,

wouJd appear tho.l these temperament types arc very likely of

universal recu rrence. TIm! is, there is an 3scertaimlble range of
human behavior Ihal is fOWld wherever a sufficiently large series of individuals is observed. But thE" proportion in whicll behavior tyf".'S stand to one another in d ifferent societies is not
universal. The vast majority of the u,dividuals in an)' group are
shaped \ 0 the fall hion of thai culhlre. In other words, most indi viduals are plastic to the ma uldins, force of the society into
which they arc born . In a society thtll val ues trance, as in India,
they will have supcmorm;ll experience. In a society thai insl1lutionali.zes homosexuality. they w ill be homosexual. In ;\ society that sets the sathering o f possessions as Ii'll' duef human
objective, they will amasS property. The devi,tnts, whatever the
Iype of bfoha vior the culture has mstitutionalizcd. will remam
no
di.fficulty in mouldlew in numbel. and there
ing that vast malleable majority to the "normality" of what we
delusions of reference, than
consider an aberrant trait. such
to the normality o f such acce pted beha vior p atterns as acquisThe s null proportion of the number of the deviants
in any o..:ulture is not a function of the sure instinct with which
thai society has buil t rlsClf upon the fun damental SJ.n.ities, but
of lhl!' unive rsal fact that, happily. the majority of mankind
quite readily take any shape that is
to them .

Moral Absolutes Must Be

Learned
ARISTOTLE

Aristotle (:l84-322 n.c.) and his teacher. Pla to. are the two an.
cient Greek philosophers who have most influenced Westem
lhought. Aristotle was an encyclopedic thinker who studied
nea rly every branch of
that was known ill hls da y.
His work included but was not limited to physics. meta.
physics. politics, biology, and ethics. The present selecLion is
taken from his Nicomacheall Ethics. Aristot le was uJtim.ately
more interested in developing people who were inclined to
do the right thi ngs than in formulating detailed rules for
havior.
believed that virhres are not inbom. but d'veloped
in the contex t of training and repetition. Eventually individu.
als develop hilbits which dispose them to make good cho ices.
In seneral. making a good dloice means chOOSing .:l mean or
FfOm

Ni((}lfflfCI.f"(ln

/1"0.

Geor,:e Bel l '" Sam. 1395.

238

by R.W. Drowne. I...ondOI1"

"T
middle point
cxtrenles which are in themselves bad
choices. For example, it is not good to eat too lillie or too
much, but to eat in modl:f.ltion, w hich is betw{... n the two ex
tremes. A nstotle was a careful observer of human nature and
he realized thai the lure of pleasure and personal styles and
preferences often makes it difficult to choose the mean. He
goes on to !ist 1m: virtues he has ident ified along w ith associated vices. nus list has influenced Western lUlderstanding of
what it means to bt: <l virtuo us person for OVE' r two thousand
years.

QUESTION S

1. How does Aristotle relate virtue to babit?

2. How precise docs the author think we can be when we talk
about virtues? Wh y is thI S so?
3. Why does Aristotle t.hlnk we m ust avoid both excess and
deficiency (defect)?

4. Accord ing to Ih e aut ho r, ho w can responses to pain and

pleas-ure ma ke a person either virtuous or not virtuous?
Why tht:n is ed ucation so important?
5. How does Aristotle distinguish between ncts which are
virtuous and people who are virtuOus?
6. What relationship holds
personsl choice lind
prllise and blilme, according to the author?
7. Can you give an example of a mean between two vices? Is
this meiln, in your opinlon, a
8. According to Arislot.ie, in what sorts o f cases are there no
meflns'
9. How mllny virtues does Aristotle mention? Can you list
them?
10. Do you think the virtue'S Inal apptied to Aristotle's time
apply toda y? Wh y or why not?
11. What does the author mea,n by "bringing ourselves far
from the side of error, we shall arrive at the mean"'?
1'2. Why does Arbtotle say that pleasure is most to be guarded

ag<rinst?
240

How vi r/II I: is prod/Iced, Qnd iI/crea sed.

irtue being twofold, one part mieUectual and the other

moral. inte UectuaJ virtue has its origin and increase lor the
most part from tellclting; therefore it stands in
of experience and time; but moral virtue arises hom habit, whence a lso
it has got its name [l liJikl) , which is onJ y in a small degn :c aJtered from lelhos-ffh..bit" j. Whence it is aI$Odear, that not one
of the moral virtues sp rings up in us by nature, for none of
those things which exisl by natl.u'C eXJX'rience alteration from
habit; for ittstance, the slone which by nature goes d ownw ards
could never be accustomed to go upw:u:ds, not even if one
should
ten thoUS<lnd times. by throwing it up, to give
it this habit; nor could fire be accustomed 10 bum downwards;
nor could any thing ebe wnicn has one natural bent get another
differen t one from habIt. The virtu(."S, then, arE' produced in us
neither by nature nor contTary to natu re, but. we being naturally ada pted to receive them, and this natural capacity is perfected by habit. Further, in t!vt!ry case when? any thing is p*
d ueed in us na tl.lI"aUy, we {"irst get the capacities for doing these
things, and ilherwards perform the energies; w hich is cvident
i.n the case of the senses; for it was not from frequentl y seeing
or frequently heuring that we got the 5en<ses, but, on the contrary, we had them firs t, and then used them, and did not get
them by havin g used lh,m. But we gel tlle virtues by having
first perfonned the encrgi ...,;, as is t.he case also in all the other
arts; fot those thin gs which we must do after having learnt
the m we leilIn to do by dOing them; as, for example. by building houses me n bp\ orne builders. and by playing on the harp,
harp-playef5; thus, al"0, by do ing just actions we become just.
by performing temperate actions, tcmperate, and by pedorming br.lve actions we beco me brave . . . .
TIrat fXCesS and defeci destroy virlllf, bill thaI being in the

mean preserves it.

Since our present treatise is not for the purpose of mere specu lahon, as all o thers are, {or the object of our investigation is 1'101

24\

the knowing what vi rtue is, but to become good (since otherwise there would be no usc in it), it is
10 s tud y the subJect of actIOns, and how we must perform them; (Of these have
entire innuenre over our habits to cause them to become of II certain character, as we have said . No w, to say that we mu... t ace accordi.ng to right reason is a general maxim, and let it be assumed; but we will speak hereafter about ii, .\nd ... bout the
natu re of n ght reason, and its relation to the other virtues. 6ut
this point m ust first be full y gr,lnted, that everything $aid on
moral s ubjt:cts oubhl to be said in outline, and not with exaclneM;
as we !laid in the begmning.. that arguments must be
demanded of s uch" J'I.lture onl y as the s ubject-matter admits;
but the subjects of mornl conduct and of C')(pedicncy have OQ slabilit)'. Just as also things wholesome. !:luI li the treahnent of the
it admit of exs ubject gcncraU)' is of this I\3ture, still lcss
ac tn<.-ss in pa.rticulars; fo r )1 comes wu.lc r no art or sci of precepts, but it is the du ty of the agents themselves to look to the
circwnstances of t.he OoX.lsiQl\, just as is the case in the arts of
medicine and navigation. But although lhe s ubjt!ct before us is
of Lhisdescription, yet we musl endeavour to d o the best we can
10 help II .
This, then, we mu!1 first obst!rve, thOlt things of this kind
are na tura Uy d estToyed both by defect and (!Xcess (for it i!l necessa ry in Ihe case of thing$ whidl ca.n.not be &ren to ma ke use
of iIIustTations which can be seen), just as we se.: in Ul t: case of
strength and health; for too much as well 8!<t too little exercise
d estroys stn:n gth. In like manner d rink and food, whether
there bt, too linle or too much of them, destroy health, but
moderation it'! qllan tity Cl'lU$eS,
and preserves it. The
same thiJlg. therefore. holds good in the C.lSC o f lemper.lnce,
fo r he who files from and
and courage, and the other
is afraid of everything, And stands up agains t nothing, beCOtnes <I cowiJrd; and he who fears not hing .It .:Ill, but goes
bold ly .:It everyt hing.. becomes rash . Ln like manner, he who tndulgcs in the entoy mcnt of every pleasure, and refrains from
none, is intempera te; but he who ShWlS all, as c\OIYru. d o, becomes a kind o f i..r\$ensible mAn. For temperance and courage
are destro}'t><I both by the excess and Ihe defe("l, bu l are pre-served by the mean.
The case with the vittuC'5 is the samt'; for by abstaining
and when we ha ve befro m pleasun.>s we

'"

come $0 ,
are best able to dbstain from them. The sa m.e ")50
is the case with
for by bein&
to despise 0bjects of feat, and to bear thf'm, we lx.'COme
and when 've
howe become so, we are besl able to bear them.
Thnl virl Uf

IS

concerned will, pleasures lIud pnills.

But we m ust make the p leas ure Or paLn whidl foUo w!l after acts
a tE!S1 of the habits; for he who absti'lins !Tom the bodily pleasures, and in this vcry Uling takes pleasure, is tempcriltci but he
who feels p.lin at it is inh:'rnpcrote; and he IIIho meets d angers
and re;Oict.'S at it, or .11 least feels no p.un, is brave; bul he who
feels pam IS a coward; for moral virtue is conven.ant with pleasures and pains; fnr by reason of pleasure we d o w hat is
w icked, and throuSh pain we abstain from honourable acts.
TIlcrcfore it is necessary to bE' in some manner trained inuTiedipleas ure and
alely from our childhood, as Plato says, to
pilin at proper
fo r this is right educa tion. Ag<lin, if the
virtues 011\:' conversan t w ith "Chons and passions, and pleas w e
and pain Me con..<:equen t upon every acrion ::trId paSSion, On this
accowlt. also. virtue must be conVefSilnl with pleasw t"S and
p<Uns. t' u.nishments also, w lUch
inflic1ed by means of p lc.ls ure And pdin, indicate the sume thing; for they are kinds o(
remedies. 8lld remedies naturall), work by contraries. Again, liS
WI! said before, every habit of the $QuI has a natural relation and
refetenC'(' 10 those things by which il na turall y becomes bettcr
and worse. Bu t habilS become h.ld by means o f pleasures and
pains, by pursuing or avoiding either improper one:;, or at improper times, in imprope r Wil YS, or imp roperly in an y other
m.lAAeI, w hich JCason determines.
Hence some ha ve even defined the virtues to be cert.1in
stales of "pllth y and tranquillity; but not com.-'ctJy, in that
speak absolutely, and not in relation to propriety of tim!:! or
manner, and so on through the other categories. Therefore
virtue is !lUpposed to bt' such as we ha ve !tald, in rela tion to
pleclsures and Pi'Un<;. and apt to practiSe the ix'S! thmSS: and
vice is Ult: contra ry.
TIlese s ubj('("ts may also become plain 10 us from the following t."Onsiderat1ons. Since there
Ihrre thiJ1Ss which lead
us 10 Uloice, and Ihree to ave-mon,- lhe honowable, the exped1eClI, and the pleasant; and thn."\.' contraries to U1(!m,-thc dis-

'"

graceful, the inexpediCflt, and

pnintul; on aU these subjects
the good man is OIpl 10 be right in h is actions, and the bad m... n
isapllo be wrong, and especially on the 5ub}e(t of pleasure; (or
this is common 10 aU living creatures, and acoomparu.e s all
things which are the objects o( choice; fo r bol h the honourable
and the expedient appear pleas-wI. Again, from ow infancy it
has grown up with aU of us; and therefore it is difficult to rub
out this affection, which IS, as il were, engrn.ined in our vel)' ellistcnce. Asain, we mnke pleusure and pain the rule of our DCnons, some of us in a greater, some in I('SS degree. For U'ill reason, therefore, it is nccess.1ry that our whole busines.<; must be

with these subjects; for, to feel pleasure or pain, properly or improperly, makes no slight difference to our actions. Again, it is
more difficult to resist pleasure than anger, as Hernditus says,
and both art and excellence are always conver.l<U1t with that
which is more difficult.; for exce llence in this case ;s superior So
thili, for lh.is reason l'J lso, the whole business of virtue, and poUtkal prulO!>Ophy, must be with pleasures ,md p&lJ\.S; for he who
makes il proper use of these will be good, and he who makes a
bad use w ill be bad. Now on the point tha i virtue is conversant
with pleasures and pains, and that it is
and destroyed
by means of the same lhlngs from which it originally sprung.
when they are dilfcrcntly circumstanced; and tha t its energit:s
are employed on those things ou t of wh.ich it originates, lei
enough have been said.

That melt become just and tempt-rate by pt.:rjo1'millg jllst lind

temperole actions.
But a person may be in difficulty ilS to whal we mean when we
say that it is necessary for men to become just by performing
just actions, and temperate by performillg tempera.te ones; for
if they do jU5t and temperate actions, they are already just i\Ild
temperate; JUS!

<IS,

if they do grammatical and

actions,

they a re grammarians and musidan.... Or, is this not the C<lse in

the arts also? for it is possible 10 do a gra m.matical action arodentaUy, or at another 's sus,sestion. A mall, therefore, will only
then be a grammarian, whe n he not only does a gr;!Jl\maticaJ
action, but also does it grammatic.1Uy, that is, in. acoordOlf"lCe
with the gnunmat:ical science, which hepossesscs in h.i.rru;cU. ...
Acts then are called Just and temperate, when they are 5uci'l

'"

as the just or temperate m:1n would do; bul he w ho performs

these acts is nOla just and IcmpcT1ll(' man, but he who performs
them in such a m,1nner;'lSjWlt and temperate men do them. It is
wcU s., id, therefore, that nom perfonning just actions, a man
becomes just; and from performing temperate ones, temperilte;
bul without performing them no person would even hI: li.kely
to become good. But the generality of men do not do these
things. bUI taking refuge in words, they think that they Me
philosophers. an d thai in thls Ulilnner they will become good
men; and what they do is Uk.e whM sick people do. who listen
3l1entively 10 their physicians, and then do nol aMend to I.he
things which they prescribe. Just as tht.'Se, then, will never bE' in
a good Slate or boOy under such treatment, 50 those wiJ] never
be in a good sule of mind, if thas is their philosophy.

Definition of Moral Virtue

Mml is the ffgen lls" of vir/llt-. T/ml il ;s a hnbit.

But we mu.sl next find Qut what the genus of virtue 1.5. Since,
!.hen, the qualities which have their origin in the soul are
three, -Passior\S, Capacities,:md Habits,-V<rt'ue must be some
one of these. By passIOns, I mean, Desire,. Anger, Fear, Confidence, Envy, Joy, Love, Hatred, Rt.'gret. Emulation, Pity; in a
word, those ie.::lings which a re followed by pleasure or pain; by
capaCit:i('S, those qU3uties by means of which we are said to be
able to be under the innuence of th\.'Se passions; as those by
of which we a re able to feel anger, pOlin, or pity; by
habits, those by means o( whk.h we arc well or ill disposed with
relation 10 the passions; as with rclabon to being made angry, if
we
anger too vehemently or 100 remissly, we are ill disposed; if we do it moderately, weU disposed; and in like mann!!r with relation to the others.
Neither the vir\\lcs, therefore, nor the vices are passions;
because we are not Called good or bad according to our passions, but according to our virtues o r vices, and because we are
neither praised nor blamed according: to oW" passions (for Ihe
man who fears o r is angry, is nol praised; nor is the man who is
simply angry, bl.,.med; but th!! milO who is .:tngry in a certain

'"

way); but M:COrding to OUT virhJes nnd vices, we are

or
blamed . Again.. we feel anger and fear without deliberate p reference; bul the virtues are acts of deliberate preference, or at
any rate, not without deliberate prefen.'flCC. But beside.<; 'hese
thin&" we are said 10 be
by our passions. but we are
not said to be 1I10V';''<1, bulm some way to be "disposo.."'<l.:' by o w"
virhJes and vices. r'Or the'S(' reasons, also. they are not capllcitit:S; for we are neither called good no r bad, neither praised nor
bla med. for our being able 10 feel passions simply. And again,
we ha"c oW" capacities b)' nature; but we do not become good
o r bad by natu re; hut of this we have already spoken. If, then,
nor CIIP.l cities, it remairu. thai
the v irhJes all? neither
the)' are habIts. v-thal, Ihel"(>fore. the "gellus" ol vutue is, has
been s ufficiently shown

Tlwl llirtlle is a mean Imiddld slalc, and IlOw it is so.

nl'C\':SSary not onJy to say Ih(\1 virtue is a habit, but also
wha t sort of II habit it is. We
StlY, therefo re, that every
virtue both makes that of which It is the virtue 10 be in a good
state, iU'ld makes its work good also; for instance, the vi rtue of
the eye makes both the eye and the work of the eye good; fo r by
the virtu(l' of the eye we sec well. in llke manne r, Ihe virwe of a
horse ma kes 11 horse good, and good in speed. and in carrying
its ride r, and in s tanding the anack of the enemy. If, then, this is
the
in aU instances, the virtue of man also must be a hal:>it
from which man becomes Sood, and from which he will perfonll his work well ... .
II is possible to go wrong in many wayti (for evil. as the
Pylhagoreans OO11jectured, is of the I'\1Itu.re of the inhnite, bu t
good of the finite); bUI we can go right in one way only; and for
this reason the fonner is eos}" and the latter difficult, it is easy
to miss a m<l1k, but difficu.1t to hit it; and for t11e;e reasons,
therefore, the excess and defect belor'S \0 vice, but the mean
s tale to virtue, fo r, "we are good in one way o nl y, but bad lTI all
sorts of ways."
Vr.rtue, th('refore, is a " habit, aompanied with deliberate
prcferen, U1lhe relatIVe mean, den.ned by re<lson, and as the
prudent man lVould define
II is a rne.ln s tale betWe(:I) two
vices, one in excess, the other in defect, and il is so, moreover,
bccaUSt' of the vices o ne division faJls sh ort of, and the o the r ex8111 il is

24'

cc:.'Cd.s w hat is right, both in passions and actions, whils t virtue

discovers the mean and chooses it. Therefore. with reference 10
its essence. and the definilion w hich s tales ils !ouhs tance, vir tue
is a mean slale; but with n:.ferenc:e to the standa rd of "the best"
and "the excellent " it is an extreme. But It is nOI (>\'ery netio n,
nor every passion, which admits of the melln slate; for some
have their badness at o nce implk od in their name; as. (o r cxa nlpie. malevolence, shamelessness, envy; and a mo ngst af..1ions,
adulte ry, theft.. homicidf>. r'Or aU these, and s uch as these, are so
called !Tom thcir being themselves bad, nol be(ause their excesses or defects Me bad. in thl'Se, then, it is impossible evcr to
be right. bUI we must always be wrong. No r does dIe right or
wrong in such cases as t.hcst! depend .11 aU upon the person with
whom, o r the time wht!tl, or the manner in which, adultery is
committed , but absolutely the doing of an)' onc of
things
is wrong. It would be equally absurd, then, to requiN! a mean
st.. te, and an excess, and a defect, in
and cowanJice,
and intemperance. For thus Ulc re would be a mean slale o f c )(cess and defect, and an excess of excess, and a defect of defect.
But jusl as t1wre is no excess and defect o f temperance and
cou rage (owing to the fact thai the mean is in some.!lense an extreme), so neither in the case o f these is Ihere a mean s tate. cxor defect; but however they be done, sin L<;conunitlt:d. For,
in a word, there is neither a nlCa.n s tate o f exccssand d decl, no r
an
and defect of a mean state.
All enrrmeratiOIl of menn {modemtej habits.

But it is necessary that this shouJd not on ly be s tated generaUy,

but Ihat it should alw be appbcable to the particula r cases; (or in
discoss.ions on sobjects of moral action, wu versal statements ;Ire
apt to be too vague, but particular oncs art: mort' ronsistL'rI1 ,\li th
truth; for
are conversant Wit h particulnl1i; but il is necrsSolry that the s llltements s hould agi"L"e with these ... . Now, o n the
!>ubject of fear and confidence, courage is the mcan sbllc. Of the
persons who are in excess, he who is in the excess of fcarlcsslIl?"$s
has no nllme; but there art' many CilS('!! without name':!; and he
who is in the excl'SS of confidence. Is called rash; but he who is
in the exo'-,s of fear, but in the de(ccc of conndenre. is cowardly.
On tJle s ubject of pleaswes and pains (but not all pleasu.1es
and pains, and less in th e ca$C of pains thM pleasures). te m-

'"

perance is the mean state, and intemperance the excess. But

there are, in fact. none who are in the defe<:l on the s ubjecl of
pleasures; therefore these also have no name; but lei them be
caUed insensible.
On the subject of the: giving and receiving of money, liberal
ity is
mean stale, and the excess and defect. prodigality and
the excess and defect are mutually conilliberality. But in
trary to each other; for the prodigal man is in the excess in givmg money, but is in the defect in receiving; but the illiberaJ man
is in the excess in receiving, but in the defec1 in giving. Now,
thcrcl'ore, we are speaking on these points as in an oulline, and
sununarily, because we consider thls sufficient; but aft erwards
more accurate distinctions shaH be drawn respecting them.
But on the subject of money
are other dispositions
also: magnificence is il mean state; but the magnificent man
dift'er.l from the liberill man; for one has to do with greal
things, the other w ith small ones; the excess is bad taste and
vulgar profu sion, the defect shabbiness. But these differ from
the vices whjch are relal:llo li bera lity; but their points of difference shall be Slated hereafler.
On the subjt:("t of honour and dishonour, magnanimity is
tile mean; the excess, il vice called empty vanity; the defect.
meanness o f spirit .
But as w e SDid UUI\ liberality, when compared with O'Ul.gniIinee, differed from it in being concemed with small things, $0
there is a kind of feeling which. being itself abou t small honour,
the same retatlon to magnanimity, w hich is about greal honour; for it is
10
honour as we ought, and more
than we ought, and less than we ouShl. Now he who is in the excess in the desire of honour is cclle-d ambitious, and he who is in
the defect unambitious. but he thDt is in the mean has no naDle;
and the dispositions lire likewise nameless, except thai of the
ilmbitious, which is caJJed ambition;
from this cause the extremes claim the middle place. And we sometimes call rom who
is in the me<lJl I'Imbitious, and sometimes unambitious; a.nd
sometimes we praise the ambitious man. and sometimes the
mM who is unambitious, But hereafter t,he reason why we do
this wi ll be explained; but now lei us go on speaking of the others in the w<ly in which we hnve begun.
TIlere are .\Iso o n the subject of anger an excess, ,1 defect, and
a mean state; but since they may be said to be nameless, and as
248

we caU him w ho is rn the mean meek, we w ill call the lJlean

meekness; but of thcexh'emes, let him who is in excess be called
passionate, and the vice passion; him who is in defect insensible
to anger, and the defecl insensibility to anger....
Bu t there Dtc also mean SttllCS both in the passions and also
in cases which c:oncenl the passions; fo r modesty is not D virtue;
and yet the modest man is praised; for in this case also there is
one who is said to be in the mean, another in the extreme, of excess (as the bashful, who is ashamed Dt everything); the TI'Wl
who is deficient in shame, or does not feel il at all, is impudenl,
but he who is in the meM is modest. But indignation is a mean
between envy and rnalevoleno:; but these affections are
concerned WiUl the pa in and plCllSure which are felt at the orcumstances of OUI neighbours; for he who is "pt to feel indignation, feel s pain at those w ho are
surossfu l;'but
the envious man, going tH'yonu him, feels pain ;)1 everyone's
success; and the mw.evo!ent man falls so far shorl of being
pained, thai he even rejoices.. . .

Characteristics of the Extreme and Mean States:

Practi cal Corollaries
How virtues t?nd vices are apposed to one arlother.
But since there are thTee d i'Jpositions,- two vicious, one in excess and Ihe other in defect, and one virtuoos, namely, the mean
state, they are I\lJ i.n some sc.nse opposed to each other; Inr the
extreme;. ,ut: opposed both to
meM state and 10 each other,
and the- me::ul state to tile extremes. For as th.e equal when compared w ith the less is greater. and when COmp.1Ted with lhe
degreater is k'SS; so the mean SiDl es w hen compared with
(L'CtS are in exCC$.S, and when compared with the exces9CS ;tte in
defect, both in the passIons and in the actions; for Ihe brave man
in comparison with the coward IIppcars rash; and in comp<!rison
wi th the rash man n coward . In like manner alc;o the tem per,lle
and in
man in comparison wi th the insensible is
comparison with the intemperDtc is insensible; and the liberal
man in comparison with rile illiberal is prod.igal. and in comparison with the prodigal is
1nercfol't' those who are in the exlreme thru SI away from

'"

Lhe-m hiO'l who is in the mea n stale, each to the other, a nd the
coward caUs the brave man rash, aJ1d the rash man calls him a
coward; and so on in !.he otner C3SeS. DUI though they are thus
opposed to each ot.her, UlCre is ill gn-atcr opposition between
Lhe exl'T'emes one to lhe other. than to Iht: mean; for these stand
furthGT ilpatl from each other th,m from the mean; jusl as the
greD t is further (rom the small, Md th t> small from the gTell !.
than eit her (rom the equal. Agai.l1, there Ilppenrs in some e>;tn-mes some resemb lance 10 the mean, as
seems lu resemble couragl.:, ilnd prodigality liberality; but there is the
greatest dissimilarity between the extremes. Now things that
are tUrthesl apart from each other are defined to bE" opposi tes;
so thai thO!le that are further off are more opposite. But in somt
cases the d efect IS more opposed to tiM.! mean. and in some

aim at the mean in paRSions and aCiJons, has been suffiCiently

provt.-d. It IS therefore difficult also to be good: fOT in ench CMe
it !.5 difficult to .find the mean; jusl as it is not in every man's
but only in the power of him who knows how, \0 find
of a circlei and thus it is
and i.n every man't'
10 be angry, ilnd to give i\I1d spend money; but \0 determine the person to whom, and Lhe quantity, and the time,
and the motive, <U1d Ule manner, is no lonf,rr lr\ ('very m(ln's
power, nor is it eaSYi therefo!\;! exc(>JlenC1' is rare, and praiseworth y, and honourable. It is Iherefo!'\? nCl..'Cltul for him who
aims ill the mean, fln.t to
away from that extreme which
UI more con rrary, like Ihe .. dvice tlMI Dlyp5('l
"Kt-ep the Ship clear of thi!; smok" and surge.

caSl."S Ute CXCt'$S. as, for example. raShness, which lS the excess,
is not i'OO much oppo$(.-d to couroge as cowardice, which is the
defe-::t; I\Tld inS{'!\Sibility, which is the defect, is k'Ss opposed to
temperance than intemperance, which is the excess.
Bul this happens fOT two fCtlSOns; the first from the Mtme
of the thi ng itself; fo r from one extreme' being nearer and more
like the mean than the o ther, it is Mt this but its opposite which
we set down as most opposite; as, since rashness appears to be
nearer and more like courage than cowa.rdice, and cowardice
less like lh.ul rashness, we oppose
10 roo rage rather
lhings that a!'\? further from the
than rashness. because
appe.1T to be more opposite to it. This, therefore, is olle
re;J$On arising from the nature of the thing itself; the other o riginates in
for \hoSt' lhings to which we ate mol"(' nIlI
urally disposed , ap)"?.H 10 bP. more contury to tile mcan; os,
for instance, we nre more
dis posed to p leasures, and
therefore we are mort' easily co rried aw ay to intemperance
than 10 propriety o( conduct. These, \hen, to which the inclination is more deCIded. we call more opposite; and for this rea
son., intemperance. which is the
is more opposite 10
temper.rnce.

How we shall arrrue a/

!/It! nlt"Ol1

and at excellence.

Now Ihilt moral vim!e IS 3 mean sta te, Md huw, and that it is
il mean state between two
ont' on the side of
and
the other on the side of defect; and thill is so fTOm being :tpl t('1
2<0

of the extremes, one is more and one

erroneous.
Since, then,. it is difficul t to hit the mean exacll)', we must.
lit' our second tria l, choos!: the least of these evils; and lhis will
be best done in Ihe maruler which we have stah:d . Bul it is necto consider to wtuch of the vices we oun:elves lire most
i!lCli!,ed; for some of us i\I"e M I'UI(llly d isposed to onc, and
son'.? to another; and IIUs we shall be able to
from the
pleasure and pam whIch anse m us. But it is necessa ry to drag
ourselves awa), towards the opposite extreme; (or by bringiflg
ourselves far from the side of eTT'(Jr, we shall arrive at the mean;
dS people do with crooked slicks to make them straight. Bul in
every case w(" must be m ost upon our guard against what is
plcas'lIlt, and ple<lsu,re, fOr we are not unbiassed judges of il.
JuSI, then, as the Trojan eldc!'S fell respecting Helen, must we
leel respecting pleasure. and in all Cilses pronounce ::;cnlcncc ill>
the)' did; for thus, by
!t awa),," we
be less likely
to faJJ into error. By .<iO d oin&. then, to speak summMil)" we
shaU be best able to rul the meiln. Bul pe{hop9 Uus !Th1y be dtf!n particular cases; for it is nOI easy to dE'(;cult, and
fine the manner. and the persons, and !.he Ol"Glsions. and Ule
length o( lime for a person to be anb'1')'; for we sometimes
praise those who are In the defect, and caU them meek; "nd
those who an;: cilsily angcn:d, and call them manly.
Bul he who
the right a littl". is nol bL,:,med,
whether it be on Ihe side of excess or defect, but he who d oc'S
it too much; for he does not escllpe notice, Bul it is nol ea.<iy to
r'Of

'51