People v.

Tiu San
G.R. No. L-7301, April 20, 1955
FACTS:
Petitioner, Tiu San alias Angel Gomez was denied certificate of
naturalization on June 3, 1953 by the court due to his conviction on April
25, 1952 for a violation of a municipal ordinance of Lucena, Quezon that
occurred during the intervening two years from promulgation of the
decision for naturalization dated July 13, 1950 pursuant to R.A. No. 530.
The petitioner alleged that, with reference to R.A. No. 530 Sec. 1 clause
(3), this provision is not applicable to the case at bar since the violation of
the aforementioned ordinance occurred prior to the enactment of the said
R.A. No. 530.
ISSUE:
Should R.A. 530 be given retrospective effect?
DECISION:
Yes. By virtue of Sec 4 of R.A. No. 530, except with reference to the date
of the hearing of the petition for naturalization, the said Act was meant to
have a retrospective operation. This section of the Act provides:
This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and shall apply to cases
pending in court and to those where the applicant has not yet taken the
oath of citizenship...

Title: CHAVEZ vs COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS

GR No. 17814, Oct. 31, 1963

Facts: Aquilino de los Reyes bought of a parcel of Riceland

with the intention of working it himself but he could not take
possession of the land because the then incumbent tenant,
Pablo Chavez, did not want to surrender the land to its new
owner. According to Pablo Chavez his son Eugenio Chavez was
working the land for him, he was 74 years of age already.
Aquilino de los Reyes filed a petition with this Court against
Pablo Chavez asking for authority to dispossess said tenant but
suit was dismissed.
Then, Pablo Chavez died of old age (senility) on October 21,
1958. When he died the law governing tenant and landowner

relation is Republic Act No. 1199. Under this statute the

tenancy relationship between the petitioner Chavez and
respondent De los Reyes was terminated by reason of such
death.
On April 8, 1959 Eugenio Chavez filed a petition, this time
R.A. No. 1199 was amended by R.A. No. 2263. Unlike R.A. No.
1199, he amendment provides for the continuance of the
relationship in the event of the tenants death or incapacity
between the landholder and one member of the tenants
immediate farm household who is related to the tenant within
the second degree of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the
land himself personally .

Issue: Can R.A. No. 2263 be applied retroactively?

Decision: NO. Republic Act 2263 cannot be applied
retroactively.
Since the law in force on October 21, 1958, when the tenant
Pablo Chavez died, was Republic Act 1199, under which the
tenancy relationship between him and respondent De los Reyes
was terminated by reason of such death, the subsequent
enactment of Republic Act 2263 did not operate to confer upon
petitioner any successional right to continue as tenant.
In Ulpiendo v. CAR the Court ruled that The amendment to
section 9, Republic Act No. 1199 by Republic Act No. 2263
providing for the continuance of the relationship in the event of
the tenants death or incapacity between the landholder and
one member of the tenants immediate farm household who is
related to the tenant within the second degree of consanguinity
and who shall cultivate the land himself personally which
took effect on 19 June 1959, cannot be applied retroactively.
To hold otherwise would lay open this particular provision of
the law to the objection of unconstitutionality, on the ground
that it impairs a substantive right that has already become
vested.

Title BUYCO vs PNB

GR No. 14406, June 30, 1961
Facts: The petitioner was indebted to respondent
which was secured by a mortgage of real property.
Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment
Certificate that is more than sufficient to cover the
loan which he offered as payment for the deficit on
April 24, 1956.
Respondent denied the offered payment due to its
amended Charter which provides that "...the
authority herein granted shall not be used as regards
backpay certificates", enacted on June 16, 1956 as
RA 1576.
Petitioner filed this case praying that the respondent
be compelled to accept his Backpay
Acknowledgment Certificate as payment of his
obligation.
Issue: Can RA 1576 be applied retroactively?
Decision: NO. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided" (Art. 4, New Civil
Code).
This has bearing on the case at bar inasmuch as the
herein mentioned Act does not contain any provision
regarding its retroactivity.
Therefore, the present case should be governed by
the law at the time the offer in question was made.

DBPV.CAG.R.NO.28774
Facts:
DBP bought 91,188.30 square meters of land, consisting of 159
lots, in the proposed Diliman Estate Subdivision of the PHHC.
However, the sale of the lots to DBP, Lots 2 and 4, which form
part of said 159 lots, were still sold by PHHC to the spouses
Nicandro, for which 2 deeds of sale were issued to them by PHHC.
Upon learning of PHHCs previous transaction with DBP, the
spouses filed a complaint against DBP and the PHHC to rescind
the sale of Lots 2 and 4 by PHHC in favor of DBP. The CFI held
that the sale of Lots 2 and 4, to DBP is null and void, for being in
violation of Section 13 of the DBP Charter.
Issue:
Do the spouses possess the legal personality to question the
legality of the sale?
Held:
Yes. The spouses stand to be prejudiced by reason of their
payment in full of the purchase price for the same lots which had
been sold to DBP by virtue of the transaction in question.The
general rule is that the action for the annulment of contracts can
only be maintained by those who are bound either principally or
subsidiarily by virtue thereof. However, a person who is not
obliged principally or subsidiarily in a contract may exercise an
action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights
with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show the
detriment which could positively result to him from the contract
in which he had no intervention.

TAC-AN vs. CA
G.R. No. L-38736, May 21, 1984
FACTS:
Eleuterio Acopiado and Maximo Acopiado conveyed a parcel of land to
Tac-an through a document entitled Deed of Quitclaim as payment for
legal services. After the execution of the deed, the Acopiados told Tac-an
that they were terminating his services because their wives and parents
did not agree that the land be given to pay for his services and that they
had hired another lawyer, a relative, to defend them. But Tac-an continued
to represent them. Moreover, Eleuterio Acopiado sold his share of the land
previously conveyed to Tac-an to Jesus Paghasian and Pilar Libetario.
On July 2, 1964, Tac-an secured the approval of the Provincial Governor
of Zamboanga del Norte to the Deed of Quitclaim. And on October 7,
1964, he filed a complaint against the Acopiado brothers, Paghasian and
Pilar Libetario in CFI of Zamboanga del Norte praying that he be declared
the owner of the land and that the sale made in favor of Paghasian and
Libetario be annulled and he be paid for damages, attorney s fee, etc. The
CFI decided in favor of Tac-an whereupon the Acopiados, et.al appealed
to CA. The CA voided the transfer of the land to Tac-an applying section
145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu Contracts w/ NonChristians Requisites.
On April 12, 1965 while Tac-an suit was pending in the trial court, the
Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, revoked his approval to the deed of
quitclaim for the reason of Sec. 145 being the Acopiados as nonChristians. The petitioner asserts that the revocation of the approval which
had been given by the Provincial Governor has no legal effect and cannot
affect his right to the land which had already vested.
ISSUE:
Are the requisites in Sec. 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao &
Sulu still necessary when it is already repealed by RA 4252?
HELD:
Yes, because when the deed of quitclaim was executed, when the
approval by the Provincial Governor was given and when the approval was
revoked, Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu
were in full force and effect and since they were substantive in nature, the
repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect. All requisites are still
necessary.

Eugenio v. Drilon
G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996)
FACTS:
Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner, two
lots. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because
of non-development on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two
lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name.
Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to
him. Applying P.D. 957 The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers
Protective Decree, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
ordered Petitioner to complete the development, reinstate Private
Respondents purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him
of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses.
Petitioner claims that the Exec. Sec. erred in applying P.D. 957 saying it
should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development
does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations.
ISSUE:
W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect.
HELD:
No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of
discretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even
those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not
expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly
inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the statute is
the law.
Alunan vs Mirasol
GR No. 108399 July 31, 1997
Facts:

LGC of 1991 provided for an SK in every barangay to be composed of a chairman, 7

members, a secretary and a treasurer, and provided that the first SK elections were
to be held 30 days after the next local elections. The Local Government Code was
enacted January 1, 1992.

The first elections under the code were held May of 1992. August 1992, COMELEC
provided guidelines for the holding of the general elections for the SK on Sept. 30,
1992, which also placed the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of

DILG, with the technical assistance of COMELEC. After postponements, they were
held December 4, 1992.

Registration in 6 districts of Manila was conducted. 152,363 people aged 15-21

registered, 15,749 of them filing certificated of candidacy. The City Council passed
the necessary appropriations for the elections.

September 18, 1992 The DILG, through Alunan, issued a letter-resolution

exempting Manila from holding SK elections because the elections previously held on
May 26, 1990 were to be considered the first SK elections under the new LGC. DILG
acted on a letter by Santiago, acting President of the KB (Kabataang Barangay) City
Federation of Manila and a member of the City Council of Manila, which stated that
elections for the Kabataang Barangay were held on May 26, 1990. In this resolution,
DILG stated that the LGC intended to exempt those barangay chapters which
conducted their KB elections from January 1, 1998 to January 1, 1992 from the
forthcoming SK elections. The terms of those elected would be extended to coincide
with the terms of those elected in the SK elections

Private respondents, claiming to represent 24,000 members of the Katipunan ng

Kabataan, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, arguing that the DILG had no
power to amend the resolutions of the COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs,
and that DILG denied them equal protection of laws.

RTC issued an injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from implementing the
order of the DILG Secretary, and ordered them to perform the specified pre-election
activities in order to implement the general elections. The case was reraffled to a
different branch of the same court, and the new judge held that DILG had no power
to exempt Manila from holding SK elections, because that power rests solely in
COMELEC, and that COMELEC already determined that Manila has not previously held
elections for KB by calling for a general election, and that the exemption of Manila
violated the equal protection clause because of the 5,000 barangays that previously
held elections, only in Manila, 897 barangay, were there no elections.
Issue:
Whether COMELEC can validly vest the DILG with the power of direct control and
supervision over the SK elections with the technical assistance of COMELEC
Whether DILG can exempt an LGU from holding SK elections
Held:

Despite the holding of SK elections in 1996, the case is not moot; it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.

DILG had the authority to determine whether Manila would be required to hold SK
elections.
o
COMELEC vesting DILG with such powers is not unconstitutional. Election for
SK officers are not subject to the supervision of COMELEC in the same way

that contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the

jurisdiction of COMELEC.

Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993

FACTS:
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by
the salvage company against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court. The
case eventuated in petitioners conviction of the crime charged on the
basis that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an
obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Pending litigation,
Ministry of Justice Circular No. 4 (which excludes guarantee check from
application of B.P. Blg. 22) was subsequently reversed by Ministry Circular
No. 12 which ruled that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg.
22. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought
exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional
Trial Court but the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984 declaring the
guarantee check will no longer be considered as a valid defense be
retroactively applied.
HELD:
NO. Decision of the Court of Appeals and RTC were set aside. Criminal
prosecution against accused-petitioner was dismissed.
RATIO:
It would seem that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the
proposition that the Courts decision of September 21, 1987 in Que
v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) that a check issued merely to guarantee
the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22
should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner
and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister
of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar,
fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything
considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear
implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal
liability.
ESTRADA, vs CASEDA
G.R. No. L-1560
Facts:
On September 5, 1945, plaintiff brought this suit, for unlawful detainer,
because one of her married daughters was going to occupy them by the
first of the following month; that defendant refused to leave. On October
13, 1945, Judge Mariano Nable, then of the municipal court, gave
judgment for plaintiff with order for defendant to pay the rent from October
1, 1945, at the rate of P26 a month. On the case being appealed to the
CFI, Judge Rafael Dinglasan presiding, cited "Commonwealth Act No. 689.
The court correctly held that the fact that the premises under lease were
needed by plaintiff's married daughter was not comprehended in the said
Act. The requirements to evict occupants were provided in abovementioned Act, which was approved on October 15, 1945. Section 14 of
that Act provided that the same "shall be in force for a period of two years
after its approval." Republic Act No. 66, approved on October 18, 1946,
amended section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 so as to read as
follows: "Section 14. This Act shall be in force for a period of four years
after its approval."
Issue:
Whether or not there is retroactivity of the amendment of Commonwealth
Act No. 689 By RA No. 66.
Held:
Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66, cannot
be given retroactive effect. The provision of Republic Act No. 66 amending
section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689, related back to, and should be
computed from the date of the approval of the amended act, that is
October 15, 1945. The period as thus construed expired on October 15,
1949.
The cause of action in the case at bar arose before the passage of the
Acts. An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute
had been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form
had been adopted in its stead.

ERECTORS, INC. VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

GR. NO. 104215 MAY 8, 1996
PETITIONER:
ERECTORS, INC.
RESPONDENTS:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JULIO ANDRES,
JR. AND FLORENCIO BURGOS
PONENTE: PUNO,
J:
FACTS:
In September 1979, petitioner recruited private respondent to work as service contract
driver in Saudi for a period of twelve months with a salary of US$165.00 and an
allowance of US$ 165.00 per month. They agreed that private respondent shall be entitled
to a bonus of US$ 1,000.00 if after the 12 month period. He renews or extends his
employment contract without availing of his vacation or home leave. Their contract dated
September 20, 1979 was duly approved by the Ministry of Labor and Employment but it
was not implemented. In December 1979, petitioner notified that the position of a service
driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they executed another contract
which changed the position of private respondent into that helper/laborer with a salary of
US$ 105.00 and an allowance of US$105.00 per month. The second contract was not
submitted to the Ministry of Labor and Employment for approval. On December 18,
1979, private respondent left the country and worked at petitioners Buraidah
Sports Complex project in Saudi Arabia performing the job of a helper/laborer. He
received a salary and monthly allowance of US$210.00 in accordance with the second
contract. Private respondent renewed his contract of employment after one year. His
salary was increased to US$231.00. Private respondent returned to the Philippines on
August 24, 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract. He demanded from the
petitioner the difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said
contract, and the amount actually paid to him, plus the contractual bonus which should
have been awarded to him for not availing of his vacation or home leave credits.
Petitioner denied private respondents claim. On March 31, 1982, private respondent filed
with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against the petitioner for underpayment of wages and
non-payment of overtime pay and contractual bonus. On May 1, 1982, while the case was
still in the conciliation stage, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 797 creating the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) took effect. Section 4(a) of E.O. No. 797
vested the POEA with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including
money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any
law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment.
ISSUE:
Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction in affirming the Labor Arbiters void judgment in the case a quo?
HELD:
NO. the respondent NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding
the jurisdiction of respondent Labor Arbiter over the complaint filed by private
respondent against the petitioner.

ManilaJockeyClub,Inc.v.GamesandAmusementsBoard
G.R.No.L12727February29,1960
FACTS:
TheauthorizedracingdaysspecificallydesignatedanddistributedinSection4of
RepublicActNo.309,thebasiclawonhorseracinginthePhilippines,aslater
amendedbyRepublic ActNo. 983, areasfollows:12SundaysforPhilippine
AntiTuberculosisSociety,6SundaysforPCSO,4SundaysWhiteCross,Inc.,1
SundayforGrandDerbyRaceofPhilippineAntiTuberculosisSocietyand29
Sundaysforprivateindividualsandentities(30forleapyear).RepublicActNo.
1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races of the PCSO to twelve, but
withoutspecifyingthedaysonwhichtheyaretoberun.Toaccommodatethese
additionalraces,theGamsandAmusementsBoard(GAB)resolvedtoreducethe
numberofSundaysassignedtoprivateindividualsandentitiesbysix.Appellants
protested, contending that the said increased should be taken from the 12
SaturdaysreservedtothePresident,forcharitable,relief,orcivicpurposes,or
shouldbeassignedtoanyotherdayoftheweekbesidesSunday,Saturday,and
legalholiday.
ISSUE:
Whetherornottheadditionalsweepstakesshouldbeinsertedintheclubracesin
relationtothedebateintheHouseofRepresentativesbeforevotingonHouseBill
No.5732
HELD:
Legislativedebatesareexpressiveoftheviewsandmotivesofindividualmembers
andarenotsafeguidesand,hence,maynotberesortedtoinascertainingthe
meaningandpurposeofthelawmakingbody.Itisimpossibletodeterminewith
certaintywhatconstructionwasputuponanactbythemembersofthelegislative
bodythatpassedthebill,byresortingtothespeechesofthemembersthereof.
Thosewhodidnotspeak,maynothaveagreedwiththosewhodid;andthosewho
spoke,mightdifferfromeachother.Inviewoftheseconflictingauthorities,no
appreciablereliancecansafelybeplacedonanyofthem.Itistobenotedinthe
specificcasebeforeus,thatwhileCongressmenMarcosandAbeledawere,
admittedly,oftheviewthattheadditionalsweepstakesracesmaybeinsertedin
theclubraces,stillthereisnothinginRepublicActNo.1502,asitwasfinally
enacted,whichwouldindicatethatsuchanunderstandingonthepartofthesetwo
membersoftheLowerHouseofCongresswerereceivedthesanctionor
conformityoftheircolleagues,forthelawisabsolutelydevoidofanysuch

indication.Upontheotherhand,atthetimeoftheenactmentofRepublicActNo.
1502inJune,1956,thelong,continuous,anduniformpracticewasthatall
sweepstakesdrawsandraceswereheldonSundaysandduringthewholeday.
Withthisbackground,whenCongresschosenottospecifyinexpresstermshow
theadditionalsweepstakesdrawsandraceswouldbeheld,itissafetoconclude
thatitdidnotintendtodisturbthethenprevailingsituationandpractice.Onthe
principleofcontemporaneousexposition,commonusageandpracticeunderthe
statute,oracourseofconductindicatingaparticularundertakingofit,will
frequentlybeofgreatvalueindeterminingitsrealmeaning,especiallywherethe
usagehasbeenacquiredinbyallpartiesconcernedandhasextendedoveralong
periodoftime(Optimusinterpresrerumusus).

Sarcos v. Castillo
G.R. No. L-29755 (January 31, l969)
FACTS:
Petitioner, the elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was charged with
misconduct and dishonesty in office by Respondent, the Provincial
Governor of Surigao del Sur. The act, constituting the alleged dishonesty
and misconduct in office consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner
with certain private individuals in the cutting and selling of timber or logs for
their own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the public and of
the government. And on the basis of such administrative complaint,
Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension by Respondent
pursuant to Sec. 5, of RA No. 5185, otherwise known as the
Decentralization Act of l967.

ISSUE:
W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive
suspension under the Decentralization Act of l967.
HELD:
The new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on
the Provincial Board. The purpose of this was to prevent partisan
considerations by vesting the power on a board where no one person may
have monopoly over the power of suspension. The Provincial Governor
may no longer have the power of preventive suspension over a Municipal
Mayor.

Montelibano v. Ferrer
Facts:
In 1940, the Subdivision Inc, of which Montelibano is the president and
general manager, leased a lot to Benares for five years, with an option in
favor of Benares of another five crop years. On 1951, the
Subdivision instituted against Benares an unlawful detainer case which
rendered a decision ordering him to eject from the said lot. However,
Benares continued planting on the said lot, instead of delivering it to
Subdivision. Acting upon Montelibano, his co-petitioners cleared the land
of sugarcane planted by Benares. Hence, a criminal case was filed by
Benares against petitiioners. A warrant of arrest was then filed to the
petitioners. Monteibano and his companions filed a motion to quash the
complaint and warrant of arrest A civil case against Municipal Judge and
Benares was filed alleging that the said judge had o jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the criminal case.
Issue:
Whether or not the municipal court may entertain the criminal case relying
upon CA 326, section 22 (Charter of the City of Bacolod) which provides
that the City Attorney shall charge of the prosecution of all crimes,
misdemeanors, and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First
Instance and the Municipal Court of Bacolod.
Held:
No, the Judge of Municipal Court has no jurisdiction over the case.
In the interpretation of reenacted statutes the court will follow the
construction which they received when previously in force. The legislature
will be presumed to know the effect which such status originally had, and

by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same effect.
Two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose and terminology should, each
in its own field, have a like interpretation, unless in particular instances
there is something peculiar in the question under consideration, or
dissimilar in the terms of the act relating thereto, requiring a different
conclusion.
In the case at bar, the same provisions were contested in Sayo v. Chief of
Police wherein it was held that in the City of Manila, criminal complaints
may be filed only with the City Fiscal who is given the exclusive authority
to institute criminal cases in the different courts of said city, under the
provisions of its Charter found in Sec 39 of Act # 183. The provisions of
the Charter of City of Bacolod which are substantially identical to that of
Manila should then be interpreted the same.
Therefore, the decision appealed is reversed and the warrant of arrest
issued by the judge shall be annulled.

American Bible Society v. City of Manila

Facts:
In the course of its ministry, ABS has been distributing and selling bibles
and/or gospels throughout Philippines and translating the same into
several Philippine dialects. On May 1953, the acting City Treasurer of
Manila informed ABS that it was conducting the business of general
merchandise since November 1945 without providing the city with Mayor's
permit and municipal license in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as
amended and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028, 3364 and required plaintiff to
secure within three days the permit and license fees, together with
compromise covering the period from fourth quarter of 1945 to second
quarter of 1952 in P5, 281.45. ABS protested about the requirement but
paid to the defendant the said permit and license fees in the said amount.
Issue:
Whether or no the Ordinances of Manila Nos. 3000 as amended, and
2529, 3028 and 3364 are applicable to the case at bar.
Held:
Yes, the city ordinances mentioned are still in force and effect.
When the old statute is repealed in its entirety and by the same enactment
re-enacts all or certain portions of the pre-existing law, the majority view
holds that the rights and liabilities whihc have accrued under the original

statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the reenactment

neutralizeds the repeal, therefore continueing the law in force without
interruption.
In the case at bar, Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000 of the city of Manila
were enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by virtue of the
power granted to it by section 2444, subsection (m-2) of the Revised
Administrative Code, superseded on June 18, 1949, by section 18,
subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila. The only essential difference between these two
provisions is that while subsection (m-2) prescribes that the combined total
tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under subsections
(m-1) and (m-2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned
therein,shall not be in excess of P500 per annum, the corresponding
section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not contain any
limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to
pay per annum. Hence, and in accordance with the weight of the
authorities above referred to that maintain that "all rights and liabilities
which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be
enforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore
continuing the law in force without interruption", We hold that the
questioned ordinances of the City of Manila are still in force and effect.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court

of Tax Appeals [G.R. No. L-52306.
October 12, 1981]
Facts: During the period pertinent to this case,
petitioner corporation was engaged in the business of
telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from
foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business
within the Philippines. for which petitioner paid rentals
after withholding income tax of 30%of one-half of the
film rentals. In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax
Code, the Commissioner issued General Circular V-

334. Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp.

dutifully withheld and turned over to the BIR 30% of
of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not
engaged in trade or business in the Philippines. The
last year that the company withheld taxes pursuant to
the Circular was in 1968. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431
amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing
the tax rate from 30% to 35% and revising the tax
basis from such amount referring to rents, etc. to
gross income. In 1971, the Commissioner issued a
letter of assessment and demand for deficiency
withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968. The
company requested for reconsideration; where the
Commissioner did not act upon.
Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71,
revoking General Circular V-334, may be retroactively
applied.
Held: Rulings or circulars promulgated by the
Commissioner have no retroactive application where
to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers.
Herein ,the prejudice the company of the retroactive
application of Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond
question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years
after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld
taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The
assessment and demand on petitioner to pay
deficiency withholding income tax was also made
three years after 1968 for a period of time
commencing in 1965. The company was no longer in

a position to withhold taxes due from foreign

corporations because it had already remitted all film
rentals and had no longer control over them when the
new circular was issued. Insofar as the enumerated
exceptions are concerned, the company does not fall
under any of them.

Mecano vs. COA (G.R. No. 103982.

December 11, 1992)
16
APR
ANTONIO
A.
AUDIT, respondent.

MECANO, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION

ON

Ponente: CAMPOS, JR.

FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that

he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised

Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA)
Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioners claim on the ground
that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative
Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same
section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also
anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by
Secretary Drilon stating that the issuance of the Administrative Code did
not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative
Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment
of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its
entirety the RAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated
Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
HELD:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on
petitioners claim for benefits.
RATIO:
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later
date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a
prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before
there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the
lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old
one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at
least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation
of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two
acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by
implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on
the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
The two Codes should be read in pari materia.

Title: ORTIZ vs COMELEC

GR No. 78957, June 28, 1988
Facts:
The petitioner was appointed as COMELEC
Commissioner by then President Marcos for a term
expiring on May 17, 1992. Following the installation
of the Aquino government, the petitioner submitted a
"courtesy resignation" which was accepted by
President Aquino. The petitioner requested for
payment of retirement benefits by invoking RA 1568,
as amended by RA 3595 and re-enacted by RA 6118,
which was denied by the respondent on the ground
that he is "not entitled to retirement benefits under
RA 1568, as amended" without specifying the reason
therefor.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to retirement
benefits as provided by RA 1568 and re-enacted by
RA 6118.

Decision:
YES. RA 6118 as a retirement law is remedial in
character which should be liberally construed and
administered in favor of the persons intended to
benefit thereby. This is, as it should be, because the
liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian
purposes of the law in order that the efficiency,

security and well-being of government employees

may be enhanced.

US v. Soliman
Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1917/jan1917/gr_l11555_1917.html
Facts:
Soliman, testifying in his on behalf in the course of another criminal case in
which he, with several others, was charged with estafa, swore falsely to
certain material allegations of fact. He testified falsely that a sworn
statement offered in evidence in support of the charge of estafa, which was
in effect an extrajudicial confession of his guilt, had not been executed
voluntarily, and that its execution had not been procured by the police by
the use of force, intimidation and prolonged torture. The trial judge who
presided in the former case acquitted him on the ground that there was
room for reasonable doubt. Soliman is however, guilty of perjury as defined
and penalized in Section 3 of Act No. 1697. However, since judgement was
entered on November 1915, section 3 of Act No. 1697 was expressly
repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code which was effective
on july 1, 1916 and it has been suggested that the judgement convicting
and sentencing the accused under the provisions of that statute should not
be sustained and the repeal of the statute should be held to have the effect
of remitting and extinguishing the criminal liability of the accused incurred
under the provisions of the repealed law prior to the enactment of the
Administrative Code.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the repeal of Section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the
enactment of the Administrative code had the effect of providing new and
distinct penalties for the commission of the crime of perjury.
(2) Whether or not the new penalties are more favorable to the convict in
the case at bar than those imposed by the trial judge.
Held:
(1) Section 3 of Act No. 1697, which defined and penalized the crime of
perjury, repealed the provisions of the Penal Code defining and penalizing
the crime of perjury, not expressly, but by implication, and we are of
opinion that the repeal of Act No. 1697 revived those provisions of the

code. The old rule continues in force where a law which repeals a prior law,
not expressly but by implication, it itself repealed; and that in such cases
the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of
the repealing statute provides otherwise. In the case at bar, the express
repeal of section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the Administrative
Code (Act No. 2657) revived the provisions of the Penal Code touching
perjury, which were themselves repealed, not expressly but by implication,
by the enactment of Act No. 1697.
(2) The penalties prescribed in the Penal Code is less than that imposed in
Section 3 of Act # 1697. Hence, the penalty imposed by the court below
must be revoked and the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code should be
imposed.

Gaerlan vs Catubig
GR No. 23964, June 1, 1966
Facts:
In the 1963 elections, among the registered candidates for
councilors in the eight -seat City Council of Dagupan were
Gregorio Gaerlan and Luis Catubig. The latter obtained the third
highest number of votes and was proclaimed one of the elected
councilors while the former lost his bid. Gaerlan went to the Court
to challenge Catubigs eligibility for office on the averment of nonage. Catubig was born in Dagupan City on May 19, 1939. At the
time he presented his certificate of candidacy on September 10,
1963, he was 24 years, 3 months and 22 days; on election day,
November 12, 1963, he was 24 years, 5 months and 24 days; and at

the time he took his oath of office as councilor on January 1,

1964,3 he was 24 years, 7 months and 13 days. Whether his age be
reckoned as of the date of the filing of certificate of candidacy, or
the election date, or the date set by law for the assumption of office
the - result is the same. Whichever date is adopted, still, respondent
was below 25 years of age. The judgment held Catubig ineligible
and declared his seat vacant.
Catubig appealed and alleged that the question of age eligibility
should be governed not by R.A. 170, and not by R.A. 2259.
Republic Act No. 484 amending, inter alia, Section 12 of the
Dagupan City Charter, took effect on June 10, 1950; whereas,
Republic Act No. 2259 became law on June 19, 1959 - nine years
later.
R .A . 170, as amended
Sec. 12 x xx the elective members of the Municipality Board
shall be qualified
electors of the city, residents therein for at least one year, and
not less than twenty- three years of age. xxx"
R .A .2 2 5 9
Sec. 6.No person shall be a City Mayor, Vice-Mayor, or
Councilor unless he is at least twenty-five years of age, resident
of the city for one year prior to his election and is a qualified
voter.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 12 of R.A. 170 of the Dagupan City Charter,
as amended, has been repealed by Sec. 6 of R.A. 2259
Decision:
Yes. The judgment appealed from was affirmed. The question of
whether or not a special law has been repealed or amended by one
or more subsequent general laws is dependent mainly on the intent
of the Congress in enacting the latter. The discussions on the floor
of Congress show beyond doubt that its members intended to
amend o r repeal all provisions of special laws inconsistent with

the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259, except those which are
expressly excluded from the operation thereof. In fact, Section 9 of
R.A. 2259 states that
All Acts or parts of Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations
in consistent with theprovisions of this Ac t, are hereby repealed.
Section 1 of R.A. 2259 makes reference to "all chartered cities in
the Philippines,
whereas Section 8 excludes from the operation of the Act "the
cities of Manila, Cavite, Trece Martires and Tagaytay", and Section
4 contains a proviso exclusively for the City of Baguio, thus
showing clearly that all cities not particularly excepted from the
provisions of said Act are subject thereto. The only reference to
Dagupan City in R.A. 2259 is found in Section 2 stating that voters
in said city, and in the City of Iloilo, are expressly precluded to
vote for provincial officials.
Since Dagupan City is removed from the exceptions of R.A. 2259,
it stands to reason itself that its charter provision on the age limit is
thereby repealed. Until Congress decrees otherwise, we are not to
tamper with the present statutory set-up. Rather, we should go by
what the legislative body has expressly ordained. It is accordingly
held that respondent is disqualified on the ground of non -age
because at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, at the time
of the election, and at the time he took his oath of office, he was
below the age of 25 years.
Iloilo palay and corn Planters assn. vs Feliciano 13 SCRA 377
(Quico's version)
Facts:
On December 26, 1964, Jose y. Feliciano, chairman and general manager
of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines
urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a
government agency which the president may designate, pursuant to the
recommendation of the national economic council as embodied in its
resolution no. 70, series of 1964.
On December 28,1964, the cabinet approve d the needed importation after

the said referral of the president. The chairman Jose y. Feliciano of the rice
and corn administration announced an invitation to bid for said importation
and set the bidding for February 1, 1965. The said facts were all pursuant
to a certain provision in republic act 2207.
Considering the said importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the
government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating
funds to finance the same, the petitioners together with Ramon A.
Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this
court asking for a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents.
Issue:
WON RA 2207 was impliedly repealed by RA 3452?
Held:
Republic Act 2207 still stands. RA 3452 only authorizes importation during
normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of such gravity
as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These
two laws, therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not
ensue.
A repealing clause in an Act which provides that all laws or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed.
Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the
condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior
Acts.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was
not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no
such inconsistency.
Wherefore, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued
by this court is hereby dissolved. Cost against petitioners.

Lagman vs. City of Manila 17 SCRA 579 (1966) (Quico's version)

Facts:
Petitioner was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public
service Commission to operate for public service fifteen (15) auti trucks
with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers
and freight. Pursuant to the said certificate, petitioner who is doing
business under the name and style of Marco Transit, began operating

twelve (12) passenger buses along his authorized line.

On june 17, 1964, the Municipal Board of respondent City of Manila, in
pursuance to section 18, paragraph hh, of RA no. 409, as amended
(otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila), enacted
ordinance no. 4986, entitled an ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and
Streets within the City of Manila, and for other purposes, which the city
mayor approved. The pertinent provisions of said ordinance includes;
Section 1. As a positive measure to relieve the critical congestion in the
City of Manila, which has grown to alarming and emergency proportions,
and in the best interest of public welfare and convenience, xxx
Petitioner Lagman claims that the enactment and enforcement of
ordinance no. 4986 is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void.
He contends that regulation and control relating to the use of and traffic of
which are vested, under Commonwealth Act no. 548, in the Director of
Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. He also contends that the public Service Commission
has the only right to enact Ordinance amending or modifying a certificate
of public convenience granted by the said office. In compliance with Sec.
16(m), public service Act.
Issue:
WON R.A. no. 409, as amended (Revised charter of the City of Manila)
prevails over Commonwealth Act no. 598 and Public Service law (C.A. no.
146, as amended)?
Held:
Republic act no. 409 prevails. The said act is a special law and of later
enactment than C.A. no 548 and the Public Service law (C.A. no 146, as
amended) so that even if a conflict exist between the provisions of the
former and the latter acts, Republic Act no. 409 should prevail.
Although the Public Service Commission is empowered, under Sec. 16(m)
of C.A. no 146 to amend, modify or revoke certificates of public
convenience after notice and hearing, there is no provision which can be
found in this statute vesting power in the Public Service Commission to
superintend, regulate or control the streets of the city of manila or suspend
its power to license or prohibit the occupancy thereof. On the other hand,
this authority is conferred upon the city of manila. The power vested in the
public service commission under section 16(m) is, therefore, subordinate
to the authority granted to the said city under section 18(hh) of its revised
charter.
Furthermore, C.A. no. 548 does not confer an exclusive power or authority
upon the Director of public works------to promulgate rules and regulations
relating to the use of and traffic on national roads and streets. This being

the case, section 18(m) of the revised charter of the city of manila is
deemed enacted as an exception to the provisions of C.A. no. 548, for
repeals by implication are not favored, and special law must be taken as
intended to constitute an exception to the general law, in the absence of
special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
Wherefore, petition for prohibition is hereby dismissed. With cost against
petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman.

National Power Corporation vs Arca

GR No. 23309, Oct. 31, 1968
Facts:
On December 26, 1963, the Philippine Power and Development
Company(PPDC) and the Dagupan Electric Corporation (DEC), in their
own behalf and on that of all the electric plant operators, who are members
of the Philippine Electric Plant Owners' Association (PEPOA), filed an
injunction suit to restrain enforcement by the NAPOCOR of a revised rate
of charges for electric power and energy sold by the latter, which was
scheduled to take effect on January 1, 1964. The petition alleged that the
unilateral revision by NAPOCOR of the rate and its imposition upon PPDC
and DEC of the amended contracts embodying said new rates, without first
submitting them to arbitration, was in gross violation of the provisions of
the current contracts between them.
Issue:
Whether Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 120 has been repealed by R.A.
2677.
Held:
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 120 has not been repealed by R.A. 2677.
The court held that a special law, like Com. Act No. 120, providing for a
particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute,
general in its terms, like Republic Act. No. 2677, although the terms of the
general statute are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the
special law, in the absence of a clear intent to repeal. There appears no
such legislative intent to repeal or abrogate the provisions of the earlier
law. From the explanatory note to House Bill No. 4030, that later become
Republic Act No. 2677, it was explicit that the jurisdiction conferred upon
the Republic Service Commission over the public utilities operated by
government-owned or controlled corporations is to be confined to the fixing

of rates of such public services, ' in order to avoid cutthroat or ruinous and
unfair competition detrimental to operators and to the public interests.

People vs Pimentedl
G.R. No. 100210. April 1, 1998
Facts: In 1983, Tujan was charged with possession of illegal
firearms and in 1990 he was once again charged of the same and
was posed with no bail. The counsel of the defendant then filed a
motion to quash the case where the petitioner opposed standing
that Tujan was not in double jeopardy. Petitioner now comes to
this Court, claiming that: (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals
is not in accord with the law and applicable jurisprudence; and
(2) it was deprived of due process to prosecute and prove its case
against private respondent Antonio Tujan in Criminal Case No.
1789.

Issue: Whether the respondent court erred in not applying the

accord law and jurisprudence?

Held: The Court of Appeals considered as duplicitous the

Information for violation of P.D. No. 1866 filed against private
respondent Antonio Tujan. The ruling of the Court of Appeals is
erroneous.

G.R. No. 137174 July 10, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the POLLUTION
ADJUDICATION
BOARD (DENR)
vs.
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION
FACTS:
Respondent MMC was issued a temporary permit to operate a tailings sea disposal
system. In the meantime, the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) was
abolished by EO No. 192 dated June 10, 1987, and its powers and functions were
integrated into the Environmental Management Bureau and into the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB). On April 11, 1988, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as
Chairman of the PAB, issued an Order directing MMC to "cease and desist from
discharging mine tailings into Calancan Bay." This was appealed by the MMC with the
Office of the President (OP). In line with the directive from the OP, the Calancan Bay
Rehabilitation Project (CBRP) was created, and MMC remitted the amount of P30,000.00
a day, starting from May 13, 1988 to the Ecology Trust Fund (ETF) thereof. However, on
June 30, 1991, MMC stopped discharging its tailings in the Bay, hence, it likewise ceased
from making further deposits to the ETF. The PAB sought for the enforcement of the
order issued by the OP, however, the CA acted on Marcoppers petition and ordered the
PAB to refrain and desist from enforcing aforesaid Order. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Republic Act No. 7942 repealed the provisions
of Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984, with respect to
the power and function of petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board to issue, renew or
deny permits for the discharge of the mine tailings.
HELD:
The SC held that the CA erred in ruling that the PAB had no authority to issue the Order
from the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the PAB has been divested of authority to act
on pollution-related matters in mining operations is anchored on the provisions of RA
7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995). However, Section 19 of EO 192 vested the PAB
with the specific power to adjudicate pollution cases in general. Sec. 2, par. (a) of PD 984
defines the

Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole
Full Text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/dec1995/gr_108072_1995.html
Facts:

On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against
Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public officials
of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson, Baricede. There respondents
were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), as amended,Articles 170 (falsification of legislative
documents) and 171 (falsification by public officers) of the Revised Penal
Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of
Public Officers). The respondent officials were allegedly causing alteration
of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allotted appropriation from
P3.5M to P7M without authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Mandaue.
The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try,
hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under
Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to
investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials,
as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with
the Office of the President. On September 1992, a TRO against Hagad
was filed and granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him
from enforcing suspension.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898)
has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations
over local elective official by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160.
Held:
No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA
6770 is not removed by LG Code of 1991.
There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has
repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the
Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are
not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold
one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws
by implication are not favored, 16 and that courts must generally assume
their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible,
and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied
repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform

system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be

presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against
any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize
and give effect to all laws on the subject.
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose
preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that
time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became
concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770,
specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common
grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did
not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being
only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government
by the Office of the President.

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGOvs.

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
x -xG.R. No. 193036REP.
EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.vs.EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President
with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to

warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin
the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power
of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its
operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the
Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency
does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it
vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating,
if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created
under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively
targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the
previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even
as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present,
who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of
petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include
the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No.
9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate
funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds
already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the

functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding

body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause
because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and
question E. O. No. 1;2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ;4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent
the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain
inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as
legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in
danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in

interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or

defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the
plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He
has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to
make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and
the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however,
finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are
faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to
those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized
powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionallymandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows
from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have
been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President
is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in
the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of
existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part
of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There
is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided
for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for
the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their

respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the

commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints
before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the
class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to
investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent
to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class
of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating

differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle

for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC
must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation
to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws
that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for
being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.