Search and Rescue Report Aug 2011

SARF
A REVIEW OF UK SEARCH AND RESCUE PROVISION

FOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS

A REVIEW OF UK SAR PROVISION FOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLES Page 1 of 84
RNLI

A REVIEW OF UK SEARCH AND RESCUE PROVISION FOR

OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS

A report for The Crown Estate on UK Search and Rescue

capabilities with particular regard to the offshore renewables
industry, both for the present and medium term future.

Prepared for The Crown Estate by Commander Aviation Services Ltd


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abbreviations and Acronyms .......................................................................................................... 5
Glossary ......................................................................................................................................... 6
SCOPE ............................................................................................................................................. 8
USE OF THIS DOCUMENT ................................................................................................................. 8
The Author and CAS ........................................................................................................................ 9
The Crown Estate Marine Activities ............................................................................................... 11
The Offshore Wind Farm Sites: ...................................................................................................... 12
ROUNDS 1 and 2: Operational and planned ............................................................................................................................ 12
ROUND 3: Planned .............................................................................................................................................................................. 13
Combined Map: All areas ................................................................................................................................................................. 14
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 15
Current SAR Provision ................................................................................................................... 17
International Requirements ........................................................................................................................................................... 17
UK SAR Structure .......................................................................................................................... 18
The Bureaucracy ................................................................................................................................................................................. 18
UK SAR Operators Group and Terms of Reference ......................................................................... 20
Total Water Incident Figures for UK 2009 ............................................................................................................................... 21
Current Assets Available for SAR Around the UK ........................................................................... 23
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) ................................................................................ 23
Maritime Rescue Co-‐ordination Centres ................................................................................................................................... 24
SAR Helicopters ................................................................................................................................................................................... 26
Helicopter Comparison ................................................................................................................. 27
Current SAR Helicopter Comparison .............................................................................................. 28
Advantages of Using Helicopters for SAR ...................................................................................... 29
Britain’s Joint Search and Rescue – Helicopter .............................................................................. 30
Background and Timeline to proposed Joint Search and Rescue Helicopter Project
Background ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 30
Timeline .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 31
The Military Aviation Authority ..................................................................................................... 32
Royal National Lifeboat Institute RNLI ....................................................................................... 33
Organisation ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 33
Concept of Operations ........................................................................................................................................................................ 33
Communication with Lifeboats ...................................................................................................................................................... 35
Aids to Navigation ............................................................................................................................................................................... 35
Duration of Lifeboats .......................................................................................................................................................................... 35
Lifeboat and Helicopter training for wind farm rescue ...................................................................................................... 36
Satellites, Radio Aids, Trackers and Google ................................................................................... 37
COSPAS-‐SARSAT SYSTEM ............................................................................................................................................................... 37
COSPAS-‐SARSAT .................................................................................................................................................................................. 38
GLONASS ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 38
GALILEO .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 38
BNS ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 38
RADIO AIDS ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 38
Personal Locator Beacons ............................................................................................................................................................... 39
Inmarsat .................................................................................................................................................................................................. 40
Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) ....................................................................................................... 41
Possible review of the elements and procedures of the GMDSS .................................................................................... 41
Automatic Identification System (AIS) ...................................................................................................................................... 42
Pros and Cons of AIS .......................................................................................................................................................................... 43
Bespoke Surveillance of Wind Farms ......................................................................................................................................... 44
Offshore Wind Farm Solutions ...................................................................................................................................................... 44
Google and other Tracker systems .............................................................................................................................................. 48
Assessing the International Responsibility on the UK for SAR ....................................................................................... 49
The offshore renewables industry and its likely scale and needs ................................................................................. 49
over the next 20 -‐25 years. ............................................................................................................................................................. 49
Assessing The International Responsibility on the UK .................................................................... 50
Qualitative Measure of Consequences or Impact .......................................................................... 51
IAMSAR Qualitative Risk Analysis Matrix ...................................................................................... 52
Changes Arising from Offshore Renewable Energy Activity Within the United Kingdom SAR Region
..................................................................................................................................................... 54
CONTEXT ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 55
ROUND 1 AND 2 ................................................................................................................................................................................... 55
ROUND 3 ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 57
RISK EXPOSURE ................................................................................................................................................................................... 58
PERSONNEL AT RISK ........................................................................................................................................................................ 59
PERSONNEL PER TURBINE ............................................................................................................................................................ 60
COMPARISON WITH OTHER RELEVANT INDUSTRIES ...................................................................................................... 62
Fishing Industry .................................................................................................................................................................................. 62
Oil and Gas Industries ....................................................................................................................................................................... 63
Comparison between the three Industries .............................................................................................................................. 64
IMPACT ON EMERGENCY RESPONDERS .................................................................................................................................. 65
Rescue Times Examples ................................................................................................................ 66
SAR Helicopters ................................................................................................................................................................................... 66
Other Assistance .................................................................................................................................................................................. 68
BP Jigsaw ...................................................................................................................................... 69
JIGSAW assessment for Renewables ........................................................................................ 72
Support Helicopters for SAR? ........................................................................................................ 73
Other Future Possibilities .............................................................................................................. 75
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) .............................................................................................................................................. 75
Airships and Captive Balloons (Blimps) ................................................................................................................................... 76
Marine and Renewable Industry Developments ................................................................................................................... 76
Options for The Crown Estate and Other Renewables Stakeholders .............................................. 77
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 84
Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIS Automatic Identification System LUT Local User Terminal

ALARP As low as reasonably practical MCA Maritime and Coastguard Agency
ARCs Admiralty Raster Chart system MCC Mission Control Centre
ARRC Autonomous Rescue and Recovery Craft MHz Megahertz

ARPA Automatic Radar Plotting Aid MMSI no. Maritime Mobile Service Identity number
COMSAR Sub-‐committee on radio communications and MMO Marine Management Organisation
Search and Rescue
DECC Department of Energy and Climate Change MOR Mandatory Occurrence Reporting
DF equip Direction Finding equipment MRCC Maritime Rescue Co-‐ordination Centre
DMSC District Marine Safety Committee MRSC Maritime Rescue Sub-‐Centre
DPSSG Domestic Passenger Ship Steering Group MSCC Marine Safety Co-‐ordinating Committees
DSC Digital Selective Calling NWSF National Water Safety Forum
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency OREI Offshore Renewable Energy Installations
EIEC Extended Immediate Emergency Care PFI Private Finance Initiative
EPIRB Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon PLB Personal Locator Beacon
ERCoP Emergency Rescue Coordination Plan RAeS Royal Aeronautical Society
FLIR Forward Looking Infrared RCC Rescue Co-‐ordination Centre

FRC Fast Recovery Craft RSV Regional Support Vessel

GIG Government Interdepartmental Group SARH Search and Rescue Helicopter

GMDSS Global Maritime Distress and Safety System SAR-‐H Search and Rescue Harmonisation
Hs height Significant wave height SAROps Search and Rescue Operations
IAMSAR International Aeronautical and Maritime SKIOS Sea King Integrated Operational Support
Search and Rescue Manual
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation SOLAS International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea
IMO International Maritime Organisation SRT Software Radio Technology
IPT Integrated Project Team TORs Terms of Reference
ISAF OSR International Sailing Federation Offshore UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Special Regulations
LOM Lifeboat Operation Manager VTMS Vehicle Traffic Management System
LoS Line of sight WAID Water Incident Database

Glossary

Automatic Identification A VHF radio system which communicates information between AIS
System (AIS) equipped vessels for purposes of collision avoidance.
Captain Master of a ship or pilot-‐in-‐command of an aircraft, commanding

officer of a warship or an operator of any other vessel.

Coast earth station (CES) Maritime name for an Inmarsat shore-‐based station linking ship earth
stations with terrestrial communications networks.

Cospas–Sarsat system A satellite system d esigned t o d etect d i s t r e s s beacons
t r a n s m i t t i n g on the frequencies 121.5 MHz and 406 MHz
Craft Any air or sea-‐surface vehicle, or submersible of any kind or size.

Direction finding (DF) Homing on signals to pinpoint a position.
Digital Selective Calling a brief burst of digitised information transmitted from one station to
(DSC) alert another station or stations.
Emergency locator Aeronautical radio distress beacon for alerting and transmitting
transm itter (ELT) homing signals.

Emergency position-‐ A device, usually carried aboard maritime craft, that transmits a
indicating radio b eacon signal that alerts search and rescue authorities and enables rescue
(EPIRB) units to locate the scene of the distress.

Galileo A global navigation satellite system with search and rescue capability.
Global Maritime Distress A global communications service based upon automated systems,
and Safety System (GMDSS) b o t h satellite-‐based and terrestrial, to provide distress alerting and
promulgation of maritime safety information for mariners.
Global positioning s y s t e m A specific satellite-‐based system used in conjunction with mobile
(GPS) equipment to determine the precise position of the mobile equipment
Inmarsat A system of geostationary satellites for worldwide mobile

communications services and which support the Global Maritime
Distress and Safety System and other emergency c ommunications
s y s t e m s .
Joint rescue co-‐ordination A rescue co-‐ordination centre responsible for both aeronautical a nd
centre (JRCC) maritime search and rescue incidents.
Local user terminal (LUT) An earth receiving station that receives beacon signals relayed by
Cospas–Sarsat satellites, processes them to determine the location of
the beacons a nd forwards the signals.

Mission control centre Part of the Cospas–Sarsat system that accepts alert messages from
(MCC) the local user terminal(s) and other mission control centres to
distribute to the appropriate rescue co-‐ordination centres or other
search a nd r escue p oints of contact.
Personal locator beacon Personal radio distress beacon for alerting and transmitting homing
(PLB) signals.
Rescue An operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial

medical or other needs and deliver them to a place of safety.

Rescue co-‐ordination A unit responsible for promoting efficient organization of search and
centre (RCC) rescue services and for co-‐ordinating the conduct of search and
rescue operations within a search and rescue region.
Note: The term RCC is used in this Report to apply to either
aeronautical or maritime centres; ARCC or MRCC will be used as the
context warrants.

Rescue sub-‐centre (RSC) A unit subordinate to a rescue co-‐ordination centre
e s t a b l i s h e d to complement the latter according to particular
provisions of the responsible authorities.
Note: The term RSC is used in this Report where it applies only to
aeronautical or maritime; ARSC or MRSC will then be used.

Search An operation, normally co-‐ordinated by a rescue co-‐ordination centre
or rescue sub-‐centre, using available personnel and facilities to locate
persons in distress.
Search and rescue region An area of defined dimensions, associated with a rescue co-‐ordination
(SRR) centre, within which search and rescue services are provided.
Search and rescue service The performance of distress monitoring, communication, co-‐
ordination and search and rescue functions, including provision of
medical advice, initial medical assistance, or medical evacuation,
through the use of public and private resources, including co-‐
operating aircraft, vessels and other craft and installations.
Search and rescue unit A unit composed of trained personnel and provided with equipment
(SRU) suitable for the expeditious conduct of search and rescue operations.
Supervisory Control and A computer system that monitors and controls industrial, infrastructure
Data Acquisition (SCADA) and facility-‐based processes.
Vessel A maritime craft.

Some of the terms used in the Abbreviations and Acronyms and in the Glossary are derived from the IAMSAR
documents produced by ICAO and the IMO 2010.
Some documents in the accompanying SAR Portfolio have their own definitions and abbreviations and these should
be used when reading the particular document.

A REVIEW OF UK SEARCH AND RESCUE PROVISION

FOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS

SCOPE

• Review all current available emergency search and rescue resources,

including aerial and marine emergency search and rescue assets,
consulting with stakeholders such as MCA, RAF, etc.
• Review the current and likely future capacity requirements of the

offshore renewable energy projects.
• Assess the current and likely future capabilities of the infrastructure to

provide services to the offshore renewable energy projects.
• Investigate potential solutions to meet the capacity requirements.

USE OF THIS DOCUMENT

This document is intended as an overview and guide to a selection of more

detailed information contained in a Search and Rescue Portfolio.
It also contains electronic hyperlinks to other information on the Internet and

in documents in the Portfolio as well as embedded video clips and cross-‐
referencing.
It follows that it is intended for reading on screen and, although it can be

printed off for reading, much of the flexibility of this presentation will be lost.
Much of the material is copyright and, wherever possible, this is

acknowledged. Extracts from this document may be used but the source should
be acknowledged.
Other documents in the Portfolio may carry individual copyright and must not
be reproduced without the permission of the copyright holder.


The Author and CAS

This review has been prepared by Bob Commander of Commander Aviation
Services Ltd (CAS). CAS specialises in aerial work and corporate aviation
operations and has advised The Crown Estate on aviation matters related to
offshore renewables development. Bob Commander has personal experience of
Search and Rescue Operations as a Royal Air Force navigator, but is now more
used to producing readable reports on complex subjects where there is an
aviation involvement.
The needs of the offshore renewables industry for adequate SAR cover for
workers who are being deployed ever further offshore is just such a complex
subject and this review is intended to pull together some of the available
information and from that develop a feel for the present level of SAR provision
and whether this needs to be augmented either now or in the medium future,
looking ahead some twenty years.
It is acknowledged that SAR has a large marine element as well as that from
aviation and thanks are due to all who have assisted from the marine
viewpoint. That said, it is hoped that this review with its less familiar aviation
bent can assist with the understanding of SAR overall.

and the Marine Estate
The Crown Estate is a body corporate charged by Parliament with
responsibility for managing the property interests belonging to the Sovereign
as part of the hereditary possessions of the Crown. The Marine Estate is one of
the four constituent estates managed by The Crown Estate.
The Marine Estate includes virtually the entire United Kingdom seabed out to
the 12 nautical mile territorial limit, as well as the rights vested in the Crown
to explore and utilise natural resources of the UK Continental Shelf which
extends to 200 miles from the coast.
The Crown Estate looks to have positive working relationships with
Government, devolved administrations, local authorities, seabed users and
developers, environmental groups and other stakeholders and interest groups
whose activities take place in the Marine Estate.


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is in two main parts.
Part 1 gives an overview of current Search and Rescue provision in the UK, with emphasis
on the offshore capability.
Part 2 looks at the offshore renewables industry and its likely scale and needs over the next
20 -‐25 years.
The current and proposed development of Offshore Renewable Energy Installations (OREI)
will see one of the biggest changes to sea area use since the oil and gas boom of the 1970s
and 1980s. It is estimated that at the end of Round 3 the Offshore Renewable Energy activity
will exceed that of the UK fishing industry and be about a half the size of the current oil and
gas industry. Personnel on OREI within 12 nautical miles of the coast are exposed to the
same turbine risks as their land based colleagues and maritime risks comparable with the
fishing industry. As OREI move further from land, personnel and supporting structures will
be permanently based offshore and operations will be conducted in a more demanding
environment. Personnel will continue to be exposed to the shore based and comparable
offshore fishing risks, but will also be exposed to risks associated with their oil and gas
colleagues operating on fixed structures; although, the risk for petrochemical activity will be
much reduced though not eliminated. Renewable activity is unlikely to place a high demand
on the UK’s emergency services, although should assistance be required it would be very
difficult to predetermine the location, as activity will be spread throughout the UK’s
Renewable Energy Zone. Accordingly, prior preparation and local liaison will be essential in
ensuring the correct response to persons in distress.
It is recommended that the renewables industry should;
• support the associated RenewableUK paper and its approach to government.

• form an overarching renewables safety structure under the control of an
independent safety organisation to monitor offshore risks and to correlate accurate
statistics to provide a basis for a clear risk assessment for the industry as a whole.

• seek synergies with the mature energy industries of oil and gas in terms of safety
cover for offshore workers.
• Seek a memorandum of understanding b etween government and other stakeholder

interests to establish responsibilities for all aspects of SAR and other worker
monitoring and protection while working offshore.
RJC: 24 Aug 2011

The Crown Estate Marine Activities
Current Offshore Activities

´
60°0'0"N
60°0'0"N
58°0'0"N
58°0'0"N
56°0'0"N
56°0'0"N
54°0'0"N
54°0'0"N
52°0'0"N
52°0'0"N
50°0'0"N
50°0'0"N
12°0'0"W 8°0'0"W 4°0'0"W 0°0'0"
Current Offshore Activities

Dredging Licence Bathymetry
22 April 2009
Round 1 Windfarm Lease Shallow
Round 2 Windfarm Lease 0 50 100 200 300
Kilometers 1:4,000,000
Round 3 Zone Deep Positions shown relative to WGS 84
© Crown Copyright April 2009. Reproduction in whole or part is not permitted without prior consent of The Crown Estate.
Scottish Windfarm Exclusivity Agreement © British Crown and SeaZone Solutions Limited. All rights reserved. Product Licence No. 052008.007.
Elevation data supplied by STRM.
Pentland Firth Area of Interest Bathymetry Data supplied by DBDBV.
UK 12 nm Limit The Marine Estate

16 New Burlington Place
UK Continental Shelf London W1S 2HX
Tel: 020 7851 5080
www.thecrownestate.co.uk
S:\MARINE\Restricted\MaRS\GIS\Presnetation\All_activity_map.mxd

The Offshore Wind Farm Sites:

ROUNDS 1 and 2: Operational and planned

Round One & Two

Wind Farm Sites
Round 1 Wind Farm Sites
Round 2 Wind Farm Sites
UK Continental Shelf
12 Nautical Mile Limit
Robin Rigg
Teeside
Ormonde
Walney
Barrow
West Duddon Westermost
Rough
Humber Gateway
Burbo
Gwynt Y Mor Bank Triton Knoll
Rhyl
Flats North Hoyle
Race Dudgeon
Lincs Bank
Inner
Dowsing
Lynn Docking Sheringham

Shoal Shoal
Scroby
Sands
Greater
Gabbard
Gunfleet Sands
Gunfleet London
Sands II Array
Kentish
Flats
Thanet
This map is reproduced from the OS map with the permission of Ordnance Survey on behalf of The Controller of HM Stationery Office. © Crown Copyright. Licence Number GD03219G.

ROUND 3: Planned

Offshore Wind - Round 3 Zones

Zone Name Developer
Moray Offshore
1 Moray Firth
60°0'0"N
Renewables Limited
Seagreen Wind
2 Firth of Forth
Energy Limited
60°0'0"N
3 Dogger Bank Forewind Limited
4 Hornsea SMart Wind Limited
East Anglia Offshore

5 East Anglia
Wind Limited
E.on Climate & Renewables
6 Southern Array
UK Southern Array Limited
58°0'0"N
Eneco Round 3
7 West Isle of Wight
Development Limited
Bristol Channel
58°0'0"N
8 Atlantic Array
Zone Limited 1
Centrica Energy Renewable
9 Irish Sea
Investments Limited
56°0'0"N
56°0'0"N
3
54°0'0"N
54°0'0"N
4
9
5
52°0'0"N
52°0'0"N
6
50°0'0"N
7
50°0'0"N
12°0'0"W 8°0'0"W 4°0'0"W 0°0'0"
Offshore Wind - Round 3 Zones

Round 3 Wind Farm Zone Bathymetry
15 January 2010
Territorial Waters Limit Shallow
Size : A4 Author : DF
UK Continental Shelf 0 50 100 200
Kilometres 1:5,800,000 QA : SR
United Kingdom Deep
Positions shown relative to WGS 84
Europe © Crown Copyright 15 January 2010. Reproduction in whole or part is not permitted without prior consent of The Crown Estate.
© British Crown and SeaZone Solutions Limited. All rights reserved. Product Licence No. 012009.017.
16 New Burlington Place 6 Bell's Brae

London W1S 2HX Edinburgh EH4 3BJ
Tel: 020 7851 5080 Tel: 0131 260 6070
www.thecrownestate.co.uk

S:\MARINE\Restricted\MaRS\GIS\Sectors\Wind\MXD\R3_Zones_Iteration_3_developernames.mxd

Combined Map: All areas

Introduction

As the landowner for offshore developments around the UK, “The Crown Estate
The Crown Estate takes great interest in the work being looks to have positive
carried out in the Marine Estate and endeavours to assist the working relationships
developers. The development of offshore renewable energy with Government,
sources has been gaining momentum since 2000 and the
devolved
latest Round 3 allocation of development zones is likely to see
administrations, local
a step change increase in activity at ever-‐increasing distances
authorities, seabed
offshore.
users and developers,
To date, development has been largely close to shore, with environmental groups
more recent development reaching out to the 12 mile and other stakeholders
Territorial Waters limit. As can be seen from the introductory and interest groups
maps, Round 3 zones are significantly larger and further whose activities take
offshore than any existing wind farm. This means that more place in the Marine
people will be required to work further offshore and in more Estate.”
challenging, sometimes hostile, conditions for many years to
MoU with Marine Management Org
come.

The Crown Estate takes a particular interest in safety
oversight and has built standards for safe operations into the Round 3 tendering
process. To further assist in this area, The Crown Estate funds specific work streams in
areas where it sees a common requirement which may be useful to all developers in
terms of a safer operation. This review of UK Search and Rescue (SAR) is one such work
stream and is intended to feed into industry plans and standard operating procedures
for offshore renewable developments. Knowing what SAR facilities are likely to be
available will help developers plan their own response to an emergency where one or
more persons need to be evacuated back to shore with the least possible delay.
This report is intended to outline the existing SAR facilities in place for UK waters.
Because both the coastguard and SAR helicopter services are under review at the
moment, the level of self-‐support needed from industry may be difficult to gauge.
Nevertheless, it is felt important as Round 3 gets underway to undertake at least a first
review of what the industry can expect and where there may be alternative solutions or
scope for augmentation of basic provision from the authorities.
This report is in two main parts.
Part 1 gives an overview of current Search and Rescue provision in the UK, with emphasis on
the offshore capability.
Part 2 looks at the offshore renewables industry and its likely scale and needs over the next 20
-‐25 years. This part also concludes with recommendations and suggestions for industry
consideration if supported by The Crown Estate.

P A R T 1
An overview of current Search and Rescue provision in the UK,
with emphasis on the offshore capability.

Current SAR Provision

International Requirements

The present SAR structure in the UK is described fully in the Maritime Coastguard Agency’s
(MCA) document, Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland dated April 2008. The document is available offline in the SAR Portfolio. The
following overview examines this structure and its fitness for purpose in international terms, as
the requirement for the provision of SAR services in all countries1 is laid down in international
conventions.

The UK, by being party to the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) Convention, the International Convention
on Maritime Search and Rescue, and the Convention
on International Civil Aviation, has accepted the
obligation to provide aeronautical and maritime
SAR co-‐ordination and services for its territories,
territorial seas, and, where appropriate, the high
seas.

The two international bodies involved, the
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)
and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO),
produce guidance material contained in three

volumes on all matters to do with SAR provision at
a national level:
Volume 12. Organization and Management;
Volume 2 Mission Co-‐ordination; and
Volume 3 Mobile Facilities

Volume 1 Organization and Management; provides guidance on establishing a SAR
structure and, importantly, gives clear guidance on how to assess the level of service that is
required by using risk assessment guidelines given in the document. The guidance is clear and,
although a high level document, any country should be able to follow the guidance given to
provide an internationally acceptable level of SAR service. Whether this level of service is
adequate for a particular activity is looked at in more detail later.

Volume 2 Mission Co-‐ordination; covers how the SAR service should be physically
structured and establishes the links between the various services which are required; lifeboats,
coastguard, SAR helicopters, mountain rescue teams, etc. There is considerable detail on the
establishment and functions of both maritime and aeronautical rescue co-‐ordination centres3.
Interestingly, there is a recommendation that both functions should be co-‐located if possible,
but this is not currently the case for the UK.

Volume 3 Mobile Facilities; explains the detail of an actual rescue procedure and, as the
title implies, it is intended to be carried on vessels and aircraft as a procedural guide in the
event of an emergency requiring SAR assistance.

1
Strictly speaking, all contracting states to the particular treaties; to all intents and purposes, this is all countries.
2
All volumes were revised in 2010 at the time of writing, July 2011.
3
MRCC and ARCC respectively.

UK SAR Structure

The Bureaucracy

Over the years, responsibility for Search and Rescue has rested with various Government
departments – The development of international requirements began in 1946 and significant
amendments were made in 1979 and again in 1999 where the present structure emerged
linking maritime and aeronautical requirements in one operating volume, IAMSAR.
Source: RoSPA
Collaboration with NWSF
WDPC ID:911/Paper :187

The UK SAR structure was established
in its present form in 2000, with the
Department for Transport (DfT) now
the lead Government Department.
DfT co-‐chairs the overarching UK SAR

Strategic4 Committee with the
Ministry of Defence (MoD).
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency

(MCA) provides the main regulatory
staff for offshore SAR, together with
MOD provision of SAR helicopters.
The terms of reference (TORs) for

this committee include a
requirement to meet twice a year.5
The SAR Strategic Committee sits

above the UK SAR Operators Group,
which is itself, composed of three
committees. This report is primarily
concerned with the Maritime and
Aviation Consultative Committee.

4
Also referred to as the UK SAR Strategy Committee
5
Full TORs for this committee and others are given in the MCA Framework Document in the SAR Portfolio. Also available as part of The
Crown Estate June Update PowerPoint Presentation

UK SAR Operators Group and

Terms of Reference

The UK SAR Operators Group includes representatives from each of the emergency service
providers – police, fire, ambulance and specialist rescue teams -‐ plus the MoD and the
Department for Communities and Local Government.
Note that, as with the SAR Strategic Committee, there is a predominance of land-‐based interests,
with the coastguard and lifeboats as the input on offshore matters. It may be coincidental, but
this distribution is reflected in the RAF’s typical distribution figures for rescues around the UK.
There is consensus that the figure

for offshore incidents is between
15 -‐ 20 % of the total distribution.
Even with a further 20% of

incidents occurring on the coast,
the majority is clearly the 60% on
land.

Total Water Incident Figures for UK 2009
Source: WAID 2009

Water Incident Database
National Water Safety Forum
st
1 Edition: January 2011
Development of WAID To give a starting point for comparison later in respect of numbers of
fatalities that might be predicted in relation to a particular activity, the
table above is from the Water Incident Database for 2009. The figures
are shown here only to indicate relative proportions i.e. 11 commercial
incidents at sea compared to an overall total of 57 incidents at sea.
However, for all of the listed commercial operating areas, incidents at sea
result in the vast majority of deaths related to water.
The assessment of risks and their control and regulation will be looked at
in greater detail in a separate chapter, but note that in relation to these
figures, the Department for Transport states an intention to use these
statistics to make informed decisions on the appropriate level of
Government measures to control the perceived risk.
Finally, to provide an indication of levels of risk in daily life, the DfT
figures for road accidents in 2009 are shown in the table overleaf. It is
accepted that these can be dismissed when looking specifically at risks
offshore (“like comparing apples and oranges” is the usual analogy used
to suggest that one set of figures has no bearing on or relationship with
the other.) However, society lives with the road traffic figures of 7 deaths
and 68 people seriously injured every day on Britain’s roads.
National Water Safety Forum
2011

Source: DfT Reported Road Casualty Figures 2009

Published September 2010

Returning to the Government and stakeholder committee arrangements, the UKSAR Strategic
Committee is tasked with biannual meetings. At this level, offshore renewable energy
development risks and the possible need for SAR intervention has not been a topic for
discussion.
Before trying to assess the level of SAR provision against the numbers of persons working
offshore on renewable energy projects, we first need to see what is available right now. There is
a large question mark over future provision, but the current manning levels and distribution of
manpower and equipment for the various elements of SAR will provide a good starting point for
later discussion of the possible effects of changes to the MCA, SAR helicopter, and RNLI lifeboat
services.
Commenting on search and rescue capability, h e acknowledged that it was vital when things go
wrong, but prevention of the need for search and rescue through the setting of high marine
standards supported by effective regulation is even more important.
Chairman of David MacBrayne Ltd: Comment on MCA Review

Current Assets Available for SAR Around the UK

The UK area of responsibility

for SAR covers approximately
half of the North Sea and the
English Channel and extends
out to 30°W. Note that the
Republic of Ireland has its own
Search and Rescue Region
(SRR).

There is a small variation in
the Maritime and Aeronautical
SSRs in the far North. The
large Westerly extent is
Source: MCA intended to provide SAR cover
for passenger aircraft en route
to or from the United States of
America.

Until recently, Nimrod aircraft had patrolled this area, but these were very publicly scrapped in
January of this year (2011). There is currently no decision on future provision of maritime
reconnaissance aircraft, but a Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) commentator gives one view of
possibilities. A link with a European partner is mooted in this link. This is mentioned here as
another area where there is likely to be a significant change in the type of coverage provided for
SAR, but at the moment there is no way of predicting the final outcome or even the options
being considered.

There are also fixed wing aircraft in use by the MCA for reconnaissance and pollution control.
These aircraft are currently provided by RVL Group ltd, based at East Midlands, but with aircraft
dispersed in the UK as required. These aircraft are not mentioned in the MCA’s SAR role and so
are not included further in this report.

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)

HM Coastguard (HMCG) responds to all search and rescue (SAR) incidents that occur within the
UK SAR region. This region covers 1.25 million square nautical miles of sea and over 10,500
nautical miles of coastline. HMCG co-‐ordinates SAR operations through a network of 19
Maritime Rescue Co-‐ordination Centres (MRCCs).

Maritime Rescue Co-‐ordination Centres

All of the MCA’s operations -‐ including SAR -‐ are divided into geographical regions, including
the:
• East of England Region -‐ this covers the East and South Coasts of England from the Scottish
border down to the Dorset and Devon border
• Wales and West of England Region -‐ this extends from Devon and Cornwall to cover the coast
of Wales, North West England and the Moray Firth
• Scotland and Northern Ireland Region -‐ this covers the remainder of the UK coastline
including the Western Isles, Orkney and Shetland
Each of these regions is divided into three areas each with a pair of MRCCs, which co-‐ordinate
SAR response for maritime and coastal emergencies within the area boundaries. The East of
England Region has an additional station -‐ London Coastguard -‐ for co-‐ordinating SAR on the
River Thames.
The objectives of SAR are to rescue anyone in distress and deliver them to a place of safety. To
do this, HMCG will make the best use of all available resources, including both its own and those
of other SAR providers.
As such, HMCG can call on a wide range of resources made available by other organisations
participating in UKSAR. These are known as 'declared assets', and the list includes:
• HMCG's initial response and coastguard rescue teams

• inshore lifeboats, all-‐weather lifeboats and inshore rescue hovercraft -‐ operated by the
Royal National Lifeboat Institution
• other nominated inshore rescue services
• SAR helicopters contracted to the MCA
• Ministry of Defence (MoD) SAR helicopters and fixed wing aircraft operated by the Royal Air
Force and Royal Navy
• emergency towing vessels
• nominated fire service teams designated as maritime incident response group (MIRG) for
fire fighting, industrial accident and chemical incident response for vessels at sea. (No
mention of wind farms and the MIRG is primarily intended for larger vessels.)
There are other facilities -‐ known as additional facilities -‐ that can also be used for SAR, such as:
• other vessels in the vicinity of the casualty

• non-‐declared aircraft and ships that the MoD can make available
• vessels under the control of various authorities -‐ including lighthouse and pilotage
authorities, HM Revenue & Customs or the police
• MCA coastguard rescue services
• helicopters and other facilities made available by offshore oil operators
• foreign SAR facilities
• MCA boats and HMCG rescue boats
• emergency services

Consultation on modernising the Coastguard

In December 2010, the Government announced a formal consultation on its plans to
modernise HM Coastguard and a consultation document ‘Protecting our Seas and Shores in
st
the 21 Century’6 was issued immediately following that announcement. The consultation
document provided information about the modernisation proposals under consideration.
These included improved technology to deliver a nationally networked and more resilient
service, at lower cost and staff would be better rewarded for taking on increased
responsibilities with enhanced career opportunities.

A team comprising 17 serving Coastguard Officers including four Public and Commercial
Services Union (PCS) representatives was assembled to independently review the responses
to the consultation. The team was led by a senior Coastguard Officer with a Maritime &
Coastguard Agency (MCA) Non-‐ Executive Director as Chair.

The review team carried out a quantitative review of the responses to the consultation
document to identify key themes and concerns. At the same time a qualitative examination
was completed to identify risks and ideas. In the case of alternative proposals received the
rationale and underlying drivers were also noted.
“In producing this independent review report it was not the team’s mission provide an
alternative or final solution or to apply judgement as to whether response was in favour of, or
against, the proposals. The questions contained the consultation document invited
evidence based comment and the was intended to gather information rather than
conduct a
MCA Review Team
While the review team was looking at the responses to the original report, the Transport Select
Committee (TSC), a cross-‐party group of MPs, had also been investigating. The original report
included plans to close over half of the current provision of coastguard centres. So, when the
report was published on 23 June 2011, the TSC said that the government's plans were "seriously
flawed" and it called on the immediate withdrawal of the proposals.
Launching the report, Transport Committee Chair Louise Ellman said,
“We found little support for the current proposals and we have no confidence that, under these
proposals, the coastguard will in future be able to respond to emergencies at sea as well as they
do now, let alone in a more effective way.”

"A drastic reduction in the number of rescue co-‐ordination centres will result in a loss of local
knowledge amongst coastguard officers who are responsible for taking calls from people and
vessels in distress. The committee is not convinced by the government's claim that technology
can, at present, replace such local knowledge."

The TSC did concede that there is a case for reducing the total number of rescue co-‐ordination
centres but it said that any future reorganisation should be based on the use of 24-‐hour centres
and not on stations open only during daylight hours.

The Government responded by issuing a revised proposal with a new consultation period which
started on 14 July 2011 and runs until 6 October 2011.

6
Both the original Report, the Review Team Report and the revised version of the Report are available in the SAR Portfolio.

SAR Helicopters

Search and rescue helicopters are operated in the UK by a combination of the Royal Air Force,
the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm and the MCA. The MCA uses civilian contractors to provide its
element of the UK SAR cover. More detail of the cover provided is given on the next page.
The RAF and Fleet Air Arm both use Sea King aircraft while the MCA uses Agusta Westland
(AW)139s to cover the English Channel and the larger Sikorsky S92 in Scotland.
The RAF covers the West and East coasts of the UK:
West Coast: Prestwick Valley Chivenor
East Coast: Lossiemouth Boulmer Leconfield Wattisham

The Royal Navy has two SAR bases: Prestwick on the West coast of Scotland and Culdrose on
the Western Approaches
The MCA has four bases:
North Scottish Coast Stornoway Sumburgh

South Coast Portland Lee on Solent

Helicopter Comparison

A comparison table of the three types of helicopter currently in use for SAR is provided on the
next page. More detail of each aircraft is given in the Report Portfolio.

A few points to note:

 The specifications given are generic and can vary between versions and even actual
airframes. This is particularly relevant when discussing range, where helicopters
commonly take off with a reduced fuel load to allow a greater payload to be lifted but at
the expense of range and duration.
 The aircraft which will be chosen for the UK Search and Rescue Harmonisation (SAR-‐H)
program may well differ from the types covered here.
 In simple terms, the S91 is similar but also an improvement in performance and size to
the Sea King. The A139 is suited to the relatively short sea transits involved in the
English Channel, although it could also provide useful cover for wind farms a short
distance offshore.
 Acknowledgement of the source information is given in the Report Portfolio.

Current SAR Helicopter Comparison

General Performance
Helicopter Crew Capacity Max TOW Max Range Service Rate of
Speed Ceiling Climb
Sea King HAR 3/HAS 5
129mph 764 miles

2 to 4
20 plus 21,400lb 2020fpm
depending 112kts 664nm 10,000ft
depending on fuel load
9700kg 10.3m/s
on mission
208kph 1230km
Sikorsky S92
190mph
19 26,500lb 539nm
depending
2 on fuel load 165kts 14,000ft N/A
12,020kg 1000km
306kph
Agusta A139
c.6283lb 177mph 600 miles

6 to 7
1930fpm
1 or 2 c.3000kg 154kts 521nm 19,600ft
depending
on fuel load 9.8m/s
depending
on version 285kph 964km
Generic examples of Types of helicopter: a Royal Navy Sea King will differ from an RAF version, etc.

Advantages of Using Helicopters for SAR7

Helicopters are tasked by rescue co-‐ordinators to operate either alone or in co-‐operation with
other rescue agencies to assist in Search and Rescue Operations (SAROps). Helicopters are
called because they are fast, efficient, can operate over land and water and are well spread
around the country. Consequently, they can usually assist the casualty quicker than other
rescue assets which have to deploy from land bases. Their ability to search large areas quickly
by using the third dimension of height is often crucial to the success of an operation. A
helicopter’s ability to rescue casualties is usually only restricted by very bad weather
conditions, range or the length of the winch cable.

Speed. Speed of response is vital for any SAROps. Helicopter response times are generally
faster or on a par with other assets and transit times are shorter due to the straight-‐line
approach and greater speed than surface-‐based rescue assets. Once on scene, the speed can be
varied from a maximum of 110 knots for the Sea King to the hover, allowing the crew to
optimise the speed relative to the task. Search parameters are dependent on light levels, sea-‐
state, terrain and visibility. Unlike a fixed-‐wing aircraft, the helicopter can reduce speed and
even stop to make a detailed investigation of any area of interest.

Height and Efficiency. The quicker a comprehensive search can be done the better, as the area
of uncertainty expands rapidly with time. From the viewpoint of a rescuer at surface level,
anything more than a moderate sea state will render much of the surface out of sight.
Additionally, in rough seas, if a target is sighted, it can be very difficult to maintain visual
contact with it. A helicopter adds the extra dimension of height. The crew can choose the
optimum search height for greatest visibility, dependent upon terrain, sea state and weather
conditions. At any one time during the search, there is no area within the bounds of the track
spacing that is out of sight of at least one member of the crew. Therefore, the helicopter can
quickly complete its search with a high percentage coverage factor.

Detection Range. In addition to advantages of height for visual searches, increased height also
improves radio signal detection distances. The higher the receiver, the further the
transmissions will be detected. Helicopters, being able to adjust height rapidly can quickly
extend communication distances considerably, thus adding another dimension to the rescue
effort. This is particularly important when trying to establish the position of lost persons or
rescue beacons.

Amphibious. Helicopters are not confined to either land or sea operations, being very capable
over all types of surface. Hence, in the terms of SAR area coverage, helicopters can attend
incidents almost anywhere and particularly important from the point of view of this report, can
land on vessels and structures located far offshore.

In summary, rapid response, short transit times and the ability to use height to search and
detect make helicopters a key SAR asset. Their unique ability to operate over land or water
coupled with the ability to hover precisely over a casualty for rescue can also be a crucial factor
in the preservation of life. With only the worst of weather conditions restricting operations,
helicopters are therefore essential for large area SAR cover.

7
Based on DfT MCA Coverage Report 2001

Britain’s Joint Search and Rescue – Helicopter

Background and Timeline to proposed Joint Search and Rescue Helicopter Project
and MoD/MCA Private Finance Initiative

There has been a global trend toward public-‐private partnerships to perform some Coast Guard
and SAR functions, including Australia’s billion-‐dollar Coastwatch program. The UK chose to
look at a similar approach.

Background
The Ministry of Defence and Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) have been providing a
round-‐the-‐clock military and civil helicopter SAR service from 12 bases, covering 11,000 km of
coastline and 3.6 million square km of sea. Approximately 40 Navy and RAF Mk5 Sea King
helicopters and civilian helicopters under contract to the MCA had provided this service,
although in emergencies other British forces were also equipped for such tasks. However, a
joint MoD/MCA Private Finance Initiative (SAR-‐H) was proposed, with a value of between £1
billion and £6 billion.
The current Mk5 Sea Kings have been in SAR use for 40-‐50 years, and, despite several upgrades
and their renowned stability and precision, they will soon be due for replacement at
considerable recapitalisation costs, making a public/private partnership very attractive.
As already mentioned, of the 12 SAR bases in the UK, six are operated by the RAF (Chivenor,
Wattisham, Valley, Boulmer, Leconfield and Lossiemouth), two by the Navy (Culdrose and
Prestwick, and these two alone had seen 441 callouts and 370 people rescued in 2005) and four
by the MCA (Lee-‐on-‐Solent, Portland, Sumburgh and Stornoway). The MCA started using
Canadian based CHC helicopters in 2007 under a five-‐year, £20million per annum contract.

A joint MoD/MCA Integrated Project Team (SAR-‐H IPT) was tasked with implementing the
future SAR helicopter capability and deciding on key issues and contract requirements. It was
already determined that the service would continue to be jointly managed by the MoD and MCA
and the contract was expected to run from 2012-‐2037. It was felt important to retain military
capabilities within SAR and a significant proportion of the aircrew would continue to be
provided by the Navy and RAF. MCA notes from the time show that the Falkland Islands SAR
service was a potential option for inclusion in the scheme.
The details of this harmonisation programme were being developed at the same time as the
government began debating the proper role of the UK rescue services, including their role in
cases of inland emergencies when rescuers would need rapid access.

Timeline

May 2006 Announcement of the SAR-‐H initiative was made, and in October 2007 the MCA
announced that the first of 4 new, specially configured, Sikorsky S-‐29 helicopters had completed
its maiden mission for Stornoway Coastguard. The new helicopter, which is a civilian version of
the H-‐92, provided 24 hour coverage and was being operated by CHC Scotia on behalf of the
MCA, CHC Scotia having been awarded an interim contract to provide SAR services from July
2007 until July 2012 at the MCA’s 4 civilian-‐operated bases.
November 2007 The Sea King Integrated Operational Support (SKIOS) maintenance
contract for the UK’s Sea King helicopters was expanded to include the SAR fleet.
9 February 2010 the Soteria Consortium, comprising CHC, Sikorsky, Thales and the Royal
Bank of Scotland, were chosen to provide the SAR service for the term of 25 years starting in
2012, replacing the existing Navy and RAF Sea Kings with S-‐92A Superhawks. They succeeded
over competition which would have utilised Eurocopter EC225 helicopters, civil versions of the
EC725 Cougar, which has a combat SAR version already deployed in France.
The S-‐92A SAR 4-‐crew helicopter is equipped with a paramedic station, piped oxygen and
electric power circuit within the cabin. Featuring rear ramp and built of highly corrosion
resistant composites, the S-‐92 is already well known in the offshore oil and gas sector and
providing SAR services around Shetland and Lewis. It is 30% faster than the Sea Kings, has a
130km greater range, has a pair of side-‐by-‐side high speed winches and a 1.7m high cabin to
accommodate 6-‐10 seated persons and 1-‐2 stretchers.
It was envisaged that military and civilian aircrew would work alongside each other in the new
MoD/MCA initiative. The four MCA bases would transition first, followed by the eight MoD
bases, with full details to be finalised later in 2010.
22 February 2010 upgrades to the S-‐92 were announced including a Search and Rescue
Automatic Flight Control System and a load-‐sensing cargo hook to automatically update weight
and balance readings. Further, Sikorsky would be introducing, later that year, strengthened
main transmission housing, designed for longer life and intended to “reduce unscheduled
maintenance by eliminating such possibilities as the foot-‐mount cracks recently experienced by
some operators.”
May 2010 after the UK’s General Election, the incoming coalition government suspended
the initiative following a review of spending decisions made by the previous Labour
government.
February 2011 the government announced that the SAR-‐H contract had been cancelled, -‐ not for
financial reasons, but due to irregularities regarding the conduct of Soteria’s bid team during

the bidding process, which had subsequently come to light and been reported by Soteria. An
investigation was launched and the government stated:
“…the irregularities that have been identified were such that it would not be appropriate to
proceed with either the preferred bid or with the current procurement process.”
It is now unclear how the Government intends to proceed. The current Maritime and
Coastguard Agency contract for search and rescue provision expires in 2012; while the Sea King
helicopters which provide RAF/Royal Navy search and rescue are due to be withdrawn from
service in 2016. As an interim measure, the government has just issued an invitation to tender
for helicopter services to extend the current provision for a further six years (August 2011).
“This whole sordid and botched episode shows that the raw greed of the private sector should
never be allowed anywhere near life or death rescue services on the high seas. M illions of pounds
of taxpayers’ money has been wasted and the whole plan should n ow be scrapped, not shelved.”
General Secretary of the Rail, Maritime and Transport Union [Bob Crowe]
DfT currently has a group working on the next proposal for the way ahead for SAR helicopters
in the UK, but a decision is not imminent. There is little mileage in trying to guess the outcome
of the DfT deliberations, but there are still some definite international requirements to be met
in terms of SAR provision, whether the final choice is civilian, military or any proportional
combination of the two.

If the intention remains to cover all of the UK shoreline, then the current SAR bases provide that
cover, although there may be some spare capacity on the South coast. The number of
helicopters currently employed for SAR is probably already the minimum that can be used for
the task.

The parallel review of the MCA may provide some savings in operational control, but again
there is little to be gained by hypothesising at this time. The one interesting point that may
affect both reviews however, is the IMO and ICAO recommendation that a National Rescue
Coordination Centre should combine both maritime and aviation aspects of SAR in one
structure (if not one building).
The Military Aviation Authority

As if the reviews of SAR provision and the MCA were not sufficient upheaval, the RAF is also
adapting to its new safety management structure introduced as the Military Aviation Authority
in April 2010. The structure is intended to introduce into the military a cohesive process for
safety management along the lines of the civil Air Navigation Order prescribed by ICAO and
tailored at a National level by local CAAs. Initially, the Authority is concentrating on
maintenance, but in the relatively short term there is a great deal of paperwork to be processed
at RAF headquarters and station level to achieve the aims of the new Authority.

This additional workload is already telling on smaller Headquarters units such as the SARF at
RAF Valley. It may also require the RAF to reappraise the whole of its SAR operation in terms of
risk and safety processes which may lead eventually to changes in the operating methods for all
SAR in the UK. Again, the impact of this new Authority is not yet known, but there are
significant implications for the SAR Force in the timescale that this report covers.

Royal National Lifeboat Institute RNLI

The Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) is a voluntary organisation incorporated by
Royal Charter for the purpose of saving lives and promoting safety on water in the
United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the Republic of
Ireland.

Organisation

The RNLI is organised in six divisions for the operation and administration of lifeboats, with
each division under the authority of an Inspector of Lifeboats. There are 232 lifeboat stations
of which 127 operate lifeboats over 10 metres in length (all weather lifeboats) including 74 at
which an Inshore Lifeboat (under 10 metres in length) is also available. In addition there
are 105 stations at which there are Inshore Lifeboats only; 4 of these also operate an Inshore
Rescue Hovercraft. A fleet of relief lifeboats is maintained so that boats can be replaced at
short notice in the event of damage, or when withdrawn for refit, without diminishing the
cover available. The location of lifeboat stations is shown on the map on the next page.

Concept of Operations

The RNLI saves lives at sea throughout the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland by
providing:

• A strategically located fleet of all-‐weather lifeboats which are available at all times
and tactically placed inshore craft which are subject to weather limitations.

• Safety education and accident prevention to a defined standard of performance,
commensurate with the resources available, using trained and competent people who,
wherever possible, are volunteers.
Strategic Performance Standards

The RNLI aims to:

• Achieve an average launch time of 10 minutes from notification to the RNLI.

• Reach all notified casualties where a risk t o life exists, in all weathers, out to a
maximum of 100 nautical miles.

• Reach at least 90% of all casualties within 10 nautical miles of Lifeboat
stations within 30 minutes of launch in all weathers.



Authority to Launch

A Lifeboat Operations Manager (LOM) controls each lifeboat station. The LOM authorises the
launching of a lifeboat. The LOM is supported by one or more Deputy Launching Authorities
who can act in the absence of the LOM. Whilst the SAR co-‐ordinators are responsible for
requesting the launch of a lifeboat, the final decision to launch in the weather and sea or
water conditions prevailing, rests with the Launching Authority and the Coxswain or Helmsman.

RNLI Central Cooperation’s and Information Room (COIR)

The COIR at RNLI Headquarters, Poole, Dorset, is staffed continuously and enables a
responsible officer to be fully and quickly informed of lifeboat operations. The COIR also
ensures that there is adequate liaison between RNLI staff and Lifeboat Station officials and
provides advice and guidance where necessary. It also provides a central point of contact for
other SAR authorities wishing to contact the RNLI.

Communication with Lifeboats

All lifeboats and hovercraft are fitted with VHF (FM) radio operating in the 156-‐174 MHz
band. All-‐weather lifeboats are also fitted with MF radiotelephone e quipment a nd t he
Severn, Trent and Tamar class lifeboats have an HF capability. Where a special requirement
exists a few are also fitted with transceivers on 121.5 MHz (International Aeronautical
Distress) and 123.1 MHz. All-‐weather lifeboats are also fitted with MF and VHF Digital
Selective Calling (DSC).

Aids to Navigation

All lifeboats carry Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers. All-‐weather lifeboats are fitted
with GPS, integrated to an electronic chart system operating ARCs (Admiralty Raster Chart
System). All B Class, Hovercraft and some D-‐class (IBI type) are fitted with electronic vector
chart systems.

All lifeboats over 10 metres in length are also fitted with VHF/DF equipment which operates on
the marine band and also on 121.5 MHz (but no longer used for civil SAR).

Duration of Lifeboats

All-‐weather lifeboats have a duration of 10 hours at full speed. Proceeding at economic or slow
speed can considerably extend this duration when on scene and searching.
Inshore lifeboats have a duration of 3 hours at full speed. Proceeding at economic or slow
speed can considerably extend this duration when on scene and searching.

Radius of Action

The RNLI normally operates out to the UK Territorial Water’s limit of 12 miles. The large Severn
lifeboats were introduced to increase the potential operating radius out to 50 miles (80km).
This is adequate for Round 1 and Round 2 sites, but cannot assist some of the Round 3 sites
which are much further offshore.

Lifeboat and Helicopter training for wind farm rescue

Contingency plans for accidents are drawn up between the wind farm operator and the nearest
MCA Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC). Once agreed, the details are published in
the joint Emergency Rescue Coordination Plan (ERCoP). Procedures for rescue are also detailed
within the MCA Marine Guidance Notice 371 and these are exercised regularly with key
responders such as the RNLI and SAR helicopters.
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) have been established for these joint operations and a
copy of the SOP is available in the SAR Portfolio.

Satellites, Radio Aids, Trackers and Google

As with other aspects of modern life, Search and Rescue depends heavily on global positioning
systems provided by satellites, both geostationary or orbiting the earth. The satellite systems
are complex and the subject of considerable national posturing and expenditure. Each system
has an explanatory website and links are provided to each in this section.
COSPAS-‐SARSAT SYSTEM

Source: Cospas-‐Sarsat

COSPAS-‐SARSAT

COSPAS-‐SARSAT is currently the most used system for the UK. It was developed by the USA,
former USSR, Canada and France and has been available for all countries to use since 1985. A
full description of the COSPAS-‐SARSAT satellite systems is given on the operator’s website. The
overview document is also contained in the accompanying SAR Portfolio.

GLONASS

The Russian satellite positioning system, Glonass is
forecast to be fully operational on a worldwide basis in
2012. This will make it possible for GPS receivers to
be developed to use a choice of systems or a mixture
depending on coverage. The system was primarily
developed as a Russian national resource to be
independent of The American GPS system.
GLONASS The link is to a recent BBC News item on the subject.
Satellite launch
GALILEO

Galileo is the European project to provide an independent GPS system with a
SARSAT capability. The system was intended for introduction in 2010, but is Galileo has been
bedevilled by delays
now forecast to be operational in 2018. The link to more information is again
and cost overruns.
to the BBC. This article is dated 2008, but is still useful as an overview of the A group of UK MPs
European intent. Galileo is designed to provide greater accuracy than the said that Galileo
existing system – within a few feet worldwide (GPS can be up to 30 feet out provided "a
on occasion with no system integrity warning of the error; Galileo will have textbook example of
such a warning built in). The article mentions that the SAR mode will include how not to run
a voice facility to inform the casualty that rescue is on the way. It is large-‐scale
understood that this has now been ruled out on grounds of cost and over-‐ infrastructure
complication. projects".
BBC link
BNS

China hopes that the Beidou Navigation System (BNS) will enable its military and civilian users
to find their way anywhere in the world without relying on the U.S. The system is already
operating over China and is planned to be operational worldwide by 2015.
RADIO AIDS

While GPS systems provide accurate position indications world wide, searching for a person lost
overboard from a ship or from a ditched aircraft has been traditionally the preserve of radio
aids. This has changed significantly since GPS systems became more reliable and more
available, and cheaper. However, there is still a place for radio aids, now more usually used in
combination with GPS to locate a missing person offshore.

Personal Locator Beacons

PLB Personal Locator Beacon Attached to or worn by the person.
Registered through MCA.
Maritime beacon.
EPIRB Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon Various activation methods – manual
and/or automatic
Aircraft beacon.
ELT Emergency Locator Transmitter Various activation methods – manual
and/or automatic

A personal locator beacon (PLB) is a portable distress beacon that transmits an emergency
signal to rescue services to alert them to a person or persons in difficulty. PLBs are widely
available for use in outdoor adventurous pursuits as well as being used by the military and the
rescue services themselves.

PLBs work by transmitting a 406Mhz signal monitored by agencies the world over to a network
of 4 polar low earth orbit and 3 geostationary operational environmental satellites (at the time
of this report, July 2011) internationally owned and monitored (American, Canadian, Russian
and French). The tracking system is collectively known as COSPAS-‐SARSAT and membership
and monitoring responsibility has expanded to include 36 other nations operating 66 ground
stations and 29 mission control centres worldwide. In the UK, the 406MHz distress frequency is
monitored by the Maritime and the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centres (currently 19
MRCCs and 1 ARCC).
While this section refers generically to PLBs, there are actually 3 types of emergency distress
beacons; EPIRBs, ELTs and PLBs. The first two are for maritime and aviation use respectively
and the actual term PLB is now more usually associated with land recreational use. Whichever
type of distress beacon is used, the process of calling for help is very similar.
On activation, the distress beacon transmits a signal to the orbiting search and rescue satellites
comprising the COSPAS-‐SARSAT collection. The signal is then transmitted to an unmanned
ground station known as a Local User Terminal (LUT). LUTs are unmanned.
The LUT transfers the distress signal to the relevant RCC. There is some prioritisation because
the type of distress beacon received determines precisely who is notified. For example, EPIRB’s
(marine distress beacons) are directed to a Coast Guard RCC.
Importantly, the signal from a PLB simply tells rescuers that you are in need of help. That’s
really at the heart of the matter. If a beacon isn’t transmitting to the satellites, it is assumed that
all is well. If it is transmitting, it is assumed that the user is in serious trouble. However, the
modern PLB actually uses and reveals much more than earlier radio transmitter only systems.
A PLB can now have a GPS system built into it. This means that the unit has the ability to
transmit your latitude and longitude position to rescuers when activated. This generally
narrows the casualty’s position down to within 100 meters for SAR teams.
A PLB requires registration for activation. A registration number is transmitted along with the
signal and that helps SAR identify who is in difficulty. Some PLBs come with subscription
services that open up a whole array of additional options. This can include contact between a

company and individuals on its emergency contact list. The main objective of a PLB is to effect a
rescue. However, they can offer peace of mind to families and also function as an integral part
of a surveillance system for offshore personnel. It is important to remember that any additional
services are independent of the RCC conducting the actual rescue activity and are managed by
the company or subcontractor servicing the particular PLBs subscription.
There is much discussion surrounding the use of individual PLBs and as with most discussions
there are good and bad points to be considered. As a bottom line, however, there can be little
doubt that personal SAR alerting devices can save lives when conditions are very serious.
Inadvertent or even deliberate false alarms are the down side of such devices, although this is
still a relatively rare occurrence. If a company working offshore is considering using PLBs for
its staff, then it needs to research thoroughly the pros and cons of the various systems on offer.
For instance, beacons can be automatically activated by immersion in seawater. They can also
be activated manually or by a lanyard type link to a structure or vessel. And a slightly different
type of beacon can be built into a boat or aircraft for automatic activation either in the event of a
crash or sinking.
Inmarsat

Inmarsat currently uses 11-‐satellites providing mobile voice and data communications around
the world, enabling users to make phone calls or to connect to the internet on land, sea or in the
air. The maritime community has used its communication and safety services for more than a
quarter of a century; Inmarsat was founded in 1979 to ensure that ships could stay in constant
touch by telephone.
A new non-‐SOLAS maritime voice distress service is being launched to enhance safety
communication on commercial and leisure vessels. The Inmarsat Voice Distress (Non-‐SOLAS)
service utilises the company’s FleetBroadband to provide priority call access -‐ interrupting all
non-‐distress calls as soon as the red distress button is pushed.
The new service was scheduled to go live from the end of July 2011.

Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS)

The basic concept of the GMDSS is that SAR authorities ashore, as well as shipping in the
immediate vicinity of a ship in distress, will be rapidly alerted to a distress incident so they can
assist in a co-‐ordinated search and rescue operation with the minimum of delay.

A key concept of the GMDSS is that
of Sea Areas. The oceans of the
world have been divided into
operational Sea Areas, defined
according to the radio facilities
provided on shore for distress
alerting. This approach recognises
the capabilities and limitations of
the various communications
techniques employed in the GMDSS.
The maritime administration of
each contracting government to the
SOLAS 1974 convention defines the
sea area or areas for its country,
using criteria given in IMO
Resolution A.801(19).8

MRCC Falmouth is linked directly to
the Coast Earth Station at Burum,
Netherlands whereby distress, urgency or safety messages received via the Inmarsat satellite
systems are routed automatically to Falmouth for SAR action. Any distress alerts received from
vessels outside the UKSRR, then MRCC Falmouth will pass details to the appropriate foreign
RCC. Where this is not possible, then MRCC Falmouth will co-‐ordinate the necessary SAR action
regardless of location worldwide.

The concept of sea areas is fundamental, since GMDSS equipment carriage requirements are
based not on the size of a ship, but on the sea area(s) in which it operates.
The SOLAS Convention Chapter IV, Regulation 5, sets out the services which contracting
Governments undertake to make available, as they deem practical and necessary, either
individually or in cooperation with others. Governments are to provide appropriate shore-‐
based facilities for Inmarsat satellite and terrestrial radio communication services having due
regard for the recommendations of the IMO.

Possible review of the elements and procedures of the GMDSS

The Sub-‐Committee on Radio Communications and Search and Rescue (COMSAR) is currently
undertaking a scoping exercise to see if there is a need for a review of the elements and
procedures of the GMDSS. The COMSAR Sub-‐Committee was instructed to study how any
review of the elements and procedures of the GMDSS may be implemented and further advise
on the shape, size and structure of this review. The COMSAR Sub-‐Committee is expected to
report to the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in 2012, after which the Committee will decide
on the way forward.

8
Also available in the SAR Portfolio.

Automatic Identification System (AIS)

AIS is a VHF radio system which automatically communicates vessel information between AIS
equipped vessels.

AIS was developed as a collision avoidance measure to enable commercial vessels to ‘see’ each
other more clearly. AIS does this by continuously transmitting a vessel’s identity, position,
speed and course along with other relevant information to all other AIS equipped vessels and
port authorities within range. AIS is compulsory for most large commercial ships:
• ships over 300 gross tonnage on international voyages;
• cargo ships over 500 gross tonnage not engaged on international voyages; and
• passenger ships irrespective of size.

An AIS transponder determines its own position, speed and course using a built in GPS
receiver, with optional connections to other instruments such as a gyrocompass. This
information is combined with other navigation information entered by the operator (vessel
call sign, MMSI9 number, size, etc.) and automatically communicated between AIS equipped
vessels without any user interaction.

AIS transponders on other vessels and coast stations -‐ and also inexpensive ‘receive-‐only’ units
-‐ receive this information and use it to create a real-‐time graphical display of traffic in the area.
A transponder can be connected to many types of chart plotters or PC charting software to
overlay vessel positions on the chart. It can similarly be overlaid on many radar screens. In the
simplest application, target information is displayed on a text screen.

AIS uses digital VHF signals to transmit its information. The range of the system is similar to
VHF radios. These VHF radio signals can be picked up around corners, over islands and
through heavy rain, giving better coverage than RADAR in some conditions or enhancing a
RADAR picture when used together.
There are 3 different classes of AIS systems: Type A, B and receive-‐only.

• Type A: Required on IMO/SOLAS commercial vessels, this equipment includes a
12.5watt VHF transmitter (typical 20-‐40 mile range, mostly depending on antennae
height), a dual channel receiver and either a built in GPS or a port to external GPS. It
can transmit and receive the full complement of AIS information.

• Type B: Does not meet the SOLAS standards but does meet ISAF OSR Cat 1 & 2
requirements and has been designed to provide less expensive AIS functionality for
smaller commercial vessels and pleasure vessels. This equipment also includes a VHF
transmitter, a dual channel receiver and is required to have a built in GPS (and is
forbidden to take external GPS data). However, transmission power is restricted to
2W, giving a typical range of about 5 – 10 miles. In addition, only a subset of the
possible AIS information (for instance, not destination, ETA, draft, navigational
status) is transmitted at a reporting rate less than a Class A (e.g. every 30 seconds as
opposed to every 10 seconds for Class A).

9
A Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) is a series of nine digits which are sent in digital form over a radio
frequency channel in order to uniquely identify ship stations, ship earth stations, coast stations, coast earth stations, and group
calls. (International Telecommunications Union Radio Regulations)


• Receive-‐only: Inexpensive, low power systems that only receive information from
other vessels and do not transmit any information about the vessel they are installed
on. Does not meet ISAF OSR Cat 1 & 2 requirements.

Pros and Cons of AIS

AIS gives you a graphic view of the targets around you and will display warnings if the
closest point of approach of any of those targets is ‘too close’. This is very much like a
radar with an ARPA (Automatic Radar Plotting Aid) function. However, AIS has several
distinct pros and cons in comparison to RADAR with ARPA:
Pros:
 The AIS system will give you the MMSI number and description (and the call sign for
type A AIS systems) of other vessels. This allows users to easily establish VHF voice
contact (by name or call sign) or to initiate a DSC VHF, facilitating discussion of joint
actions, rather than having to call “big ship near the Bay Bridge” and hoping the right
vessel answers. The ability to know the ship’s MMSI number is valuable because it
allows you to send a DSC message directly to them, which will ring an alarm in the
deckhouse and possibly be noticed by the watch keeper even if the VHF volume is
turned down.
 The AIS system will penetrate better through rain squalls, over islands and around
corners than basic radar systems.
 The AIS system draws somewhat less power than a radar system.
Cons:
 By far the biggest drawback is that AIS only shows other targets that have functional
AIS systems. This means that users miss other traffic: – pleasure vessels, small
fishing vessels, commercial vessels with failed AIS, foreign flagged vessels offshore
not in compliance with the IMO requirements, marker buoys, etc. For this reason and
at this time, AIS should only be viewed as a supplement to other watch keeping.
 AIS was developed for commercial shipping use. There is some concern that if
thousands of pleasure vessels start transmitting AIS signals, it will clutter the system to
the point that it will be less useful or even rendered useless.
 AIS is a relatively complex system. It is mechanically simpler than the moving parts of
a radar, but with AIS, users are depending on the other vessel having properly
maintained and functional equipment. For the system to function you must have at
least one AIS transceiver and one receiver working on two different vessels. Each
transceiver must have a functional multi-‐channel digital VHF and GPS. As the system
has developed there have been both interfacing and compatibility problems, but these
should be resolved as the system matures.

There are public websites that display AIS targets off the UK coast and much of the world (also
available on Google Earth as an overlay). There is considerable debate as to whether this
information should be freely available, mainly from a security point of view. However, the
website gives a good idea of what an AIS system is capable of displaying.

This is a rapidly developing technology, and the hardware costs are reducing while the
features improve. The latest development includes AIS capability inside new VHF
transceivers. Some of these have a rudimentary AIS graphic display on the transceiver or
remote microphone.


Bespoke Surveillance of Wind Farms

There are a number of consultancies offering tailored solutions for the surveillance of the seas
in the vicinity of an offshore wind farm. One such company is VisSim and the information that
follows is mainly gleaned from the VisSim website and from discussions with the company. This
information is included as an illustration of what is currently available and is not an
endorsement per se of a particular service provider.
The primary purpose of the surveillance of the offshore wind farms is to prevent large vessels
colliding with the array. This application requires full coverage of the area with radar, AIS and
VHF. Remote controlled CCTV cameras can also be used to evaluate conditions on the remote
site and to monitor the operation offshore.

In addition to the surveillance tasks the collected information can also be used for logistic
purposes, planning and for incident debriefing.
Typical Wind Farm Surveillance Objectives

Surveillance objectives can be categorised as follows:
• Collection and recording of information about all vessels in the area
• Provision of warnings when vessels are in potential collision course with the wind farm
• Maintaining radio communication with all vessels and helicopters
• Visual monitoring of situation at site (e.g. hoisting people from helicopters, weather
conditions, etc.)
• Vessel Work Coordination during the wind farm construction stage
• Monitoring distribution of people on the wind turbines within the park
• Storage of vessels’ information for synchronous replay and statistical analysis
Offshore Wind Farm Solutions

The system configuration on the next page is for information and will differ for different
customers and locations.

Source: VisSim

Sensor Sites
Certain equipment has to be installed on the remote site. Typically, all the necessary equipment
is installed on the offshore transformer platform where power and communication back to
shore is present. The processing equipment is usually installed in a standard 19” rack and
connected to the sensors mounted outside.
Operator Station
The Operator Station is located onshore where the main process control is also carried out. The
communication for most of the modern wind farms include fibre optics and these can be used to
transfer the data from the surveillance area. Most of the processing is done offshore and the
result is sent to the displays. The scale of the control centre varies from one monitoring PC to a
number of PCs spread around the local area network. The operator has oversight of the
targeted situation by having an overview of all the vessels in area, pictures from remotely
controlled CCTV cameras and voice communication via a remote VHF base station.
Integration with existing alarm systems

All the systems used for unmanned offshore operation are built using components with very
high availability. Monitoring of the system performance and preventive maintenance are key
elements for trouble free operation of any system. It is very important to exchange information

with other systems used for remote monitoring of the offshore wind farms. All VisSim systems
can be integrated to external SCADA10 systems using SNMP11 or other monitoring protocols.
Vessel Work Coordination

One of the important aspects of the wind farm surveillance is during the construction phase. At
this stage the power, connection onshore and other useful elements of the surveillance system
are not yet present but the work offshore still requires coordination and remote monitoring. A
temporary installation can be provided using land based or other offshore constructions to
monitor the activity offshore. VisSim has also developed special graphical tools for editing the
wind turbine symbols, changing their status to reflect the construction progress and entering or
importing as laid cable positions.
The offshore wind farm surveillance system is based on the VisSim Vessel Traffic Management
System. The heart of the system is the same, but it is adapted for the particular offshore
operational requirements using the following basic elements.
Radars
Radars are used to monitor the entire area of interest around the wind farms. Wind turbines
are good radar echoes and thus tracking in the conditions of the wind farms is a complicated
and challenging task. VisSim has developed special filters to reduce effects of the wind turbines
to the overall system performance. As experience is gained in wind farm surveillance, VisSim
can advise on the configuration necessary for a new application.
AIS
AIS is used to identify radar targets. This eases the surveillance operations as the VTS operator
does not have to enter names manually. In standard surveillance applications a standard AIS
receiver (Type B) or a read only connection (Type C) to the existing AIS chain is recommended.
When additional features are required, such as virtual AIS aids to navigation to mark the wind
farm so that its location is known to passing vessels, it is necessary to use a base station (Type
A).
VHF
VHF is an essential tool for communication with vessels and helicopters. The base stations are
installed offshore and the voice and commands are transferred back to the operator sitting
onshore via the network. The operator talks to the vessels as if he were located on the platform.
Several VHF stations can be combined in order to provide gapless coverage from the near by
port to the offshore wind farm. It is possible to combine VHF/FM base stations (talking to
vessels) and VHF/AM base stations (talking to helicopters).
CCTV
A long range CCTV camera helps in identifying targets, monitoring different service operations
such as hoisting personnel from the helicopter to the wind turbine, etc. This visual
identification also helps to distinguish between floating debris and from the smaller craft
without AIS. The camera can be linked to one of the radar targets and zoom into the area to
show exactly what is there.

10
SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) generally refers to industrial control systems: computer systems that monitor and
control industrial, infrastructure, or facility-‐based processes.

11
SNMP: (Simple Network Management Protocol)

People Tracking System

A People Tracking system has been especially developed for offshore wind farms. The system
uses AIS installed on a boat to transmit the information about which people are leaving the boat
at a particular location which corresponds to the location of one of the wind turbines. This
information is visualized on the operator’s screen where it is also linked to the People Tracking
Database containing chosen information.

Real time remote images of the Thames Estuary area shown above live on the VisSim site during
the RenewableUK Offshore Wind exhibition and conference in Liverpool 24 June 2011.


A closer view of the London Array.

As seen to the right, the display can

superimpose data on such subjects as:
• shipping (vessel type and registration,

speed, direction, weight, etc.)
• weather (sea state, wind, visibility, etc.)
Google and other Tracker systems

This mention of Google and other location-‐
based mobile phone services is included as a final example of possible location devices for the
future. For the moment the Google service is firmly consumer-‐based, but there is obvious scope
for the technology to be used to monitor personnel working offshore.
Google Latitude is a feature on Google Maps that allows users to view the approximate location
of friends who choose to share their location. The feature was launched in February 2009. Two
years later, Google recently introduced a check-‐in feature in the Google Latitude app. Users are
now able to connect their location with specific places on Google Maps. The move to include
check-‐in is in line with what Facebook Places, Foursquare and Gowalla, among other location-‐
based services, are offering. The services allow users to “check in” when they are at different
locations using their mobile phones. The new utility from Google is completely opt-‐in and to
make it a little different from what other companies offer, Google users can activate the option
to check in and out of specific places automatically. Also to address the problem of users
forgetting to check in, users have the option of choosing to receive alerts that will remind them
to check in at certain places. With the entry of Google and Facebook into location-‐based
services, it may be worthwhile for the offshore renewable industry trade bodies to investigate
possible future adaptation of these systems to oversee workers’ locations within a wind farm.

P A R T 2

Assessing the International Responsibility on the UK for SAR
The offshore renewables industry and its likely scale and needs
over the next 20 -‐25 years.
Conclusions and Recommendations

The analysis that follows draws heavily on a draft paper currently in
development for RenewableUK and kindly provided for use in this report as a
“first estimate” of renewables industry personnel expected to be working
offshore over the coming years. The figures are based on industry returns and
estimates provided to RenewableUK, but also on an interpolation of the data on
wind farm power output given in the DECC timeline as published in July 2011.

Assessing The International Responsibility on the UK

As explained under Current SAR Provision, the UK is responsible for SAR under international
aviation and maritime conventions. The level of provision expected is laid out in some detail in
IAMSAR Volume 1 and this is tabulated as a risk to the organisation appointed to oversee SAR
on behalf of the Government. The UK Government department with responsibility for SAR is the
DfT which administers the service through the SAR Strategic Committee and its sub-‐groups.
The day-‐to-‐day management of SAR is largely vested in the MCA with the support of the MoD
and the RNLI.
Any attempt at assessing the risks involved in a particular operation has to start from a
discussion of what is considered an acceptable level of risk. Very few assessments start from a
zero acceptable risk level and instead opt for the less precise “as low as reasonably practical”
(ALARP). This eliminates from the start the more excessive proscriptions of Health and Safety
pundits beloved of the media. International aviation and maritime requirements for SAR are
based on the ALARP principle and the planned level of intervention starts by quantifying the
occurrence rate for events in the table below.
Level Descriptor General Description
A Almost certain Daily occurrence
B Likely Weekly occurrence
C Occasional Monthly occurrence
D Possible Yearly occurrence
E Unlikely 1 year > occurrence < 10 years
F Rare > 10 years

Source: IAMSAR
Volume 1

The first level of real interest to consider here in terms of workers offshore is the present rates
of serious injury or death. This review is not intended to serve as an overall risk analysis for the
offshore industry, but in general terms it is possible that more than one person will be seriously
injured or killed in a year. It is suggested that twelve people a year being injured or killed is
unacceptable. However, we must be careful here to be clear on what activities we are dealing
with. Looking at activities or situations rather than numbers of deaths, we must ask the
question, is it possible for a particular event to occur? As an example, could a boat sink with all
hands during the construction phase of a wind farm? If so, is this likely to happen every year
(or, is this an acceptable occurrence once a year)? Again, it is suggested that once a year is not
likely and also it would not be acceptable. With the high development levels forecast for the
medium future, it may be that a working craft will sink with loss of life during the next 10 years.
If this simple assessment provokes outrage in some parts of the industry, then it is clear that
those responsible need to set their own levels of acceptability and apply suitable mitigations to
keep within their own standards rather than those recommended by ICAO and the IMO.

Qualitative Measure of Consequences or Impact

The table below uses a similar process to that just described to establish levels of the impact an
event is likely to have in terms of the business of managing SAR.
Level Descriptor General Description
1 Very Low • Routine or business management task with no lifesaving consequence.
• Non-‐critical support role to other agency leading incident response.
• Staff have good SAR support tools available.
2 Low • Routine or business management task with potential lifesaving

consequence.
• Lead role in non-‐SAR/safety of life activity.
• Staff have adequate SAR support tools.
• Fair communications systems available.
• Adequate level of first response assets available.
3 Medium • Routine or business management task with demonstrated lifesaving

consequence.
• Staff have inadequate SAR support tools.
• Poor communications systems available.
• Inadequate first response assets available.
• A situation that may lead to an internal decision to make a major change
to procedures, structure or staffing.
• Fatality (1-‐5 people).
• Hull loss.
4 High • A situation that may lead to an external decision to make major changes to
structure or staffing at the management level.
• Fatalities (6-‐14 people).
• Hull loss.
5 Extreme • A political review of SAR organisation and its effectiveness.

• Fatalities (more than 14 people).
• Hull loss.
Source: IAMSAR
Volume 1

The bullet points reflect different aspects of the impact at a management level, ranging from
Level 1, little or no impact, to Level 5, where questions are asked at Government level resulting
in a review of SAR organisation and its effectiveness.
Inevitably, these impact levels are also dependent on numbers of fatalities and it is not until
Level 3 that deaths are mentioned. Level 3 is the Medium impact descriptor. For the expected
numbers of people working as teams offshore, Level 3 is the most likely impact level for a
serious incident at both construction and maintenance phases of the wind farm life cycle.

IAMSAR Qualitative Risk Analysis Matrix

Consequences
1 2 3 4 5
A H H E E E
B M H H E E
Likelihood C L M H H H
D L L M H H
E L L L M H
F L L L L M
Source: IAMSAR
E = Extreme H = High M = Medium L = Low Volume 1
For the two broad categories discussed – fatalities and loss of a ship – combining the likelihood
of the event with the impact or consequence produces the result shown above. The qualitative
risk in both cases is classed as Medium albeit with a danger of drifting towards High risk with
only slightly modified parameters (larger ship with more crew/ workers aboard; two vessel
collision, etc.) Without wishing to overstate the case, this is only explained here as the way the
IAMSAR process is intended to work and the levels of risk that the process classifies as High,
Medium or Low and why. Industry must of course decide if a Medium level of risk is acceptable
for the situation being considered and if this is indeed the ALARP level of risk. This is
considered in more detail under the specific figures for the industry under RISK EXPOSURE later.
The IAMSAR document then goes on to hedge the specifics of the assessment tables described
with a few careful generalities:
Treat the Risks

• Risk should be minimised where it
can be practically reduced on a
cost/benefit basis.

• There may not be sufficient funds
to treat extreme risks.
• However, the risk analysis itself can

be used to prioritise areas needing
greater Government and/or
industry investment and highlight
areas where change is necessary to
improve overall safety.

Communicate and Consult

The IAMSAR guidance concludes with a request for communication and consultation
throughout the risk assessment process. ICAO and the IMO consider industry – stakeholder –
input to be vital to the process of establishing the correct level of SAR provision for a country.
With the significant changes engendered by the offshore renewable industry over the next
twenty years, it is vital that there is a dialogue with the DfT and other interested Government
agencies to ensure that the planning of SAR services is adequate for the needs of the people
working offshore.
As is discussed later, this dialogue is already underway and is focussed through RenewableUK.
Fortunately it is not too late to influence Government deliberations over such critical matters as
Coastguard staffing levels and location and similarly the SAR helicopter review process.

Communicate and Consult

It is important to have a communication plan for stakeholders and involve them in the process.
Industry peak representative bodies, if they exist, can be important stakeholders as they have a
vested interest in the outcomes and may have the ability to influence higher-‐level Government
decision-‐making processes.
IAMSAR Volume 1 Appendix L
Applying Risk Management Principles to Assess SAR Response and SAR System Performance


Changes Arising from Offshore Renewable Energy Activity

Within the United Kingdom SAR Region
The objective of the RenewableUK paper is to:
“…inform those stakeholders tasked with safety within the UK Search and
Rescue Region of the changes that have, and will, occur in sea area use as
industry meets the Government’s offshore renewable energy targets.”
RenewableUK Draft Introduction

The Coalition Government has recently reaffirmed its commitment to produce 15% of the
UK’s energy consumption from renewable resources by 2020. Offshore renewables,
predominantly wind, will contribute between 15 and 25% of this1. The benefit to the UK of
such projects is therefore self evident, b ut we have to remember that the offshore
environment is an unforgiving place to work and we must ensure the safety of those exposed
to danger. The first step in that process is to establish who, where and how those individuals
are to be placed at risk. Now is the time to start developing appropriate response plans, and
as with the oil, gas and fishing industries, self-‐help must come first, but in extremis National
Search and Rescue (SAR) assets may be requested to assist. The RenewableUK document is
intended to inform all parties tasked with maintaining the UK Search and Rescue Region
(SRR) of forthcoming Government approved developments, so that the UK’s national Search
and Rescue posture may be aligned to assist those at risk.

The current and proposed development of Offshore Renewable Energy Installations will see
one of the biggest changes to sea area use since the oil and gas boom of the 1970s and 1980s.
Although Round 1 and 2 developments have been predominately near-‐shore; -‐ i.e. within 12
nautical miles (nm) of the UK coastline, Round 2.5 and 3 will extend well offshore to the UK’s
Renewable Energy Zone at up to150nm. All development rests within the UK’s SRR.
Maritime SAR within the SRR rests with Department of Transport and is executed on their
behalf by the Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA). The last major review of UK SAR
provision was completed in 2001. Her Majesty’s Coastguard have just issued their second
consultation document on revised proposals for m odernising the Coastguard1 and the future
delivery of the UK’s SAR Service is under review following the decision not to proceed with
joint MOD/DfT PFI procurement in February 2011.1 It is imperative that industry, through its
trade association RenewableUK, informs key safety stakeholders of the effect that renewable
development will have on sea area use.

CONTEXT

The development of offshore wind farms has been controlled by licence agreements with The
Crown Estate. So far there have been three Rounds.
Round 1 licensed 13 wind farms with an installed capacity of 1.1 GW consisting of 322 turbines
with an average installed capacity of 3.4 MW. All of these have been built, commissioned and
are producing electricity.
Round 2 sanctioned a further 16 wind farms. These are at different stages of development
ranging from still within planning, received consent, under construction and a small number
now built and producing power. It is estimated with a high degree of probability that this round
will comprise some 7.6 GW of installed capacity from around 2166 x 3.5 MW type turbines.
Round 3 licences for 9 wind farms were awarded in 2010. Although considerable work remains
to be done to validate proposals, it is estimated that up to 32 GW of installed capacity would be
delivered from 6450 x 5.0 MW turbines on project completion12.
Wind farms Turbines/Average Output Total Output
Round 1 13 322/3.4MW 1.1GW
Round 2 16 2166/3.5MW 7.6GW
Round 3 9 6450/5MW 32GW
ROUND 1 AND 2

Initial wind farm development was land-‐focused with only the turbines placed offshore and
supporting electrical substation infrastructure on land. Construction required the assistance of
specialist vessels including jack-‐up barges and vessels to erect the turbines. Operation and
maintenance activity is now done by
day visits from a local port with
transportation provided by small
specialist boats of limited capacity.

The number of personnel employed
is relatively small; turbine
maintenance teams work in groups
of no less than two. Technicians are
exposed to similar risk as their
land-‐based colleagues, e.g. falls,
rotating machinery, electricity,
working in cramped conditions and
the manual handling of machinery
and equipment.
Source: Eon

12
Details obtained from The Crown Estate, RenewableUK and wind farm operators.

In addition the transit to and from the turbine by boat introduces a maritime boat risk and the
actual transfer between the vessel and the turbine structure requires timing and agility. The
maritime risks are comparable to those arising from the fishing industry, such as vessel
swamping, sinking, breakdown and collision.
Such activity is restricted to daylight hours and by weather condition, mainly wind and sea
state. Since the turbines are relatively close to port, maintenance can be cancelled and stopped
at very short notice and personnel recovered to safety. Contingency plans for accidents are
drawn up between the wind farm operator and the nearest MCA Maritime Rescue Coordination
Centre (MRCC). Once agreed the plans are published in the joint Emergency Rescue
Coordination Plan (ERCoP). Procedures for rescue are also detailed within the MCA Marine
Guidance Notice 371 and these are exercised regularly with key responders such as the RNLI
and SAR helicopters.
As the wind farm size and distance from land increases, more supporting infrastructure is
placed offshore e.g. transformer units. Personnel may remain for longer periods at sea either on
board ship or in accommodation units. As the distance from port increases then support vessels
become bigger and helicopters are used to transport technicians directly to the turbine nacelle
through hoisting procedures as described later under the heading BP Jigsaw.
As the distance from shore increases and passes the RNLI normal radius of action of 12 nm from
shore, then the only timely emergency response external to the wind farm itself is likely to come
from SAR helicopters. SAR helicopters can recover casualties from the nacelle or from a surface
based vessel. Although the SAR helicopter is optimised at collecting and recovering the casualty
to a place of safety whilst providing Extended Immediate Emergency Care (EIEC), the aircrew
have a limited ability to rescue from within wind turbine structure and would require physical
wind farm support to extract a casualty.

ROUND 3

Although the licensees for Round 3 are known, their exact plans remain under development and
proposals remain commercially sensitive. In addition, each farm is likely to have unique
character arising from distance from shore, environmental conditions, turbine selection and
operator preference. Accordingly, the following concept of operations is based on best practice
and unattributed industry advice.
A Round 3 wind farm is likely to consist of the most modern large wind turbines designed for
minimal maintenance. Wind turbines will be grouped around transformer units, a number of
which will be required for each wind farm. Power will be sent to shore through multi
redundant sea cables. Although transfer vessels will be larger, sea surface access to the turbines
will be limited by sea state, wind and weather. Routine maintenance activity will be
concentrated into periods of fair weather. Unscheduled maintenance will be required all year
leading to the requirement for personnel to be permanently located within the wind farm.
Accommodation will be similar to current oil and gas structures and is likely to comprise
purpose built vessels, floating hotels and fixed structures. Personnel are likely to remain
offshore for substantial periods, two weeks being the oil and gas industry norm. Transfer
between accommodation modules and the mainland could be by fast vessel or large helicopter.
Inter field transfer may be through a combination of smaller vessels, sometimes known as
daughter vessels, and small helicopters optimised for hoisting operations. [See Support
Helicopters for SAR?]

In addition to the risks already described, Round 3 personnel will be exposed to greater
environmental risks and the inability to dash to port will constrain safe haven options.
Structures will be more complex and larger, leading to more complex and more manpower
intensive maintenance. Turbine teams may be larger and the demands to complete
unscheduled maintenance in poorer weather is likely to see the introduction of new technical
transfer mechanisms which, although they will reduce daily risk, may introduce a new risk
through failure. The distance from shore will make a minor ailment a major issue necessitating
an immediate return to the mainland. The overall risk from Round 3 Offshore Renewable
Energy Installations (OREI) is more akin to those arising from the current oil and gas industry.
Major disasters will be similar, such as ship collision, fire within domestic modules and
structural failure. Although the danger from the petrochemical extraction process will be
absent, there is a likelihood of offshore helicopter refuelling with its associated dangers.
RISK EXPOSURE

OREI share similarities with oil and gas industries regarding distance from shore and size of
supporting structures; however the dispersal of those individuals is more akin to a fishing
industry where small numbers of personnel my be operating in relative isolation far from
immediate support. The maritime risk will vary depending on the size and role of the vessel.
Once within a turbine, a technician’s risk will be comparable to their onshore colleagues,
although time to safety maybe more prolonged. Any use of helicopters will introduce an
aviation risk comparable to those in the oil and gas industry.

PERSONNEL AT RISK

There are two distinct periods when personnel are placed at risk, firstly during construction
and secondly during the operational and maintenance (O&M) phase.
Source: GL-‐Garrad Hassan

Offshore wind farm construction is concentrated within suitable weather windows and ideally
should be complete within one operational season. This leads to a surge of activity. The
number of personnel involved in construction will vary depending on local conditions, distance
from shore and the location of the logistics hub. For indicative purposes a recent wind farm of
some 80+ turbines employed over 800 personnel, operating from 38 vessels varying in size
from small passenger craft to some of the largest cranes and jack up vessels available. Industry
estimates that a ratio of 10 construction workers per turbine per year is an appropriate
planning figure.
Exact details will be

maintained and
shared, together with
the Emergency
Rescue Coordination
Plan, with the local
Maritime Rescue
Coordination Centre
(MRCC) or Maritime
Rescue Sub-‐Centres
(MRSC) post
Coastguard
modernisation.

Source: Eon

The number of personnel required to support O&M activity on OREI is a combination of turbine
design, maintainability, reliability and wind farm layout. The trend within the industry is for
routine maintenance to be reduced and to be timed to concur with seasonal weather, with
annual or bi-‐annual activity being the norm. Industry, understandably, guards its actual
reliability figures and subsequent unscheduled maintenance activity very closely. In order to
protect sensitive information, scheduled and unscheduled activity has been collated from
industry and grouped together to give a figure for the number of maintenance technicians

required offshore per annum to support a single turbine. These may be augmented during
modification programmes and fair weather scheduled surge maintenance periods.
PERSONNEL PER TURBINE

The following table gives the number of full time employed personnel required to support a
single offshore turbine.

ROUND TECHNICIANS PER SUPPORT STAFF PER TOTAL PER
TURBINE TURBINE TURBINE

1 1 .25 1.25

2 1 .25 1.25

3 .5 .5 1.0

NOTES:
• Technicians are defined as those personnel qualified to work at height within a Wind Turbine Generator.
• Support staff are defined as those personnel who regularly work offshore in direct support of the wind farm
operation. E.g. marine vessel operators, electricians on sub stations, domestic support on accommodation
modules, etc.
• Round 1 and 2 consists mainly of land turbines modified for offshore use and therefore require more
maintenance than industry expects to see in the dedicated turbines being developed for offshore use.
• Round 1 and 2 support staff are mainly concerned with logistics and transportation; Round 3 will have more
support staff personnel permanently based offshore.

TURBINE ROLL OUT

DECC13 believes that up to 40 GW could be deployed by 2030, this figure equates to a 100%
take-‐up and development of The Crown Estate licensing arrangements. A central range
calculation by DECC indicates an 18GW roll out by 2020 and this is supported by
RenewableUK14 who estimate a Medium Scenario roll out of 23GW by 2021.
Applying the median turbine roll out gives the following turbine deployment and associated
personnel working offshore.

13
UK Renewable Energy Roadmap, Department of Energy and Climate Change July 2011 Page 42.
14
Working for a Green Britain: Vol 2, RenewableUK, June 2011 Page 10.

It is estimated that there will be over 10,000 regular personnel offshore by 2016. The slight dip
in the following year will be dependent on how soon Round 3 construction begins. As with oil
and gas, it is expected that specialist personnel will visit OREI on an irregular basis increasing
the number of personnel who will have visited an OREI in a year.

COMPARISON WITH OTHER RELEVANT INDUSTRIES

Offshore renewable activity has similarities with fishing, oil and gas. The fishing industry
estimates that 12,20015 workers are employed full or part time. The oil and gas industries
break down their employment figures depending on the number of nights that individuals
spend offshore. There are 51,10016 personnel who go offshore during the year, and 22,200 who
spend over 100 nights offshore, although the industry reckons on about 15,000 being offshore
at any one time. The latest Health and Safety Executive (HSE) bulletin on offshore safety in the
oil and gas industries uses a bald figure of 27,660 for the number of offshore workers.
By 2020 it is estimated that the renewables industry will have 10,700 offshore with this
increasing to just less than 14,000 on completion of Round 3 developments. There is currently
no industry estimate on the number of personnel that visit offshore over and above core
workers; however, only about half those that complete mandatory offshore training regularly
use their qualifications, implying that there are the same number of personnel again that would
go offshore for a limited purpose.
Fishing Industry
The graph shows the number of fishermen on UK registered vessels: 2001 to 2010
Source: MMO

Marine Management Organisation:
The UK Fishing Industry in 2010 Structure and Activity (Slow loading document)
Links are provided to the MMO website and the document itself as this is considered a well
constructed source of information on a commercial activity and would be most useful if a
similar resource could be developed for offshore renewable information. The document is also
available from the SAR Portfolio.
The fishing industry document records a wealth of information including accidents and
fatalities as shown overleaf for 2001 to 2010. While the number of injuries and fatalities is
highlighted, care must be taken in making any comparison with the risks and likely injuries and
fatalities in the renewables industry. Just from first inspection, many of the fishing vessel
accidents are caused by the risks inherent in the activity – machinery failures and operations in
extreme weather conditions. Nevertheless, with this caveat – fishing is a comparable workforce
size and shares some of the risks associated with wind farm development offshore.

15
UK Sea Fisheries Statistics 2010 -‐ all fishermen including part time
16
Oil and Gas UK 2009 UKCS Workforce Demographic Report, September 2010


Source: MMO

Oil and Gas Industries

The Oil and Gas industry figures are less clearly illustrated in the latest HSE bulletin, but the
following graph gives some indication of the number of serious injuries annually (there have
been no fatalities recorded using the HSE system since 2007).

Oil and Gas Offshore Combined fatal and major injury rate1997/1998 – 2009/10p
Source:
HSE
Note that the injury rate is shown as per 100,000 workers. While this shows a consistent drop
over the years, the actual numbers of injuries and fatalities is clearer in the next graph.

Oil and Gas offshore fatal and major injuries 1997/1998 – 2010/2011p
Source: HSE
Comparison between the three Industries

Industry Total Workforce Core workers (100 nights +)
Oil and Gas 51,116 22,20917
Fishing 12,212
Renewable (27,500) 13,876

Source: R enewableUK Draft

The final graph shows the estimated number of workers who will be involved in offshore
construction for wind farms as the development first increases over the next few years and then
drops back to an estimated 4000 personnel.
Offshore Construction personnel

8000
6000
4000
Construction
2000
0
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035

17
Oil and Gas UK 2009 UKCS Workforce Demographic Report, September 2010

Although there remains some uncertainty on the take up and commitment to Round 3, the
median calculation appears a cautious approach. There is a possibility that Round 3 activity
may be accelerated and offshore activity may be compressed to a shorter timescale. It is
unlikely that renewable activity will exceed that of oil and gas. Nevertheless, it is apparent that
it is only a matter of time before renewable activity will surpass that of the UK fishing industry.
IMPACT ON EMERGENCY RESPONDERS

The risk profile of renewable activity is comparable to that of fishing and oil and gas. However,
it is important to keep a perspective on the likely effect this could have on the UK’s emergency
services. Using the UK SAR helicopter statistics18 as an indicator. Of the 1921 occasions that
SAR helicopters were called out in 2010 only 165 (8.6%) were to the maritime environment
which encompasses fishing, oil and gas, and general maritime traffic. Accordingly, it is thought
that renewable activity is unlikely to generate a vast number of call outs. However, where and
when assistance may be required is difficult to predict with activity spread throughout the UK
territorial waters and not concentrated in the relatively compact areas associated with
petrochemical developments. Some illustrative calculations are given in the Rescue Time
Examples that follow.

18
Summary of UK SAR Helicopter Callouts 2001-‐2010, DASA statistics, 2010.

Rescue Times Examples

The following examples show estimated times to reach the Dogger Bank area from the UK
mainland, starting with RAF helicopters from either RAF Boulmer or Leconfield. Times shown
are for transit and do not include time to get airborne.
SAR Helicopters
The top box contains figures for the Sea King helicopter which is currently in service with the
RAF and the Royal Navy (as discussed in Britain’s Joint Search and Rescue – Helicopter]. The Sea
King will eventually have to be replaced and the S92 is a possible successor. The S92 figures are
given in the lower box. Note that, although the S92 is faster and therefore gets to the incident
faster, it has less time on task before needing to recover. A safety margin of 45 minutes fuel has
been built into all figures.
If the task is to collect an injured or an ill person from a turbine, then both helicopter types have
sufficient range and time on task to complete the mission comfortably. However, if a person has
gone overboard from a support vessel and a search has to be carried out, the S92 will have
limited capability – about one hour – before having to return to base. However, this can be
significantly improved if fuel is available on a helicopter platform in the wind farm area.

RNLI Severn Lifeboat

Humber lifeboat station has a Severn lifeboat with a duration of 10 hours at 45km per hour.
Clearly this is not sufficient to reach Dogger Bank and return. More practically, the Severn is
designed to operate out to about 80km offshore. An operational limit also generally keeps RNLI
operations within the UK 12 mile (20km) limit. The example shown is intended to highlight the
remoteness of the Dogger Bank area from what might be considered the “usual operating area
for the RNLI. This should not detract from the vital cover provided closer to shore and the
Severn boat has adequate range for all of the Round 1 and 2 sites.
From discussions with the RNLI, it is clear that lifeboats will assist wherever possible in a
search and rescue situation in the vicinity of an offshore wind farm and exercises have already
been undertaken using helicopters and lifeboats at some Round 1 sites. However, the RNLI
currently have operational limitations which need to be addressed to make the rescue of
persons from the base of a turbine structure safer and more easily managed.
At the moment, lifeboats are not designed to contact the turbine structure and, if it is decided
that this is a viable means of evacuating an injured or ill person, then there has to be
consideration given to modifying some lifeboats for this purpose. The second limitation is that,
at the moment, a real rescue from the base of a turbine is potentially dangerous to the
unprotected lifeboat. Furthermore, the crew are not trained in standard procedures to
undertake the operation. Again, such procedures and training should follow on if a need is
identified.

The cost of such modifications and associated training will also have to be discussed. As the
RNLI is self-‐funding, it is unlikely that the Government would consider assisting with such a
modification programme in the current economic climate.
Other Assistance

Dogger Bank
The picture above has the Marine Traffic AIS overlay added. As well as showing vessels, this
also shows oil and gas platforms and two are shown within 80km of the Dogger Bank area as
used in the earlier illustrations. This is approximately 15-‐20 minutes flying time for the S92 and
Sea King respectively.
It would be foolish to consider renewable energy developments in isolation from other energy
resources offshore. It would be similarly parochial to ignore the lessons learnt by the more
mature offshore industries. However, the research for this review keeps finding a reluctance to
develop or learn from existing facilities put in place for another offshore energy source. An
example of this is the BP Jigsaw helicopter and ship support system. The system was mooted in
2004 as a more efficient way to meet the UK legal requirements for the protection of workers
offshore than the existing plethora of support vessels. Jigsaw replaced many of these ships with
a combination of purpose built large support vessels carrying smaller rescue craft and these
operating in concert with SAR equipped helicopters.
A full description of the concept is given in a PowerPoint presentation available in the SAR
Portfolio. A more detailed document “Jigsaw-‐Solving the Safety Problem” is also available in the
Portfolio. Both the presentation and the document are copyright protected and must not be
published. A shorter summary follows here.

BP Jigsaw

The Cullen Inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster and the way in which its findings were taken up
by the UK Health and Safety Executive, drove BP’s Jigsaw system. BP’s decision in 2004 to
implement Jigsaw provided the funding and the tools that enabled that basis to be turned into
practical reality. The project was managed from within BP’s Logistics Department in Aberdeen,
and was supported by BP’s workforce in their responses to consultations, by BP Shipping, and
by BP’s contractors, especially Vector Offshore who provide most of the marine operating
expertise and personnel. The consultation process, which was a very important contributor to
the development of Jigsaw, was audited and approved by the Industrial Society (now The Work
Foundation).

After several years of design, development, and construction, Jigsaw went live in a limited area
on 1st May 2007. Subsequent extension to the full planned operating area is following rapidly.
Jigsaw represents an investment by BP of nearly £1 billion into its North Sea support and safety
systems. The map below shows the various Circles of Response with Marine coverage in red
and Helicopters in green.
We believe it represents a sea change in the philosophy and delivery of offshore safety, which will act as
a prototype and example upon which other systems can be developed for other offshore operators
having other applications in other sea areas.
Jigsaw Developers


RSV (Regional Support Vessels)
Source:

Note: FRC is a Fast Recovery Craft visible forward of the ARRC.

The RSVs cover the area around a group of
platforms in the three regions shown on
the map.

There is an additional back-‐up RSV for the
use of all three regions.

It is important to note that these vessels
can accommodate 300 survivors. They
each carry two large rescue craft (see next
page) and two smaller FRCs. The scale of
Source: FYJS.CN
the Jigsaw operation is therefore much
greater than the needs of an individual
wind farm in terms of persons likely to need rescuing at any one time. To go further, an
individual ARRC is probably very large in terms of the renewables industry requirements for
rescue offshore.


Click for video

ARRC (Autonomous Rescue and Recovery Craft)

Source:

Enlarging on the information given above, the ARRC is a purpose built rescue craft which is
intrinsic to the Jigsaw concept. Crucially, it is regarded as a “Place of Safety” in HSE terms so
that a rescue is considered complete once survivors are on board the ARRC. There is a qualified
medical member as part of the crew.
It can operate in conjunction with the SAR Helicopters or it can recover to the RSV or the
mainland if required.

SARH for Jigsaw

Source:


JIGSAW assessment for Renewables

BP’s Jigsaw support system is an expensive solution to a safety oversight scenario which could
see hundreds of people in need of evacuation from a damaged oil or gas platform. Although
expensive, it is probably cheaper than the less formalized support vessel system that was in use
before.
The numbers of workers catered for by Jigsaw are most unlikely to be in need of rescue in the
offshore renewables case. As was mentioned in the Renewable UK draft discussion on RISK
EXPOSURE, the numbers involved in any one incident are likely to be more in line with the
fishing industry than oil and gas.
An important consideration is the relatively limited area covered by Jigsaw in terms of the total
offshore waters around the UK. It would be patently impractical to try to expand Jigsaw for the
whole of UK offshore and it would also be prohibitively expensive. Returning to the opening
part of this report, seeking to replicate Jigsaw for offshore renewables purposes would be
considered unnecessary in terms of International Requirements.
A much more practical consideration is whether the Jigsaw facility can be used in the future by
offshore renewables as well as by the oil and gas industry. The provision of two helicopters for
Jigsaw is a large investment by BP and there must be scope for some sharing of facilities.
The probable need for larger replenishment helicopters for the Dogger Bank site is also
mentioned as part of the discussion on Support Helicopters for SAR?
There is clear potential for a “mini-‐Jigsaw” for some of the Round 3 sites and this will be
included as a significant recommendation of this report. Allied with this, is a need for co-‐
operation between developers and operators of adjacent sites and also with the oil and gas
companies who are also nearby relative to the distance offshore.
In summary, Jigsaw appears to be a “gold-‐plated” solution in terms of the offshore renewable
industry’s likely requirements. However it has significant read-‐across in terms of equipment
development and operating experience combining maritime and aviation expertise. There is
likely to be significant synergy from discussing mutual needs with oil and gas at this relatively
early stage.
As a final note, it should be emphasized that this is not suggesting that the existing SAR
provision is inadequate for offshore renewables’ needs in terms of international requirements
and probably for most purposes for the foreseeable future. The question returns yet again to
what level of protection does the industry wish to afford its workers in terms of SAR,
irrespective of what is actually required in Governmental terms and international treaties and
conventions?

Support Helicopters for SAR?

Bond Air Services have a helicopter

operating out of a purpose built site in
Lowestoft to support the Greater Gabbard
wind farm.
The Eurocopter EC125T2i is equipped with

a hoist as shown and this is used to lower
personnel onto the turbine nacelle to
undertake servicing or repairs. Importantly,
this is not designed as a SAR winching
system and is intended to operate close in
to the turbine for a short lower of one
person at a time while the pilot keeps visual
Source: Bond Air Sevices contact with the turbine. SAR traditionally
uses a longer winch with a winchman on the
end equipped with a strop or a stretcher to lift an injured person. The winch is operated by a
trained crewman who also talks the pilot into position, as he may not be able, or may not always
wish, to keep visual contact with the structure.
The Eurocopter is also not designed to lift a stretcher patient – again there is no trained
winchman and, more importantly, there is no room to manoeuvre the stretcher through the
door by the winch.
From the legal point of view, the Bond Air Services helicopter and crews are cleared by the UK
CAA for the support task as described. The crews are not trained for SAR and this company
operation is not authorised as an SAR undertaking which would require a
specific Operations Manual including a training schedule for the crew members.
Nothing in this
Having said all that, the Air Navigation Order Article 128 gives an easement to
article: ………..
allow a person to be picked up in an emergency or to save a life. While this is
(b) prohibits the
laudable, it may well catch the helicopter pilot or operator in a “no win”
picking up or
situation if an attempt to rescue a person goes wrong. This certainly needs
raising of any
clarification from the CAA and probably from the European Aviation Safety
person, animal
Agency (EASA).
or article in an
emergency or
for the purpose This potential quandary may be
of saving life; removed for the Round 3 sites
further offshore as full helicopter
Air Navigation Order
replenishment may be required
between shore and either a fixed
or floating accommodation
arrangement within the wind farm. This will
require larger transport helicopters as are
currently used to carry personnel and equipment
out to oil and gas platforms. These aircraft land
on purpose built helidecks and generally this
removes the requirement for winching.
Source: Bond Air Sevices


There may still be a requirement for some “Search” element of a rescue if a person has been lost
overboard from a support vessel or has fallen in the water during a transfer. Provision could be
made for this capability within the operations procedures and the training of the helicopter
crews used for the transit flying. The helicopter could also be equipped for the additional task.
As with all possibilities, this would have to be assessed in terms of economic viability against
the likelihood of the extra training and equipment being used in anger later.
As a ballpark figure (in answer to a recent Parliamentary question), the cost of operating the
current MCA contracted helicopters is approximately £7000 an hour. Additional flying training
and aircraft use generally will have to be assessed by each user operating a wind farm at an
extended distance offshore.
A final thought on helicopters – the picture maps two separate helicopter crashes in the defined
Jigsaw area in 2009. Both aircraft were replenishing oil platforms and were not part of the
Jigsaw system. While the helicopter is a valuable SAR tool, it also introduces its own risks into

the mix of hazards for offshore workers. The helicopter operators are well aware of the
inherent risks in their operations and will be able to advise on this aspect of a risk assessment
for a particular wind farm. As already discussed, it is almost inevitable that helicopters will
have to be used in support of offshore operations and their potential use for SAR should be kept
in mind when deciding on the type and size of helicopter to choose.

Other Future Possibilities

The British have a reputation for innovative solutions as situations change and this section is
intended to look at a few options which are not currently part of UK SAR provision.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

The Australian Coastwatch program has reportedly looked at the possible use of UAVs in a
maritime surveillance role. The General Atomics Mariner UAV has been looked at but there are
also rumours of the much larger and expensive Global Hawk also being assessed. This report
has not included fixed wing aircraft and these two UAVs are effectively maritime
reconnaissance fixed wing aircraft so are mentioned only as a possible idea for the future.
However, there are a number of rotary UAVs which can also be used for long-‐range surveillance
and possibly SAR in years to come.
The Boeing Hummingbird is possibly

the most viable current example, and
has been under development since
2004. As with many UAVs, it has a
chequered history, but the expanding
military use of UAVs is increasing
reliability and flexibility in leaps and
bounds.
The aircraft specification is

impressive on paper -‐ it is designed to
fly 2,500 nautical miles with
endurance in excess of 24 hours and a
payload of more than 300 pounds.
The autonomously flown A160 is 35
feet long with a 36-‐foot rotor
Source: Boeing diameter. It will fly at an estimated
top speed of 140 knots at ceilings up
to 30,000 feet.

Airships and Captive Balloons (Blimps)

As with UAVs, airships have a mixed history for reliability and usefulness. In the not too distant
future, it may be possible to combine both the airship’s long time on task with an autonomous
(i.e. can be programmed to fly a particular route or pattern) and unmanned capability.
An aerostat (a blimp) has been fitted to a

Norwegian rescue ship for a number of years. It
has a day and night camera and transmits a
picture to a monitor on the bridge from which it
is controlled. Normally, the Captain on the
bridge can see only 11kms, but with the aerostat
at 3,000ft, his visibility is increased up to
110kms. Thus, a blimp can increase visibility by
a factor of 10 in all directions, with a claimed
cost increase of about 2% of the cost of the ship.

Source: Lindstrandtech
Marine and Renewable Industry Developments

There will almost certainly be significant developments in the maritime field similar to those in
aviation as the needs of the offshore renewables industry become more apparent. That said,
development has not been world changing in support of the oil and gas industries –i.e. there is
still heavy dependency on ships and aircraft.

The real likelihood of significant change is in the design and maintenance requirements for the
turbines and ancillary equipment. If forecasts are being made for support needs over the next
20-‐25 years, the biggest factor is likely to be the reliability and service intervals for the
equipment offshore. Spending more at the planning and design stage may save more lives in the
long term than any provision for SAR.


Options for The Crown Estate and Other Renewables Stakeholders

This review has given an overview of why SAR is structured as it is for the UK and has gone into
some detail on the capabilities – and limitations – of the existing services. It has also looked at
what the likely scale of offshore renewables will be over the next 20 – 25 years. The conclusion
was coloured by the overall high level of unknowns in the most significant areas:
• SAR helicopter provision;

• Coastguard reorganisation; and
• The actual requirements of the industry as the Round 3 sites are at a very early stage.
With so many variables still in the melting pot, this is an ideal time for industry to decide what it
wants in terms of SAR protection and to let the Government know that renewables needs
should be viewed with equal weighting to that given to the longer-‐established offshore
industries of fishing, oil and gas. A strong argument can be made that, while the Government
wants the renewables development, it must be aware that there are areas such as SAR where
attention is needed and where an injection of money may be required to maintain the existing
standards while, at the same time, ever more workers are being asked to work in sometimes
harsh and hazardous conditions offshore. This message needs to get to the Government in a
cohesive and credible form and the main recommendations of this review seek to assist that
end. The RenewableUK approach to Government should also be supported for the same reason.
The Options
Option 1 Do nothing
The Crown Es ta te
looks to have Option 2 Develop an offshore industry occurrence reporting system
posi tive working
rela tionshi ps w ith Option 3 Develop an industry database for occurrences
Governm ent,
devol ved
Option 4 Establish an offshore renewables industry safety organisation
adm ini strations ,
local a uthoriti es,
se ab ed us ers a nd Option 5 Develop an MoU for government and other interested parties to
deve lope rs, clarify responsibilities
envi ronmen ta l
g roups and othe r Option 6 Establish an industry SAR requirement for sites within the 12 mile
stake holders a nd limit
i nte re st g roups
whose acti vitie s
take pla ce i n the
Option 7 Develop industry augmentation of SAR for Round 3 sites beyond
M arine E state . practical lifeboat range
Marine Estate Website Option 8 Share resources and information with other offshore energy
companies
Option 9 Review other countries’ procedures for SAR in support of offshore
industries

Option 1 Do nothing

The conclusion that the current provision of SAR is probably adequate for the type of relatively
small-‐scale occurrences likely as wind farms are constructed and then operated could suggest
support for the option to do nothing. This will always be an attractive option to those seeking to
save money and particularly in the present economic situation. However, it is thought that this
would miss an important opportunity for the burgeoning offshore industry to decide what it
actually wants to do, not just in terms of SAR, but for the development of a cohesive national
structure that ensures all workers are given adequate protection. “Do nothing” remains an
option to consider, but before taking this path, there should be careful consideration for some of
the other options listed below.
The option to do nothing strictly in terms of additional provision for SAR could be looked at
with regard to a wind farm’s distance offshore and for this reason there are separate options for
sites within the 12 mile limit and those beyond.
Option 2 Develop an offshore industry occurrence reporting system

As was noted in the Fishing Industry discussion, the statistics produced by the Marine
Management Organisation are easy to understand and appear to be comprehensive for a very
diverse industry in terms of the companies involved. Whether there is an element of good
presentation in this, masking some shortages of information, is not known. However, what is
known is that similar figures and statistics for the offshore renewables industry are not readily
available and, worse, are hedged in protectionism masquerading as commercial sensitivity.
The aviation industry decided many years ago that safety information should be available to all
with a no-‐blame culture (unless safety rules had been deliberately breached – see box below)
and encouragement is given to all aircraft crew and ground staff alike to report risks and, more
basically, all accidents and incidents. This grew into the Mandatory Occurrence Reporting
(MOR) scheme for Commercial Air Transport.
The CAA espouses a ‘Just Culture’ in the interests of the ongoing development of flight safety.
This means the CAA supports the development, within all areas of the aviation community, of a
culture in which:
• individuals are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are
commensurate with their experience and training but which result in a reportable event;
but
• where gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated.
This position is in line with European Commission Regulation 691/2010.
Note that the scheme is introduced by the Chief Executive of the CAA to provide some
reassurance to those wishing to report incidents that retribution will not follow and any scheme
of this type needs that sort of top level statement. In the case of offshore renewables, this could
be signed by heads of industry and the government parties mentioned in Option 5.
Choosing this option leads naturally into Option 3.

Option 3 Develop an industry database for occurrences

A mandatory occurrence reporting scheme would outline what information should be reported
and this would then form the basis for a structured industry information database, from which
figures similar to those for the fishing industry could be recorded and published annually. The
MMO presentation of accident figures for the Fishing Industry was noted as being particularly
clear and apparently comprehensive for the whole industry.
Option 4 Establish an offshore renewables industry safety organisation

The data in Option 3 could be managed by, say, RenewableUK, or elsewhere within the industry,
but it would be more transparent if a separate Renewables safety organisation were to be
established. This would not need to be a large body but should have sufficient expertise and
weight to deal both outwardly with the Health and Safety executive and Government and the
media, and inwardly with any industry complaints of unnecessary expense and health and
safety getting in the way of business.

Option 5 Develop an MoU for government and other interested parties to clarify
responsibilities

This review has mentioned various government departments with interests in SAR and also in
offshore renewables and at the moment there would seem to be the potential for
misunderstanding and, worse, room for the interests of the renewables industry to fall between
departments or organisations. As RenewableUK are about to raise with government some
concern for the planned future protection of workers who are building and maintaining offshore
wind farms, this would seem to be a good time to develop a comprehensive Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) between the various stakeholders.
This might be best approached as an extension of the current RenewableUK draft report to the
government and could be suggested as part of that report or as a follow on action.
A nucleus of interested parties should include:

• DfT
• MCA
• DECC
• MMO
• HSE
• RenewableUK
• The Crown Estate

It is stressed that this is the opinion of a relative newcomer to the whole process of developing
renewable energy offshore and that this option might be viewed as a naive interpretation of
much work which has already gone into protecting workers offshore. However, there is little
doubt from the ease with which evidence can be gained of other comparable industries offshore,
that there is less clarity surrounding offshore wind and associated developments.


Option 6 Establish an industry SAR requirement for sites within the 12 mile limit

There is already an established industry procedure through the ERCoPlanning requirement as
discussed under Lifeboat and Helicopter training for wind farm rescue. However, the ERCoP
templates are not written as a generic procedural manual which would assist all new entrants
to offshore wind farm development. This would be a relatively straightforward task where the
generic material could be produced and then circulated for comment and amendment by all
interested parties. This is a logical extension of the existing ERCoP requirement and is strongly
recommended as an option.
The 12-‐mile limit is referred to here mainly for convenience. During the development of the
generic operating guidance, further thought should be given to what is the practical limit in time
and distance offshore for the use of lifeboats and helicopters in a co-‐ordinated rescue process.
This should then lead naturally into Option 7.

Under this option, thought should be given to even closer co-‐operation with the RNLI to explore
the scope for modifying existing lifeboats for operations within wind farms or possible even
developing a purpose-‐built rescue vessel along the lines of the ARRC used in Jigsaw.

Option 7 Develop industry augmentation of SAR for Round 3 sites beyond practical lifeboat
range

This is considered the main option where significant progress can be made to improve the
safety provision for workers a long distance offshore; the actual distance is suggested as an
exercise under Option 6, but it could be tackled separately here. If this is accepted as a
reasonable way forward, it is difficult to see how this could be progressed without Option 8
being implemented at the same time.

As already discussed, it is unlikely that a large-‐scale renewable industries standalone SAR
provision is viable or even desirable. However, the larger wind farms further offshore may wish
to have a local safety net with a faster reaction time than that provided by onshore helicopters.
There are a number of possibilities to consider under this option and the following examples
given as a possible starting point for detailed discussion:
• A smaller version of the Jigsaw Regional Support Vessel with its attendant Rescue and
Recovery Craft. This could be a full scale Autonomous RRC or, again, a smaller
derivative.
• An ARRC designed specifically for work within a wind farm – capable of approaching the
base of a turbine or equipped to speed recovery from the turbine structure.
• If there is to be an accommodation and servicing block within the wind farm, this could
have a dock for rescue and support vessels. The accommodation block could also have a
medical facility and appropriate staff.
• Helicopter support with an SAR capability either based offshore or shared with oil and
gas if these are close by.
• Overlapping with the next option, there may be areas where the provision of SAR type
services within a wind farm will also benefit existing oil and gas production or
exploration platforms.
Although listed here as an option, it is considered vital that at least elements of this proposal are
carried forward with the fullest co-‐operation of the various parties already listed under the
MoU Option 5 and the other industry representatives considered under the next Option 8.

Option 8 Share resources and information with other offshore energy companies

As was mentioned in the BP Jigsaw discussion, BP has spent and is spending a great deal of
money providing emergency cover for offshore facilities in the northern North Sea. Jigsaw has
been openly publicised, but there must be similar contingency plans for oil and gas platforms
further south and also in the Irish Sea where the media interest has not been so great. There
should be synergies to be gained by discussing exactly what is available with the existing oil and
gas platforms close to the new or proposed wind farms. RenewableUK and/or The Crown
Estate could facilitate this sharing of resources by discussing the possibility of cooperation with
the main energy companies.

As with the Option 5 to develop an MoU, there is also scope here to work toward an overall
offshore energy strategy for SAR and other processes to enhance worker safety for all offshore
industries.

Option 9 Review other countries’ procedures for SAR in support of offshore industries

This review has looked at the UK provision of SAR, but there may be lessons to be learnt from
other countries’ experiences as offshore renewables have developed. It is appreciated that
many of the energy companies currently involved in UK renewables have other developments
around the world, but there is not sufficient information readily available to see if other
countries have acknowledged a need to change procedures or increase services for SAR as wind
farms are constructed around their coasts.

Reviewing other countries’ experiences could be done relatively easily and at little expense,
starting with a survey form to other countries’ CAA’s and Coastguard Authorities, or equivalent
government departments, to solicit views.

As should be apparent from the options list, it is considered essential that work is started in
some areas to develop a more quantified and unified approach to offshore SAR and worker
safety monitoring in general. This is not to denigrate the work that has been carried out to date,
but more to flag up a need for clearer overall processes and, most importantly, clearer
ownership of various associated tasks. Having listed the options, there are some
recommendations which follow naturally and while, in most cases these are very similar to the
options, it is worth stating them clearly as separate recommendations.

Recommendations
Recommendation 1 Establish an industry information database

As was noted in the Fishing Industry discussion, the statistics produced by the Marine
Management Organisation are easy to understand and appear to be comprehensive for a very
diverse industry in terms of the companies involved. At the moment, similar figures and
statistics for the offshore renewables industry are not readily available and it is recommended
that this should be rectified as soon as possible.

Recommendation 2 A Renewables Industry Safety Organisation

The data in Recommendation 1 could be managed by, say, RenewableUK, but it would be more
transparent if the industry established its own Renewables Safety Organisation. This would not
need to be a large body but should have sufficient expertise and weight to deal both outwardly
with the Health and Safety executive and Government and the media, and inwardly with the
usual industry complaints of unnecessary expense and Health and Safety getting in the way of
business.

Recommendations 1 and 2 should be considered together if Recommendation 2 is considered a
good idea.

Recommendation 3 Liaison with other Offshore Industries

The investment made by BP to provide emergency cover for offshore facilities in the northern
North Sea probably means that there is spare capacity in the Jigsaw area and there may be
similar contingency plans for oil and gas platforms further south and also in the Irish Sea where
co-‐operation with new wind farm developments should be considered. There should be
synergies to be gained by discussing exactly what is available with the existing oil and gas
platforms close to the new or proposed wind farms. It is also possible that the new wind farms’
requirements for augmented SAR and protection for staff generally could benefit existing oil
and gas facilities. RenewableUK and/or The Crown Estate could facilitate this sharing of
resources by discussing the possibility of cooperation with the main energy companies.

Recommendation 4 Review other Countries’ Procedures

This review has looked at the UK provision of SAR, but there may be lessons to be learnt from
other countries’ experiences as offshore renewables have developed. It is appreciated that
many of the energy companies currently involved in UK renewables have other developments
around the world, but there is not sufficient information on the internet to see if other countries
have acknowledged a need to change procedures or increase services for SAR as wind farms are
constructed around their coasts.

This could be looked at for little expenditure starting with a survey form to other countries’
CAA’s and Coastguard Authorities, or equivalent government departments, to solicit views.


Recommendation 5 Develop an MoU for Government and Other Interested Parties

Responsibility for SAR and other aspects of worker oversight and protection offshore should be
clearly established in the terms of an MoU between the government and other interested parties
outlined in Option 5. This recommendation follows from a heightened awareness of industry
needs which RenewableUK is in the process of establishing with its own paper to government
on the state of the offshore industry and its likely needs for the future.

Recommendation 6 Support the RenewableUK Paper

This final recommendation has already been supported to date as the RenewableUK paper has
taken shape, but it is included here as a reminder that industry action is underway to establish a
basis for further dialogue with the government and other stakeholders in the offshore
renewables industry.

Conclusion

Proposed offshore renewable development will see a major change in sea area use over the next
two decades. Although the activities are new and will introduce new issues; there remains a
similarity with the fishing and oil and gas industries of today. Personnel will be exposed to
danger during the construction and operation and maintenance of offshore renewable
developments. Although there remains some uncertainty in the exact size of the eventual
industry, by using the Government’s median calculation we can expect to see the offshore
renewable industry surpass the UK’s fishing industry but remain below that of oil and gas.
Renewable activity is unlikely to place a high demand on the UK’s emergency services although,
should assistance be required, it would be very difficult to predetermine the location, as activity
will be spread throughout the UK’s Renewable Energy Zone. Accordingly, prior preparation and
local liaison will be essential in ensuring the correct response in times of distress.
This overall conclusion requires some caveats in the light of the present Government cutbacks
and the uncertainty surrounding both the SAR Helicopter provision and the Coastguard service
for the UK. Any significant reduction in the number of SAR helicopters – whether military or
civil -‐ and their placement around the country will have to be reassessed in terms of the effect
on the renewables industry. The RenewableUK draft report is intended to act as a “heads-‐up” to
Government that there is a burgeoning industry offshore which may not have been included
adequately in its calculations of the need for UK SAR. Similarly, modernisation of the MCA must
acknowledge the needs of the industry as it already does for fishing and offshore oil and gas.
The veracity of the conclusion also rests firmly on what is an acceptable level of provision of
SAR for the renewables industry. As discussed, the industry may wish to augment the level
predicated by the international standards of the IMO and ICAO. More practically, the industry
has to decide what it can afford if it decides to “gold plate” the internationally agreed
requirements.
A practical conclusion is that the industry needs to act as a unified body to decide on its own
standards and requirements for SAR and then see if the prescribed standards are adequate.
There are almost certainly advantages to be gained from co-‐operation with the other offshore
energy industries and there may be similar benefits from shared capacity and equipment for oil
and gas.
The Government’s own deliberations on SAR and the MCA will become clearer as this process
develops and a further review should be undertaken when this position is known. This is
expected to be in approximately six months time. A further review at that time will also provide
a convenient resume of both industry and government progress in the interim.
RJC
30 August 2011

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A REVIEW OF UK SEARCH AND RESCUE PROVISION

A REVIEW OF UK SEARCH AND RESCUE PROVISION FOR

A report for The Crown Estate on UK Search and Rescue

TABLE OF CONTENTS

AIS Automatic Identification System LUT Local User Terminal

ARCs Admiralty Raster Chart system MCC Mission Control Centre

ARRC Autonomous Rescue and Recovery Craft MHz Megahertz

DF equip Direction Finding equipment MRCC Maritime Rescue Co-­‐ordination Centre

DMSC District Marine Safety Committee MRSC Maritime Rescue Sub-­‐Centre

DSC Digital Selective Calling NWSF National Water Safety Forum

EIEC Extended Immediate Emergency Care PFI Private Finance Initiative

ERCoP Emergency Rescue Coordination Plan RAeS Royal Aeronautical Society

FLIR Forward Looking Infrared RCC Rescue Co-­‐ordination Centre

Hs height Significant wave height SAROps Search and Rescue Operations

IMO International Maritime Organisation SRT Software Radio Technology

IPT Integrated Project Team TORs Terms of Reference

LoS Line of sight WAID Water Incident Database

Captain Master of a ship or pilot-­‐in-­‐command of an aircraft, commanding

Inmarsat A system of geostationary satellites for worldwide mobile

Rescue An operation to retrieve persons in distress, provide for their initial

Vessel A maritime craft.

A REVIEW OF UK SEARCH AND RESCUE PROVISION

• Review all current available emergency search and rescue resources,

• Review the current and likely future capacity requirements of the

• Assess the current and likely future capabilities of the infrastructure to

• Investigate potential solutions to meet the capacity requirements.

USE OF THIS DOCUMENT

This document is intended as an overview and guide to a selection of more

It also contains electronic hyperlinks to other information on the Internet and

It follows that it is intended for reading on screen and, although it can be

Much of the material is copyright and, wherever possible, this is

The Author and CAS

and the Marine Estate

This report is in two main parts.

It is recommended that the renewables industry should;

• Seek a memorandum of understanding b etween government and other stakeholder

RJC: 24 Aug 2011

The Crown Estate Marine Activities

Current Offshore Activities

12°0'0"W 8°0'0"W 4°0'0"W 0°0'0"

Current Offshore Activities

UK 12 nm Limit The Marine Estate

The Offshore Wind Farm Sites:

ROUNDS 1 and 2: Operational and planned

Round One & Two

Lynn Docking Sheringham

ROUND 3: Planned

Offshore Wind - Round 3 Zones

4 Hornsea SMart Wind Limited

East Anglia Offshore

12°0'0"W 8°0'0"W 4°0'0"W 0°0'0"

Offshore Wind - Round 3 Zones

16 New Burlington Place 6 Bell's Brae

with emphasis on the offshore capability.

Current SAR Provision

DfT co-­‐chairs the overarching UK SAR

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency

The terms of reference (TORs) for

The SAR Strategic Committee sits

UK SAR Operators Group and

There is consensus that the figure

Even with a further 20% of

Total Water Incident Figures for UK 2009

Source: WAID 2009

DF equip Direction Finding equipment MRCC Maritime Rescue Co-‐ordination Centre

DMSC District Marine Safety Committee MRSC Maritime Rescue Sub-‐Centre

FLIR Forward Looking Infrared RCC Rescue Co-‐ordination Centre

Captain Master of a ship or pilot-‐in-‐command of an aircraft, commanding

DfT co-‐chairs the overarching UK SAR

Maritime Rescue Co-‐ordination Centres

over the next 20 -‐25 years.