REPUBLIC VS.

CA AND NAGUIT
G. R. No.144057
January 17, 2005
Tinga, J.
FACTS:
Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of
title which seeks judicial confirmation of her imperfect
title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged
that Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have
occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even
the government until she filed her application for
registration. The MCTC rendered a decision confirming
the title in the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico
Angeles to appear during trial after filing his formal
opposition to the petition.
The Solicitor General, representing the Republic
of the Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration on
the grounds that the property which is in open,
continuous and exclusive possession must first be
alienable. Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide
claim of ownership since the subject land was declared
as alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980.
The alienable and disposable character of the land
should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14
(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the
subject land be first classified as alienable and
disposable before the applicants possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership could even
start.
RULING:
Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of
title is filed.
There are three requirements for registration of
title, (1) that the subject property is alienable and
disposable; (2) that the applicants and their
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
and exclusive possession and occupation, and; (3) that
the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945.
There must be a positive act of the government
through a statute or proclamation stating the intention of
the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property, thus, declaring the land as alienable and
disposable. However, if there has been none, it is
presumed that the government is still reserving the right
to utilize the property and the possession of the land no
matter how long would not ripen into ownership through
acquisitive prescription.
To follow the Solicitor Generals argument in the
construction of Section 14 (1) would render the

paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would

mean that all lands of public domain which were not
declared as alienable and disposable before June 12,
1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant. In effect, it precludes the government from
enforcing the said provision as it decides to reclassify
lands as alienable and disposable.
The land in question was found to be cocal in
nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now
over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but
confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence
agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the
continuous possession by her and her predecessors-ininterest of the land since 1945.

Heirs of Lacamen v Heirs of Laruan

65 SCRA 605
Facts: Laruan executed a deed of sale in favor of
Lacamen which was duly notarized. Immediately after
the sale, Laruan delivered the certificate of title to
Lacamen. Thereupon, Lacamen entered in possession
and occupancy of the land, introduced improvements
therein, without securing the corresponding certificate of
title. The document was also not approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes whose
approval is necessary in order for the Deed to be valid.
This rule bounds the contracting parties considering that
they belong to the illiterate non-Christians. Later on, after
the death of Laruan, his heirs discovered that Laruans
heirs were able to obtain a new owners certificate of
title. Hence, they sued Laruans heirs for reconveyance.
The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the heirs
of Laruan whose decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: WON estoppel by laches applies.
Held: Laruans sale of the subject lot to Lacamen could
have been valid were it not for the sole fact that it lacked
the approval of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes
considering that there was impressed upon its face full
faith and credit after it was notarized. However,
notwithstanding the invalidity of the sale, the fact that
when the Lacamens succeeded to the estate of their
father, the Laruans kept silent, never claiming that the lot
is their own. Even granting that no prescription lies
against their fathers record title, their inaction for almost
30 years commands the imposition of laches. Hence, the
Lacamens were declared as the owners of the land.
BINALAY VS. MANALO

A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is not

the alluvial process contemplated in Art. 457. The
accumulation of the soil deposits must be slow and
hardly imperceptible in order for the riparian owner to
acquire ownership thereof. Also, the land where the
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the
rivers (or the sea coast).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of
accretion

FACTS

RULING: No.

Manalo acquired 2 lots which were originally owned by

Judge Taccad from 2 different people (the latters
daughter and from an earlier purchaser). These lots
were later consolidated into Lot 307, a total of 10.45
hectares. The lot was beside the Cagayan River, which,
due to flooding, would place a portion of the land
underwater during the rainy season (September to
December). On sunny days, however, the land would be
dried up for the entire dry season (January to August).
When a survey of the land was conducted on a rainy
month, a portion of the land that Manalo bought was
then underwater and was thus left unsurveyed and
excluded from Lot 307.

The disputed property is not an accretion. It is the action

of the heavy rains that cause the highest ordinary level
of waters of the Cagayan River during the rainy season.
The depressed portion is a river bed and is thus
considered property of public domain.

The big picture is this: Cagayan River running from

south to north, forks at a certain point to form two
braches (western and eastern) and then unites at the
other end, further north, to form a narrower strip of land.
The eastern branch of the river cuts through Lot 307,
and is flooded during the rainy season. The unsurveyed
portion, on the other hand, is the bed of the eastern
branch. Note that the fork exists only during the rainy
season while the island/elongated strip of land formed
in the middle of the forks becomes dry and perfect for
cultivation when the Cagayan river is at its ordinary
depth. The strip of land in the middle of the fork totaled
22.7 hectares and was labeled Lot 821-822. Lot 821 is
directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated by the eastern
branch of the rivers fork.
Manalo claims that Lot 821 belongs to him by way of
accretion to the submerged portion of the land to which it
is adjacent. Petitioners (Binalay, et al) who possess the
Lot 821, on the other hand, insist that they own it. They
occupy the other edges of the lot along the river bank
(i.e. the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and
other agricultural products) and also cultivate the
western strip during the summer.
Manalo filed 2 cases for forcible entry which were both
dismissed. Later on, he filed a complaint for quieting of
title, possession, and damages against petitioner. The
trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Manalo, saying
that Lot 821 and Lot 307 cannot be considered separate
and distinct from each other. They reasoned that when
the land dries up for the most part of the year, the two
are connected. [Note: The CA applied the ruling in Govt
of the Phil Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, which was
actually inappropriate because the subject matter in this
case was a lake so that the definition of a bed was
different.]

The SC observed the following:

a) The pictures identified by Manalo during his direct
examination depict the depressed portion as a river bed.
The dried up portion had dike-like slopes (around 8m) on
both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are
vertical and very prominent.
b) The eastern bed already existed even before Manalo
bought the land. It was called Rio Muerte de Cagayan.
c) Manalo could not have acquire ownership of the land
because article 420 of the civil code states that rivers are
property of public dominion. The word river includes
the running waters, the bed, and the banks. [The seller
never actually owned that part of the land since it was
public property]
d) The submerged area (22.72 ha) is twice the area of
the land he actually bought. It is difficult to suppose that
such a sizable area could have been brought about by
accretion.
More importantly, the requisites of accretion in article
457 were not satisfied. These are: 1) that the deposition
of the soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; 2)
that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river
(or sea); and 3) the land where the accretion takes place
is adjacent to the banks of the rivers (or the sea coast).
The accretion shouldve been attached to Lot 307 for
Manalo to acquire its ownership. BUT, the claimed
accretion lies on the bank of the river; not adjacent to Lot
307 but directly opposite it across the river. Aside from
that, the dike-like slopes which were very steep may only
be formed by a sudden and forceful action like flooding.
The steep slopes could not have been formed by the
river in a slow and gradual manner.
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998
FACTS:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved
granting authority to all municipalities and chartered
cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense
the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of
any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish,
provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and
adequate docking and harbor facilities as such

municipalities and chartered cities may determine in

consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution

(Land Titles and Deeds)

Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed

by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore
lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an
agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the
said project.

FACTS:

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a

corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired
from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land

possession of the Infiels over the

landdates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan

land sought to be registered is a private

land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute
ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes
on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land
or within the public domain

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has

introduced more than P45M worth of improvements

ownership and possession of the land

sought to be registered was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of
Maconacon, Isabela

donated part of the land as the

townsite of Maconacon Isabela

IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of

ISSUES:
1.
W/N the land is already a private land - YES
2.
W/N the constitutional prohibition against their
acquisition by private corporations or associations
applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
1.
YES

already acquired, by operation of law not only a

right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it
is not necessary that a certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the courts, an application therefore is sufficient

it had already ceased to be of the public

domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption

The application for confirmation is mere

formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the
patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent.

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not

to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was

already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962
when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to
make such acquisition

The only limitation then extant was that

corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

Republic questioned the agreement. It contended,

among others, that the agreement between RREC and
the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract
is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore
land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object
in question is within the commerce of man because RA
1899 gives a broader meaning on the term foreshore
land than that in the definition provided by the
dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and
RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA with
modifications.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the term foreshore land includes the
submerged area.
II.
Whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area
is within the commerce of man.
I.

HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and
unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent
court that the term foreshore land includes the
submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands"
refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low
water marks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or
stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water
line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace
and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually
marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA
1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much
less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of
Congress were to include submerged areas, it should
have provided expressly. That Congress did not so
provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged
areas from the term foreshore lands.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City
Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158,
and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be
outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and
therefore ultra vires and null and void.
Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest: Director Of Lands
V. IAC (1986)
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

Director of Lands v. Abairo, 90 SCRA 422

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. ABAIRO, 90 SCRA
422 (1979)
FACTS: Petitioner contended that CFI of Isabela should
have dismissed the application for registration based on
an imperfect or incomplete title because it has no
jurisdiction over it inasmuch as it was filed on March 1,
1971, that is, after December 31, 1968, the expiry date
for filing such kind of application under RA 2061. The
latest extension of the period to December 31, 2020
within which to file said applications, as provided in
Section 2, RA 9176, shall apply where the area applied
for does not exceed 12 hectares.
ISSUE: Whether or not the application is valid despite
being filed after the period expired and before the
extension was granted.
RULING: Yes. It is clear from the law itself that those
who applied for judicial confirmation of their title at any
time prior to the cut-off date of December 31, 1976 did
so on time, even if such application was filed during the
intervening period from January 1, 1969 to June 18,
1971. Respect should be given to the obvious intention
of the lawmaker in extending the period for filing such
applications time and again, to give full opportunity to
those who are qualified under the law to own disposable
lands of the public domain and thus reduce the number
of landless among the citizenry.
Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands

the Government, either

EXCEPTION: Lands under private

time immemorial.

ownership since

Application for decree of registration is a

condition precedent to acquisition of title. Noncompliance gives rise to mere possessory right.

Whether or not Oh Cho had title

Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree
of registration

HELD:
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which
may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act.
All lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and
of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or
that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest.
The applicant does not come under the exception, for
the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor
in interest began in 1880.
Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a
decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.

G.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946

GR: All lands are acquired from
by purchase or by grant.

ISSUEs:

An alien cannot acquire title to lands of the

public domain by prescription.

FACTS:
Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the
Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they
openly, continuously and adversely possessed since
1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied
for registration of this land. The Solicitor General
opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said
land and also because he was an alien.

Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been

entitled toa decree of registration had they applied for
the same. The application for the registration of the
land was a condition precedent, which was not complied
with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was
mere possessory right, not title. This possessory right
was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter
is an alien, the possessory right could never ripen
to ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is
disqualified from acquiring title over public land
by prescription.