Philosophy 269: Humes Ethical Theory

The D ialogues Con ce rni ng N atu ral Reli gio n, I.

The Puzzle: Why does the design hypothesis retain its power in the fact of Philos objections?
Demea and Cleanthes: vegetation, generation, instinct, etc. are not rivals to design but further
evidence of it.
The Argument from Design:
Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find
it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser
machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses
and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most
minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into
admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of
means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds,
the productions of human contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, and
intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by
all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble, and that the Author of Nature
is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties,
proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument
a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a
Deity and his similarity to human mind and intelligence. (Popkin p. 15)
Reconstruction #1:
Question: What brings the teleologically organized world into existence?
Argument:
1. The teleologically organized objects we find in the world are produced by rational minds.
2. The world is a teleologically organized object.
>3. The world was produced by a rational mind.
Objections:
1. There are at least four causes of teleologically organized objects, viz., vegetation, generation,
instinct, and intelligence, so premise one is false.
2. We havent concluded the explanation until we know what produced the rational mind. (If any of
these causes is prior, generation or reproduction produces rational minds, not the reverse.)
Reconstruction #2:
Question: What introduces teleological order into objects?
1. We know from experience that matter of itself does not fall into teleological order.
2. We know from experience that ideas do of themselves fall into teleological order
(designs).
>3. Therefore teleological order comes from minds, not from matter.
Note: Premise two comes from experience; there is nothing more intelligible about order springing
from mind than about order springing from matter. Our ideas themselves fall into order from
internal unknown causes.

Objections:
1. Premise one is false, so far as we know animals and plants are cases of matter falling into order of
its own accord.
2. We havent concluded the explanation until we know what produces the teleological order in our
ideas.
Both Philo and Cleanthes take the second objection to be essentially the same in both cases a
request for further causes. Thats because they accept premise 2. But those who believe in the
argument from design may not accept that they may think that explaining teleological order in
terms of intelligent thought makes it inherently intelligible.
Cleanthes two analogies: the voice from the sky and the vegetative books.
Point: Philo could make the same arguments about these cases and they wouldnt convince us.
What this shows: Reconstruction #2 is not correct. We think that teleological order comes from a
mind because it makes sense to us, like words, not because in our past experience teleological order
has always come from minds.
Why we find words intelligible: because when we hear them, we think the thoughts expressed by
their utterers.
Why we find teleological objects intelligible: because when we think about the adjustment of means
to ends, we understand and when we understand them, we in effect rehearse their creation or
construction.
Reconstruction #3
Question: Why do we find the objects in the world intelligible?
Argument: Because they were created by a mind like our own.
Philos objection: our ideas fall into teleological order from inexplicable unknown causes.
The problem with that: Even if it is true, it doesnt explain the act of recognizing and appreciating
the fact that our ideas have fallen into teleological order. That must be some additional
mental act.
Why Hume cant think that conforming to the standards of thought/rationality makes
objects intelligible:
1. He doesnt believe doesnt believe that instrumental thinking is any more intelligible than any other
causal connection.
2. He doesnt believe that objects are essentially functional unities. He thinks they are collections of
associated properties.
Cleanthes Vindication: The argument from design didnt lose its power until Darwin produced an
alternative explanation of apparently designed arguments.
Humes Vindication: Hume had already thought of Darwins explanation the natural selection of
worlds described in Part VIII.