Socrates, Ma. Celine Anastasia P.

MA Political Science

Political Science 313

Professor Francisco Nemenzo, Jr.

Guns N Carnations: Exploring the Role of the MFA in Portugals 1974 Revolution

Introduction

The Revolution of Carnations in Portugal on April 25, 1974 marked the fall of
the last right-wing authoritarian regime in Western Europe. This was also the first of the
so-called third wave democratic transitions that occurred in the 1970s1. The
revolution was led by junior officers of the Movimento das Foras Armadas (MFA) or the
Armed Forces Movement. It began during the wee hours of the morning and by the end
of the day, Marcello Caetano, the successor of the dictator Antonio de Oliveira Salazar,
surrendered his power to what was later called the Junta de Salvaao Nacional (JSN) or
the Junta of National Salvation under General Antonio Spnola. The seizure of power
was striking for its non-violence. On the morning of the 25th, when key establishments
had been occupied by the military, crowds of Portuguese citizens poured into the
streets of Lisbon to express their support for the new regime. A popular image which
articulates the sentiments of the period is that of civilians placing carnations inside the
gun barrels of military men. Various accounts of the event attest to the festive character

This is based on Huntingtons framework for understanding the democratization process in his work on
the three waves of democracy. See: Samuel Huntington. The Third Wave Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century. (Oklahoma University Press 1991).
1

of the revolution, including stories of how, due to the large demand for carnations, the
Portuguese supply ran out and more had to be imported from Holland2.
The April Revolution was followed by a period dubbed as the Processo
Revolucionario em Curso (PREC or, when roughly translated to English, the course of the
revolutionary process)a turbulent period of transition in which various political
forces competed for the dominant hand in the government. Among the political parties,
the Portuguese Socialist Party (PS), the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the
Center Democrats (PCD) played vital roles. The period from 1974 to 1976 saw six
transitional governments succeeding one after the other before finally consolidating
into a constitutional democracy in 1976.
Beneath the power shifts that occurred on the surface of this transition process,
one entity remained to be the stable and enduring force, and this was the Armed Forces
Movement (MFA). Scholars3 would argue that the actual power throughout the
revolutionary process resided in the hands of the military. In fact, one explanation that
has been raised to justify the continuing presence of military forces in a democratizing
government is that the MFA members were meant to play the role of the guardians of
the Revolution. This was in order to ensure the fidelity of the transition process to the
spirit of the revolution, whose original plan of action was, in the words of one MFA
leader Melo Antunes, decolonization, democratization and development. Even after
Andrew J. Waskey. Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974. The International Encyclopedia of Revolution
and Protest. Edited by Immanuel Ness. Blackwell Reference (2009).
3 Cf. Maria Inacia Rezola. The military, 25 April and the Portuguese transition to democracy. Portuguese
Journal of Social Science. Volume 7 Number 1 (2008): 3-16. Accessed September 26, 2012. DOI:
10.1386/pjss.7.1.3/1.
2

the establishment of a constitutional democracy, the MFA continued to exert a

considerable influence in politics through the Council of Revolution which played a
tutelary role in the selection of the President and the Prime Minister. This entity,
however, was abolished in the 1980s, with the emergence of the moderate center-right
as the dominant party in government.
This paper is an attempt to describe and explain the unique turn of events in the
Carnation Revolution using a historical approach. This historical approach to political
analysis sees political phenomena not as isolated events, but rather as a contingent part
in a historical tapestry of a plethora of happenings. In particular, this paper explores the
significant role played the MFA in the process of transition and consolidation, as well as
in bringing about fundamental changes in the political system.

Breakdown of the Salazar Dictatorship

In order to understand the emergence of the revolution and the rise of a new
political regime, it is necessary to have a basic knowledge of the old regime that
preceded it. As established by scholars4, the nature of the old regime is a key
component in explaining the foundations of the revolutionary process. In the case of
Portugal, the Carnation Revolution was preceded by forty-two years of fascist
dictatorship under Antonio Oliveira de Salazar. His regime, dubbed as the Novo Estado
or the New State, functioned in a system of corporatism.
This idea is well-articulated by Theda Skocpol in her work, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative
Study of France, Russia and China. (1979).

The foundation of corporatism is the philosophical notion of society as an

organic entity in which each member exists as a part of the whole body. In this context,
no member can be understood as singular, or isolated from the body and its head. This
philosophy enabled the government to device a system in which all organizations and
businesses are subsumed within the organs of the state. It is almost reminiscent of the
GOSPLAN implemented by the Soviet Union under Stalin which penetrated all social
institutions at the lowest level. The obvious difference, of course, is that in the
Portuguese case, there was no element of direct control through micromanagement,
unlike in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this corporatist system allowed the state to
have an incisive access within each entity in society. This was a convenient strategy to
prevent the rise of dissent or opposition. This is also one way of explaining why the
Novo Estado was able to survive the forty-two years of its existence.
Aside from this system, another mechanism utilized by Salazar to ensure the
stability of his regime was the secret police known as the Policia Internacional e de Defesa
do Estado (PIDE, or the International Police of State Defense). In fact, the PIDE may be
argued to be the main repressive agency5 of the Salazar regime. Following
Gallaghers account on the internal workings of the secret police, the PIDE harbored a
nationwide network of spies and eavesdroppers who were able to penetrate the most
mundane venues of every day living. Thus, as Gallagher puts it, the citizens for nearly
half a century never dared to discuss politics in the open6.

Tom Gallagher. Controlled Repression in Salazars Portugal. Journal of Contemporary History Volume
14, Number 3 (July 1979): 385-402.
6 Ibid. p. 387
5

Despite this seemingly effective strategy for repressing the opposition, a

significant event which precipitated the breakdown of the old regime is the beginning
of the colonial wars in Portugals African colonies. By 1960, Portugal was the only
country in Western Europe which had refused to grant independence to its colonies.
However, with the rise of independence movements in Angola, Mozambique and
Guinea-Bissau during the 1960s, the Portuguese government refused to yield, and opted
instead to fight the colonial wars. This entailed channeling a fair portion of the budget
and the human resources in order to win these colonial wars. By 1975, the Portuguese
government was allotting 44% of the countrys budget for the war alone, and 150,000
soldiers were also being mobilized to fight the wars in Africa7. This need for military
manpower, as well as the widespread emigration (a total of 1.3 million) of Portugals
peasant population caused a significant labor shortage in the domestic economy8.
To worsen the domestic conditions, Salazar suffered from a stroke in 1968. His
poor health condition necessitated then President Americo Tomas to appoint Marcello
Caetano as the Prime Minister to replace Salazar. Caetano was a lawyer and formerly a
Professor at the University of Lisbon before he became a Minister in the Estado Novo.
When he was appointed as Prime Minister, he instituted minor liberal reforms to curb
the negative effects of the repression. In 1969, the opposition was able to compete for
seats in the elections, although none of them actually won. Caetano also dissembled the

7 Thomas C. Bruneau. The Portuguese Coup: Causes and Probable Consequences. The World Today.
Volume 30, No. 7 (July 1974): 277-288. Accessed August 23, 2012. URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40394793.
8 Steward Lloyd-Jones. Portugal since 1974. CPHR Working Papers Series 2 Number 1 (November 2001):
1-15.

PIDE secret police, although this was replaced by the Direco General de Segurana, or
General-Directorate of Security (DGS). In reality, what actually took place was a mere
change of names for the same repressive institution. In fact, it may be argued that these
attempts towards liberalization were merely a front to appease the demands for reform,
while consequently legitimizing the continuity of the Estado Novo. Among the elements
that stood firm with this change of leadershipstill adhering to Salazars vision of the
Novo Estadowas the refusal to withdraw from the colonial wars in Africa. This proved
crucial in the events that followed on April 25, 1975.

The emergence of the MFA

Needless to say, the role of the military was the most crucial not only in the
actual seizure of power on April 25, but also in the turbulent period of transition in
which the new regime was being consolidated. This section attempts to trace the roots
of the Movimento das Foras Armadas (MFA) and its development as a major political
force for revolutionary change. A key question in this regard is: how was the military
able to form a revolutionary organization in the face of a repressive state?
In retrospect, it must be understood that the Carnation Revolution was not the
first time that the military intervened in Portuguese politics. In the past, the military
had already played a major role in bringing about revolutionary change in Portuguese
society. In fact, the military itself was a key in installing Salazar as Prime Minister. In
1926after less than two decades of Portugals first republic, amid social and economic
6

instabilitythe military staged a coup which installed General Antonio de Fragoso

Carmona as President of the Republic. During this period, the revolutionary regime
appointed Salazarthen a Professor of Economics at the University of Combrato be
the Minister of Finance. In 1932, after six years of governing the country, the military
appointed Salazar as the head of the Republic. The Novo Estado was established, and
the military withdrew to the sidelines. From a dialectical perspective, this paradox may
be understood as a component of the process in which the 1926 coup itself gave birth to
its own antithesis; thus, forty-two years later, a new revolution was staged.
What is interesting with the Portuguese military is not so much the act of
intervention itselfsince military intervention in politics is also something we can find
in various other cases, such as in Latin American countriesbut the deliberate act of
withdrawal and leaving the government in the hands of civilians once the aims of the
revolution had been met. The tendency by the military towards government
intervention is, as suggested by Harvey9, a result of Portugals feudal structure and the
absence of a developed middle-class. Taking this into account and borrowing from the
ideas of Rezola10, this also explains the minor role played by elites in the revolutionary
process itself. This is different from the experience of other countries such as Spains

Robert Harvey. Portugal: Democracys Balance-Sheet. The World Today, Volume 35 No. 1 (January
1979): 24-30. Accessed August 13, 2012. URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395076
10 Maria Inacia Rezola. The military, 25 April and the Portuguese transition to democracy. Portuguese
Journal of Social Science. Volume 7 Number 1 (2008): 3-16. Accessed September 26, 2012. DOI:
10.1386/pjss.7.1.3/1.
9

ruptura pactada11, in which the transition to a new regime was heavily influenced
primarily by the negotiations among the elite.
Going back to the question that was originally posed, the key to understanding
the formation of the MFA is the colonial wars. After more than a decade of fighting in
the war, the military was beleaguered by a deep sense of discontent12. By 1974, the war
in the African colonies had already been dragging on for thirteen years, with a very
bleak hope of victory.
As an aside, one may recall a similar situation which happened in Russia in 1917.
Among the factors which caused a widespread discontent among the Russian citizens
during this time was Russias involvement in World War I, which consumed the
countrys human and financial resources. Even peasants were being conscripted during
this period. Consequently, there was a shortage of agricultural produce and the cities
were beset with famine. These conditions were maximized by the Bolsheviks to gain
public support, with their campaigns for Bread, Peace and Land. The second element,
Peace, became quite crucial because it struck a contrast with the Provisional
Governments ambiguous stand with regard to the war. These three concerns mirrored
the dominant sentiment among the public and proved to be very effective.
Going back to the MFA, accounts regarding its nature and origin have conflicting
aspects. A point of consensus, however, is that the MFA finds its origin in the Captains
11

Marina Costa Lobo, Antonio Costa Pinto and Pedro Magalhaes. The Political Institutions of
Portuguese Democracy in Portugal in the Twenty-First Century: Politics, Society and Economics, ed.
Sebastian Royo. (Lexington Books 2012).
12 Thomas C. Bruneau. The Portuguese Coup: Causes and Probable Consequences. The World Today.
Volume 30, No. 7 (July 1974): 277-288. Accessed August 23, 2012. URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40394793.

Movement which was established in September 9, 1973 in a meeting of among captains

who were involved in the colonial wars. Some scholars hold that the movement was
established in a meeting was held at Monte Do Sobral, in the Portuguese town of
Alcaovas13. Others, however, claim that the Movement was created in the colonies14.
Initially, the movement did not harbor explicitly revolutionary objectives; rather,
it was formed in order to safeguard the professional interests of the officers such as the
issues of promotion and salary15. In particular, the captains were opposing a decree of
the Caetano government allowing promotions for non-military officers who were
conscripted and who fought in the colonial wars. This sparked the ire of professional
military officers. Before long, however, the concerns of the Captains Movement became
increasingly centered on the issue of withdrawing from the wars in the colonies. On
December 1973, the Movement gathered together in Obidos with 86 delegates. Their
agenda was even more specific: overthrowing the authoritarian regime. This is reflected
in the program that they proposed after their seizure of power, which was,
decolonisation, democratization and development16. The Caetano government
learned about this plan, but mysteriously did nothing about it17.

Maria Inacia Rezola. The military, 25 April and the Portuguese transition to democracy. Portuguese
Journal of Social Science. Volume 7 Number 1 (2008): 3-16. Accessed September 26, 2012. DOI:
10.1386/pjss.7.1.3/1.
14 Joanna Rollo. Portugal: Role and Nature of the Army. Notes of the Month, International Socialism,
Number 73 (December 1974): 6-7. Accessed September 26, 2012. URL:
http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/isj/1974/no073/rollo.htm.
15 Cf. Steward Lloyd Jones. An End or Beginning for Portugal? Some Notes on the Legacy of 25 April
1974. Lustopie 2 (2002): 141-147.
16 Rezola, 2008. This was based on the MFA revolutionary program crafted by Melo Antunes.
17 Andrew J. Waskey. Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974. The International Encyclopedia of Revolution
and Protest. Edited by Immanuel Ness. Blackwell Reference (2009).
13

As regards the actual membership of the MFA, no accessible material yields a

complete and detailed amount of data. The Movement was a clandestine organization.
However, there are estimates that the movements membership reached up to 40018,
most of which were captains who were assigned to fight the war in the Portuguese
colonies. Some of them, according to Rollo, were peasants. Others were left-wing
university students who had been conscripted in the army. Many of them were
mandatorily enlisted for the four-year national service. These officers had a direct
experience of combat in the war and were convinced that it could not be won.
According to Thomas Bruneau19, it is possible that the left-leaning members of the army
were beforehand already members of the Left movements in Portugal, since political
activists during this period were given a choice of whether to be conscripted for the
colonial wars or to be imprisoned. Naturally, a portion of the Left chose to be
conscripted. More interestingly, Bruneau points out the high likelihood (though
unvalidated) that it had been a deliberate policy of the Socialist and Communist
movements to encourage their members to penetrate the ranks of the military in order
to radicalize them.
What is of greater interest, however, is the leadership within the Movement.
Three key persons are understood to be the ones leading the MFA20: Vasco Gonalves,

Joanna Rollo. Portugal: Role and Nature of the Army.

Thomas C. Bruneau. The Portuguese Coup: Causes and Probable Consequences. The World Today.
Volume 30, No. 7 (July 1974): 277-288.
20 Fallaci, Oriana. Disintegrating Portugal: An Interview with Mario Soares. The New York Review of
Books Volume 22, Number 18 (November 13, 1975). Accessed October 1, 2012. URL:
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1975/nov/13/disintegrating-portugal-an-interview-withmario-so/?pagination=false
18

19

10

Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and Ernesto Melo Antunes. While some refer to Gonalves as
the ideological brains behind the Portuguese Carnations Revolution of 197421, it is
more commonly held that22 Otelo Saraiva de Cravalhothen ranked as a Majorwas
the original leader of the MFA, and the chief architect of the meticulously planned
coup23. In any case, it is worth inquiring into the background of these three persons
before the 1974 revolution.
A brief obituary on Gonalves from The Telegraph reveals much interesting
information about this mans background. He was a military engineer. Although born
into Portugals prosperous middles classes, it is evident that the man had radical
tendencies (despite popular perceptions that persons from the middle classes are
generally conservative). As explained in the said obituary, Gonalves was part of a 1959
coup attempt which is believed to be linked with the Communist Party, of which
Gonalves himself was believed to have been a member24. When the independence
movements erupted in the colonies, he was assigned to fight in Angola and
Mozambique. Furthermore, as explained in The Telegraph, he was the only colonel in the
MFA, and was invited to join the Movement precisely because of his radical tendencies.
His radicalism was later on manifested through his support of Communist policies

General Vasco Gonalves. Obituaries. The Telegraph. June 23, 2005. Accessed October 1, 2012. URL:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1492590/General-Vasco-Goncalves.html.
22 See, for instance, Michael J. Faber. Portugal: The Party Systems from 1963 to 2000. International
Comparative Political Parties Index. (2000). Accessed October 1, 2012. URL:
http://www.janda.org/ICPP/ICPP2000/Countries/1-WestCentralEurope/17-Portugal/Portugal6300.htm.
23 Portugal: The Military Takeover of 1974. Country Data Website. Accessed October 1, 2012. URL:
http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-10993.html
24 Michael J. Faber. Portugal: The Party Systems from 1963 to 2000.
21

11

when he became the head of the Second Provisional Government. This will be discussed
in the next part of this term paper.
What is even more interesting, however, is the background of Otelo Saraiva de
Carvalho. At the time of the Carnation Revolution, he was a 38-year-old captain.
Although he was educated in the military academy in Lisbon, he spent his formative
years in Mozambique, where he was born in 1936. During the colonial wars, he was
assigned as to the Guinea-Bissau as the head of propaganda department. It was during
this period that he worked under the leadership of General Spnola, eventually became
a key figure later on in the Carnation Revolution and as the leader of the First
Provisional Government.
Similar to Carvalho, Melo Antunes had the experience of living in one of the
Portuguese colonies during his formative years, albeit only during a brief period of four
years. His father was a military officer who was assigned in Angola. Antunes
completed his education and military training in Portugal. During the colonial wars, he
was sent to fight in Angola. His main contribution to the movement is in the crafting of
the

MFA

revolutionary

program

of

decolonization,

democratization

and

development. Unlike Gonalves and Carvalho, who had more radical leanings,
Antunes was associated with the moderate Socialists led by Mario Soares25.
None of these three persons deemed to be the leaders of the Movement headed
the First Provisional Government. Instead, the one who emerged as the leader
immediately after the revolution was General Antonio de Spnola. Ironically, in fact,
25

Revolution in Portugal. Socialism Today. Issue 82 (April 2004).

12

Spnolas background is deemed to have impeccably fascist credentials26. His close

relations with the Novo Estado may be deduced from the fact that his father was the
Finance Minister of Salazar. Another author describes General de Spnola as a
consummate representative of the Portuguese ruling class, right down to the toe of his
jackboot27. Despite this background, Spnolas emergence as a leader of the revolution
has much to do with his role as a catalyst which instigated a further politicization of the
MFA.

The April Revolution

Given the climate of dissatisfaction in the military and the already-existing MFA,
what pulled the trigger to stage a revolution was General Spnolas book, Portugal and
Its Future. The book was published in February 1974, two months before the revolution.
A central argument from this book was the impossibility of winning the colonial wars
in Africa. He argued for a gradual withdrawal of direct control over the colonies, but
maintaining indirect Portuguese power. These ideas were supported by another
military officer General Francisco da Costa Gomes. By this time, Costa Gomes was the
Lisbon militarys chief of staff. Although supposedly at the side of the government,
Costa Gomes also had associations with Humberto Delgado, a military general who, in
Manny Thain. 1974, revolution in Portugal. Website, Committee for a Worlds International.
Accessed July 16, 2012. URL: http://www.socialistworld.net/doc/1187
27 Phil Michinson. Workers History: Portuguese Revolution 1974. Website. International Marxist
Tendency. October 7, 2002. Accessed July 17, 2012. URL: http://www.marxist.com/workers-historyportuguese-revolution1974.htm
26

13

1958, attempted to stage a coup against Salazar. Upon the publication of the book, due
to their resistance to the colonial policies of the Caetano administration, both Spnola
and Costa Gomes were removed from their posts.
The governments treatment of Spnola and Costa Gomes sparked resistance
among the military. Even before the successful revolution in April 1974, this was
preceded by a revolt in March 1974 in Caldas de Rainha. This was composed of an
estimate of 200 junior officers from the 5th Infantry Regiment28. However, they were
immediately arrested without a shot being fired29.
30With

this sequence of events and the failed revolt, the MFA finally took action

to stage a coup dtat on April 25. The Command Post of the MFA was stationed at
Pontinha, which was at the outskirts of Lisbon. However, to communicate with those
who would be taking part in the coup, the Movement used the music played in the
Lisbon radio station to send signals to one another. The first signal, which was played
late at night on the 24th, the eve of the coup, marked the beginning of the coup. It was a
song by Paulo de Carvalho, entitled, E Depois de Adeus. The second song was played
on the 25th of April a few minutes past midnight. The song was Zeca Afonsos Gradola,
Vila Morena. This song alerted the MFA soldiers to begin capturing key
establishments. By four in the morning, the MFA had occupied the Lisbon Military

Revolution in Portugal. Socialism Today. Issue 82 (April 2004).

Andrew J. Waskey. Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1974. The International Encyclopedia of Revolution
and Protest. Edited by Immanuel Ness. Blackwell Reference (2009).
30 The events narrated in this section is reconstructed from the data available from various sources,
namely: documents from Contemporary Portuguese History Online (URL: www.cphr.org), data from
www.25abril.org, and chronological data from the Instituto Camoes (URL: http://www.institutocamoes.pt/).
28
29

14

headquarters and three media stations (the Rdio Clube Portugus, the Rdio Televiso
Portuguesa, the Emissora Nacional and the Rdio Clube Portugus). In the next few
hours they occupied banks and offices, including the headquarters of the DGS. They
had also occupied the Lisbon airport as well as the entire area of Terreiro do Pao,
where the ministries were located. Capturing the radio stations enabled the MFA to
make various announcements to facilitate communication. The content of most of the
announcements were warnings to the government troops, as well as to the people, to
maintain caution. The MFA also appealed to the public to remain calm and to stay on
their homes in order to avoid bloodshed. Of course, the plea for civilians to stay at
home was completely useless. In the morning of the 25th, crowds of Portuguese citizens
flooded the streets of Lisbon expressing support for the revolutionaries.
Forces loyal to the government were being sent to the areas already occupied by
MFA forces. However, actual firing was minimal31. In fact, some of the forces that were
loyal to the government began to join the forces of the MFA. Before noon of April 25,
the MFA forces announced in the radio stations that it had a complete control of the
situation. The only thing that they were waiting for was the surrender of the Prime
Minister. By this time, Prime Minister Marcello Caetano was known to be hiding at a
military headquarters in Carmo. A group of the MFA forces under Salguiero Maia
surrounded the area. For several hours, however, there was no progress in the
negotiations with Caetano. Maia even threatened to open fire. Caetano insisted that he

Only four people died in the course of the revolutionary seizure of power, and the shots actually came
from government forces.
31

15

would only surrender to a General, for fear that the government would fall into the
hands of the mob32. Before long, however, communication was opened between
Caetano and General Spnola through the MFA Command Post. Spnola went to the
Carmo headquarters to receive the surrender of Caetano. The revolution had succeeded
in overthrowing the Novo Estado, but it was not yet finished.

Rebuilding government: the Processo Revolucionario em Curso

With the surrender of Caetano, and the rise of Spnola as the President, this
paved the way for the establishment of the Junta da Salvao Nacional (JSN or Junta for
National Salvation). Among the first policies of the JSN was the elimination of fascist
institutions such as the DGS secret police and the government political party, Aco
Nacional Popular (National Popular Action). Most of the officials of the Novo Estado
were allowed to leave the country. Many of them fled to Brazil.
As indicated in the introduction, the Carnation Revolution was followed by a
turbulent period of transition dubbed as the Processo Revolucionario em Curso (PREC),
which lasted from 1974 until the establishment of a constitutional democracy in 1976.
This period saw six transitional governments replacing one after the other. This section
of the paper will attempt to discuss the highlights of this transition period, and the steps
taken in order to consolidate the new regime.

Steward Lloyd-Jones. Portugal Since 194. CPHRC Working Papers Series 2 Number 1 (November
2001): 1-15.

32

16

The MFA was not the sole actor in the PREC. The first provisional government,
in fact, was at the onset a coalition government. The government was headed by
General Spnola and peopled by ministers from different political parties. As mentioned
in an earlier part of this paper, various political parties were involved in the process of
the transition. Below is a table showing the composition of the First Provisional
Government. It can be observed that the military presence in the government is actually
very minimal. However, this changed after a conflict between Spnola and the leaders of
the MFA.

First Provisional Government33

Military
PS (Socialist Party)
PCP (Portuguese Communist Party
PDP (Popular Democratic Party)
Independent
MDP/CDE (Portuguese Democratic
Movement/Democratic Elections
Committee)

Ministers
1
3
2
2
6
1

%
7
20
13
13
40
7

The main challenge with the First Provisional Government, however, was
Spnolas refusal to carry out the original program laid down by the MFA, which
emphasized the decolonization of Portugals colonies. Although Spnola himself was
supportive of withdrawing from the colonial war, his solution to the problem with the
colonies was the gradual establishment of federal relations with these colonies. At heart,
From Maria Inacia Rezola. The Portuguese Transition to Democracy. Institute of Contemporary History.
(March 2010).
33

17

Spnola still dreamt of fulfilling Salazars vision of a Lusitanian Community embracing

Brazil, Portugal and autonomous African states with their own institutions consecrated
with a referendum34. This became a major source of conflict, and paved the way for the
second provisional government in July, three months after the revolution.
The second provisional government marked a power struggle between General
Spnola and the MFA. Although it still had Spnola as the President, there was a
massive reconfiguration of the Cabinet. The MFA leader Vasco Gonalves became the
Premier (a position that was formally held by Palma Carlos). Moreover, there was a
drastic change in the composition of the Cabinet, infusing it with a greater degree of
military involvement. Below is a table showing the composition of the Second
Provisional Government.

Second Provisional Government35

Military
PS (Socialist Party)
PCP (Portuguese Communist Party
PDP (Popular Democratic Party)
Independent
MDP/CDE (Portuguese Democratic
Movement/Democratic Elections
Committee)

Ministers
8
3
1
1
4
--

%
47
18
6
6
24
--

34 Jonathan Story. Portugals Revolution of Carnations: Patterns of Change and Continuity. International
Affairs Volume 52, Number 3 (July 1975): 417-433. Accessed June 26, 2012. URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2616554
35 From Maria Inacia Rezola. The Portuguese Transition to Democracy. Institute of Contemporary History.
(March 2010).

18

In September, Spnola resigned and was replaced by General Francisco da Costa

Gomes. The latter supported the MFA proposal for rapid decolonization. Initially,
Spnola attempted to seek the support of the Portuguese citizens. He called for a march
of the silent majority, which was unsuccessful because the MFA secured Lisbon with a
barricade and forced Spnola into exile in neighboring Spain. This event marked the
transition to the third provisional government. With Spnola out of the picture, the
rapid process of decolonization began, ending in 1975 with the withdrawal from East
Timor.
While the colonies were being liberated, however, the domestic economy of
Portugal was undergoing a crisis. There was a shortage of skilled labor, since those who
were supportive of the Novo Estado emigrated to Brazil for fear of the purges, which
indeed happened. Moreover, Portuguese living in the colonies were returning to
Portugal throughout the process of decolonization. These so-called retornados numbered
around 75,00036.
On March 1975, Conservative forces who were loyal Spnola attempted to stage a
counter-coup by occupying the Lisbon airport in Portela. This was a failure, but it
instigated a further radicalization of the MFA. A Revolutionary Council consisting of
leaders of the MFA was established, as well as a 200-member MFA Assembly. These
institutions were, to use the words of Steward Lloyd-Jones37, like a hidden

Trevor Grundy. Portugal-Africa: 30 Years After the Carnation Revolution. New African (March 2004):
54-57.
37 Steward Lloyd-Jones. Portugal since 1974. CPHR Working Papers Series 2 Number 1 (November
2001): 1-15.
36

19

government acting as the real power behind the Provisional Government. Below are
the names of the members who formed part of the Revolutionary Council.

Members of the Council of the Revolution38

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

General Francisco da Costa Gomes, President and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Brig. General Vasco dos Santos Goncalves, Prime Minister
Vice-Almirante Jose Pinheiro de Azeveda, Chief of Staff of the Army
General Carlos Alberto Idaes Soares Fabiao, Chief of Staff for Training
General Narciso Mendes Dias, Chief of Staff for the Air Force
Vice-Almirante Antonio Alva Rosa Coutindo, Member of Former JSN
General Anibal Jose Coentro de Pinho Freire, Member of Former JSN
General Nuno Manuel Guimaraes Fischer Lopes Pires, Member of Former JSN
Brig. General Otelo Nuno Romao Saraiva de Carvalhi
Lt. Colonel Manual Riberio Franco Charais, Coordinating Commission of MFA
Lt. Commander Carolos de Almada Contreiras, Coordinating Commission of MFA
Major Pilot Jose Bernardo do Canto e Castro, Coordinating Commission of MFA
Major Air Force Engineer Jose Gabriel Coutinho Pereira Pinto, Coordinating Commission of MFA
Captain Vasco Correlia Lourenco, Coordinating Commission of the MFA
Captain Engineer Duarte Nuno de Ataide Saraiva Marques Pinto Soares,
Coordinating Commission of the MFA
1st Lt. Jose Manuel Miguel Judas, Coordinating Commission of the MFA
Naval Captain, Construction Engineer Manuel Beirao Martins Guerreiro,
Representative of the MFA
Major of Infantry Pedro Julio Pazarat Correia, Delegate of the MFA
Major Aeronautical Engineer Jose Manuel da Costa Neves, Delegate of the MFA
Captain of Artillery Rodrigo Manuel Lopes de Sousa e Castro, Delegate of the MFA
1st Lt. Naval Medical Corp Ramiro Pedroso Correia, Delegate of the MFA
Captain of Aeronautical Engineering Vitor Manuel Graca Cunha, Delegate of the MFA

The fourth provisional government led by Vasco Gonalves, as a reaction to the

militancy of the Right, began to side with the forces of the Left, particularly the
Communist Party led by Alvaro Cunhal. This was no abrupt shift, however. It must be
remembered that Gonalves himself already had links with the Communist Party even
before he became part of the MFA. This period saw more radical reforms in Portugal.
There year was marked by a series of purges among right-wing sympathizers in
38

Rona M. Fields. The Portuguese Revolution and the Armed Forces Movement. Praeger. (New York 1975).

20

government and in civil society. Generals who were supportive of Spnola were also
imprisoned. There was also government intervention in key sectors of the economy, but
free enterprise was still allowed to flourish and foreign investors were exempt from
government takeovers. There was a nationalization of banks, insurance companies, the
petroleum and electric companies, as well as the airline and railway. By 1975, 50% of
businesses were state-owned. Minimum wages for workers was established. The taxing
system was rationalized. Policies on income redistribution were created to favor
industrial and agricultural workers.
Democratic elections for a Constituent Assembly were scheduled on April 25,
1975. The Socialist Party (PS) led by Mario Soares garnered the most support from the
people, with 37.9% of the votes. This was followed by the Social Democratic Party led
by Francisco Sa Carneiro with 26.4% of the votes. The Communist Party under Alvaro
Cunhalwhich was supported by Goncalvesonly had 12.5% of the votes. However,
the Revolutionary Council continued to dominate the Fifth Provisional Government,
with the creation of the Directorate of three persons: Vasco Gonalves, Francisco do
Costa Gomes and Otelo Saraiva do Carvalho . This was a consequence of a pact39
between the MFA and the political parties giving the former a veto power as regards
the outcome of the constitutional assembly and a supervising role over government. By
this time, the Communist Party continued to exert the most influence in the government

Marina Costa Lobo, Antonio Costa Pinto and Pedro Magalhaes. The Political Institutions of
Portuguese Democracy in Portugal in the Twenty-First Century: Politics, Society and Economics, ed.
Sebastian Royo. (Lexington Books 2012).

39

21

as it continued to enjoy the support of Vasco Gonalves. This contributed to a rise of

anti-Communist sentiment and the Socialists resigned from government.
Incidentally, a rift had been formed within the MFA. Some members of the MFA
were more supportive of the moderates and the Socialist Party. They supported a
pluralist democracy. This group, headed by Melo Antunes, came to be called the
Group of Nine. The other members were Captain Vasco Loureno, Brigadier Pedro
Pezerat Correia, Brigadier Franco Charais, air force Major Canto e Castro, air force
Major Costa Neves, Captain Rodrigo de Sousa e Castro, Major Vtor Alves and
Commander Vtor Crespo. Aside from this group, another group of MFA was
advocating for a popular democracy based on support from the grassroots. They
formed the group Comando Operacional do Continent (COPCON or Continental
Operations Command) under the leadership of Otelo Saraiva do Carvalho.
On September 1975, Gonalves was ousted as Prime Minister and replaced by the
Socialist Partys Jose Azevedo, with the support of the Group of Nine. There began a
process of restructuring within the Provisional Government. In response to this, radical
left-wing factions supporting Gonalves are believed to have been responsible for the
riots and protests during this period40. On November 25, 1975, left-wing members of the
MFA attempted to stage a coup, but it was not successful. In a final confrontation
among the political parties and the various MFA factions, negotiations resulted in the

From Maria Inacia Rezola. The Portuguese Transition to Democracy. Institute of Contemporary History.
(March 2010).
40

22

purging of radical left-wing elements in the government. The moderate and socialist
parties were placed in power.
November 25, 1975 marked the end of the PREC and secured the hold on power
of moderate political groups41. In April 1976, the new democratic constitution was
approved and a new legislature elected, with the Socialist and the Social Democratic
parties winning most of the seats. The leader of the Socialist Party (PS), Mario Soares,
became the Prime Minister. This was followed shortly by presidential elections in July
1976, where an MFA member with moderate leanings, General Eanes, won 61.5% of the
votes. His opponent was Otelo Carvalho.
Under the leadership of Soares, Portugal accepted the IMF stabilization program
in 1976 in exchange for $750 million loan from various industrial countries. There was a
reorientation in economic development that focused on attracting foreign investments.
Gallagher42 describes the Socialist Democratic Party to have drifted steadily
rightwards, especially after it was rejected from the Socialist International. With regard
to the Socialist party, Gallagher quotes Soares to have said that Portugal must leave
Socialism at the drawer. However, the Revolutionary Council continued to govern
from the background. Soares also had frequent clashes with President Eanes, who
wanted to create a Presidential type of government. This and various other factors
contributed to the rise of the center-right coalition as the main force in the 1979

Ibid.
Tom Gallagher. Portugals Second Decade of Democracy. The World Today Volume 42, Number 4
(April 1986): 67-69. Accessed August 13, 2012. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395916
41
42

23

elections. They revised the 1986 Constitution. In 1982, the Revolutionary Council was
abolished, thus marking the final withdrawal of the military from politics.

Conclusion

The Carnation Revolution provides a unique case of military intervention in the

process towards democratic transformation from a fascist regime. It cannot be denied
that there is a common perception which views the military as a fascist institution.
Perhaps this is because of the strictly regimented lifestyle often associated with the
military, not to mention the hierarchical relations that are embedded in the
organizational structure itself.
However, in the case of the April 1974 Revolution in Portugal led by military
captains who are part of the Movimento das Foras Armadas (MFA), the military was the
leading agent which overthrew the fascist system of the Novo Estado established by
Salazar. It became, in effect, an instrument for democratic change. The MFA, however,
had a different configuration. In the first place, it was non-hierarchical, since most of the
members were captains. Second, the context of the period was beset with external
conflicts (with Portugals colonial wars on three frontsMozambique, Angola and
Guinea-Bissau), thus providing unique circumstances for the radicalization of the army.
This paper was an attempt to reconstruct a narrative of the events that led to the
Carnation Revolutionhighlighting the pivotal role of the MFAand the process of
rebuilding and consolidating a new government.
24

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