Firewalls: Mahalingam Ramkumar

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Firewalls

Mahalingam Ramkumar

Evolution of Networks

Centralized data processing


LANs
Premises network interconnection of LANs
and mainframes
Enterprise-wide network interconnection of
LANs in a private WAN
LANs interconnected using the Internet and
using virtual private networks

What is a Firewall?

A choke point
A location for monitoring security related
events

Non-security related functions

Audits and alarms


NAT, network management

An end-point for IPSec

Firewall Limitations

Cannot protect from attacks bypassing it

Cannot protect against internal threats

eg sneaker net, utility modems, trusted


organisations, trusted services (eg SSL/SSH)
eg disgruntled employee

Cannot protect against transfer of virus


infected programs or files

because of huge range of O/S & file types

Firewall Basic Types

Packet-Filtering Router
Stateful Inspection Firewalls
Application Level Gateway
Circuit Level Gateway

Packet Filters

Packet Filters

Filtering based on

Source IP address
Destination IP address
Source and Destination transport-level address
IP protocol field
Interface (physical)

Rules!

Configuration files
Explicit allow / block

Packet Filtering Example

Attacks on Packet Filtering

IP address spoofing
Source routing attacks
Tiny fragment attacks

Firewalls Stateful Packet Filters

Examine each IP packet in context

keeps tracks of client-server sessions

checks each packet belongs to a valid session

Better ability to detect bogus packets out of


context

A session might be pinned down by

Source IP and Port,

Dest IP and Port,

Protocol, and

Connection State

Firewalls - Application Level


Gateway (or Proxy)

Application Level Gateway

Application specific gateway / proxy


has full access to protocol

user requests service from proxy


proxy validates request as legal
acts on behalf of the user,
returns result to user

need to separate proxies for each service

some services naturally support proxying


others are more problematic
custom services generally not supported

Firewalls - Circuit Level Gateway

Circuit Level Gateway

Relays two TCP connections

Imposes security by limiting types of connections


that are allowed

Once created, usually relays traffic without


examining contents

Typically used with trusted internal users (by


allowing general outbound connections)

SOCKS (RFC 1928)

SOCKS server

SOCKS client library

SOCKSified versions of application programs

SOCKS

Bastion Host

Highly secure host system


Exposed to "hostile" elements

hence secured to withstand attacks


Trusted System

May be single or multi-homed


Enforce trusted separation between network
connections
Run circuit / application level gateways
Provide externally accessible services

Firewall Configurations

Screened Host Single Homed Bastion Host


Screened Host Dual Homed Bastion Host
Screened Subnet

Screened Host Single


Homed Bastion Host

Screened Host Dual


Homed Bastion Host

Screened-subnet Firewall

Access Control

Given that system has identified a user


Determine what resources they can access
General model - access matrix

subject - active entity (user, process)


object - passive entity (file or resource)
access right way object can be accessed

can decompose by

columns as access control lists


rows as capability tickets

Access Control Matrix

Trusted Computer Systems

Varying degrees of sensitivity of information

military classifications: confidential, secret, TS, etc

Subjects (people or programs) have varying rights of


access to objects (information)
Need to consider ways of increasing confidence in
systems to enforce these rights
Multilevel security

subjects have maximum & current security level


objects have a fixed security level classification

Bell LaPadula (BLP) Model

One of the well-known security models


Implemented as mandatory policies on system
Two key policies:
no read up (simple security property)

a subject can only read/write an object if the current


security level of the subject dominates (>=) the
classification of the object

no write down (*-property)

a subject can only append/write to an object if the


current security level of the subject is dominated by
(<=) the classification of the object

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