JournalofContemporary

EuropeanResearch

Volume10,Issue4(2014)

ResearchArticle

Bottom-up Perspectives on Multilingual

Ideologies in the EU: The Case of a Transnational
NGO
RuxandraComanaruBirkbeck,UniversityofLondon
FrancoZappettiniBirkbeck,UniversityofLondon

Citation

Comanaru,R.andZappettini,F.(2014).BottomupPerspectivesonMultilingualIdeologiesinthe
EU:TheCaseofaTransnationalNGO,JournalofContemporaryEuropeanResearch.10(4),pp.402
422.

Firstpublishedat:www.jcer.net

Volume10,Issue4(2014)jcer.net

RuxandraComanaruandFrancoZappettini

Abstract
Thispaperinvestigatesthediscursiveconstructionofmultilingualismincitizensdiscourses,aiming
to fill a gap in the literature of European studies that has scarcely been concerned with language
ideologiesfrombottomupperspectives.Inparticular,wefocusonthediscoursesofatransnational
NGO to analyse how its members position themselves in relation to linguistic issues and to what
extent (if so) they reproduce the EUs multilingual ideology. Deriving data from focus groups and
semistructured interviews, we contextualise our analysis against the backdrop of an increasingly
glocalised European site of struggle between global communication and linguistic justice. Using
criticaldiscourseanalysisweaimtoshowhowdiscoursesofmultilingualismarebeingnegotiatedat
thegrassrootslevel.Ourfindingssuggestthatwhilstcitizensdiscoursesvalidateanidealpromotion
and preservation of linguistic diversity in the EU, they also endorse a diglossic scenario with
language performing separate identity and communicative functions. We thus argue for an
understanding of European multilingualism that takes into account the transnational dynamics of
theEuropeansphere.

Keywords
Multilingualism;languageideologies;languagepolicies;activecitizenship;criticaldiscourseanalysis

Inthelastdecade,multilingualismhasfeaturedprominentlyintheEuropeanUnionspoliciesagainst
the backdrop of an increasingly superdiverse European community, legitimisation processes and
thestruggletofindacommonidentity.Whilstinstitutionaldiscoursesonmultilingualismhavebeen
thefocusofmuchliteraturefromsociolinguistic,political,legislativeandcriticalperspectives(Kjaer
and Adamo 2013; Rindler Schjerve and Vetter 2012; Weber and Horner 2012; Krzyanowski and
Wodak 2011, 2010; Gal 2010; Extra and Gorter 2008), bottomup approaches to multilingual
ideologies and attitudes have mostly been limited to educational issues (Creese and Blackledge
2010)orconductedfromquantitativeperspectives(SpecialEurobarometer3862012).Bycontrast,
there have been relatively few qualitative insights on language ideology that have focused on
citizensviewsintheEuropeancontext(seeforexample,MillarandWilson2007;GubbinsandHolt
2002). This is rather surprising given that the dilemma between communication and identity
(Mamadouh2002;Wright2000)intheconstructionofEuropeisnotonlyaconcernforinstitutional
practicesbutencompassesawiderideologicalstruggleinvolvingissuesofcivicparticipation,social
inclusion/exclusion and the transformation of cultural identities in an increasingly diverse, mobile
andinterconnectedEuropeansociety.AspointedoutbyWright(2000),thelanguageissuegoesto
thecoreoftheEuropeanpoliticalprojectanditslegitimisationiftheEUaspirestobemorethana
tradingbody.
The main rationale for this article therefore lies in the need to provide bottomup views on
multilingualisminadditiontotheinstitutionalonesthatcancontributetobetterunderstandingof
thelanguageissueintheEuropeansociopoliticalfield.Forthisreason,ourinvestigationintothe
discursive construction and negotiation of multilingualism focuses on an association of citizens
engagedwithEuropeanpoliticsandthepromotionofcivicparticipationcalledDemocraticChange
forEurope(DC4E).1Theorganisationhasbeenrunonavoluntarybasisandconsistsofanumberof
semistructuredlocalgroupsacrossEuropeopentoallEUandthirdcountrycitizens,2whooperate
at the transnational level by running debates, cultural events and (on and offline) campaigns

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simultaneously across local groups. Furthermore, members who characterise themselves as

transnational share an ideological commitment to the development of a European public sphere
(EPS)beyondnationalremits.
Thepublicspherewhich,putsuccinctly,isanetworkforcommunicatinginformationandpoints
of view (Habermas and Rehg 1998: 360) has increasingly been regarded as a crucial feature of
modernanddeliberativedemocracies,asitstandsforasiteofcivicparticipationandtheformation
ofpublicopinion(WodakandKoller2010).ForHabermas(1984)thepublicsphereischaracterised
bythreeelements:opennesstoparticipation;challengestopublicauthoritytolegitimisedecisions;
and an ideal of rationalcritical discourse. From this stance, Habermas (ibid) suggests that a
EuropeanpublicspheremustconsolidateinwhichactorsareabletodiscussEuropeanissuesandto
deliberate democratically through consensus. Furthermore, by challenging the logic of democratic
deliberations organised around national clusters (Fraser 2007), the public sphere may provide
solidarity bonds between strangers and the development of what Habermas calls constitutional
patriotism, that is a sense of belonging to a society organised around a civic (rather than ethnic)
definition of community. In spite of Habermass optimistic views, the extent to which a
transnationalised EPS exists (if at all) remains a debated issue (see, for example, Triandafyllidou,
WodakandKrzyzanowski2009;Fligstein2008;Splichal2006;EriksenandFossum2002;Closa2001).
However, Risse (2010) contends that, notwithstanding a number of limitations, an embryonic
transnational community of communication has been emerging where new European
perspectives are negotiated at the transnational level by different actors including the media,
interest groups, and nongovernmental organisations. It is thus in the general context of the
developingEPSthatweinvestigateDC4EasasalientcommunityofEuropeancitizensinwhich,we
hypothesise, institutional meaning(s) of multilingualism are likely to be reproduced, but also
transformedandreconstructedatgrassrootsandtransnationallevels.Ofcoursetheveryspecificity
ofourobjectofstudydoesnotallowustoextendourfindingstothegeneralpublicortoadvance
claimsthatourdataisrepresentativeofageneralEuropeanpublicopinion.
The article is structured as follows: in the next section we offer a general contextualisation of
language ideologies in relation to globalisation phenomena looking in particular at different
philosophicalandpoliticalapproachestothenatureoflanguageanditsusewithinacommunity.
ThisisfollowedbyathirdsectionwhichfocusesonEUmultilingualpoliciesincludingsomecritical
perspectives on the sociopolitical multilingual arrangement. We subsequently outline our
theoreticalframeworkanddescribeourmethodology.Buildingontheanalysiswhichisthensetout,
theconclusionengageswiththemainfindings,suggestingthattheconstructionofmultilingualismin
membersdiscoursessomewhatdepartsfromtheinstitutionalvisionandismoreorientatedtowards
adistinctseparationofthecommunicativeandidentitarianfunctionsoflanguage.

LANGUAGEIDEOLOGIESINGLOBALISEDPOLITICS
Multilingualism is a polysemic construct that can refer to different dimensions: individual (the
personal ability to speak more than one language), societal (the coexistence of many languages
withinasociety)andinstitutional(organisationalpracticesinvolvingmorelanguages).However,as
thenormalisationoflinguisticpractices(instantiatedinthecreationoflanguagepolicies)istypically
negotiated in the political arena, language policies are never exclusively about language and are
often understood as embedded in wider social, political and economic contexts (Ricento 2006;
Shohamy2006;Kroskrity2000).Withinpoliticalphilosophy,atraditionalapproachtotheregulation
of language use within communities (for example, in nation states) has often relied on ideologies
predicated on either the function of languages as ingroup identity markers or on
functional/communicative arguments. De Schutter (2007) for example suggests that two opposed
politicalviewshaveexistedonthenatureoflanguageconstitutivismandinstrumentalism.Inbroad

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terms, constitutivism sees language as intrinsic to identity and of moral value, whilst for
instrumentalismlanguage isonlyameanstoachieveotherobjectivesthrough communication.De
Schutter (2007) thus suggests that a constitutivist approach will typically tend to regard language
and the speakers identity as deeply interrelated, relying on a rather essentialist notion that
language is intrinsic to ones culture and the ability to express ideas and concepts. From this
perspective, constitutivists will argue for institutional recognition of linguistic/group identities
throughlinguisticrightssincelanguagerightsremedytheinjusticethatariseswhenminoritiesare
forced to live their life in the language of majorities, who happen to possess the prerogatives of
linguisticpower(DeSchutter2007:10).
Conversely,theinstrumentalistperspectiveillustratedbyDeSchutter(2007)contendsthat,rather
than an intrinsic expression of the self, language is an arbitrary convention which provides the
necessarytoolsforcommunicationofthoughtsandideas.Therefore,inmattersoflanguagepolicies
and linguistic justice, by and large, instrumentalists tend to downplay issues of identity whilst
focusingontheinstrumentalfunctionsoflanguageandtheattainmentofobjectivessuchasefficient
communication,equalityofopportunity,mobility,cohesionandsolidarity.Thedifferentideological
orientationsillustratedherearesummarisedinTable1.

Table 1. Instrumental and constitutive language ideology and policy (adapted from De Schutter,
2007)

Instrumentalism

Constitutivism

Underlyingviewof
linguisticmembership

Languageisexternaltotheself,itis
atool,aconvention

Languageisintrinsictotheselfand
toonesidentity

Normativeconclusion
(languagepolicy)

Languageshouldberegulatedsuch
thatnonidentityrelatedgoalsare
realised

Languageshouldberegulatedsuch
thattheidentityinterestof
languageistakenintoaccount

De Schutter (2007) recognises that the ideologies presented in the taxonomy above have so far
resultedintheimplementationofdifferentlanguagepoliciesandinterpretationsoflinguisticjustice.
Whilst constitutivists generally will call for protection of linguistic rights as a matter of principle,
instrumentalistswillsupportlanguagemaintenance/diversityaslongasthisdoesnotrepresentan
obstacle to communication and priority practices. Obviously these ideologies do not interplay in
mutually exclusive ways, neither do they exist in a vacuum, but rather they are part of a complex
socialsysteminfluencedbymanyotherfactors,suchaseconomicandculturalcontexts.
Weconsiderthereforehowsomeliteraturehasmadesenseofthoseprocessesofglobalisationthat
we consider key to our analysis that impact on and are reflected in linguistic practices and the
formation of language policies in modern European societies. First, for example, it has been
recognised that intensified patterns of migration and mobility resulting in increased (linguistic)
diversityinEurope,canamplifytensionsbetweenconstitutivistandinstrumentalistideologies,and
intertwine with discourses of human rights (Kymlicka and Patten 2003), identity and education
(Blackledge2005).Asecondaspectofglobalisationistheintensificationofeconomicexchangeand
increasedcommunication.Inrelationtotheresponseoflanguagepoliciestothisissue,Kibbe(2003)
suggeststhattwomodelshavemetwithstrongpoliticalpopularity,i.e.thefreemarkettheoryof
unfettered capitalism and the green theory of ecological protection. Kibbe sees these two
ideologies resulting in distinct linguistic geostrategies: the race for market share among the
governments representing the major international languages and the protection of endangered

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languagesundertakenbylinguistsandbythoseinterestedinlinguistichumanrights.Finally,much
literatureontransnationalismhasrecognisedtheimpactofglobalisationonthetransnationalisation
of society and public spheres, and a weakening of national systems in favour of crossborder
(organised) connections (Vertovec 2009; Albert, Jacobson and Lapid 2001; Smith and Guarnizo
1998). Once again the implications for language policies have been on the one hand the
reaffirmation (albeit incongruous) of de jure notions of national languages (see for example Mar
Molinero and Stevenson 2009) whilst, on the other, this has resulted in the de facto validation of
hegemonic regimes with the convergence towards English as a lingua franca in crossborder
communication.
Consequently,the useof Englishinrelationtoquestionsofsocialjusticehas beenalong debated
issue (Van Parijs 2011; MarMolinero and Stevenson 2009; Phillipson 2003; Ammon 2001). While
somescholarshavetakenacriticalapproachtohegemonicpractices,othershaveseenthediffusion
ofgloballanguagesasopportunitiesformorecrossborderinteraction.Forexample,House(2003),
suggesting a pragmatic distinction between language for communication and language for
identification,defendsEnglishasagloballinguafrancafromaccusationsofbeingakillerlanguage
ortheembodimentof(neo)imperialistaspirations.Instead,shearguesthatEnglishasalinguafranca
canworkinconjunctionwithlocallanguagesonthebasisofthefunctionaldistinctionraisedabove.
Inthisrespect,Houseseesadiglossic3scenariodevelopinginEuropeinwhichEnglishisusedashigh
language for various 'pockets of expertise' and nonprivate communication on the one hand, and
nationalandlocalvarietiesforaffective,identificatorypurposesontheotherhand(2003:261).

MULTILINGUALISMINEUROPE
Thecomplexityofmultilingualismhasbeenextensivelycoveredbyawealthofacademicliterature
(Unger,Krzyzanowski,andWodak2014;WeberandHorner2012;VanEls2005;Wright2000).Inthis
study, we approach European multilingualism as a set of ideological discourses produced and
promoted at institutional level by EU organs such as the Commission. In the Commission's
discourses,themultilingualideologyhastypicallybeenconstructedarounditsbenefitsinthreemain
areas: social cohesion, democratic participation and the economic dimension (Krzyanowski and
Wodak2010).Whilstthefirsttwoareascanberelatedtoidentitymarkerandfunctionalarguments
respectively,theeconomicdimensionportraysmultilingualismasanecessaryskillthustyingwith
the Lisbon strategy main agenda (Krzyanowski and Wodak 2010) and neofunctionalist ideologies
thatclearlypromotetheEUasaglobalenterprise(Zappettini2014).
Byandlarge,multilingualideologieshaveappliedto:a)internalpracticeswhereofficialandworking
languagesareusedwithintheEUinstitutions;andb)thesocietallevelwheretheEUhaspromoteda
model of multilingual polity which intends to protect and promote linguistic diversity.4At the
societallevel,policieshavebeenintroduced,interalia,aimedatenablingcommunicationbetween
citizens and institutions in any of the EUs official languages and some of the regional languages.
Furthermore, all national official languages of the European Union member states have official
statuswithintheEU.Suchapanarchicpolicyregime(Grin2008)iscomplementedbythepractices
ofEUofficialswhooftenresorttopracticesofmultilingualismtoaccommodateaninterlocutorand
allow for smooth communication (Wodak, Krzyanowski and Forchtner 2012). The EU also makes
special provision for European citizens whose mother tongue is a regional language (for example,
Welsh)providingacertainleveloftranslationandinterpretationservices.
Ontheotherhand,thelimitationsofdevisingmultilingual(andforthatmattercultural)policiesata
supranational level has been widely acknowledged (see for example King et al. 2011; Kraus 2011;
and, with specific regards to cultural policies, Sassatelli 2009). The promotion and protection of a
plurilingual Europe can only be implemented in practice insofar as individual member states are

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willingtodosoastheEUcannotimposeonnationalpoliciesregardingmultilingualismandlanguage
learning.
Wright(2000)offersaninterestingaccountofthetensionsandcontradictionsthatexistintheEUs
multilingual proposition, suggesting that the present EU strategy of promoting plurilingualism is
admirableinitsidealism[]butUtopian(p.8).Wrightadvocatesthedevelopmentofacommunity
ofcommunicationamongEuropeansinordertolegitimisetheUnion,whichotherwisewouldjust
be a trading association run in an autocratic way (ibid.). She argues that a system of personal
bilingualismandsocialdiglossiacouldprovidethebestsolutionforEuropeancommunicationneeds
andlanguagepreservation.Inotherwords,sheenvisagesanidealscenariofortheEUwithEnglish
performing a communicative function, whilst the identity function would be embodied by mother
tongues. Wright (2009) recognises the political implications of such a choice as any formal
legitimisationofEnglishwouldinfringetheprincipleofequalityandlinguisticjustice.However,she
invitesustoreconsidertherigidityofsuchaprinciple,whichsheseesasanchoredintheideological
legacies from nation building and colonial empire (p. 93), arguing that history demonstrates that
communitiesandindividualsusuallyachievethecommunicationnetworkstheyneed,whetherthis
happensinaplannedoranunplannedway(Wright2009:8).Kraus(2008)proposesanothermodel
for dealing with the issues of multilingualism in Europe and avoiding the creation of a diglossic
society. He suggests that an attainable solution is the support for converging multilingualism a
model which, in Krauss view, attempts to find a necessarily precarious balance between
pragmatismandrespectfordiversity(p.176).
Inasimilarvein,Archibugi(2005)supportsthenotionofstrikingtherightbalanceinthequestfor
the language of democracy within the EU by envisaging the adoption of a vehicular language for
improving communication (that he sees best represented by Esperanto), whilst retaining the
multiculturalapproachtotherecognitionofindividuallanguages.Thisapproachwoulddoawaywith
the notion of official languages. Archibugi (2005) rests his argument on the cosmopolitan
perspectivethat:
in the face of common problems, cosmopolitanism seeks to apply democratic procedures,
implementingpublicpoliciesdesignedtoremovelinguisticbarriers,evenifthisimpliesthat
some members of the population who are not fluent in the language used for public
purposesmightbesomehowdisadvantaged(p.544).
From this premise, Archibugi opposes Kymlickas idea that democratic politics must be in the
vernacular, arguing that it is the responsibility of individuals and governments to remove the
languagebarriersthatobstructcommunication(p.545).
ThesevarioustheoreticalmodelspointtothecomplexityoftheissueofmultilingualisminEurope,
bothataninstitutionalandsocietallevel.Inourview,therefore,thepromotionandprotectionof
theculturalandlinguisticdiversityofEuropeisnotonlyapolicyissue,butneedstobeaddressed
fromawiderperspective,includingcitizensperspectives.Whilstthesehavesometimesbeenvoiced
explicitly (for example in the consultations conducted with the EU Civil Society Platform on
Multilingualism, 2009) we contend that views at the grassroots level have largely been
underestimatedandthusturntotheexplorationofthoseviews.

METHODOLOGICALCONSIDERATIONS
TheoreticalAssumptions
Ourtheoreticalframeworkdrawsonthegeneraltenetofcriticaldiscourseanalysis(CDA)thatsees
society and language as mutually constitutive (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). We refer here to the

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term discourse in its amplest meaning of text carrying different social properties in different
contexts.Wethusinterpretdiscoursesnotonlyasrepresentationsbutalsoasconstitutiveofsocial
reality and the objects of discourse (Foucault 1984). From this perspective, the analysis of
discourses informs our theoretical understanding of language in use and, at the same time,
represents our heuristic approach to the analysis. We treat ideology as instantiated in discourse,
that is, we believe that linguistic structures and elements dialogically relate to systematic
representations/organisations of the world. We therefore regard discourses of multilingualism as
metarepresentations of society at large and furthermore as embedded in wider sociohistorical
contexts,suchasglobalisationandEUintegration.Crucially,inlinewithCDA,wealsoassumethat
ideologies can be (re)produced, challenged and dynamically transformed in discourses through a
variety of discursive strategies such as, for example, (de)legitimisation, justification,
recontextualisationandsoon(seeforexampleWodaketal.2009).
In approaching the analysis of our data we rely in particular on Van Dijks (1997) sociocognitive
framework which sees ideologies as acquired, expressed, enacted and reproduced in and through
discourse as cognitive structures socially stored and shared in schemas and realised through
linguisticfeatures.ForVanDijk,discoursemaybeideologically`marked'andthuspointingtospecific
schemasasthespeakerdrawsforinstanceonacollectivememory,orinvokesspecificdiscursive
strategiesandotherphonological,syntactic,lexicaland/orcontextualelements.Moreover,forVan
Dijk, such elements are not always explicit but can underline discourses as implicatures or
metaphorsandthereforebecomeinferablethroughinterpretation.

ResearchAimsandProcedure
This article contributes to existing perspectives on the EUs multilingual setup (see, for example,
KjaerandAdamo2013;RindlerSchjerveandVetter2012;KrzyanowskiandWodak2011and2010)
by providing qualitative insights from a bottomup perspective. Our main aim is to ascertain if, to
what extent and how multilingual ideologies (as fostered by the EU institutions) are reproduced,
(re)constructedandnegotiatedatgrassrootslevelinandthroughdiscoursesofcitizensengagedin
the debate on Europe. We emphasise however that our analysis does not intend to focus on
multilingualismasacommunicativepracticeofourinformantorganisationassuch,butratheronthe
sociocognitivedimensionenactedindiscoursebyitsmembers.Moreover,wetakeaninterpretative
approach to the data analysis in line with social constructivist views of discourse5(defined in the
followingsection).Ourresearchisthereforeguidedbythefollowingquestions:1)HowisEuropean
multilingualismideologically(re)producedatgrassrootslevel?;2)Howaretheideologicaltensions
ofEUsmultilingualismreflectedandnegotiatedinthediscoursesofmembers?
Our data consists of four focus groups and nine individual interviews conducted in two waves
between 2010 and 2013. In total we spoke directly to 26 members from seven different local
branchesofDC4E(Bulgaria,CzechRepublic,Germany,Italy,theNetherlands,Spain,andtheUK).All
the NGO branches were initially approached through contact with gatekeepers and participants
were sought. The 26 respondents who agreed to participate in our study thus represent a self
selecting sample of DC4E members and, therefore, are not necessarily representative of the
organisations view at large. Furthermore, due to the mixed national makeup of each local group
(see note 2), we were not able to control the sample for national or regional variables (i.e. the
nationality,residencyandotheraffiliationsofparticipants).Instead,inthelightoftheNGOidentity
and the contextualisation of their activities in the wider EPS we decided to treat the data at a
transnational level. We were, however, able to profile our informants through sociodemographic
data(agegroup,languageproficiency,nationality,etc.)collectedviaaquestionnairedistributedto
each participant before commencing the interview. A summary of these details and further

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informationonthecircumstancesofgroupandindividualinterviewsareprovidedinTables1and2
intheAppendix.
The rationale for combining focus groups and individual interviews was to maximise the main
advantages of two methods of collection for discursive purposes. Focus groups have been
increasingly usedinsocialsciencesto exploresharedopinions andbeliefsbecauseofthedynamic
interaction that can emerge out of the discussion whilst staying focused on the topic (Litosseliti
2003). Individual interviews, on the other hand, provide informants with a more personal setting,
whichcanallowtheemergenceandelaborationofpersonalnarratives.
The focus groups were moderated by the authors in the local language (i.e. English, Italian and
Romanian). Individual interviews were also conducted by the authors in English by request of the
interviewees,exceptintwocaseswhentheywereconductedinItalianasthelanguagewasmutually
shared by the interviewees and the interviewer. Discussions focused on a number of European
issues and different topics related to multilingualism, which had been derived from the literature
and previous ethnographic investigation of the NGO. These were: a) orientation towards
constitutive/instrumental views of language; b) the social and political significance of
multilingualism;c)viewsontheinstitutionaluseoflanguages;d)languageanddemocraticpractices;
e)theuseofEnglishinEurope.
However, rather than strictly structuring the discussion protocol or following a specific order, the
topicswerelooselyintroducedbythemoderators/interviewersaspromptstoelicitthediscussion,
sothatdifferentthemeswerealsoallowedtoemerge.Ingeneral,moderatorsactedasfacilitators
whilstbeingawareoftheirpotentialroleofcoconstructorsofthesocialrealityofparticipants.All
datawasaudiorecorded,transcribedand,ifneeded,translatedintoEnglish.Datawassubsequently
coded and systematically treated for linguistic insights in relation to the following categories: i)
macropropositionsandrecurrentdiscursivethemes;ii)speakersenunciativepositioningandtheir
ideologicalorientation;iii)linguisticstrategiesrealisedintalk;iv)specificlinguisticfeaturessuchas
metaphorsandfigurativelanguageandtheirargumentativepurpose.Thefollowingsectionprovides
insightintothesediscussionsandtheemergentcategoriesexamined.

DATAANALYSIS
Discursive (Re)Constructions of Languages and Multilingualism: Constitutive vs. Instrumental
Views
Several members spoke about languages referring to cultural aspects, often associating languages
with the identities of their speakers, stressing thereby their constitutive function. Some, for
example,metaphoricallyrepresentedlanguagesaslivingentitiesandsubjecttolife/deathcycles
(but also to transformation). Overall, we noticed a positive evaluation of multilingualism as a
desirable individual and social practice linked to the expression of ones culture. Most members
highlightedtheinterculturalfunctionofmultilingualismprovidingnewopportunitiesforseeingthe
world from different angles/perspectives whilst retaining a significant social meaning of group
affiliation. In these discourses, we thus recognise the recontextualisation of the overarching
institutionalframeonthesocialcohesionfunctionofmultilingualismbringingthepeoplesofEurope
together. The following extract is an example of how the speaker draws on the common house
metaphorwhichhasoftenbeendeployedininstitutionalrepresentationsofaunitedEurope(Drulak
2004;ChiltonandIlyin1993):
CL4:[language]givesyouthefreedomtogoanywhere,andyoufeelathome

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Inanumberofcases,howeverthesepositiveviewswereexpressedbymemberswithgenericand
somewhat idealised statements referring, for example, to oversimplified notions of national or
official languages associated with (member) states. In our view this would therefore indicate the
ideological reproduction of the EU hierarchical system. In some cases, rather essentialist
interpretationsofnationalculturesemergedaswellascertainmisconceptionsonlanguagesasin
thefollowingextractwherethespeakermistakenly assumesthe mutualintelligibilityofRomanian
andBulgarian:
LO2:...Let'ssaypeopleinRomaniawerespeakingtopeopleinBulgariainEnglishyouknow
andthey'renotspeakingtoeachotherinRomanianorBulgarianandthat'sarealshame.
By contrast, we also found more critical views that challenged established EU discourses. One
member, for example, challenged a representation of Europe as the sum of its parts and of
Europeanness as the simple interconnection of cultures which has often been promoted in
institutionaldiscourses:
CL5:WellIdonotknow,...theEuropeanterm,IshouldbeveryveryEuropeansinceIam
connectedwithsomanycultures,butIfindittobejustarhetoricaltoolthatactuallymeans
nothing.
Anothercriticalviewemergedinrelationtothenatureoflanguagesandtheirinstrumentalusein
politics.Forexampleonesuggestedthat:
BO3:languageisameansandthusitshouldnotbeanobstacle,howeveritcanbedragged
byitshairintopoliticssothatitrepresentsanobstacle.
Inthiscasethespeakerhighlightstheinstrumentalfunctionoflanguageintwoways:firstlythrough
the explicit enunciation that language is a means [for communication] and secondly through the
personification of language, for which he uses the metaphor of language dragged by its hair.
Althoughthespeakerhereusesapassiveformthatbackgroundsthedragger(theagent) wecan
still infer his reference to and negative valuation of the instrumental use of languages for
nationalisticpoliticalagendasintheconstructionofnationstates.

PromotionandProtectionofLanguages
Ingeneralwerecognisedthatanumberofargumentswereconstructedoneitherthetoposofzero
sum (that is the logical premise that one language does not take away from others) or on the
assumption of an ecology of languages, whereby languages can be lost at the expense of the
system.Forexample,indismissingEsperantoasaviableoptionasacommonlanguage,LO3said:
LO3:Ifeelitsmorelikewehavelotsoflanguagesand,andtheresnoneedtosortoflose
everyoneslanguagetocreatethisnewone.
BycontrastPR2argued:
PR2:Ithinkthatthatsreallyisgreat,youknowthisideaof,offindingthebalanceandnot,
youknowinthis,inthiskindofquesttokindofseehowtheintegration,howpeoplecan
worktogether,exactlynotlosingtheindividualcultures.
Thus whilst most members seemed to agree on the benefits of individual multilingualism (that is,
learning more languages through personal initiative), opinions were split and conflicting on the
institutional commitment to protect and promote languages. On the one hand, we recognised
constitutivistideologicalstancessubscribingtotheprotectionoflinguisticrightsasanindispensable

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universal/humanrightandthereforeaEuropeanvaluetosafeguard.Ontheotherhand,however,
somemembersquestionedthedesirabilityofdefendinglanguagesoutofprinciple,raisingtheissue
ofartificialityofnormativeapproaches,thusclearlyorientatingtowardsinstrumentalideologies.We
thus found significant differences among our informants over whether and to what extent
protection should apply to which language. Significantly, most members debated the definition of
what counts as language or dialect6(which was perceived as a convenient discriminant in guiding
policyapproaches):
BO4: the question is if we really need to protect every single language, I mean Venetian,
Neapolitan,Sardinianwhichafterallaredialects.
In this respect, ultimately, most members fell back on institutional definitions of minority and
regional, as formulated in the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Council of
Europe). We thus found an implicit instrumentalist approach supporting a general ideological
orientation towards a selective maintenance of linguistic diversity and a reproduction of national
ideologies that perceive certain institutionalised languages as more prestigious and with a higher
statusthanothers.
Similarly, in reference to the promotion and protection of languages through education, we
recognisedcontrastingviews.Somemembersarguedinfavourofkeepingaliveasmanylanguages
as possible through schooling policies. A large number of members, however, tended to support
policies that would develop competences in much needed and viable common denominators of
communication in Europe (i.e. English) as a priority. To support their ideological stances, most
membersengagedinstrategiesofjustificationaimedatlegitimisinghegemonicpractices,whereby
dominantlanguageswerenaturalisedthroughhistoricframes.Theseviewswereconspicuousinthe
Italian and Romanian focus groups. The Italian members discussed at length the reproduction of
globallanguagesthroughouthistory,offeringexamplesofhowLatin,Frenchinthepastandlately
English emerged as dominant languages in relation to specific socioeconomic conditions. Italian
memberBO4forinstance represented thecyclesof historythrough tropesof movementssuchas
wavesofculturaldiffusion/dominanceandthispremiseallowedtherespondenttojustifythesocial
promotionofimportantlanguagesbecauselanguagefollowsthemovementofhistory.
Furthermore,wefoundthatoftentheagentivisationofhistorywasrecontextualisedintoeconomic
discourses. This strategy allowed some members to construct a relationship between economic
power and language diffusion and crucially to justify the supremacy of certain languages visvis
othersinrelationtoalinguisticmarket.Inthefollowingextract,forexample,BO5referstopatterns
of economic highs and lows to represent and justify the reproduction of hegemonic languages in
education as dictated by the market (a linguistic realisation achieved via the term boom that
impliesasuddensurgefordemandandsupply):
BO5:untilthirtyyearsagotherewasFrench,thenEnglishboomed(...),inthefutureIdont
know,butperhapswellstopstudyingEnglishandwelltakeupChinese.
WefoundsimilarperspectivesheldbyourRomanianinformantswho,duringthediscussion,brought
totheforeseveraleconomicargumentsinrelationtothebenefitsofmultilingualismasexemplified
bythefollowingextract:
CL2: The economic benefits come through English, look, since I can speak English, now I
workinaplacewhereIneedtospeakEnglishotherwiseIcouldn't...Languagescontinueto
existanywaytilltheendoftheworld,butIthinktalkingaboutalanguageofcommunication
thatwillbeEnglishfromnowon,andlocallanguageswillresist,andlocalandeverycountry
thatspeaksotherlanguagethosewillresistanyway,IwillstillwriteinRomanianandnobody
willhaveanythingagainstit.

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CL1: You say [...] English from now on, but 200 years they would have said it was French
fromthenon
CL2:Yes,buttherewasnoglobalisationthen,andmaybeonlyiftheplanetwilldeglobaliseit
willchange,butuntilthen...
In this example, CL2 encapsulates many discursive patterns emerging from our data. The first one
highlights the constraints of the linguistic market that citizens are engaged with, and the tensions
betweenidealanddefactosituations.Thesecondistheuseofinterdiscursivelinkswiththemesof
globalisation,whichwerealsooftenputforwardbymemberstoconstructageneralunderstanding
of the value of languages as determined by social and economic contexts. In this respect, we
recognisedaconceptualisationoftheeconomicbenefitsofmultilingualismconspicuouslydivergent
fromtheinstitutionalideologythatregardsalllanguagesasequal.

ReconcilingUnityandDiversity:WhatIstheLanguageofDemocracy?
Ideationalvs.practicaltensionsclearlyemergedwhendiscussingmultilingualisminrelationtothe
issueofhowbesttoensuredemocracy,whilstencouragingthedevelopmentofatransnationalEPS
and an ever closer Union. By and large, however, we found that our informants showed an
ideologicalorientationtowardssupportingacommonlanguagethatcouldfacilitatecommunication,
asforexampleinthefollowingextract:
RO1:Ithink[English]shouldbeencouraged...andyesitwouldgiveanadvantagetoEnglish
andIrishspeakersbut...Ithinksometimesitgoeslikethat,somegroupsinsocietyhave
advantagesoverothersandtheroleofthestateorofaninstitutionliketheEUistomake
surethatthesenaturaladvantagesdonotmakethosepeoplestepoverothers...
Here,RO1recognisesthetensionbetweenideationalandpragmaticaspectsacknowledgingthatthe
officialpromotionofEnglishcouldbeseenasaninfringementoftheprincipleofequality,however
the respondent seems to reconcile the instrumental and constitutivist ideologies of language with
thewatchdogfunctionoftheEU.
AnothersimilarperspectiveisexemplifiedinthisextractfromtheRomanianfocusgroup:
CL4: Now, I think it depends partly on what democracy means for each person, what the
personunderstandsbythetermdemocracy,andwecouldthenmakeananalysisbetween
what the EU says in there that multilingualism underlies democracy and what I think
democracyis.
Similarly,inreferencetointernalmultilingualpracticesoftheEUinstitutionsmostmemberstended
to endorse the selective multilingualism of the Commission primarily on functional and pragmatic
reasons.Forexample:
LO2:Ithink[thesecontradictions]arejusthistorical,theyarealittlebituncomfortablebutif
it was decided that the lingua franca of the EU institutions could be Maltese then
everybody would have to ... you know, take a break for the next three or four years and
learn Maltese and then get together again, its, it is just not practical the biggest, the
widestspokenlanguagesin Europein thatorderarent they,theyareEnglish,Frenchand
Germanandthat'sthereasontheyrespokenpurelyforapracticalreasonehmit'sabit
unfortunatemaybeeverybodyshouldlearnMaltese(laughs)...butitisafactwearegoing
tohavetolearntolivewith.

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Here the speaker legitimises the status quo of institutional practices through different discursive
strategies.Theyfirstlyrefertohistoricalreasons,presumablyinreferencetothehistoricalpractices
of the Commissions working languages (political continuity). Secondly, LO2 appeals to practical
reasons by offering the counterargument that if the Maltese language were adopted instead it
wouldhavepracticalnegativeconsequences.Suchanargumentseemstorecontextualisethedebate
that took place during Malta negotiating accession to the EU.7Finally, the speaker appeals to the
logic of big numbers (the widest spoken languages), reproducing notions of pecking order and
prestige which they then downplay with some linguistic hedging (a bit uncomfortable, a bit
unfortunate).
In most cases it would appear that finding a balance of interests in evaluating language practices
against the benefits of democratic participation was a major ideological orientation for members.
Thisnotionalsoseemedtoapplytotheinternalpracticesoftheorganisationitself.Forexample,in
discussing the editing of the NGO magazine, AM1 valued the pros and cons of having different
articlesindifferentlanguages:
AM1: The more general things are written in English and then there are pages that are in
ourownlanguageandweintheNetherlandswealwaysalsowriteitinEnglishbecause[]a
lot of Dutch people know English anyway. But in other countries they, they write in their
own language and I think thats also ... it excludes other people from reading it, I dont
know,its,fortheirownpeopleit...,itmakesthe()the,thethresholdorsomethingabit
lowerbutits,Ithinkitsalways,itsalwaysstandinginbetweenalittle.
For AM1, lowering a metaphorical threshold to allow more citizens to enter the debate was a
compromiseworthacceptingevenifitimpingedonherowncontributiontothecommunity.Inthis
sense, we recognised a strategy of accommodation of the lower threshold in which language
representedaproxyforcivicequality.TheissueofcommitmenttotheNGOactivitywasalsoraised
byVA1whoargued:
VA1:Iwillsayit'sapracticalissue,itdependsalsooneachperson,itdependsonhowmuch
youwanttogiveImeanifIbelieveinthisnetworkandIbelieveinthetransnational
levelthenit'samustthatIspeakEnglishtowork.
Notably, the ideological positioning of English native speaker members in this respect was
orientated towards recognising their head start and conceding that English only is not enough.
Native speakers of English thus adopted a positioning of solidarity as exemplified by the following
extractinwhichLO3,thememberinterviewedinLondon,adoptedthemetaphoricalrepresentation
ofhousetoexpresstheirstance:
LO3:Itsjust[]likehavingfriendsthatyoudontmakeaneffortwith,makingthemalways
cometoyourhouseratherthanyougoandvisitthem,thatkindofthing.

Adiglossicscenario
Ourdatarobustlysuggestthatmostmembersportrayedanexisting,orenvisagedafuture,diglossic
scenariowherealanguageoflargediffusion(forthetimebeingidentifiedwithEnglishbutopento
being superseded by Chinese for instance) would enable communication across different native
speakerswhilstthesamespeakerswouldadditionallyretaintheirpersonallanguage.Thisargument
was often discursively constructed along a functional distinction between languages for
communicationandlanguagesforidentitythatlargelytallieswithWrightsandHousesarguments
(see above). For example, the interplay between the communicative and identity functions of
languageisillustratedbythefollowingextract:

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RO1:WellIthinkthatmydream,myvisionisthatEuropebeunitedpoliticallyandforthisto
happen [] we need to have a language in common [] I'm really a fan of English not
becauseIseethisasasortofculturalimperialismbecausebynowEnglishhasnothingtodo
withEnglandanymoreorwiththeUK
MO:CanIjustaskyoutoexplainwhatyoumeanbyEnglishisnolongerrelatedtoEngland,
doyoumeantheEnglishidentity?
RO1: Yes, that's exactly it, I don't see it as an imposition of cultural imperatives from the
Brits,youknow,bynowEnglishisthelanguageofEurbynow,youknow,ifalienscameto
the Earth, by now, theyd probably try and talk to us in English its the language of old
EnglanditisthelanguageoftheUSbutitisthelanguageoftheEUtoo
There is a series of ideological assumptions inferable from this passage. The first one relates to
Europeasaunitedpolitywithacommonlanguageandwhichisofferedasastatementofnecessity
(supportedbythemodalverbweneed).Inthissense,thespeakersdiscursivestrategyappearsto
legitimisethedefactodominanceofEnglishoninstrumentalgrounds.However,wecanalsoinfera
sort of evaluative process in weighing and juxtaposing the effects associated with linguistic
hegemony(culturalimperialism)andsupportforit.Intheirargumentofjustification,RO1referstoa
cognitive schema of universality through which they place Europe in a global, indeed universal
context.Inthiscontext,therespondentnaturalisesexpectationsofbeingabletocommunicatewith
others through the hyperbolic and futuristic imagery of aliens communicating with humans.
Crucially,insupportofthisconstruction,RO1clearlydecouplesutilitarianfromidentitarianaspects
of the English language, appealing to the modernity of this argument (signalled by the temporal
expressionbynow).
Further examples of the deconstruction/decoupling of English into separate communication and
identitylanguagesemergedinthisexchangeinwhichglobish(thatisasimplifiedversionofEnglish)
isseencapableofperformingthecommunicativefunction,whilsttheidentitarianfunctionremains
anchoredtoclassicalEnglish:
BO1:Inmyopinionwereallyneedtodistinguish,therearetwolanguages,oneisforwork
andeverydaycommunication,globish,right?AndthentheresEnglish.
BO6: Indeed theres also the EuroEnglish of bureaucracy that has got nothing to do with
Shakespeareslanguage,whichisthelanguageoftheEnglish.

HomogenisationandCulturalDiffusion
Afinalthemethatemergedfromourdatarelatestothemembersideologicalorientationtowards
globalising flows and the risk of cultural homogenisation impacting on (and deriving from)
languages.Whilstdifferentviewsemergedindiscourse,overallwenoticedaconspicuoustendency
toaccommodateandjustifyglobaltransformations,whilstdownplayingthepotentialnegatives.We
willpresentoneexampleofhowtheserepresentationswereachievedbyquotingPR2,whotoldus:
PR2:Wespeakofhomogeneityinthewholeworld[but]wehavebeenalsohomogenifyinga
lotinmanycountriesandsomepeoplehaveseenitasathreatbutintheendpeopleare
happy about that. I dont know if I take the example of France in the sixteenth century
probablypeoplewerenothappythattheywereforcedtospeakFrenchandtheypreferred
to keep their own language, their own culture and etc. but the result is that now the
French culture,letssay,ispartofamoreglobaldiversity,aslongas peopleareawareof
ehmehmnotnecessarilyofthefactthatthereisthisprocessofehmofhomogenifying

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butalsoehmiftheyareawareofwhatcanbedoneinadifferentwayehmthenthereisno
problem.Itsitsaquestionofcreativityyeah,Ithink.
Inthiscasethememberusedadistinctdiscursivestrategyaimedatrelativisingtheglobalisationof
culture by an argument of historical analogy. Comparing the current process of global
homogenisation with that of French language standardisation, the member portrayed the former
positivelyandwasabletorepresentitaspartofthemoreglobaldiversity.Theargumentrestsona
temporal dimension, which assumes linguistic change through standardisation as a positive
development(realisedthroughthepropositionspeoplewerenothappy/peoplearehappy).

CONCLUSIONS
InthisarticlewehavehighlightedthemanytensionsoftheEUsmultilingualideologyandaimedto
establishifandhowthesearereproducedandnegotiatedatgrassrootslevel.Ourdatashowthat
theideologicaltensionsaresomewhatpresentinthediscoursesofourrespondentsthrougharange
of cognitive orientations towards constitutivist views of languages at one end and instrumentalist
viewsattheother.Theemergentconstructionofmultilingualisminourdata,however,reflectsthe
institutional one(s) to different extents. Overall, our informants endorsed an idealistic vision of
Europe as a multicultural/multilingual community and in this sense they largely reproduce the
ideological ecology of languages fostered by the EU. It must be noted, however, that often the
notion of language is restricted to official and national categories, thus effectively reproducing a
pecking order of languages. Such vision is consistently emerging in discourses of promotion of
languages,wherewefoundanideologicalsplitontheactualimplementationofpoliciesthatwould
eitherfavouroneormorelanguages.
Whilst we used the constitutivist/instrumentalist taxonomy to guide inductively our analytical
approach to members ideological orientations to language, we must emphasise that no member
portrayedtheirperspectiveinsuchdichotomicterms.Onemajorinsightemergingfromouranalysis
is that most members seemed to be willing to accommodate instrumental and constitutivist
ideologies in a diglossic situation whereby a high common language would coexist with individual
low languages. Different arguments were put forward in support of such an either existing or
envisaged arrangement. For example, discourses of globalisation were conspicuously linked to the
need for competitiveness in the linguistic market and such discourses offered the premises for
supporting the use of dominant languages as valuable linguistic capital. Thus, although most
membersreferredtolanguagesasresources,aclearpreferenceforEnglishwasgenerallyarguedin
contrast to mainstream institutional discourses (and the rhetorical notion of the equality of
languages).
Furthermore, where our data appears to be most divergent from most institutional
conceptualisationsoflanguagesisinthefact that membersappealtoan ideologicalseparationof
the identity and communication aspects of language. Such conceptual separation of different
functionsoflanguageenabledourrespondentstoconstructasetofargumentsaimedatlegitimising
hegemonicpracticeswhetherwithintheirownorganisationorataninstitutionallevel.Crucially,we
thus found that the notion of multilingualism as an expression of democracy (as portrayed in
institutional discourses) appears reproduced only to a small extent in our sample. Instead,
discourses of democracy are often reconstructed as the necessity of promoting civic debate and
improving participation in the EPS. In this light, our data suggest that most members tended to
conceptualisedemocracyasauniversallanguageofitsownthatshouldfindconcreteexpressionin
the most pragmatic forms. Similarly, the notion of linguistic justice was mainly interpreted as the
democraticbenefitsderivingfromtheconstructionofEuropewhichcouldbespedupbyincreased
interactioninasharedlanguage.

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OntheselastfewconsiderationswerecognisesomeofWrights(2000)perspectivesonthestateof
acommunityofcommunicationintheEUdiscussedearlier.Oneisthatcommunicationnetworks
develop informed by ideological stances that are not necessarily determined by institutional
planning.Anotherimportantinsightisthatthedecouplingofidentityandcommunicationenacted
byourinformantsintheirdiscoursesisanideologicaldeparturefromnationalisticandcolonialviews
and arguably a move towards a postnational direction, although we cannot dismiss the idea that
such views exist in embryonic forms and are partly contradicted by the discursive validation of
national/officiallanguages,ifonlyusedasconvenientlabels.Neverthelessourdatawouldtallywith
existingargumentsonsocialagencyandthepowerofdiscourseinstructuringchange.Ofcourse,we
must recognise the specificity of our sample, a transnational organisation engaged with reforming
Europe, which does not permit the generalisability of such claims to the wider definition of
European citizens. Nonetheless, this study may provide potential grounds for future studies to
investigate language issues in the EPS. In particular we have deliberately resisted crosscountry
comparisonsortheanalysisofnationalvariables,inthebeliefthatadefinitionofmultilingualism
must necessarily take into account the transnational dimension of communication in the EPS. We
believe that more research should be carried out in this field for there are significant social and
politicalimplicationsforlanguageideologyintheconstructionofEurope.
***

416

Sweden
6mths

Romani
an

ENG5

SW4

FR1

Student

Turkish

UK

Cyprus
4yrs;UK
2yrs

Turkish

ENG5

FR3

35+

Male/Fema
le

Occupation

Nationality

Current
CountryOf
Residence

Lived
Abroad

First
Language

British

Romani
an

FR5

English

France
9mths

Wales

Student

Student

CA3

IT1

GR2

GER2.5

ENG4

FR5

ENG4

ROM5

GER5

Hungarian

Germany
3mths;
Netherlands
1mth

Belgium
7mths;
Greece
3mths

Romania
n

Romania

IT3

ENG3

Romania
n

Italy8mths

Romania

Romania
n

Employe
e

Unemploy
ed
Hungarian

CL3

CL2

Romania

Romania
n

Student

CL1

84

HUN1

SP2

GER2

IT4

FR5

ENG5

Romania
n

France
4mths;
Austria
3wks

Romania

Romania
n

Student

CL4

14/09/2011

ClujRomania

GR2

RU2

SP3

IT4

ENG5

FR5

Romania
n

Romania

Romania
n

NGO
Coordin.

CL5

SP1

FR2

ENG4

Romani
an

Romani
a

FR3

ENG4

Italian

France
9mths;
Tanzania
3mths

Italy

Italian

Journali
st

Youth
Worker/
Student
Romani
an

BO1

CL6

SP4

FR3

ENG5

Italian

Spain1yr;
Belgium
9mths;UK
6mths

Italy

Italian

Researc
her

BO2

FR1

GER1

ENG5

Italian

Germany
1mth

Italy

Italian

Student

417

POR1

SP3

FR4.5

ENG4

FR2

ENG3

IT4

SP4

GER5

Italian

France
6mths

Russia
13yrs;
Spain
2yrs;Italy
1yr;
Slovakia
1mth

Russian

Italy

Italian

Employee

BO5

German
y

German
/Russian

Student

BO4

70

21/04/2011

ENG3

FR5

Italian

UK4mths;
Ireland4mths;
France9mths

Italy

Italian/Fren
ch

Employee

BO6

FR3

ENG3

Italian

Ireland
1mth;
France
4mths;USA
5mths

UK

Italian

Researche
r

LO1

36

FR4

GER5

English

France1yr;
Spain
6mths;
Lebanon
1yr

UK

British

Employe
e

LO2

06/04/2011

London(pilot)UK

RuxandraComanaruandFrancoZappettini

BolognaItaly

BO3

LEGEND:ENGEnglish;FRFrench;GERGerman;GRGreek;HUNHungarian;ITItalian,PORPortuguese;ROMRomanian;RURussian;SPSpanish;SWSwedish.

Other
Languages;
Self
Reported
Proficiency

Wales

2534

1824

CA2

AgeGroup

CA1

65

22/04/2012

Date

Duration
(mins)
Participant
Code

CardiffUK

Focus
Group

Appendix1.Summarisingsociodemographicdatacollectedthroughquestionnairesatfocusgroups

Volume10,Issue4(2014)jcer.net

Italy9mths

German

ENG4

IT3

FR2

SP1

TUR1

NGOWorker

Italian

Italy/UK

Canada2yrs;UK
8yrs;Spain1yr

Italian

ENG5

SP5

POR2

35+

Male/Female

Occupation

Nationality

CountryOf
Residence

LivedAbroad

FirstLanguage

German

Unemployed

SP2

GER3

ENG4

SP1

FR1

GER2

English

Spain6mths;
Austria3yrs;
Germany7yrs
Italian

UK

British

Student

LO3

45

18/01/2013

London
UK

Germany

Italian

CulturalManager

BE2

41

08/02/2013

BerlinGermany

CZ2

IT3

ROM3

GER5

ENG5

French

Germany3yrs;UK1yr;
Romania8mths;Czech
Republic2yrs

CzechRepublic

French

HumanRightsofficer

PR1

65

24/01/2013

PragueCzechRepublic

CZ3

SP3

English

CzechRepublic
5yrs

CzechRepublic

RU3

SBCR4

MAC5

ENG5

Bulgarian

Croatia3mths;
Malta6mths;
Macedonia3yrs

Slovenia

Bulgarian

PhDStudent

Admin/education
sector
American

SO1

61

21/01/2013

SofiaBulgaria

PR2

42

27/01/2013

PragueCzech
Republic

CAT5

IT1

ENG3

Spanish

Netherlands2yrs;
Hungary1mth;Russia
1mth;Finland1mth

Spain

Spanish

Journalist

VA1

56

24/01/2013

ValenciaSpain

SP1

FR2

GER4

ENG5

Dutch

Sweden1yr;
Australia2mths

Netherlands

Dutch

Tempclerk

AM1

80

09/02/2013

Amsterdam
Netherlands

RuxandraComanaruandFrancoZappettini

418

LEGEND:CATCatalan;CZCzech;ENGEnglish;FRFrench;GERGerman;GRGreek;HUNHungarian;ITItalian;MACMacedonianPORPortuguese;ROMRomanian;RURussian;SBCRSerboCroatian;
SPSpanish;SWSwedish;TURTurkish.

OtherLanguages;
SelfReported
Proficiency

Germany

2534

1824

BE1

RO1

ParticipantCode

52

16/02/2013

Berlin
Germany

AgeGroup

36

20/04/2010

Date

Duration

RomeItaly

Interview

Appendix2:Summaryofsociodemographicdatacollectedthroughquestionnairesatindividualinterviews

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CorrespondenceAddress
c/oFrancoZappettini,DepartmentofAppliedLinguisticsandCommunication,Birkbeck,Universityof
London,26RussellSquare,LondonWC1B5DT,UnitedKingdom[franco.zappettini@gmail.com]

WeuseapseudonymtoprotecttheanonymityoftheNGO.DC4EwassetupinthepostconstitutionalcrisisoftheTreaty
ofLisbonwhentheEUsoughttoimprovethecommunicationgapbetweencitizensandtheinstitutions,andcitizens
themselveslaunchedPlanDforDemocracy,DialogueandDebate(see
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/decisionmaking_process/a30000_en.htm).
2
Thismeansthatthegeographicallocationofeachgroupisnotnecessarilyreflectedinthenationalcompositionofthat
group(i.e.theCardiffbranchismadeupofRomanian,TurkishaswellasBritishnationals).
3
Insociolinguisticsthetermdiglossiareferstolanguagepracticesinacommunitywherebyahighversionoflanguageis
usedforformalorliterarypurposeswhereasalowversionisusedforeverydayconversation.
4
FormoredetailsoftheEUsmultilingualpoliciesandacritiqueofmeaningsofprotectionandpromotionseeStrubell
(2007).
5
Inthisarticle,languageisunderstoodasboththeobject(multilingualideologies)andthetool(discoursesof
multilingualism)ofinvestigation.
6
Thequestionofthedifferencebetweenlanguagesanddialectshasbeenlongdebatedinlinguisticdisciplines.Froma
linguisticperspective,thedifferencehingesontheirmutualintelligibilitywherebytwomutuallyintelligiblesystemsof
communication(suchasCastellanandCatalan)areconsidereddialectsofthewiderfamilyofRomancelanguages.In
sociolinguistics,thedistinctiontendstorefertothesocioeconomicandhistoricalprestigeorstatusacquiredbyalanguage
throughinstitutionalisationandstandardisation(sothatNorwegianandDanish,forexample,aremutuallyintelligiblebut
areregardedasseparatelanguages).
7
OnthatoccasionitwasdiscussedwhetherMalteseshouldberecognisedasanotherEUofficiallanguagegiventhatitis
spokenbyacomparativelysmallnumberofpeopleand,asthenationallanguageofMalta,itcoexistsalongwithEnglish
(whichhasofficialstatus)andItalian(whichiswidelyspoken)thelattertwoalreadybeingofficiallanguagesoftheEU.In
2007,MaltesewaseventuallygrantedEUofficiallanguagestatusafteratransitionalperiodofthreeyearsduringwhich
theinstitutionswerenotobligedtodraftallactsinMaltese.

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