81.

People v JIMENEZ
71 SCRA 186
Facts:
The Chief of Police admitted that prior to the police interrogation of appellant, the latter was
not warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney-either
retained or appointed. The appellant not only repudiated the alleged extra judicial
confession (Exhibit "A") as one procured thru coercion but also claimed that he was
threatened by the police that if he would not affirm his signature in Exhibit "A" before the
City Judge, they will further maltreat him.
Issue:
Is the affidavit of appellant (Exhibit "A") admissible?
Held:
No. Without proper safeguards the process of in custody interrogation of persons suspected
or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the
privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively
apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored. Appellant was
acquitted.
82. PEOPLE V CAMALOG
109 SCRA 816
Facts:
The accused were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. The accused stated
that they were never informed about their constitutional rights and that the police
investigators never conducted an investigation as regards their alleged participation in the
crime. The two accused further testified that during the period covering their custodial
interrogation, they never had the chance to confer with a lawyer.
Issue:
Is the extrajudicial confession admissible?
Hled:
No. It appears that the appellants were not informed of their constitutional rights and, even
assuming that they were so informed, there is no indication that they understood those
rights. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence
With the inadmissibility of the extra-judicial confessions of appellants, their conviction
becomes baseless. They are entitled to an acquittal.
83. REYES V QUIZON
142 SCRA 362
Facts:

The trial court convicted Nenita Quizon y Katipunan for the violation of Section 4, Article 11,
in relation to Section 21, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 primarily on the
basis of her alleged extra-judicial confessions. Appellant and the Solicitor General contend
that the said extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence because appellant was
not fully apprised of her constitutional right to counsel.
Issue:
Is the extrajudicial confession admissible?
Held:
While the appellant was informed of her right to remain silent and to hire a lawyer to assist
her, she was not, however, informed that if she could not secure a lawyer, the State will
provide her with one, to assist her in the custodial investigation. The omission is a fatal
defect rendering the extra-judicial confession inadmissible in evidence as ruled by this
Honorable Tribunal in People vs. Pascual, Jr.
84. PEOPLE V TRINIDAD
162 SCRA 714
Facts:
Sgt. Casio and Cpl. Dominador Barwel apprehended the accused. On the way to Umingan,
Pangasinan, Romeo Condaya was verbally interrogated inside the jeep. Here, Condaya
admitted the shooting as Isabelo Trinidad promised to pay him the amount of Five Hundred
Pesos (P500.00) and pointed where the gun used in the killing was hidden.
After their apprehension, Condaya, Trinidad, Palding, and Mitrado were made to execute
sworn statements which, however, they refused to affirm before the Municipal Judge of
Umingan, Pangasinan.
Issue:
Is the extrajudicial confession admissible?
Held:
No. Since there is no proof that when they made their confessions they were informed of
their right to remain silent and to counsel and that they knowingly and intelligently waived
these rights, such confessions are inadmissible in evidence.
It is not only the oral confessions made to the apprehending officers, Sgt. Casio and Cpl.
Barwel, that are tainted but also the written confessions made and signed a few days after
their arrest. Thus, the testimonies of the police officers on the matters allegedly confessed
to them by accused-appellants and the written extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in
evidence.
85. PEOPLE V GALIT
135 SCRA 965
Facts:
During trial, Galit denied participation in the commission of the crime and also assailed the
admissibility of the extrajudicial confession extracted from him through torture, force and

intimidation. Against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators,
purporting it to be a re-enactment. This notwithstanding, the trial court found Galit guilty of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Issue:
Is the accused extrajudicial confession inadmissible?
Held:
YES. A long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements
of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws.
Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in
simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is
from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of
his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend.
In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for
investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his
relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right
to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed
reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute
gross violations of his rights.
The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as
evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law. Galit acquitted.

86. PEOPLE V POLICARPIO

121 SCRA 538
Facts:
What the records show is that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to be silent
and that he may refuse to give a statement which may be used against him, that is why he
refused to give such a written statement unless it is made in the presence of his lawyer as
shown by the paper he signed to this effect. However, he was made to acknowledge that
the six (6) small plastic bags of dried marijuana leaves were confiscated from him by
signing a receipt and to sign a receipt for the P20.00 bill as purchase price of the dried
marijuana leaves he sold to Pat. Mangila.
Issue:
Is the extrajudicial confession obtained admissible?
Held:
No. Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these alleged
receipts which in effect are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense.
Indeed it is unusual for appellant to be made to sign receipts for what were taken from him.
It is the police officers who confiscated the same who should have signed such receipts. No
doubt this is a violation of the constitutional right of appellant to remain silent whereby he
was made to admit the commission of the offense without informing him of his right. Such a
confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence.

87. MORALES V PONCE ENRILE

158 SCRA 85
Facts:
Petitioners were convicted of violation of Section 4 Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425 as
amended. Petitioners allege that they were arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their
constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to counsel, the right to remain
silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail. They also air the charge
that they were subjected to maltreatment and torture.
Issue:
Is the evidence admissible?
Held:
No. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient
means-by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any
person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself
or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
88. PEOPLE V BARLIS
231 SCRA 426
Facts:
Jonathan Barlis was found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. On appeal, he
contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to his sworn statement
or "salaysay" (Exhibit "B") which was taken without the assistance of a lawyer. He alleges
that he surrendered to the police only to help them find the real culprits, that Pfc. Rivera
misled him into signing the sworn statement by telling him not to worry, and that he was
brought to the Office of the IBP-Quezon City Chapter where Atty. Sansano signed the
document without conferring with him.
Issue:
Is the contention of appellant tenable?
Held:
We are not persuaded. It was the appellant's uncle who surrendered him to Pfc. Rivera, his
uncle's colleague. Before he was questioned, he was duly informed and advised in Tagalog,
a language he speaks and understands, of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
have a competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. 28 He voluntarily
agreed to be assisted by no less than the Chairman of the Legal Aid Assistance Office of

the IBP-Quezon City Chapter, Atty. Confesor Sansano. The latter affirmed in court that he
assisted the appellant during the investigation. A lawyer is an officer of the court and upon
his shoulders lies the responsibility to see to it that protection has been accorded the rights
of the accused and that no injustice to him has been committed. 29 He has in his favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties. This presumption was not
rebutted in this case. With the presence of Atty. Sansano, we believe that the rights of the
appellant were duly protected.
89. PEOPLE V MOLEDA
86 SCRA 667
Facts:
The accused Molleda, Baluyot and Nicolas were found guilty by the trial court of the crime
of murder. On appeal, Molleda claims that his extra-judicial confession is not admissible
because he was not afforded the right to counsel during the interrogation; and, that, having
been allegedly illegally arrested, his statement is inadmissible in evidence. Baluyot and
Nicolas also claims that their extra-judicial confession (Exhibits "H" and "I", respectively)
were obtained thru maltreatment, torture and intimidation and should have been rejected
Issue:
Are the extra-judicial confessions admissible?
Held:
Yes. Molleda's claim that he is entitled to counsel is without merit. The right to be
represented by counsel at custodial investigation became effective and enforceable only
after the enactment of the Constitution on January 17, 1973. 2 The investigations of the
accused-appellants having taken place much earlier or in April 1971, the right to counsel
was not applicable in their case
Appellants Nicolas' and Baluyot's claim is bereft of any evidentiary support apart from their
own testimonies to this effect. The records show that they never complained to anyone that
they were maltreated or tortured in the course of their investigations.
The trial court, therefore as maintained by the Solicitor General in his reply briefs
correctly concluded that the same were voluntarily given and consequently are admissible
in evidence.
90. PEOPLE V AYSON
203 SCRA 750
Facts:
Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which
defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by
a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration
filed by the prosecutors was denied.
Issue:
Is the evidence admissible?

Held:
Yes. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial
investigation when his statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the right to
counsel in administrative proceeding. The right to self incrimination and custodial
investigation are accorded only when the accused is subjected to custodial inquest which
involves the questioning initiated by police authorities after a person is taken in custody or
deprived of his freedom in any way. Because the statements were obtained beyond the
purview of custodial investigation the evidence should be admitted in court.
91. ARROYO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS
203 SCRA 750
Facts:
A criminal complaint for adultery was filed by the husband against his wife and petitioner.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioner and the wife, based, among
others on the wife's admission to her husband, of her infidelity. This decision was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. The wife later filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial
contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband. The husband filed a
manifestation praying for the dismissal of the case as he had "tacitly consented" to his
wife's infidelity.
Issue: Whether the admission of adulterous conduct by the wife to her husband is
admissible in evidence.
Held:
YES. The husband's testimony relating to the admission of adulterous conduct made by the
wife to her husband is admissible in evidence. The husband was neither a peace officer nor
an investigating officer conducting a custodial investigation. Neither was said testimony
rendered inadmissible by the constitutional provision on the right to remain silent and the
right to counsel of a "person under investigation for the commission of an offense."
92. PEOPLE V BENNY DY
158 SCRA 111
Facts:
Accused is the owner of Bennys Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder
before the trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the
court erred in admitting the presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a
police officer and made a confession on the crime and informed said officer where to find
the gun he used, a statement the accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility
to the court on the grounds that such statement was not made in writing and is in violation
of the due process required in custodial investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of
the accused.

Held:
An oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar
which he wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This
is because such confession was made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was
not under investigation when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is no need to
invoke compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial investigation at the case at bar.
The rule on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the confession is
competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral
confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in
substance. Thus the oral confession made by the accused outside
the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible in court and was given
due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime.
93. MAGTOTO V MANGUERA
63 SCRA 4
Facts:
(no preliminary facts available in the body of the case)
Respondent judge declared the extra-judicial confession which had incorporated an
uncounseled waiver by the confessant of his constitutional rights during custodial
investigation as admissible in evidence.
Issue:
Is the right to counsel and to be informed of such right prospective or retroactive?
Held:
We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a
prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a
person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of
his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been
obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such
confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been
obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17,
1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the
accused the right to be so informed before that date.
94. MONCADO V PEOPLE'S COURT
80 PHIL 1
(spanish text)
95. PEOPLE V VIZCARRA
115 SCRA 743
Facts:
Appellants were found guilty of the crime of rape with homicide. On appeal, appellants
Salamatin, Delos Reyes and Fernando assail the admissibility of their respective

extrajudicial statements on the ground that they were extracted by the CIS agents through
force and intimidation.
Issue:
Are the extra-judicial confessions admissible?
Held:
As heretofore pointed out, appellants admitted in their respective statements that they took
turns in ravishing Erlinda. Their responses to the questions of the investigators were so
candid and informative as to indicate the lack of any extraneous pressure on their mind
In Exhibit H, Salamatin further attested to the fact that, immediately after he and his
companions were taken into custody, i.e., before they had given their statements to the CIS
officers, a televised interview was held in the office of Lt. Col. Pelagio Perez, then chief of
the CIS, and that in the presence of the latter and of several press reporters, he and his coappellants spontaneously admitted that they were the ones who raped Erlinda Manzano.
Thus, the written confessions they gave on July 18, 1969 merely reaffirmed their prior public
admissions of culpability.
It further appears that appellants, at the request of the city mayor of Quezon City, were
physically examined by Dr. Ernesto Baylon, medico-legal officer of the Quezon City Police
Department. The latter's findings that he "did not find any visible and palpable sign of injury"
on the persons of the appellants 9 belie their claim of maltreatment and torture.
96. PEOPLE V BERNARDO
220 SCRA 31
Facts:
Bernardo, one of the appellants, admitted the crime to the police and made statement to the
media regarding the commission of the crime.
The accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of kidnapping for ransom by the RTC
of the National Capital Judicial Region.
Issue:
Is Bernardo's admission to the media admissible?
Held:
Yes. Bernardo's culpability is shown by his spontaneous statement given to GMA 7 reporter
Jessica Sojo, to wit: "Siguro, naisip ko nga ring sabihin to sa kanya (Paul Cruz) na may
konti ka ring kasalanan, Paul, siguro kasalanan 'in quotation' dahil parang inispoil mo ako,
inispoil ako."
This was made not as part of the custodial interrogation but as Bernardo's voluntary
accommodation to media questioning and is thus admissible in evidence especially so
because the statement tries to justify his ungratefulness to his employer. The fact that the
GMA 7 tape was edited with commentaries does not erase the reality that such declaration
came out freely from Bernardo's own lips.

97. PEOPLE V MAQUEDA

242 SCRA 565
Facts:
Maqueda was arrested and taken to Calauag, Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. Afterwards, he was brought to
the Benguet Provincial Jail. While under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He
stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled
case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."
Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to Prosecutor
Zarate and to Salvosa.
Issue:
Are the extra-judicial admissions admissible in evidence?
Held:
Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3,
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean
Salvosa stand on a different footing. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to
Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's
plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private
person.
Accordingly, Maquedas admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in
evidence against the former under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
98. PEOPLE V DOMANTAY
307 SCRA 1
Facts:
The accused was convicted of the crime of rape with homicide for the death of a 6 year old
girl. The accused admitted the killing to SPO1 Espinoza and Celso Manuel, a radio reporter
who interviewed him 6 days after he confessed the killing to the police.
On cross-examination, Espinoza admitted that at no time during the course of his
questioning was accused-appellant assisted by counsel. Neither was accused-appellant's
confession reduced in writing. Espinoza's testimony was admitted by the trial court over the
objection of the defense.
Issue:
Are the extrajudicial admissions to SPO1 Espinoza and Celso Manuel admissible?
Held:

But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor
made in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is
inadmissible.
However, that accused-appellants confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel is
admissible.
[A]ppellants [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the
individual and the State.
99. PEOPLE V ORDOO
334 SCRA 673
Facts:
The accused Ordoo and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to confess.
Due to the non-availability of practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the remoteness of
the town, the confession was not assisted by counsel but by the presence of the Parish
Priest and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as the relatives of the accused to obviate
the possibility of coercion, and to witness the voluntary execution by the accused of their
statements before the police.
Issue:
Are the extra-judicial admissions by the accused admissible?
Held:
No. It is explicitly stated therein that before the above-mentioned persons can appear two
(2) conditions must be met: (a) counsel of the accused must be absent, and, (b) a valid
waiver must be executed.
Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal
Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other police officers of the
municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the two
(2) accused in continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be
effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, any
admission obtained from the two (2) accused emanating from such uncounselled
interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
100. PEOPLE V TABOGA
376 SCRA 500
Facts:
Accused-appellant claimed that he was maltreated by the policemen and forced to admit the
crime. Regarding his admission to radio announcer Mario Contaoi, he narrated that the
interview was held inside the investigation room of the police station where policemen were
present. Thus, he had to admit the crimes because he was afraid of the policemen.

Issue:
Is the tape confession to the reporter admissible?
Held:
Yes.
The court a quo did not err in admitting in evidence accused-appellants taped confession.
Such confession did not form part of custodial investigation. It was not given to police
officers but to a media man in an apparent attempt to elicit sympathy.
101. PEOPLE V ENDINO

352 SCRA 307

Facts:
Accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was arrested by the police officers. On their way to the
airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused Galgarin was
interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin
admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. His
interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol.
Issue:
Is the videotaped confession admissible?
Held:
the Supreme Court ruled that the admission of the videotaped confession is proper. The
interview was recorded on video and it showed accused unburdening his guilt willingly,
openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of
custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt
to solicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. There was no showing that the
interview was coerced or against his will. However, because of the inherent danger in the
use of television as a medium for admitting ones guilt, courts are reminded that extreme
caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions.
102. PEOPLE V MORADA

307 SCRA 362

Facts:
Manimbao testified that, after coming from the hospital to see the victim, he returned to the
police station and there was told by SPO3 Gomez that accused-appellant wanted to talk to
him. Accordingly, he said, he went to see accused-appellant who was then in jail. Accusedappellant allegedly admitted that he had killed the victim. Apparently, the purpose is to
show that accused-appellant spontaneously made the confession, that is, not in the course
of interrogation by the police. In fact, Manimbao claimed accused-appellant sought him out
for a meeting
Issue:
Is the alleged confession to Manimbao admissible in evidence?
Held:

No. It would thus appear that Manimbaos conversation with accused-appellant was part of
the then ongoing police investigation. In fact, he said it was SPO3 Gomez who told him
about the alleged desire of accused-appellant to see him
(Manimbao). Since the confession was admittedly given without the safeguards in Art. III,
12 and the additional ones provided in R.A. No. 7438, particularly the requirement that the
confession be in writing and duly signed by the suspect in the presence of counsel, we hold
that accused-appellants confession is inadmissible, and it was error for the trial court to use
it in convicting accused-appellant
103. PEOPLE V SAMUS

389 SCRA 93
Facts:
After being illegally arrested, appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel. The trial court found him
guilty of the crime of murder.
Issue:
Is the admission elicited from him by the law enforcers during custodial investigation
admissible?
Held:
Even if the uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible, under the present
circumstances we cannot rule it out because of appellants failure to make timely
objections. Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section
12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given under custodial investigation and
was made without the assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to object to its
presentation during the trial, with the result that the defense is deemed to have waived
objection to its admissibility
104. PEOPLE V ANDAN

269 SCRA 95
Facts:
In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own
wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. During the confession, the mayor opened the
door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The
mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he
ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped.
Issue:
Is the videotaped confession admissible?
Held:
Yes. Appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by
the latter. Accused talked with the Mayor as a confidant, not as a law enforcement officer.

Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions
were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other
investigating officer.
Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to the spontaneous
statements not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed the crime.
105. PEOPLE V DENIEGA

251 SCRA 626

Facts:
The accused-appellants were convicted of rape and homicide. The prosecution was based
solely on the alleged extrajudicial confessions taken by the police officers without the
presence of a counsel during custodial investigation. It was also notable that the
prosecution did not present any witness to the actual commission of the crime and the basis
of the lower courts conviction to the accused was based on their
alleged extrajudicial confessions.
Issue:
Are the alleged extra-judicial confessions admissible?
Held:
The court held that under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and
jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental
requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary 2) the confession must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express and
4) the confession must be in writing.
The court noted that the assistance of a counsel provided for the accused was inadequate
to meet the standard requirements of the constitution for custodial investigation. It seems
that the lawyers were not around throughout the custodial investigation.
106. PEOPLE V TALIMAN

342 SCRA 534

Facts:
Attorney Nicolas V. Pardo was mayor of Labo, Camarines Norte. He went to the police
station upon invitation of police corporal Cereno to assist accused during their custodial
investigation. Accused executed extra-judicial statements, confessing to the commission of
the crime.
Issue:
Can the mayor be considered as an independent counsel?
Held:
No. Mayor Pardo cannot be considered as an independent counsel for accused during their
custodial investigation because as Mayor his duties were inconsistent with his

responsibilities to the suspect. It is seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake

the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests.
107.
108.
109. US v EVANGELISTA

24 PHIL 453
Facts:
The accused was convicted of arson after the trial court admitted evidence that he had
earlier attempted to set fire to the same premises.
Issue:
Is the evidence admissible?
Held:
While it was not the fire charged in the information, and does not by any means amount to
direct evidence against the accused, it was competent to prove the intent of the accused in
setting the fire which was charged in the information.
Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be
received of other similar acts, committed about the same time, for the purpose only of
establishing the criminal intent of the accused.
110. PEOPLE V VALENCIA

59 Phil 42
Facts:
Appellants Valencia and Socorro stopped their car in front of a store belonging to Morales
and bought some cigarettes and corn beef, and gave the seller a ten-peso bill which was
found to be a counterfeit. After receiving the change in the sum of P9.55, they hurriedly left
the store. Appellants went to another store belonging to Eustaquia Suga and bought cigars
and some cans of salmon, giving, in payment, another ten-peso counterfeit bill. Upon
receiving the change, they again hurriedly departed. They were, however, overtaken by
Pedro Morales and, at his instance, were detained by the authorities. They were guilty of
the crime charged against them.
Issue:
Is the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction of Socorro?
Held:
Counsel contends that Socorro did not know anything about the counterfeit bills, but an
examination of the evidence in this case convinces us to the contrary, and so we are not
disposed to interfere with the finding of the trial court on this point.
111. PEOPLE V IRANG

64 Phil 285 (1937)

Facts:
After barging into her home, a man ordered Maximiniana Vicente to bring out her money
and jewelry. As she turned over the items, she looked at the man's face and saw that he
had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. Irang was identified by Maximiana from a
police line-up and was charged. During the trial, Maximianas neighbor, Juana de la Cruz,
testified that on the night in question, her house was assaulted by malefactors. De la Cruz
noticed that one of them had pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid. She identified that
man to be Irang.
Issue:
Is the evidence of another crime admissible?
Held:
The testimony of Juana de la Cruz indirectly corroborates Maximinianas testimony that the
man of the same description was the one who went to her house and demanded delivery of
her money and jewelry. While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a
prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to
identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence
at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a
circumstance connected with the crime.
112. US v. PINEDA

37 Phil 457
Facts:
A druggist filled a prescription for protassium chlorate with barium chlorate, a poison,
causing the death of two horses. After analyzing the packages, two chemists went to the
drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was
found to be barium chlorate.
Issue:
Is the testimony of the chemist admissible?
Held:
The testimony of the chemist was admissible in order to demonstrate defendant's motive
and negligence. It is permissible to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent and to fix
his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts,
accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent
may even be established. There is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of
accidents. Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although
it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant.
113. CORNEJO, JR. V SANDIGANBAYAN

152 SCRA 559

Facts:

Petitioner Cornejo falsely presented himself as duly authorized to inspect and investigate
privately-owned buildings by which he was able to inveigle complainant to agree to have the
floor area of her house and store measured and to have a plan thereof drawn for a fee less
than that supposedly officially charged for said service.
During trial, Exhibit B was presented as part of the testimony of-the complainant that such
certification was issued in her presence and the declaration of Assistant Pasay City
Engineer Ceasar Contreras that the signature appearing thereon was that of Engineer
Reyna.
Issue:
Is the certification, Exhibit B, issued by the City Engineer to the effect that petitioner was not
authorized to inspect and investigate privately-owned buildings admissible in evidence?
Held:
Where the statement or writings attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand are
being offered not to prove the truth of the facts stated therein but only to prove that such
statements were actually made or such writings were executed, such evidence is not
covered by the hearsay rule.
114. PIONEER CERAMICS V SAMIA

12 PHIL 64
Facts:
On the motion for reconsideration, the petitioner objects to the consideration of the
physicians report as a basis for the award on the ground that it is hearsay evidence, the
physician himself not having been presented as witness.
Issue:
Is the petitioner's contention correct?
Held:
while such a report may be hearsay under the common law rules of evidence, it is
nevertheless admissible under Section 49 of the Act, and may be considered in addition to
the sworn testimony at open hearing. In the present case, aside from the physicians report
there is the testimony of the claimant himself concerning the nature of his work, which
testimony constitutes substantial evidence to support the award. It can hardly be doubted
that the disease (pulmonary tuberculosis) which the claimant contracted, if not directly
caused by his employment was at the least aggravated by it.
115. PEOPLE V BRIOSO

37 SCRA 336
Facts:
Appellants were found guilty of the crime of murder. The two accused appealed the
conviction and assigned the following error, among others, that the lower court erred in
disregarding the affidavit (Exhibit 2) of Antonio Daria, son of the deceased, clearing the

accused Mariano Taeza, which affidavit had been identified in court by the fiscal before
whom the same was executed.
Issue:
Is the affidavits admissible in evidence?
Held:
No. Exhibit "2," the alleged affidavit of Antonio Daria, was presented in court to corroborate
Mariano Taeza's testimony. But while the said affidavit was identified by the Provincial
Fiscal as having been subscribed and sworn to before him, he also stated that he did not
know Antonio Daria personally and that was the only time he appeared before him. Exhibit
"2" does not have the seal of the Fiscal's Office. Moreover, the said exhibit was never
identified by the supposed affiant and there was no opportunity for the prosecution to crossexamine him.
Affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
116. NGO SENG V FERNANDEZ

98 Phil 197
Facts:
The most important issue raised in the appeal is the failure of the Respondent Court of
Appeals to take into account the report of a certified public accountant, Exhibit O, in which it
appears that the balance of collections for which Quisumbing is responsible is P63.69.
Petitioners contend that the said report Exhibit O was not objected to by the respondent Paz
Fernandez, the same should be admitted even though the referee did not attach the exhibits
supporting said report.
Issue:
Is the Exhibit O admissible in evidence?
Held:
We presume that the papers examined were statements prepared by Quisumbing himself.
The authenticity and correctness of said documents were never before the court. The same
were not presented to support the report and no opportunity was afforded the adverse party
to question them. Admitting for the sake of argument that the documents were in the
handwriting of Quisumbing, the same are incompetent against Paz Fernandez and Darjuan,
because books of account, as regards other persons, are hearsay or res inter alios acta,
except when circumstances are shown to justify their admission as an exception to the
above rule
117 ROBLES V LIZARRAGA

42 PHIL 584
Facts:

Lizarraga filed a case of unlawful detainer against spouses Robles. Evarista Robles
contends that she is a possessor in good faith and is the owner of the improvements of the
building in question and has the right to demand payment of their value from Lizarraga.
One of the proofs establishing the fact that Evarista Robles possession was in good faith is
found in Exhibit A, a statement of account.
Issue:
Can a document not signed be admissible in evidence?
Held:
When a document, which is a statement of accounts, is offered in evidence not to prove
such accounts, but for the only purpose of showing the possessors good faith, section 335
of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable, and such a document i8 admissible in
evidence although it is not signed
118. PEOPLE V DE JOYA

203 SCRA 343

Facts:
The prosecution relied heavily on the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim as
testified to by the witnesses and the dying statement of the victim when her grandson Alvin
asked her Apo, Apo, what happened? and she answered, Si Paki, then she expired.
When Alvin was asked during his testimony who is this Paki, he identified the accused. The
accused during his testimony never denied that he is called Paki.
Issue:
Is the dying statement admissible in evidence?
Held:
No. A dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself
does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of
the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a full
expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact.
It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was
incomplete. In other words, the deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a
complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by
uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person who had
thrust some sharp instrument through and through her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia
herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication might
have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a
dying declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the bloddy deed.
119. PEOPLE V MORENO

220 SCRA 292

Facts:

Immediately after the three accused left the house where the crime was committed, and the
threatening presence of the accused was gone, both Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa
Sumayo told their employers, the Mohnani spouses, that they were raped. The latter later
testified in court as to these statements.
Counsel for appellant claims that in the absence of Galedos testimony in court, her affidavit
is hearsay evidence and was thus inadmissible for the purpose of proving the allegation of
rape.
Issue:
Is Galedo's affidavit a hearsay evidence?
Held:
No. Admittedly, Galedos affidavit would be hearsay evidence if she did not testify as to its
contents at the trial. The accused was not given the opportunity to face and cross-examine
her on her accusations, a right guaranteed to him by the Constitution. However, there are
exceptions to the rule on inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, and one of these is when it is
part of the res gestae as provided in Section 42 of Rule 130, Rules of Court. This exception
is based on the belief that such statements are trustworthy because made instinctively,
"while the declarants mental powers for deliberation are controlled and stilled by the
shocking influence of a startling occurrence, so that all his utterances at the time are the
reflex products of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by retrospective mental action."
Said natural and spontaneous utterances are perceived to be more convincing than the
testimony of the same person on the witness stand.
120. ENCARNACION V CA