad predicatum;
potentiam
quodsi predicatum
talisterminus
essentialis
seuinparticipatione
si accidenessentiale,
essentiali;
accipitur
enimstansin forma
inparticipatione
Terminus
taleaccipitur,
accidentali.
complexionis
secundum
nonretinet
esseproprienature,
actum.Ergonec
quod est incomplexum
et
retinet
libertatem
secundum
talis
facultatem
aptitudinispotentie,
proprie
quinimmo
1 = subject.
2 = predicate.
3 proed.
7

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siveterminorum
et esse et possecomplexorum
mensuratur
qui comcomplexionis
plectuntur1.
Our author agrees that in the above said propositions (those of the
Buridaniandemonstrativetype) the subject terms have naturalsupposiradiem
tion accordingto theirorigin ( secundum
), but he still denies that
et
actum
, i.e. according to what they
formam
they have it secundum
actuallystandforin a proposition.He adds an example:
' dumtaxat
cui
curri
. Hic *homo
estut4homo
Ibid.:Exemplum
accipitur
pro presenti2
sivesit presens
indifferenter
tarnen
inestcursus,significai
hominem,
unumquemque
cuiussignificatiosivenoncurrens
sivecurrens
sivefuturus,
sivepreteritus
; ex aptitudine
et
Sed secundum
essentiam
radiem.
ad
suam
naturalis
ns oritursuppositio
quantum
naturaliter
nisiextra
terminus
nonaccipitur
talemsuppositionem
propositionem.
naturaliter.
nullum
terminm
estinpropositione
verum
Etideosimpliciter
supponere
A furtherobjection gives him the opportunityof opposing natural
suppositionto simple supposition:
etiampro
terminus
diceres
: insuppositione
: Sedforte
Ibid.yf. 18rt>-va
accipitur
simplici
a suppositione
naturali.
distincta
iliasuppositio
nonvidetur
natura;
igitur
in suppositione
terminus
estquodaliteraccipitur
Adquoddicendum
pronatura
in
naturali.
in
aliter
et
[i8va]
Quia
accipitur
suppositione simplici
suppositione
simplici,
subaliquaintentione
a suppositis,
abstracta
secunda;
eoquodtuncaccipitur
pronaturas
secundum
terminus
naturali
sedinsuppositione
quamparticipabilis
pronatura*
accipitur
et
subindifferentia
ests ab omnibussuis suppositis
preteriti,
presents,
temporum
futuri.
Gerard had
For thatmatter,in the introductorypart of his Commentaries
as
taken
view
of
the
being always
supposition
alreadyprotestedagainst
view ofsupposition.
the
Nominalist
with
the
case
was
which
propositional
He explicitlymentions Buridan and his adherentsin this connection.
When discussingthe Nominalistdefinitionof suppositionhe insiststhat
a term may have suppositionalso when it is not used in a proposition.
verbis
:
He opposes his own view to thatof the Nominalistsexpressis

velintennature
termini
:
Ibid., f. ^va^vb
Quintodicitur
prosupposito
suppositio
diffinitio
est
an
dubium
Secundum
....
tionisacceptio
quintomodo
suppositionis
et
bona.
sit
conveniens
accepte
Nominalium.
dediffmitionibus
Etvidetur
Quorum
quodnon,perinstantiam
primo
estparspropositiostands6
esttermini
: suppositio
prosevelproalioprout
quidamdicunt
1 i.e.terms
orcomplexum.
ina proposition
used
2 sc.nomine.
3 i.e.theuniversal
otthething
nature
signihed.
* i.e.thenatural
ot theterm
aoove,p. 49.
given
signitying.
L,p.tneinterpretation
capability
lines
ofthefourth
below,
Seealsotheopening
dubium,
p.72.
quoted
5 sc.terminus.
6 terminus
stans
ed.
71

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

veroet eumsequentes
dicunt
in proposition
: estacceptiotermini
Dis.Buridanus1
pro
vel
vel
demonstratis
'hic>hec
,
proquo, proquibus,
peristapronomina
aliquo, aliquibus,
talisterminus
verificatur
mediante
hocvelequivalentia,
Utin
copulatalispropositionis.
homo
'homo'
crrente
lomnis
curri
hacpropositione
proquolibet
supponit
qui est,quiade
hec estvera:'hocestcurrens1 Ergnonvidetur
demonstratio
quolibetcrrente
istabona.Antiqui
etiamdicuntquodsuppositio
estsubstantive
reidesignatio.
diffinitio
etc
Igitur
Ad primum
est dicendum
ille
vb.... Ad obiectain oppositum.
quoddiffinitiones
nonvalent,quianonexplicant
entitatem
Modernorum
precise
suppositionis,
eoquod
sed etiamextraeam,ut inferius3
fitin propositione
nedum2
patebit
suppositio
demonstrativa
nonsuppone: demonstratis
Etiammaleadditur
, quiasic ficta*
perpronomina
est.
rent,proutipsidicunt;quodfalsum
PetriHyspani,
Diffinitio
vero Antiquorum
ideminterpretatur
quod diffinitio
quia
vi pro re subiectavel subicibili.
substanti
est acceptiotermini
vultquod suppositio
enimnotanter
differentiam
Dicitur
, adinnuendum
, etnonsignicatio
designatio
suppositionisetsignificationis.
Hence it appears that the Antiqui, i.e. the AlbertistSchool, joined the
thirteenthcenturyview of the possibilityof a non-contextualsupposition. In a fifthdubium thisview is givenagain:
estquodsuppositio
naturalis
nichilaliudest
dicendum
Ibid,
yf.6vb:Adconfirmationem
sedaccidentalis
eirespectum
substantivus,
suppositio
superaddit
quammodus
significandi
et determinationem
natusest talisterminus
ad adiunctum
per cuiusmodificationem
variari
etdistinguis.
substantivus
inmodosuosubstantivo
The fourthdubium is importantin that it gives informationabout the
differentnames for natural suppositionin the thirteenthcenturysense
(i.e. as non-contextual supposition). They are most clarifyingand
confirmthe decisive distinctionbetween Hispanus' and Buridan's views
once more :
naturalis?
dubium
est:quotnomina
habetsuppositio
Ibid.,f. 18va:Quartum
naturalis
termino
ratione
SolutioAlberti6.
, quiaconvenit
Quatuor.Primovocatur
forma
autemtermini
iuxtapredicta;
utterminus
est
suenature
que estsuasignificado
communiter
et
eius,licetformadictionis
acceptesit modusproferendi;
significado
termini
dicipotest
essentialis
oritur.
eademratione
, quiaex essentialibus
principiis
1 Sophismata
Buridan:
onMeaning
and
byT. K. Scott,
Sophisms
John
Cap.III; cp.thetranslation
NewYork,
andwithan introduction.
Truth
Sourcebooks,
ytranslated
Century
Philosophy
Meredith
1966,p. 100.
Publishing
Company,
2 nedum
= notonly.
3 viz.inthediscussion
seeabove,
ofnatural
.
pp.72-73
p.69f.andbelow,
supposition;
* E.g.chimaera.
s Thedifferent
after
those
aredistinguished
kinds
variations.
ofaccidental
supposition
6 ThisAlbertus
wasanavowed
ofHarderwijk
sinceGerard
must
theGreat,
beAlbert
Albertist,
Forthat
Alberti
doctrinam
Gerard
must
works
onlogicsecundum
several
whowrote
matter,
Magni.
ofallthisisfound
sincenothing
ofAlbert's
in
Albertist
edition
haveusedaninterpolated
works,
Albert's
works.
72

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

Secundodiciturabsoluta
termino
et perse sumpto
absolute
et nonin
, quiaconvenit
adaliquodadiunctum,
sivefuerit
siveaccidentale.
ordine
hocessentiale
Terciodiciturpotencialis
sive aptitudinalis
actualiter
, eoquod nonfacitterminm1
vel aliquasupposita
sed per
determinata,
respicere
aliquoddeterminatum
suppositum
etindifferentiam
sue
termino
aptitudinem
suppositum
qualecumque
quodcompetit
gratia
significationis.
habenssuppositionem
naturalem
Quartovocaturindijferens,
quia terminus
potentiam
suespecieietproipsisindividuis,
habetutteneatur
uno
perindifferentiam
prosupposito
vel pluribus,
et noncontrahitur
ad
diversa
cuius
est
per comparationem
predicata
Utcumdico'Ao/no'
naturam
humanam
perse,ibistatproomnibus
exemplum.
potentibus
et potestaddiquodcumque
,
participare;
predicatum,
quiapotestdici:'homoestanimai1
'
estspecies1
lhomo
curri
. Hoc2autemfierinonpotestin propositione.
ergo in
, homo
NULLA
PROPOSITIONE
SUPPONIT
TERMINUS
NATURALITER.
names foraccidental suppositionand
The last dubiumgives the different
theirexplanations:
est: quotsuntnomina
dubium
?
Ibid., f. 18vb-19ra: Septimum
accidentalis
suppositionis
SolutioAlberti.
ab
, quiaestin termino
Quatuor.Diciturenimprimoaccidentalis
etcontraliitur
nonpernaturam
sedpernaturam
etquiadiversificatur
termini
extrnseco,
circaterminm.
Etideoestvariabilis
adiunctorum.
dicitur
termino
suiadalterum.
Secundo
, quiaconvenit
respectiva
perordinationem
inea contrahitur
contracta
diversitatem
Tertiodicitur
secundum
, quiaterminus
predicatenetur
suespeciei,quandoque
torumsecundum
prosupposito
quandoque
quamterminus
intotaliambitu,
utinferius
patebit*.
proinferioribus,
quandoque
actualiter
actualis
earn
communis
terminus
Quartodicitur
respicit
supposita
eoquodper
facituthuiusmodi
sueintentionis.
velstatprosupposito
Etiamquiaactualiter
aliquidad
et falsitatem
veritatem
propositionum.
Three conclusionsmaybe drawn. First,Gerardof Harderwijk'sexpositionof naturalsuppositiontestifiesthatin the AlbertistSchool of the
fifteenthcentury Peter of Spain's view of natural supposition was
reintroduced.Second, the names given to this non-contextualsupposition show that the whole thirteenthcenturytraditionconcerningthis
point had been taken up, since two of the alternativenames are those
givenby Sherwoodand the anonymousauthorof thetractDe proprietatibus
sermonm*.
Third, the Albertistview of natural supposition as nonpropositionalis explicitlyopposed to the Nominalistview of supposition
as the acceptance of a term,if,and onlyif,it is used in a proposition.
The next section will show that in the seventeenthcenturyboth
views of naturalsupposition,that of Peter of Spain and thatof Buridan,
1 termini
ed.
2 hoc
kind
ofsupposition
mentioned
ofthis
above.
allproperties
resumes
3 viz.inthediscussion
ofthedifferent
kinds
ofaccidental
f.2ora
e.q.s.
supposition,
4 Seemyhrst
article,
pp.85^-89.
73

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

still survived.The latter is even foundin our days in the Neo-Thomist

School where it can be pointed out as an offshootof fourteenthcentury
logical tradition.
8 - The survival of 14th century natural supposition from John a
Sancto Thoma up to 20th centuryNeo-Thomism
The PortugueseBlack FriarJohna Sancto Thoma (Joo Poinset) was one
of the most authoritativeThomists of the seventeenthcentury(15891644). He was the confessorof King Philip IV of Spain and wrote an
thomisticus
extensive Cursusphilosophicus
, which is considered the most
first
Its
.
Thomist
part contains ea quae ad artem
synthesis1
important
with
deals
Ten
supposition.
Logicamspectant.Chapter
John starts with a definitionof supposition taken as a term's
standingfor somethingin the propositionand rejects a modern view of
suppositionwhich seems to identifysuppositionwith signification.The
many adherents of this view, he says, do not admit the old and
propositionsthe subject termsof which
approved rule that affirmative
are false:
nonsupponente)
referto nothing(de subiecto
definitur
termini
Curs.
I, 10: Suppositio
proaliquodequo
quodestacceptio
phil.thomist.
tionem
nonadmittunt,
hancdefini
existimantes
Multiex Recentioribus
verificatur.
quod
necdistinguimi
solumestacceptionominis
prore quamsignificai,
suppositisuppositio
in signifiseu ab exercitio
onema significatone
qua vox substituitur
significations
etacceptatum
candolocorei.lindeilludantiquum
principium
quodaliquaepropositio- et ideosi sintaffirmativae,
falsaesunt- ab
nonsupponente
ns suntde subiecto
hocipso
siveintrasiveextrapropositionem
supponit,
quiaomnenomen
ipsisreiicitur,
proaliquoapudintellectum.
quodsubstituitur
John adduces Thomas Aquinas against their view and insists on the
requirementof the propositionalcontext. This is explained as follows:
termini
substitutiva
tio: suppositio
estacceptio
defini
Ibid.: Sicergoexplicatur
, idestacceptio
inpropositione
inordine
adaliquam
facta
abintellectu
; etsumitur
proacceptione
copulam
accipientis2.
accepti,non pro activaa parteintellectus
passivaex partetermini
Additurin definitione:
; intellige:pro quo verificatur
proaliquode quo verificatur
siVeritas
seuverificado
adsuppositionem
Nonenimrequiritur
propositionis,
propositio.
1
dicitur
ut
:
'/io/no
est
falsa
cum
datur
in
etiam
lapis
suppositio,
propositione
quidem
1 RmlP. Joannis
Academia
incomplutensi
doctoris
a SThoma,
Ord.Praed.
theologi
professoris,
a Confessionibus
ettandem
fidei
Censoris
IV,Magni
Regis
Primarii,
Hispaniarum
Philippi
Supremi
Aristotelis
et Doctoris
et genuinam
veram
secundum
Thomisticus
Cursus
exactam,
Philosophicus
: Johannes
a Sancto
oftheCursus
isa partial
translation
mentem
.... etc.Lyons
1663.There
Angelici
a.o. Chicago
Treatises
Basic
The
Material
1955.
, translated
Thoma,
byYvesR.Simon
Logic.
2 Compare
solum
ei (sc.termino)
enim
convenit
Vincent
Ferrer,
Fages:acceptio
op.cit.,p. $4*5
nonquodterminus
accipiat.
accipitur,
quodterminus
quiadicimus
passive,
74

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

Licetenim
nondaturextrapropositionem.
termini
Ex dictiscolligitur
quodsuppositio
utterminus,
non
extrapropositionem
et quaelibet
voxsignificativa
terminus
significet
iliumproaliquo,verificando
iliumsecundum
tamenapplicoet substituo
exigentiam
inquasoluminvenitur
alicuius
copulaetinvenitur
applicatio
copulaenisiinpropositione,
etsubiecti.
uniusadalterum
praedicati
permodum
Supposition is divided into proper and improper; the former into
seunaturalisand
; the latterinto essentialis
materialise
, and personalis
simplex
Natural (or essential)suppositionis definedas follows:
accidentalis.
natus
estaccipi
termini
estacceptio
naturalis
,
Ibid.,I, 11: Suppositio
proomnibus
proquibus
convenit
intrinsece
et
essentialiter
. Ut
eo
cui
termini
seualiisverbis
: estacceptio
praedicatum
pro
'homo
insuiverificatione.
a tempore
'est*
abstrahit
estanimal
', ubiverbum
As is easilyseen, like Buridanand FerrerJohndefinesnaturalsupposition
as thatkind of suppositionaccordingto which, regardlessof the tenseof
the proposition,the subject term of a proposition- of the demonstraestanimaV- is taken to standforall its supposits
tive type,such as '/ionio
atemporally.
All thisis explainedextensivelyin the sixthquestionon supposition.
I quote fromit some portionswhich are relevantto our discussion.
The objection has been made ( Questio6, art. i, secunda difficultas)
that in some propositions the subject term supposits and yet is not
verifiedaccordingto the copula, so that it mightbe concluded that the
propositionalcontext is not required. One type of these propositions
is interestingnow, viz. the so-called propositionsof eternaltruth1:
est
ut 'homo
aeternae
veritatis,
Q. 6, art. i, sec.dijf.:Ac deniquein propositionibus
'hoc*ad2
terminus
demonstrando
iliumper pronomen
animal
', nonpotestverifican
ab omnitempore.
illudabsolvatur
cumverbum
Ergo
temporis,
aliquamdifferentiam
verificatione.
sine
datur
suppositio
Johnanswers:
subiecti
a tempore,
verificado
abstrahit
ubiVeritas
autemnaturali,
Ibid. : Insuppositione
secundum
verificatur
ad
sed
ad
non
demonstratur
intellectum,
sensum,
quia
supponentis
est homo*
a tempore.Ut si dicas: ' Petrus
verbiabstrahentis
existentiam
, ly 'Petrus*
' illud
ut
dicendo
secundum
intellectum
Petrm
demonstrando
se,
quodest
per
supponit
'4 ly'est*
estanimal
a tempore.
Et quandodico: 'homo
abstrahente
Petrus
*,demonstrando
velunistatus
hocquodesthomosecundum
se, nonratione
singularis
perintellectum
versalis.
1 Cp.Buridan'
veritatis
spropositiones
(above,
perpetue
p.54).
2 = according
to.
3 Cp.thedefinition
andMarsilius
ofInghen,
ofaccidental
quoted
given
byBuridan
supposition
above,
pp.53and65.
Petrus
= 'a man
ismeant.
Peter
that
theApostle
Peter; itispossible
named
75

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

From the above quotations the conclusion can be drawn that John a
Sancto Thoma continues the fourteenthcenturytraditionin takingthe
propositional context as an indispensable requirement for a term's
having supposition. His natural suppositionis that according to which
the subject term of a propositionis taken to stand for all its supposits
regardlessof (the time o) theiractual existence. As a Realisthe is setting
forthmore specificallythe Ferrertradition,his naturalsuppositionbeing
.
of the correct
atemporalratherthan
4 omnitemporal1John'sexposition
the
of
term
in
the
definition
of
acceptw
meaning
suppositionmay also be
adduced in supportof his dependence on the Ferrertradition2
.
The twentiethcenturyNeo-ThomistJacques Maritain(1882-1973)
has elaborated the doctrine of suppositionfound in Johna Sancto Thomas. His natural supposition (supposition
or supplanceessentielle
)* is the
of
the
term
of
a
in
which
the
subject
supposition
proposition
predicates
et essentiellement
) belongs to the thing
intrinsically ( intrinsquement
signifiedby that subject term. It is used in those propositionsin which
the copula only expressesthe essentialrelation of subject and predicate
regardlessof their actual existences. Maritain's natural supposition is
apparentlyatemporal (like Ferrer's and Johna Sancto Thoma's) rather
than omnitemporal(such as found in JohnBuridan).6
The same doctrineis foundwith JosephGredt O.S.B. (1863-1940)
in his Elementa
aristotelico-thomisticai
.
philosophiae
9-

Conclusion

The resultsof thisstudymaybe summarizedas follows:

(1) In thirteenth century logic natural supposition is a term's
suppositionwhen it is taken by itself,that is: apart fromany context
1 Seeabove,
p.68.
2 Seeabove,
p. 74,n. 2.
3 Elements
IIL'ordre
I Petite
dephilosophie
desconcepts
(Logique
logique
formelle
) Paris71923,pp.
Maritain
mentions
histributariness
toJohn
a Sancto
Thoma.
73-94.Seeesp.p. 76,n. 22,where
4 SeeMaritain,
op.cit.,pp.87-88.
5 Maritain,
la copule
naturalis
neditde soiquela
op.cit.,p. 88: quandle sujeta unesuppositio
duPrdicat
auSujet
dans
l'existence
desorte
relation
qu'iln'estpasncessaire
possible,
quelesujet
affirmative
soitvraie."Tout
animal
existepourquela proposition
estsensitif
': quandmme
il
icibas[sic! DeR.]aucun
cette
n'existerait
demeurerait
vraie.
animal,
proposition
6 Fora well-conceived
s views(andsimilar
criticism
ofMaritain'
onesfound
withothers),
see
OntheLogic
E. M.Barth,
Historical
iu Traditional
nr.
, Synthese
Philosophy
oftheArticles
Library,
Dordrecht
1974.
7 Vol.I Logica,
imBreisgau
realis
subdividinaturalis,
7i937,p.43: Suppositio
Freiburg
Philosophia
turperordinem
adcopulam
seuadnexum
inter
S etP inessentialem
etaccidentalem.
(naturalem)
estacceptio
termini
essentialis
etessentialiter
convenit
P. Itain
proeo cuiintrinsecus
Suppositio
' 'homo
'
*homo
estanimal
essentiali.
supponit
suppositione
propositione
76

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

whatsoeverand, consequently,withoutany adjunct; it can be seen as a

term's mere capabilityof denoting somethingwhen it is put in some
context. On the other hand, accidental suppositionis a term's actual
standingin a context, for something,in virtue of its being combined
with some adjunct; this context may be eithera propositionor a phrase
or a social context. See above, p. 43.
(2) In fourteenthcenturylogic for all kinds of supposition, natural
supposition included, the propositional context is an indispensable
requirement. See above, pp. 44-47. Natural supposition, then, is the
supposition a term has when the proposition in which it occurs as a
subject termcauses its being takenforall its significates
regardlessof the
tense of the proposition. As found with the Realists (such as Vincent
Ferrer)it can be best termedas atemporal
supposition,withthe Nominalist Buridan on the other hand as omnitemporal
supposition. See above,
pp. pff. ; 68.
(3) Fourteenthcenturynatural supposition is closely linked up with
the analysis of demonstrativepropositions. For the Realists (such as
Vincent Ferrer) natural supposition refers to the absolute, universal
nature signifiedby a common term, the actual existence of which in
some particularbeing, is quite irrelevantto the truthof the proposition.
See above, pp. 50-51. Buridanus, however, (who has been the only
Nominalist using natural supposition as far as we know) resorted to
natural suppositionin order to explain the necessarytruthof demonstrativepropositions without groundingit on some kind of abstract,
absolute entity. In his view, natural supposition refersto the omnitemporalityof a common term's significate,i.e. the termhavingnatural
supposition is taken to stand for all the concrete suppositathat term
possiblyhas, had, or will have; in which case the presenttense of the
copula of the propositiondoes not referspecificallyto presentsupposita.
See above, pp. 4 ff.
(4) From an anonymouscommentaryon Buridan's Summulawe learn
thatotherlogiciansconsideredBuridan'sview of naturalsuppositionnot
It is
of common use and not beingby virtueof speech (de virtute
sermonis).
a
verb
as
with
such
in
^imaginan (e.g.
commonlyaccepted propositions
not in propositionsof merely present tense (e.g.
'chimeraimaginatur9),
1tonitruum
estsonus
') ; in the lattercases the acceptance of
factusin nubibus
naturalsuppositionis quite superfluous.Buridan'sopponentsturnout to
be the more faithfuladherentsof Ockham's analysisof demonstrative
propositions, which eliminates the need for the Buridanian natural
supposition.See above, pp. 9-61.
77

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

(g) Buridanprobablywas the reintroducerof naturalsuppositionin the

fourteenthcentury.For that matter, in the NominalisttraditionBuridan's positionseems to be ratherisolated. See above, pp. 62-67.
(6) It cannot be stressedenough that Buridan's naturalsuppositionis
fromthe thirteenthcenturynon-contextualtype, such as
quite different
foundin Peter of Spain. See above, pp. 67-68.
(7) The fifteenthcentury Albertistsrestored the thirteenthcentury
view of naturalsuppositiontakenas a term's non-contextualsupposition,
apparentlyas a result of a faithfulinterpretationof Peter of Spain's
as such.
Tractatus.It is interpretedas the modussignicandisubstantivus
See above, p. 72.
(8) We learn from Gerard of Harderwijk's Commentaryon Peter's
Tractatusthat natural supposition (.suppositionaturalis
) was also called
siveaptitudinalis,
or indijferens.
essentialis
or absoluta, or potentialis
suppositio
The alternativenames of accidental supposition (suppositioaccidentalis
)
were suppositio
, or contracta
, or actualis. See above, pp. 72-73.
respectiva
(9) In the seventeenthcenturyJohna Sancto Thoma has the fourteenth
centuryview of suppositionas being always of the propositionaltype.
His natural supposition is of the Vincent Ferrer type. On the other
hand, some of his contemporariesheld the (Albertist?)view of natural
suppositionas the non-contextualone. See above, pp. 74-76.
(10) In our days the Neo-Thomist Jacques Maritain follows John a
Sancto Thoma's view of natural supposition, taking it as the metaof the subject term of so-called
physical (or: essential) supposition

as
omnis
homoestanimaV.
metaphysicalpropositionssuch
(11) Thus, the developmentof naturalsuppositionmaybe schematized
as follows: (see next page)
LEIDEN
Instituut
Filososch
WitteSingel71

78

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

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79

189.235.178.250

00:13:37 AM

Abstraction

and the object of the human

intellect according to Henry of Ghent

JV. BROWN

INTRODUCTION

it is not usual to classifyHenry of Ghent (?-i293) as a

While "major" figureof the 13th century, an examination of his
thought does give us a rare opportunityto observe what it
must have been like for philosophersand theologiansto labour in the
shadows of the famousCondemnationof 1277.1 A secular masterat the
Universityof Paris from 1276 to 1292, he was appointed by Etienne
Tempier, bishop of Paris, to the Commission that drew up the list of
219 propositionsthatwere condemned.2Judgingboth fromthe title he
was to receive ( DoctorSolemnis
) and from the general nature of his
he
seems
to
have
works,
represented conservative interests on that
Commission.3 Considering the content of some of the condemned
propositions,then, it would not be surprisingto findHenry of Ghent
displayinga much more restrainedattitude toward philosophyand the
scope of humanreason thandid manyof his immediatepredecessorsand
4
his contemporaries.
This, perhaps more than anythingelse, explains both Henry's
ubiquitous interest in the problems of knowledge and truth and the
1 Forwhat
little
weknow
ofhislifeandwork,
seeJ.V. Brown,
inHenry
Sensation
: Alate
ofGhent
Archiv
frGeschichte
derPhilosophie,
mediaeval
LH(1971),
Aristotelian-Augustinian
synthesis,
thesame,Henry
onInternal
Sensation
oftheHistory
ofPhilosophy,
X
, Journal
238-239;
ofGhent
(1972),i-i6.
2 OntheCondemnation,
inthe
seeE. Gilson,
Middle
History
Philosophy
(NewYork:
ofChristian
Ages
intheWest,
Aristotle
Leonard
Random
F. VanSteenberghen,
House,i9$),402-410;
Johnston,
trans.
Nauwelaerts,
19),230-238.
(Louvain:
3 Doctor
Hewasdevoted
ofsolemnis
is "established",
Onecommon
toAugustine
Solemnis.
meaning
Aristotle
northeLatin
Averroists
should
andwasdetermined
that
neither
over
him.
triumph
4 "Ina prologue
theattitude
thebishop
ofthemembers
oftheArts
tothedecree,
castigates
Faculty
teach
themost
detestable
ofpagan
andthen
theinfluence
errors,
who,under
philosophers,
tryto
thetruth
between
oftheCatholic
faith
andphilosophic
thecharge
ofheresy
bydistinguishing
escape
VanSteenberghen,
betwocontradictory
the
asifthere
could
truths."
truth,
pp.235-36.Among
arethewisemen
wefind,
"That
thephilosophers
alone
ofthis
condemned
world."
propositions
80

189.235.178.250

00:13:46 AM

now-famousfirstfive articles of his SummaQuaestionum

Ordinariarum.1
introduces
us
to
those
five
articles
in
this
wise:
"Therefore,
Henry
insofaras it pertainsto the possibilityof human knowledge, these five
items must be investigatedin connection with the firstof the aforesaid
[viz., of knowledgeand the knowable, commonlyand in general]: first,
the possibilityof knowing; second, the mode of knowing; third, the
quality of the knowable; fourth,the desire to know; fifth,studyand
"2
knowing. One need not go beyond this prologusto the Summato find
boththereasonforHenry'sinterestin the problemof knowledgeand the
whole rationalebehindthose firstfivearticles.
The SummaQuastionum
is a work on theology.With the
Ordinariarum
exeption of the fivearticleswhich now occupy our attention,it roughly
parallels the structureand subject matter of the SummaTheologiaeof
Thomas Aquinas as far as question 42 of the primapars. Theology is
discourse about God and divine things. Within it, three topics claim
most of our attention.First,we ask how theologyabout God and divine
things is a science; second, how in theology we can have discourse
) about God and divinethings; third,what reallycan be known in
( locutio
3
theologyabout God and divine things.
Theology,then, is not firstconcerned with the existenceof God or
the divine attributes; nor with salvation and grace and the four last
- in what
way
things.Henrywonders how
theologycan be called a
science. We mustshow how in theologywe can have a genuinescientific
knowledge of causes as opposed to the mere accidental knowledge
1 Jean
istobefound
Paulus
remarks
that
ofknowledge
scattered
a thousand
theory
through
Henry's
andthat
isnotthetask
inhisworks,
aneffective
ofthese
a timid
for
soul.
synthesis
passages
passages
desamtaphysique
deGand.
surlestendances
Henri
Essai
(Paris:J.Vrin,
1938),1. Weare
J.Paulus,
tothink
that
ofa thousand
ismuch
inclined
thefigure
toolow.
passages
isunquestioned
aretheSumma
Theonly
works
ofHenry
whose
OrdinariaQuaestionum
authenticity
as"SQO"
AllreferenandtheQuodlibeta.
These
areabbreviated
below
and"Quod."
rum
respectively.
Badius
atSt.
cesareto: SQO.2 vols.Paris:Iodocus
edition
issued
Ascensius,
1520.(Facsimile
2 vols.Paris:Iodocus
Badius
Bonaventure
Institute,
193.2 vols.);Quod.
[N.Y.]: TheFranciscan
issued
atLouvain:
edition
S. J.,1961.2vols.)
Ascensius,
15-18.
(Facsimile
Bibliothque
arecitedaccording
toarticle
volume
recto
Texts
number,
folio,
(orquod.)y
question,
("r")or
ofthefolio.Forexample:
verso
would
the
XXVIII,
3c; I, i67rM"
"SQO,
designate
("v"),section
Summa
Ordinariarum
ofthequestion,
volume
, article
28,question
I,folio
3,inthebody
Quaestionum
M ofthat
tothecorpus
ofthequestion;
textcitations,
"c"refers
folio.Within
, section
167recto
ofthequestion;
which
"res.
"obj."to Henry's
arguments
quaestionis
q."totheresolutio
opponent's
atthebeginning
"sedcontra"
inoppositum
which
follow
ofa question;
toHenry's
arguments
appear
"ad"or"ad... .inoppositum"
toHenry's
to theinitial
ofhis
theobj
ectiones;
arguments
replies
ortohisownsedcontra
A foliosection
inquotation
marks
"O"isenclosed
arguments.
opponents
with
confusion
thedigit
toavoid
O.
2 SQO, prologus;
I, irA.
3 Ibid.
8l

189.235.178.250

00:13:46 AM

possessed by the sophist. The studyof problemsof knowledgeis, therefore, not incidentalto theology- it is at the very heart of it: for if
scientificknowledge is impossible, then it follows that a science of
theologyis likewise impossible.
Our second concern in theology - how lucutioabout God and
divine thingsis possible - likewise draws us to the noetic realm, for if
meaningfulhumandiscourseis to be a possibilityin divinematters,then
we must develop a theoryof knowledge which will explain how it is
about objects which are present
possible forus to discoursemeaningfully
to us in sensible experience.
And assumingthat there is a science of theologyand that in it we
can talk meaningfully
about God, exactlywhatcan we know about him?
We mustbe able to distinguishwhat is knowableabout God fromwhat is
unknowableabout him. In Theology, therefore,we need a standardof
knowledge which can be developed only within the frameworkof a
more generalmetaphysicsof knowledge.
These firstfive articles, therefore,are not just a "philosophical
preface" to theology and Henry is not in them simply "clearingaway
some of the underbrush." In justifyingthe very possibilityof scientific
knowledge,he is attemptingto destroyscepticism; to give real meaning
to theological discourse, and to show that even in the face of the
Condemnation, genuinely sound philosophical investigation is still
possible.1
With these ideas in mind, it would benefitus now to turn our
attentionto thisproblemof knowledgein Henryof Ghent. We propose,
moreover, in place of a rathervague and uninformative
summaryof his
in
detail
but
two
of
solution
to
his
theproblem:
to
ideas, investigate
parts
and
views
on
the
his
his
of
abstraction
viz.,
proper object of the
theory
humanintellect.
2

ABSTRACTION ACCORDING TO HENRY OF GHENT

For Henry of Ghent, man's cognitive operations are never absolutely

autonomous; completelyindependentof all being save the being of that
1 Inthis,
hewasdoing
didnotfeelthat
a radical
what
theSolemn
Doctor
moreover,
represented
five
articles
stand
thefirst
totherest
with
thepast.Ina more
ora break
innovation
systematic
way,
Dei, andperhaps
ofAugustine
stands
tohisDeCivitate
tohis
Acadmicos
astheContra
oftheSumma
arethose
which
totheology
maintain
most
that
aswell.Those
DeTrinitate
arguments
pernicious
wemust
Todotheology
first
andthat
canbeknown.
isuncertain
successfully,
nothing
everything
recourse
aloneandnottoarguments
from
:
toreason
ofthese
arguments,
having
authority
dispose
I, irA.
SQO,prologus;
82

189.235.178.250

00:13:46 AM

individualsubstanceand supposit fromwhich theyoriginate.Operations

must not be considered exclusivelyin themselves,in their own formal
structure: they must also be considered in relation to their ends; in
relation to that at which they aim. The perfectionof the operation is
other than the operation itself and to understandthis perfectionwe
must have some clear idea of the nature of this "that at which" the
operationaims: in short,we musthave some clear and precise knowledge
ofthe objectupon which the operationdependsforits perfection.
Because of the immaterialityof both the power and the object in
question, there is no doubt in Henry's mind thatthe taskof discovering
of all when
the "thatat which" the operationaims remainsmost difficult
we are dealingwiththe properand perse end ofthose cognitiveoperations
which are designatedas intellectiveor intellectual.What, according to
Henryof Ghent,is the properand perseobject of the intellect?What is it
that the intellect possesses as its perfectionwhen we speak of that
intellect as "knowing", or of that intellect as "having knowledge"?
Perhaps more importantstill: can this proper and per se object of the
intellectperfectthe intellectwhile retainingonlyan ordinarydependence
in being vis--visthe being of God? Can thisobject be the perfectionof a
natural operation without exhibiting some special relationship to
PerfectionItself?
As we have suggested,Henry evidentlyregarded the answers to
theseand like questionsas beingofsomethingmore thanpassingacademic
interest. It is perhaps also helpful to recall at this point Aristotle's
:
definitionof scientificknowledge in the Posterior
Analytics
ofa thing
scientific
ourselves
topossess
. . . whenwe
We suppose
unqualified
knowledge
asthecauseofthatfactandofno
thatweknowthecauseonwhichthefactdepends
think
than
itis . . . Consequently
theproper
andfurther
thatthe
notbeotherwise
other,
factcould
is something
which
cannot
beother
scientific
thanit is.1
objectofunqualified
knowledge
ours)
(italics
In the Platonic tradition, the Philosopher identifiesthe object of
knowledge as somethingwhich has fixityand permanence. The Solemn
Doctor findshimselfwithin the same tradition: the proper and per se
object of the intellect,as thatwhich perfectsour intellectualoperations
and gives us scientificknowledge, must exhibit fixityand permanence.
Without such fixity and permanence, scepticism must ultimately
triumphand man must be contentwith probabilitiesand beliefs. What
then is this proper and per se object at which all cognitiveoperations
1 Aristotle,
I i, 7ib8-i.
Post.
Anal.,
83

189.235.178.250

00:13:46 AM

ultimatelyaim and how does it exhibita fixityand permanencesuch that

the unpalatableconsequences of scepticismare avoided?
The Solemn Doctor's theory of abstraction provides us with a
convenient basis for formulatingan answer to this question. It may
seem somewhat strangeto finda doctrine of abstractioin the theoryof
knowledge of Henry of Ghent: given, that is, his commitmentto the
primacy of the thought of Augustine. It certainly should not seem
strangeto us, however, for we will recognize that the Solemn Doctor
was by no means anxious to hide his Aristotelianismunder an Augustinin cloak. Divine illumination,for example, plays its part in our
knowledgeof things,but it playsthatpartonly in conjunctionwithsuch
sensitiv
ae, phantasia,
respectedmediaevalAristotelianconceptsas potentiae
is quite at home in such
intellectus
possibilis.Abstractio
agensand intellectus
a milieu.1
With Henry,however, flexibilityof vocabularydoes not permitus
to fix one definiteand univocal meaning to the term "abstraction".
There are several varietiesof abstraction,depending upon the context
in which the word is being used, and not all of them are of equal
importance so far as his theory of knowledge and the object of the
intellectare concerned. At the furthestremovefromthattheorywe have
in the expressionabstractio
the termbeing used substantively
realis.This
kind of abstractionprevails when an abstr
actumdiffersfrom something
else both in re and in subiecto- and this quite independentlyof the
operations of any cognitive power, be it sensitive, imaginative or
intellective. Thus, separate forms and intelligences are said to be
in refrommatter.
abstractedin thisway because theyare formsdiffering
That is, theydo not have matteras part of themselves,nor do theyfall
into compositionwith matterso as to constitutea thirdthing.2
In contrastwith this quite substantiveuse of the term, we have it
1 Onthepossibility
ofabstraction
inAugustine,
ofa doctrine
seeR. Jolivet,
"Ladoctrine
augustiinMlanges
nienne
del'illumination,"
himself
1931),97ff.Jolivet
(Paris:M.Rivire,
Augustiniens
a goodaccount
a negative
Gilson
ofhowAristotelian
takes
onthematter.
abstraction
gives
position
inthehands
ofthe13thcentury.
Seehis,"Sur
fared
oftheAugustinians
difficults
del'illumiquelques
dePhilosophie
Revue
nation
is
, XXVI(1934),323ff.Henry,
however,
augustinienne",
Noscolastique
andabstraction
Onthedifference
abstraction
toHenry
notmentioned.
between
according
according
DieErkenntnislehre
Heinrichs
vonGent
seeR. Braun,
toThomas
: St.
(Freiburg
Aquinas,
[Schweiz]
Paulus-Druckerei,
1916),48-2.
2 Cf.SQO,XLVIII,
what
heconsidered
2ad2m;II,3irP.Inopposing
tobeAristotle's
erroneous
theSolemn
Doctor
makes
itquite
ofPlato
onthestatus
oftheuniversais,
clear
in
that
interpretation
didhethink
a universal
wasaninstance
ofabstractio
SeeQuod.
that
realis.
nosense
,IX,1c; II,383rZ.
oftheuniversais
deGandy
toHenry
ofGhent,
cf.Paulus,
Henri
Formore
onthestatus
according
pp.
67ff.
84

189.235.178.250

00:13:46 AM

being used within the rather broad area of cognitive powers. Henry
realisfromabstractio
himselfseparatesabstractio
rationissiverationalis.This
abstractionof reason or rationalabstraction(which is the most important kind of abstractionas faras an understandingof Henry's noetic is
concerned) can itselfbe understoodin severaldifferent
ways, depending
kind
the
of
distinction
which
between
the
abstraction
and
prevails
upon
the subject fromwhich it is abstracted.1That is, thereis an abstraction
which is proper to each of the three fundamentaltypesof distinction
- distinction in re, distinction in intentione
,
recognized by Henry
distinctionin ratione.2
There is the abstractionof the material formfromthe matter in
which it exists and in this case there is a certain samenessbetween the
actumand the subject fromwhich it is abstractedthoughtheydiffer
abstr
in re. But a materialformmay have essein matterin two different
ways:
this
first
basic
of
rational
abstraction
admits
of a
type
accordingly,
furthertwo-fold division. The form may have esse in the matter as
- as does the substantialformwhich is one
givingesseto that matter
with the matterin that verysubject which it constitutestogetherwith
the matter. The abstractionof the form in this case is a metaphysical
abstraction.But otherformshave essein the matteras receivingessefrom
that matter. These are accidental formswhich are identical in subject
with that of which they are the accidents. The abstraction of the
intellectin thiscase is mathematicalabstraction.3
1 "... abstractio
a seipso
a differenti,
eteiusdem
utoporteat
nonestunius
seeldifferentis
diffr
Estautem
ethocper
aliaabstractio
siverationalis
abeo a quoabstrahitur.
rationis
abstractum
abaliocumquoestidem
adminus
etintellectum,
rationem
subiecto."
SQO,XLVIII,
quaeestunius
insomemeasure
ofrational
involve
thereduction
ofan
abstraction
2 ad 2m;II,3irP.Allmodes
: Quod
toanintelligible-in-act
., IV,2ic; I, i36vH.
intelligible-in-potency
2 Intentio
in
inHenry.
SeeBrown,
"Sensation
andRatio
difficult
tograsp
. Twoofthemost
concepts
andp. 86n.
ofGhent
ofGhent
: ...,"pp.2^2-2^6;"Henry
onInternal
Sensation,"
Henry
pp.24-25,
Anintentio
A thing
is neither
concrete
norpurely
becomes
mental.
3 infra.
intentionally
purely
itis known.
wants
situated
between
the
when
somekindofrealbeing
Henry
evidently
present
hasintheintellect
andtheconcrete
diminished
singular
being
being(ensdiminutum
) something
hasoutside
thething
oftheintellect.
which
essendi
a genuine
ofbeing
Ratio
mode
Thus,
(modus
signifies
) notdesignated
bytheterm"being".
isthereality
ofa ratio
neither
cognitional.
purely
3 Etesttriplex
requaedam
verotantum
idem
subiecto
etdifferunt
secundum
quaedam
quodsunt
a materia
in
materialis
verotantum
Primo
modo
estabstractio
formae
intentione
ratione.
quaedam
adhucestduplex
abstractio
secundum
istorum
triummodorum
quodforma
quaest... Primo
ut
habet
esseinmateria
a quaabstrahitur.
enim
forma
esseinmateria
habet
Quaedam
dupliciter
insubiecto
estidem
cuidatesse,utforma
substantialis
quodcumipsaconstituit,
quaecummateria
habet
essein
abipsaperintellectum
Aliaautem
forma
abstractione
quaeabstrahitur
metaphysica.
a quo
cumeocuiaccidit
accidentalis
subiecto
uta quarecipit
materia
esse,utforma
quaeestidem
2ad2m;II,3irP.
abstractione
mathematica."
abstrahitur
SQO,XLVIII,
perintellectum
85

189.235.178.250

00:13:46 AM

and
A second basic type of abstractionoccurs when the abstraction
: when this takes place, we have
the subject are the same in intentione
the abstractionof the universalfromthe particular. Finally,when the
and the subject are the same in ratione
abstraction
, we have the abstraction
of the verum fromthe ratioof the bonum.1
There seems to be no good reason forsupposingthatthisclassification is either exhaustive2or that the various types of abstractionare
mutuallyexclusive of each other. That the various modes of abstraction
are not mutually exclusive of each other is evident both from our
and ratioand fromHenry's own account of
considerationsof res, intentio
abstraction.
Not every res is an intentio
y for an intentiois possible only where
is
thereis a relationbetweena resand a cognitivepower. But everyintentio
ofa res, since the actualizationof a cognitivepower occurs only
an intentio
througha species ultimatelytraceable to an individualres.3 This would
at least in potency. Similarly,not every
mean thateveryresis an intentio
ratiois an intentio
, fora ratio(a modusessendi
) is possible when thereis no
is a ratioinasmuchas if
relation to a cognitivepower. But everyintentio
there was no basis in act for a cognitiverelationshipto be established,
then there could be no such cognitiverelationship.
actioshould take into
It is onlynaturalthatHenry'steachingson abstr
account these distinctionsamong res, intentioand ratio. But in distinguishingthree modes of intellectual abstraction,he is not designating
three concretely-separateand temporally-successiveacts of the intellect. The universalis not entitativelythe same as the form,nor is the
verum entitativelythe same as either the universalor the form; but we
do not firstabstractthe formfromthe matter,then the universalfrom
1 "Secundo
veria ratione
modoestabstractio
Tertio
a particulari.
universalis
modoestabstractio
Ibid.
boni."
2 Thus,at onepoint
andlogical
between
it convenient
todistinguish
finds
metaphysical
Henry
wearenowconsidering.
intotheclassification
doesnotenter
thelatter
eventhough
abstraction,
SeeSQO,XXXIV,
$c; I, 2i8vQandin/ra,
p. 91n. 1.
3 Thespecies
and
andcannot
betheproper
a manknows
themeans
istherefore
whereby
intelligibilis
diciesseper
nullo
modo
rationem
obiecti
nonhabet
enim
seobject
oftheintellect.
potest
"Quod
per
- utputa
informans
intellectum."
a nobis
. . . species
seetinsecognitum
intelligibilis
SQO,I, 3c;
I,8VA.
estquodpotentiam
intellectus
articulum
adprimum
"Dicimus
oportet
quodbeneverum
primo
etquodhocsitsemper
adhoc: utipsum
adintelligibile
determinan
intelligiperspeciem
intelligat
Seealso,ibid.,III,i resq. I,
bilisinformantem
..." Quod.,
intellectum.
IV,7 res.q.; I, 93VS.
47VR;III,14res.q.; I, 68rX;SQO,I, 3c; I, 9rD;I, 8 res.q.; I, i8rE;I, 3c; I, iorF;I, 4c; I,
32r"0";XL,i ad im;I, 26vU-27rU.
inthe
toknow
themind
anddisposes
istaken
thething
from
Thespecies
byinhering
intelligibilis
mind:
XXIV,
7adim;I, 144*1.
SQO,I, 3c;I, iorG.Cf.also,SQO,II,5c;I, 260C-rY;
86

189.235.178.250

00:13:46 AM

the particular,thenthe ratioof the verum fromthe ratioof the bonum.

In mattersof the speculative intellect at least, it would appear that a
vera forma is abstractedas universalby means of the operationsof the
agent intellectand the possible intellect.
This vera forma is abstractedfromthe species in the imagination.
In the light of the agent intellect, the intelligiblespecies is separated
fromthe imaginablespecies in such a way that it can then serve as the
vehicle by which the possible intellect understandsthe intelligibles.1
Through such an intelligible species rational abstraction is directly
connectedwith extra-mentalsensibleparticularsonlyon the level of the
means whereby the object of the intellect is acquired and not on the
level of the object itself.2Abstractionis not at all simplythe separation
of an intelligiblespecies froman imaginablespecies : it is the separation
of whatthe intelligiblespecies bears from whatthe imaginablespecies
bears. This concept of the "object of the intellect"is at the veryheartof
Henry's teachingson abstractionand well does he insist that it is the
- not the
imaginablespecies; not the act of imagining
imaginedobject
- which is the real source of abstraction.3
The imagined object or phantasm is an intelligible-in-potency.
Through the operation of the agent intellect, the intelligible-in-actis
abstractedfromit. This means thatthe formis denuded of matterand a
universalis therebyproduced. This universalis now capable of being the
intelligibleobject of the possible intellect, which it is said to move
*
"obiettive"
1 ". . qualis(seil,species
utabeisabstrahat
nataesteidem
ostendere
imaginabiles)
ipsaphantasia
..." SQO,I, 8c;I, i8rH."Quemadmodum
intelligibiles
perquasintelligat,
(seil,
intellectus)
species
intellectus
intelabstrahitur
a sensibili
enim
intelligibilis
quacognoscit
species
(seil,materialiter)
exphantasmate
. .."SQO,XXIV,
enim
. . . Species
abstrahitur,
7adim;
intellegibilis
prima
ligibele.
invi
inphantasmatibus
existentibus
utinpotentia
manet
I, i44vI. . sedsolum
(seil,
intelligibile)
siintellectus
noster
debeat
actione
abstrahitur
interato
a quibus
sensitiva
agentis
intelligere."
aliquid
yV,14res.q.; I, iyjT"O".
Quod.
2 ... licetnonabilla(seil,
seda phantasmate
abstrahitur
reuniversali)
(seil,species)
particulari
a reextra
..." SQO,LVIII,2 ad 3m;II, i3ovH."... sedperintellectum,
abstracto
particulari,
a sensibus
. . ." SQO,II, 1ad
estdepuratam
abstrahendo,
possibile
intelligibilem
speciem
quantum
Seealso,p. 86n.3 supra.
im;I, 23VC.
3 ". . . abstractio
isimpressimaterial
a specie
tarnen
nonfiteque
quiaintellectus
impressa
speciei
abobiecto
ut
abactuimaginandi
. . . sedsolum
sitabstractio
onem
nonrecipit,
. . . eque
imaginato,
- quiascilicet
estobiectum
aliomodo
inimaginativa
illudquodestsicutcognitum
cognoscente
estidemsubratione
verointellectus
subratione
. . . obiectum
universalis,
singularis
imaginativae
..." Quod.
yIV,2ic; I, 137rI.
*"Etest(seil,
actuintelligibile,
abstrahens
depotentia
intellectus
mens
agens
intelligibili
rationalis)
de
utintelligente,
extrahendo
inintellectu
illudutobiectum
possibili
ipsum
intelligibile
ponen
actuintelligentem.
Etperhoc
de potentia
etfaciens
inactum
intelligente
intelligendi
potentia
87

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00:13:46 AM

THE OBJECT OF THE INTELLECT

This universal,thisformnow abstractedfrommatter,is an intentio.It is

not simply a fictivemental being; it is somehow related both to the
phantasmfromwhich it arises and to the intellectbywich it arises. There
is no question about the complete immaterialityof the universal; it is
abstractednot only fromthe presence of matter,but also fromall those
particularand individualconditionsofmatter(figure,forexample) which
were proper to the phantasmin the imagination.It is, purelyand simply,
that essence of the thingwhich is graspedby the intellect in the act ol
or simplexapprehensio.Yet Henry, ever anxious to
simplexintelligentia
preserve the concrete as well as the cognitionalbeing of the intentio,1
does not hesitateto continueto referto thisuniversalas the "phantasm
dnudt
a materiis
et deinde
eas(iamfactas
facit
formas
intellectas
inactu
universales)
primo
erant
intellectae
inpotentia."
IV,2ic;I, i36vH.
Quod.,
postquam,
inthesame
modes
ofabstractio
rationalis
An
NotehowHenry
relates
thefirst
andsecond
passage.
sitsicutsecundum
evencloser
linkisindicated.
"Cum
universale
intelligitur
igitur
dispositionem
i phantasmate
lineaerectae
abstrahendo
a particular
formam
universalem...."
Ibid.,i37vM.Cf.
, pp.8-1o.
supra
inintellectu
intellectus
sicut
visquaedam
activa
adabstrahenda
. . quiest(seil,
agens)
possibili
estactuuniversale
a dictis
materialibus
conditionibus
Quofacto
(seil,
particularibus).
phantasmata
etmovens
etimmutans
intellectum
adsimplicem
obiective
essentiae
et
apprehensionem
possibilem
rei."Quod
, V, 14res.q.; I, i76v"0".
quidditas
1 Theintentio
Eventheconcretely-existing
hasconcrete,
andnotpurely
cognitional
reality.
: Quod.,
hasconcrete
individual
isanintentio
intentio,
however,
V,6 res.q.; I, i6irL.Notevery
first
Universais
andparticulars
Wemust
between
andsecond
arenot
intentiones.
being.
distinguish
ispartly
andpartly
thework
Theuniversal
thework
oftheintellect
of
thebasis
forthis
distinction.
islikewise
a first
ofnature
a res
Theindividual
thework
and
: itistherefore
intentio.
particular
partly
- atleastwhenthere
a workofanintellect
is a cognitive
resand
between
relationship
partly
differ
first
because
theformer
areexclusively
thework
intellect.
Second
intentiones
from
intentiones
andthelatter
arenot:theformer,
havelessconcrete
than
the
oftheintellect
therefore,
being
andQuod.,
latter:
ibid,
V, 12c;I, i7irX-rY.
Atrue
vera
res(res
but
Theintentio
andtherescannot
beidentical.
beproduced
) must
byanagent,
itispermanent
Theintentio,
is
ofitself
ontheother
onceithasbeenproduced
hand,
agent.
bythat
itneeds
thecontinued
ofitsgenerating
and,forpermanence,
produced
bytheresvera
presence
Theresvera
: Quod.,
becomes
"intentionalized"
source.
Ill,12c;I, 6$rF;ad im;I, 6^rG;IV,21c;
I, i36vG.
then
wemean
totheintellect,
that
from
Ifwearespeaking
with
ofintentio
simply
respect
solely
inthesoul; that
ofessence
a certain
ornature
as
theresitself
canbeformed
is,thequestion
concept
ofcognitional
doesnotevenarise:Sqo,XXI,4c;I, i27r"0".Asa product
content
oftheintentio
creature
andcreator
: SQO,XXIV,
aswelltoboth
canbeapplied
theintentio
9c; I,
activity,
equally
146VY.
andthere
aremany
then
the
isatleast
thework
oftheintellect,
Since
theintentio
intellects,
partly
islookedatfrom
Butiftheintentio
the
is "many"
andnot"one":Quod.,
intentio
IV,21c;I, i37rK.
inres
isa necessary
since
anidentity
andnot"many"
sideoftheres,
then
itwillbe"one"
presupposii6irKandSQO,I, 2c;
inintentiones:
tionofa diversity
V,6res.q.; I, i6irL.Seealso,ibid.,
Quod.,
I, 4vc.
that
itiscognitional,
itismany.
isconcrete,
that
anintentio
itisone; totheextent
Totheextent
88

189.235.178.250

00:13:46 AM

which has the ratioof a universal"and "the universalphantasm".1Even

the mode of separationwherebythe abstraction
takes on the characterof
the dematerializeduniversalis qualifiedin such a way as to preservethis
relationship to concrete being: it is not a "real" but a "virtual"
separation.2
1 SeeQuod.
yV, 14res.q.; I, i76v"0".We canhaveintelligible-objects-in-act
onlythrough
"Secundum
statum
naturalem
abstraction.
statum
naturae
communiter
. . . secundum
inquam
nisiperabstractionem
a sensibilibus
intellectus
etpersensum
nonintelligit
(seil,
humnus)
acceptae
adminiculum."
IV,7adim;I,96rH.
Quod.,
thatwe havedifficulty
in understanding
It is precisely
because
ofthisneedforabstraction
materiales
estmagis
material
"Difficultas
formas
ex se quiaindigent
veroinintelligendo
forms.
abstractione
exnobis."
SQO,XL,4c;I, 2$8rL.
quam
losesallsingularity
aswellasall
Inbeing
theintelligible-in-act
abstracted
from
thephantasm,
habet
ubiveram
rationem
universalis
notitia
". . inmentis
., IX,ic;
Quod
singularis."
materiality.
"vera
Thusit is impossible
to knowthesingular
II, 383vZ.Noteagaintheexpression
forma".
a universal
remains
beimpossible
tosense
howdirectly.
Henry
justasitwould
directly,
opposed,
atall.SeeQuod
totheposition
that
wecannot
know
., IV,21c;I, i37rL-i37vM.
ever,
singulars
isthat
weknow
reflection
on
onAverroes,
through
singulars
only
heavily
Henry's
position
Relying
nobisconiunctus
ex
oftheuniversal.
"... intellectus
thephantasms
themedium
through
potest
abstracta
abimaginativa
rerum
sensibilium
utobiecta
existente
suaintelligere
etuniversalia
natura
inintellectu
ea sicutin cognoscente
et
in actuvirtute
intellectus
agentis
proponentis
possibili,
inimaginativa
actum
abstracta
secundum
ut
utsunt
existentia
similiter
peruniversalia
particularia
I, i37vN-i38rN;
Ibid.,i36rF.Seealso,ibid.,i37vM;epilogus;
Quod
.,
intelligendi."
perradones
Braun,
XV,9c;II,$8irDand
V,26c;I, 2orN;
p. 37.
asan"object
beknown
known"
caninnosense
means
isthat
thesingular
What
thisineffect
; our
thephantasm:
than
never
ofthesingular
V,26c;I, 2orN;
VII,14c;
Quod.,
goesdeeper
knowledge
betheproper
andperseobject
oftheintellect
orof
cannot
Theoneknowing,
therefore,
I, 268rY.
isknown
aswehave
thesingular
Theknower
ishimself
theactofknowing.
and,
justseen,
singular,
oftheuniversal:
under
theratio
V,26c;I, 2orN.
Quod.,
' . . sic
become
ofparticular
material
essences".
when
denuded
conditions,
Phantasms,
"simply
in
sint
intellectum
sub
ratione
ut
illustrt
qua
possibilem
agens
apta agere
phantasmata
spiritualiter
etmateriales.
conditiones
essentiae
suntnonsecundum
Quodappellatur
particulares
simpliciter
eas. . . praeter
et abstrahere
ab istisconditionibus
denudare
quodperhuiusmodi
phantasmata
intellectus
etmotivi
activi
..." Quod.,
universalis
abstractionem
habent
rationem
VIII,
possibilis,
12c;II,324rB.
inphantasia
circaquemoperatur
luxagentis
sunt
existentia
"Hieverophantasmata
particularia
illasabeis: quodestabstrahere
abeis
etsequestrando
eaa conditionibus
particularibus
separando
"
2ad3m; II,13orG.
universalia.
SQO,LVIII,
quaesunt
species
phantasmata
2 "Hievero
nec
universale
sicut
etspecies
nonestaliud
rephantasma
quaeestphantasma
particulare
a
abstrahitur
universale
Necipsaspecies
resuniversalis
estaliaa reparticulare.
quaeestphantasma
in
realisautgenerationis
autmultiplicationis
permodum
separationis
particulari
phantasmate
inintellectu
actum
sedsolum
ad eliciendum
intellectum
intellectionis),
per
(utqueminformat
materialium
etparticularium
etillarum
virtualem
conditionum
sequestraquamdam
separationem
immutandi
intellectum
nonsecundum
conditiones
habet
virtutem
tionum
abipso.Quascilicet
rem. . . (quodestimet principaliter
ad intelligendum
particularem
ipsam
particulares
primo
et
abstracti
etseparati
a materiae,
etquasi
sedsecundum
rationem
simpliciter
phantasmatis
possibile)
ininintellectu
intellectionis
actum
ethocadeliciendum
conditionibus
materiae,
particularibus
intellectae
omni
alia
reiuniversalis
etinformantem
haerentem
absque
ipsum
ipsiintellectui
nIbid.Sucha specieisstillsufficient
toplace
adintelligendum
remuniversalem.
illiinhaerente
separation
intheknower.
intheintellect
assomething
known
theuniversal
89

189.235.178.250

00:13:46 AM

Such an abstracted universal, though immaterialand the initial

source of our knowledgeof the quiddityor essence of a thing,remains,
as the object of simplexintelligentia
, too confusedand indistinctto serve
of
we
are
ratio
what
as the definitive
seekingto know. As confusedand
indistinct, this universal intentio(which, as an intentio
, is equatable
neither with concrete being nor with cognitional being) exhibits an
independence in nature, the understandingof which contributesin no
small measure to an even deeper understandingof how the Solemn
Doctor can maintain,in almost one and the same breath,that anything
is apprehensibleonly insofaras it is verum and yet that to possess the
verum still leaves us with a problem of Veritas and falsitas.
When Henry speaks of the abstracteduniversalas "confusedand
indistinct", he is evidentlynot referringto a psychological state in
which the knower findshimself,but ratherto the entitativestructureof
the universal itself. In an Aristoteliansetting,we might say that the
in potency not sufficiently
in act to be
universalis neither sufficiently
designated as either the one or the other. The tensions implicit in
now become almost painfullyevident. If the
Henry's concept of intentio
abstracteduniversalis both concrete and cognitional,at the same time
it is neither. It has to be the quod quid est, which is afterall its whole
raisond'tre(its definitiveratio, Henrywould say), and yet it must have
which alone befitsan immaterialintellectualpower.
the immateriality
The universal can in fact be "both" and yet "neither" only by
having a being and unity of its own. The being is called "common
) and the unity is called "specificunity".1This is
being" (esse commune
regarded by Henry as in no wise subvertingthe position that the
universalis a work of the intellect; nor does it implya reificationof that
universal.What thispositionon the beingand unityof the universaldoes
mean is thatwhile the universaloriginatesfromthe intellect,its actuality
itis proper
tospeak
offirst
ofuniversais
Intheacquisition
asbeing
ofknowledge
principles,
orfrom
the"terms"
thephantasms:
either
abstracted
from
SQO,I, 12res.q.; I, 22rK;SQO,
8ad im;I, i44vI.
XXIV,
arefirstly
conceived
theintellect.
Thatis,they
Thesefirst
are
through
intelligible
concepts
8 ad 2m;I, 144VK.
in
determinate
contained
XXIV,
SQO,
concept:
any
implicitly
1 "Licetenimquodquidestsituniversale
universalis
dietiet
quiaestratiodefinitiva
proprie
estopponendo,
differunt
tamen
cumipsosicutdictum
convertibilis
proprie
loquendo
quiaipsum
utconsideratur
etdifferentias
subratione
etindistincti
confusi
essedefinibile
commune
pergenus
indefinitiva
ratione
sicproprie
debent
dicitur
universale."
secundum
Quod.,
quaecadere
partes
intentio
est(seil,
unaintentio
seenim
"Secundum
tantum
et
XIV,6c;II,$66VE.
intellecta)
speciei
essesecundum
seextra
nonindividuali;
intellectum
itaunaimitate
quaelicetnonhabet
specifica
benetamen
subistaratione
habetessein intellectu
Platoeasposuisse
dicitur
quemadmodum
Aristoteles."
secundum
J.,IV,21c;I, i37rK.
Quo
quodposuit
90

189.235.178.250

00:13:46 AM

is not the actualityof a complete and totaldependencyon thatintellect.1

Actualityof complete and total dependencyon the intellectcomes
about only throughthose acts of the composing and dividingintellect
wherein the confusedand indistinctabstractum
is analyzedin such a way
that what is implicit in it is made explicit, and through that act of
simplexintelligentiawherein the distinct and determined universal is
finallyapprehended.When it is thusmade clear and distinct,the universal has the true esse quidditativum
of a being of the intellect; the esse
of a definition
which is simply convertiblewith the quod
quidditativum
Thus
the universal is the notitiadeclarativa
est.2
conceived,
, the
quid
verbumdeclarativum
, which is expressive of the plenitude of intentiones
which were potentiallypresentin the confusedand indistinctuniversal
firstapprehendedin the initialact of simplexintelligentia
.3
Yet even clarityand distinctnessin the universalare not sufficient
to
constituteit as the proper and perse object of the intellect. To Henry's
1 "... ethabet
universale
esseabactuintelligendi
intellectus
(seil,
ipsum
possibilis
universale)
per
a phantasmate
eiusa singularibus
intellectis
etintelligenabstractionem
abhocetabistoabstrahendo
hocetillud.Etdetaliuniversale
verum
do'hominem
estquod
, noncointelligendo
simpliciter'
est... etabopere
..." Quod
intellectus,
., XIV,6c;II,566VE.
ipsum
posterius
inthisactofabstraction
atthesame
When
that
weunderstand
mansimply
without
says
Henry
"this
and"that
it is evident
to the
timeunderstanding
thatheis referring
singular"
singular",
andhence
ofwhat
hehaspreviously
abstraction
ofthesubstantial
form
from
thematter
toaninstance
a particuluniversale
called
"Non
dicoabstractione
abstraction".
logica
quaabstrahitur
"metaphysical
forma
sivequidditas
ab
aribus
uthomo
abhochomine
etabilio,sedmetaphysica
quaabstrahitur
"
eisquorum
uthumanitas
ab hochomine
etab ilioa quibus
estquidditas,
SQO.,
participiatur.
is innowayincompatible
where
withabstraction
the
XXXIV,
c;I, 2i8vQ.This,werepeat,
anditssubject
inintentio.
asthat
which
differ
beviewed
abstractum
Thesameabstractum
gives
may
which
itinforms
orasthat
matter
hasincommon
with
tothematter
which
theinformed
being
instances
ofinformed
other
matter.
2 "Similiter
etcongregando.
Cum
habet
esseabintellectu
dividendo
dicoquodessequidditativum
inipsacognitione
fuerit
confusa
intellectus
enim
intellectus
universale
quodestprimum
opreratus
ineogenus
subratione
etsecundum
artem
definitivm
maxime
confusi
primo
concipit
supremum
illud
definibili
ad
dividit
universali
etillam
genus
aggregat
primo
quaeconvenit
perduasdifferentias
et subdividit
universali
addendo
differentiam
convenientem
genus
aggregatum
quousque
semper
Etilludappellatur
habeatur
convertibile.
ratio;etestopusintelligentiae
quodquidestetdefinitiva
fuerit
abintellectu
differentiam
aggregatam
quodcumformtm
praecedenti,
simplicis
perultimam
universale
distinetum
etdeterminatum
movet
intellectum
possibilem
tamquam
tamquam
perpartes
ineointellectionem
Etformat
verbum
de
eiusobiectum.
declarativam
quaeintellectio
appellatur
eoquodquidest."Quod
., XIV,6c;II,$66VE.
- in
3 Etestsimile
ex parte
intellectus
nostri
de universali
estinpotentia
quodinreextra
inactu- etdegenere
rein
diversis
inspecie,
intellectu
autem
etdedifferentis
quaeidemsunt
illaintelligit
diversa
etunumforma
Sedintellectus
noster
etaeeipit
utintentione
simplici
speciei.
illorum
extra
etintellectum
rationem
hoc:quoddiversitas
. . . istorum
alterius,
quodque
praeter
Etitaquemadmodum
veroinintellectu
nostro
estsecundum
uthabitm
estsuperius.
intentionem
intellectus
noster
etoperatione
suaintellectuali
format
abstrahendo
etcomponendo
etdividendo
sibiobiectum
universale
utactuintelligat
etdistinetionem
diversarum
circaeandem
intentionum
formam
SQO,XL,4adim;I, 2$8rM.
specificarci."
91

189.235.178.250

00:13:46 AM

mind, thereare verydefinitelimitsto the knowledgeof anyvera forma

that can be obtained by remainingon the level of that vera forma as
universal.
There can be no question that the universal is apprehended as
verum, for verum designatesnothingmore than the ratioor mode of
being by which being is apprehensible.1Indeed, it would seem rather
strangeto be speakingof the apprehensionof the universalunder the
ratioof the falsum since this would mean nothingelse thanthat somethingwas being apprehendedunder the ratioof the non apprehensible!
And sincetheuniversal- whetherwe are speakingof it as a confusedand
indistinctintentio
in the intellect- is the
or as havingessequidditativum
work of the apprehendingintellect, it seems reasonableto suppose that
the apprehensionof that universal will be as verum as the universal
apprehended. That is, eitherin the apprehensionof "man simply"or in
the apprehension of "man", "rational" and "animal", it would seem
that it is not just the case that "man" (either "simply"or "intentionally
distinctas to definitiveparts") is a vera res or a verum obiectum,
but thatthe act of intellectio
is vera as well.
The "seeminglyreasonable" however does not follow: we do have
apprehensionswhich may be declared false; we can, and indeed, often
do, fall into error2. The object apprehended is not false, but our ap1 "... sciendum
considerata
insesecundum
essenaturale
autquidditativum
quodresquaecumque
nullum
omnino
dicitad intellectum
sedsolum
ex hoc,quod
huiusmodi,
respectum
inquantum
inserationem
habet
Hocestquodsitmanifestabile
intellectui
ethocpassive.
Sedex
intelligibilis.
hocprimo
habet
rationem
veriquodestsuimanifestativum
ethocactive.
Ethaec
apudintellectum
estratioveriinreimperfectissima
manifestans
estse intellectui
secundum
actum
et
priusquam
actualiter
gc;I, 2i8rP.
intelligitur."
SQO,XXXIV,
nihil
aliud
sitquam
ensassimilativum
"... utverum
velaequativum
veldeclarativum
eiusquodest
. . . quianihil
nisisubratione
veri- eque
verum
ens,eque
apudintellectum,
concipitur
eque
caeterorum."
bonm,
3 res.q.; I, 2i4vP-2irP.
equepulchrum,
SQO,XXXIV,
equealiquod
Seealso,ibid
., 2i4v"0".
2 Theroleofthewillinerror
cannot
beignored.
offalling
isproduced
Thecondition
intoerror
by
malice
ofthewill,eventhough
malice
ofthewillwillhardly
what
error
is: Quod
., X, 10
explain
res.q.; II,43irR-vT.
aseither
a voluntarist
cannot
beclassified
oranintellectualist.
"Etsicintellectus
Henry
readily
voluntatem
ad modum
movet
movet
efficientem
voluntas
movet
; econtra
quofinis
metaphorice
inopus,
intellectum
etpermodum
etimpellantis
utdictum
est."SQO,IV,1ad2m;
agentis
proprie
asoccupying
theradically
viewthewillinHenry
ofGhent
role
I, 3irE.Wecannot
independent
itoccupies
inScotus.
aliuda volntate
totalis
involntate."
estcausa
volitionis
("Nihil
Op.Ox.,II,
and
dist.2$;q. unica,
n. 20;Vivs
ed.,II,699.Cf.with
SQO,IV,i ad imetad2m;I, 3irD-rE,
areourbestresource:
withSQO,LVIII,2 ad 3m;II, i3ovI.)Here,asever,Henry's
ownwords
a manthrough
toknow,
"... wehavetosaythat
hiswilldesires
butaccording
tohisintellect."
SQO,IV,ic; I, VC.
alldueallowances
forthismutual
ofwillandintellect
still
wemust
Making
interdependence
anactoftheintellect,
that
eventhough
thewillcannot
without
thisactofthe
recognize
operate
92

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00:13:46 AM

prehensionof it is. That the problem lies in the apprehensionof the

universaland not in the nature of the universalitselfmay not alwaysbe
clear from the texts of Henry himself. In an oft-quoted text which
, we are told: "... an exemplar of such a
appears early in the Summa
because
it
is
the
intention
and sensible species of a thing,has a
nature,
likeness to the false as well as to the true when it has been abstracted
from the phantasm. Thus, in itself it cannot be distinguishedfrom
either.
Henry uses this to support the position that we cannot naturally
know the Veritas without some special divine illumination. But if
the argumentis taken to mean that the "likeness" of the true and the
falseis in the abstr
actum
, thenwe would have to conclude thatone could
not know the verum either without a special divine illuminationa conclusion which is primafacie contraryto almost everythingHenry
says about the verum and the Veritas.2 In fact the meaning of the
) becomes clear only when we turnto
passage (the key word is similitudo
ad
The
likeness
of
the true and the false consistsin this:
2m.
SQO, II, 3
that the exemplar (which we are taking to mean at least the formal
content of the universal-in-act)3has no trace of the false in it/ but
neverthelesshas the power of inducingin us a false, or at best what is
only a "seeminglytrue", apprehensions.
intellect
is notabletoaffect
theliberty
ofthewill.Liberty
ofthewilldoesnotdepend
onthe
intellect
assome
would
have
it: quite
isthecase: Quod.,
theopposite
XI,7c;II,49rP.
1 "... huiusmodi
cumsitintentio
etspecies
sensibilis
reiabstracta
a phantasmate
similituexemplar
dinem
habet
cumfalso
sicut
cumvero.Itaquodquantum
exparte
suainternosci
nonpotest."
SQO,
I, 2c;I,vE.
2 "Deeisigitur
sunt
abhomine
etexpuris
natural
ibusadexemplar
cognoscenda
quaenaturaliter
crea
a rebus
utestomnis
tumacceptum
id quodverum
estinre,simpliciter
cognitio
quascitur
dicendum
inquolibet
estquoddeusnondicet
actudiscendi,
utpatet
exsupra
determinatis."
SQO,
inoppositum:
motu
scientiam.
I, 7c; I, i7rL."Adprimum
quodhomo
potest
proprio
acquirere
Dicendum
estderebus
sciendo
idquodverum
estinre."/>ic/.,
adim;I,
naturalibus,
quodverum
i7rM.
inpotentia
"Notitia
animam
. . .inclint
naturalis
etvisinipsautnaturaliter
tamquam
potentia
tendat
adapprehendendum
verum."
SQO,I, 11res.q.; I, 2irB.Seealso,SQO,I, 2 ad imsed
contra;
I, 8rS.
isavailable
Theverum,
toeveryone
: SQO,XXIV,
8res.q.; I, i4rM-rN.
therefore,
indifferently
isnoteven
Itsapprehension
tointellectual
limited
tothesenses
aswell:
; itisavailable
knowledge
andQuod.,
iscompletely
inaccord
with
II,6c;I, 32rA.This,
thinks,
SQO,I, 2c;I, vF-6rG
Henry
SeeSQO,XXIV,
8res.q.; I, i4rN.
Aristotle,
3 Onthenature
ofanexemplar
, seepp.22-23
infra.
"Unde
nonsolum
intellectus
verus
verus
simplicium
apprehensionum
semper
quinetiam
semper
estetipsesensus
inapprehendendo."
8res.q.; I, i4rN.
SQO,XXIV,
s "... quaelibet
ressubintentione
entisexistens
inconsideran
. . . Secundo
tripliciter
potest
inessesuohabet
adquodestrepraesentat.
Sicconvenit
eiintentio
quantum
quoddeea exemplar
enimveraestquaecumque
in se continet
eius
veri;intantum
res,inquantum
quodexemplar
93

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What Henryis alludingto is the Platonic distinctionbetween belief

or opinion and knowledge.1The universalis what it is and is verum, but
we maystill believethatit is somethingelse. To borrowterminologythat
is more at home in a discussion of the bon um, we may say that the
differenceis that between the verum honestum and the verum
apparens. "Man simply" is what it is and the verum honestum quite
properly designatesthe ratio or mode of being under which it is apprehended. But whether our apprehensionof "man simply" is verum
honestum remainsopen.2 The verum of that apprehensionis not selfevidentlyjustified; nor does it seem possible to find in the universal
supposedly being apprehended the evidence that would give us this
certitude.3 In knowingsomethingas verum, we know the quid of that
dicit
verum
reiinrespectu
intentionem
adsuum
. . . Quiaigitur
repraesentat
exemplar
quaenonest
reiprimam
sedsecundaria
etabsoltam),
idquodestenset
(ensenimdicitintentionem
prima
ab intellectu
inrebenepotest
verum
veritatis
eiusabipso
apprehendi
absquehocquodintentio
isanintentio
ofenswhereby
ensisrelated
toa secondary
SQO,I, 2c;I, rD.verum
apprehendatur."
: i.e.nottotheuncreated
buttothecreated
Because
itisrelated
exemplar
exemplar,
exemplar.
only
itdoesnotinvolve
a knowledge
tothesecondary
oftheVeritas.
a reference
such
exemplar,
Lacking
theintentio
ofverum
usina state
leaves
ofperplexity.
tothefirst
Arewedealing
with
exemplar,
oronly
is"apparently
the"real
truth"
with
that
true"?
Seealso,SQO,XXIV,
8adim;I, i4vQ.
ina position
weshall
have
toputourselves
Toanswer
this
where
wecansaynotmerely
question,
itisthat
weshall
have
what
tobeabletogivetheultimate
is,butwhy
something
wayandnoother;
reason:
$c;I, 2i8rP-rQ.
SQO,I, 2c;I,4VC.Seealso,SQO,I, i 2c;I, 22rL;XXXIV,
theverum
that
caninnosense
betheproper
andper
seobject
Itisevident
oftheintellect.
1 Cf.Plato,
44.C-D.
Grgias,
2 "Perintellectum
incontraria
autem
nonpotest
estexseper
quiaipsesicdeterminatur
quantum
modo
utnullo
abeodissentire
velapparens
verum
sednecesse
estassentire.
Similiter
verum
possit
utnullomodopossit
ei consentire
falsum:
autapparens
sednecesse
estabeo ipsum
perfalsum
adsitei facultas
assentiendi
ei quodsibiapparet
Etsi aliquaquandoque
vel
dissentire.
falsum,
ei quodsibiapparet
verum
volundissentiendi
etlibertatem
econverso
; hocsolum
perdominium
tatis."
XI,7c;II,49rP.
Quod.,
theroleoftheliberty
is that
ofthewill,thepoint
wewishtomake
forthemoment
Ignoring
iseither
true
towhat
orapparently
what
isfalse
asassenting
true
from
seesman
; asdissenting
Henry
ofthe
orapparently
Without
somefurther
itisimpossible
todetermine
which
false.
indication,
weareassenting
toordissenting
from.
disjuncts
wastheguarantee
we
ofitsowncertitudo
Onthispoint,
seeJolivet,
, then
p. $6.Iftheverum
itasthat
which
itself
with
characteristics
which
to
would
have
donotpertain
torecognize
presents
toJolivet,
ZenoofCitium.
texts
ofAugustine
thefalse.
Thebackground
is,according
Appropriate
arecited.
3 Certitudo.
isaware
oftheterm.
oftheAvicennian
background
"Propter
quoddicitAvicenHenry
inomnibus
habet
suam
rescertitudinem
na,'unaquaeque
quaestidquodest.'Undesi homines
incertificando
utexpectarent
Nuncautem
iudicium
attenderent
rationis
errarent.
quia
numquam
aliquando
incertis
secundum
ea quaeapparent
homines
iudicium
praeveniuntur
saepius
opinando
cumsolum
etscire
secredunt
utdicit
certisadhaererent
habeant,
opinionem
Philosophus
tamquam
VIIEthicorum
SeeAvicenna,
I, 6C; (Venice,
Metaph.,
io8),fol.72VL;
SQO,II,2res.q.; I, 24rF.
Eth.
Nic.,VII3,i i46b2-3o.
Aristotle,
- thedistinction
is to
andknowledge.
Toapprehend
isbetween
thecertitudo
Again
opinion
Forthis,
andscience
: SQO,II,6c;I, 27rH-vI.
more
than
what
have
something
knowledge
"appears"
94

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thing according to the diminished esse which that quid has in the
to give us knowledge of that
intellect.1But this is simplyinsufficient
in
its
formal
i.e. in its Veritas.2 These
structure,
complete
thing
doubts can be resolvedonly by an appeal to a being whose conditionit is
to be unconditionedby any intellectualact.3
This distinctionbetween the verum and the Veritas is of cardinal
importancein Henry's theory of knowledge.4 The understandingof a
thingin its complete nature; the understandingof it according to the
being which its form has outside of the intellect, implies something
more than a knowledgeof that thingaccordingto the diminishedbeing
which thatformhas in the intellect. That is, it implies somethingmore
than simplya knowledge of that thingas verum. What we need is a
knowledge of the formor quiddityas it gives thisbeing and no other
being to the thing; a knowledgeof the perse concrete being of the form
and not simplya knowledgeof the per accidenscognitionalbeing of the
form; a knowledgeof thatbeingof the formby which it is what it is and
andforthisreason,
certitudo
is directly
ornorm,
isneeded.
Weneeda standard
or"isapparent"
toVeritas:
II,4 adim;I, 2vR;II,6
II; 3c;I, 24vL-2$rM;
, I, ic; I, ivB-2rB;
SQO
proportioned
sedcontra;
I, 2jrC; 6c;I, 2jrG.
1 "Etpatet
nonestnisiverum
essereiquiasecunnonestnisiunaetetiam
huiusmodi
quodVeritas
estdiminutum
essequando
nonhabent
Sedincreaturis
habet
dumessentiam
esseinintelligente.
sedimago
rei."SQO,XXXIV,
nisipersuam
esseinintelligente
2c;I,
quaenonestVeritas
speciem
21ivP.
2 ... loquendo
idquodresest,
eiusquodquidestincreatura
decognitione
autem
apprehendendo
Seealso,ad im;I, i4vQ
and
veritatem
nonapprehendendo
8c;I, i4vP.
eius,..." SQO,XXIV,
devero,
estergo
verum,
quodestquoddam
quodest
SQO,I, 2c;I,4VC."Distinguendum
especially,
dere,quoddicitur
verum
ettantum
ensdiminutum
quodquidest
(scilicet
conceptus
opusintellectus
suam
remquaperessentiam
nonhabet
essein
inquaintuetur
etnotitia
reiapudanimam)
quaedam
reientitas
extra
intellectum
existens
dequadicit
Estaliudverum
anima.
quodestipsaperfecta
inveritate,
reiinesseestsuadispositio
II Metaph
..."
., quoddispositio
uniuscuiusque
philosophus
i ad im; I; 2iirK.Seealso,SQO,XXXIV,
5c; I, 2i8vQ,andAristotle,
.,
Metaph
SQO,XXXIV,
II i, 993b3o.
3 "Inquantum
sensibilium
a phantasmasubspecie
abstracta
tarnen
nobis
(seil.Veritas)
praesentatur
utperhocipsa
falsi
comixta
estutdictum
estsupra,
verisimilitudo
inquacumsimilitudine
tibus
- utorichalcum
verum
aurum
eteconverso
credamus
utfalsum
similitudo
nosdecipere,
possit
et privemur
scientia
omnino
nonintelligamus
. . . Veritatem
verum
utsicquandoque
omnino
modolaxaverit.
Suntenim
si falsis
obtinere
nemopotest
imaginibus
comprehensionis
deceptus
cumVeritas
et quasiin
nosetiam
tenetur
rerum
istaeimagines
corporalium
quaeconsuetudine
inrebus
inquibus
Perhunc
verisimoliuntur.
autilludere
habetur
manibus
ergomodum
decipere
estex parte
falsitatem
bene
Veritas
vero
cum
milecontingit
compatitur
quantum
apprehendere
iscuriously
ofPlato's
account
of
"O".Thepassage
suggestive
intelligentis."
SQO,II,3ad2m;I, 2r
Cf.Theatetus,
inhisuseoftheaviary
error
intheTheatetus
196A-200C.
image.
, particularly
4 Thedistinction
etal.,trans.,
himself.
Cf.G. Bardy
ofcourse
Mlanges
goesbacktoAugustine
etBrouwer,
deSaint
Vol.X: Oeuvres
701,n. 2. Cf.also,
(Paris:Descle
Doctrinaux,
Augustin
1952),
Jolivet,
pp.71-72.
9S

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no other. To know the thingin its form in this way is not simplyto
know it as verum - it is to know it as Veritas.1
And when we speak of thisperse concrete being of the form,we are
not speakingof a Platonic Form or Idea : Henry,as we have seen, rejects
this.2 We are speakingratherof the being which the formhas in the
3 which the formhas in
uncreatedintellect, i.e. of the essequidditativum
the esse quidditativum
the divine intellect and according to which
- the form has esse actualisexistentiae
as
the
in the
exemplar
serving
concrete thing.*
Two characteristicsof the Veritas are now before us. First, the
Veritas of anythingis the fulland complete naturein virtueof which it is
what it is and no other.s Second, the Veritas of anythingincludes a
1 Inthusassociating
andcomplete
initsmostproper
sensewithknowledge
ofthe
knowledge
asfollowing
inthelong
seeshimself
tradition
established
andAristotle
and
Veritas,
Henry
byPlato
andAvicenna:
continued
SQO,I, i obj.2m;I, irA;I, 2c; I, 7rL;I, 12ad 2m;I,
byAugustine
2 obi.3m;I, i37rH.
II,2res.q. 24rF;XXIV,
22vW0M-23r"0";
2 Seep. 84n.2supra.
AsdidAugustine:
SeeJolivet,
pp.72ff.
3 Veritas
arealways
associated
andquidditas
: toknow
theoneistoknow
the
, therefore,
byHenry
termini
siccognoscuntur
indefinitiva
"Ettuncprimo
ratione
other.
Veritas
et
quando
intelligitur
rerum."
rei
veritatem,
SQO,I, 12res.q.; I, 22rL."... ipsam
quaeestipsaquidditas
quidditas
. . ." Quod.,
II,6c;I, 32rA.
intellecta;
differ
inthissense
: thequidditas
theresasobject
dohowever
; theVeritas
;
signifies
They
only
initsrelationship
toanintellect.
enim
theresspecifically
subnomine
"Quidditas
signifies
quidditatis
obiectum
tantum
verointelligitur
subpropria
obiectum
. . . intelligitur
; Veritas
tamquam
tamquam
adintellectum."
ratione
2c; I, 206VB.Seealso,ibid.,2o6vA
intelligibilis
SQO,XXXIII,
respectus
andXXXIV,
S res.q.; I, 216*1.
- sivecreatae
- estquodipsasithoc
* "... perfecta
veritatis
reicuiuscumque
siveincreatae
ratio
insequidquidadnaturam
scilicet
suarequirit,
continendo
etessentiam
suam
concurrit
quodnatura
"
suiapud
huiusmodi
intellectum.
2c; I, 211VN.
ethocsubratione
SQO,XXXIV,
quaestdeclarativa
homine
dicitur
suainipsoquiaipsasolaestdeclarativa
inunoquoque
Veritas
"Unde
humanitas
forma
subratione
homo.
quodsitverus
Ipsaenim
quidditatis
imparticipati
ipsius
apudintellectum
- sedperaccidens
declarandi
veritatem
et regula
eiusin participante
estrecititudo
quaedam
creato
deeaet
habet
esseinintellectu
quiaineononestnisiutnotitia
quaedam
concepta
inquantum
eiusadipsacausata.
Perseveroestregula
verbum
etimago
declarandi
veritatem
eiusin
tamquam
increato
habet
esseinintellectu
natura
quiaineoestutinsupersubstantiali
inquantum
participante
etquidditas
velessentia
a quahabet
dicatur
ventate
etsumma
quodipsaVeritas
inquantum
exemplar
eta quahabet
causari
secundum
esseeiusquidditativum,
actum
eiusestsecundum
actualis
existen1res.q.; I, 21irH.
Ibid.2i2vS.Seealso,SQO,XXXIV,
tiaeinparticipantibus."
utquodhomo
esthomo
deinhaerentia
velanimal,
"Veritas
enunciationum
. . . potest
essentiali,
estreexistente
etaequaliter
extra
velnonexistente."
aeterno
esseaeterna
inintellectu
III,
Quod.,
9c; I, 62rQ.
seeJolivet,
OntheAugustinin
background,
p. 86.
s "Nunc
ineoquodhabet
nondicitur
veritatem
inessenaturali
itaestquodVeritas.
autem
quocumverus
homonisiquiahabet
veram
suae.Nonenimdicitur
aliquis
quidditatis
quenisia veritate
isforHenry
there
noconcrete
. . SQO,XXXIV,
humanitatem;
g res.q.; I, 217V"0".Actually,
andtheVeritas.
thequiddity
between
veritatem
"... sedipsam
whatsoever
distinction
quaeestipsa
reiintellecta
..." Quod.,
II,6c;I, 32rA.
quidditas
initself
a thing
isseenbareandopen
: Quod.
theVeritas,
When
, III,1c; I,48VX.
knowing
96

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specific referenceto a per se concrete being which is not the being

exercised by the thingwhich was firstthe object of sense apprehension.
As Henrysays, "what is needed forthe Veritas of any creatureis thatit
be in its essence what its ideal perfectionis in the divine wisdom."1 It is
hisconsistentteachingthattheVeritas absolutelyneedsthisrelationshipto
being which is other than cognitionaland other than extra-mentaland
concrete: without this relationship,Veritas is still compatible with
falsitas.2 With thisrelationship,the object of the intellectis established
in its true being: the doubt and uncertaintywhich we previously
experienced in our apprehension of the thing as verum are now
removed. The vera res and the vera intellectio are conformedto
each other, such thatthe latteris adequated to the former.3In asserting
this, we are assertingthe primacyof the Veritas over the verum: a
primacynot in the order of knowledge, but in the order of being. We
proceed from "man" to "humanity",but humanityis the source of a
man's being man.*
This attempt to get at "the truth" of things is not without its
embarrassments.In our effortsto give the utmostmeasure of certainty
to the resultsof our scientificinquiries,we seem to have come dangerously close to the position that to have a genuine notion of the Veritas
1 "Hocenim
Veritas
creaturae
creatura
estquodrequirit
est; videlicet
inquantum
quodipsasitillud
indivina
insuaessentia
2c; I, 2i2vT.
perfectio
sapientia."
SQO,XXXIV,
quodesteiusidealis
takes
where
thetraditional
definition
astheadequation
ofVeritas
SeeSQO,1,2c; I,7rL,
ofres
Henry
a heavily
andshows,
thattheresinthiscasecannot
andintellect
Augustinin
against
background,
insensible
concrete
resavailable
Onthispoint,
mean
seealso,
justtheextra-mental
experience.
SQOyI, 7c;I, 16VIandijtLandSQO,II,6 obj.im;I, 2jTC.
2 "Adsecundum:
semper
puraest.Dicendum
quodinreipsasemper
quodVeritas
puraest,non
inquibus
verisimile
exparte
tarnen
... inrebus
cumvero,
cognoscentis
contingit
apprehendere
falsitatem
estexparte
Veritas
benecompatitur
intelligentis."
SQO,II,3ad2m;I, 2r"Ow.
quantum
3 "... conformitas
etcoaequatio
verorum
sinecuiusperceptione
nonpercipitur
Veritas
utriusque
estsiveveritatem
habens
autparticipans."
idquodverum
sedsolum
c;I 2i8rP.See
SQO,XXXIV,
where
contrasts
thecertainty
ofa sincera
notitia
ofVeritas
with
the
also,SQO,I, 2c;I, VG,
Henry
with
oftheimagination
beclouded
phantasms.
uncertainty
isalways
unlike
coextensive
with
theesse
ofa thing.
Ittherefore,
unlike
Veritas,
verum,
exactly
isthesource
ofallcertitude
ina science:
theverum,
SQO,II,6c;I, 27rD-rG.
* Athing
isverum
itcorresponds
totheextent
that
tothefirst
Veritas:
SQO,I, 7c;I, i6vK.See
I, 2i6rHandres.q.; I, 2i7rL.
also,SQO,I, 2ad$m;I, 8rR;XXXIV,
gsedcontra;
means
a knowledge
oftheVeritas
ofcauses.
Itistoknow
what
makes
a true
Thus,
knowledge
velintell
veritatem
reicerto
de
tobea true
iudicio
"... concipiat
igat
thing
thing.
ipsam
percipiendo
velverus
homo
inilio
color."
SQO,I, 2c; I, 4VC."... intellectus
ipsaquidsit:utquodsitverus
etcausam
reicognoscit
universali
naturam
etveritatem
abstracto
vidt."
SQO,I, 12res.q.; I, 22rK.
Seealso,SQO,II, ic; I, 23VB;IV,8c;I, 3rX;
2 obj.4m;I,
VI,2 res.q.; I, 43VM-VN;
XXIV,
137vH.
isknown,
allpossibility
Inthis
oncetheVeritas
offalsitas
isexcluded.
Cf.infra
, p.98n.1.
way,
that
forHenry
Veritas
andperfect
Itisnotsurprising,
science
areone.
then,
genuine
97

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of anythingis to see thingsexactly as God sees them. Or it may even

mean that God and the mode of being which thingshave in theintellect
are ultimatelythe only true objects of the intellect. As a matterof fact,
the concept of the Veritas and the process wherebywe come to know
it are a great deal more complicated than this. Why, for example,
should it be necessaryforthisproper and perse object of the intellectthe Veritas1 - to have this referenceto the divine intellectin the first
place? On the surface at least, it seems a simple enough process to
abstractthe Veritas from"thisverum" and "thatverum".
Partly,this is true. The intellectual act whereby the Veritas is
obtained is an act of abstraction.We do not mean thatact of abstraction
whereby the confused and indistinctuniversal is firstformed in the
intellect. We mean rather that act of abstractionwhereby, after the
verum of what is known has been comparedwiththe "verum" ofour act
of apprehensionin successive judgmentsof composition and division,
ofthe one verum to the otheris apprehendthe extentof the conformity
and
The
full
ed.
importanceof the Solemn Doctor's theoryof
meaning
abstractionis realized only when we consider it on this level. To know
"man simply" is not just to have abstracted the universal from the
througha farther
particular: to know "man simply"is to be certain
The truth
is
"the
truth".
abstraction
our
that
abstraction
of
act
- is
Veritas
or
comes only when the common form
quiddity
abstractedfromthe verum of the thingand fromthe "verum" of the
intellect.2This abstractionis in certainrespectslike and in certainother
1 "... Veritas
obiectum
etintelligitur
reiestidquodresscitur
intellectus,
quiaipsaestproprium
Dicendum
intellectus.
estperseobiectum
Veritas
. . ." SQO,II,6c;I, 27rD."... quodomnis
quod
adinvicem,
etVeritas
verum
est: ..." SQO,I, 12ad 3m;I, 23rP."... cognitio
persesehabent
etconsiderans
habitm
inactuesthabens
scientiae,
..." SQO,XXIV,2 ad 3m;I, i38rL."Sciens
etinreiventate."
sciens
secundum
SQO,I, 10c;I, i9vF.Seealso,SQO,
proprie
quidicitur
ipsum,
I, 2i6rH.
s sedcontra;
I, 2c;I, srDandXXXIV,
notitiam
etinquantum
veritatem
veritatis
nisidequohabet
scire
hominem
"Non
aliquid
contingit
errare
derecuius
est.Quianon
noncontingit
veritatis
notitiam
seit.Sedhabendo
intantum
noscit
errare
seithomocertitudinaliter.
sedubinoncontingit
nisifalsitate
errat
Ergonon
deeeptus;
Cf.
illudcertitudinaliter."
scire
I, 24rE.
hominem
SQO,II,2sedcontra;
quinsciat
contingit
aliquid
is called
in
Veritas
offact,
Asa matter
nothing
except
y2c; I, 24rF;I, ic; I, ivB-2rB.
also,ibid.
2res.q.; I, 206VAandXXXIV,
2c;I, 21ivN.
totheactofunderstanding:
relation
SQO,XXXIII,
2 Thelocus
Veritas
Because
isSQO,XXXIV,
forthisdoctrine
classics
gI 1,2i6rH-2i9rZ.
specifies
boththeresandthe
totheintellect,
related
is specifically
as thatquiddity
insofar
thequiddity
canbeintheintellect
theVeritas
Inother
inthat
words,
willbeterms
only
intellect
relationship.
in theresanditsownvera
boththeverum
considers
as thatintellect
insofar
self-reflexively
eachofthem.
from
ratio
ofconformity
thecommon
andabstracts
them,
intellectio,
compares
do
notperceive
vera
each
we
to
of
both
and
the
other,
Without
coaequatio
perceivingconformity
of
Theprocess
inVeritas.
orthatwhich
is verum,
which
that
butonly
theVeritas,
participates
verum"
We
"this
a
one.
Veritas
of
the
a
therefore,
is,
together
complex
put
knowledge
acquiring
98

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respects unlike the abstractionwhereby the confused and indistinct

is firstformed.
universalintentio
Abstractionof the Veritas from"thisverum" and "thatverum" is
like the abstractionof "man" from "thisman" and "thatman" inasmuch
as the abstractionis the work of the intellect,while the actualityof the
abstraetum is not the actualityof complete dependence on the intellect.
In the case of the confusedand indistinctuniversal,this was taken to
had a being and unityof its own - a being and
mean that the intentio
unity which was lost in successive judgments of composition and
whereinthe definitive
division,and in the finalact of simplex
intelligentia
revealed
and
wherein
it therebyreceived
was
structureof the universal
of the intellect.
the essequidditativum
It is at thispointthatthelikenessbetweenthe two acts ofabstraction
startsto disappear. The actualityof the Veritas is not the actualityof
complete dependence on the intellect: what strikesus however is that,
as somethingunconditionedby intellectualacts, its definitivestructure
can never be revealed in the way in which "man", "rational" and
"animal"are revealed. To findthe definitiveratioof the Veritas, it is at
least necessaryto recognizethatit cannot be given a fullcomplementof
in the humanintellect.
essequidditativum
To be sure, the weakness of the human intellect because of its
union with the body is at least partlyresponsiblefor this, thoughwe
mustimmediatelyadd thatHenryis not nearlyas insistenton thispointas
is Plato.1 But also, it is the very nature of the Veritas - the role it
- which preventsthat Veritas from
havingan
plays in Henry's noetic
human
the
To
of
intellect.
total
of
say that the
dependence
actuality
is
that
its
to
total
and
full
is
esse
Veritas
esseof
quidditativum say
actuality
consists in its being a known universal. How then could it serve as a
Theactual
oftheconformity
is
so thatwemayseetheir
verum"
and"that
conformity.
seeing
which
canbereferred
actofintellection
toastheapprehenanditisthis
actofintellection
another
18r"'0'; 5c;I,2i8rP-vQ
andXXXVI,
6
SeeSQO,XXXIV,
sionoftheVeritas.
gres.q.; I, 21yrK-2
ad2m;I, 238VN.
isnotknown
inanactofsimple
no
issure- theVERiTAS-as-such
OfthisHenry
apprehension,
concrete
in realextra-mental
itsfoundation
matter
what
I,
things:
sQO,I, 10ad 3 sedcontra;
.
8 res.q,; I, i4rN-r"'0'
andXXIV,
2ovK
1 Plato
andthat
itwasonly
ofnecessity
because
ofthehinderance
of
God(sic)illuminated
saidthat
He waswrong,
theillumination.
to Henry,
not
thebodythatwecouldnotreceive
according
toourknowledge
wasa hinderance
oftheVeritas,
butonly
thebody
that
heemphasized
because
andthat
ofnecessity
this
hinderance
ofthebody
necessitated
that
Godilluminated
heinsisted
because
andadimetad2m;I, 23vC-24rD.
a theory
ofrecollection:
SQO,II,ic; I, 23VB
itisa psychological
matter
istwo-fold:
because
ofthevery
of
fact
ofthebody"
The"hinderance
matter
because
thebody
usto
hinders
ofsoulandbody
union
; itisa moral
, pp.100-102)
(seeinfra
: SQO,II,sc; I, 26rY.
wepractice
viceandnotvirtue
that
theextent
99

189.235.178.250

00:13:46 AM

standardof certitude?How could it remove even the slightestelement

of doubt that mightbe presentin other supposed acts of knowledge? It
itselfwould be in the same position as any other universalconditioned
by the operationsof the intellect,but not the conditionof them.
actum
Must we say,then,thatthe clarifiedand distinctuniversalabstr
known as Veritas is really like the confused and indistinctuniversal
"man simply"; that it does not have an esse quidditativum
, but only a
this
its
definitive
It
is
Is
ratio
?
of
its
own?
difficultto
and
unity
being
see how anythingis gained by hypostasizing
anyuniversal still less this
one. If it is just anotherobject to be known, thento be sure thatwe are
dealing with Veritas and not just with a similitudeof it, we shall have
to have a standardaccordingto which we can compare the verum of the
Veritas and the "verum" of our intellectualact, which is not only to
beg the originalquestion, but also to hauntourselvesall over againwith
the infiniteregressargument.
The Veritas is abstracted: Henry is clear on this. But if it is to
serve as the condition of havingknowledge as distinctfromopinion or
belief; if it is to be the perse and motive object of the intellect,then it
can neither have the complete dependency on the human intellect
so often implies, nor can it have the esse
which esse quidditativum
absolutumwhich would make it just one more object among many
others. Our hypothesisat this point would be that the definitiveratioof
the Veritas would include at least a dependencyin being on the human
intellect (i.e. as that which is abstractedthroughintellectualacts) and,
not an independencein being, but a dependencyon thatbeing whichis in
some way both the cause of Veritas and is itselfuncaused by anything
else. That is to say - God. What the abstractionof the Veritas does,
therefore,is to turn us aside fromVeritas as a product of the human
intellectand its operationsand toward God as its source1.
4-

conclusion:

Veritas

and the exemplar

cause

In a context of exemplar causality,what the Solemn Doctor is tellingus

is that the created exemplar, which is the universalintelligiblespecies
1 Theconformity
betheconformity
must
notmerely
of
a knowledge
oftheVeritas
for
sorequisite
isits
tothat
which
totheverares,butoftheveraresasa created
theveraiNTELLECTio
exemplar
" Veritas
reiintellectui
Veritas.
ortheprima
i.e.theuncreated
igitur
quousque
source,
exemplar
adsuum
a quoesttransei conformitatem
nisiostendendo
nonpotest
ostendi
primm
exemplar,
solum
nonestnisiVeritas
etprincipalissimum
cumilludexemplar
formata.
prima
Quare
primum
reiadsuum
ostendere
conformitatem
etmaxime
illedocere
exemplar
potest
quiintellectui
potest
solusdeuspotest."
Hocautem
SQO,I, 7c;I, i6vK.
primum.
IOO

189.235.178.250

00:13:46 AM

to the mind in virtue of its being abstractedfrom

presentas an intentio
in itselffor
in
the
the phantasm
imagination,is necessarybut insufficient
a knowledge of the Veritas. It cannot be completely dispensed with:
because of his condition, prostatuisto, man must have it to know the
Veritas. But of itself, it is incomplete.1 In a passage well-known to
Duns Scotus,2 Henry says that it is impossible to acquire an absolutely
certainand infallibleknowledgeof the truthfromtheacquired exemplar,
and this forthree reasons. First,the exemplar is abstractedfroma sensible and thereforemutable thing: and this means that it itselfwill be
mutable. Second, the soul which receives this exemplar is also mutable
and hence, it cannotbe stabilizedby an exemplar takenfromsomething
mutable. Third, the exemplaritselfis mutable.3
In the tradition of Augustine and Anselm, therefore,we must
maintainthatno knowledgeof the Veritas is possible withoutrecourse
to the eternaland uncreatedexemplar which is the cause of the thing.
This uncreated exemplar may be described as the divine being's archetypalknowledge of all thingsprior to their creation; it is the ratioor
mode of being of the divine essence according to the patternof which
the world unfoldsitselfin time.* Henry is unequivocal on this point:
1 "Nonenim
inseperfectam
reinisihabeat
scientiam
perfectam
agens
imprimere
potest
aliquid
inalionisi
sibisimilem
veritatem
eiusetperillam
veritatem
agitperfectam
agat.. . . Nihilenim
suam
formam
immedisicut
sua
Veritas
id
est
immediate
sigillum
per
ipsam
per quod ipsa
quodagit
informat
earn."
etverafigura
ateimprimit
informat,
ceram;
SQO,I, 4 res.q.; I, i2vE.
quaipsum
Seealso,SQO
, I, 2c;I, $rE.
solummodo
divinum
inmente
format
similitudinis
"Etnota
perfectae
conceptum
quodlicettalem
estexemplar
formationem
necessarium
adconceptus
rei,cumhoctarnen
quodestcausa
exemplar
nihil
dere
sineiliaenim
inmente
reia phantasmate
etforma
a reutestspecies
accepta
acceptum
inqualisumus."
vitae
intalistatu
noster
intellectus
SQO,I, 3c;1,iorF.
potest
concipere
quacumque
seeibid.,iorG;I,4ad3m;I, 13rI,I, 7c;I, iTL
ofthecreated
Ontheincompleteness
exemplar,
andXXXIV,
8c;I, i4*vP.
2 SeeOrdinatio
, I,dist.3,pars1,q. 4; Balied.,III,128-130.
3 Cf.SQO,I, 2c;I, srE.
4 "Etestdicendum
nisiexcognitione
reinonpotest
esttamVeritas
cognosci
quodcumutdictum
devera
:
adsuum
reicognitae
tatis
conformi
religione
Augustinus
Quiasecundum
quoddicit
exemplar.
deveritate
uniussimilia
sunt'.Et Anselmus,
verasunt
,
... inquantum
'veraintantum
principalis
etibidem:
adsuum
rmitas
estreiconfo
Veritas
verissimum;
'Quodestvereestinquantum
exemplar
Veritas
rei
adduplex
estexemplar
estquodibiest'.Secundum
rei,dupliciter
exemplar
quodduplex
Timaei
inprimo
secundum
Estenim
abhomine
habet
, duplex
exemplar
quodvultPlato
cognosci.
rei
Primm
immutabile.
factum
exemplar
atque
perpetuum
quoddam
quoddam atqueelaboratum;
notitiam
omnium
existens
animam
eiusuniversalis
estspecies
suppositorum
perquamacquirit
apud
rerum
ideales
omnium
continens
estarsdivina
a re.Secundum
rationes,
eiusetestcausata
exemplar
suafacit
inmente
artis
ad exemplar
sicutartifex
institusse
ad quodPlatodicitdeummundum
DeVera
adprimm."
66; PL
nonautem
, XXXVI,
Religione
domum,
SQO,I, 2c;I, $rE.Augustine,
Timaeus
DeVeritate
,
ed.,I; i8f,i. is andXII;I, 11.11-29;Plato,
, VII;Schmitt
34,i$2; Anselm,
Seealso,SQO,I, 3c;I, iorF.
27D-29A.
IOI

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we cannot know the Veritas without knowing the prima Veritas.1

Looking at the problem from the side of the prima Veritas, the
reason why we cannot know any Veritas without knowingthe prima
Veritas is because the natureor essence of anythingexistsmostperfectly
not in thingsbut in God.2 What we must ascertain, however, is the
modusoperandiof the divine exemplar. Does it serve as an object known,
or simplyas a ratioof knowingP Can we say, with Augustine, that it
"informs"the intellect?* Clearly enough, until we have answeredsuch
questions, we cannot be said to have reached the core of Henry's
theoryof knowledge.
What is "man" then? When do we "know" what "man" is? The
answer to the latter question at least surely comes only after many
reiabstractum
reietaliudexemplar
estexemplar
aeternum
hocautem
"... praeter
quodestcausa
a re."SQO,I, 7c; I, i7rL.
etcausatum
- unum
a re quodest
ad quodhabetcognosci
estexemplar
"... etquodduplex
acceptum
inmente
existens
divina."
resquodestarsidealis
inmente
causans
universalis
SQO,
; alterum
species
8c;I, 14sVP.
XXIV,
1 ... nullam
veritatem."
veritatem
seimus
nisisciendo
SQO,XXIV,2 ad4m;I, i38rM.
primam
alia
sunt
estratio
dicendum
"Isto
quaintelligibilia
ergomodo
quadeusestintelligibilis
quodratio
adomnia
aliaa seintelligenda
movere
abipso.Ipseenim
esttaleintelligibile
potest
quodintellectum
insecontinens,
omnium
inactuintelligenda
adomnia
etsicestunum
intelligibilitates
intelligibile
enim
estutdispositio
Necesse
esseinsecontinens.
aliaessenda
omnium
sicut
esseadomnia
estunum
estesseprimum
deusinquantum
inveritate.
Etitasicut
cuiuslibet
reiinessesitsuadispositio
ipsum
inserationes
essendi
continens
esseperessesuum
faciendo
omnia
estratio
essendi
omnia,
quaevult
omnia
faciendo
estratio
estVeritas
sicinquantum
omnium
omnia,
aliorum,
intelligendi
quae
prima
subessetamen
eminentiori
inseomnes
rationes
continens
vult
secum
omnium,
intelligendi
intelligi,
and
aliis:..." SQO,XXXIII,
esseinrebus
habeat
I, 2o9rT
3c;I, 209VY.Seealso,sedcontra;
quam
XXIV,
7 adim;I, 144VI;8ad im;I, i4vQ.
3c;I, 2o9rX;
2 "Estergointentio
deterentes
secum
antecorpora
erant
nonquodanimae
Augustini:
separatae
utposuit
nonaddiscens
sedreminiscens
anima
excitata
adquospersensus
habitus
Plato,
revertitur,
a
inphantasmatibus
sensibilium
rerum
sedpostquam
receptis,
persensus
intelligibilia
conspexerit
inipsa
rationes
Etperhocattingit
etphantasmatibus.
sesubstrahit
sensibus
incorpreas
praedictas
et
inphantasmatibus
etpraedicta
intellecta
eadem:
Sunt
enim
veritate
existens.
cognita
incorporea
et
Nonsuntenimaliudquamipsaenaturae
inipsaveritate
aeterna.
rationes
ipsaeincorporeae
essentia
rerum."
IX,ic;II,382vX-383rX.
Quod.,
3 "Sincera
Sedestadvertendum
aeternum
Veritas
. . . nonnisiadexemplar
potest.
conspici
igitur
ad
Unomodoaspiciendo
adhocexemplar
Veritas
sciripotest
dupliciter.
aspiciendo
quodsincera
videndo
inipsoscilicet
obiectum
imagiquiabeneprobat
exemplatum,
cognitum
ipsum
tamquam
ad rationem
illudtamquam
ad exemplar
nemquiintuetur
. . . Aliomodoaspiciendo
exemplar,
ad g m;I, 8rR;adimsedcontra;
Seealso,6rI-vK;
I,
tantum."
SQO,I, 2c;I, 6rH-rI.
cognoscendi
8rSandSQO,I, 7c; I, 16VK.
4 Henry
Buthealsoadmits
theintellect.
"informs"
that
theeternal
with
exemplar,
Augustine,
says,
: SQO,I, 2c; 7rL.Thesame
means
howrwhat
that
heisata losstounderstand
bythis
Augustine
in
illumination
ofdivine
nature
inSQO,II,1adim;I, 23VC.Ontheformal
isevident
puzzlement
itis surely
atthispoint,
owntimidity
InviewofHenry's
seeJolivet,
Augustine,
pp.146-147.
illumination
ofdivine
wemust
ofBraun
toassert
that
onthepart
theory
Henry's
interpret
premature
andPlatonic
SeeBraun,
ina very
sense.
; j.
pp.46-48
Augustinin
102

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judgmentsof composition and division and acts of reason. But just as

surelythe answer does not lie exclusivelyin such judgmentsand acts
not even in that act of ultimateabstractionwherein the communityof
"this verum" and "thatverum" is allegedly revealed to us. We know
what manis, Henrywould say,onlywhen we are surethatwe possess "the
truth"about man.
At that,it need not even be the wholetruth.It is doubtfulwhether
anyaction effectedby the eternalexemplarcould completelycompensate
for either the inherent limitations of the human condition or the
obscuritycreated by the presence of matter.1It is a guidingprincipleof
the Solemn Doctor that as a thing stands to esse, so does it stand to
Veritas and knowledge.2It would follow, then, that since things"are"
in different
degrees, so too will there be more or less Veritas in our
apprehensionsof them.
Veritas, then, does eliminate falsitas; but this is not to be
understoodas meaningthatwhen we know the Veritas in the case of
one thing,we know the Veritas of everything.Apparentlyit does not
even mean thatwhen we know the Veritas of one thing,we know the
Veritas of the complete and whole thing! We know the Veritas of that
sensible
thing only to the extent that that thing is revealed to us in
- how much more there may be : this we do not know.
experience
The paradox, therefore,is: we know as much as we do know - how
much more there is to know, thiswe do not know. Henry's concept of
we say
knowledge thus includes a certain open-endedness. Even when
1 "Consimiliter
rei
autex parte
alicuius
etintellects
in comprehensione
contingit
imperfectio
exsenonestnatum
Autquiaintelligibile
autexparte
intelligi:
intellectae
perfecte
intelligentis.
aut
nisipernegationem
nonestintelligibilis
materia,
Philosophum
quaesecundum
quemadmodum
sensibilis
necplene
necpleneestintelligibilis
Platonem
; autquiainetsecundum
peranalogiam
exse
suiintellectus
nonestnatus
etimperfectionem
debilitatem
capere
perfecte
telligens
propter
nostra
in
anima
intellectus
dicit
apud
(ut
dispositio
Philosophus)
intelligibile:
quemadmodum
lucem
onisapud
oculorum
estdispositioni
similis
valde
manifestum
illudquodestinnatura
vespertili
w
., II,sec.
; Averroes,
solis.
., Il i, 993b8-ii
Metaph
Metaph
SQO,XL,4c; I, 2^8rL.SeeAristotle,
i; VIII,fol.29rB-C.
2 "... sicut
: II,Metaphysi.
etcognitionem
adessesicadveritatem
SQO;II,
sehabet
unumquodque
II i, 993^30.
6 obj.im;I, ijTC.SeeAristotle,
Metaphy.,
IIMetaphysi
.
secundum
reietesseeiusparificantur,
itaestquodVeritas
"Nunc
autem
quoddicitur
utdicitcommen.
adveritatem.
adessesicsehabet
sehabet
estergosicut
Necesse
Quanto
igitur,
Etideo
inveritate.
eritperfecta
inesse,tanto
fuerit
resqualibet
magis
ibidem,
magis
perfecta
essentiam
reietquodidquodsignificai
etveritatem
essentiam
ineodem
dicitur
quodenssignificat
SeeAristotle,
etesserei."SQO,II,6c;I, 27rD-rF.
, II 1,
hocestfinis
Metaph.
cuiuslibet,
cognitionis
., II,sec.4; VIII,fol.3orD.
Metaph
8-3o;Averroes,
993b2
tasest:. . ." SQO,XXXIV,
veri
deidiminuta
veritatis
ic;
creaturae
omnis
"... sicVeritas
respectu
ad im;I, 2iirK.
I, 211rI. Seealso,ibid.,
io3

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that we know humanitywhen we know the Veritas of man, there is

always the possibility,because of the weakness of the incarnatedhuman
intellect,thatthereis more to humanitythanwhat we do know. Again,
however, we must emphasizethatthisdoes not mean thatthere is some
suspicionor doubt thatwhat we know is merelyopinion or belief.What
we do know, Henry insists,we know in the fullestsense of the term
"knowledgeV
A delicate balance, therefore,is what Henryasks us to preservein
his theoryof knowledge. The act of abstractionwherein we attain the
Veritas is not to be passed over lightlyin a considerationof his noetic.
In the matterof Veritas, we have an instanceof cognitionalbeing in part
dependentupon its object; in part dependentupon anothersource - a
source transcendingthe knowing intellect - for its full measure of
actumreveals itselfas
intelligibility.In this one case at least, the abstr
this
to
a
when
transcendent
source is unexincomplete
relationship
In
a
for
of
sincera
) Veritas, a special
pressed. short,
knowledge genuine (
divine illuminationis necessary.2But this, of course, is anothermatter
entirely.
of Windsor
University
U.S.A.

1 Cf.SQP,II,3c; I, 24vL-vM
andII,6sedcontra;
with
wearein
I, 2jTC.What
SQO,II,ic; I, 23VB
is thatevendivine
illumination
hasitslimitations.
effect
thisis thereason
saying
Perhaps
why
issoconcerned
itscharacter
ofnon-necessity.
with
that
mancan
Also,tomaintain
stressing
Henry
inthislife- eventhough
andtotalVeritas
attain
weaddthecaveat
thatthisis only
complete
- is notmuch
divine
ofa special
illumination
withtheassistance
different
from
the
possible
isreally
there
between
man
statu
isto
andinstatu
nodifference
that
beato
itseems
. Again,
pro
position
that
isnotunaware
oftheCondemnation
tosuppose
of1277.SeeGilson,
reasonable
Henry
History
of
inthe
Middle
Christian
, pp.406-407.
Ages
Philosophy
"
2 ... assistit
divina
veritatis
illustratio
adperceptionem
sincerae."
SQO,I, 4 ad gm;I, i3vL.
autaliquam
veritatem
"Sinceram
autem
veritatem
autforte
veritate
cognoscendam
supernaturaliter
scire(seil,homo)
sineipsoproprio
nonpotest
..." SQO,I, 7ad
(seil,
deo)docente,
quamquamque
imsedcontra;
andDe Wulf,
Histoire
dela
I, i7rM.Seealso,Quod.,
IX,i$c; II, 382vX-383rZ,
TheAugustinin
enBelgique
influence
isquiteevident
1910),106-107.
(Paris:F. Alean,
philosophie
intheconnection
andtheimmutable
ofdivine
illumination
SeeJolivet,
truth.
p. 142.
104

189.235.178.250

00:13:46 AM

A Note on Aganafa

s Thesaurus

philosophorum

(?)

AN UNKNOWN ARAB SOURCE OF THE WELL-KNOWN

et respondendi
de modoopponendi
Tractatus
L. M. DE RIJK
yearsago I foundin the Vatican Library(Vat. Lat. 4537, ff.4raet
an incompletecopy of a tracton the modusopponendi
Some2ra,s. XIII)
himself
:
which
calls
of
author
the
,
Aganafat(or Aganasat).
respondendi
Further investigationshave shown that this tract, called Thesaurus
de
, musthave been the source of the well-knownTractatus
philosophorum
foundin severalmanuscripts(Paris, BN. Lat.
etrespondendi
modoopponendi
16.390, 16.617 and Montecassino362 VV) and printedunder Albertthe
Great's name. (See M. Grabmann, in Sitzungsberichteder bayer.
Akad. d. Wiss., Phil.-Hist. Abt. Jahrg. 1937, H. 10 (Munich 1937),
24 f.) There exist at least two otheradaptationsof the originaltract,viz.
an anonymousone in Erlangen, Univ. cod. 436, and one ascribed to
Gentiiisde MonteSneteMarie inGeorgioprovincieMarchieAnchonitane
O.E. S.A., which is found in Paris, B.N. Nouv. acq. lat. 1803 and in
Bologna, Univ.19 (920).
in full next year, toI hope to edit the Thesaurus
philosophorum
of
getherwith the adaptationsand a studyon its place in the development
. At this moment I confinemyselfto edit
the arsobligatoriaetexercitativa
and the prologusin order to enable studentsof Arab (or
the argumentum
Hebrew?) logic to get some impressionof this work and its author. I
could be givenon his identity.
shouldbe verypleased ifsome information

VAT.LAT.,437,f.46ra~va
etrespondendi
de modoopponendi
tractatus
46ra Hieincipit
(ARGUMENTUM)
hec.
Circaartemopponendi
ponuntur
duodeeim
Et primoponuntur
probariomnia
per qua possunt
argumenta
in
vult
et
homo
mundo.
arte
sive
scientia
in
omni
quiequid
problemata
10s

189.235.178.250

00:13:53 AM

io

ig

20

30

Deindeprobatur
(sitalterum.
quodunumcontrariorum
quatuorargumentis
sit
Posteaprobatur
quod unumcontradictoriorum)
quatuorargumentis
alterum.
sintsimul
Deindeprobatur
quodduo contradictoria
quinquargumentis
vera.
Posteaprobatur
(!)
(dsperatum
quodunumdisparatum
quinquargumentis
sit
ut
homo
sit
(hocMS) asinus.
MS) alterum, quod
de
Deindeponuntur
9 regulenecessarie
MS) extracte
(oppositi
opponenti
Ex quibusregulis
et Secundo
et de Primo
et de Tertio
Priorm
Primo
Thopicorum.
ad probandum
ad
infinita
impossibile
quodlibet
potestfacere
argumenta
opponens
sive
scientia
arte.
in
omni
suum
beneplacitum
Posteaostendetur
responsionem
quomodoopponenspoteritimprobare
8
modis.Namprimoprobatur
et ostendere
datamab ipsorespondente,
(!) tribus
Deinde
totidem
verum
dicit
sit
nichil
respondens.
probatur
quod
quod
argumentis
Nam quandorespondens
solvit
quodnullaoratiosit disfinguenda.
argumentis
velminorispropositions,
talemresponmaioris
perdistinctionem
argumentum
sit distinsionemdebetimprobare
probando
quodnullapropositio
opponens,
non
Nam
fallacia
de
sit.
Tertio
quod
quando
responprobatur unaquaque
guenda.
talemresponsionem
debes
in tuo argumento,
densassignat
aliquamfallaciam
sit,deindeprobare
quodnullaresponsio
probando
quodnullafallacia
improbare,
sitbonaingenerali.
cauteleextracte
de librisAristotilis.
Ultimo[46ra[ponuntur
Quasresponin
ac etiamet opponens,
subcumbet
denssecumhabensin disputatione,
numquam
vel
respondendo opponendo.
:
Etestprologus
(prologus)

de quibusnovitetmentientes
videlicet
nonmentiri
Duosuntoperasapientis,
idest
Seddoctores
in
libro
Elencorum.
ut
habetur
(/),
generatob
possemanifestare,
videantur
mentiri
et quod
est
non
necessarium
viderisapientes.
debent
quod
Ergo
habeant
manifestandi
mentientes
potestatem.
ininferendo
etopponenscilicet
verum
talisinduobus
Sedpotestas
consistit,
3$
arte
volunt
doctores
Si igitur
dofalsum.
MS)
sequigloriam
(regulam indigent
aliqui
non
scientiam
ars
solum
et
pestat
opponendi
respondendi.
Ergo
opponendi
sivedisputando,
sed
acquiritopponendo
perquamaliquisvictoriam
apparentem
modum
et
in
dat
aliis
intellectum
subtilia(t)
MS)
loquendi(sequendi
(intellectus
inlellectum.
excitandi
etmodum
40 MS)copiosum
et inlibrosecundo
inlibrogenerationis
uthabetur
Arsautemrespondendi,
et ad gloriam
est
ad
utilis
idest
Elencorum,
Phylosophye
cognitionem
generatob,
et in nullo
videri
exercitatum
faciet
omnia
et
circa
respondentem
acquirendam
insciesehabere.
6 philosophorum
denobilicivitate
Nosautem
egipti( /)adpetitionem
aganafai*
a
fonte
denostro
assumens,
(?) illamlaboris
inscolisnostris1,
potentiam
phylosophye
1 Thewell-known
adpredictorum
inParis
herereads
etc.
B.N.Lat.16.617
found
sophistaadaptation
intheopening
linesoftheprologue
mentioned
tosophiste
refers
which
rum
apparently
petitionem,
as
Theformer
doctores
volunt
debent.
hassophiste
Paris
where
B.N.Lat.16.617
, andourtract
phrase
toconcrete
doesnotrefer
since
isutterly
intheParis
found
indeed,
absurd,
sophistarum
manuscript
here.
persons
I06

189.235.178.250

00:13:53 AM

so

se

60

diversis
sententiis
(scientiis
MS)
loyceet antiquorum
magistris
phylosophorum
famosiores
in
tota
orientali
a
damasco
civitatem
(?)
qui
plaga
usque
cabumgusum
vetustissimis
de (modo)opponendi
et responextiterunt,
temporibus
quandam
facilemet compendiosam
introductionem
[46va]-dendi
composui,ut (et MS)
diversas
viascuiuslibet
et improbande
propter
propositionis
subscripta
probande
invenire
valeant
multiformes.
Perhocenimopusmagnus
inqualibet
scientia
unusquisque
poterit
apparere.
Deindein omniscientia
poterit
disputare
peruniuse(b)domade
spacium,
oppoinargumentis
nendoetrespondendo,
sedinhocmiromodoet
deficiens,
numquam
humanum
ineffabili
ter opposi
tionibussuperhabundans.
Hoc
supraintellectum
enimopusThesaurum
sive appellandum
iudicavi,
meditavi,
philosophorum
appellari
cumomneshabentes
faciat
ipsumin omniscientiaproculdubioperitos
apparere,
et
indicibiliter
armans.
oppositionibusresponsionibus
ipsos
Istumautemtractatum
dividimus.Quia in primaparteponemus
modum
in generali
(in generali)et in secundapartemodumrespondendi
opponendi
similiter.
duosuntfacienda.
Circaprimum
Primm
est sciremodumpro[modum]
bandi(quodlibet)proposi
tumquod cuilibetplacuerit
erit
probare.Secundum
sciremodum
datam
ab
[et]responsionem
improbandi
ipsorespondente.

Leiden
Instituut
Filososch
Witte Singel 71

107

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00:13:53 AM

Notes on Anselm's

Aims in the Proslogion

JOHN M. RIST

is not unknownto the annalsof scholarshipthatwhen an important

It discoveryhas been made, it is too decisive to be given the attention
it deserves. Revolutionarysuggestionscan be readily discounted if
they are not entirelycorrect; their substantialbut incomplete merits
can thus be consigned to polite oblivion. Such seems more or less to
have been the fate of Stolz' claim that there is no trace in Anselm's
of a proof of God's existence.1 Yet the interpretationof the
Proslogion
Proslogionas a work of mystical theology, of theologizingin prayer,
with its corollary that all those who have looked for an "ontologicaln
argument for the existence of God are mistaken, is so powerfully
that it is no more thanjustice
presentedand avoids so manydifficulties
to look once again at the controversialchaptersand , even at the cost of
ignoringmuch thathas been said since Stolz wrote, to considerwhether
the text bears out this unorthodoxapproach. In any case even if Stolz
is wrong,manyof his insightscan onlybe ignoredat the cost of erecting
unlikelyhypothesesabout what Anselmis doing.
Another close look at Anselm's text is desirable, and we may hope
that at least a few pointers will emerge. The title of chapter two, to
which Stolz has drawn attention,is Quod veresit deus- which seems to
indicate that the chapter will show not that God exists, but that God
exists in a real way, or has "real existence". Stolz has filledin the Auof Augustine that
gustinin background. We read in the Confessions
manet.2The Greek backgroundis unId vereest, quod incommutabiliter
covered by a glance at Marius Victorinus: "There are existentswhich
1A. Stolz,ZurTheologie
frKontroversimProslogion
in: Catholica,
Anselms
Vierteljahrschrift
Faced
inTheMany
andreprinted
2 (1933),1-24,translated
(ed.J.Hickand
Argument
theologie
imProslogion
deshl.Anselm
Esse
Vere
London
Cf.Stolz'other
A.C. McGill,
papers:
1968),183-206.
in: Revuebndictine
deshl.Anselm
in: Scholastik
47 (193i),
9(1934),400-9;DasProslogion
331-347.
2Stolz,
andDeTrin.
Esse
Vere
7.5.1oetc.
y403;Aug.,Conf.
7.11.17;cf.7.20.26
IO9

189.235.178.250

00:05:40 AM

'exist' and existentswhich 'truly exist'" ( Ipsorumautemquae sunt,alia

suntverequae sunt, alia quae sunt. . .). Since the work of Hadot,1 we can
be sure that this vererepresentsthe Svtcoof Neoplatonic tradition.
Quae veresuntare the intelligibles,the real existentsof Plotinus, Porphyryand theirsuccessors.
Anselm obviously knows neither Plotinus nor Victorinus. But he
knows Augustineand Boethius, and we may thereforeassume in the
Proslogiona familiaritywith the Neoplatonic and Augustininnotion
of "real being". So according to the chapter heading one thingat least
which Anselm wants to indicate in chapter 2 is that God is, in the
Neoplatonic sense, a "real existent".
follows the thoughtof chapter 1 in an
Chapter 2 of the Proslogion
is
Anselm
:
importantrespect
speakingas a believer. The facthas been
modern
emphasized by
interpreters,by Karl Barth above all.2 What
does this believer wish to understand?That God exists in the way that
we believe him to exist, i.e. "really"; and that he is what we believe
him to be. Stolz' view that we are dealing not with a proof of God's
existence but with a discussionof the way he exists looks strong. But
is our translationof the text, which Stolz seeminglyalso proposed,
correct? The key words are Quia es sicutcredimus
. Perhaps they could
mean "That you exist, as we believe you do", whereas we prefer,
"Thatyou exist in the way thatwe believe you do". The case cannot be
would seem to support
called open and shut, thoughhoces quodcredimus
our interpretation.And Anselm does not go on to talk about the
possible or proposed existence of God, but remarks that we believe
thatyou are somethingor other, namelythatthanwhich nothinggreater
can be thought. So what we need to understandis what we mean
when we say not that there is a God, but that God is that than which
nothinggreatercan be thought.
Let us pursue this line of thoughtfurtherand considerAnselm's next
step. The question Anselm poses is that perhaps something"of such a
particular kind or nature" ( aliqua talis natura) does not exist. Why
should such a possibilityarise? Because the Fool of the Psalmist said
in his heart that there is no God ( nonest deus). What is the counterargumentto Anselm's position here? It seems to be as follows: There
is no god ; thereforethereis nothing"thanwhich nothinggreatercan be
thought". To the Fool's plea, "God does not exist; thereforeGod
1P. Hadot,
etVictorinus
(Paris1968).*
Porphyre
2 K. Barth,
Inteilectum
Fides
1931).
Quaerens
(Munich
I IO

189.235.178.250

00:05:40 AM

cannot be of such a kind", Anselm seems firstto want to reply: "Such

a kind of thingdoes exist; therefore,perhaps, God exists". Or, "Itis not
unreasonableto suppose thatGod exists". But thisis to proceed too fast.
What makes it impossibleto accept Stolz* argumentin its entiretyis
that the Fool does not say, "God does not 'really exist* ( vereest), but
. Thus if Anselm is to say anythingto
"God does not exist (simpliciter)"
the Fool at all, he must say something
about the existence of God (simEven
if
he
tells
the
Fool
rather than argues with him,
pliciter).
merely
he would still seem to need to tell him somethingabout the existence
of God. And, as Hayen has well argued, the Fool is not told thingsin a
merely off-handedway; the aim is not to silence him, but to talk to
him, perhapseven to convince him.1And to convince him of something
about the existence of God.
Anselm's reply to the Fool begins with the assertionthat the phrase
"that than which nothinggreater can be thought"is intelligible,and
that the Fool understandsit (has it "in his mind") even if he does not
thinkthat it exists. In other words Anselm is sayingthat when we say
"God", we mean "that than which nothinggreater can be thought".
Hence it would follow that, if that than which nothinggreater can be
thoughtexists, then that thingis God. Thus the Fool would be refuted
in a particularway. When he says "There is no God", he means, as far
as one can guess fromAnselm's treatment,thata possible being of such
and such a kind does not in factexist. But perhapshe means more, too.
Perhaps he could also mean that the concept "God" makes no sense.
Anselmat anyrateseems to be preparingto answerboth kindsof attack.
Thus he is arguing,in effect,that if "that than which nothinggreater
can be thought"makes sense, then the word "God" has a possible referent and is intelligible. And if that than which nothinggreater can
be thoughtexists, then "God exists" not only makes sense, but we can
reject the Fool's opinion and say "There is a God".2 Of course we still
would not know what kind of God there is. What we would have
shown is that if, for example, money is the greatestthingthat can be
thoughtand which exists,thenmoneyis God ; and ifJesusis the greatest
thing which can be thought and exists, then Jesus is God. "God"
1Cf.A. Hayen,
etS. Thomas:
la vraie
S. Anselme
nature
dela thologie
etsaporte
in:Spiapostolique
Beccense
inHick
andMcGill
(Paris
cilegium
19^9),esp.69-8$,
reprinted
(seep.109,n. 1),162-182.
2 "Godexists"
make
sense
whether
there
isa Godornot,since
ifthere
isa God,hemust
exist.
may
=
Existence
andtheOntological
in: Mind71 (1962),307-325"
Cf.J.Shaffer,
, Predication
Argument
226-245.
Hick/McGill,
III

189.235.178.250

00:05:40 AM

is thereforea shorthandway of referringto the greatestpossible object

of thoughtand is, as it were, used predicatively. Such usage is well
known in Greek antiquity,as has often been observed. Almost everyone then assumed that something or other is divine, i.e. is God.
The questionwas, "What is divine?"
Anselm's position may be expressed in a differentway. When the
Fool says "There is no God", Anselmreplies, "God (= thatthanwhich
nothing greater can be thought) exists". We note, with Barth, that
there is nothingat this stage about the way that he exists (his "real
existence") nor about what he is. That is a later problem. First, we
have to persuade the Fool that he understandsthe phrase "that than
which nothinggreater can be thought",and that this thing,whatever
it may be, exists. Two problems present themselves to us, though
with probably less clarity to Anselm. What does Anselm mean by
"great" in this context? Are existent things in some ways "greater"
than non-existentones? The context of Anselm's notion of greatness
has oftenbeen described, so we need not lingeron it. A briefstatement
will suffice.In chapter 2 of the Proslogionitself Anselm assumes that
what exists in the world (in re) is "greater" than what exists only in
the mind (in intellectu
). We should not think about later talk about
better to stick to Anselm's own words.
this
in
context;
"perfections"
In the Replyto Gauniloit is assumed1thatwhat exists withoutbeginning
and end is "greater"thansomethingwhichmayor does exist only at some
time or place. The Neoplatonic schema is evident, and the Augustinin
acceptance of it. To be "greater" means to exist in a superior way;
Anselmuses "better"as a synonymfor "greater"in his replyto Gaunilo.
There are assumed to be superior ways of existing, and this may be
assimilatedwith the furtherassumptionthat there are particularthings
which do in fact exist in a particular superior way. The schema of
superiorand inferiortypesof being is a hierarchywhich has to be taken
into considerationwhen there are in factbeings of the particulardistinguishable types. Thus we do not have to assume fromthe existence of
the schema that there is a greatestpossible object of thought- that
will be argued for - only that some objects of thoughtare "greater"
than others. One way in which this notion of "greater" and "less"
may be made to seem more respectable may be via the notion of
"importance".Anselmwould certainlyinsistthata man is more important thana mouse; and if we said, "I don't see how you can compare a
1Kesp.
i.
chapter
I 12

189.235.178.250

00:05:40 AM

man with a mouse in this way, he would reply: "It's more serious to
kill a man thana mouse; thereforethe lives of men are more important
than those of mice; thereforemen are more importantthan mice".
Perhaps we mightreply, "Only to men, and only to some of them at
that". But Anselm can still come back: "Mice can't judge; men can.
Those who can judge must judge". The case is not demonstrable,but
that the notion of importance means something seems primafacie
possible. Of course, even if we accept it, we have to determinewhat
is in factmore importantthanwhat, and how we make such a judgment.
But it is not inconceivable that Anselm thought (with some justice)
thathe and the Fool mightagree on this. But in any case, in chapter 2
the sense of "greater"is not spelled out; it is assumed that the Fool
will accept it in some sense. Chapter gives us a better idea of what
this sense mightbe, as we shall see later.
Even more notorious than Anselm's general use of "greater" and
"less" has been a particularapplication of it; but it is an application
which tells us somethingof the general concept in its broadest form.
In chapter 2 of the Proslogionit is suggested - and assumed to be
true - that if any object which can be thoughtof actually exists, its
existence makes it "greater",thatis, thatan existentx is greaterthana
conceptual x. In order to understandAnselm's position here we must
return to his general concept of greatness. He argues in chapter 3
of the Proslogionthat a creator is greater than his creature without
giving us the reason for what he assumes to be an obvious fact. But
at least part of the reason is obvious: a creator can do thingswhich a
creaturecannot. The sense of "greater"is certainly"greaterin power" which includes the notion of more wide-rangingin power. This notion
is in the pure Neoplatonic tradition. Furthermorea creator, if he
exists, does not need a creator; a creaturedoes. Anotherway of understanding"greatness"becomes apparent. In general "greater"thingscan
do what lesser thingscannot - and for Anselm that is all he needs to
satisfyhimselfthat an existent x is greater than a merely conceptual
(and thereforenon-existent)x. Thus an existent God might create;
a concept of God cannot. FurthermoreAnselm seems to be arguing
thatthere is a differencebetween a concept of something(which might
exist) and a concept of somethingwhich doesexist and cannot not exist.
For whatmightexist,mightnot exist, and if it does not exist, it has no
power. Thus in general what cannot not exist must, ifit exists,be more
powerfuland "greater" than what exists at times. But it is important
to notice thathis position is only even arguableif the object thanwhich
113

189.235.178.250

00:05:40 AM

nothinggreater can be thoughtis of such a kind as not to be able not

to exist. We shall returnto problemsabout thislater.
Let us returnto the argumentin chapter 2 with Anselm's (and the
Fool's) assumptionsabout "greatness"a littleclearer.The Fool, we recall,
is in the position of havingto admit that the concept "thatthan which
nothinggreater can be thought"is intelligible. Even the Fool, argues
Anselm, must admit that this thing, than which nothinggreater can
be thought,exists in the mind. Then comes the crunch. Let us call
that than which nothinggreater can be thoughtx. If, as is assumed,
existence in reality is greater than existence in the mind, then x,
which by definitionis the greatestthingthat can be thought,must be
an existent, since existents are greater objects of thought than nonexistents. So that than which nothinggreater can be thoughtexists.
Yet when that is said, what has Anselm shown? Only that whateveris
in factthe greatestobject of thoughtmust be an actual existent. Hence
God exists in the sense that whatever is the greatestobject of thought
exists and may be called God. Anselm has not proved, nor is there
any evidence that he has so farattemptedto prove, that any particular
kind of God exists; only that God is the name we give to the greatest
possible existent. In his reply to Anselm Gaunilo says that Anselm's
"proof" depends on the notion of something "greater than all else".
Anselm rightlyrejects this as his starting-point.His starting-pointin
chapter 2 of the Proslogionis the concept of that than which nothing
greatercan be thought.The concept "thatwhich is greaterthan everyin chapter 2. For the Fool
thingelse" is derivedfromthat starting-point
could well say that he did not immediatelyunderstandthe notion of
some particularexistent
greater than everythingelse, where he would
not be able - according to Anselm - to claim that he could not
understandthe notion of thatthanwhich nothinggreatercan be thought.
At the beginningof chapter 3, therefore,we are in the position of
beingaware thatthat than which nothinggreatercan be thought(which
is called "God") exists. We then turn to furtherdeductions about it.
As Stolz points out,1 the firstword of the new chapter is quodyand it
refersto that than which nothinggreater can be thought. This thing,
whichwe knowfromchapter 2 exists, is now to be specifiedfurtheror so we should expect. In fact Anselm now returnsto the question
of the modeof existence and the Neoplatonic schema. It exists, he says,
in such a way that it cannot even be thoughtnot to exist. At firstthe
1Stolz,
ZurTheologie
,trans.,
p. 203.
114

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00:05:40 AM

kind of existence proposed looks peculiar. How could it make any

differenceto the existence of any existent ("real" or other) whether
any one thoughtit existed or not. Anselm is certainlynot thinkinghere
of objects held in existence as God's thoughts; he means that human
beings, when they use the phrase "thatthan which nothinggreatercan
be thought" cannot(logically) think of such a thing as non-existent.
It has sometimesbeen supposed that Anselm is using some ontological
concept of necessarybeing at this point, but that assumption seems
unnecessary.The matteris simpler.It makesno sense to talkof imagining
the non-existenceof the greatestpossible object of thought,if, as we
have seen, thatobject must in factexist, for if we are thinkingof x as a
non-existent,we are not thinkingof the greatest possible object of
thought.Hence when Anselmconcludes this section of chapter 3 of the
Proslogionby sayingthat that than which a greater cannot be thought
exists so truly(sic vereest) that it cannot even be thoughtnot to exist,
he seems to mean that,since it is the greatestpossible object of thought,
it must always exist (logical necessity). Hence just as "God exists" is
analyticallytrue, if we accept "God" as an intelligibleconcept, so that
than which nothinggreater can be thoughtexists (at all times) in the
same way.
But what has Anselm proved here? It might be argued that he has
shown that that thanwhich nothinggreatercan be thoughtis eternalin
the sense that it (i.e. one particularthing)lasts for ever. But this does
not seem to be the case. What Anselmhas proved is thatthere is (must
always be) an object, than which nothing greater can be thought.
What this object is, or indeed whether there is (over the whole of
time) more than one such object has not been made clear. In other
words while in chapter 2 of the ProslogionAnselm has argued that
we use the word "God" (= that than which nothinggreater can be
thought)of an actual existent, the firstpart of 3 would suggestonly
thatwe cannot meaningfully
use it in anyother way.
Let us look at some of the consequences of this. Suppose we take
the proposition, "That than which nothing greater can be thought
is money qua money." Anselm would be arguing that this statement
couldbe true if there are actual sums of money in existence. Obviously
there would not have to be any particular coins and bills, but there
wouldhave to be coins and bills. Thus if thatthanwhich nothinggreater
can be thoughtis money, it would not follow even that there is one
God (i.e., money), but only that there is one kind of God. And if,
as Anselm believes, that than which nothinggreater can be thought

189.235.178.250

00:05:40 AM

is everlasting,all we have proved is that there is always somethingof

thatparticularkind. Hence what Anselmhas done is show that we use
the word "God* for some thingor thingswhich actually exist and of
which one (not necessarilythe same or the only one) will alwaysexist.
The question we would like to answer is, "Does Anselm thinkhe has
proved more than this?"
In the middle of chapter 3 Anselm startson a completelynew tack.
He identifiesthis God which exists and which will always exist. And
the identificationis arbitrary.That than which nothinggreater can be
thoughtis now identifiednot just with an existent, named for short
"God", but with the God of the Christians: "And you, Lord our God,
are this", that is, you are a being than which nothinggreater can be
thought.This seems to be the crux of the matter,forAnselm's assertion
is an appeal to faithwhich, if he were tryingto prove the existence of
the Christian God would be an obvious begging of the question.
Clearly the Christian God would only be that than which nothing
greatercan be thoughtif he exists. But what if a solutiongroped for
- Anselmis not
the
existence
of the Christian
to
Stolz
by
trying prove
If
he
exists, Anselm
God, but to show what kind of a being he must be.
would then be saying,he must be such thathe cannot be thoughtabout
as not existing,for such thoughtwould not be about him. Hence he
would be eternal and unchanging.Therefore
(ergo), Anselm is able to
"so
truly" that he cannot even
say, since he does exist, he must exist
be thoughtnot to exist. Thus froman assumptionof God's existence
Anselm would have argued to a concept of his superiorexistence (vere
esse).
This solution would save Anselm from a gross petitioprincipii
, but
where does it leave us as regardsthe Fool's original claim nonestdeus?
On perfectlysafe ground. For Anselm has alreadymade the Fool admit
that the word deushas some referent; the question remainedas to what
thatreferentis. Thus Anselmhas alreadyindicated to the Fool thatit is
absurd to say non est deus, and when the Fool has been compelled to
admit that there is a deusof some kind, he is offereda candidate, the
we learn
ChristianGod. And in the next few chaptersof the Proslogion
more about what this ChristianGod is ; and we base our developing
understandingon the factthathe is a superiorkind of being ( vereest)
are
which he has been proved to be necessarilyif he exists. What then
?
his characteristics
In the second part of chapter 3 Anselm mentions two basic char?cteristicsof the ChristianGod: he is a creator and we are his creation;
116

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00:05:40 AM

else thanthe ChristianGod can be thoughtof as non-existent,

everything
that is, everythingelse can be recognized as free from any logical
necessityof continuingexistence. So what has happened is that Anselm
points out that the ChristianGod, as traditionallyunderstood, satisfies
therequirementsofsomethingthanwhichnothinggreatercan be thought.
There is no need to assume that Anselm thinksany of this means that
he has proved the existence of the ChristianGod. What he has shown
is that it makes sense to thinkof the ChristianGod in the way he has
been thoughtof.
traditionally
We have argued that Anselm's direct answer to the Fool is limited.
He contentshimselfwith claimingthatthe word "God" is a meaningful
and usefulword. In chapter4 this becomes clearer still. There are two
ways in which one can say "God does not exist". If we take the word
"God" as a logical subject (without understandingwhat it means),
clearly we can deny existence to God. Our statementis, however,
both grammaticallysound and logically trivial. If we thinkof Anselm's
content of the word "God" (i.e. that than which nothinggreater can
be thought), then it becomes absurd to say God does not exist. If
the Fool were to do this, it would be because he was a fool (cf. the
etinsipiens
end of chapter3, stultus
).
In chapter g Anselm begins furthermeditationson the traditional
concept of the ChristianGod, showingtherebythathis attributescould
correspond with those of that than which nothing greater can be
thought. And what, we might wonder, is the effectof this? It is to
demonstratethatthe traditionalconcept of the ChristianGod is not out
of keeping with what can be understood rationally. Thus Anselm is
not provinghis existence, but arguingthat his existence makes sense.
First he reverts to the question of God as creator, and emphasizes
that he only exists throughhimself( solumexistens
). Then we
perse ipsum
hear that he must not lack for the highestgood, since he is the source
of good, and then that he must be just, truthful,happyand "whatever
to be thannot to be".
it is better
The catalogue of excellences continueswitha most interestingdiscussion of omnipotence in chapter 7. Here again Anselm is concerned to
show thatwhen we attributeomnipotenceto God, we are not attributing
anythingparadoxical. God, it is admitted, cannot do all thingsin the
sense that he cannot tell lies or undo the past. The abilityto do these
things, Anselm oddly argues, is not power but impotence ( non est
, sed impotentia
). If a man tells lies, it is because perversity
potentia
controls him; he does not control himself.Whatever the logical value
117

189.235.178.250

00:05:40 AM

of the argument which Anselm thus produces, it is clear that his

intentis to show thatwhen we say that God is omnipotent,we are not
"explaining"God, but sayingsomethingrational and intelligibleabout
have the same intent.In chapter 8
him. Other chaptersof the Proslogion
it is argued that God's mercy is compatible with his "impassivity",
and in chapter 9 that it is not irrationalto argue that it is just for
God to spare the unjust. It seems that the patternfor these chaptersof
is thus set by chapters 2 and 3.
the Proslogion
In briefthen it appears that the Proslogion
, as originallyconceived by
Anselm, had at least five tasks to achieve. They are listed in order of
increasingimportance:
1. To show that the word "God" has a specific reference.
2. To show that the word "God" can only referto somethingwhich
exists.
3. To argue that "God" must referto a "real" being in the Neoplatonic
sense of theword.
4. To show that"God" can intelligiblybe takento referto thetraditional
God of Christianity.
. To argue that the traditionalGod of Christianity,though beyond
human understanding,does not confrontus with any intolerable
paradoxes.
The lastpointhelpsus to understandthe phrasefidesquaerensintellectum.
Toronto
College
University

118

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00:05:40 AM

Magister

Willelmus,

Regulae

de mediis syllabis

edited fromMS. Paris, B.N. lat. 14744

WILTON D ESMENSE
MS. Paris, B.N. lat. 147441, antea Fonds Saint-Victor 172,
antea
Bibliothquede Saint-VictorJJJ23, is the only one known
The
to contain on ff. 2$6v-29r, under the name of "Magister
Willelmus", a grammaticaltreatiseconsistingof a great numberof rules
with respect to the quantityof the middle syllable. Afterthe descriptionsby Grandrueand Delisle of the MS., thistreatisehas been examined
successively by Ch. Thurot*, who quotes many examples from it,
by M. Manitius*and by Ch. Samaran6. ProfessorSamaran agrees with
Thurot and Manitiusthat the author may be the same as the French or
Provenal "Magister Willelmus" who wrote 3 grammaticaltreatises.
In his edition?, Samaran called them De declinatione
, De regimine
, Ars
dictaminis.They are transmittedin the MS. Paris, B.N. lat. 166718,
antea Fonds de la Sorbonne 1569?, Xlllth century,probably the beginning,and the firstto call attention to them was V. Le Clerc10.
The descriptionof the MS. 14744 in the Inventaire
by Delisle is, as
concise
:
always,very
14744 Papi elementarium.-Summa grammatice (228).- Regule
magistiGuillermi de mediis sillabis (26v).- XlIIs.
1L. Delisle,
BEC30,Paris,
desmanuscrits...,
Inventaire
1869,p. 46.
2 H.Omont,
desmanuscrits
etdesnumros
actuels
latins
delaBibliothque
anciens
desnumros
Concordances
nationale
... , Paris,
1903,
p. 100.
3Shelf-mark
deGrandrue,
ofthelibrary
A.D. 1^13,transmitted
inthecatalogue
byClaude
given
f.21h.
intheMS.Paris,
B.N.lat.14767,
4 Ch.Thurot,
desdoctrines
servir
Vhistoire
latins
au
manuscrits
Extraits
dedivers
grammaticales
pour
dela Bibliothque
desmanuscrits
etextraits
, XXII,Paris,1869,repr.
impriale
moyen
geyNotices
toasThurot
referred
Franckfort,
), p.43,etpassim.
1964(here
s M.Manitius,
desMittelalters
Literatur
derlateinischen
Geschichte
, III,Mnich,
1931,
(here
pp.193-4
toasManitius).
referred
6 P. 163ofthearticle
inthefollowing
note.
quoted
7 Ch.Samaran,
duXIIIe
sicle
latinitatis
UneSumma
, avec
, in:Archivm
provenales
gloses
grammaticalis
duCange,
Bulletin
medii
1961,pp.157-221.
XXXI,
Aeviy
8 L. Delisle,
... , BEC31,Paris,
desmanuscrits
Inventaire
1871,p. 1^7-8.
9 H.Omont,
. . . , p. 123.
Concordances
10Histoire
dela France
littraire
, XXII,1852,pp.26-7.
II9

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

Grandrue had been more explicit and mentioned the grammatical

verseson the lastpage :
Liber papi de grammatica Cuius B. 19. E./^i.
d.c.38
Item
V.
Z.
226.
O.
1098
178.
132.
213.
J.
quedam /
summagrammaticede octo partibusorationis. 228./
Item regule de mediis sillabis. 2^7. Item / metra
JJJ.2.
de quibusdamdictionibus.29.
Workingon a partialreproductionof the MS., I am able to supplement
the followinginformationwhich has been extended with data collected
by Drs. C. H. Kneepkens, who personallyinspected the manuscript.
MS. lat. 14744:
Cover:leather back, on which in gold papi / Glossarium / bnf,
and covers of cardboard; on the backside of the superior leaf
latin 14,744.
Fly-leaves:
paper, 2 at the beginningand 2 at the back.
Folia: vellum, 2^9 ff.,34 x 22{ cm.
Appearance
oj theJf.: prickings; capitalsalternatelyin blue and red;
text in 2 columns, written in a very legible gothic minuscle1,
with manyabbreviations.F. ir: s. victor 17. F. iv: Tu quicumque studebisin hoc libro prospice ut leniteratque dulciter tractes
folia./ut cavere possis rupturampropter ipsorum tenuitatemet
imitabisdoctrinamJhuxpi:/ qui cum modeste apperuissetlibrum
Ysaie2 et attentelegissettandemreverentercomplicuitac ministro
reddidit3.
Que secunturhie habenturscilicet
J. JJ.
.2.
(next comes the note of Grandrue, writtenin the same
handwriting.)
F. 2r: in marg.sup.: d.c. 38. 33, in marg.inf.: iste liber est sancti
VICTORISACQUISITUSEX BONIS QUORUNDAMAMICORUM.ET / MEEIUSDEMLOCI. /
LABORIBUS
DIANTIBUS
QUORUNDAMRELIGIOSORUM
A
ALIENETUR
CONVENTU.
F. 2V:
UT
NON
ROGANTIUM
AFFECTUOSE
in marg. inf.: IHS maria s. victor, s. Augustinus. F. 227rb:
Expl. papiae: per infinitascula amen.
ergo mente pia pro me rogitatepapia.
explicit iste liber, sit scriptorcrimine liber.
1Littera
descritures
Nomenclature
G. Battelli,
G. I. Lieftinck,
currens
textualis
(cf.B. Bischoff,
sicle
duIXeauXVIe
,pp.iy,i8,fig.l6).
livresques
2 Luc.4, 17 sqq.
3 L. Delisle,
Lecabinet
desmanuscrits
.. . II,Paris,
Amsterdam,
1874(repr.
1969),p. 227,withsome
small
misreadings.
I20

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

sit adeo illuminatus. iste

Kubr.: EXPLICUITQUI ILLUMINAVO1
LIBERACQUISITUSEST ECCLESIESANCTIVICTORIS PARISIENSIS
EX
BONISQUORUNDAM
AMICORUM
LABORIBUS
/ AC ECIAMMEDIANTIBUS
PREDICTEECCLESIE.QUORUM NOQUORUNDAM/ RELIGIOSORUM
MINA SCRIPTAI SINT IN LIBRO VITE. NOS IPSIUS ACQUISITORES
UT NON EFFERATUR
SUCCESSORES.
ROGAMUS
INQUANTUM
/ POSSIMUS
seu ALiENETUR.a. CONVENTU.amen. F. 227V: blank. F. 29V:
Kubr.:ISTELIBERESTSANCTIVICTORISPARISIENSIS
quicumque eum
FURATUSFUERIT VEL CELAVERITVEL TITULUMISTUMDELEVERIT.
ANATHEMA
SIT. AMEN.1
ff. 2-22jT Elementarium
Contents:
Papiae2.
ff.228r-26v Grammatica
Papiae*.
ff. 26v-29rRegulaede mediis syllabis.
f. 29r-v Metrade quibusdam dictionibus*.
'
MagisterWillelmus treatisehas not come down to us in its original
form. Someone ( quidam
) wrote an introduction( praefatio
) to it, and
added some glosses. The anonymousauthor of the preface may have
known Willelmus personally. He calls him one of the most prominent
authoritiesin grammar,a conclusion that could not be drawn merely
from the lecture of the Regulae. He mentions a "G. Cenomannensis
episcopus",to whom is ascribed the verse thatcontainsa word of 13 syllables: "Fulgethonorificabilitudinitatibushoc
vas"s, which will be quoted
Labour
Act
in
Love's
Scene I. That bishop of
Lost,
V,
by Shakespeare
Le Mans would give us a date for the preface and for the Regulae, if
identified.One thinksof Gui(do) of Etampes6,disciple of Hildebert de
Lavardin. He succeeded his master as head of the cathedral school at
Le Mans, perhaps already in 1097, and as bishop of Le Mans in ii2.
In his preface, the quidam, who seems to be himselfa schoolmaster
1Cf.Delisle,
loc.cit.
2 G. Goetz,
Deglossiariorum
latinorum
etfatis
etBerolini,
, Lipsiae
Amsterdam,
1923(repr.
origine
196i),pp.172-3.
3Thurot
, p. 4.
Anecdota
Helvetica
Latini
and
H. Hgen,
, in: Keil,Grammatici
, VIII,p. CLXXIX
(quoting
incipits
loc.cit.
Goetz,
explicits).
Incipit
: Estpilapespontis
Proverbia
latinitatis
(cf.H. Walther,
pilaludus
pilataberna
sententiaeque
inalphabetischer
medii
Lateinische
und
Sentenzen
desMittelalters
aeviy
, Gttingen,
Sprichwrter
Anordnung
: Forf
icefilapiloscapeforpice
no.s8o).Explicit
ferrum.
1963-1969,
forcipe
*Cf.Joannes
toasBalbus
Catholicony
Mainz,
Baibus,
Westmead,
1460(repr.
1971)(herereferred
),
andOsbern
ofGloucester
inMediaeval
andRenaissance
s.v.honorifico,
vol.IV,1958,
studiesy
p. 279.
6 E. Lesne,
delanduVIIIe
Lescoles
sicle
lafinduXIIe
11.
, Lille,1940,pp.1471133,PHSIII,Stuttgart,
Hildebert
von
Lavardin
IO6P. vonMoos,
196$,p. i6n.;p. 199.
I 2I

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

too, gives some very clear definitionsto help youngpupils who would
, obscure in consequence of their
study the Kegulae de mediissyllabis
extreme brevity. The term media (sillaba) is used to indicate the
paenultimaof a word of 3 syllablesor more1. The prefacestatesthatthe
rules governingthe quantityof the mediaeapply generallyalso to the
, i.e. firstsyllables. No wonder, since the primaeoften become
primae
4
mediae by means of composition, e.g. duco/traduco'. The quidam
definesfirstand classifiesthe litterae
, givingexplicit laws forthe possible
of
the
definitionof the syllaba, and next
combinations letters. Follows
that of the differentaccentus.The quidamdeclares that he intended to
, not of the gravis, circumexus
speak of the productusand the correptus
or acutus.
He declares furtherthat in transcribingthe Kegulaehe did not want
to suppress nor add anything.Nevertheless,the sentence Hoc dicit ne
. . .2 cannot have been writtenby Willelmus. Most likely the sentences
beginning with Nota quod also originate from the quidam, for they
introduceelucidatingremarks,where MagisterWillelmus had leftsome

obscurity.
Let us now treat the Kegulaethemselves,and firstof all theirauthor.
His name is not mentionedin the text. The quidamof the prefaceonly
calls him Magister
.3 The name appears only in 4 rubrics, the firstof
which, as appears from the term cuiusdamycertainly comes from a
cuiusdamin KegulisMagistiGuillermi4; Incipiunt
copyist: IncipitPrefatio
de
mediis
sillabis
Magisti Will el mi*; and twice identically:
Kegule
Will
e Imi de mediissillabis6. Thus the namehas
Expliciunt
KeguleMagisti
not been determinedwith absolute certaintynor is it possible to decide
if the Willelmus of the above mentionedgrammaticaltreatisesard the
one who wrote the Kegulaeare the same person. Still it is permittedto
suppose that the author of the Kegulaelike his namesake worked in
France. As to the date the convergingbut vague data we have, suggest
the 12th or 13th century.It is a pity thata reference,viz. to "Macer",
which might have yielded a somewhat more precise dating, does not
permitto distinguishwhich Macer is meant.
Magister Willelmus, in indicatingthe quantityof the penultimate

1Cf.BalbuSj
etdeinceps
intrissillabis
etmaxime
accentu
tur
nosci
sillaba
sive
fol.IX: Media
t
penultima
cog
asAimer,
inVivarium
IX-X(quoted
Ars
lectora
andH. F. Reijnders,
Aimericust
(i), (2),(5)),Aimer.
rectum
lectori
br
evisque,
usum.
/Demediis
pandimus
opere
quesillaba
longa
(l), p. 126:Hocmonstrans
2 Infra,
s Infra,
AanteB p. 126.
p. 126.
6 Infra,
3Infra,
p. 136.
p. 126.
Infra,
p. 124.
122

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

syllables,presentsthem, as is oftenthe case in the Middle Ages, in the

of their immediatelyfollowing
alphabeticalorderof the vowels and that
4
A
B
ut
. But as the late Stephen
ante breviatur Agabus1
consonant, e.g.
A. Hurlbut1 has shown, one could choose between two alphabetical
systems,dubbed by Drs. C. H. Kneepkens respectivelythe "vowel
In
the
the
the
and
a
of
one,
"consonant-system".
quantity
system"
determinedvowel is treated with regard to all the possibilitiesof the
immediatelyfollowingconsonant,beforepassingto the nextvowel, e.g.
A anteB ... ; A anteC . . . , etc. till A ante V. In the other, the quantities
of all fivevowels are treated together,firstbefore one consonant,and
then beforeanother,e.g. A, , /, O, U anteB; A, , /, 0, U anteC, etc.
till A, , /, 0, U ante V. The "vowel-system"has been applied in the
of Alexander de Villa-Dei and, before that, in the
Doctrinalemetricum
has been applied in the
Arslectoraof Aimericus2.The consonant-system
Ars lectoraof Magister Seguinus3 and by our Magister Willelmus.
To illustrate his rules, Willelmus gives only one quotation, from
Lisorius. And it is only with regardto single words used with different
accentuationby different,
mostlyclassical, authors,thattheirnames are
with
the
recorded,
exception of a case of ectasiswhere the authorityof
Ovidius is adduced.
In editingthe Paris manuscript,designed by P in the critical apparatus,
I followed its orthography,while resolvingits abbreviations,with one
notable exception: it was inevitableto apply to the praefatiothe quidam's
prescriptionsconcerningthe combinationsof letters*. And, as he declares to have transcribedhimselfthe Regulaeof MagisterWillelmus, it
seemed sensible to apply them here again. The glosses, presumably
by the quidam, have been indicated by a paragraph. All corrections,
with the exception indicated above, have been justified in the Notes.
For makingthem I continuouslycompared Thurot and Aimericusin the
edition of Dr. HarryF. Reijnders,who kindlypermittedme to consult
his transcription
of Seguinus.
it
is
a
Finally
pleasure to acknowledge the help and suggestions
received fromprofessorJ. Engels, directorof the InstituteforMediaeval
Latinof the Universityof Utrecht,and his assistantDrs. C. H. Kneepkens
whichprovedto be an importantsupportforthe editor.
1S. A. Hurlbut,
Aforerunner
deVilla-Dei
, Speculum
VIII,1933,P2S%iP-262>n*!
ofAlexander
2 Recent
asAimer.
invivarium
F. Reijnders
edition
IX-X,quoted
(l), (2), (3).
byDr.Harry
3SeeAimer,
isforthcoming.
F. Reijnders
byDr.Harry
(i), pp.121-2.Anedition
4 Infra,
p. 12$.
123

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

TEXT
de mediis
[f. 2^6vb] Incipitprefato cuiusdamin RegulisMagistiGuillermi
sillabis.
Quoniam sapiens quidam vir et eloquens et nostristemporibusin arte
gramatica nulli pene secundus breves quasdam regulas de mediis
sillabis dedit et sub tanta brevitate simplicibusobscuritatemquandam,
que filiaest brevitatis,reliquit, nos eas transcribentesnichil addere vel
detrahere volumus nec audemus. Quippe que adeo universales sunt,
ut non solum de mediis, sed etiam de primis sillabis quendam et non
mediocrem scientiam pretendant. Nec mirum, cum prime sillabe
persepe fiantmedie per compositionem. Verbi grada: Muco, traduco/
traducs, reducs' Que prima est in 'duco', media est in 'traduco',
et sic in similibus. 'Duco' vero quandoque prime est, quandoque tercie
coniugationis. Et in tercia producitur, ut 'educo^-is)1', et in prima
corripitur,ut 'educlas'. Similiter Gradueis' et 'reducs', cum verba
sunt, produeuntur; cum vero sunt nomina, corripiuntur.Sunt enim
nomina 'tradux/traducis,redux/reducis'. Et tam de his quam de aliis
per regulam et per accentum cuiusque sillabe et pene omnium dat
differentiam.
Nos igitur de littera et sillaba, priusquam de Regulisvel agamus vel
transcribamus,pauca dicamus. Littera est vox individua nichil significans,ut A, B. Litterarumautem alie sunt vocales, alie consonantes,
id est "simul sonantes". Nam sine eis vocem non habent, licet sonum
habeant. Vocales sunt quinqu: A, E, I, O, U, et hoc ordine quo eas
posui, sunt in alphabeto posite. Nam A, tam apud nos quam apud
Hebreos et2 [27ra] Grecos, prima alphabeti littera est. Inde alpha
ponitur pro principio, et to3pro finevel pro ultimo, sicut scriptumest:
a
rEgo sum alpha et <o, primuset novissimus1. Vocalesdicuntur,quia per
se vocem faciunt, singule per se vel cum aliis coniuncte; quod non
dicuntur.Consonantiumalie suntsemivocales
faciuntalie que consonantes
et
semivocales
alie
tantum,
liquide, alie mute. Semivocales sunt he:
ut
X
et
dicunturet
F,
L, M, N, R, S,
quidam volunt. Et ideo semivocales
sunt, quia a vocali* incipiunt(et in se desinunt),id est ab e, que vocalis
est, ut eL, eM, eN, eR, eS, eX, efs. Sole ita debent nominariet proferri,
etiam sine prescriptae. Ex hiis sunt liquide: L, M, N, R. Et dicuntur
1-isaddidi.
2 etetP.
3o P.

4 vocalibus
P.
5L, M,N,R,S,X,F P.
a Apoc.
i,8; 2i,6; 22,i2.

124

189.235.178.250

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liquide, quia quandoque liquescuntin metro. Mute sunthe: B, C, D, G,

K, P, Q, T. Et ideo iste mutedicuntur, quia a se ipsis incipiuntet in
aliqua vocalium desinunt,ut Be, Ce, De, Ge, Pe, Te. Q et K in u et in a
desinunt. H non est littera, sed aspirationisnota. X duplex consonans
est, quia pro duabus litterisrespondet, id est C et S; et semper compositionemfacit et longam sillabam precedentem in eadem dictione. S
vero est semivocalis et liquida, quia sepe, non semper, in metro liquescit, id est deficit,id est non sonat, quasi ibi non sit. Ut ibi in fine
a: versus hic falsusesset, nisi S omnino
versus Oratii: rpremia scribe"1
diceretur
rpremia cribe"1: A, que ante illam est
liquesceret, quasi
vim
esset
si
S
suam
brevis,longa
optineret.
Littere accidunt tria: nomen, figura,potestas. Nomen accidit ei ut
vocetur A vel B. Figura ut sit triangulaut (A)1, vel rotondaut O, vel
alteriusfigure.Potestasvero accidit littereut sit2vocalis vel semivocalis
vel muta: hoc est ut una sonet levius alia, alia mollius, alia duriusaltera;
vel ut una in aliam transeat.Nec omnes 3 possuiitscribiante omne, sed
alie ante alias, ut M ante P vel B vel alterum M. Ante Q vel D vel T
debet scribiN, non M. Et hoc pene totumad sonumet ad modumpronuntiandipertinet.
Nunc de sillaba pauca dicamus. Sillaba est litterarumcomprehensio
sub uno spiritu et uno accentu prolata. Comprehenduntur aliquando
due sole littere in una sillaba, ut 'do' Vel tribus constatut 'ars'; vel
quattuorut 'mons' ; vel quinqu ut 'stris' (et si per X scribatur,C et S
equipollet) ; vel sex litteris constat, ut 'stirps'; et ultra non produ[27rb]cit.Sillaba igiturest comprehensiolitterarum,sicut in exemplis
ostensum est, aut duarum, aut trim, aut plurium. Quod dicit "sub
uno spiritu", hoc dicere vult sub uno lingue impulsu. Et quod addit
"sub uno accentu", brevem vel longam morulmnott, qua teneturilla
sillaba dum profertur.Nam brevis sillaba minorem habet tenorem et
longamaiorem.
Duo sunt soli accentus, correptuset productus,in quibus et per quos
omnis sillaba moderaturet ponderatur.Productusaccentus est, quo tiens
pronuntiamusmediassillabascum aliqua mora vocis, ut 'fortuna,natura'.
Correptus accentus est, quociens medias sillabas sine aliqua mora
vocis exprimimus,ut 'menala, tabula'. Accentus dicitur correptus
, id
cum
aliis
hoc
est
"cito
sillabis
est "simulraptus",vel corriptur
,
rapitur":
nulla mora fit nec retinetur,ut patet in exemplis 'menala, tabula'.
1A addidi.
2siP.
3dm(dicimus
?)P.

Hor.Sat.I,s, 3^.

12s

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00:05:53 AM

Productus
autem accentus dicitur quasi "procul ductus" et cum aliqua
mora suspensus et acute prolatus, ut 'fortuna, natura'. Hic tenetur
paululum U medie sillabe et in proferendoacuitur. Et dicitur accentus
quasi "accantus", quia una sillaba accantaturad aliam. Et est notandum
et diligentermemorie commendandum,quod cum omnis sillaba suum
proprium habeat accentum, omnis tamen dictio, quotaruncunque1sit
sillabarum,sub uno proferturaccentu; non tamensub uno spiritu,quod
est sillabe, non dictionis. Et hoc similiternota, id est caute prospice,
quod ille accentus sub quo dictio queque profertur,aut in penultima
aut in antepenultimasillaba fiet, etiam si illa dictio tam longa ut numerumtredecimsillabarumimplerepossit. Verbi gratia: rfulgethonorificabilitudinitatibus
hoc vas1a. Hunc versum, ut aiunt, G. Cenomannensisepiscopus composuitde aliquo2 vase argenteo; et in antepenultima
huius dictionis est accentus. rEt in amaritudinibusmoratur occulus
meus"lbin -di- antepenltimasfitaccentus. Et licet hec sillaba -di- sit
brevis,tamenest accentusproductus,quod est mirum.Sed planuslector,
ut Magister dicit in hiis Regulis,c quandoque producit quod metricus
corripit.
De correpto et producto accentu pro tempore aliqua dixi. De gravi
vero, vel circumflexo, vel acuto accentu, quo cuncte monosillabe
dictiones proferuntur,nichil dicere proposui. Ule enim solum solis
monosillabisservit,ut 'me [27va],te, se, pre, de, e' et 'ars' et 'pars'
et 'nos' et 'vos'. Propria autem nomina (hebrea)* personarum sive
locorum soient hoc accentu proferri, ut 'Abraham, Ysaac, Iacob,
Symon,Sanson, Segor, Babylon' en 'Hermon', preter 'luda'. Tractatus*
ergo:
regule de MEDiissiLLABisMagistiWillelmi.
Incipiunt
A ante B breviatur,ut 'Agabus6, cacabus, Arabs/Arabis', preter 'octabas' et obliquos prime declinationis, ut 'animabus, famulabus', et
preterverba ut 'amabam, iocundabam', quod simplex est.
- Hoc dicit ne
putetur esse compositum a 'do/das'. Nam a
'do/das' corripiuntur'dabam' et 'dabo' cum compositis suis per
* Videsupra,
1quotanin
queP.
p. 121.
bJob17,2.
2quoP.
c Videinfra,
3penultima
AanteC p. 127.
P.
4hebrea
addidi.
*tracturus
P.
6abacus
Manitius
coni.
, p. 428.
(<III),p. 194,sedcf.Thurot
I 26

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

'circum, venum, pessum'. Nota quod oblquos vocat Priscianus

omnes casus preter solum nominativm,qui vocatur rectus.Regulade E.
E ante B breviatur,ut 'Erebus', id est "Infernus",'Deifebus', preter
'Corebus, ephebus', id est "iuvenis", et preterobliquos nominisquinte
declinationis,ut 'rebus, diebus', et preter obliqua verborum,ut 'docebam, herebo'.
- Nota: obliqua verborum
dicuntur omnia tempora verbi preter
presens indicativi, quia hoc est verbo tempus, quod est nomini
casus. I ante B breviatur, ut 'celebs/celibis, calibs/calibis,prostibulum,
vestibulum',preter 'scribo, libo' et preter obliqua verborum,ut 'partibor, metibor,1 ibo' cum compositis suis; sed composita ex 'habeo'
corripiuntur,ut 'adhibeo, perhibeo, adhibet, perhibe.
0 ante B breviaturpreter 'october', brevis regula satis, et preter
'ambobus' et 'duobus'.
U ante B breviaturpreter 'saluber' et 'nubes' et 'pubes' et 'bubus'
vel 'bobus' et 'nubilis' cum compositis eorum, ut 'renubo, impubes,
innubilis'. Sed 'innuba, pronuba' corripitur.'Conubium' communeest.
Alia regularepetit
easdemvocalesperanteC.
A ante C breviatur,ut 'stomacus, Syriacus,simacusa, abacus, Itacus',
preter 'opacus, toraca, cloaca, meraca'b et preter obliquos tercie
declinationis,ut 'nugax/nugacis,Aiax/Aiacis',et preternominalocorum
et urbium, ut 'Floriacum, Pontiniacum'. A 'facio/facis' metricus
corripit, planus lector0 producit, ut 'calefacit, patefaci. 'Calefac,
Sidrac, illac, istac' produciturd.
E ante C breviatur, ut 'seminecis, reseco, Seneca', preter 'feci,
vervecis'.
ieci, theca, fex/fecis,
1 ante C breviaturpreter 'amicus, apricus, Mirice, umbilicus, cervical, pericula, convicia, natalicium, commendaticius, adventicius,
empticius, mendicus, tibicen, pudicus, redimicula, posticium, lectica,
[27vbl rubrica, mirica, formica, lorica, Caicus, Cambicese, vesica,
urtica, trilicem, inimicus, Nasica' ; 'extricans,inspica et que compo1metimor
P.
a Thurotf
s.v.simachus:
, p. 43j; videBalbus
"compugnans".
b Thurot
mulierum".
: "ornamentm
, p. 431; videBalbus
c Videsupra,
p. 126.
d Cf.Aimer,
(i), p. 127(infine).
Thurot
s.v.Cambises.
, p. 428,sedvideBalbus
127

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

nunturab istis; et preter oblquos femininorumin -ix, ut 'obstetrix/

radieis' et que
obstetricis,meretrix/meretricis,
cornix/cornicis,
4 radix/
derivanturab eis. Excipiunturab his femininis salix/salicis, filix/filicis,
fornicis' Similiter producuntur obliqui communis generis in
fornis/
-ix,ut 'felix/felicis,fenicis,trilicis' Excipiturex communibus'Silices',
nomen gentile. Similitermasculina in -ix corripiuntobliquos ut 'calix/
calicis'. Similiter propria nomina virorum in -icus producuntur, ut
'Henricus, Ludovicus'. Appellativa cetera omnia corripiuntur, ut
civicus'. Similiterin -ex
'pedica, pertica, tubicen1,mantica, hosticus,
4
finitaomnia corripiuntobliquos, ut apex/apicis, silex/silicis, index/
indicis'.
0 ante C breviaturpreter'suffoco,Baiocas' et preterobliquos nominis
tercie declinationis,ut 'celox/celocis' id est "navis",et 'velox/velocis',
excepto 'Capadoces', quia gentilia nomina per es omnia corripiuntur.
U ante C breviatur, ut 'duco/ducas, Teucros' et 'volucres' et
'Pentateucum' si diptongumdisiungas,preter 'ducis, traducs,reducs',
cum sunt verba, non nomina, et 'duco/-cis' cum suis compositisa.
- Nota:
diptongusest pars composita ex 'dia' quod est "duo",
et 'tongom' quod est "sonus", quia duas vocales una queque diptonguscomprehendit,que una queque per se vocem facit.Suntenim
quattuor diptongi: AU, EU, AE, OE; et semper producunt sillabane in qua est una ex his diptongis; ideo superiusdixit "si diptongumdisiungas".
A ante D breviatur, ut 'ebdomada, Palladis', preter 'cicada, eadem'
quando est ablativus2,et verba omnia preter 'degradai, commade.
E ante D producitur,ut 'comedo' nomen (comedo/-donis', id est
"commessor"), preter 'Macedo, comedo' verbum, et a 'pede' composita et 'edit, dedit, exedra, cathedra, Andromeda'.
1 ante D breviatur,ut 'preissidab,Numidas', preternominatrissillaba
in -ides, ut 'Atrides', et preter nomina tercie declinationisin -ido, ut
'cupido' ; et a 'cedo/cecidi' cum compositissuis, ut 'occido, incido', et
a 'ledo' composita,ut 'allido*, illido' ; 'vidi, rides, fido' cum compositis,
1tibicen
P.
2ablativum
P,sedcf.infinitivm
p. 133
infra
3itumida,
Aimer.
P. Thurot
, p. 431: sedvide
(3),p. 144(infine).
alledo
P.
Videsupra,
p. 124.
b Thurot
, p. 433.
128

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

ut 'arridet, infidus, revidit1'; 'fastidio, Davidis, ibidem, Crenidis*,

'
trucido, eidem id est in masculino.
0 ante D producitur preter 'tripodis, modus, commodo/-das* et
'quomodo'. [2$8ra]
U ante D producitur, ut 'imprudens', preter 'pecudis, tutudi,
impudens,erudi.
Brevis regula: ante F nulla vocalis producitur; ante Z nulla vocalis
corripitur.
A ante G breviaturpreter2 'presagus,Ariopagus,suffrago^et nomina in
- , ut
ago
'ymago', et nomina tercie declinationisut 'Astianages3'.
E ante G breviaturpreter 'collega, Cetegus, egi, legi, legas, fregi'
et ab his composita.
1 ante G breviatur,ut 'pon-igo^is', preternominain Agout lentigo,
prurigo, caligo', et preter hec verba: 'caligo, castigo, instigo, fatigo,
confligo,configo', et preter 'auriga, quadriga, vectigal'*.
0 ante G breviatur,ut 'dyalogus', preter 'ysagoga,pedagogus, synagoga' et preterilla, que habentduo G, nisi Aggioga'.
U ante G producitur preter 'pupugi, leugam, iugum, coniugis,
fugo/-gas,fugio'; sed 'fugi' in preteritoproducitur.
A ante L breviatur,ut et 'Ispalis' et cetera primitiva,nam derivativa
producuntur, ut 'animalis' Propria nomina corripiunt obliquos ut
'Anibal/Anibalis'. 'Alo/alis' corripitur, 'alo/alas' producitur.
E ante L producitur preter 'sepelis, angelus, Tescelus, Figelusb,
pericelis's.
1 ante L breviatur in nominibus a verbis venientibus, ut 'fusilis,
ductilis, textilis, sculptilis, utilis, sectilis6, parilis?, altilis'. Sed que a
nominibusveniuntvel sunt solum neutra, producuntur,ut 'infantilis,
monachilis, quintilis, sextilis, herilis, fabrilis, febrilis, aprilis' ab
1revidet
P.
1 preter
P.
preter
3 Astiages
Thurot
Aimer.
P,item
, p. 428; sedvide
(2),p. 93.
4 vetigal
P.
5pericelus
Thurott
Balbus
s.v.perichelis.
, p. 433;vide
6 sextilis
P.
">paralis
P.
Thurott
, p. 429,sedvideAimer.
(3),p. 146:"nomen
nimphe".
b Thurott
nomina
, p. 430,sedvideAimer.
(3),p. 131inter
propria.
129

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

'aprico', 'brachile, cubile, monile*. Cetera corripiaspreter 'nasiluma,

asilum'.
0 ante L breviaturpreter 'consolor, prestolor, Pactolus, Timolus,
Capitolium,.
U ante L breviatur preter nomina tercie declinationis: 'tribulis,
edulis, torcular,pedulis' Sed terciadeclinado corripit'specular*solum;
contra Lisorius: rIpsa specular habens confer cristallina secumlb.
Et eadem corripit obliquos eorum quorum nominativinon producunt
penltimas,ut 'consulis, exulis'. Cetera corripiunturpreter' Getulus,
adulor, betulus, tribua, culula'.
A ante M breviatur,ut 'calamus', preter neutra tercie declinationis,
ut 'dictamen', et preter 'clamo' et 'fama' cum compositissuis, et preter
obliqua verborum, ut 'amamus, iocundamus' quod simplex est. Sed
'damus' a 'do/das' corripituret que componunturab eo per hec tria:
'circum, pessum,venum'c.
E ante M producitur, ut 'amemus, circundemus', preter 'ingemit,
t, Triptolemus,vehemens,hyemis,hereconcremat,immemor,infremi
mus'
1 ante M breviatur,ut 'legimend, specimen, monimenta' et nomina
tercie declinationis, que veniunt a tercia coniugatione, ut [2$8rb]
'regimen, tegimen'. Nam a quarta coniugationeproducuntur,ut 'munimen', et anomalia omnia, ut 'assimus, velimus', et prima persona
pluralis presentis indicativi quarte, ut 'venimus'. Nam in preterito
corripitur,ut 'venimus'. Producuntureciam 'sublimis,opimus1,illimis'.
- Hic notandum
quod, si dictio erit tetrasillabaet habet omnes
I ante M vel ante aliam consonantemprosillabas
breves,
quattuor
duci potestin metroper figuramque diciturhectasise
, ut 'dederimus,
dederitis', preter 'poterimus', quod nunquam produci poterit. O ante M corripitur,ut 'athomus, edoma, nisi sint solum neutra,
ut 'ydioma', vel composita a longis, ut 'epitomen'.
U ante M producitur, ut 'volumen, legumen, cacumen, bitumen,
acumen, celeuma, toreuma, reuma, pneuma', si coniunxerisdiptongum
1subi
imus,
P.
opimis
Thuroti
sivenasel
lus.
s.v.nsile
, p. 432,sedvideDuCange
b Lisorius
6.
frgm.
c Cf.supra,
AanteB pp.126-7.
d Thurotf,
p. 431,sedvideDuCange.
e Videinfra,
I anteT p. 136etThurot
, pp.430,449,4^0,464,etAimer,
(3), p. io.
130

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

EU; et preter 'columen' et preter 'postumum,tume et 'autuma et

omniaverbain -umus
, ut 'volumus'
A ante N breviatursi sint primitiva,ut 'laganum, coctana1, Oceanus,
tipsana'2 et preter nomina tercie, ut 'Mediolanis, Garganis*4,Iordanis,
Nicanor, Tigranes', et preter derivativa, ut 'Vaticanus* quamvis a
'
'
'cano' derivetur,et preter 'manat, canus, Ianus, vanus'. Titan/Titanis
producitur. 'Hyspanis' tarnenet 'Taranis* breviantur*,sed cetera talia
nulla.
E ante N produciturpreter 'hebenus, iuvenis' et preter propria, ut
'Elenus, Helena, Emenus, Emenaa, Pemenesb, Ermogenes' nisi 'Oritempore veni' Tercia
genes'c; et preter 'venio' nisi in (preterito)s
4
declinado producit obliquos omnes, ut Siren/Sirenis' preter 4Anio/
Anienis*.
I ante N producitursi sint derivativa,ut 4morticinus,ierocontinusd,
Prenestinus,vicinus,elefantinus,echinus,equinus, vervecinus,Reatinus,
mediastinus,Palatinus, Libitina, catinus, emina, resina, sagina', preter
'clandestinus'. Sed derivativa vestium vel lapidum quidam auctores6
producunt; nos breviamus, ut 4iacintinus,ametistinus'. Producimus
tamen 4adamantinus,cristallinus, cilicinus' 'Byssinus, corpassinus>e
breviantur.Similiterderivativaab adverbiisbrevianturnisi Repentinus'.
Similiterbrevianturex 'oleo' et 'fago', ut 4oleaginus,faginus'.Similiter
brevianturque veniunta brevibusper compositionem vel derivationem,
ut 'destint,cominus, eminus, comminor' Rursusbreviantur'Mutina,
trutina,runcina, nundine, circinus, fuscina,fiscina' Rursus breviantur
4
omnes obliqui tercie preter delfn/
delfinis,Trachin/Trachinis,affinis,
confinis,Erinis'.
O ante N producitur, ut 'querimonia, obsonor', preter [2^8va]
'Antigonus, tigonus', diaconus, sonus, tonus, bonus, monet, canonis,
1octana
, p.432.
P,cf.Thurot
2ante
inmarg.
add.;Thurot
, p. 436:tipsna.
tipsana
preter
3Garganus
Aimer.
P,sedvide
(2),p. 96,11.4>lSbrevi
P.
5preterito
addidi
, sedcf.n.2.
6actores
P.
r/iurott,
p. 429.
b Thurot^,
III,215.
p. 433,sedvideOv.Met.
' inter
'
c Fortasse
Aimerici
maletransposuit
E brevem
editor
anteN,Aimer.
Orgenes
(3),p. 132.
d Thurot
, p. 430.
e Thurot
, p. 429.
Thurotty
p. 436.
M*

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

demonis'. Sed ceteri obliqui producuntur omnes, ut 'agon/agonis,

monis'. Et cetera propria per -oDido/Didonis', preter 'Symon/Sy
Rursus
nominataproducuntur.
gentilia breviantur,ut 'Saxones'.
U ante N semperproducitur,ut 'Lugdunum'.
A ante P breviaturpreter 'Priapus, Mesapus, synapis'.
E ante P breviaturpreter 'precepit' et compositaa 'cepi ; 'subrepit;
sepis^-is'1cum compositissuis.
I ante P breviaturpreter 'constipo' et preterpropria, ut 'Philippus'.
0 ante P breviatur preter 'Ciclopes, Europa, Canopus, piropus,
est.
Esopus' 'Ysopus' indifferens
U ante P breviaturpreter 'interrupi.
A ante Q producitur preter 'Tanaquil, Adaquasa, itaque'
E ante Q breviaturpreter 'plereque, utreque, exequans'.
1 ante Q produciturpreter 'reliquum, siliqua, denique, aliquid, uti-

que'
O ante Q breviaturpreter 'pleroque, utroque, alioquin'.
U ante Q non invenio.

A ante R breviatursi sint primitiva,preter 'tyara'. Sed derivativaet

composita de curtiscurta, ut a 'cesarie' 'Cesaris' ; de longis longa, ut e
'lumbis' 'lumbare'. 'Nectaris, iubaris,bacaris' breviantur.Cetera derivativa producuntur,ut 'avarus' ; obliqua verborum,ut 'amare, iocundare' quod est simplex, preter 'dare' et ab eo composita per 'circum,
venum,pessum'.
E ante R breviatur preter 'austerus, procerus, Iberus, Homerus,
sincerus, sinceris' tercie secundum quosdam, 'sicere, Neera, machera,
Megera2, cratera, statera, Citeron' ; et preter obliquos trium: 'carcer/
carceris, ver/veris, Iberis'. Obliqua verborumin -eratcorripiuntur,ut
'aderat, librt', preter 'desperat, perseverai, replerat' per sincopam.
-rerisvel -rereproducitur in coniunctiviset optativis: 'legereris' vel
'legerere'. In' -eris corripiunturin coniunctivo, ut 'legerim/legeris,
legero/legeris ; et presens indicativi in passivo tercie, ut 'legeris' ;
nam futurumeiusdem modi producitur,ut 'legeris', et presenssecunde,
ut 'doceris', et futurumoptavi et presens coniunctivi,ut 'ameris'. In
-eret
corripiuntur, ut 'legeret', preter secundam coniugationem,ut
1sepls.se
P; Thurott
, p. 435.
2 magera
Thurot
Aimer.
, p.431, sedvide
P,item
(3),p. 134.
Thurot
delieu".
, p. 428:"nom
I32

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

'docere, et que componuntur a longis, ut 'adhere. Producuntur

preteritaperfecta,ut 'potuere, legere'. Et futurumoptativi,ut 'ameris'
vel 'amere', et presensconiunctivi,et infiniti
vus1secunde coniugationis,
ut 'docere', et futurumindicativiin passivo (tercie)2 coniugationis,ut
'legeris' vel 'legere'. Cetera corripiuntur,ut infiniti-[2^8vb] vus tercie
coniugationis,ut 'legere' . In -eruntcorripiuntur,ut 'suggrant', preter
preteritaperfecta,ut 'potuerunt,legerunt'. In -brisvel -berecorripiuntur
futura,ut 'conaberis' vel 'conabere'.
I ante R breviatur, ut 'Zephirus, Iairus, Saphira, satirus', preter
'saphyrus,delirus, Epirus, nimirum,aspiro, butirum' et preter verba
quarte coniugationis,ut 'audire'.
O ante R breviatursi sint primitiva,preter 'sycomorus' et preter
'Pelorus, liquoris, Licores'*. Derivativa producuntur, ut 'canoras,
decorus, adorat' ab 'ador', 'irrorat, vaporat, aurora'. Oblquos corripiuntpropria ut 'Castoris', per -or-. Appellativavero producunteos,
ut 'lepos/leporis, decor/decoris'. Obliquos tamen neutra corripiunt,
ut a 'decorat' 'decus/decoris'. Et ex appellativisexcipiuntur 'arboris,
rectoris,leporis'.
U ante R breviatursi sint nomina primitiva,ut 'purpura, Ceturaa,
Bituris'; et obliqui tercie, ut 'murmuris',preter 'telluris'; et meditativa
ut 'parturit, esurit, micturit', preter 'comburit, securis' a 'secare'*.
Et omnisparsin -urus
j -uraI -arumproducitur.
A ante S breviatur,ut 'Damasus', preter 'Parnasus,agaso, occasus, omasus, crisoprasus' et preter obliqua verborum, ut 'rasi, suasi, vasi'.
('Vasum')s quoque et 'casum' et cuncta supina per -s- producuntur.
E ante S breviaturpreter 'poesis' et secundumIuvenalem 'matesis'b,
et 'dyocesis, frenesis'c, quod tamen Macer melius corripitd, sicut
Lucanus coripit 'Batavi'e, quod Iuvenalis producitf. Et Oratius 'Pale1infinitivm
P,sedcf.ablativum
supra
p. 128.
2 tercie
addidi.
3litores
Thurot
P,item
, p. 431.
4sacare
P.
5vasum
addidi.
a Thuroti
, p. 429;cf.Aimer.
(3),p. i6$,1. 13.
b Juv.
Sat.cf.VI,562.
c Juv.
Sat.XIV,136.
'' Videsupra,
s.v.frenesis.
, pp.406,425,428,430,437;etBalbus
p. 122;Thurot
1 Luc.Phars.
I, 431.
fJuv.
Sat.VIH,i.
I33

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

mon' corripita', quod Vergiliusproduciti. Persius corripit 'pituita1'0,

Oratius produciti
- Hic nota
quod greca per -sis>sive longa sint sive brevia, lector
in fineacuite. 'Galesus' flumenOratius produciti sed Lucanus corripit^. 'Vogesum'
verumproducunth.
I ante S prduciturpreter 'citisus'.
O ante S prducitur,ut 'corosus', preter 'rosa/rose'.
U ante S semper prducitur.
A ante T breviatursi sint nomina primitiva,ut 'malobatrum,aratrum,
baratrum, Sostratus, laphatum2, anas/anatis'. In -ates corripiuntur:
'Ecates, Socrates, Innobates1,preter 'Achates'. Derivativa producuntur, ut 'grabatum, pirata'; in -atim, ut 'dyatimJ,sigillatim', preter
'affatim'id est "habundanter"; et supinain -atumpreter 'datum, statum,
satum, ratum' cum compositis per 'circum, venum, pessum'. Nomen
in -tas producit genetivum in -atis, ut 'civitas/civitatis'. Pluralia in
-ates et in -atumproducuntur, sed tercia [29ra] declinado corripit
obliqua neutrorum,ut 'climatum'. Obliqua verborumproducunturin
-atispreter 'datis' secundam personampluralis numeri a 'do/das' cum
compositissuis.
E ante T prduciturpreter nominativosin -etassupra duas sitiabas,
ut 'anxietas, pietas', et preter 'stetit, petit, metit, vegetus, vegeto',
et que finiunturin -trix,ut 'meretrix'; in -trum
, ut 'feretrum'; in
et
et
ut
-tra,
genetivos in etis, ut
'pharetra';
preter 'Massagetes'
lebetis'
tribus:
; et
'quietis, locupletis,
'segetis, teretis', exceptis his
propria producuntur.Verborumobliqua omniaproducuntur,ut 'detur'.
Greca producuntur,ut 'senipetak,geometer, trapezeta, alphabeta'; et
1pictuita
P.
"herba
2iaphatum
.
Thurot*
, p. 430: apathum:
Noninveni.
b Verg.
Aen.
V,823.
c Pers.Sat.II,7.
d Hor.Sat.II,2,76/Ep.I, i, 108.
e VideThurot
, p. 406,n. 1.
Hor.C. II,6, 10.
* Noninveni.
hLuc.Phars.
I, 397.
1r/iurott,
p. 431; nomen
proprium
apudSeguinum.
JThurot
s.v.diatim.
, p. 429,sedvideDuCange
" Thurot*
s.v.sempectae.
yp. 43 sedvideDuCange
134

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

omnia in -etasj -etaj-etum;et supina in -etum;et 'irreti et 'tabetes'a.

I ante T breviatursicut sunt omnia in -itus, ut 'polimitus, neophitus,
spiritus,attonitus',exceptis que de longissupinisnascuntur,ut 'largitus,
petitus, lacessitus', et preter derivativa a nominibus in -itus si sint
masculina,ut 'insignitus,crinitus,auritus,pellitus', a Veste' 'vestitus,
mellitus*; a 'servo'b, non a Servio', derivatur'servitus' brevis. 'Ambitus' mobile producitur, fixum corripitur. 'Ydolotitum' breviatur;
secundum nos producitur. Similiter et propria corripiuntur,ut 'Democritus,Bonitus, Agapitus,Numitor'. Adverbia in -ituscorripiuntur.
Nomina in -ita breviantur,ut 'semita,compita,amita,pulpita,Laphita'1,
preter illa quibus est certa habitado, ut 'Betleemita'2, vel generatio,
ut 'Israelita', vel professio,ut 'Nicholaita' ; et preter ea que desinunt
in -tes,ut 'Tesbites, Tecuitesc, Salomitesd,Sunamites'; vel que habent
in -dis genetivumvel in -tis et sunt feminina,ut 'Levitess/Levitidis,
; et preter propria, ut Mulita*,Tabitae; et preter ea que
Sannis/-tis'
derivantura longis supinis, ut 'servitor, petitor'. Rursus omnia breviantur,que desinunt in -as, ut 'civitas'. Rursus omnia supina prime
et secunde coniugationisin -itumbreviantur,ut 'sonitum, domitum,
dolitums, recensitum, studitum'. Tercia coniugatio corripit supina
omnia in -itum
, ut 'canitum, scabitum, scobitum', preter ista decern
faciunt
que
preteritum in -ui: 'arcessitum, capessitum, lacessitum,
tritum, cupitum, oblitum' ab 'obliviscor', 'ascitum' a 'scio', non a
'cieo', petitm, quesitum, facessitum'. Sed 'litm' a 'lino'6, 'situm'
a 'sino', 'citum' [29rb]a 'cio' aut? a 'cieo', 'itum' ab 'eo', 'quitum'
a 'queo', quamvis faciantpreteritain -ni, cum compositissuis corripiuntur. Similiter omne preteritumin -ui divisas1corripit supinum, ut
fremitum'. Supina quarte coniugationis producuntur preter
'fremui/
et
'queo/ quis'.
'eo/is'
Frequentativa cuncta corripiuntur nisi sint quarte coniugationis.
1iaphita
Thurott,
p. 430.
2Belleemita
Aimer.
P,item
Thuroty
(3),p. i 54.
p. 428, sedvide
3lenitis
ibid.
Thurotf,
p. 43i, sedvide
4 Nilita,
Thurot
ibid.
, p.432, sedvide
s olitum
P.
6limoP.
1namP.
Thurot
, p. 436.
b Sc.servus
.
, nonservare
c Thurot
sedvideAimer.
t, p. 436(tetuites),
(3),p. 154.
d Thurotj
p. 434,sedvideibid.
e Thurot^
, p. 436,sedvideibid.
1idest
ambas
vocales.

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

'Videritis, dederitis' et omne verbumin -itiscorripiturnisi sit presens

quarte coniugationisvel anomalum, ut 'velitis, assitis' Sed 'dederitis'
producit Ovidiusa per ectasimb in futuro.
Tercia coniugatio corripitur, ut 'moritur'; quarta producitur, ut
'potitur'. 'Irrita' verbum producitur, 'irrita' nomen corripitur.
0 ante T producitur,ut 'ydiota, taxeota'c, preter 'compotus, antidotum, dnott, utpote, impotis, compotis, aptotum'
U ante T producitur,ut 'confuto,voluto', preter 'puto, puteo, puteal,
rutus, dirutus,percutit, veluti, amputat'.
A ante V loco consonantis positum producitur, ut 'conclavis, depravai, artavus,papaver', et propria, ut 'Pictavis', preter 'Andegavis'
et preter 'cavat, lavat, grava ; 'cavet, pavet, favet' (horum preterita
producuntursicut omnia preteritain avit); et preter 'attavus'1 (et)2
ab
'avus'.
composita
E ante V producitur,ut 'nevus, sevus', preter 'alleva.
1 ante V producitur,ut 'civis, diriva.
O ante V in presenti, in preterito, in perfecto et futuroindicativi
corripitur,ut 'admovet'. In preteritoperfectoproducitur,ut 'movit,
fovit,devovi.
U ante V, ut 'iuva, corripiturin presenti; in preteritoproducitur,
ut 'iuvit'3. [Preter 'ovum'*.]
ExpliciuntReguleMagistiWillelmide mediissillabis.
EXPLICIUNTREGULEMAGISTI
WILLELMIDE MEDIISSILLABIS.
Utrecht
Instituut
voorLaat Latijn

1attavus
P post
favet.
2 etaddidi.
3uuP.
4 Corrgete
non
potui.
Ov.Met.
VI,347.
b Videsupra,
I anteMp. 130.
c Thurot,
p. 436."Tae<>T7)".
136

189.235.178.250

00:05:53 AM

The Doctrine

of Exponibilia

and Sixteenth

in the Fifteenth

Centuries*

E. J. ASHWORTH

of the most neglected parts of late medieval logical theory

is
that devoted to exponibilia
, or those propositionswhich need
One
furtheranalysis in order to lay bare their underlyinglogical
formand to make clear under what conditions they can be said to be
true or false. My main intentionin this paper is to examine the rich
array of printed sources which are available to us from the later fifteenth and early sixteenthcenturies, but I will consider some texts
written before the invention of printing,and I will also give some
account of what happened to the theoryin the late sixteenthand seventeenth centuries. The sources fall into three main groups. There are
separate treatiseson exponibles, especially those written by Peter of
Ailly and later Parisian logicians; there are commentaries on the
treatiseon exponibles attributedto Peter of Spain; and there are those
parts of longer works which were devoted to Proofs of Terms', as
in Paul of Venice and his followers.These groupingsare not, of course,
exhaustive. For instance, Marsilius of Inghen and George of Brussels
discussed exponibles in the second part of a treatiseon consequences,
and Albert of Saxony included exponibles in the part of PerutilisLogica
devoted to differentkinds of proposition. As might be expected, the
authorsof the separate treatiseson exponibles were considerablymore
detailed and careful in their analysis than were those authors who
treated exponibles as a subsidiarymatter. In my view, the two most
outstandingtreatises are those written by Peter of Ailly (d. 1420)
and by Domingo de Soto (d. 1^60). The latteris not original,but it is a
very acute and thoroughsurveyof the doctrines which were current
in late fifteenth
and early sixteenthcenturyParis, where de Soto had
studiedunderand with such logicians as Major, Celaya and Lax, whose
names will frequentlyoccur in my text. Outside treatisesdevoted to
* I would
financial
assistance
which
forthegenerous
liketothank
Council
made
theCanada
- Forfull
is referred
thereader
ofpublications
for
this
details
tothe
theresearch
possible
paper.
bibliography.
I37

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

exponibles, good brief treatmentsare to be found in the anonymous

commentatoron Marsilius of Inghen,and in George of Brussels, (both
of the later fifteenthcentury)and in Hieronymusof St. Mark (of the
early sixteenthcentury). The earlier writers are often disappointing.
For instance, although Paul of Venice's Logica Magna is sometimes
describedas an encyclopediaof medievallogic, the sectionon exponibles
lacks the precise analysisof typesand sub-typesof exponiblepropositions
found in other authors, and the examples are frequentlyconfusing.
Similarly,the treatisewronglyattributedto Peter of Spain lacks detail,
and derives most of its value fromthe remarksof commentators.
I have delimitedmyfieldof investigationby confiningmyselfto certain
kindsof exponibles. It was usual to discuss such mattersas comparatives
and superlatives,incipitand desinit
, the infinite,collective signssuch as
totus
,
, similarityand difference,and such temporal signs as ab eterno
and
of
ita
sicut
and
discussions
finds
also
One
and
,
t
semper.
perpetuo
, and various modal signs. An adequate investigationof all these
factum
matterswould require a booklength study, and I thereforeintend to
discuss only the three types of proposition which were central to the
theoryof exponibles, namelyexclusives, exceptives and reduplicatives.
I shall begin my studyby looking at the definitionof an exponible, and
I shall then consider each of these three types of exponible separately
and in some detail. At the end I will append a section on the decline
of the doctrineof exponiblesafterthe firstpart of the sixteenthcentury.
In this task I have confinedmyselfeven furtherby ignoringthe lengthy
discussionsof sophisms, or problem cases, which were often included
in order to illustratethe application of the initial analyses. I have thus
leftample scope forfurtherresearch.
.
SectionOne: TheDefinition
ofan Exponible
An exponible was normallydefinedas a proposition whose sense was
obscure because of a sign which it contained, and which therefore
needed to be expoundedby meansof a clearer,better-knownproposition
which was equivalent to it.1 Sometimes an exponible term ratherthan
1A typical
conse"Circa
secundam
ofBrussels,
isthat
offered
definition
104:
partem
byGeorge
estpropositio
estprimo
sciendum
exponibilis
quodpropositio
quaeestdeexponibilibus
quentiarum
ettalis
homoestanimal,
inea positi:uttantum
alicuius
habens
ratione
sensum
obscurum
signi
sensum
notior
sed
solet
vocari
alteriuspropositionis
expresse
explicans
propositio
expsita,
propositio
alicuius
obscure
ratione
estsensum
lindeexponere
dicitur
propositionis
propositionem
exponens.
sivedeclarare
... w
formaliter
convertibilem
secum
notiorem
exprimere
signi
perpropositionem
138

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

exponible proposition was the object of definition,but the result

was the same, for an exponible term was just one whose presence
produced a propositionof the kind just described.1The other variations
to be foundin the literatureare of only minorsignificance.For instance,
it was occasionallylaid down that an exponible propositionshould not
be self-evident[perse nota] but this,as Domingo de Soto remarked,was a
redundantrequirement.2The word 'convertible' was oftenused instead
of 'equivalent', but as the Mainz commentatorspointed out, in this
context the requirement that exponible and exponents should be
convertiblemeant no more than thattheyshould be equivalentin truth
and falsity.The only objections came from Hieronymusde Hangest,
who argued that 'obscure' could only mean doubtfulor inevident,and
thatmanyexponibleswere not obscure in eithersense. He pointed out,
moreover, that some exponibles were expounded by means of other
exponibles, and he cited the case of comparativepropositions,whose
exponents contained ita and sicut,whereas propositionscontainingita
and sicut were in turn expounded by means of comparatives. Such
examples cast grave doubt on any claim that an exponible is by nature
more obscure than the propositionsused to expound it. As a result,
he offereda definitionwhich made no referenceto relative clarityor
obscurity.An exponible proposition,he said, is a propositioncontaining
an exponible sign which implicitly denotes hypothetical
ly. That is,
itsmeaningcan onlybe explainedbymeansofa hypotheticalproposition.3
Such a definitionleaves open the possibilitythatthe explanationmay be
less apparent to the auditor than the exponible is, and it avoids the
introductionofpsychologicalcriteria.
The claim that an exponible proposition was equivalent to a hypotheticalpropositionformedout of its exponents raised some questions
about the status of exponible propositions. Were they categorical or
? Indeed, could it not be
were they merely disguised hypotheticals
claimed that in a sense there were no exponible propositions? The
originsof this debate are to be found in the doctrine of mentalpropositions. It was held that for a spoken or writtenpropositionto have
meaning, it had to be subordinatedto a mental proposition, and such
1E.g.Mainz;
deLapide.
Johannes
2 Domingo
de Soto,Ixxxvi.
3Hieronymus
cuisignum
estpropositio
: "Dicoigitur
deHangest
exponibilis
exponibile
propositio
denotans
etiam
mental
iter
estsignum
vero
annectitur
quidem
implicite
ypothetice
signum
exponibile
ilio
Etilludsignum
dicitur
denotare
tribuat.
nonmerito
ypothetice
quamtermino
suppositionis
venit
mediate
velimmediate
denotatio
modo
cuius
explicanda."
perypotheticam
I39

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

propertiesas synonymyand equivocation were explained by means of

the relationshipsbetween these three typesof proposition. If a spoken
or writtenpropositionwas equivocal, this meant that its tokens could
be subordinatedto more than one mental proposition. On the other
hand, if two differentwrittenor spoken propositionswere said to be
synonymous,thismeant thattheywere subordinatedto the same mental
proposition. A corollaryof these claims was, of course, that no mental
propositionscould properlybe called either equivocal or synonymous.
All mental propositionswere explicit and distinctfrom one another.
It was also claimed that mental propositionsshared in many if not all
of the syntacticalproperties of written and spoken propositions. For
instance, if a comparativeterm governed an ablative term in a spoken
or written proposition, it must also govern an ablative in a mental
proposition.1 Moreover, any term which appeared in a written or
spoken proposition was supposed to have some mental analogue.
In all the texts I have read, the argumentsagainst the categorical
nature of exponible propositionswere put forwardonly to be refuted.
The main argumentwas a simple one.2 It was asserted that since every
written or spoken exponible was equivalent to a written or spoken
hypothetical proposition, both must be subordinated to a mental
hypotheticalproposition. If they were not so subordinated,the claims
about the nature of synonymyand about the explicitnessof all mental
propositionswould be falsified.If every written or spoken exponible
was subordinatedto a mentalhypothetical,it followedthatall exponibles
were disguised hypothetical and that there were no exponible propositions on the mental level, the only level of language which really
mattered.Some subordinateargumentswere also offered.For instance,
it was claimed thatexponible propositionslacked some of the properties
of ordinarycategoricalpropositions.The rules for the truthand falsity
terms did not apply,3 the it les for
or propositionswith non-referring
truthcould not be demonstrated
and
their
were
conversion
different,4
byascentand descent.*
1Hieronymus
seePeter
ofAilly,
ofmental
Fora fulldiscussion
ofSt.Mark.
Conceptus
propositions,
: see
ofAilly
aretohisExponibilia
toPeter
references
etInsolubilia
editions).
(various
Subsequent
bibliography.
2SeePeter
deHangest;
deLapide;
ofAilly;Johannes
Enzinas,
xxxvii;
ivvo;
Major,
Hieronymus
Gerardus
Harderwickensis
lxxxvi
de
of
St.
; Tartaretus,
;
Soto,
Mark;
Domingo
Hieronymus
Celaya;
69.
3Hieronymus
ofSt.Mark.
*Domingo
ofSt.Mark.
deSoto,lxxxvi
; Hieronymus
5 Domingo
deSoto,lxxxvi.
I40

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

The standard answer to these arguments involved a distinction

between two kinds of equivalence, equivalence in significando
and
truth
and
or
in
That
one
in
could
is,
,
falsity.1
inferendo
equivalence
be inferredfrom the other, and if one were true (or false) the other
would also be true (or false). Neither of these featuresinvolves subordination to the same mental proposition. Various other points were
also made by some of those who discussed the matter. A proposition
was said to be categoricalso long as it had subject, predicateand copula,
and that it lacked other propertiesdid not mean that it was not categorical.2 To say that a mental proposition is explicit is merely to say
that it is not equivocal, not that it cannot be explained by means of
other propositions.3 If exponible signs appear in written and spoken
propositions,mental analogues must appear in mental propositions.*
If "Man is an animal" is a legitimatemental categoricalproposition,and
ifthe sign 'every' can be added to it, and does not changethe categorical
nature of the proposition, there is no reason why mattersshould be
differentwhere the exponible sign 'only' is concerned.s In the case of
those exponible propositionswhose exponentsare themselvesexponible,
it does not make sense to claim thatthe originalexponible is subordinated to a non-exponible mental proposition.6 Finally, in the case of a
propositionsuch as "Everyman in as much as he is rationalis a laughing
thing",experience shows both thatpeople understandwhat it meansand
thattheyfrequentlydo not know the fourexponents.7This surelymakes
nonsense of the claim that everysuch writtenor spoken proposition is
subordinatedto a mental propositionformedout of its exponents.
Another problem connected with the definitionof an exponible
concerned the statusof universalaffirmative
propositions.A numberof
authorsunquestioninglyincluded these in their list of exponibles,8but
others refused to do so on the grounds that the so-called exponents
were not clearer and better known than the original proposition, and
that one of the definingcharacteristicsof an exponible was therefore
absent.9 The most usual exposition was:
1Seep. 140,n. 2.
2 Hieronymus
deSoto,lxxxvi;
deLapide.
ofSt.Mark;
Domingo
Johannes
3Domingo
deSoto,lxxxvi;
xxxviiv0.
Cf.Major,
ivV0.
Enzinas,
4 Hieronymus
xxxvii-xxxviivo
ofSt.Mark;
.
Enzinas,
Celaya;
5Enzinas,
ofSt.Mark.
deHangest;
xxxvii;
i, ivVo;
Major,
Hieronymus
Hieronymus
6 Enzinas,
xxxvii.
7 Domingo
deSoto,lxxxvi;
Celaya.
8E.g.Mainz;
Peter
ofMantua;
Blanaellus,
Lib.Soph.
Oxon.;
72; PaulofPrgula,
47.
9 E.g.Peter
saidthat
onecould
ofAilly;Greve,
cii' Hieronymus
ofSt.Mark
xxxxiiiivo;
Eckius,
itwasnota matter
because
susptible
ofdemonstration.
sayasonepleased,
141

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

EveryA is a B = Some A is a B1 and nothingis an A unless it is a B

[nihilestA quinilludestB],
Domingo de Soto claimed that quin did not have conditional force in
this context, and that it was equivalent to qui non.2 His version was:
EveryA is a B = Some A is a B and no A is an A which is not a B.
Few authors mentioned universal negative propositions, and most of
those who did so said only that they were not exponibles.3 Celaya,
Lax and Domingo de Soto offeredthe followingexposition:
No A is a B = Some A is not a B and no A is an A which is a B.
Domingo de Soto went even furtherwhen he showed how particular
propositionscould be expounded:
Some A is a B = Every A is a B or some A is an A which is a B.
Some A is not a B = No A is B or some A is an A which is not a B.
These have the desired featurethat the particularcontradictoryof each
universal proposition is expounded by means of the disjunction of
the contradictoriesof those exponentswhose conjunctionwas equivalent
to the universalin question! However, Domingo de Soto only introduced these examples in order to strengthenhis case againstthe claim
that universal propositions (whether affirmativeor negative) were
exponible. It was, he said, ridiculousto assertthatparticularpropositions
could be expounded, yet such an assertionwas a logical consequence of
the claim thatuniversalpropositionscould be expounded. Furthermore,
since universalpropositionsappeared in the position of exponents,one
would be faced with an infiniteregressof exponents.4
.
SectionTwo:Exclusive
Propositions
Exclusive propositionswere said to be marked by the presence of such
solus, solum
terms as tantum
, though
, unicus and precise
, tantummodo,
The
mere
discussion
and
was
of
the
tantum
subject
analysis.
only
lengthy
to
was
an
exclusive
term
of
not,
however,
produce
enough
presence
an exclusiveproposition,for exclusive terms could play a wide variety
of roles. As such earlier authorsas Paul of Venice took particularcare
1Inmost
wereheld
since
indefinite
indefinite
wereused.However,
cases
propositions
propositions
'A is B*
than
'SomeA isB*rather
I have
towrite
chosen
toparticular
tobeequivalent
propositions
inLatin.
Thisisnot
donotappear
which
indefinite
AisB'. I havealsoinserted
or'[Some]
articles,
weretaken
andpredicate
terms
thesubject
inallthecasesunder
discussion
because
misleading,
inquestion.
oftheclasses
members
That
stood
for
theindividual
tohave
is,they
supposition.
personal
2 Domingo
deSoto,lxxxvi.
3 Blanchellus,
PaulofPrgula,
72vo;
48.
Domingo
deSoto,lxxxvi-lxxxvivo.
142

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

to point out, tantumcould govern subject, copula, or predicate, or

variouscombinationsof these.1Only when it governedall threetogether
was there said to be an exclusive proposition. A number of authors
devoted some space to propositionswith exclusive subjects and predicates,2and a varietyof problems was mentioned. For instance, "Milk is
only sweet" can be interpretedin two ways. It can mean either that
milk is not anythingother thana sweet thing,or thatmilk possesses no
3
propertyother than sweetness. Another problem involved the interpretationof exclusive subjects. If 'only' in "Only men are animals" is
said to govern 'man' alone, what does this mean? Hieronymusof St.
Markansweredthat,so faras he could see, such a sentencewas equivalent
to "Somethingwhich is only a man is an animal" which in turn means
"Somethingwhich is a man and is not a non-man is an animal." His
analysisis verysimilarto thatofferedby George of Brusselsin the previous century.4
Even when tantumgoverned a whole proposition, other distinctions
remainedto be made. For instance, "Only men are running"and "Only
ninemen are running"clearlyhave to be treateddifferently,
forwhereas
the firstimplies that no other kind of thingis running,the second is
quite compatiblewith the claim thatother kindsof thingsare running.*
Exclusiveswith numericaltermswere called exclusivesgratiapluralitatis
and were given a different
, which
analysisfromexclusivesgratiaalietatis
did not exhibit numerical terms. Terms signifying
wholes composed
of parts created anotherproblem. "Only the house is white" could be
seen as leadingto a contradiction,since it implies both "Somethingother
than the house [i.e. a part of the house] is white" and "Nothingother
than the house is white."6 Such propositionswere only acceptable if
they were given an improper interpretationof the form "Nothing
extrinsic to the house is white." Finally, there was the problem of
4
propositions already containing such quantifyingterms as every'.
1PaulofVenice,
PaulofPrgula,
made
distinctions
these
central
to
34,andhisfollower,
7-58,
their
unlike
other
authors
whotreated
asintroductory
them
innature.
discussion,
2E.g.Lax;Celaya;
deSoto,lxxxvivo-lxxxviivo.
Domingo
3Peter
ofAilly.
Cf.Hieronymus
ofSt.Mark,
whousedtheexample
"Socrates
onlyis white",
inwhich
thecopula
rather
than
thepredicate.
deSoto,
lxxxvii,
'only'is saidtogovern
Domingo
chose
thesame
ofexample.
type
* George
ofBrussels,
Cf.thecommentator
onMarsilius
ofInghen2,
whooffered
theanalysis:
104.
"existens
homo
etnulla
resquenonesthomo
estanimal."
5Albert
ofSaxony,
with
thesecond
forhesaid:"tantum
duo
20,doesnotseemtoagree
claim,
currunt
sic: duohomines
homines
a duobus
currunt
etnullaaliaanimalia
hominibus
exponitur
"
currunt.
6 Albert
ofSaxony,
Peter
ofAilly.
Cf.Ockham,
2ovo;
187-188.
M3

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

"
"Only everyman is an animal is unacceptable in its proper interpretation, whereby it implies "Every man is an animal and nothingother
than every-manis an animal", but acceptable in its improper interpretation,wherebyit implies "Everyman is an animal and no kind of
thingother thanman is an animal".1 It was sometimespointed out that,
in the propersense, 4Only everyA is B' had to be takenas falsewhenever
therewas more thanone A.2 The reasonforthisbecomes apparentwhen
4
4
one learnsthat Only A is B' was said to be equivalentto EveryB is A'
In the case under consideration,one would get 'Every B is every A'
or 'Each member of the class B is identical to all the members of A
taken together/ Such an interpretationworks when A has just one
member, but not otherwise.
Once the standardexclusive propositionhad been isolated,it was usual
to specifysubdivisionsin termsofthepresenceandpositionofthenegation
sign. Some earlierauthorsmentionedonly two possibilities, 'Only A is
B' and 'Only A is not B'3 but the majoritylisted all fourpossibilities:
1. Only A is B.
2. Not (only A is B).
3. Only A is not B.
4. Not (only A is not B).
Some authorsexpanded the numberof subdivisionsto eightby including
the following
. Only everyA is B.
6. Not (only every A is B).
7. Only everyA is not B.
8. Not (only everyA is not B).
As can easily be seen, each of the numbered propositionscontradicts
thepropositionwhichprecedes it.
The general lines of the expositionof standardexclusive propositions
were agreed upon by every author, but the precise way in which the
exponents were to be worded was a matter of dispute. Many early
authors,as well as the later traditionalists,used the phrase nihilaliud ab
and said thatone of the exponentsof 'Only A is B' was 'Nothing other
than A is B'.s However, the phrase aliud ab could be interpretedin
such a way as to make the production of counter-exampleseasy. It
1Peter
ofAilly;
Harderwickensis.
Cf.Ockham,
187.
2 Domingo
ofSaxony,
deSoto,lxxxviii.
2ovo.
Cf.Albert
3 PaulofPrgula,
chel
186.
lus,83.Cf.Ockham,
57-58;Blan
4 E.g.George
deLapide.
ofBrussels,
; Johannes
Clichtoveus,
32vo
105;LeFvre:
5E.g.Ockham,
ofSaxony,
Greve,
xxxxvvo;
186; Albert
20; PeterofAilly;Harderwickensis;
deLapide.
Johannes
I44

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

was claimed that alietas applied only to existing things, and that it
implied essential difference.As a result, although "Only the Father is
divine in essence" is false and heretical, its exponents, "The Father is
divine in essence" and "Nothing other than the Father is divine in
essence" are both true.1 Since the Son differsfrom the Father really,
but not essentially,it is never true to say of the Son "This is other than
the Father", and hence the second exponent cannot be falsified.To
those who tried to save the analysisby claiming that it is valid for all
but Divine terms, it was pointed out that secular counter-examples
could also be produced.2 "Only this phoenix was a phoenix" is false,
as an examinationof the equivalent "Everyphoenix was this phoenix"
will show, but its exponents,"Thisphoenix was a phoenix" and "Nothing
other than this phoenix was a phoenix" are both true. Since there is
nevermore thanone phoenix in existenceat a giventime it is impossible
to point to a phoenix and say truly "This phoenix is other than this
"
(second) phoenix. Hence the second exponent cannot be falsified.
An alternativeanalysisproposed by George of Brusselswas 'No being
which is not an A is a B'.s However, this analysiswas not popular with
his successors, and several authors rejected it explicitly.4They argued
that since 'being' is a term, it can be replaced by another term, and
as a result the inferencefrom exponents to exponible is not formally
valid. For instance, "Socrates runs and no being which is not Socrates
run, thereforeonly Socrates runs" is valid, but the invalid inference,
"Socratesrunsand no brayingthingwhich is not Socratesruns,therefore
only Socrates runs" is of precisely the same form. The force of this
objection may not be apparent to the modern reader, who is tempted
to treat 'being' as a variablerangingover a domain and to formalize'No
being which is not an A is a B' as '(Vx) (-Axd-Bx)'. However, such
an interpretationwould be quite foreignto the medieval logician, who
never interpreteda proposition by means of a domain of objects some
of which were (or were not) A and some of which were (or were not) B.
Instead, propositions were interpretedonly by means of those things
which were A and those thingswhich were B, with special provisions
forthe cases in which either A or B or both were emptyclasses.
1Forfulldiscussions
ofInghen2;
Mainz.
andLax.Cf.Marsilius
seeCelava
2 Forfulldiscussions
whodiscusses
deSoto,lxxxviivo,
andLaxandalsoDomingo
seeCelaya
only
tomake
thesame
obscure
thesecular
case.PaulofVenice,
34,usesrather
examples
point.
3 George
esthomo."
ofInghen2,
Cf.Marsilius
10: "Nullum
ensquodnonestanimal
ofBrussels,
formulation.
estanimal."
"Nulla
resquenonesthomo
Tartaretus,
70,usesthelatter
Celaya;
deSoto,
lxxxviivo.
Lax.Cf.Domingo
Hi

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

The preferredanalysisof 'Only A is B' had 'No non-A is B' as the

second exponent;1 and I shall use this formulationin my account. The
foursub-divisionsof the standardexclusive propositionwere expounded
as follows:2
1. Only A is B = Some A is B and no non-A is B.
2. Not (only A is B) = No A is B or some non-A is B.
3. Only A is not B = Some A is not B and everynon-A is B.
4. Not (only A is not B) = EveryA is B or some non-A is not B.
It should be noted thatwhereverone exponible is expounded by means
of a conjunction of propositions, its contradictoryis expounded by
means of a disjunctionof the contradictoriesof the conjuncts,and vice
versa. This is because of the logical rule: '-(P . Q) = -P v -Q'
The formalrelationshipsbetween the propositions were seen to be
similar to those between standardcategorical propositions. There are
two sets of contradictories, 'Only A is B' and 'Not (only A is B)'
and 'Only A is not B' and 'Not (only A is not B)' That is, one member
of each set is true, and one member of each set is false. 'Only A is B'
and 'Only A is not B' are contraries. That is, both may be false, but
at most one is true. 'Not (only A is B)' and 'Not (only A is not B)'
are subcontraries.That is, both may be true, but at most one is false.
'Not (only A is not B)' is subalternateto 'Only A is B' since it follows
fromit without implyingit, and 'Not (only A is B)' is subalternateto
'Only A is not B' for the same reason. Several authors set out the
followingtable of opposition,3and mnemonicnames were added whose
vowels indicatedthe quantityand qualityof the exponents.
ORA
MILES
A
is
B
nly A is not B
Only
contraries
subalternates
Not (only A is not B)
SACROS

subcontraries

subalternates
Not (only A is B)
DEI

1Somehad"Nihilnonhomoestanimal":
ofSt.Mark;
seePaulofVenice,
34; Hieronymus
seeLokert,
had"Nullum
nonhomoestanimal":
Others
deSoto,lxxxviii.
i; Celaya;
Domingo
viv0.
Lax;Major,
2Itwasusualtohavethepreiacens
from
thedeletion
ofthe
resulted
which
, i.e. theproposition
A is B"rather
than'A is B' for
"Some
asthefirst
butI havewritten
term,
exponent,
exponible
thesakeofclarity
.
3 George
Summule.
ofBrussels,
xxxvvo;
Tartaretus,
70; Trutvetter,
io$vo.Cf.Mainz;Major,
146

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

Some attentionwas also paid to non-standardexclusive propositions.

Exampleswith singulartermswere common, and so too were examples
of propositionsin which 'only* governed a universalproposition. The
followingtable of oppositionappeared in several texts:1
Only everyA is B
Only everyA is not B
contraries
subalternates

subalternates

CO*
CSe
subcontraries s

Not (onlyeveryA is not B)

Not (onlyeveryA is B)
The propositionswere expounded as follows:2
1. Only everyA is B = Every A is B and no non-A is B.
2. Not (only everyA is B) = Some A is not B or some non-A is B.
3. Only everyA is not B = No A is B and everynon-A is B.
4. Not (only everyA is not B) = Some A is B or some non-Ais not B.
Tables of opposition were also drawn up for exclusives containing
numericalterms. For instance. George of Brusselsgave the following:*
MILES
ORA
one
is
.
Only
_
Only
J
J one is not
contraries
subalternates

C^

subalternates

^o
subcontraries

.
.
/ i one is
X
XT
Not (only
Not (only one is)
not)
SACROS
DEI
However, the exponentswhich were givenhave a veryodd ringto them.
1 shall quote the list given by George of Brussels without attempting
to providea translation:*
1. Tantum unum est = Unum est et non plura quam unum sunt.
2. Non tantumunum est = Nullum unum est vel plura quam unum
sunt.
=
Tantum
unum
non
est
unum
Unum
non
est
et
omnia
3.
plura quam
sunt.
1Hieronymus
ofSt.Mark;
inCaubraith,
Cf.discussion
Summule.
xxxvvo;
Mainz;
Trutvetter,
Major,
xlvvo
andDomingo
deSoto,
xciii-xciiivo.
2 Mainz;
deLapide.
Cf.LeFvre:
Johannes
Clichtoveus,
32.
3 George
ofBrussels,
106.Cf.Tartaretus,
Summule.
70andTrutvetter,
* George
ofBrussels,
106.Cf.Hieronymus
ofSt.Mark
deSoto,xcv,fordifferent
andDomingo
butequally
curious
examples.
147

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

4- Non tantumunumnon est = Omne unum est vel plura quam unum
non sunt.
A number of rules concerning exclusive propositions were given.
Virtuallyeverytext listed the three rules which applied to each kind of
exponible:
A. i An exclusive proposition both implies and is implied by its
exponents.
A. 2 Any exclusive proposition which implies a conjunction of
exponents implies just one exponent.
A. 3 Any exclusive propositionwhich implies a disjunctionof exponentsis impliedbyjust one exponent.
Virtuallyeverytextalso gave the4followingrule :
A. 4 'Only A is B' implies All B is A' and 'All B is A' implies
'Only Ais B'
Johannesde Lapide remarked that this rule could be proved in two
ways by appeal to the acceptance of the terms (see below) and by intermediate consequences. He gave quite an elaborate proof,as did Clichtoveus,1but a simplerand neater proofwas offeredby Domingo de Soto.2
The stepscan be set out and justifiedas follows:
1. Only A is B.
2. Some A is B and no non-A is B. i, exponible to exponents.
3. No non-A is B. 2, froma conjunctionto its parts.
4. No B is non-A. 3, simple conversion.
. Some A is B. 2, froma conjunction to its parts.
6. Some A is. 5, fromthe 'is' of predicationto the 'is' of existence.
7. No B is non-A and some A is. 4, 6, conjunction.
withvariedpredicate
8. EveryB is A. 7, fromnegativeto affirmative
and the constantiaof the predicate.
9. Only A is B, thereforeeveryB is A. 1,8, fromthe firstto the last.
10. EveryB is A.
11. Some B is A. 10, subalternation.
1Le Fvre:Clichtoveus,
34-34*.
2 Domingo
animal
esthomo/
enimbene/
tantum
esthomoet
deSoto,xc. "Sequitur
ergoanimal
nihil
ultra
estanimal,
nonanimal
esthomo/
etnullus
homo
estnon
ergohomo
perexpositionem,
nullus
rursus
homoestnonanimal,
et aliquishomoest
animal/
perconversionem
simplicem,
estanimal
exprima
homo
adaffirmativam
ergoomnis
/a negativa
(quesequitur
posita
exponente)
animal
esthomo
acpro
indedeprimo
adultimum,
tantum
estanimai.
omnis
homo
constantia,
/ergo
E contrario
bene/omnis
estanimai
homo
estanimai,
est
etnullus
homo
homo
sequitur
/ergo
aliquis
ad subalternatam,
nonanimai,
enimsequitur
a subalternante
etsecunda
abaffirmativa
ad
prima
variato
Exquibus
rursus
negativam
perconversionem
simplicem,
predicato.
sequuntur
exponentes
"
huius
animai
esthomo,
acsubinde
/tantum
ipsa.
exponibilis
148

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

i2. Some A is B. 11, simple conversion.

i 3. No B is non-A. 10, affirmative
to negativewith varied predicate.
14. No non-A is B. 13, simple conversion.
i. Some A is B and no non-A is B. 12, 14, conjunction.
16. Only A is B. i, exponentsto exponible.
17. EveryB is A, thereforeonly A is B. 10, 16, firstto last.
In addition, a rather miscellaneous set of rules can be drawn from
a small number of texts. Most of them were introduced in the course
of a discussionof the conversionof exclusive propositions,althoughit
was clearly felt that the meaning of the word 'conversion' had to be
stretchedif some of the examples were to be called examples of conversion. I shall group the rules according to the type of antecedent.
B. i 'Only A is B' implies 'Not only A is not B'.
Clichtoveus gave a detailed proof for this example of subalternation.1
B. 2 'Only Ais Band thereare non-AV implies'Only non-Bis non-A'.
This rule, which was given by Lokert,2 is an obvious consequence
of A. 4 togetherwith the version of contrapositionwhich ran: "'All B
is A and thereare non-As' implies 'All non-A is non-B'. "
B. 3 'Only A is B' implies 'All non-A is non-B'.
Major gave thisrule,3 which is merelyan intermediatestep in the proof
of B. 2, provided that one accepts the version of contrapositionwhich
omitsexistencerequirements.*
C. i 'Not only A is B' implies 'Some B is not A' and 'Some B is not
A' implies 'Not onlyA is B'.
This rule appeared in three authors, and it was explained that it
followed from A. 4 and the principle that if A and B are equivalent,
thentheircontradictoriesare equivalent.*
D. i 'Only A is not B' implies 'Not (only A is B)'.
Clichtoveus gave a detailed proof for this example of subalternation.6
D. 2 'Only A is not B and there are As' implies 'Only B is not A'
and 'Only B is not A and there are Bs' implies 'Only A is not B'.
Caubraith offereda detailed proof, which can be set out and justified
as follows
1LeFvre:
Clichtoveus,
34*.
2 Lokert,
ivo-ii.
3Major,
xvo.
4 Fordetails
ofexistence
seemypaper"Existential
inLateMedieval
requirements,
Assumptions
inAmerican
Logic",
forthcoming
Quarterly.
Philosophical
5Domingo
deSoto,
xvo.
xc;Lokert
,ivo;
Major,
LeFvre:
Clichtoveus,
34.
7 Lokert,
ii. Caubraith,
lxii:"Quinta
talisexclusiva
secundi
ordinis
in
propositio:
quelibet
potest
149

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

1. Only A is not B and there are As.

2. Only A is not B. i, conjunctionto parts.
3. Some A is not B. 2, exponible to exponent.
4. There are As. 1, conjunctionto parts.
. Some A is not B and there are As. 3, 4, conjunction.
6. Some A is non-B. , contrapositionwith existence requirement.
7. Some non-B is A. 6, simple conversion.
8. Everynon-A is B. 2, exponible to exponent.
9. There are non-Bs. 7, from Ms' used predicativelyto 'is' used
existentially.
10. Everynon-A is B and there are non-Bs. 8, 9 conjunction.
11. Everynon-B is A. 10, contraposition(with substitutionof A for
non-non-A).
12. Some non-A is B. 8, subalternation.
13. Some B is non-A. 12, simple conversion.
14. Some B is not A. 13, contraposition.
i. Some B is not A and everynon-B is A. 11, 14 conjunction.
16. Only B is not A. i, exponentsto exponible.
17. There are Bs. 13, from 'is' used predicatively to 'is* used
existentially.
18. Only B is not A and there are Bs. 16, 17 conjunction.
One can now establish 'Only A is not B and there are As if and only if
'
onlyB is not A and thereare Bs.
Two authorsgave D. 2 withoutthe existence requirement.1Presumably
theyhad not placed an existencerequirementon contraposition.
D. 3 'Only A is not B' implies 'Every non-A is B'
This was offeredas a separate rule by Peter of Ailly and Tartaretus,

: quoniam
constantia
subiecti
hec
converti,
eiusdem
ordinis.
unam
exclusivam
patet
propositio
posita
nonestanimal
ethomo
est:ergotantum
animal
homo
nonest
tantum
estformalis.
consequentia
constantia
contra
hanceiiim
similiter
subiecti.
e contra
formaliter
immo
homo,
posita
sequitur
est:
etanimal
animal
nonesthomo
tantum
consequentiam
dariinstantia
de forma
velde
et homoest.nonpotest
homononestanimal
ergotantum
ostendi
namex
ut claret,de primoad ultimum
terminorum:
forma
potest,
acceptionis
cumconstantia
nonesthomo
subiecti.
istaanimai
animai
huius
tantum
sequitur
prima
exponente
exquacumsecunda
illius
exclusive
estanimai,
etexillahecnonhomo
estnonhomo
exponente
conseestanimai
nonhomo
ista.omne
queestsecunda
exponens
percontrapositionem
sequitur
tantum
animai
nonesthomo:
sicarguendo:
inferri
etsimilimodo
ergoomne
prima
quentis.
potest
esthomo,
habebis
nonanimai
hanc.
nonanimai
esthomo:et ultra
quamconvertendo
sequitur
nonestanimai,
etsimiliter
hec:homo
hec.homo
exquaevidenter
homo
estnonanimai,
sequitur
est."
1Peter
ofAilly
xvo.
; Major,
150

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

who did not use 'Every non-A is B' as the second exponent, and by
Major, who did.1
E. i 'Not (only A is not B)' implies 'Not (only B is not A).'
This rule, given by three authors, follows from the version of D. 2
withoutthe existence requirement,togetherwith the rule that contradictories of equivalent propositionsare themselvesequivalent.2 Peter
of Ailly said that he personallydid not know of any counter-examples
to this rule, but he did not wish to exclude the possibilitythat such
could be found.
Finally,there are three rules which do not fitinto any of the groups
given above :
F. i 'Only A is B' implies 'Only C is B', where C is a superior
term to A. 3 For instance, "Only men are laughing things" implies
"Only animalsare laughingthings."To say that C is superiorto A is to
say that 'All A is C'. Since this is equivalent to 'Only C is A', we have
a close analogue of the followingrule :
F. 2 'Only A is B and only C is A' implies 'Only C is B'* This
followsfromA. 4 and Barbara.
F. 3 'Only A is B' implies 'Nothing except A is B.'s
As well as the analysis,opposition and conversionof exclusive propositions, it was usual to discuss supposition, or the type and range
of reference of terms within exclusive propositions. Most sources
pointed out that in both 'Only A is B' and 'All B is A', A had merely
confusedsuppositionand B had distributivesupposition. To say that a
term has merely confused supposition is to say that the proposition
in which it appears can be replaced by a propositionwhose subject or
predicate is a disjunctionof singularterms, and to say that a term has
distributivesuppositionis to say thatthe propositionin which it appears
can be replaced by a conjunctionof propositionswith singularsubjects
or predicates.6Thus, 'Only A is B' is equivalent to <AI or A2 or ...
or An is Bj and Al or A2 or ... or An is B2 and . . . and Aj or A2 or ...
1Major,
inhisdiscussion
vii,didraisesomeobjections
xv0;Tartaretus,
joyo.However,
Major,
seebelow.
arenotchimeras":
non-chimeras
of"Only
2 Major,
ofAilly.
7ovo;Peter
xVo;Tartaretus,
3Ockham,
deLapide;Lib.Soph.
Cant.
190;Johannes
4 Major,
viii.
s Johannes
under
Forfurther
discussion
andvariants,
seebelow,
rulesforexceptive
de Lapide.
propositions.
6 Forfurther
intheSixteenth
andSeventeenth
: "TheDoctrine
ofSupposition
seemypaper
details,
derPhilosophie
benoted
that
someArchiv
Centuries",
i (1969)260-2 Itshould
frGeschichte
had
A term
de Lapide,
ofacceptio
rather
than
suchas Johannes
times
suppositio.
spoke
logicians,
iii

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

c
or An is Bn.' Similarly, All B is A' is equivalent to "Bj is A, or A2
or . , . or An and B2 is Aj or A2 or ... or An and . . . and Bn is
or A2 or ... or An." Since the 'is* is the Ms' of identity,it is clear
why the equivalence of 'Only A is B' and 'All B is A' could be proved
by appeal to the suppositionof the terms. Celaya and Lax both claimed
that the terms in 'only A is not B' had the same kind of supposition
as in 'Only A is B' but thattheywere immobile. That is, no replacement
by a proposition or propositions containingsingular terms could be
carried out. It was also remarkedthatin 'Only everyA is B' B was still
'
governedby tantum,1but A was governed solely by omnis.2Thus, they
both had distributivesupposition. Otherwise, littleof interestwas said
about the more standardcases.
Finally, Peter of Ailly and John Major (who presumably copied
Peter of Ailly) added some remarksabout the conditionsunder which
exclusive propositionsof the form 'Only A is not B* were said to be
true or false.3 It was firstof all required thatthe disjunctionof A and B
should be exhaustiveof all beings. Thus, "Only substancesare not accidents" is true because everythingis either a substanceor an accident,
but "Only men are not donkeys" is falsebecause there are thingswhich
are neithermen nor donkeys. However, this conditionis not sufficient,
for although "Only non-chimerasare not chimeras" has terms whose
disjunctionexhauststhe universe, it is false, because the second exponent, "All non-non-chimerasare chimeras" is false. Hence it was also
required that the predicate terms should suppose, that is, that there
should be at least one thingof which it is true to say 'This is B' Major
pointed out that, given these two conditions, it followed that "Only
chimeras are not non-chimeras"is true, and hence not equivalent to
"Only non-chimerasare not chimeras" (see the discussion of D. 2
cateabove). The reason is to be found in the rule that all affirmative
modern
the
are
To
terms
false.
with
non-referring
gorical propositions
"All
non-non-chimerasare chimeras"and "All
the
two
exponents
eye,
non-chimerasare non-chimeras"look equally like logical truths, but
most medieval logicians would regard the firstas false and the second
as true. A corollary followed from the second condition. Although
ornot.
whether
itreferred
have
could
buta term
ifitdidinfact
refer,
acceptance
only
supposition
asifithasdistributive
canbeaccepted
in"Every
chimera
..." 'chimera'
Forinstance,
supposition,
refer.
haveifitdidinfact
itwould
isthekindofsupposition
that
because
1Peter
ofAilly.
2 Domingo
deSoto,xci.
3 Major,
vii.Cf.Lax.

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

it was in general held that any negative categorical proposition which

term was true, this rule could no longer be
contained a non-referring
applied to exclusivepropositions."Only a non-chimerais not a chimera"
is negative,it has a non-referring
term, and it is false. Similarlyit must
exclusive propositionwhich contains
also be possible for an affirmative
term to be true. As was mentionedearlier, some logia non-referring
cians used these exceptions to case doubt on the claim that exponible
propositionscould properlybe called categorical.
SectionThree:Exceptive
Propositions.
,
Exceptive propositionswere those which exhibitedsuch termsas preter
as
but
was
taken
the
standard
and
case
for
preter
preterquam nisi,
purposes
of analysis and discussion. It was recognized that it could appear in
contextsother than those of exceptive propositions,but little attention
was devoted to these. The main topic of preliminarydiscussion was
the conditions needed for a proper [propria
] exclusive proposition,
and two such conditionswere laid down for affirmative
propositions.1
In the firstplace, the subject term had to be preceded by a universal
sign. "Everyman except Socrates is running"is well-formedbut "Some
man except Socrates" is runningis not. In the second place, the term
following the exceptive sign (the pars extracapta) had to apply to a
class of things (or to an individual)which was included in but not coextensive with the class of things referred to by the subject term.
This second conditionhad two consequences. First, "Everyman except
laughingthings..." and "Everysun except this sun..." were improper
because the pars extracapta was equal in extension to the subject class.
Second, "Every man except wood ..." was improper because 'wood'
cannot be subsumed under man'. On the other hand, "Every animal
except white things..." is proper because it is possible for all white
thingsto be animals, even if they do not now forma recognized subclass ofanimals.
One mightwonder what kind of improprietywas thoughtto be involved in an exceptive proposition which violated the above rules.
Domingo de Soto spoke of conditions necessary for congruity,and
suggestedthat to go againstthese conditionswas to go againstthe rules
of grammar,at least so faras the latins were concerned. However, the
1PaulofVenice,
2iVo
ofInghen2
ofSaxony
ofAilly
; Marsilius
; Peter
38; Albert
; Mainz
; Tartaretus,
ofSt.Mark;Celaya;
de Soto,xcv;Major,
xiii-xiiivo.
71-71*;
Domingo
Hieronymus
13

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

commentatoron Marsilius of Inghensaid thatan inept exclusive proposition was not so-called because it was incongrua(i.e. ungrammatical)
but because it was not suitableforlogical purposes. Celaya observedthat
grammaticalrules could not be used to rule out propositions of the
. Ifanyonewished to argue
type in question as being ineptasaut incongruas
that "Everyman except wooden thingsis white" or "Everyman except
Brunellusruns" (where 'Brunellus' is a donkey's name) were grammatically acceptable, he could defendhis position well, and therewould be
no untowardconsequences. It is of course the case thatthe sentencesin
question are false, but this result is easily conceded, and cannot be
called inconveniens
, he added. Celaya's point is borne out by the fact
thatlogiciansset up theirrules of expositionin such a way thatimproper
exceptive propositionsturn out to be false upon analysis. "Every man
except wooden thingsis white" has the clearly false exponent, "Every
wooden thing is a man"; and, although this case was not mentioned,
any exclusive which begins "Every man except laughing things..."
will have an exponentwhich is falsebecause the subject, 'man which is a
non-laughingthing', fails to refer to anything. Logicians obviously
realized thatan exceptive propositionrestedon certainpresuppositions.
If these presuppositionswere false, it was not usual to employthe exceptive proposition in discourse, but if it were so employed then it
could be assigneda truth-valuewithoutanydifficulty.
Once the criteria for a well-formedexclusive proposition had been
met, it was usual to specifythe standardsubdivisionsofsuch a proposition
in terms of the number and position of negative signs. Some authors
listedjust thefourfollowingtypesi1
1. EveryA except B is C.
2. Not (every A except B is C).
3. EveryA except B is not C.
4. Not (every A except B is not C).
Since it is also possible to put a negation sign immediatelybefore the
exceptive sign, some authors added the four followingtypes, making
eight in all.2
. EveryA not except B is C.
6. Not (every A not except B is C).
7. EveryA not except B is not C.
8. Not (every A not except B is not C).
1E.g.Marsilius
deSoto,
xcvvo.
ofInghen1
xiii;Domingo
; Celaya;
Major,
2 E.g.Marsilius
LeFvre:
deLapide;
ofBrussels,
ofInghen2;
io6vo;
Clichtoveus,
George
Johannes
ofSt.Mark;
Tartaretus,
Caubraith,
xlvV0-xlvi;
71.
Mainz;
32v;Hieronymus
14

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

The obvious objection to the second set of propositionsis that theyare

not properlyexceptive, for to say "Everyman not exceptingSocrates is
is running,ratherthanto exclude
running"is to emphasizethateverybody
or
a
individual
sub-class
from
any
group of runners.This point was not
made, however. Instead, it was argued that the second set introduced
needlesscomplication,1and thatit was redundant,because each member
of the second set could be paired with a memberof the firstset.2 That
is, can be paired with 2, 6 with 1, 7 with 4 and 8 with 3 because the
only differencebetween theirexponentsis thatwhere the firstexponent
of one memberof each pair is universal,the firstexponentof the other
memberis particular,and vice versa.
The exposition of exclusive propositionsinvolved two controversial
points: the number of exponents, and the way in which the firstexponent should be phrased. Some logicians,particularlyfromthe earliest
period, gave only two exponents,and leftout the one which related A
and B.3 However, it was felt that the mutual inferencebetween an
exclusive propositionand its exponents was only formallyvalid if the
semantic condition that B should be included in A was made explicit*
and most logiciansincluded 'All B is A', or the relevantvariation,without comment. The second point concerned the use of aliud ab. Some
4
logicianswrote EveryA other than B is C as theirfirstexponent^ but
otherlogiciansfeltthatone could thenhave a true exponible with a false
exponent. The problem arose fromthe claim that some things,such as
phoenixes and emperors,exist only serially,whereas alius is a relation
which holds only between two concurrentlyexisting things.6Thus,
"Everyemperor except this was in Rome" is true, but "Everyemperor
other than this was in Rome" is false,because there is now no thingof
which it is true to say "This is an emperor other than this (second)
emperor", and hence we have an affirmative
proposition with a non1Celaya;
xiii.
Major,
2Major,
deSoto,xcvv0.
xiii;Domingo
3Ockham,
ofInghen1
ofSaxony,
2ivo;Marsilius
; Blanchellus,
84;Mainz
192;Albert
[text];
Silvester
dePriera;
Oxon
ofAilly;
Lib.Soph.
PaulofPrgula,
. ; Lib.Soph.
Cant.
; Peter
* Mainz;
commentators
citedthecaseof Every
86.TheMainz
manexcept
stone
is
Blanchellus,
thetwoexponents
eventhough
manwhoisnota stone
isfalse
isrational"
rational"
which
"Every
didnotattempt
aretrue.They
toruletheexample
and"Nostone
isrational"
outonthegrounds
deviant.
itwassemantically
that
5 "Omne
estirrationale":
deLapide.
aliudabhomine
Cf.Ockham,
animal
192;Peter
Johannes
dePriera;
Silvester
Albert
ofSaxony,
2iv0;Marsilius
ofAilly;
ofInghen1
ofMantua;
Peter
Mainz;
;
: Clichtoveus,
LeFvre
3iv0.
6 SeeMarsilius
xiiivo
deSoto,
ofInghen2
xcvv0
; Domingo
; Major,
; Lax.
I SS

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

subject. The most usual version of the firstexponent was

referring

A
which
is non-Bis C. 'l
Every
The eight possible subdivisionsof the standardexclusive proposition
were expounded as follows:
1. Every A except B is C = Every A which is non-B is C and every
B is A and no B is C.
2. Not (every A except B is C) = Some A which is non-B is not C
or some B is not A or some B is C.
3. EveryA except B is not C = No A which is non-B is C and every
B is A and everyB is C.
4. Not (every A except B is not C) = Some A which is non-B is C or
some B is not A or some B is not C.
. EveryA not except B is C = No A which is non-B is C or some B
is not A or some B is C.
6. Not (every A not except B is C) = Some A which is non-B is C
and everyB is A and no B is C.
7. EveryA not except B is not C = EveryA which is non-B is C or
some B is not A or some B is not C.
8. Not (every A not except B is not C) = Some A which is non-B
is not C and everyB is A and everyB is C.
Suitable variantswere given for the cases in which B is a singularterm.
The two followingtables of opposition were given.2I include George
of Brussels' mnemonic names, which indicate the quantityand quality
of the exponents:
contraries
LAVATE
PECCATA
A
B
is
A
C
Every except B is not C
Every except
0/)t &'
subalternates

subcontraries

Not (everyA except B is not C)

YDOLO

subaiternates
Not (everyA exceptB is C)
COMMOTI

1 "Omne
de Soto,xcvvo.
animal
Cf.PaulofVenice,
nonhomoestirrationale":
38;
Domingo
Oxon
xxi-xxivo;
Lax;George
; Lokert,
Blanchellus,
gg;Lib.Soph.
84;PaulofPrgula,
Celaya;
estirrationale".
animal
Cf.Tartaretus,
ofBrussels,
71*;
ioivo,had"Omne
quidnonesthomo
ciiivo.
Eckius,
2 George
the
describes
01Brussels,
xlvvo-xivi,
107.Ct.Tartaretus,
71 , andMainz.Caubraith,
andTrutvetter,
seeHieronymus
ofSt.Mark
Summule.
Forthefirst
twofigures.
Domingo
figure
only,
therelationships
xcvi-xcviV0.
deSotodescribes
Cf.Celaya.
involved,
i 6

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

DERONIS
_
A
Every not except B is C
subalternates

, .
contraries
Cq

ADOMON
_
A
not
Eyery
except B is not C

C
,
. A/eo
subcontraries

Not (every A not except B is not C)

ROGATA

subalternates

Not (every A not except B is C)

VITATE

A number of rules concerning exceptive propositions were given.

Virtuallyevery text listed the three followingrules:
A. i An exceptive proposition both implies and is implied by its
exponents.
A. 2 Any exceptive proposition which implies a conjunction of
exponentsimpliesjust one exponent.
A. 3 Any exceptive proposition which implies a disjunction of exponentsis impliedbyjust one exponent.
The followingrule was also a commonone :
B. i 'Every A except B is C9 implies both 'Some A is C9 and 'Some
A is not CV
OccasionallyB. i was paired with:
B. 2 'No A except B is C implies 'Some A is C'2
Some attentionwas paid to so-called rules of conversion,of which the
followingis the mostcommon:
C. i 'No A except B is C' implies 'No C which is not B is A's
Otherwise the rules which were given related exceptive propositions
to exclusive propositions:
D. i 'Only A is B' implies 'Nothing except A is B'*
D. 2 'Nothing except A is B' implies 'Only A is B'.V
Celaya said that these rules were not formallyvalid because 'nothing*
[omneens ... non . . .] could be replaced by 'no white thing'[omnealbum
... non ...]. That is, he rightly(in the context of medieval logic)
1Albert
ofSaxony,
ofBrussels,
deLapide;
2ivo;George
107*;Johannes
Lokert,
xxivo;
Major,
deSoto,
xcvii.
xiiiv;
Domingo
2Albert
2ivo; Major,
ofSaxony,
xiiii.
3 Peter
ofAilly;Tartaretus,
andDomingo
de Soto,xcvii,
xvvo.SeealsoCelaya
for
72; Major,
discussion
ofconversion.
Albert
21vo; PaulofVenice,
ofSaxony,
xxiT.
84*;Lib.Soph.
Cant.;Lokert,
40; Blanchellus,
5Blanchellus,
Lokert
xxivo.
Cant.;
84;Lib.Soph.
1S7

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

regardsensas a termwhich is replaceable by any other termratherthan

as a variable which rangesover a domain of objects.
D. 3 'Only A is not B and there are As' implies 'Everything[omne
ens]except A is B' .*
Paul of Venice argued that the second premise was necessaryin order
to block the inference"Only a chimera does not exist" implies "Everythingexcept a chimera exists", where the antecedent is true but the
consequent is false, because it implies that a chimera is something
[aliquid]. He added the same extra premise to D. i.
D.4 'Every A except B is C implies 'Not (only C is A)'2. This rule
clearly follows from the equivalence of 'Only C is A' and 'Every A
is C togetherwith B. i , whereby'Every A except B is C implies 'Some
of 'All A is C'
A is not C' the contradictory
So faras the suppositionof termsin affirmative
exceptivepropositions
is concerned, the texts exhibit no clear agreement. Usually the subject
termwas said to be governedby the precedingsignsin the normalway,3
but the predicate termwas sometimessaid to have merelyconfusedsup^
s
position, sometimes distributive, and sometimes mixed,6 where to
mixed
a
term
has
that
say
suppositionis to say that no one kind can be
this
because the predicate term has a different
to
in
case
assigned it,
type of suppositionin one exponent than it has when it occurs in another exponent. The pars extracapta was sometimessaid to have simple
7
supposition, on the grounds that it stood for a universalnature, and
sometimesto have a distributivesupposition.8No descent was possible
from either predicate term or pars extra capta, but some logicians
thought that one could descend from the subject term, so long as
'except' was replaced by 'other than*or 'which is not'.9 For instance,
Albert of Saxony rewrote "Every man except Socrates is running"as
"This man runs if he is other than Socrates and Socrates does not run
and this man runs if he is other than Socrates and Socrates does not run
1PaulofVenice,
vo.
40-40
2Major,
andexclusive
rulesrelating
ofother
lxiii.Fora number
xiiiv0;
Caubraith,
exceptive
seeCaubraith
lxiii-lxiiiv0.
propositions,
3George
deLapide;Le Fvre:Clichtoveus,
ofBrussels,
32; Domingo
107;
Johannes
Celaya;
de Soto, xcvi.
deLapide;
1 Peter
ofAilly;Johannes
Ockham,
192.
s Celaya.
6 Domingo
deSoto,xcvi.Cf.LeFvre:
Clichtoveus,
32.
7 Giogo
lxiii;Harderwickensis.
viensis,
8 Celaya;
ofAilly;LeFvre:
Tartaretus,
Clichtoveus,
72; Peter
32.
9 Albert
21vo; Johannes
deLapide;
Peter
ofAilly;
ofSaxony,
72; PaulofVenice,
Tartaretus,
39;
deSoto,
xcvi.
Domingo
ii

189.235.178.250

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and so for all the singulars." One could easily formalize this descent
as follows:l
Cx v C2 v ... v Cn) d
EveryA except b is C = [(Ax^ b .
=
v
B
...
.
b
/
Ci C2
C, v C2 v ... v Cn) o
(A,
Cn)]. [(A2?t
v
v
.
.
b
.
.
C, v C2 v . . . v Cn) 3
(A2= C, C2
Cn)
[(An^
v
v
v
Cn)]
(An= C, C2 ...
Much the same procedure could be followed if B were a commonterm,
thoughthe rewritingwould be more complicated. The firstof the above
conjunctswould now be :
vB2 v . . . v Bn. Bj ^ Cj v C2 v . . . Cn
[(Ax
. B2^ Cj v C2 v ... v Cn
Bq^Cj v C2 v ... v Cn) d
=
v
v
v
...
Cj
C2
Cn)]
(Aj
SectionFour: Reduplicative
Propositions.
Reduplicative propositions were marked by the presence of such
words as inquantum
, prout,and quatenus(the favouriteexample of late
sixteenthand seventeenthcenturyauthors); but of course a proposition
could contain these words withoutbeing a reduplicativepropositionin
the strict sense. Inquantum(the usual example in all earlier authors)
could appear in just the subject or the predicate; it could be used adverbially,as in "Socrates studies, inasmuchas he is able"; and it could
be used specificatively.Examples of the latter use are "'Man* signifies
Peter inasmuchas he is a man", "Conrad hates his brother inasmuch
as he is a malefactor"and "Being inasmuchas it is being is the subject
" In all these cases
of metaphysics.
is used to specifythe reason
inquantum
the
to
the
subject, but in a properlyreduwhereby
predicate belongs
plicative proposition, inquantumis used to convey the cause whereby
the predicate belongs to the subject.2 Even here, distinctionscan be
made, for a reduplicativepropositioncan be taken either conditionally
or causally. "Everyman inasmuchas he is rationalis a laughingthing"
when taken conditionallyhas as one of its exponents the conditional
proposition, "Ifsomethingis rational,it is a laughingthing",but when
taken causally it has as one of its exponents the causal proposition
"Because something is rational, it is a laughing thing." Presumably
1Although
I haveused I donotwishtocommit
heretoanyparticular
myself
interpretation
of4if- then'.
2Fordiscussion
ofSt.Mark,
ofthese
distinctions
seeespecially
deSoto,
Domingo
Hieronymus
SeealsoPaulofVenice,
ofAilly;
Marsilius
ofInghen2;
ofBrussels,
xcviiivo-xcix.
41; Peter
George
io7vo;
Celaya.
IS9

189.235.178.250

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context and semantic considerationswould guide the logician in deciding whether to adopt a causal or a conditional analysis. No formal
considerationswere offered,and it is difficultto suppose thatany could
plausiblyhave been offered.
As was usual with exponibles, reduplicative propositions were
classifiedin terms of the position of the negative sign or signs. The
majoritygave a list of eight types,but a few omitted the four cases in
which inquantumitselfwas negated.1 Major referredthe reader to his
argumentsabout exclusive propositions2where he had pointed out that
each member of the firstgroup could be paired with a member of the
second group whose exponents differedonly with respect to quantity.
In the case of reduplicativesthe pairs are i and 6, 2 and
3 and 8,
of
one
member
each
and 4 and 7. Where the firsttwo exponentsof
pair
are universalthe firsttwo exponentsof the othermemberare particular,
and vice versa. The listof eighttypesis as follows:
1. EveryA inasmuchas it is B is C.
2. Not (every A inasmuchas it is B is C).
3. EveryA inasmuchas it is B is not C.
4. Not (every A inasmuchas it is B is not C).
. EveryA not inasmuchas it is B is C.
6. Not (every A not inasmuchas it is B is C).
7. EveryA not inasmuchas it is B is not C.
8. Not (every A not inasmuchas it is B is not C).
The reader who is temptedto add a fourthnegationsign, in frontof B,
should be reminded that the Latin has no verb after inquantum
, and
BestC.
reads: OmneA inquantum
The eightkindsof reduplicativepropositionwere normallyexpounded
like this:
1. EveryA inasmuchas it is B is C = EveryA is C and everyA is B
and everyB is C and ifsomethingis B, it is C.3
2. Not (everyA inasmuchas it is B is C) = Some A is not C or some A
is not B or some B is not C or not (if somethingis B, it is C).
3. Every A inasmuchas it is B is not C = No A is C and every A is
B and no B is C and ifsomethingis B, it is not C.
4. Not (everyA inasmuchas it is B is not C) = Some A is C or some
A is not B or some B is C or not (if somethingis A, it is not B).
1Marsilius
deSoto,xcviiiV0-xcix
ofInghen1;
; Lokert
xxvvo;
Domingo
Celaya.
2 Major,
xiii,xvvo.
3I shall
isB,itis C".
"Because
omit
thestandard
variant
something
160

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

Every A not inasmuchas it is B is C = No A is C or no A is B

or some B is not C or not (if somethingis B it is C).
6 Not (every A not inasmuchas it is B is C) = Some A is C and
some A is B and everyB is C and ifsomethingis B, it is C.
7. Every A not inasmuchas it is B is not C = Every A is C or no
A is B or some B is C or not (if somethingis B it is not C).
8. Not (every A not inasmuchas it is B is not C) = Some A is not C
and some A is B and no B is C and if somethingis B it is not C.
A few logicians questioned the way in which the last exponent was
expressed. The normal wording was "If somethingis A, that thing is
B" [si aliquid est A, illud est B] ; but it occasionallyargued that the formalityof the inferencewas therebydestroyed.1One could take a false
exponible such as "Every man inasmuch as he is rational is white"
and, given that in factall men are white, produce four true exponents
by rewriting"Ifsomethingis rational,it is white" as "Ifa brayingthing
is rational, it is white". To avoid this they adopted the formulation
"If a rational thingis rational, a rational thingis white [si rationaleest
rationale
, rationaleestalbus]2. It should be noted that the antecedentof
this conditionalwas not thoughtto be analyticallytrue, but to be true
only if at least one rational thingexisted. Domingo de Soto criticized
thisformulationon two grounds.3 In the firstplace, it failsto capturethe
generalityof the originalproposition,which implies that the predicate
belongsto anythingwhatsoeverthatthe reduplicativetermbelongsto. In
the second place, theargumentdependson the beliefthatanyconditional
with an impossibleantecedentis automaticallytrue.* If one believes, he
argued, thata conditional is true only if there is a special link between
antecedent and consequent, then the formalityof the inferencewill
be retained. One can illustratethis point by arguingthat "If a braying
thingis rational,it is white" is false, like its exponible, while the true
exponible "Every man inasmuch as he is rational is a laughingthing"
has the absurd but true exponent "If a brayingthingis rational, it is a
"
laughingthing. For Domingo de Soto, no truthvalues would be altered
if Something' was replaced by Graying thing'. To modern eyes, the
problem arises from the interpretationof propositionsin terms of the
membersof specifiedclasses ratherthan a domain of individualswhich
1Celava.
Cf.Lax.
2 Celava;
Marsilius
ofInghen2.
Lax;Lokert,
xxvvo;
3 Domingo
deSoto,xcix.
* Thisbelief
inthelateFifteenth
and
Seemypaper,
"TheTheory
ofConsequence
wascommon.
inNotre
Dame
Sixteenth
Centuries",
forthcoming
Logic.
Journal
ofFormal
Early
li

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

mayor maynot belong to these classes, and fromthe relateduse of term

letters ratherthan predicate letters and variables. For us, "Something
is rational" would be formalizednot as 'Some A is B' but as <(Dx)Fx>
and, giventhe latterformulation,the possibilityof replacing'something'
with 'brayingthing'cannotarise.
The way in which the last exponentwas formulatedhad some bearing
on the debate as to how manyexponentswere necessary.A numberof
authors felt that the third exponent could be dispensed with, since it
followed fromthe second exponent and the fourthexponent as usually
formulated.1It was argued that 'Every A is B' implied 'There are Bs',
is true only if both termsrefer,and 'There
since a universalaffirmative
is
are Bs' and 'If something B, it is C in turn implied 'Every B is C'2
Celaya and Lokert, who adopted the alternativeformulationof the
fourthexponent, both claimed that there were some exponibles whose
falsitywas only captured by the third exponent, but all the examples
they cited had modal terms, and it is not altogether clear how they
3
expected themto be construed. Domingo de Soto said in his comments
that the problem arose from the claim that a conditional with an impossible antecedent was true, and this is born out by an example
given by the commentatoron Marsilius of Inghen, who said that "If
chimera is a chimera it is a laughing thing" is true. However, the
commentatordid not himselfsee this as causing a problem for he explicitly accepted the legitimacyof exposition by means of the second
and fourthexponentsalone.
It was agreed thatthe fourthexponentwas itselfindispensable*,since
one could have a false exponible such as "Everyman inasmuchas he is
rational is white" whose firstthree exponents would be true on the
assumptionthat all men were in fact white. The second exponent was
also indispensable,since one could have a falseexponible such as "Every
man inasmuchas he is white is coloured" all of whose exponentsexcept
the second were true. However, the firstexponent could be dispensed
with. In propositionsof type i, it follows from the second and third
, in 6 by Darii and in 8 by
exponentsby Barbara, in type 3 by Celarent
and
Ferio. The remainingtypes, 2,4, ,
7, are just the contradictories
of i, 3, 6 and 8 so thatno separateproofis needed forthese. Those who
1Thethird
86vo.
wasomitted
60; Blanchellus,
by,e.g.,PaulofPrgula,
2 Domingo
deSoto,xcixvo.
deSoto,xcixvo.
3Lokert,
Seecomments
xxvi-xxvivo.
byDomingo
whoalsowent
Thefollowing
deSoto,xcixvo.
Cf.Celaya,
trom
aredrawn
Domingo
examples
various
the
through
possibilities.
162

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

agreed thatthe thirdexponentwas implied by the second and the fourth,

and thatthe firstfollowed fromthe second and third,claimed thatonly
two exponentswere necessaryforthe expositionof reduplicativepropositions.1 However, it was often thought advisable to give four exponentsforthesake ofclarity.2
Tables of opposition were drawn up by several authors. I shall illustratefirstthe two given by George of Brussels3and then the two
describedby the commentatorsof Mainz*togetherwith theirmnemonic
names. Correctionsto these names are to be found in square brackets.
Strictlyspeakingthe last exponent cannot be labelled as A, E, I or O ,
since it is a hypotheticalproposition,but Johannesde Lapide explained
thata conditionalcontainingno negationsignwas called 'I', a conditional
with a negated consequent was called 'O', a negated conditional was
called 'E* and a negated conditional with a negated consequent was
called 'A' Bythe side of each proposition1 have put a numberindicating
whichof the eighttypesit exemplifies.
ADAMASCl
ERETRAHENDO
contraries
*s not ^ 3*
i. Everya inq. B is C
velT ^ ln?*
Cq
^o^
subalternates

cX
Vsubcontraries

subalternates
Not (every A inq. B is C) 2.
PROHONORE

4. Not (every A inq. B is not C)

SYMONIAM
PENTHECOSTE
. EveryA not inq. B is C
subalternates
8. Not (every A not
inq. B is not C)
ROMIPETA (O)

contraries ^
0/?

ARQUERIO(A)
EveryA not inq. B is not C 7.

c^
^0/7' ^
subcontraries

subalternates
^0t (ever7 ^ notinq. B
is C) 6.
VICIARI

1PaulofVenice,
ofMantua.
41,andPeter
2 E.g.Domingo
Harderwickensis.
de Soto,xcixvo;
3 George
Summule.
Tartaretus
Cf.Tartaretus,
ofBrussels,
108-108*0.
Trutvetter,
73-73*;
repeats
setofmnemonic
hasa correct
butTrutvetter
names.
ofBrussels'
mistakes,
George
4 Hieronymus
alleight
inwhich
most
butnotall
ofSt.Mark
relating
propositions
gavea figure
aremadeexplicit.
ofthese
relationships
163

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

ADAMASTI
i. Every A inq. B is C
subalternates

contraries
c<v * ^
.
>c

PENTHECOSTEN
Every A not inq. B is C
subalternates

subcontraries
6. Not (every A not inq. B is C)
Not (every A inq. B is C) 2.
VICIATI
COMOROSI (E)
ALLELIA
7. EveryA not inq. B is not C
contraries
h1
subalternates

CC%"

>

RETRAHENDO
EveryA inq. B is not C 3.
subalternates

co*
subcontraries ^
Not (everyA not inq. B is not C) 8.
4. Not (everyA inq. B is not C)
SYMONIA
SOSIMEO
Not very many rules concerning reduplicative propositions were
given. We findthe usual set which applied to all exponibles:
A. i A reduplicativeproposition both implies and is implied by its

exponents.
A. 2 Any reduplicativeproposition which implies a conjunction of
exponentsimpliesjust one exponent.
A. 3 Any reduplicative proposition which implies a disjunction of
exponentsis impliedbyjust one exponent.
One rule of conversionmaybe mentioned:
B. i 4Every A inasmuch as it is B is C' implies 'Something which
inasmuchas it is B is C is A' .*
Equally little attentionwas devoted to supposition. The subject and
predicate terms were sometimes said to have the sort of supposition
4
B' were deleted^; but no agreementwas
they would have if inquantum
reached about the reduplicativeterm itself. Some said that when not
negated it had distributivesupposition,^ others that it had mixed supposition.5
1Tartaretus,
ofSt.Mark.
7ovo;Hieronymus
2 ButseeCaubraith,
lxiiivo
andJohannes
deLapide.
3 George
ofBrussels,
ofAilly;
deLapide.
109;Peter
Johannes
4 George
ofBrussels,
ofAilly;Celaya;
deLapide.
109;Peter
Johannes
s Domingo
deSoto,xcixvo;
LeFvre:
Clichtoveus,
32.
164

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00:06:00 AM

SectionFive: The LaterHistory

of Exponibles.
I have discovered seventeen authors in the later sixteenthand seventeenth centuries who introduced the doctrine of exponibles in the
courseofwritinga general logical textbook. Only exclusives, exceptives
and reduplicativeswere examined in any detail, though other kinds
of exponible sometimes received a mention,1 and no-one discussed
the problem cases which arise when propositions exhibit exponible
terms. Exclusive propositions received the standard treatment; exceptive propositionswere usually expounded by means just of the first
and thirdexponents; and reduplicativepropositionswere said to be best
expounded by means of only one exponent, a causal proposition.2Most
authorsgave the standardrules relatingexponible propositionsto their
exponents. The best general account was given by Petrus Fonseca
(d. i 99), who even illustratedtables of opposition;3 but no-one comes
out well froma close comparison with earlier sources. The only surprise is provided by Andreas Kesler, a German who published De
ConsequentiaTractatuslogicus in 1623. He discussed both exponible
propositionsand syllogismscontainingexponible propositions at considerable length.4 However, the surprise is occasioned more by the
fact thata man who was not a Spanishscholasticwas investigatingthese
matters,thanby the qualityofwhathe said.
To conclude, one can say that the historyof exponible propositions
mirrorsthe historyof medieval logical doctrinesin general. At the end
of the fifteenthand beginningof the sixteenthcenturies there was a
sudden surge of activity,duringwhich such topics as exponibilia
, insolubilia and suppositiones
were analyzed,clarifiedand elaborated in works
which are highlyrespectablefromthe logician's point of view, even if
theycontain little that is original. This period of activitywas followed
by a period of decline, in which medievaldoctrinescontinuedto receive
some attention,especially in Spain, but they are clearly subordinated
to the main businessof expoundingAristotelianlogic. By the end of the
seventeenthcenturythey cease even to be mentioned.
oj Waterloo
University
U.S.A.
1E.g.Javellus,
212vo
i72vo-i78vo.
; Toletus,
27;Villalpandeus,
2 E.g.Fonseca,
72; Oa,121;Toletus,
26vo;
171;
Sanderson,
113.
Villalpandeus,
3 Fonseca,
2vo-2
67-72.Cf.Toletus,
7; Ormazius,
i-^3;Villalpandeus,
16^-178*.
4 Kesler,
68-86,121-130.
I6

189.235.178.250

00:06:00 AM

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167

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Reviews

"La
de SaturneOuvrage
JEHAN
THENAUD,
(B. N. Ms.fr. 1358),suivi
Ligne
anonyme
" ou "LeTrait
9
de "La Ligne
de Saturne
de Science
potique(B.N. Ms.Jr. 2081).
Textesditset prsents
avecnoteset commentaires
parg. mallarymasters,
et Renaissance
d'Humanisme
Genve,Droz, 1973, !74 PP- (Travaux
, CXXX).
La figure
de JeanThenaudconnat,
Les
depuisquelquesannes,un regaind'intrt.
deMmeMarieHolban,deM. Joseph
travaux
rcents
et
Masters
de
M.
G.
Mallary
Engels
ontmontr
de Thenaud
vasteet que cet
taitrelativement
littraire
que la production
auteur
traducteur
historien,
historien,
cabaliste,
gnalogiste,
mythographe,
astrologue,
etvoyageur,
reflte
souhait
certaines
du
tiers
du
XVIe
sicle.
proccupationspremier
d'outremer
et quelquesextraits
d'autresoeuvres,
toutecetteproOr, partle Voyage
ductiontaitdemeure
Il fautsavoirgr M. Masters
d'avoirpublile
manuscrite.
Trait
descience
potique.
L'introduction
etVoeuvre
consacre
Thomme
donneunesorted'tat
queM. Masters
de nosconnaissances
surThenaud,
etmontre
enmmetemps
encore
prsent
qu'ilserait
de vouloirporterun jugement
prmatur
globalsurcet auteur,parceque tropde
textes
attendent
encore tretudis
fond.On regrette
d'autant
plusqueM. Masters
n'utilise
cetteoeuvre
oellefournit
desrepres
bio-bibliographiques,
quedansla mesure
etnesaisisse
oeuvres
la forme
etle contenu
desdiffrents
pasl'occasion
pourprsenter
de Thenaud,
est
semble
si
bien
du
Trait
de
connatre.
L'dition
science
qu'il
potique
de Saturne
Franois
, dontl'auteurest probablement
prcdeparcelle de La Ligne
du Moulinde Rochefort
(maisdontle nomn'apparat
passurla pagede titrede la
Si
la
de l'intrt
vers
publication). Lignet
compose 1510/11,
que portait
tmoigne
etcultule futurFranois
Ier la Saturnalia
tellus
et possdeunesignification
politique
rellebiendfinie,
le Trait
, critentre1513 et 1515 (Engels)ou entre1515 et ii 9
le
est un rpertoire
(Masters),
plusvaste,puisqu'iladapteen franais
mythologique
Vaticanus
tertius.
Mythographus
Dansces conditions,
on auraitsouhait
unecomparaison
pluspousseet plussystde
entre
le
modle
et
la
version
Thenaud
latin
d'Albric
(quelquesindications,
matique
et
les
M.
seulement,
14
Certes,
notes,
28).
p.
p.
copieuses,
que Mastersajoute son
de s'orienter.
aussi(p. 14) que Thenaud"passe
On nousapprend
dition,
permettent
la mythographie
soussilencele longpassage
surl'immortalit
de l'meque contenait
l'ditionBode pourconstater
d'Albric",maisil fautse reporter
que Thenaud,
du zodiane traduit
d'Albricsurlesdouzesignes
pasle dernier
chapitre
l'astrologue,
des
surles intentions
suffisamment
nousrenseignent
que et que les seulsprologues
diffrents
Albric
les
auteurs.
de l'idoltrie
et montrer
veutcombattre
leserreurs
que
168

189.235.178.250

00:06:07 AM

nomsdes dieuxmythologiques
d'unedoctrine
Thenauden
monothiste;
procdent
revanche
Vestude
se situesurun planpluslittraire
et recommande
poeticque
pourle
de la tradition
enFrance
plaisiret pourl'utilit.Unebrveprsentation
mythologique
et de PierreBersuire,
auraitpu montrer
s'cartede VOvidemoralis
combien
Thenaud
maisausside Jacques

sa
ovidienne
unepotrie
avait
ajout potrie
qui
biblique.
Legrand,
Parsonrefus
estplusprsdu commentaire
auxEchecs
de toutemoralisation,
Thenaud
Il aurait
amoureux.
le commentutilede rappeler
quele ms.BNfr.143,quicontient
taireaux Echecs
amoureux
de
semble
et 1'Ar
chilo
avoirt
ge Sophie JacquesLegrand,
excutpourle comted'Angoulme,
suis
de
Ier.
Franois
Je
persuad
que des
pre
recherches
o JeanThenaud
illustrer
le passagedu prologue
pourront
codicologiques
dit son protecteur
Franois:"s florissans
joursde vostredelicatejeunesse[...]
vousvousoccupez ensercher
lesrepaires
desMuses".
et manoirs
Voiciquelquesnotes,prisesau filde la lecturede la publication
de M. Masters:
, p. 17,au lieude pp.XVI, au lieude Genealtic;
p. i lireGenealitic
p. 9, n. 7 lireinfra
la datedu 3 (ou du 2?)janvier;p. 12: je comprends
mal
XVII;p. 9 : il faudrait
prciser
le rapport
entrele titredesTriumphi
desVertus
de Ptrarque
etlesTriumphes
deThenaud;
- on
l'ordredestraits
sembled'ailleurs
trePrudence,
Force,Justice,
Temprance
aimerait
du moinssavoirpourquoiM. Mastersintervertit
et
Justice Temprance;
se reporter
l'tudede M. Engels(vivarium1972),dont
pourla p. 13,ona intrt
les conclusions
de cellesde M. Masters;
diffrent
parendroit
p. 17,n. 48, nousapdu Voyage
d'abordqu'aucune
dition
n'a putretrouve;
traced'unedeuxime
prenons
la
bas
M.
Masters
conclusion
des recherches
quelqueslignesplus cependant,
rapporte
de M. Engels,qui avaitprouvl'existence
d'unerimpression
du Voyage;
M. Masters
nenousditpaspourquoi
de M. Engels;p. 22: le Sophiloil n'accepte
pasla dcouverte
de Jacques
1476;on esten outresurpris
estbienantrieur
d'entendre
gium
Legrand
d'al-Farabi
commed'un"certain
"lemanuscrit
parler
Alphorabius";
p. 2: quesignifie
taitconnu"( proposd'Apollodore)?
du dessinqui se
p. 28: l'intressante
analyse
trouve
dansle ms.de la Ligne
6
et
le vieillard
entre
et
7) qui reprsente
p.
(planche
du dessinavaient
tconfrontes
avecl'tude
yauraitgagnsi lesparticularits
Tempus
d'E. Panofsky
surle "Vieillard
inIconology
(1939; trad,
Temps",publiedansStudies
fr.Essais
Paris,1967,pp. 105-130).
d'iconologie,
La bibliographie
unpeuplusde soins.
desoeuvres
de Thenaud
(p. 33) auraitmrit
Dansla section
unerimpression
, ondevrait
imprims
qu'ilsemblebienexister
signaler
du Voyage,
"excute
entrefin1531d'unepart,et 1533ou bienoctobre1535d'autre
il fautmaintenant
citerla lettre
part",commel'a tabliM. Engels.Parmilesimprims
ici-mme
x = 1972,pp. 103-106),
Gasnault
(vivarium
publieparM. Pierre
autographe
lettre
dontM. Masters
a eu connaissance
aussifallumentionner
(cf.p. 19). Il aurait
que
MmeHolbana publidesextraits
de VEloge
del'adaptation
delafolied'Erasme,
franaise
insre
dansle secondtrait
desTriumphes
rabelaisiennes,
IX, 1971,pp.66-69).
(cf.Etudes
Thenaud,
oeuvres
indites
attribues
unedistinction
lesattributions
entre
Quant la section
certaines
et les attributions
ou improbables
auraitt la bienvenue:
douteuses
dans
cettedernire
on
d
Thenot
me
sembleaurait
de

Robin
t-il,
YEpistre
catgorie,
ranger
etLa Ligne
deSaturne.
Le titredela troisime
section
oeuvres
ouincompltes,
enfin,
perdues
n'estpas suffisamment
il y manquele
clair;cettesectionest d'ailleursincomplte:
Genealitic
au trait
mentionn
(citp. 1), dontj'ignores'il estidentique
gnalogique
dansla lettrepubliepar M. Gasnault;cettelettrefaitgalement
allusion deux
doncfigurer
dansla sectiondes oeuvres
horoscopes,
qui devraient
perdues;danscette
onaurait
aussipurappeler
les
des
Vertus
aussi
semblent
section,
que Triumphes
theologalles
I 69

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00:06:07 AM

du Paradis
Traict
celeste
avoirt intituls
(voirla ddicacedu ms. de Leningrad).
ont
l'diteur
lors
de
Lesprincipes
l'tablissement
dutextene sontsignals
qui guid
du Trait
nullepart.Pourm'entenirau seulprologue
, je constate
que la ponctuation
faitperdre la magnifique
"moderne"
priodede prsde dix-neuf
lignes(p. 9,1.
ou
Quant l'accent,il estmisp. ex. 9,2 mesle
1-19),toutesa saveurrhtorique.
desraisonnez
et 60, 27 aures.
; il manqueen revanche
60, 2g prsentez
S9> 17 volupts
11fautlire9,27 Periarchon
(au lieude Periarchus
s); 60, i
); 60, 10Jaisoye
(pourfaisoy
detoutte
(au lieude Therillus).
part(pourdetoutte
prix);60, 18 Cherillus
Les textespublisparM. Masters
soulvent
de
plusde questions
qu'ilsne donnent
de l'diteur
Maisil tait,je crois,dansl'intention
d'offrir
au plusviteaux
rponses.
la recherche.
de la Renaissance
desdocuments
historiens
quiinvitent
Romanisches
Seminar
Universitt
Zrich

MarcRenJung

170

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