SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and
MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and overwhelming
powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental
liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need. The Court is now called to decide
whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the government's ironclad duties under a
treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the
fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual
concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where
the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the
intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need
for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said
treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter
referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its
concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic
Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents
accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer
of the requested state resident in the Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S.
Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez
to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of
arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents
for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the
United States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):
A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2]
counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5
years on each count);

C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5
years on each count);
D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on
each count);
E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum
Penalty less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel
of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree
No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the
extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English
translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some
other matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel,
wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and
that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in
abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the
request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period
of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999
(but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the
following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting
documents from the United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of
the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of
the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the
Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and
establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and
admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary
investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine
whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been

complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited
will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents
and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said
documents.
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and
documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United
States law. The United States had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts
authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine
government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez.
Any further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United States District
Courts. In this particular extradition request the United States Government requested the
Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This
Department's denial of your request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the
United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of
Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition
requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an
extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we
are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be
effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be
processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation,
for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents,
to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the
extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and
objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to
restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in
court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any
act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo).
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to
Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable
Ralph C. Lantion.

After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in
his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice,
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their
agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the
acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of
the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the
corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to
the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from
service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed
upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or
opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS
COMPLAINED OF,I.E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS
TO THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION
TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OFMANDAMUS IN THE PETITION
FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS
TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES
UNDER THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.

THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE,
FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND
ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as
prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO) providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this
Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person
or persons acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from
enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case
No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the
Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed
their respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent.
However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to
delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and
academic (the issues of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative
resolution would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999,
thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the extradition petition with
the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to
basic due process rights at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this
entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine
Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a
breach, is there any conflict between private respondent's basic due process rights and the
provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the
substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the filing of the petition therein,
and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court.

To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty
which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof
defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him
at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed
on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The portions of the
Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not convicted individual, are
abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by
the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other
instruments having equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the
name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or
omissions complained of, and the time and place of the commission of these acts;
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the
designation or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request;
and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
pertinently provides
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the
requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request
together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating
the sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What
then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive
authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:

1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and
probable location of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense
for which extradition is requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense;
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the
execution of punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or
paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable
cause for his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority;
and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying
documents received in support of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or
consular officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052
from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the
executive authority of the Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated, or
that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its
supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same
to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to
take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then
file a written petition with the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the
court take the extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).

The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as
soon as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer
the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it
appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends
of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective
extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal,
civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the
hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not
inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8
of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the
Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving
the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition
(Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final
and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal
in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the
required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based
on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RPUS Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines whether or not the offense for which extradition
is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).
1wphi1.nt

With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents
itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings?
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to
file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition
papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine
whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation.Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1],
Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the
extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to
abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition
request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or
less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the
Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its

accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign

Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he
simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of
the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of
Justice took it upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same
to find out whether they comply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RPUS Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of
Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had to go over
them so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it
was also at this stage where private respondent insisted on the following; (1) the right to be
furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in having a
reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of the
opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing of private
respondent's opposition to the request.
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating
its powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover,
has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its
own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not
allow private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign
Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a
well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law.
The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all
by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or
his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It
is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an
exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a
technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly
deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are
not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated,
or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn,
August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).
Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a
proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision
supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198,
citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining
or investigatory power, is one or the determinative powers of an administrative body which better
enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26).
This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the

activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of
information by means or accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of
documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a
useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial
functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the
functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial
functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto.
The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial
functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority
to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for
investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances
presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the
parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate
extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations
of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether
the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the
basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no
power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court.
The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed
in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is
characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition
process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This
deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee
pending the submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of
urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending
presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be
automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree
No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be
discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the
provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective
extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9,
RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the
purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the
temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court
(Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the
evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.

Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are
essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and
ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself,
this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78,Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation
process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to
make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights
that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice
Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that
had been advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right
against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon
vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against selfincrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in
criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal
aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with
immorality, which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The
Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the
revocation of one's license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of
property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a
respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein
ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings
are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the
earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American
jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the
proceeding is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in
the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it
must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be
considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for
the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature.
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property or property
right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible
deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed
second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be
returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition
to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this
sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation since both procedures may
have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged.
Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may

result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the
deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's
Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute is not well-taken.Wright is not authority for petitioner's conclusion that his
preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The characterization of a treaty
in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had
nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by
public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the
legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserved these
principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110
U.S. 516). Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with
treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and
punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common
due process protection to their respective citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly
identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their respective
Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed and
impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make
them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time
to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of
due process are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law
the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a
legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause "gradually
ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they
arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting
idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20
SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of
free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and
procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the
guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993
Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not
only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of
these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case
affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their

side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p.
64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the
right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the
right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt
thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by
the complainant.
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary
abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a
public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg.
337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like
establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and the
cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not
precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the
person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent
taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not
been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage
of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy
considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on
the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition
proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the governor of the asylum state has the duty to
deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are
given a liberal construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly
as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am
Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the
demand must be in proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the
extradition must appear on the face of the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded
was in the demanding state at the time the offense charged was committed, and that the person
demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the
demanding state before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents
are then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such papers and documents

prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the instrument charging the person
demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory
requirements with respect to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers
are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the government of the asylum state to effect
extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the
indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments
accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is
directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right mandatory on
demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 andEx parte Tucker,
Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853).
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the
executive authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged
offender, and the designation of the particular officer having authority to act in behalf of the
demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated
September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the
U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are basically governed by a combination of treaties
(with special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to
wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases,
requests for the provincial arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine
Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a
provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is transmitted subsequently through the
diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the
Department of Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a declaration
confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, that
under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition
proceedings, that the offenses are covered as extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof,
and that the documents have been authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that
ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a
hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the
foreign country. The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant
and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought for offenses for
which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that
the defendant is the person sought and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)

5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after
having received a "complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his
jurisdiction" with having committed any of the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in
the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of
American decisions pronounce that international extradition proceedings partake of the
character of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, rather than a trial of
the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates
its determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the person's
extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of extraditability to the Department of
State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender an
individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of
the requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition
may present whatever information he deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes
the final determination whether to surrender an individual to the foreign government
concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with
one entity the Department of State which has the power to evaluate the request and the
extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act
or not to act on the court's determination of extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the
Department of Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having
satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the
Department of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the
Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the request to the
Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request as well as thereafter,
if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition for extradition.
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person
sought to be extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He
emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is the possible delay in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a
proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of
Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular, that they were designed to
protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency
and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps
more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)

The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no right
that of liberty secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the
United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)
In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual
are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid
objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the
Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question
that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a
few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no
exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the
Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him
that right (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law
enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted
persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings
and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash
in discord. Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic
principles inherent in "ordered liberty."
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no
extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate
extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be
compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he
may hold that federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been
met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the
requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a
careful examination of the extradition documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the
request fails to meet the requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to
the Department of Justice for the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the
aforesaid requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring
compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S.
Government of certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and
without the official English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated). In fact,
petitioner even admits that consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the
lawyers in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature
of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its

intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently necessitates immediate and
prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is
private respondent precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without
prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On
one hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative if
adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request
shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of
Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition
petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional
arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus
blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with
and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7
of Article III which reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines,
namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access
to official records documents. The general right guaranteed by said provision is the right to
information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of access to official records
is likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided
by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the
premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values
of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999
do not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the
documents requested are not of public concern. On the other hand, private respondent argues that
the distinction between matters vested with public interest and matters which are of purely private
interest only becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters
requested, invokes the right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one
directly affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a
public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a

broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any
citizen has "standing".
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct
bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes
the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to
information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes
Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the
government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337).
Such information may be contained in official records, and in documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action
from the U.S. Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the
papers have some relation to matters of foreign relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if
a third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of
public concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance
must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of
the government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own
government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in
contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern,
because our government by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition
request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would
private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition
Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and
the due process clause in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the
constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law
implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice
and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international
law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of
our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution
which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations." Under the doctrine of

incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the and land no further legislative
action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public
International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize
them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with
proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the
observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine
Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a
choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates
that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the
reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of
the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries,
decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty
may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest
law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be
invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national
law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pined against each other.
There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the
provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as
regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition
proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and
during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are
clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these
rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the
evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition
request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the
basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing
law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee.
Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in
interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request

for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his
right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the
Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by
petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable
during trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized
the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of
secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two
basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective
extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the
Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Following petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a
period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III
of the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ or habeas corpus shall not be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioner's
theory would also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when
the extradition petition has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not
provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll
persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. . ." Can petitioner validly argue that since these
contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated
guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto?
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in
administrative proceeding is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997];
Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs.
NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs.
NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner
by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA
31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the
enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections

to the Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are
insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners
of Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of
Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997])
where we ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the
Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution,
Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971
(Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for
Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National
Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal
investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of
Appeals:
. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an
employee may be removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain
instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the charges
preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by
furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement
that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the constitutional
provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged
with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his
side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges levelled against him and to
present evidence in support of his defenses. . . .
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process
rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of
property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to
a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the extradition request and the
deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice
outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs.
Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even
call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true
to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation

of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is
premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and
government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and
wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and
academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented

by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon.
GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B.
JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO,respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and

hearing before warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they
entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions is
No. The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are
laid out in this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
void and set aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001 and July 3, 2001 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. The first assailed Order set for
[1]

[3]

[2]

hearing petitioners application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a
warrant, but at the same time granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the
Order reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against
respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent
be issued. Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail
for respondents temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the
same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his
passport and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to
include the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure List.
[4]

Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the
bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v.
Ralph C. Lantion.
[5]

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government,
through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522
dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and
accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B.
Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and
documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of
justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
[6]

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his
extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition
before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of
the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable
period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.
[7]

[8]

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its
October 17, 2000 Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed
[9]

their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private
respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America,
represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate
Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The
Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15,
1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in
Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to
commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in
violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US
Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code
Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US
Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his
immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an
Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that petitioners application for
an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
[10]

In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set
the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its
reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an
extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a
warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15,
2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing
the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one
million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July
4, 2001.
[11]

[12]

Hence, this Petition.

[13]

Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.

The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of
first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of
PD No. 1069.
II.

The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that
provides for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied
upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading
to extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings
leading to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear
showing by the applicant of the existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public
respondent received no evidence of special circumstances which may justify release
on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will
engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure
compliance by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case
entitled Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17,
Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting
bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the subject bail orders.
[14]

In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether
Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued,

and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the
Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioners failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration
in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. We
shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing
of the substantive issues.
[15]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for
Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: (1) the issues were fully considered by such
court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and position
papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no
useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal
basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage of
sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition;
and (4) the issues raised are purely of law.
[16]

For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following
reasons: (1) even if the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate
court takes cognizance of the issues and decides them, the parties would still bring the
matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have
a binding precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of
Appeals had in one case ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below
refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise
adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the
extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that
this Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the
potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse
effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing
extradition treaties.
[17]

[18]

As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper
unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance
to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when
the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of
urgency. As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when
the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and
[19]

exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. Aside from being of this nature, the
issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public
interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
[20]

Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari when there are special and important reasons therefor. In Fortich v.
Corona we stated:
[21]

[22]

[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of
the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which
has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs.
Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have
further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the
present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to
promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by
petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem
created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the
petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a
waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of
justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon
vs. Court of Appeals:
[23]

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a
particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so
require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper
procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to
the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases, we held as follows:
[24]

This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts
and the Court of Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in cases where
special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the
same.
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in
extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such
proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local
jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction
of the treaty and the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or
a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide
for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory,
understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the
issues raised here.
[25]

[26]

1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.

First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by
facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to the
other.
[27]

[28]

[29]

With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of
affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and
evading prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are
adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international
boundaries.
Today, a majority of nations in the world community have come to look
upon extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in the
suppression of crime. It is the only regular system that has been devised to return
fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with municipal
and international law.
[30]

[31]

An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals

should be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the
number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that
efficient means of detection and the threat of punishment play a significant role in the
deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective
extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti
commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to
escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition arrangements

flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus
indirectly does the commission of crime itself.
[32]

In Secretary v. Lantion we explained:

[33]

The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one
way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered
[into] by our government. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one
world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing
universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny
easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized
countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible
movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes.
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an
expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an
isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our
chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined,
and that both accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial process. More
pointedly, our duly authorized representatives signature on an extradition treaty
signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect
the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full
faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant
and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the
treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its
unconstitutionality.
[34]

[35]

3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are
not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused
are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
[36]

An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will

call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To
begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt
or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of
the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are
only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by
an extraditee x x x.
xxx xxx

xxx

There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal

proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal
proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding,
the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under
less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a
criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive
may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie
case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon
being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an
individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The
United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises
wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nations
foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite.
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to
ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Such
determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication
and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through
which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the
best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to
enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose
of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request
complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.
[37]

[38]

[39]

4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition
Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption
that its implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with the
requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a
bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure would discourage
other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that
hinges on reciprocity.
[40]

[41]

Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our
obligations under the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the
requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty,
are satisfied. In other words, [t]he demanding government, when it has done all that
the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the
issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under obligation to make the
surrender. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper.
[42]

[43]

5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie
presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothing
short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
[44]

The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be
extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin,
if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of
herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his
indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning
that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with
are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state,
as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an
ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the
capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient
opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
[45]

First Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused,
a fugitive from justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that
petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to avoid
extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous
precedent, in that those sought to be extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers
and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and
arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further
asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in
court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding
judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:

SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1)

Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as
soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the
day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest
of the accused which may be served any where within the Philippines if it
appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the
answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer within

the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the
hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be
promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the
case. (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately setting for
hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word
immediate to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered
nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails
sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them,
and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest
subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered immediate. The law could not
have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of
imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued.
[46]

[47]

[48]

By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make
an exhaustivedetermination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon
the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the
court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of
the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among
others, were the following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr.
Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of the
Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary
Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the
Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence
of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I Appendix of
Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers and
enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J Table of Contents
for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5)
Annex MM, the Exhibit L Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the
Affidavit of Betty Steward and enclosed Statements in two volumes.
[49]

It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from
these records adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether the accused
was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to best serve the ends of
justice. He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition

request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded from these
supporting documents that probable cause did exist. In the second questioned Order,
he stated:

In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its]
request for extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the
existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing against the extraditee.
[50]

We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition
and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself
and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that
a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he
set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.
[51]

Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer
or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons. In connection
with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word hearing is notably absent from
the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the
law could have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that
extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the
Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate
with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.
[52]

It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and
something not inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law,
nor with previous treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of
a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable,
the more reasonable to the less reasonable x x x .
[53]

Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice

of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give
them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the
Law could have intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have
been defeated by the escape of the accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does
not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may

produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution
itself requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and
the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear
the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go
to the extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the
judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent
judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to
the existence of probable cause.
[54]

[55]

In Webb v. De Leon, the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed
to conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
[56]

Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine
personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges
do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They
just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable
cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further
examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present case, validating the act of
respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses
at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the
accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during
the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop
him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in
his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the
determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and
possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the
summary nature of extraditions.
[57]

That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not
sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If
a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper
procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they
are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition
Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge

may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the
affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination,
no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge.
[58]

On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the
magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at
the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary
hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the
potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the
opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing
procedure will best serve the ends of justice in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:

Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures
the right to bail of all persons, including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the
only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present
case of Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and
consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply
according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
[59]

On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine
Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition
request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation
of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter
he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable

doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
[60]

The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does not detract
from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion. Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right
is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
[61]

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the
United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress,
extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which
he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases
against him, not before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti in arguing that, constitutionally,
[n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law.
[62]

Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition
proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the
familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at
the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to
be heard. Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case
-- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case,
respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition
court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due
process and fundamental fairness.
[63]

[64]

[65]

Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the

immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and
detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs filing in court the
Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request
meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges
independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice
before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under
the courts custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of
respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. But because he
left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be completed,
it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His
invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had that
opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of
violating its treaty obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal
liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His
supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had
previously shunned pales against the governments interest in fulfilling its Extradition
Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the suppression of
crime. Indeed, [c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process
rights accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable
government interests.
[66]

Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings
who, instead of facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and
hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty
obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to
be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of
any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the
right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail,
as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the
Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and
gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused
to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention
here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would
fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of
extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition.
[67]

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of
discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce
constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad
enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due
process extends to the life, liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic and
resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application.
[68]

[69]

[70]

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after
a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail
may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing
showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to
the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in
the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
[71]

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is
derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears

the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not
a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign
relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst
states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts
into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital
international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or
compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of fair
play, it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill
international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are
compelling enough for the Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail. We
have carefully examined these circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member
of the House of Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention will
disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are not
persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, the Court has already debunked the
disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
[72]

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters
elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do
so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional
equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws. This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be
treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither
partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the
mandate of the people are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty
to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is
only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on
the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme
Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant
is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty
to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to
serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never
has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from
those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious
discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class.
[73]

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a
congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States
was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have been
prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their representative,
including his detention pending the final resolution of the case. Premises considered
and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his election to
public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are
lengthy, it would be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are
not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases are summary in
nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its

annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither
is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights available
to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay
the proceedings. This is quite another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further
discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more
reason would the grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it
as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the
power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and
unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses
that he learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the
country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of the request for
his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the
process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting
government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines
cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our
government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for
Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at
anytime after the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even
after bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the extradition court may
continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in
accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally
unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -have been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to
discuss fully and exhaustively private respondents claim to bail. As already stated, the
RTC set for hearing not only petitioners application for an arrest warrant, but also
private respondents prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were
memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail, both of which
were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the
lengthy Memoranda and the Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has
patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the great
majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the
parties -- particularly the potential extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with

additional pleadings -- entitled Manifestations by both parties and CounterManifestation by private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea
for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its
entirety. The trial court would again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted,
however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private
respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is
absolutely no need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in
the factual presentation
of
Mr.
Jimenez. Rather,
it
lies
in
his legal arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion
and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring,
Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by the learned justices themselves -- has
exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this
case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these
already very delayed proceedings, which our Extradition Law requires to
be summary in character. What we need now is prudent and deliberate speed, not
unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not
a circuitous cop-out.
[74]

Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly disregarding basic
freedoms when a case is one of extradition. We believe that this charge is not only
baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length and breath, this Decision
has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of
potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the
request expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may
be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and
Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended
merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has
illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed
therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed
its trust in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty
partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to
the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in
which guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in
which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin,

if at all, to a courts request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at
large or has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of
the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would
escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient
in form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and
whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the
petitioner to submit further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or
witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a
warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and
to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the
applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there
is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special,
humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in
the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle
of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of
right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental
fairness. Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be
heard. A subsequentopportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed,
available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be
heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of
extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a
bulwark of democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the
limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other
co-equal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility
arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement
treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty
and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review
authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow
contortions, delays and over-due process every little step of the way, lest
these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of
international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty
partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be
converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay,
mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and
international cooperation.

10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all

deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law;
and,
while
safeguarding
basic
individual
rights,
to
avoid
the
legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpos
e.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23,
2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3,
2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail
bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila
is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed
pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as
well as our Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

EDUARDO TOLENTINO
RODRIGUEZ and IMELDA
GENER RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioners,

- versus -

THE HONORABLE PRESIDING

JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA
BRANCH 17, GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice,
and DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL

G.R. No. 157977

Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Respondents.

February 27, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition directed
against the Orders dated May 7, 2003[1] and May 9, 2003[2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 17 in Case No. 01-190375, which cancelled the bail of
petitioners and denied their motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The case stemmed from the petition for extradition filed on March 12,
2001 by the Government of the United States of America (US government)
through the Department of Justice (DOJ) against the petitioners.
After their arrest, petitioners applied for bail which the trial court granted
on September 25, 2001. The bail was set for one million pesos for
each. Petitioners then posted cash bonds. The US government moved for
reconsideration of the grant of bail, but the motion was denied by the trial
court. Unsatisfied, the US government filed a petition for certiorari with this
Court, entitled Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice v. Hon. Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, etc., et al., and
docketed as G.R. No. 151456.
Thereafter, we directed the trial court to resolve the matter of bail which,
according to its November 28, 2001 Order,[3] shall be subject to whatever ruling
that this Court may have in the similar case of Mark Jimenez entitled Government
of the United States of America v. Purganan,[4] docketed as G.R No. 148571. In
compliance with our directive, the trial court, without prior notice and hearing,
cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a warrant of
arrest,[5] to wit:
Accordingly, following the En Banc Decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 148571 dated September 24, 2002 to the effect

that extraditees are not entitled to bail while the extradition

proceedings are pending (page 1, En Banc Decision in G.R. No.
148571), let a warrant of arrest issue against the herein
respondents sans any bail, for implementation by the Sheriff or any
member of any law enforcement agency in line with Section 19 of
Presidential Decree No. 1069.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for the reconsideration of the

cancellation of their bail. The motion was heard and denied on May 9, 2003.[6]
Having no alternative remedy, petitioners filed the present petition on the
following grounds:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED SUCH SERIOUS AND
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CANCELLING THE BAIL OF
HEREIN PETITIONERS WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AND
HEARING OF ITS CANCELLATION.
II
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED SUCH SERIOUS AND
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT CONSIDERING CERTAIN
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDANT TO THE PRESENT
CASE, AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE OF NOBAIL IN EXTRADITION CASES WHEN PETITIONERS CASH
BAIL WAS UNILATERALLY CANCELLED.
III
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED SUCH SERIOUS AND
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE WARRANT OF
ARREST WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE HEREIN PETITIONERS
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY EXTRADITION
PRIOR TO CANCELLING THEIR CASH BAIL.[7]

Once again we face the controversial matter of bail in extradition cases. We

are asked to resolve twin issues: First, in an extradition case, is prior notice and
hearing required before bail is cancelled? Second, what constitutes a special
circumstance to be exempt from the no-bail rule in extradition cases?
Petitioners assert that their bail cannot be cancelled without due process of
law. By way of analogy, they point to Rule 114, Section 21[8] of the Rules of Court
where the surety or bonding company is required to be notified and allowed to
show cause why the bail bond should not be cancelled. They say that if the rules
grant this opportunity to surety and bonding companies, the more reason then that
in an extradition case the same should be afforded.
Petitioners also contend that this Courts directive in G.R. No. 151456 did
not in any way authorize the respondent court to cancel their bail. Petitioners aver
that respondent court should have first determined the facts to evaluate if
petitioners were entitled to continuance of their bail, e.g. their willingness to go on
voluntary extradition, which respondent court should have considered a special
circumstance.
Respondents, for their part, argue that prior notice and hearing are not
required to cancel petitioners bail, and the issuance of a warrant of arrest ex
parte against an extraditee is not a violation of the due process clause. Further,
respondents maintain that prior notice and hearing would defeat the purpose of the
arrest warrant since it could give warning that respondents would be arrested and
even encourage them to flee.
Besides, even granting that prior notice and hearing are indeed required,
respondents contend that petitioners had been effectively given prior notice and
opportunity to be heard, because the trial courts order clearly stated that the matter
of bail shall be subject to whatever ruling the Supreme Court may render in the
similar
extradition
case
ofGovernment
of
the United
States
of
[9]
America v. Purganan. Petitioners did not contest the aforementioned
order. Respondents declare that petitioners were likewise notified of this Courts
directives to the trial court to resolve the matter of their bail.

More significantly, petitioners claim that their bail should not have been
cancelled since their situation falls within the exception to the general rule of nobail. They allege that their continuous offer for voluntary extradition is a special
circumstance that should be considered in determining that their temporary liberty
while on bail be allowed to continue. They cite that petitioner Eduardo is in fact
already in the United States attending the trial. They also have not taken flight as
fugitives. Besides, according to petitioners, the State is more than assured they
would not flee because their passports were already confiscated and there is an
existing hold-departure order against them. Moreover, petitioners assert, they are
not a danger to the community.
Respondents counter that petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez did not show
her good faith by her continued refusal to appear before the respondent
court. Further, the reasons of petitioners do not qualify as compelling or special
circumstances. Moreover, the special circumstance of voluntary surrender of
petitioner Eduardo is separate and distinct from petitioner Imeldas.
Additionally, respondents maintain that the ruling in the case of
Atong Ang[10] has no applicability in the instant case. Angs bail was allowed
because the English translation of a testimony needed to determine probable cause
in Angs case would take time. This special circumstance is not attendant in this
case.
The issue of prior notice and hearing in extradition cases is not
new. In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,[11] by a vote of nine to six, we initially
ruled that notice and hearing should be afforded the extraditee even when a
possible extradition is still being evaluated. [12] The Court, deliberating on a motion
for reconsideration also by a vote of nine to six, qualified and declared that
prospective extraditees are entitled to notice and hearing only when the case is
filed in court and not during the process of evaluation.[13]
In the later case of Purganan, eight justices concurred that a possible
extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of
arrest while six others dissented.

Now, we are confronted with the question of whether a prospective

extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before the cancellation of his or her
bail.
The issue has become moot and academic insofar as petitioner Eduardo
Rodriguez is concerned. He is now in the USA facing the charges against
him. But co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez is here and stands on a different
footing. We agree that her bail should be restored.
In Purganan, we said that a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice
and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest, [14] because notifying him
before his arrest only tips him of his pending arrest. But this is for cases pending
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, not in a cancellation of a bail that had been
issued after determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk. The policy is that a
prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from justice.
[15]
On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that he will not flee once bail is
granted.[16] If after his arrest and if the trial court finds that he is no flight risk, it
grants him bail. The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has
already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight
risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and had already
determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to
provisional release.
Under these premises, and with the trial courts knowledge that in this case,
co-petitioner has offered to go on voluntary extradition; that she and her husband
had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that her husband had already gone on
voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing trial; that the passport
of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the authorities; that she never
attempted to flee; that there is an existing hold-departure order against her; and that
she is now in her sixties, sickly and under medical treatment, we believe that the
benefits of continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their
grant of bail should not be cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given notice
and without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be
discontinued.

We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a

clear and convincing showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community,and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.[17]
The trial courts immediate cancellation of the bail of petitioners is contrary
to our ruling in Purganan, and it had misread and misapplied our directive
therein.
Now, was the order to issue warrant of arrest against petitioners and to
cancel the bail of extraditees a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court?
Grave abuse of discretion is capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[18] In our view, the cancellation of copetitioners bail, without prior notice and hearing, could be considered a violation
of co-petitioners right to due process tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.
Finally, considering that remanding the case to the court a quo will only
delay the final resolution of the case as in all probability it would only end up with
us again,[19]we will decide if Imeldas bail was validly cancelled.
In Purganan, we held also that the grounds used by the highest court in the
requesting state for the grant of bail may be considered, under the principle of
reciprocity.[20]
Considering that she has not been shown to be a flight risk nor a danger to
the community, she is entitled to notice and hearing before her bail could be
cancelled. Based on the record, we find that, absent prior notice and hearing, the
bails cancellation was in violation of her right to due process.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Orders
dated May 7, 2003 and May 9, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
17 in Case No. 01-190375 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, as far as
petitioner IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ is concerned. We hereby (1)

declare IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ entitled to bail, (2) order her cancelled
bail restored, and (3) order the warrant for her arrest revoked.
SO ORDERED.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the

Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773.
These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private
respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the
said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges
that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong
Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on
June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and
October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of
seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for
the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application
for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition andmandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and
sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final
and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part,
private respondent filed, in the same case,-a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for
bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 9995733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The petition
for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes
that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for
judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the
government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion
for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they
so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be
filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking,
said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under
the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting
in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first
time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may
be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking
through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in
criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been

arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1,
6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando,J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail
will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusfinds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII,
Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes
the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean
that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court
cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual
person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that
the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the
second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted
in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the
laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg
principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now
a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave
recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life,
liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the
principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon
the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court,
in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution,3 the principles set
forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and

ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty,
and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment
is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable
it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and
protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts
ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is
not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings,
such as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential
history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal
proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during
the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure
to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting
that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to
treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while
deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal
law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that
foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail
pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon
the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed
in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both
are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus,
the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines
"extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand
the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the
correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. 8 It is not a criminal
proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its
nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different
nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is
it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent
the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain
the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further
note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional
arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for
extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty,
and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the
extradition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence
of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary
presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is
the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such
extraditee is a fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears
the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the
purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due
process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily
met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying
bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used
in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders
and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not
a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not,
the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

ATTY.
JULIANA
WHITE,

ADALIM-

A.M. No. RTJ-02-1738

(formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1325-RTJ)

Complainant,
Members:

- versus -

HON. JUDGE ARNULFO O.

BUGTAS, Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern
Samar,
Respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,

PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:,
November 17, 2005

x----------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a verified letter-complaint dated August 10, 2001, filed by Atty.

Juliana Adalim-White against Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, Branch 2,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar, for ignorance of the law
relative to Criminal Case No. 10772 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Manuel
Bagaporo, Jr.
The full text of the letter-complaint is as follows:
I bring to the attention of your Honors the act of Honorable Judge
Arnulfo O. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, Branches I and II, Regional Trial
Court, Borongan, Eastern Samar for ordering the Release on
Recognizance [of] Mr. Manuel Bagaporo, Jr., a convict of frustrated
murder before terminating service of the minimum penalty, and pending
the approval of the prisoners application for parole.
Thank you.[1]

In an Indorsement dated August 28, 2001, the Office of the Court

Administrator directed respondent to file his comment to the complaint.[2]
On October 29, 2001, respondent filed his Comment admitting that he issued
an order allowing Manuel Bagaporo, Jr. (Bagaporo) to be released upon
recognizance of the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, Alexandrino R.
Apelado, Sr. Respondent avers that: Bagaporo was convicted by the trial court of
the crime of frustrated murder and meted the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from four years and two months to eight years and one day; Bagaporo served
sentence; subsequently, he filed an application for release on recognizance; in
support of his application, Provincial Jail Warden Apelado issued a certification to
the effect that Bagaporo has been confined at the Provincial Jail since February 9,
1996 and is already entitled to parole; another certification was issued by
Supervising Probation and Parole Officer Eulalia R. Columbretis showing that
Bagaporo had applied for parole in line with the Department of Justices
Maagang Paglaya Program. Respondent contends that on the basis of these
certifications and on the rule that bail being discretionary upon conviction by the
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court granted Bagaporos application for bail upon recognizance
of Apelado.[3]

In our Resolution of November 25, 2002, we directed the parties to manifest

to this Court if they are willing to submit this case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings filed.[4]
In his Manifestation dated January 27, 2003, respondent requested that a
formal investigation be conducted to enable him to face his accuser.[5] On the other
hand, despite due notice, complainant failed to comply with the November 25,
2002 Resolution of this Court.
On November 16, 2004, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of lack of evidence and that complainant is not interested in prosecuting her
complaint.[6]
In our Resolution of February 7, 2005, we referred the instant case to Justice
Lucas P. Bersamin of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and
recommendation on grounds that desistance of a complainant is not a basis for
dismissing an administrative case and because there is a need to establish certain
facts surrounding the complained acts allegedly committed by respondent. [7]
Thereafter, the Investigating Justice set the case for hearing on various dates.
On April 15, 2005, respondent again filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that complainant failed to appear during the hearings set by the
Investigating Justice on March 30 and 31, 2005.[8]
On April 29, 2005, the Investigating Justice issued a Resolution denying
respondents Motion to Dismiss and resetting the hearing for the last time on May
31, 2005, with warning that the case shall be deemed submitted for study, report
and recommendation should the parties fail to appear at the date set for hearing.[9]
In a Manifestation dated May 13, 2005, complainant indicated her desire to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and annexes filed. [10]
On the other hand, respondent sent a telegraphic communication dated May 31,
2005 manifesting that the CA may consider the case submitted for resolution; and
praying that he be allowed to submit a memorandum. [11] The Investigating Justice
granted respondents motion.[12] On June 30, 2005, respondent filed his
Memorandum through registered mail.[13]
On August 18, 2005, the Investigating Justice submitted his Report and
Recommendation to this Court with the following findings:

The undersigned Investigating Justice concludes that Judge Bugtas was

guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross neglect of duty for committing the
following acts and omissions in relation to the case of convict Bagaporo, Jr., to
wit:
1.
Due to the penalty imposed on him, Bagaporo, Jr. should have
been committed to the National Penitentiary upon his conviction (whether or not
he appealed). The failure of Judge Bugtas, if he was the trial judge, to issue
forthwith the mittimus to commit Bagaporo, Jr. as a national prisoner under
Presidential Decree No. 29 to the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City was a
serious disobedience to Circular No. 4-93-A dated April 20, 1992.
2.
In acting on Bagaporo, Jr.s application for release, Judge Bugtas
supposedly relied on the recognizance of Provincial Jail Warden Apelado, Sr. and
on the other documents submitted in support of the convicts application for
release on recognizance. Judge Bugtas contends that his act did not constitute a
violation since bail was discretionary upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.
The undersigned Investigating Justice does not accept Judge Bugtas good
faith because Judge Bugtas was apparently lacking in sincerity. He was not
unaware that Bagaporo, Jr. was serving final sentence for which his indeterminate
penalty had a minimum of 4 years and 2 months. When Judge Bugtas ordered the
release, Bagaporo, Jr. had not yet served even the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence, a fact that Judge Bugtas should have known through a simple process of
computation. Even if he was informed of Bagaporo, Jr.s pending application for
parole, Judge Bugtas had no legal basis to anticipate the approval of the
application and to cause the convicts premature release. He was thus fully aware
that Bagaporo, Jr. could not be released even upon the recognizance of the
Provincial Jail Warden.

3.
Judge Bugtas act of prematurely releasing the convict in
effect altered the final sentence of Bagaporo, Jr. The undersigned
Investigating Justice submits that Judge Bugtas thereby violated Art. 86,
Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 86. Reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision
mayor, prision correcional and arresto mayor. The penalties
of reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal,prision mayor, prision
correccional and arresto mayor shall be executed and served in the
places and penal establishments provided by the Administrative
Code in force or which may be provided by law in the future.
Judge Bugtas could give no acceptable explanation for his act. A convicts
release from prison before he serves the full term of his sentence is due either to

good conduct allowances or to the approval of his application for parole. The
former is granted to him by the Director of Prisons (now Director of the Bureau of
Corrections), pursuant to Art. 99, Revised Penal Code; the latter, by the Board of
Pardons and Parole that was created and constituted pursuant to Act No. 4103, as
amended. Obviously, the grant is not a judicial prerogative.
Consequently, Judge Bugtas arrogated unto himself authority that
pertained under the law to an administrative official or agency.
4.
Judge Bugtas contends that his order of release on recognizance
was correct considering that the convict had already been in custody for a period
equal to the minimum imprisonment meted out by the trial court. To support his
contention, he cites Sec. 16, Rule 114, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail or
recognizance. No bail shall be required when the law or these
Rules so provide.
When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or
more than the possible maximum imprisonment prescribed for the
offense charged, he shall be released immediately, without
prejudice to the continuation of the trial or the proceedings on
appeal. If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be
sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of
preventive imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the
minimum of the principal penalty prescribed for the offense
charged, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or
any modifying circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or
on his own recognizance, at the discretion of the court.
The undersigned Investigating Justice opines that Judge Bugtas
contention compounds his already dire situation. He seems to believe that the
quoted rule applies to a convict like Bagaporo, Jr. He has no realization at all (or,
if he has, he conceals it) that the rule applies only to an accused undergoing
preventive imprisonment during trial or on appeal; and that the rule has absolutely
no application to one already serving final sentence. Such ignorance, whether
pretended or not, is terrifying to see in a judicial officer like Judge Bugtas, a
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court.
5.
Judge Bugtas labors under a mistaken notion about the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, that once the convict has been in custody for the
duration of the minimum of the indeterminate sentence, he may be released even
if his application for parole is still pending. He thereby ignores that the benefit
under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is accorded to the convict only after the

Board of Pardon and Parole has determined his application favorably after
considering all the cogent circumstances.

It is crucial that Judge Bugtas be reminded that the convict must remain in
prison pending the consideration of the convicts application for parole by the
Board of Pardons and Parole, for there is no assurance of the grant of his
application.
6.
In any case, Judge Bugtas should have outrightly denied the
application of the convict for release on recognizance not only because the
convict had yet to complete even the minimum of the indeterminate sentence but
also because the convict must serve his sentence even beyond the minimum
unless in the meantime the Director of the Bureau of Corrections granted him the
allowances for good conduct that offset the unserved portion pursuant to Art. 97
and Art. 99, Revised Penal Code; or unless the Board of Pardons and Parole
approved the convicts application for parole.[14]

Accordingly, the Investigating Justice recommended that respondent be fined in the

amount of P25,000.00.[15]
We agree with the Investigating Justice that respondent is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law but not as to the recommended penalty.
Respondent is being charged with ignorance of the law for having ordered
the release of Bagaporo pending approval of the latters application for parole and
before his completion of the minimum period of the sentence imposed upon him.
Respondent contends that his order allowing the release on recognizance of
Bagaporo is in consonance with the provisions of Section 16, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court which provides as follows:
Sec. 16. Bail when not required; reduced bail or recognizance. No bail
shall be required when the law or these Rules so provide.
When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the
possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be
sentenced, he shall be released immediately, without prejudice to the continuation
of the trial thereof or the proceedings on appeal. In case the maximum penalty to
which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty
(30) days of preventive imprisonment.
A person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the
principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without application of the

Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, shall be released on

a reduced bail or on his own recognizance, at the discretion of the court.[16]

Based on the above-quoted Rule, respondent argues that since Bagaporo had
already been in prison for a period which is equal to the minimum of his sentence,
his release on recognizance is in order. Respondent also contends that he simply
exercised his discretion in allowing Bagaporo to be released on bail on the strength
of the provisions of the first paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
which provides that upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may
admit the accused to bail.[17]
We are not persuaded.
At the outset, it must be noted that Bagaporo was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from four years and two months to eight years
and one day. It is not disputed that he began to serve sentence on February 9,
1996. Counting four years and two months from said date the minimum period of
Bagaporos sentence should have been completed on April 9, 2000. Hence, we
agree with the observation of the Investigating Justice that it is wrong for
respondent to claim that Bagaporo had already served the minimum of his sentence
at the time that he was granted bail on recognizance, that is, on February 16, 2000.
[18]

Furthermore, it is patently erroneous for respondent to release a convict on

recognizance.
Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting
the grant of bail after conviction by final judgment and after the convict has started
to serve sentence. It provides:
SEC. 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. An accused shall not
be allowed bail after the judgment has become final, unless he has applied for
probation before commencing to serve sentence, the penalty and the offense being
within the purview of the Probation Law. In case the accused has applied for
probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail, but if no bail was
filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on
recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. In no
case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence.[19]

The only exception to the above-cited provision of the Rules of Court is

when the convict has applied for probation before he commences to serve sentence,
provided the penalty and the offense are within the purview of the Probation Law.
In the instant case, there is no showing that Bagaporo applied for probation.
In fact at the time of his application for release on recognizance, he was already
serving sentence. When he was about to complete service of the minimum of his
sentence, he filed an application for parole. However, there is no evidence to show
that the Board of Pardons and Parole approved his application. We agree with the
Investigating Justice in holding that a convicts release from prison before he
serves the full term of his sentence is either due to good conduct allowances, as
provided under Act No. 1533[20] and Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, or
through the approval of the convicts application for parole. A good conduct
allowance under Act No. 1533 and Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code may be
granted by the Director of Prisons (now Director of the Bureau of Corrections),
while the approval of an application for parole is sanctioned by the Board of
Pardons and Parole. In addition, a convict may be released from prison in cases
where he is granted pardon by the President pursuant to the latters pardoning
power under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution.[21] In the present case,
aside from the fact that there is no evidence to prove that Bagaporos application
for parole was approved by the Board of Pardons and Parole, there is neither any
showing that he was extended good conduct allowances by the Director of Prisons,
nor was he granted pardon by the President. Hence, there is no basis for
respondent in allowing Bagaporo to be released on recognizance.
Moreover, respondent should know that the provisions of Sections 5 and 16,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court apply only to an accused undergoing preventive
imprisonment during trial or on appeal. They do not apply to a person convicted by
final judgment and already serving sentence.
We have held time and again that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.[22] It is imperative
that he be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled
authoritative doctrines.[23] He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his
passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the rule of
law.[24] When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply
apply it; anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the law.[25] In the
present case, we find respondents ignorance or utter disregard of the import of the

provisions of Sections 5, 16 and 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as tantamount
to gross ignorance of the law and procedure.
As to the imposable penalty, Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, classifies gross ignorance of the law or procedure as a serious charge.
Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, the imposable penalty, in case the
respondent is found culpable of a serious charge, ranges from a fine of not less
than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00 to dismissal from the service.
This is not the first time that respondent judge was found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and procedure. In Docena-Caspe vs. Bugtas,[26] respondent
was finedP20,000.00 for having granted bail to an accused in a murder case
without conducting hearing for the purpose of determining whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. He was warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely. Hence, we deem it proper to impose the penalty
of P40,000.00.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas is found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law. He is ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 176933

Present:

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO, * J.
CARPIO MORALES,**
Acting Chairperson,
PERALTA,***
DEL CASTILLO, and

ABAD, JJ.
LUIS PLAZA Y BUCALON,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
October 2, 2009
x-------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Raising only questions of law, the Peoples petition for review on certiorari
assails the January 31, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
November 12, 2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Br.
29 in Criminal Case No. 5144 (the case) fixing bail for the temporary liberty of
Luis Bucalon Plaza aliasLoloy Plaza (respondent) who was indicted for Murder.
The case was originally raffled to Branch 30 of the Surigao RTC presided by
Judge Floripinas Buyser (Judge Buyser).
After the prosecution rested its case, respondent, with leave of court, filed a
Demurrer to Evidence.[2] The Demurrer was denied by Judge Buyser by
Order[3] of March 14, 2002, the pertinent portion of which reads:
xxxx
The evidence thus presented by the prosecution is sufficient to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but only for the
crime of homicide and not for murder, as charged. This is because
the qualifying
circumstance
of treachery alleged
in
the
information cannot be appreciated in this case.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The defense thereupon presented evidence[4] in the course of which

respondent filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond,[5] contending that in view

of Judge Buysers ruling that the prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only
Homicide, he could be released on bail. He thus prayed that the bail bond for his
temporary liberty be fixed atP40,000.00 which he claimed was the usual bond for
Homicide in the RTC of Surigao City and Surigao del Norte.
In its Opposition to Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, [6] the prosecution
contended, in the main, that the case being for Murder, it is non-bailable as the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to death; that it is the public prosecutor
who has exclusive jurisdiction to determine what crime the accused should be
charged with; that the accused should have filed a motion/application to bail and
not just a motion to fix the amount of the bail bond; that the accused had already
waived his right to apply for bail at that stage of the proceedings; that Judge
Buysers March 14, 2002 Order, being a mere opinion and not a ruling or a
dispositive part thereof, produced no legal effect inasmuch as it had no jurisdiction
to rule on a matter outside the Demurrer; and that under the Rules, the prosecution
could still prove the existence of treachery on rebuttal after the defense has rested
its case.
During the hearing of the Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, Senior State
Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo questioned Judge Buysers impartiality, prompting
the judge to inhibit himself and to order the case transferred to Branch 29 of the
RTC for further proceedings.
Branch 29 Presiding Judge Jose Manuel Tan (Judge Tan) heard the Motion
to Fix Amount of Bail Bond.
By Order[7] of November 12, 2002, Judge Tan, concurring with the finding of
Judge Buyser that since the prosecution evidence proved only Homicide which is
punishable by reclusion temporal and, therefore, bailable, ruled that respondent
could no longer be denied bail. He accordingly granted respondents Motion and
fixed the amount of his bond at P40,000.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration cum prayer for inhibition of Judge
Tan was denied for lack of merit.[8]
Respondent was subsequently released[9] after he posted a P40,000 bond.

Roberto Murcia (Roberto), the victims brother, impleading the People as copetitioner, assailed the trial courts orders via petition for certiorari [10] with the
Court of Appeals.
Roberto faulted Judge Tan for granting bail without an application for
bail having been filed by respondent and without conducting the mandatory
hearing to determine whether or not the prosecutions evidence is strong.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adopted Robertos argument that
the grant of bail to respondent without any separate hearing is contrary to
prevailing jurisprudence.
By Decision of January 31, 2007, the appellate court, observing that the
allegations in respondents Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond constituted an
application for bail, dismissed Robertos petition and affirmed Judge Tans orders.
[11]

In its present petition, the People contends that

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE
CONTRARY
TO
LAW
AND
SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE HEARING
CONDUCTED SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS
AND THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BAIL[12] (Underscoring
supplied)

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that "All persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus
provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial

court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.
The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an
accused charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. Stressing this point, this Court held:
. . . [W]hen bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to
determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the
accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the
evidence presented by the parties. A summary hearing is defined as
such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence
of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing
which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes
of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to
enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to
the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the
outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered
and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the
court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and
cross examination.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge Buyser of the
prosecution evidence when he denied the Demurrer and the latters statement that
the evidence was sufficient to convict respondent of Homicide, holding a summary
hearing merely to determine whether respondent was entitled to bail would have
been unnecessary as the evidence in chief was already presented by the
prosecution.
The Peoples recourse to Section 5,[14] Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure to support its contention that respondent should be denied bail
is unavailing, for said Section clearly speaks of an application for bail filed by the
accused after a judgment of conviction has already been handed down by the trial
court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

RICARDO DE LA CAMARA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del
Norte and Butuan City (Branch II), respondents.
Demosthenes Mediante, Puro Velez, Francisco Fabe, Federico del Puerto and Pelaez, Jalandoni &
Jamir for petitioner.
Hon. Manuel Lopez Enage in his own behalf.
RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:
An order of respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage, fixing the bail of petitioner, Ricardo de la
Camara, in the sum of P1,195,200.00 is assailed in this petition for certiorari as repugnant to the
constitutional mandate prohibiting excessive bail. 1 The merit of the petition on its face is thus apparent.
Nonetheless, relief sought setting aside the above order by reducing the amount of bail to P40,000.00
cannot be granted, as in the meanwhile, petitioner had escaped from the provincial jail, thus rendering
this case moot and academic. It is deemed advisable, however, for the guidance of lower court judges, to
set forth anew the controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be observed in fixing the amount of
the bail sought in order that full respect be accorded to such a constitutional right.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner, Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay,
Misamis Oriental, was arrested on November 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan,
for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the
Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on August 21, 1968. Thereafter, on
November 25, 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First Instance a case for
multiple frustrated murder 2 and another for multiple murder 3 against petitioner, his co-accused
Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then on January 14,
1969, came an application for bail filed by petitioner with the lower court, premised on the assertion that
there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident of August 21, 1968. He likewise mantained his
innocence. Respondent Judge started the trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution resting
its case on July 10, 1969. As of the time of the filing ofthe petition, the defense had not presented its
evidence.

Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order granting petitioner's application for bail,
admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee
even if he had the opportunity,but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of
P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder and
P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. Then came the allegation that on August
12, 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a
telegram to respondent Judgestating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a
P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. There was likewise a motion for
reconsideration to reduce the amount. Respondent Judge however remained adamant. Hence this
petition.
The answer filed by respondent Judge on March 5, 1971 set forth the circumstances concerning the
issuance of the above order and the other incidents of the case, which, to his mind would disprove
any charge that he wasguilty of grave abuse of discretion. It stressed, moreover, that the
challengedorder would find support in circulars of the Department of Justice given sanction by this
Court. He sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
In the hearing of the case set for March 31, 1971, there was no appearance for both the petitioner
and respondents with the former, upon written motion, being given thirty days within which to submit
a memorandum in lieu of oral argument, respondent Judge in turn having the same period from
receipt thereofto file his reply. Such a memorandum as duly submitted by petitioner on April 6, 1971.
Instead of a reply, respondent Judge submitted, on May 26, 1971, a supplemental answer wherein
he alleged that petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had since then
remained at large. There was a reiteration then of the dismissal of this petition for lack of merit,
towhich petitioner countered in a pleading dated June 7, 1971, and filed with this Court the next day
with this plea: "The undersigned counsel, therefore, vehemently interpose opposition, on behalf of
petitioner, to respondent's prayer for dismissal of the present petition for lack of merit. For, the issue
in this case is not alone the fate of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The issue in the present petition
that calls for the resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is the fate of countless other Ricardo de la
Camaras who maybe awaiting the clear-cut definition and declaration of the power of trial courts in
regard to the fixing of bail." 4
While under the circumstances a ruling on the merits of the petition for certiorari is not warranted,
still, as set forth at the opening of this opinion, the fact that this case is moot and academic should
not preclude thisTribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligationof
fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of theConstitution that
excessive bail shall not be required.
1. Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the
evidence of guilt is strong. 5 Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regimeof liberty is honored in
the observance and not in the breach. It is not beyondthe realm of probability, however, that a person
charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarceand
thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be
thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a "mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable

certainty, insure the attendance of the accused" for the subsequent trial. 6 Nor is there, anything
unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong,
as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence,
an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.

2. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that
is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such
prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention
of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United
States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. 7 As construed in the latest
American decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence at
trial, and declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonablycalculated to fulfill thus
purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment." 8
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the
amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00 for
the information charging multiple murder, there being fourteen victim, and the sum of P355,200 for
the other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being twelve victims, is clearly violative of
constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the
amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and
P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that
the Department of Justice did recomend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the twooffenses.
3. There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what, on its face, appears to be
indefensible by the alleged reliance on Villaseor v. Abano. 9 The guidelines in the fixing of bail was
there summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2)
nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5)
health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing
in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice when arrested;
and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases." 10 Respondent Judge,
however, did ignore this decisive consideration appearing at the end of the above opinion: "Discretion,
indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where
conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory
the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisorypowers to provide the
required remedy." 11
No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the challenged order. There is
grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being required to
post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court judge would
apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of
respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe
that any person in the position of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resists
thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a stateof desperation. In
the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required could only
mean that provisional liberty would bebeyond his reach. It would have been more forthright if he
were informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of. There would have beenno
disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind these words of Justice Jackson, "a promise

to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will." 12 It
is no wonder that the resulting frustration left resentment and bitterness in its wake.Petitioner's
subsequent escape cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the relief prayed for. What
respondent Judge did, however, does call for repudiation from this Court.
Nor is there any justification then for imputing his inability to fix a lesser amount by virtue of an
alleged reliance on a decision of this Tribunal. Even if one were charitably inclined, the mildest
characterization of such a result is that there was a clear reading of the Abano opinion when such a
meaning was ascribed to it. No doctrine refinement may elicit approval if to doso would be to reduce
the right to bail to a barren form of words. Not only isthe order complained of absolutely bereft of
support in law, but it flies in the face of common sense. It is not too much to say that it is at war with
thecommand of reason.
With petitioner, however, having escaped from the provincial jail, no ruling can be had on his plea to
nullify the above order.
WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic. Without pronouncement as to
costs.