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G.R. No.

180394

September 29, 2008

MARJORIE B. CADIMAS, by her Attorney-In-Fact, VENANCIO Z. ROSALES,


vs.
MARITES CARRION and GEMMA HUGO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision 2 and Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98572. The appellate court set aside two orders 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 85, Quezon
City issued in Civil Case No. Q-04-53581 on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.
The instant petition stemmed from the complaint 5 for accion reivindicatoria and damages filed by petitioner Marjorie B. Cadimas, through her
attorney-in-fact, Venancio Z. Rosales, against respondents Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-04-53581 and raffled to Branch 85 of the RTC of Quezon City.
In the complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent Carrion were parties to a Contract To Sell dated 4 August 2003, wherein
petitioner sold to respondent Carrion a town house located at Lot 4-F-1-12 No. 23 Aster Street, West Fairview Park Subdivision, Quezon City
for the sum of P330,000.00 to be paid in installments. According to petitioner, Carrion had violated paragraph 8 of said contract when she
transferred ownership of the property to respondent Hugo under the guise of a special power of attorney, which authorized the latter to
manage and administer the property for and in behalf of respondent Carrion. Allegedly, petitioner asked respondent Carrion in writing to
explain the alleged violation but the latter ignored petitioners letter, prompting petitioner to demand in writing that Carrion and Hugo vacate
the property and to cancel the contract.6
On 28 October 2004, petitioner filed a Motion To Declare Defendant Marites Carrion In Default, 7 alleging that despite the service of summons
and a copy of the complaint, respondent Carrion failed to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period.
Respondent Hugo filed a Motion To Dismiss 8 on her behalf and on behalf of respondent Carrion on 18 November 2004, citing the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction to hear the case on the part of the RTC and estoppel and/or laches on the part of petitioner. Respondent Hugo argued that
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has jurisdiction over the complaint because ultimately, the sole issue to be resolved
was whether petitioner, as the owner and developer of the subdivision on which the subject property stood, was guilty of committing unsound
real estate business practices.
In the same motion, respondent Hugo averred that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Carrion for not
complying with Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court on the proper service of summons on a non-resident defendant. However, attached
to the motion was a special power of attorney, whereby respondent Carrion had authorized respondent Hugo, among others, to manage and
administer the subject property and to prosecute and defend all suits to protect her rights and interest in said property. 9
After petitioner filed a comment on the motion to dismiss, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order 10 on 21 March 2005, which denied the motion to
dismiss. The RTC held that the courts jurisdiction is not determined by the defenses set up in the answer or the motion to dismiss.
In the same omnibus order, the RTC ruled that summons was served properly, thus, the court had acquired jurisdiction over respondent
Carrion. The RTC noted that respondent Hugos failure to disclose at the outset that she was equipped with a special power of attorney was
an act constitutive of misleading the court. Thus, the RTC declared respondent Carrion in default, directed petitioner to present evidence exparte against respondent Carrion, and respondent Hugo to file an answer.
On 18 April 2005, respondent Hugo filed an answer on her behalf and as the attorney-in-fact of respondent Carrion. 11 The answer pleaded a
compulsory counterclaim for damages. The following day, petitioner presented evidence ex-parte against respondent Carrion. Thus, on 22
April 2005, respondent Hugo sought a reconsideration of the omnibus order, praying for the dismissal of the complaint, the cancellation of the
presentation of evidenceex-parte, the lifting of the order of default against respondent Carrion and the issuance of an order directing the
extraterritorial service of summons on respondent Carrion. 12
On 17 January 2007, the RTC issued an order, upholding its jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. Citing the interest of substantial justice,
the RTC lifted the order of default against respondent Carrion and set the pre-trial conference of the case.13
However, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari, praying that the Omnibus Order
dated 21 March 2005 and Order dated 17 January 2007 issued by Judge Teodoro T. Riel be reversed and set aside and that the complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-04-53581 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
On 27 September 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision granting respondents petition for certiorari. The appellate
court set aside the assailed orders of the RTC and ordered the dismissal of petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In its Resolution
dated 9 November 2007, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition, raising the following arguments: (1) based on the allegations in the complaint, the RTC has jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. Q-04-53581; (2) in any case, respondents have expressly submitted to or recognized the jurisdiction of the RTC by filing an answer
with counterclaim; and (3) respondents erroneously availed of a Rule 65 petition instead of filing a timely appeal from the order denying their
motion to dismiss.14
Principal issue: WON RTC has jurisdiction of the case. Essentially, petitioner argues that based on the allegations in the complaint and
the reliefs sought, the RTC has jurisdiction over the matter. In any case, the compulsory counterclaim pleaded in the answer of respondents
was an express recognition on their part of the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for accion reivindicatoria, petitioner adds.
Ruling: The petition is meritorious.
The NATURE OF AN ACTION AND THE JURISDICTION of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and
the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only
by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an
action.15
An examination of Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1344, 16 which enumerates the regulatory functions of the HLURB, 17
readily shows that its quasi-judicial function is limited to hearing only the following specific cases:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker, or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium
unit against the owner, developer, dealer or salesman.
The aforequoted provision must be read in the light of the statutes preamble or the introductory or preparatory clause that explains the
reasons for its enactment or the contextual basis for its interpretation. The scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the National
Housing Authority (NHA) [now HLURB] is indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs of the statute which provide:
"WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their
representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems
and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances,
and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value ."18
The boom in the real estate business all over the country resulted in more litigation between subdivision owners/developers and lot buyers
with the issue of the jurisdiction of the NHA or the HLURB over such controversies as against that of regular courts. In the cases that reached
this Court, the ruling has consistently been that the NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the
subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory
obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in. 19
Basis of SCs decision: We agree with the ruling of the RTC that it has jurisdiction over the case based on the allegations of the complaint.
Nothing in the complaint or in the contract to sell suggests that petitioner is the proper party to invoke the jurisdiction of the HLURB. There is
nothing in the allegations in the complaint or in the terms and conditions of the contract to sell that would suggest that the nature of the
controversy calls for the application of either P.D. No. 957 or P.D. No. 1344 insofar as the extent of the powers and duties of the HLURB is
concerned.
Note particularly paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1344 as worded, where the HLURBs jurisdiction concerns cases
commenced by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers. As to paragraph (a), concerning "unsound real estate practices," the logical
complainants would be the buyers and customers against the sellers (subdivision owners and developers or condominium builders and
realtors), and not vice versa.20
The complaint does not allege that petitioner is a subdivision lot buyer. The contract to sell does not contain clauses which would indicate
that petitioner has obligations in the capacity of a subdivision lot developer, owner or broker or salesman or a person engaged in real estate
business. From the face of the complaint and the contract to sell, petitioner is an ordinary seller of an interest in the subject property who is
seeking redress for the alleged violation of the terms of the contract to sell. Petitioners complaint alleged that a contract to sell over a

townhouse was entered into by and between petitioner and respondent Carrion and that the latter breached the contract when Carrion
transferred the same to respondent Hugo without petitioners consent. 21 Thus, petitioner sought cancellation of the contract and the recovery
of possession and ownership of the town house. Clearly, the complaint is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
In Javellana v. Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Manila,22 the Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for accion
publiciana and sum of money on the ground that the complaint did not allege that the subject lot was part of a subdivision project but that the
sale was an ordinary sale on an installment basis. Even the mere assertion that the defendant is a subdivision developer or that the subject
lot is a subdivision lot does not automatically vest jurisdiction on the HLURB. On its face, the complaint must sufficiently describe the lot as a
subdivision lot and sold by the defendant in his capacity as a subdivision developer to fall within the purview of P.D. No. 957 and P.D. No.
1344 and thus within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. 23
In their comment, respondents cite Antipolo Realty Corp. v. National Housing Authority,24 to bolster the argument that the HLURB has
jurisdiction over controversies involving the determination of the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot. Antipolo
Realty is not squarely applicable to the instant controversy. The issue in said case called for the determination of whether the developer
complied with its obligations to complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of time, a case that
clearly falls under Section 1, paragraph (c) of P.D. No. 1344.
In the instances where the jurisdiction of the HLURB was upheld, the allegations in the complaint clearly showed that the case involved the
determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. No. 957, 25 or the complaint for specific
performance sought to compel the subdivision developer to comply with its undertaking under the contract to sell, 26 or the claim by the
subdivision developer would have been properly pleaded as a counterclaim in the HLURB case filed by the buyer against the developer to
avoid splitting causes of action.27
The statement in Suntay v. Gocolay28 to the effect that P.D. No. 957 encompasses all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums,
which was cited by the Court of Appeals in the assailed decision, is a mere obiter dictum. As a matter of fact, the Court in Suntay nullified the
orders issued by the HLURB over the action for the annulment of an auction sale, cancellation of notice of levy and damages on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. P.D. No. 957 and P.D. No. 1344 were not the applicable laws because the action was brought against a condominium
buyer and not against the developer, seller, or broker contemplated under P.D. No. 1344. The action likewise involved the determination of
ownership over the disputed condominium unit, which by its nature does not fall under the classes of disputes cognizable by the HLURB
under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344.
The Court of Appeals held that the provision in the contract to sell mandating membership of the buyer of the housing unit in a housing
corporation was a strong indication that the property purchased by respondent Carrion from petitioner was part of a tract of land subdivided
primarily for residential purposes. Thus, the appellate court concluded that the HLURB has jurisdiction over the controversy because the
property subject thereof was part of a subdivision project.
Not every controversy involving a subdivision or condominium unit falls under the competence of the HLURB 29 in the same way that the mere
allegation of relationship between the parties, i.e., that of being subdivision owner/developer and subdivision lot buyer, does not
automatically vest jurisdiction in the HLURB. For an action to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element is the
nature of the action as enumerated in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344. 30 Notably, in Spouses Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court upheld the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for cancellation of the contract to sell of a subdivision house and lot because the case did not fall
under any of the cases mentioned in Section 1, P.D. No. 1344. In interpreting said provision, the Court explained, thus:
On this matter, we have consistently held that the concerned administrative agency, the National Housing Authority (NHA) before and now
the HLURB, has jurisdiction over complaints aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory
obligations.
For their part, respondents claim that the resolution of the case ultimately calls for the interpretation of the contract to sell and the
determination of whether petitioner is guilty of committing unsound real estate business practices, thus, the proper forum to hear and decide
the matter is the HLURB. The argument does not impress.
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of
the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a
necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon
the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted. 32 Thus, the allegations in
respondents motion to dismiss on the unsound real estate business practices allegedly committed by petitioner, even if proved to
be true, cannot serve to oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over actions for breach of contract and damages which has been conferred
to it by law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED and the Decision dated 27 September 2007 and Resolution dated 9
November 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98572 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders dated 21 March 2005 and
17 January 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-04-53581 are REINSTATED. The Regional Trial
Court is ORDERED to resume the proceedings in and decide Civil Case No. Q-04-53581 with deliberate speed. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.

GMA vs. ABS-CBN


Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. (GMA) filed on May 6, 2003 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
[1]

damages against respondents ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN), Central CATV, Inc. (SkyCable), Philippine Home Cable
Holdings, Inc. (Home Cable) and Pilipino Cable Corporation (Sun Cable), which was raffled to Branch 97 [2] and docketed as Civil Case
No. Q03-49500.
In its complaint, GMA alleged that respondents engaged in unfair competition when the cable companies arbitrarily re-channeled
petitioners cable television broadcast on February 1, 2003, in order to arrest and destroy its upswing performance in the television industry.
GMA argued that respondents were able to perpetrate such unfair business practice through a common ownership and interlocking
businesses. SkyCable and Sun Cable are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Sky Vision Corporation (Sky Vision) which is allegedly controlled by
Lopez, Inc. On the other hand, Home Cable is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Unilink Communications Corporation (Unilink), which is owned
by Mediaquest Holdings, Inc., a company controlled by the Pension Trust Fund of the PLDT Employees (PLDT Group).
Pursuant to a Master Consolidation Agreement, the ownership, rights and interests in Sky Vision and Unilink were purportedly placed
under a holding company known as Beyond Cable, 66.5 % of which is owned by the Benpres Group, composed of Lopez Inc., Benpres
Holdings and ABS-CBN, while 33.5% thereof is owned by the PLDT Group. As a result of this business combination, respondents have
cornered at least 71% of the total cable television market in Mega Manila. They are thus able to dictate the signal transmission, channel
position, and the airing of shows, programs, and broadcast of non-cable companies like ABS-CBN and GMA, which the law requires them to
carry.
GMA alleged that the re-channeling of its cable television broadcast resulted in damage to its business operations, thus:
...
17.
Following their arbitrary act of re-channeling the cable position of plaintiff GMA from Channel 12 to
Channel 14, the defendants SkyCable and Pilipino Cable (or Sun Cable) deliberately failed to transmit the signal of
plaintiff GMA to their channels in clear audio transmission resulting in noticeable dropouts and spillover of extraneous
sound and in clear visual transmission resulting in distorted and/or degraded visual presentation;
18.
Soon thereafter, numerous complaints of distortions, degradations and disorders of GMAs shows on
the cable channels were received by plaintiff GMA from subscribers of the defendant cable companies SkyCable,
Home Cable and Sun Cable, such as snowy reception, no signal, and no audio. These complaints escalated to
alarming proportions when plaintiff GMA made public the audio and visual distortions of its TV shows on the cable
channels;
19.
The audio disorder and the visual distortion and/or degradation of plaintiff GMAs signal transmission
happened mostly during the showing of plaintiff GMAs top rating programs;
19.1. These distortions did not occur in the cable TV shows of defendant ABS-CBN on
the channels of the co-defendant cable companies;
20.
It is a matter of common knowledge, and defendants are fully aware, that the quality of signal and
audio transmission and established channel position in cable TV of a non-cable television network, like plaintiff GMA,
are crucial factors in arriving at the ratings of the network and its programs and which ratings are, in turn, determinative
of the business judgment of commercial advertisers, producers and blocktimers to sign broadcast contracts with the
network, which contracts are the lifeblood of TV networks and stations like plaintiff GMA;
20.1. Defendants are also aware that 50% of so-called people meter which is a device
used by the ratings suppliers (AGB Philippines and AC Nielsen) to determine the ratings and
audience shares of TV programs are placed in cable TV.
20.2. These unjust, high-handed and unlawful acts of the defendants adversely affected
the viewership, quality of the programs, and ratings of plaintiff GMA for which defendants are
liable;
...
22.
As a result of defendants acts of unfair competition, corporate combinations and manipulations as
well as unjust, oppressive, high-handed and unlawful business practices, plaintiff suffered business interruptions and
injury in its operations for which it should be compensated in the amount of P10Million by way of actual and
compensatory damages[.][3]

On July 15, 2003, SkyCable and Sun Cable moved for dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of litis pendentia and forumshopping since there was a similar case pending before the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) entitled GMA Network, Inc. v.
Central CATV, Inc., Philippine Home Cable Holdings, Inc., and Pilipino Cable Corporation. The case, docketed as NTC ADM Case No. 2003085, allegedly involved the same cause of action and the same parties, except for ABS-CBN. SkyCable and Sun Cable also asserted that it
is the NTC that has primary jurisdiction over the issues raised in the complaint. Moreover, GMA had no cause of action against the two
entities and failed to exhaust administrative remedies. [4]
On July 17, 2003, Home Cable filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims[5] pleading, as affirmative defenses, the same
matters alleged in the motion to dismiss of SkyCable and Sun Cable.

ABS-CBN also filed an Answer with Compulsory

Counterclaims[6] contending that GMA had no cause of action against it and that the complaint failed to state any.
GMA opposed the motion to dismiss [7] and filed a Reply to the answer of Home Cable [8] and ABS-CBN.[9] A preliminary hearing
was held on the motion to dismiss as well as the affirmative defenses.
RTCs decision: In due course, the trial court issued the assailed resolution [10] dismissing the complaint. The trial court held that the
resolution of the legal issues raised in the complaint required the determination of highly technical, factual issues over which the NTC had
primary jurisdiction. Additionally, it held that GMA had no cause of action against ABS-CBN because:
... It is evident that plaintiffs cause of action is against the cable companies and not against ABS-CBN since it does not
establish that defendant ABS-CBN had a hand in the re-channeling of plaintiffs cable transmission because essentially
defendant ABS-CBN is similarly situated as plaintiff. The mere fact that the people behind ABS-CBN is allegedly the
same people who are at the helm of these cable companies, and thus were engaged in unfair competition and/or
unfair trade practices is a conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirement that the plaintiff state ultimate facts
in asserting its cause of action. [11]
Hence, this petition filed by GMA under Section 2(c), Rule 41 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asserting that:
Issues:
A
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE NTC HAS PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND IN DISMISSING THE CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
B
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST RESPONDENT ABS-CBN.[12]

GMA asserts that the resolution of the issues raised in the complaint does not entail highly technical matters requiring the expertise of
the NTC. Petitioner insists that the subject matter of the complaint merely involves respondents wrongful acts of unfair competition and/or
unfair trade practices resulting to damages, jurisdiction over which lies with the regular courts and not the NTC.
Ruling: We disagree.
GMAs complaint for damages is based on the alleged arbitrary re-channeling of its broadcast over the cable companies television
systems, thereby resulting in the distortion and degradation of its video and audio signals. The re-channeling was allegedly made possible
through the common ownership and interlocking businesses of respondent corporations and was designed to thwart petitioners upswing
performance in the television ratings game. In other words, the wrongful acts complained of and upon which the damages prayed for
are based, have to do with the operations and ownership of the cable companies. These factual matters undoubtedly pertain to the
NTC and not the regular courts.

That the matters complained of by GMA are within the NTCs exclusive domain can be discerned from the statutes governing the
broadcasting and cable television industry. Section 15 of Executive Order No. 546, [13] by which the NTC was created, provides for its general
functions as follows:
a.
Issue Certificate of Public Convenience for the operation of communications utilities and services,
radio communications systems, wire or wireless telephone or telegraph system, radio and television broadcasting
system and other similar public utilities;
b.
Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators of public service
communications; and determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation of such public utility facilities
and services except in cases where charges or rates are established by international bodies or associations of which
the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies recognized by the Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of
such charges or rates;
...
g.
Promulgate such rules and regulations, as public safety and interest may require, to encourage a
larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television broadcasting facilities, and to maintain effective
competition among private entities in these activities whenever the Commission finds it reasonably feasible[.]
In 1987, Executive Order No. 205 [14] was issued which empowers the NTC to grant certificates of authority for the operation of
cable antenna television system subject to the limitation that the authority to operate shall not infringe on the television and broadcast
markets. Executive Order No. 436 [15] issued in 1997, specifically vests the NTC with the sole power of regulation and supervision over the
cable television industry.
In Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[16] we held that the NTCs regulatory power over the broadcasting and cable television
industry extends to matters which are peculiarly within its competence. These include the: (1) determination of rates, (2) issuance of
certificates of authority, (3) establishment of areas of operation, (4) examination and assessment of the legal, technical and financial
qualifications of applicant operators, (5) granting of permits for the use of frequencies, ( 6) regulation of ownership and operation, (7)
adjudication of issues arising from its functions, and (8) other similar matters. [17] With respect to the foregoing, therefore, the NTC exercises
exclusive, original and primary jurisdiction to the exclusion of the regular courts.
In the case at bar, before the trial court can resolve the issue of whether GMA is entitled to an award of damages, it would have to
initially ascertain whether there was arbitrary re-channeling which distorted and downgraded GMAs signal. The ascertainment of these
facts, which relate to the operations of the cable companies, would require the application of technical standards imposed by the NTC as well
as determination of signal quality within the limitations imposed by the technical state of the art .[18] These factual questions would
necessarily entail specialized knowledge in the fields of communications technology and engineering which the courts do not possess. It is
the NTC which has the expertise and skills to deal with such matters.
The regulation of ownership of television and cable television companies is likewise within the exclusive concern of the NTC, pursuant
to its broader regulatory power of ensuring and promoting a larger and more effective use of communications, radio and television
broadcasting facilities in order that the public interest may well be served. The NTC is mandated to maintain effective competition among
private entities engaged in the operation of public service communications. It is also the agency tasked to grant certificates of authority to
cable television operators, provided that the same does not infringe on the television and broadcast markets.
As such, GMAs allegations of unlawful business combination and unjust business practices also properly pertain to the NTC. It is in
the best position to judge matters relating to the broadcasting industry as it is presumed to have an unparalleled understanding of its market
and commercial conditions. Moreover, it is the NTC that has the information, statistics and data peculiar to the television broadcasting
industry. It is thus the body that is ideally suited to act on petitioners allegations of market control and manipulation.
In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[19] the Court held that:
It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter
involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of
facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by
the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of
an administrative body; in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view[.][20]
Consequently, while it is true that the regular courts are possessed of general jurisdiction over actions for damages, it would
nonetheless be proper for the courts to yield its jurisdiction in favor of an administrative body when the determination of
underlying factual issues requires the special competence or knowledge of the latter. In this era of clogged court dockets,
administrative boards or commissions with special knowledge, experience and capability to promptly hear and determine disputes
on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, are well nigh
indispensable. Between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, therefore, the unmistakable trend is to refer it to
the former.[21]
In this regard, we note that there is a pending case before the NTC in which the factual issues raised in petitioners complaint have
also been pleaded. Although petitioner prays in the NTC case for the administrative remedy of cancellation of the cable companies
certificates of authority, licenses and permits, it is inevitable that, in granting or denying this prayer, the NTC would have to pass upon the
same factual issues posed in petitioners complaint before the trial court. The latter was thus correct in applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction if only to avoid conflicting factual findings between the court and the NTC.
Finally, the complaint failed to state a cause of action against ABS-CBN and the other respondents, considering that the ultimate facts
upon which the complaint for damages depends fall within the technical competence of an administrative body. Otherwise stated, pending
determination by the NTC of the factual questions involved in the case, petitioners complaint, which is founded upon such factual issues,
would be premature.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed resolution dated October 30, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 97, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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