1

.
,,.

..................................................................................................................2
.............................................................................................................3
....................................................................................................................5
....................................................................................................6
...................................................................................................8
.................................................................................................12
1
1.1 .....................................................................................14
1.1.1.........................14
1.1.2.....................14
1.1.3...15
1.1.4..............15
1.1.5...15
1.2..........................................................................................16
1.2.1................................................................16
1.2.2..............................................16
1.2.3
...................................................................................................17
1.3..........................................19
1.3.1.....................................................................................20
1.3.2.....................................................................................20
2
2.1Nash.................................................................................................22
2.1.1Nash................................................................................22

2.1.2Nash.....................................23
2.1.3Nash...........................26
3
3.1........................................28
3.2..................................................30
3.3.....................................................................33
3.3.1............................................................................................33
3.3.2.........................................................................................37
3.4.....................................................................................38
3.5
..................................................................................................................40
3.5.1................................................44
3.6vs.................................................................................45
4
4.1......................................46
4.2.............................................................47
4.3...............................................49
4.4................................................51
4.5..........................................................53
4.6,.............................................55

....................................................................................57
............................................................................................60
.............................................................................................................61

()
"".
,
,
. "". ""
,
,
.
,.
,
,
.

.

.
:

,
.

90'
.
John von Neumann, Oskar
MorgensternJohnNash.,,
, ,
().

()"",
,.,
:
"",

.

...

""
:
) (>1), , , ,
.. ( ),
.
.
" " (twopersongames),
""(npersongames).

"" ,
" ".


.
""
"".
),
1 , .. ,
,
,
...


()(strategicinterdependence).
,
.
, ()
.
, (John Forbes Nash)

(NashEquilibrium).
,

(Elster,1982).
, 1991, Roger Myerson,

,
DNA
,
.

 :

( ),
,

.
,
.
,
...,
John Nash
60 .
CssociationforComputingachinery2008.

SUMMARY

Thistheoryhasunderitsumbrellathefollowingsubtheories:
Economic
Sociology
Anthropology
Politicalscience
History
Evolutionarybiology
Psychologyetc.

Thegameasa"cell"ofallconsolidatedsocialsciencesisasituationwhere:
A) N (> 1), where N is either individuals or businesses, or governments or trade
unions etc. (Socalled players), make some choices aimed at the satisfaction of
everyone'sinterests.
Theplayerscanbeoftwoormore.Thefirstcaseshowsthegamesoftwopersons
(twopersongames) and in the second case the "games Npersons" (nperson
games).Thosewhoparticipateinagamewithmorepersonsmayforman"alliance
during game with duration or limited time, so we move back to " games two
persons." Of course a game differs from a real situation simple competition or
conflict that the realization is just under certain circumstances and in accordance
withcertainrules.Allgamescontainthefeatureofcompetitionbetweentheplayers
andtheresultleadsto"gains"or"losses".
B)Theresultsforeachplayerdependsnotonlyonitsownchoice,butbythechoices
oftheotherN1players,forexamplechess,theoptioninpricesthatarechargedby
competitivefirms,theimpactontheenvironmentfromthedecisionofeachofusto
maintainhiscarengine,electionsetc.
Themainpurposeistheanalysisofthedecisionsonsituations(games)interaction
strategy(strategicinterdependence).Eachplayertriestouseallmeansatitsdisposal
topreventtheopponenttogainanadvantagethatwillreduceitsprofits.Therefore,
his actions are directly dependent on the location (strategy) chosen by the
adversary.
9

One of the founders, John Forbes Nash generalized the problem to nonzerosum
gamesandheofferedasasolutiontheNashequilibrium.
If one accepts that the interaction is the essence of social life, then game theory
provides solid small foundations to study the social structure and social change
(Elster,1982).
Also in 1991, Roger Myerson, mathematician and economist at the University of
ChicagoandwinneroftheNobelPrizeforhiscontributiontogametheory,hemade
a comparison of the discovery of this theory to that of the doublestranded DNA,
claimingthatthisdiscoveryhasrestructuredthescienceofeconomics,soastodayit
isregardedasthefundamentalscienceofsociety.

10

 Objectiveofwork:
The main objective of this paper is to explain in the most simple way the game
theory (with a little math as possiblethis) and to analyze each concept that is
associatedwith this theory, as well as the usefulness of this theory in the fieldsof
sciences that covers. Mainly it will focus on the analysis and examination of the
theoryonthedisciplinesofeconomicsandpoliticalsciences,andhowthatchanged
ourviewinthelightofthissubversivetheory.
FinallywemadeanextensivereportfortheGreekscientistConstantineDaskalakis
Associate Professor at MIT, who managed to solve the puzzle of John Nash that
troubledthecomputerscientistsfor60years.Forhisproofhewasawardedbythe
InternationalAgencyACMAssociationforComputingMachineryin2008.

11

18(1838),AugustinCournot


.

, John von Neumann, 1928

.
TheoryofGames&EconomicBehavior,
1944,JohnvonNeumannOskarMorgenstern.
1950 John Nash
,
Nash.
,.
RusselCrow,
,
29.

,

. 1965 Reinhard Selten
( )
, 1975 John Harsanyi
John Nash
.,
1994,.
1970 ,
John Maynard Smith
.
1990
.

.

12

 2005 Tomas Schelling

Robert Aumann

.
2007 Roger Myerson, Leonid Hurwicz Eric Maskin
.

13

1.1)

1944, John von

Neumann Oscar Morgenstern
,

(
)
.

1.1.1)
,
.

.
.

1.1.2)
,,

.
(cooperativegame)
,
(noncooperativegame).

14

1.1.3)

,

.
,
.
,

.

.

1.1.4)

, .
,
.

1.1.5)

..
,
,.
,

,
.

15

1.2)

.
,

.

1.2.1)
mixed
.
.
,
,
.

1.2.2)

,
(normal) (strategic)
.

,
, .
, .

16

1.2.3)

,
1.1.

1.1RiskDominance

,.,
.
. ,
1,2.,
,
1,,2.

.
,.

.

. ,
(1)(1)
5.

,
,
.
.

dominant

.
.
dominated
.
17


1
2,(5>4)(1>0),
1,1
2.1.

.
1 , 1,
(5>0)2,1
2(100<0).
.

.
.

weakly dominates

.
weakly
dominated strategy. 1
2(5>100)(0=0).

equilibrium.
.
(1, 1) (5, 5)
1,1
(1,1).

, .
,dominated
,
.

.

18

Iterated
Elimination of Dominated Strategies, IEDS.


.
,.

, .
.

1.3)

.
:
.
.
,

,
1, 2.
3 4 5
.
.
.
(:,,

http://mathbooksgr.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/gt_simiwseis.pdf

19

1.3.1)

:
,
.
.
.

1,3

0,0

0,0

3,1

,
. 1,3 3,1
.

1.3.2)

,
.:

20

,
.
.
,.
(),Bruce
BuenodeMesquita,",.102.

,
.,
. ,

.
,
. .
,"..."

,

.

,:
()(),
(II) . ,
. , ,
.
(r),
,,
. ,
.

,"
.

5.
."
";"
";".
.
,

.

21

2
2.1)Nash

,
,
1928 .
1994
,

.
.
.
,

,

.


,

, ,
,
,
.

2.1.1)Nash;
Nash
,

,
. ,
,
.
.
Nash.
,
.
22

.
,

,.
,
.
Nash,:

Nash
Nash
. Nash

,
. ,
,.

2.1.2)Nash.

,
.

23

:

,
.

:
.
. ,
,.

.
:

1=
2=

:
B

3,3

0,5

5,0

1,1

.
,
..
,
( ),
.
.

.
,
,
.

24

 .

. ,
. ,
.Nash,
, ,
2.

.

,.
,
.
Nash

.
,
.
,.

.
:
,
.

.
50( )
.

, .

.
.

25

2.2)Nash
30
,

9,98

Berkeley,

M.I.T.
Berkeley

,

...
C (ssociation for Computing
achinery) 2009 .
(
)
Nash1950.
()

,
. ,
, .

,
..

26

,
Paul W. Goldberg
,
!
:
. ,
. ,
.

. ;
,,

. .

27

,

.
,.

3.1)
( )
.
. , Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita,

.
.
,
.:
,'

28

().,
,.,

.
.
.
, , .
,,,
,
.
.
, ,
.
,
.
:

,
.
.
,
.BruceBueno
29

 ,
,
.

, ,

.

3.2)
John Von
NeumannOskarMorgestern,1947
"Theory of Games and Economic Behavior"
(Prinston University Press, 1947),
John
Nash,
1994.

:
, Neumann Morgestern,
,Nash,
.
. ,
(
win/lose), ,
( ). ,
( )
,
.
.

30

.

,,

.
(
), John Nash
.
"",.""
politicallycorrect"".
, Bruce Bueno,
. .

. ,
,.
, .
.
, ,
.
.
.
. .
,
.

.
,
()
.,
.
,
31

, ,
. .Bruce
Bueno,
"
(.
) . ,
. .

."
,
" ,
.

,
, .
,
,

,
. [...]
, ,

."
,
,
/ .
.

32

3.3)
3.3.1)


,

, ..
.BruceBueno
,

.

"".
""

/,
,

..

. ,
.
,
,
, . Bruce Bueno
33

 Hitler
,
.
.
, .
,
.
,
.

.

.BruceBueno:
" ,
,
(
). ,
( ).
,
,
.

,
.[...]
."

, .
.

.
34


.
,
.

.
. ; .

.
.

. ,
.
.

. . ,
.

.
,
.
;
,
.
. ,
, ,

().
,

.
35

. Bueno
( service quality in restaurant operations in China:
DecisionandExperientialORientedPerspectives,2007)

.
,
.

.
,
.
,

,
.


.

,
, ,
.
,

36

3.3.2)O

(SalvadorDali)

,
.
Bruno Bueno de Mesquita
:
" ,
.

.
. ,
. ,

( )
.
,

."

37

 , ,

.
.
,
. .

3.4)
,
. , ,
/.
,
.
.,
,
.
,
.

. ,
/.

. ,
.
( ) .
,
,,,
.
' ,

38

,
',.
:

'
,.

. .
.

.
,
.

, .

,
.,
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18334593),

,.
,.

39

3.5)

,
.

BruceBuenodeMesquita,
,:

,
.
.

1
.

40

,

;
,
(
) ,
, New York
Times,FinancialTimes,Economist,...

:"[...]""

,,
".
,
.

. ,
, ,
,
.

. ,
.

41

.
, .
.
.
,.
.
,.
,
.
,
( Bruce Bueno,
):
()
.
, ( )
:

,RussellCrowe

,JodieFoster.

100
,
0.

,50(
).
,

42

50,4045.
, ,

/.,
.

,
.,.
,
.
,
100.
,
.

,
..
,
.
().
,
. , ,
100,
.

,:

43

100,60
40 , .
60 70,
RussellCrowe.

.,
.

.
3.5.1)

, ,
. ,
BruceBueno.
,
, ()
, .
, ,
CIA,
.
New York Times
. 90%
CIA.

, .
.
,
,
.,

44

.
,
, .
,
.
3.6)vs
,
.,
,
.,
"
...".
"",BruceBueno(.100),"
.

.

.

, ' .

;
'."

.,
.
.

45

,
BruceBuenodeMesquita.

4.1)

.
,
,
,
,
.


.

,

.

. ,
,

..,

.

46

,.'

.

. ,
(
).
,.

4.2)
, ,
,

.

, ,
,

,
. ,

47


.
H.

,

,
. ,

(=
,
),
.

.Mesquita,,
,
.
,

( )
. ,
.
,
.

48

4.3)
,..

.

,
. ,
,
,
. ,


;
.

', (..
).

49

 ,

. , ,
,
,
. ,
,
, .
.
.

,
.
,
90%.
,,
,,
. ,
'
.

.
,BruceBuenodeMesquita
,

,,
.
,
. ' , (
50

 ...)
.

. ,
.

4.4)
.
(

Ph.

D.

)
,
,
/

.,,
.
"
.,
."
. . ,
:
DVD
, ,

,.

,
,

51

,
.

' , ,
,
.
,

.

, , ,

(
).

, ,
,
.

.
,
.

52

4.5)

.

,

. .

.
,
:
"
100% ,
100%.
, ,

.

()
.

(
)
.

53

.


(
)."

.
,
, .
,
.

54

4.6),

,
,Nash.
,

80%.
:
.
XK,
:

. ,
120% , 13,6% 2009,
, 10%.
,

.

.

55

 7%.
..

,
.
, 8,5%
. , ,
.
.
.. ,
. ,
,.
.,
,
.

, .
, .
()
.

56

,
,
.

.
,RogerMyerson,

.
'RogerMyerson,

.
:

(
,)
,

,,
,

,.

57


,
/.

.,
,
.
(
,
)
,

.
.
(
)

,
,
,.
,
,
.

.,,

58

Nash.Nash(1950)
(noncooperative)
(),

,Nash,
.

,
Nash,

,
.

Nash
,
()
.

59

RogerMyerson,
,
JohnNash
.
,Nash(noncooperativegames)

,DNA
.
,Myerson,

Nash(.Niehans,1990),

(.Wilson,1998).
Nash
.
O
,
.
,
.
,Nash
,
.

.,

,
.
.

.
..

60

(2010)
: ,
.(2012)
John Lipczynski, John O.S Wilson, John Goddard(2012):
,,..
:/.2000
: .
.
:.
.
: ,
,:Gutenberg,2007

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gameevolutionary/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gameethics/
www.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_economy_1.../2010_402044
http://www.tovima.gr/opinions/article/?aid=159506
http://macedonia.uom.gr/~acg
http://gerasimospolitis.blogspot.gr/2011/12/nash.html
http://blog.tedxathens.com/tedxathens2011speakers
%CE%BA%CF%89%CE%BD%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B1%CE%BD%CF%84%CE%AF
%CE%BD%CE%BF%CF%82
%CE%B4%CE%B1%CF%83%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%BB%CE%AC%CE%BA%CE%B
7%CF%82

61