Ethics Digests Compiled

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
1 LEDESMA V CLIMACO
FACTS:
Ledesma is counsel de parte of one accused. Thereafter, he was appointed as
Election Registrar of Cadiz, Negros Occidental by COMELEC
Ledesma withdrew as counsel on the basis that his appointment as Election Registrar
would require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work will
prevent him from handling adequately the defense.
Judge Climaco denied his motion, and even appointed him as counsel de officio of the
accused.
ISSUE: WoN the withdrawal of Ledesma should be allowed
HELD: No.
RATIO:
1. There is obvious reluctance of Ledesma to comply with his responsibilities as counsel
de oficio. Then, even assuming that he continues his position, his volume of work is
likely to be very much less than present. There is no excuse for him to shirk from his
obligation as member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill.
2. Ledesma was not mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to know that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. Being appointed as
counsel de oficio requires a high degree of fidelity (law is a profession and not a mere
trade). Requires counsel of repute and eminence.
3. In criminal cases, right to counsel is absolute. No fair hearing unless the accused be
given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
4. The denial by Judge Climaco was due to the principal effect to delay the case (case
has already been postponed for 8 times)
2 IN RE SYCIP
FACTS:
This is a consolidated petition. The first one filed by the surviving partners of atty.
Alexander Sycip and the other filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ovaepa.
They pray that they be allowed to continue using the names of partners who had
passed away.
Petitioners based their petitions on the following arguments:
o Art. 1840 of the Civil Code,
o in regulating other professions, the legislature has authorized the adoption of
firm names without any restriction as to the use of the name of a deceased
partner,
o the Canons of Professional Ethics allows the continued use of a deceased
partner when permissible by local custom.
Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

Lopez, Mendiola, Morada, Rivas, Sarenas 2C
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
ISSUE:
W/N law firms may continue to use the names o deceased partners in their firm names
HELD:
NO!
Art. 1840 primarily deals with the exception of liability on cases of a dissolved
partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by
the person who continues the business using the partnership name. what the law
contemplates is a hold over situation preparatory to formal reorganization. Art. 1840
treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect rather than a
professional partnership whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its
individual members.
A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. a partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity.
It is not a partnership formed for then purpose of carrying on trade or business or of
holding property. Thus, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. The right
to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or
franchise.
It must be considered that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the
continued use of a deceased partners name. Therefore, the cited provision on
Canons of Professional Ethics is not applicable.
DISSENTING OPINION:
Petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the
2 firms that Sycip and Ovaepa are dead or the period when they served as partners
sould be stated therein.
3 CAYETANO V MONSOD
Facts:
Pres. Aquino nominated Christian Monsod to the position of COMELEC chairman.
The Commission on Appointments affirmed the nomination and appointed Monsod to
the position.
Renato Cayetano now assails the appointment. He says that Monsod is not qualified
to the position because he has not been engaged in the practice of law for ten years
(requirement is provided by Consti Art. 9-C Sec. 1(1)).
Issue:
W/n Monsod is qualified for the position of COMELEC chairman.
Held:
SC says yes. Monsod passed the bar in 1960 and had been consistently paying his
professional fees. He worked in a law firm for several years after graduating but after
that, had been more engaged in business and politics (for a list of his jobs, see p.238).
Still, the SC said that he can still be considered as practicing law, if we consider the
modern concept of the practice of law. This modern concept pertains to any act,

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
whether in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.
SC now says that since most of Monsods jobs involved the law, even if he has not
been engaged in traditional lawyering (i.e. making pleadings or appearing in court), he
can still be considered as to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Dissents:
Most of the dissents focused on the issue that the Consti requirement pertains to
habitual practice of law. The dissenters pointed out that for the past ten years,
Monsod really seldom practiced law. This group believed that the Consti required that
the practice of law be on a regular basis. Justice Padilla even came up with
qualifications habituality; compensation; application of law, legal principle, practice or
procedure; and atty.-client relationship to determine w/n a person has been engaged
in the practice of law..
4 CUI V CUI
Facts:
The main concern in this case is the respective qualifications of Jesus Cui and Antonio
Cui to the position of administrator of Hospicio de San Jose de Barii, a charitable
institution established by Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui.
Jesus and Antonio are the sons of Mariano Cui, a nephew of the founders of the
institution. Antonios claim to the position is based on a convenio where then
administrator Teodoro resigned in favor of him. Jesus, however, had no prior notice of
this.
Jesuss claim is that he should be preferred pursuant to the deed of donation (which
recognized their father Mariano as a legitimate descendant to the position) as he is the
older of the two.
The deed, however, gives preference to a descendant who has a titulo de abogado
or a doctor, or a civil engineer, or a pharmacist (in order). Or to the one who pays the
highest taxes. Jesus holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws but is not a member of the
Bar, while Antonio is a member of the Bar (he was formerly disbarred, though, by the
SC and was just reinstated weeks before assuming the position)
Issue:
Who has a better right to the position of administrator between Jose and Antonio?
What does the term titulo de abogado mean?
Held:
Antonio. The term titulo de abogado is not just mere possession of the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws but membership in the bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one to
the practice of law. Possession of the degree is not indispensable to qualify as a lawyer since
completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way.
It was also argued that Antonio is disqualified for having been previously disbarred since the
deed also provided that an administrator may be removed if found to lack a sound moral
character. However, Antonio was reinstated. This reinstatement is a recognition of his moral
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
rehabilitation after proving what was required by the Bar. Antonios restoration to the roll of
lawyers wiped out restrictions and disabilities resulting from the previous disbarment.
5 ALAWI V ALAUYA
PARTIES
ALAWI, sales rep of E.B. Villarosa
ALAUYA, incumbent executive clerk of court
FACTS
Through ALAWIS agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments
by ALAUYA of a housing unit
A housing loan was also granted to ALAUYA by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC)
Subsequently, ALAUYA wrote a letter to the President of Villarosa advising termination
of his contract on the grounds that his consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by ALAWI and
proceeded to expound using acerbic language
A copy of the letter, which bore no stamps, was sent to the VP of Villarosa
ALAUYA also wrote the NHMFC repudiating as void his contract with Villarosa and
asking for cancellation of his loan
Finally, ALAUYA wrote 3 other letters to officers of the SC to stop deductions from his
salary regarding the loan from NHMFC
NHMFC also wrote the SC requesting it to stop said deductions
Learning of the letters, ALAWI filed a complaint alleging that ALAUYA
o Committed malicious and libelous charges
o Usurped the title of attorney
ISSUE
W/N ALAUYA VIOLATED THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL

STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
HELD
YES, PARTICULARLY SECTION 4
RATIO
Section 4 public officials and employees at all times respect the rights of others, and
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, public order, public safety and public interest
ALAUYA, being a member of the Sharia Bar and an officer of the Court, may not use
language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing or otherwise improper
His radical deviation from these norms cannot be excused
ISSUE
W/N ALAUYA BEING A MEMBER OF THE SHARIA BAR CAN USE THE TITLE
ATTORNEY
HELD
NO, RESERVED ONLY FOR THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS

MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
RATIO
Court has already had an occasion to declare that persons who pass the Sharia Bar
are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar and may practice law only before
Sharia courts
ALAUYAS wish of not using counsellor because of confusion with councilor is
immaterial because disinclination to use said title does not warrant his use of the title
attorney
6 IN RE CUNANAN
Facts:
This is the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 case.
As per the Rules of Court. A bar candidate must have a general average of 75% in all
subjects without failing below 50% in any subject.
In spite of this, the court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained
an average of only:
72% in 1946
69% in 1947
70% in 1948
74% in 1949
In 1950 to 53, the 74% was raised to 75%
A few candidates who missed the above marks set by the courts approached Congress.
Congress made a bill, which was allowed by the president to become a law without his
signature. This is RA 972.
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951,
70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and
73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office
as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of
75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950.
A breakdown of the numbers is on page 538.
The additional candidates who want to be admitted claim that they suffered from insufficiency
of reading materials and of inadequacy of preparation.
Issue:
W/N RA 972 is valid.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held:
RA 972 is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession. The public interest
demands of the legal profession, adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as
legal problems evolved by the times become more difficult.
In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a
general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in
mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a
judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the years affecting the bar
candidates concerned
Although the SC certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is
no less certain that only the SC, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may
be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its
functions, as in this case.
Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but the
authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys-at-law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
"Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish
increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject
to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall
have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."
The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and the SC equal responsibilities concerning
the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes continue to reside in the SC.
Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would
have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it.
The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or
reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law.
Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if
according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and
reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
There is no motive stated by the authorities for the qualification in RA 972 because of this, the
classification is fatally defective.
1.
That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of
1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and
without force and effect.
2.
That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is
valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the
Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have
filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be
permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on
the date or dates that the Chief Justice may set.
7 ECHEGARAY V SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
pp. 111-112
The 1973 Constitution
Article X, Sec5 (5):
The 1987 Constitution

Article VIII, Sec5 (5):
The Supreme Court shall have the

following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission in the practice of law, and the
integration of the Bar, which, however,
may
be
repealed,
altered,
or
supplemented
by
the
Batasang
Pambensa. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform in all courts of the same grade and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive
rights.
The Supreme Court shall have the

following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the
protection
and
enforcement
of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, the admission
in the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,
and
legal
assistance
to
the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform in all courts of the same grade and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
The 1987 molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. It expanded the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court. For the first time, the court was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power
of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure.
8 IN RE GUTIERREZ
In re Gutierrez
Facts:
Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar. While he was the municipal mayor of
Calapan, he and other co-conspirators murdered the former municipal mayor of Calapan, for
which they were held guilty and sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by the
Supreme court the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the
sentence, Gutierrez was granted conditional pardon by the President. The unexecuted
portion of the prison term was remitted on condition that the shall not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippines.
The widow of the murdered victim then filed a complaint with the Supreme Court asking
that Gutierrez
be removed from the rule of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5.
Issue: W/N the conditional pardon to Gutierrez places him beyond the rule of disbarment
Held: NO.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. Moral turpitude
includes everything contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
In the Lontok case, on which Gutierrez relies, the respondent, Lontok, was granted
absolute or unconditional pardon after conviction for the crime of crime of bigamy. It
was held that such pardon releases the punishment and blots out existence of guilt, so
that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense.
In the case at bar, the pardon granted was conditional, and merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of his term. It was not a full pardon which could have blotted out
the offense committed.
The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in
band, by taking advantage of his official position, and with the use of a motor vehicle.
The degree of moral turpitude warrants disbarment. Admission of a candidate to the
bar requires academic preparation and satisfactorytestimonials of good moral
character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission:
the lawyer must adhere to them or incur the risk of suspension or removal.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
9 ROYONG v OBLENA
FACTS:
Royong, the niece it the common-law wife of Oblena, filed a rape case against the
latter.
In her complaint, Royong alleged that in 1958 Oblena forced her to have intercourse
with her and that she refrained to report the incident because Oblena threatened to kill
her family.
As a result if the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to a child
Oblena denied all the allegations and argued that he and Royong had a relationship
and Royong consented to have intercourse with him.
The Solicitor General recommended that Oblena be permanently removed from the
roll of attorney eventhough the acts of the Royong before and after the rape incident
showed that she is more of a sweetheart than a victim because of the circumstances
behind the incident
The Solicitor General also charged Oblena of falsifying and deliberately alleging in his
application in the bar in1958 that he is a person of good moral character while having
an illicit and adulterous relationship with Angeles who is not only the aunt of Royong
but also has a legal husband in the province
Oblena moved to dismiss the case because the offenses charged are different from
those originally charged in the complaint but the court overruled his petition
After the hearing, the investigators concluded that A.) Oblena used his knowledge in
law to commit immoral acts without incurring any criminal liability; B.) he committed
gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with Angeles, his common-law wife, even
after he became a lawyer and C.) Oblena falsified the truth as to his good moral
character in his application to take the bar.
ISSUE:
W/N the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation with Angeles, a
married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause Oblenas disbarment
HELD:
YES!
Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape, seduction or adultery and he
is not guilty of any of the grounds for disbarment enumerated in Sec 25, Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court, the enumeration is not exclusive and the power of the court to
exclude unworthy members of the bar is inherent and is a necessary incident to the
proper administration of justice and can be exercised even without any statutory
authority, in all cases unless properly prohibited by statutes.
American jurisprudence provides that the continued possession of a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law. The
loss requires suspension or disbarment eventhough the statues do not explicitly
specify that as a ground of disbarment.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Oblenas argument that he believed himself to be a person with good moral character
when he filed his application to take the bar examination is wrong. Ones own
approximation of himself is not a gauge of his moral character. Moral character is not
a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is
what the person really is and not what he other people thinks he is.
His pretension to wait for the 18th birthday of Royong before having carnal knowledge
with her shows the scheming mind of Oblena and his taking advantage of his
knowledge of the law.
Also, Royong is the niece of his common-law wife and he enjoyed moral ascendancy
over her. Oblena took advantage of Royongs trust on him.
Oblenas contention that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the
present complain which is entirely different from the original complaint filed is
untenable. There is nothing in the law requiring the Solicitor General to charge in his
complaint the same offence charged in the original complaint. What the law provides
is that if the Solicitor General finds sufficient grounds to proceed against the
respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint accompanied by the evidence
introduced in his investigation.
10 CORDON v BALICANTA
(complaint for disbarment against Balicanta)
Facts:
Cordon and her daughter inherited 21 parcels of land in Zamboanga City when
Cordons husband died.
Sometime after, Balicanta enticed Cordon to organize a corporation to develop the
properties. 19 parcels of land was transferred in the name of the newly formed
corporation. Balicanta became the Chairman of the Board, President, General
Manager and Treasurer of the corporation (kupal talaga)
Balicanta was able to transfer some of the land to a certain Tion Suy Ong through an
SPA signed by Cordon. Balicanta was also able to obtain a loan from Land Bank using
as collateral 9 parcels of land.
Balicanta did not even try to redeem the properties and even sold the right to redeem
to another person.
Gago talaga to si Balicanta. Cordons ancestral home was demolished and Cordon
was detained in a nipa shack. Buti na lang at nadiscover ni daughter kung ano
nangyari. Sabi kasi ni Balicanta na hes just going to have the house remodeled and
repainted, tapos dinemolish na niya. Gago talaga.
Cordon and daughter demanded that Balicanta return all the properties given by them
to the corporation but Balicanta is unable to do so (napunta na sa ibang tao eh)
IBP investigation recommended that Balicanta be disbarred. Balicanta fought back and
said that the investigation is prejudiced against him and filed a complaint for
disbarment against the people who investigated his case and the lawyers of Cordon.
Balicantas complaint was dismissed.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Issue:
W/N Balicanta should be disbarred
Held:
Hello?! Siyempre he should be disbarred.
Balicanta cannot invoke the separate personality of the corporation (wow, piercing the
corporate veil)
Balicanta has perpetuated massive fraud against his client.
Lahat ng ginawa niya against The Code of Professional Responsibility.
11 TING-DUMALI v TORRES
FACTS:
Isidra Ting-Dumali charges Rolando Torres with violating his oath as a lawyer and
canons of legal and judicial ethics.
Isidras parents died intestate and left many parcels of land to their 6 children (Isidra,
Marcelina, Miriam, Eliseo and Vicente and Felicisima (married to Rolando Torres))
Torres consented to the forgery of Isidras signature for an Extrajudicial settlement
making it appear that his wife and Miriam were the only sole heirs.
Torres, on a reconstitution hearing, presented false testimony that Miriam and
Felicisima were the only sole heirs
Torres presented the reconstituted deed to the RD to enable them to profit by selling
the land
Torres contends that his acts were done in good faith believing for himself that his and
the siblings had already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. That the false
testimony was a clear oversight. And that his conformity through his signature was pro
forma because the property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife.
Investigating Commissioner of IBP suggested disbarment
ISSUE: WoN Torres should be disbarred?
HELD: YES
RATIO:
1. The lawyers oath, to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to
dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law to be forgotten afterwards, nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a
sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times.
2. A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has
entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice, he should make
himself more an exemplar for others to emulate and he should make himself more an
exemplar for others to emulate and he should not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
3. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar.
12 MACARRUBO v MACARRUBO
Facts:
Florence Macarrubo by herself and on behalf of her 2 children files a complaint for
disbarment against Edmundo Macarrubo alleging that Edmundo deceived her
into marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza.
Florence further averred that Edmundo entered into a 3rd marriage with Josephine
Constantino; and that he abandoned Florence without providing them w/ regular
support.
Edmundo denied the allegations, insisting instead that complainant Florence was fully aware
of his prior subsisting marriage, but that Florence dragged Edmundo against his will to a
'sham wedding'.
Edmundo submitted the decision of RTC declaring his marriage to complainant void ab initio.
Edmundo claimed that he left complainant and their 2 children w/ her consent.
Issue:
W/n Edmundo should be disbarred...
Held:
Yes.
Facts show that while Edmundo has a subsisting marriage w/ Helen Esparza s/ whom he had
2 children, he entered into a 2nd marriage with complainant. While the
marriage between complainant Florence and Edmundo has been annulled by final judgment,
this does not cleanse his conduct of impropriety.
Even assuming arguendo that Edmunod was coerced by complainant to marry her, the
duress has ceased after wedding day. Edmundo having freely cohabited with her
and even begot a 2nd child.
The decision of RTC annulling their marriage is not res judicata on the final resolution of this
case. A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court on the conduct of its officers.
13 SICAT v ARIOLA
Facts:

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Arturo Sicat, Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Rizal charged Atty.
Gregorio E. Ariola of committing fraud, deceit, and falsehood in notarizing a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA).
Said SPA was purportedly executed by Juanito Benitez, of the JC Benitez Architect
and Technical Management. Said company had a contract with the Municipality of
Cainta for the construction of low cost houses.
What is fraudulent about it is the fact that the SPA was notarized more than 2 months
after the death of Benitez, the person who supposedly executed it.
P3,700T was paid to JC Benitez Architect and Technical Management for services not
rendered (as consultants).
Ariola claims that the document he notarized was superfluous and unnecessary, and
prejudiced no one, and therefore he should be exonerated the document was
cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence legally there was no public document
that existed.
Issue:
W/N Ariola can be held liable.
Held:
Yes.
Notaries public should not authenticate documents unless the persons who signed
them are the very same persons who executed them an personally appeared before
the, to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
His assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most
cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast suspicion on the
truthfulness of every notarial act.
Ariola is disbarred, and not merely suspended for a year.
14 CHUA v MESINA, Jr
Facts:
Atty Simeon Mesina is the legal counsel of spouses Anna Chua and Chua An. The
spouses leased a building owned by Mesinas family. The property, however, was
actually mortgaged in favor of a bank for a loan obtained by Mesinas mother
Felicisima Melencio (who was the registered owner as well).
When Felicisima failed to meet her obligations to the bank, the spouses were
convinced by Mesina to help his mother in consideration for the purchase of the same
lot at a certain price. A deed of sale was made conveying the property to the spouses.
But when the spouses were appraised for capital gains tax, Atty Mesina suggested to
execute another deed of salethis time, the date of the transaction is 1979, which is
before the effectivity of the law imposing capital gains tax.
Not long after the title was handed over to the spouses, another lessee of the building
Tecsonquestioned the transaction as he was, himself, interested in buying the
property. Tecson filed charges for falsification of documents.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
To avoid the falsification charge, Mesina proposed to simulate a deed of sale wherein
the spouses would appear to resell the property to Felicisima. A new title was issued to
Felicisima by virtue of said deed but this was entrusted in the hands of the spouses.
Later on, Tecson desisted from pursuing the charges. Meanwhile, Mesina borrowed
the title of the property from the spouses and promised to transfer, yet again, title in
the name of the spouses.
But Mesina failed to effect such transfer and the spouses learned that the property is
being offered to a public sale. Hence the action. The case was investigated by the IBP
and recommended that Mesina be suspended for gross misconduct.
Issue:
Was Atty. Mesina guilty of gross misconduct?
Held:
Blimey! Of course! When Atty Mesina advised Chua to execute a deed of sale antedated to
1979 to evade payment of capital gains tax, he violated his duty to promote respect for law
and legal processes. When he convinced Chua to execute another deed to make it appear
that the property was conveyed back to Felicisima, Mesina committed dishonesty. And when
he obtained the title upon the misrepresentation that he will return the same after 4 months,
he committed dishonesty again. There were also badges of fraud that can be attributed to
Mesina as there were marked differences in the signatures of Felicisima.
Clearly, Mesina violated his oath of office and Canons 1, 7, 15, and 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His disbarment is warranted.
15 DE YSASI III v NLRC
FACTS
This is a case filed by a son against his father
Father employed Son as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao
Son suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on 2 separate occasions, June and
August 1982
Father took care of medical expenses while son continued to receive compensation
However, in April 1984, Father ceased to pay Sons salary
Son filed an action in NLRC for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and payment of full
back wages
NLRC dismissed case stating that Son has abandoned his work and termination is for a
valid cause though ordered Father to pay P5,000 as penalty for failure to serve notice
of said termination to son
ISSUE
W/N SON WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED

LEGAL ETHICS
HELD
2nd Sem 2005-2006
YES
RATIO
Article 282 of Labor Code enumerates causes for which an employer may valid
terminate an employment
Father banks on the fact that Son has abandoned his work
However, to constitute abandonment there must be a clear, deliberate and justified
refusal to resume employment and not mere absence
In the case at bar, the reason for the Sons absence was due to his illness of which
Father was aware of since he paid hospital and medical bills
Father is ordered to pay Son backwages in lieu of reinstatement and separation pay
equivalent to 1 month for every year of service
ISSUE
W/N COUNSELS OF EACH PARTY ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
HELD
NO
RATIO
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Responsibility explicitly provides a lawyer shall encourage his
client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement
In the case at bar, records do not show that counsel of both parties took pains to initiate
steps geared toward a rapprochment between their clients
In the same manner, the labor arbiter has been less than faithful to the spirit of the Labor
Code as he did not exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of the labor dispute
16 PEOPLE v ROSQUETA
Facts:
There was a criminal case against Antonio Rosqueta, Jr., Eugenio Rosqueta and Citong
Bringas. On appeal, the SC issued a resolution ordering Atty. Gregorio Estacio (counsel
de parte of the accused) to explain why disciplinary actions should not be taken against
him for his failure to file the brief for appellants during the required period.
Estacio failed to explain, so he was suspended from the practice of law.
He then filed a motion for reconsideration saying that he did file the briefs but he sent it
to Rosqueta Sr., whose house was burned down along with the briefs. He also said that
the reason why he did not file the briefs was because the accused declared that they
intended t withdraw their appeal for lack of money.
The SC did subsequently receive affidavits from the accused withdrawing their appeal.
Issue:
W/n Estacios acts should be punished.
Held:
SC says yes. His acts were not consistent with the idea that the law is not a business
but a profession. Lawyers do their job not for the sole consideration of money. Estacio

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
should have continued with his duties despite knowing that the accused did not have
money anymore.
SC commended what some lawyers would have done in that situation which was to be
declared as counsel de officio so that the client remains properly represented by a
lawyer who is already familiar with the case.
SC said that Estacios suspension for 5 mos. is already sufficient punishment for his
acts. Thus, the suspension is lifted and Estacio is not anymore required to file the briefs
but he is censured for negligence and inattention to duty.
17 CANOY v ORTIZ
Facts: A Complaint was filed Canoy accusing Atty. Ortiz of misconduct and malpractice. It
was alleged that Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Coca Cola
Philippines. Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy in this proceeding. Canoy
submitted all the documents and records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position
paper. Thereafter, he made several unfruitful visits to the office of Atty. Ortiz to follow-up
the progress of the case. He was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually
dismissed way back in 1998, for failure to prosecute, the parties not having submitted
their position papers. Canoy alleged that Ortiz had never communicated to him about
the status of the case.
Atty. Ortiz informs the Court that he has mostly catered to indigent and lowincome clients, at considerable financial sacrifice to himself. Atty. Ortiz admits that the
period within which to file the position paper had already lapsed. He attributes this
failure to timely file the position paper to the fact that after his election as Councilor of
Bacolod City, he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local
government official and as a practicing lawyer.
Issue: W/N Atty. is liable to be sanctioned.
Held: Atty. Ortiz is to be sanctioned. Suspension from the practice of law for one (1) month.
Several of the canons and rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility guard
against the sort of conduct.
CANON 18A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for
information.
His failure to do so constitutes a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He owes entire devotion to the
interest of the client. The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is
ever present the need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the
developments of the case and should not be left in the dark.
Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty. Ortizs election as a
City Councilor of Bacolod City, as his adoption of these additional duties does not
exonerate him of his negligent behavior.
18 PEOPLE v STA TERESA
Facts:
Angeles Sta. Teresa was found by the trial court to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
raping his 12-year old daughter, and was given the penalty of death. The case is now on
automatic review.
When accused was arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. After 9 days, his counsel de oficio made
a manifestation that the accused wanted to change his plea to guilty. The prosecution no
longer presented testimonial evidence and merely presented exhibits to which counsel de
oficio did not comment nor object. During the promulgation of RTCs decision, counsel failed
to appear and the trial judge had to appoint
another counsel de oficio for the purpose of promulgation.
Issue: W/N counsel de officio discharged his duties properly
Held: NO.
The abbreviated and aborted presentation of the prosecution evidence and the
improvident plea of guilty was not in accordance with requirements of due process
Considering the gravity of the offense charged and the finality of the penalty, the counsel
de oficios performance was utterly wanting. As a lawyer sworn to uphold justice and the
law, he had the duty to exert utmost efforts to defend his client and protect his rights, no
matter how guilty or evil he appears to be. This duty becomes more compelling is his
client is accused of a grave crime and is in danger of forfeiting his life
The right to counsel means more that just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or
the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. Counsel must provide
effective legal assistance and commit himself to the cause for the defense. There must
be active involvement by the lawyer and he must be well-versed on the case, the
procedures, law, and jurisprudence.
19 KHAN V SIMBILLO
FACTS:
An advertisement in Philippine Daily Inquirer came out which reads: ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE SPECIALIST 532-4333/521-2667.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
SC ordered its staff to call the number and ask some information.
Espeleta called the number and the wife of Atty. Rizalino Simbillo answered who said
that his husband was an expert in handling annulment cases and guarantees a court
decree within 4-6 month. The services of Atty. Simbillo is for P48,000. half of which is
payable at the filing of the case and the balance after the decision has been rendered.
Similar advertisement also appeared in The Philippine Star and Manila Bulletin.
Khan, Assist. Court Administrator, filed a case against Simbillo for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Rule 2.03 and 3.01.
Simbillo admitted that he caused the advertisement but he argued that solicitation and
advertisement is not prohibited per se and that it is about time to change our views
about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation. He also said that the interest of
the public is not served by the prohibition and suggested that the ban be lifted.
IBP recommended that Simbillo be suspended for 1 year and that repetition of similar
act will be dealt with more severely.
While the case was being investigated upon by the court, Simbillo again advertised his
legal services, for 2 times, in the Buy & Sell Free Ads Magazine.
ISSUE:
W/N Simbillo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
YES!
Rule 2.03 provides a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business while Rule 3.01 states that a lawyer shall not use or
permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, selflaudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a
profession in which the duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
The gaining of livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
Aside from advertising himself as an Annulment of Marriage Specialist, his
assurance of his clients that an annulment may be obtained in 4-6 months from the
filing of the case encourages people, who might other have 2 nd thought, to dissolve
their marriage.
Solicitation of legal business is not proscribed. However, solicitation must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. The use of simple signs stating the
name/s of the lawyers, the office and residence address and the fields of expertise, as
well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible.
The use of calling cards is now acceptable.
20 IN RE TAGORDA
Facts:
Luis Tagorda is a member of the provincial board of Isabela
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Previous to the last election, he used placards which in a way was advertising his
services as a lawyer and notary public
He also wrote a letter to a lieutenant of a barrio in Echague,Isabela. In essence he
was informing the lieutenant that he will be in Echague during the weekends and the
lieutenant should convey this information to the other people in his town.
Issue:
W/N the acts of Tagorda is advertising
Held:
Yes, Tagorda is in a way advertising his services and this is contrary to the Canons of
Professional Ethics (wala pa yung code of professional responsibility, 1929 case to)
The most worthy and effective advertising for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity.
Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications
or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring lawsuit.
Solicitation of cases result in the lowering of the confidence of the community and
integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigations and in incenting to
strife.
Tagorda suspended for a month.
21 DIR OF LEGAL AFFAIRS V BAYOT
FACTS:
Bayot was charged with malpractice by publishing Marriagelicense promptly secured

thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and
marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor.
Everything confidential. In the Sunday Tribune
Bayot first denied the publication but later on admitted, and asked for mitigation
saying:
o I only did it once. I wont repeat it again!
o I never had any case by reason of the publication
ISSUE: WoN Bayot can be charged with malpractice?

HELD: YES.
1. The publication is tantamount to a solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or

skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade.
2. In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of
law for the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the
public by writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this
because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and
insistent..Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the
misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be,
as he hereby is, reprimanded.
3. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.)
22 ULEP V LEGAL CLINIC
FACTS:
Ulep prays the Supreme Court to order the Legal Clinic to cease, issuing
advertisement similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes A and B (p381).
Legal Clinic admits the facts of publication of said advertisement that claims that it is
not engage in the practice of law but in the rendering of legal support services through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machine.
ISSUE:
W/N the services offered by Legal Clinic as advertised by it constitutes practice of law
Whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisement complained of
HELD:
According to the IBP, notwithstanding the manner by which respondent endeavored to
distinguish the 2 terms, legal support services and legal services, common sense
would readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. The
use of the name the Legal Clinic gives the impression that the respondent corporation
is being managed by lawyers and that it renders legal services. The advertisement in
question is meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public
order and public policy. This is in violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.02 that is counseling
illegal activities.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court which requires that application of
law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. Applying the case
Cayetano vs. Monsod, the court agrees that the activities of the respondent Legal
Clinic constitute the practice of law. Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact
that respondent does not represent clients in court since law practice is not limited
merely to court appearances.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Regarding the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Profession Responsibility provides that a lawyer, in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, and objective information or statement of facts. The
proscription against advertising of legal services rests on the fundamental postulate
that the practice of law is a profession.
Exceptions:
o Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canon
o Ordinary, simple professional card. The card may contain only the statement of
his name, the law firm, address and branch of law practiced.
Considering that Atty. Nogales who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and
proprietor of the legal clinic is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby
reprimanded with a warning that the repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
23 SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS V ROMANILLOS

Facts:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Roberto Romanillos, for representing conflicting
interests and for using the title Judge despite having been found guilty of grave and
serious misconduct (in Zarate v Romanillos).
Apparently, Romanillos was previously an active board member as corporate secretary
of Durano Corp. Inc. (DCI). But it allowed itself to represent San Jose Homeowners
Association, Inc (SJHAI) before the human Settlements Regulation Commission in a
case against the same DCI.
Irrelevant info: the case above was an alleged violation of DCI of the Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protection Act. DCI sold a land designated as a school site,
without disclosing it as such. (page 106)
When SJHAIs petition over the land was denied, the SJHAIs Board terminated
Romanillos services.
Also, Romanillos acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for
DCI.
Thus, a disbarment case was filed for conflicting interests.
The IBP handled the case, but he was merely reprimanded.
In spite of this, he still continued to serve as counsel for Durano-Rodriguez. Thus, a
second disbarment case was filed. It also included his use of judge although he was
found guilty of grave and serious misconduct.
Issue:
W/N Romanillos should be disbarred
Held:
Yes.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
It is inconsequential that SJHAI never questioned the propriety of respondents

continued representation of Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean
consent. As long as the lawyer represents 2 or more opposing clients, he is guilty of
violating his oath.
His continued use of judge violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01. The penalty imposed on
him in the Zarate case forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges:
including the title judge. (he was a judge before, but he resigned instead of being
booted out)
The title judge should be reserved only to judges, incumbent and retired, an not to
those who were dishonorably discharged from the service.
24 DIMATULAC v VILLON
Facts:
In the prosecution of the Yabuts for the murder of Dimatulac, the Office of the Public
Prosecutor (particularly the Asst Prosecutor) and two Judges (who handled the case)
committed serious procedural flaws resulting in the impairment of due process
(prejudicial to both the offended party and the accused).
Procedural irregularities in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor:
o Warrants of arrest were issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended, but
the Yabuts were not arrested or were never brought unto the custody of the law.
Yet, Asst Fiscal Alfonso-Reyes conducted a reinvestigation. Though a
prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation (and conduct his own), the circumstance that the
accused waived the filing of their counter-affidavits left Alfonso-Reyes no other
choice but to sustain the MCTC findingswhich she did not do. And later on,
Alfonso-Reyes allowed the Yabuts to file their counter-affidavits without first
demanding that they surrender by virtue of the standing warrants of arrest.
o Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of 20k for the Yabuts despite the fact that
they were charged of homicide and that they were fugitives from justice (having
avoided service of warrant of arrest).
o Alfonso-Reyes was aware of the private prosecutions appeal to the DOJ from
her resolution. (The subsequent resolution of the DOJ Secretary exposed her
blatant errors.) And despite the pending appeal, she filed the Information. It
would be more prudent to wait for the DOJ resolution.
o Office of the Prosecutor did not even inform the trial court of the pending
appeal to the DOJ Secretary.
Judge Rouras procedural lapses:
o Deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until such time
that all the accused who are out on bail are arraigned
o Denied the motion to defer proceedings for the reason that private prosecution
has not shown any indication that the appeal was given due course by DOJ
Judge Villons procedural lapses:

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
o Ordered arraignment despite: a motion to defer proceedings; a ten-day period

with which the complainants can file petition with the CA; resolution of the CA
ordering the Yabuts to comment on the complainants action; pending appeal
with the DOJ.
Issue:
Can the orders of Judge Roura and Judge Villon be sustained despite procedural defects?
Held:
No. The orders of Judge Roura denying Motion to Defer proceedings are void and set aside.
The order of Judge Villon on the arraignment, and the subsequent arraignment of the Yabuts
are void and set aside. Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is ordered to comply with the DOJ
Secretarys resolution.
Prosecutors are the representatives not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
at all; and whose interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win every case but that
justice be done. They are servants of the law whose two-fold aim is that guilt shall not
escape and innocence shall not suffer.
The judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice. The judges action
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended
party.
When the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the case is
void.
25 TRIESTE v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS
TRIESTE was charged with 23 separate violations of the Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act* because while being the Municipal Mayor and member of the
Committee on Award of the Municipality of Numancia in Aklan and having financial or
pecuniary interest in TRIGEN Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, he awarded
purchases of construction materials by the said municipality from the said corporation
and signing the vouchers as evidence of said purchase
The Sandiganbayan found TRIESTE guilty and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment and perpetual disqualification
TRIESTE, in his defense, alleges that he signed the vouchers only after all the
purchases had already been made, delivered and paid for by the Municipal Treasurer
hence he cannot be guilty under the provisions of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
ISSUE
W/N TRIESTE IS GUILTY UNDER THE ANTI GRAFT AND CORRUPT

PRACTICES ACT
HELD
NO
RATIO
TRIESTE already sold his shares to a certain MRS TUASON before he assumed office
and despite the absence of it in the SEC records, the court finds this fact immaterial as
there is no law requiring submission of reports regarding sales and disposal of stocks
(what is required is only submission of annual financial reports)
The Municipal Treasurer testified that there was never a public bidding hence if there
is no bidding then there could be no awarding by TRIESTE
Testimonial and documentary evidence both confirm that TRIESTE signed vouchers
after payment and since what is contemplated in the Anti-Graft Law is the actual
intervention in the transaction which one has financial or pecuniary interest in,
TRIESTE cannot be held liable under such Law
TRIGEN did not gain any undue advantage in the transaction such that there is no
complaint for non-delivery, underdelivery or overpricing in the transactions
Hence, TRIESTE should be acquitted
NOTE
*Section 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract
or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any
interest
26 TATAD v SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Oct. 1974 Antonio de los Reyes, former Head Executive Assistant of the Department
of Public Information (DPI), filed a report to the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security
Command (PSC) containing charges of violations of RA3019 1 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Acts) against Sec. of DPI Francisco Tatad.
1979 Tatad had a falling out with then Pres. Marcos and the charges became widely
known.
Dec. 12, 1979 a formal complaint was filed with the Tanodbayan
Apr. 1, 1980 Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the PSC for investigation and
report.
(a) Giving DGroup, a private corporation owned by his brother in-law unwarranted benefits; (b) receiving a check from Roberto Vallar, Gen. Manager
of Amity Trading Corp., as consideration for the release of a check to the said corp. for printing services rendered during the Constitutional Convention
Referendum; and (c) failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
June 16, 1980 report by PSC was submitted recommending the filing of charges for
graft and corruption.
Oct. 25, 1982 all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in and the case was ready for
disposition.
July 5, 1985 Tanodbayan issued a resolution calling for the filing of charges against
Tatad in the Sandiganbayan. 5 informations were filed against Tatad in 1985.
Tatad now questions the propriety of the filing of charges. He alleges that his rights to
due process and speedy disposition of cases have been violated.
Issue:
W/n Tatads rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases have been violated.
Held:
SC says yes they were violated by the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the
law and substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by law is part of
procedural due process.
The case was ready for disposition as early as 1982 but the informations were only
filed in 1985. A delay of close to 3 years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable
in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. The charges in the
complaint, specially his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities, are not
that complicated to require 3 years before formal complaints are filed.
27 PNB v ATTY CEDO

Facts:
PNB filed a complaint against Atty. Cedo for violation of Rule 6.02 that states: A
lawyer shall not, after leaving govt. service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter which he had intervened with in said service. Cedo was the
former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset management Group of PNB.
During Cedos stint with PNB, he became involved in 2 transactions: 1.) sale of
steel sheets to Ms. Ong and 2.) intervened in the handling of a loan of spouses Almeda.
When a civil action arose because of #1, Cedo, after leaving the bank appeared as one
of the counsel of Ms. Ong. Also, when #2 was involved in a civil action, the Almedas
were represented by the law firm Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates of which Cedo
was a Senior Partner.
Cedo claims that he did not participate in the litigation of Ms. Ongs case. He
also claims that even if it was his law firm handling the Almeda case, the case was
being handled by Atty. Ferrer.
Issue: W/N violated Rule 6.02.
Held: Cedo violated Rule 6.02.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between the atty. and
the client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the
trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant cause. Whatever
may be said as to w/n the atty. utilized against his former client information given to him
in a professional capacity, the mere fact that their previous relationship should have
precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express
consent of all the parties concerned after the disclosure of facts. A lawyer
represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
28 DINSAY v CIOCO
Facts:
Planters Machinery Corporation (PLAMACO) mortgaged to Traders Royal Bank (the

Bank) certain properties as security for the payment of its loan. PLAMACO defaulted
in the payment of the loan so the Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. At a
foreclosure sale conducted by the sheriff, the property was sold to the bank, who was
the sole bidder. A certificate of Sheriffs sale was executed by Atty. Cioco, then clerk of
Court and Ex-officio Sheriff.
Records disclose that page four of the said Certificate was surreptitiously substituted.
The new page lowered the bid price from the original amount of P3, 263, 182.67 to
only P730,000. Cioco and the sheriff who conducted the sale had previously been
administratively charged and dismissed from service.
Now, Atty.Cioco is sought to be disbarred. He argues that there was res adjudicata
due to the administrative case, and that disbarment was deemed adjudicated therein,
thus he may now longer be charged.
Issue: W/N Cioco may be charged with disbarment (W/N res adjudicata appplies)
Held:
Ciocos contention has no merit. Res adjudicata applies only to judicial or quasijudicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the Courts administrative powers, as in
this case.
Disbarment has not been adjudicated in the previous case. Therein, Cioco was
administratively proceeded against as an erring Court personnel under the supervisory
authority of the court. Herein, Cioco is sought to be disciplined as a lawyer under the
courts plenary authority over members of the legal profession.
While Cioco is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, there is no
double jeopardy as both proceedings are administrative in nature.
The general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined
as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official. The exception is , if that misconduct affects his qualification as a lawyer or
shows moral delinquency.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Ciocos participation in changing the bid price in the Certificate of Sheriffs Sale affects
his fitness as a member of the bar. He knows it is patently illegal to alter its contents
after notarization, since it is already a public document.
Cioco is disbarred.
29 IGOY v SORIANO
FACTS:
Igoy is one of the petitioners in the case of Heirs of Gavino Igoy, et al. vs. Mactan
Shangrila Hotel.
Eng. William Redoblado introduced Atty. Soriano to Igoy as a Justice of the CA.
According to Igoys friend, Atty. Soriano will be able to help him in his case which is
pending in the CA
Atty. Soriano demanded from Igoy P20,000 but the former reminded the latter the he
will only be able to help in the case as soon as the case was lifted to the SC
Igoys case received an unfavorable decision in the CA and Atty. Soriano offered to
prepare the Petition for Review to be filed in the SC.
Atty. Soriano asked for an additional P20,000
Igoy send the amount by courier to the address of Atty. Soriano which was received by
his son.
SC denied the petition for review of Igoy with finality
Igoy later found out that Atty. Soriano is not a CA Justice and filed this complaint
against Igoy in the SC
Arguments of Atty. Soriano:
o It is unnatural for a person to give money to someone whom he does not know
well and whom he met only for the first time
o The money was offered gratuitously by Igoy
o it is impossible the Igoy handed the money to him on the SC parking lot for
many employees were passing in that place
o it is not Eng. Redoblado who introduced him to Igoy but Mr. Taneo
o if the SC finds that he is guilty, he will retire from the service
Atty. Soriano filed his letter of resignation/retirement under RA 1616
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Soriano violated Canon 6, Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD:
Yes! Atty. Soriano was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and is suspended from the practice of law.
Atty. Sorianos offer to resign was obviously an attempt to evade whatever penalty may
be imposed on him. However, resignation will not extricate him form the
consequences of his acts
Resignation should not be used either as an escape or an easy way out to evade
administrative liability by court personnel facing administrative sanctions
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
To accept the claim of Soriano that the money was offered gratuitously will open the
floodgates to fraud or graft and corruption.
Government lawyers who are public servants owe utmost fidelity to the public service
for public service is a public trust. Government lawyers should be more sensitive to
their professional obligations as their reputable conduct is more likely to be magnified
in the public eye.
The nature and responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the Constitution are not
mere rhetorical words to be taken lightly as idealistic sentiments but as working
standards and attainable goals that should e matched with actual deeds.
30 PCGG v SANDIGANBAYAN
*kalokohan na kaso to, 140++ pages (disclaimer) main decision 28 pages lang
** merong history of Rule 6.03 and other historical stuff sa case
Facts:
1976: General Bank & Trust Company (Genbank) encountered financial difficulties.
Central Bank extended loans to Genbank in the hope of rehabilitating it (P310M).
Nonetheless, Genbank failed to recover.
1977: Genbank was declared insolvent. A public bidding of Genbanks assets was held
with the Lucio Tan Group winning the bid. Solicitor General Mendoza, representing the
government, intervened with the liquidation of Genbank.
1986: after EDSA I, Cory established the PCGG to recover the ill-gotten wealth of
Marcos, his family and cronies.
1987: PCGG filed a case against Lucio Tan and certain other people (basta marami
sila). In relation to this case, PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by the respondents by taking advantage of their close relationship
and influence with Marcos. Sandiganbayan heard the case.
Estelito Mendoza (Solicitor General during the time of Marcos) represented the
respondents.
1991: PCGG filed a motion to disqualify Mendoza, because of his participation in the
liquidation of Genbank. Genbank (now Allied Bank) is one of the properties that PCGG
is seeking to be sequestered from the Lucion Tan group. PCGG invoked Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Sandiganbayan denied PCGGs motion. According to the Sandiganbayan, Mendoza
did not take an adverse position to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank. And
Mendozas appearance as counsel was beyond the 1 year prohibitory period since he
retired in 1986.
Issue:
W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility apllies to Estelito Mendoza
Held:
No, it does not apply to Mendoza. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
The matter (see 3rd note), or the act of Mendoza as Solicitor General is advising the
Central Bank on how to proceed with the liquidation of Genbank. This is not the
matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The matter involved in the liquidation of Genbank is entirely different from the matter
involved in the PCGG case against the Lucio Tan group.
The intervention contemplated in Rule 6.03 should be substantial and important. The
role of Mendoza in the liquidation of Genbank is considered insubstantial.
SC is even questioning why PCGG took such a long time to revive the motion to
disqualify Mendoza. Apparently, PCGG already lost a lot of cases against Mendoza.
Kyles interpretation: PCGG getting desperate
Something to think about: SC is somehow of the opinion that Rule 6.03 will make it
harder for the government to get good lawyers in the future to work for them because
of the prohibition of accepting cases in the future that were related to ones work as a
government counsel.
Concurring Opinions:
Panganiban & Carpio: the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 should have a
prescriptive period
Tinga: Rule 6.03 cannot apply retroactively to Mendoza (when he was Solicitor
General, no Rule 6.03 yet)
Bottom line, they are all questioning the unfairness of the rule if applied without any
prescriptive period and if applied retroactively
Notes:
Adverse-interest conflicts where the matter in which the former government lawyer
represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the
lawyer dealt with while employed with the government and the interests of the current
and former are adverse
Congruent-interest conflicts the use of the word conflict is a misnomer, it does not
involve conflicts at all, as it prohibits lawyers from representing a private person even if
the interests of the former government client and the new client are entirely parallel
Matter any discrete, isolatable act as well as indentifiable transaction or conduct
involving a particular situation and specific party
Intervention interference that may affect the interests of others
31 IN RE GALANG
FACTS:
Ramon Galang has a pending criminal case of slight physical injuries in the City Court
of Manila
He took the Bar Exams 7 times and was allowed to take the lawyers oath in 1972.
BUT, he was allowed to do so only because he fraudulently concealed and withheld
from the Court his pending criminal case in 1962,63,64,66,67,69 and 71. And in
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
1966,67,69 and 71 he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had
no pending criminal case in court
ISSUE: WoN Galang should be disbarred?
HELD: YES!
RATIO:
1. It is well-settled in a long string of cases that concealment of an atty in his application
to take the Bar of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for,an alleged
crime is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law. (Guilty of Fraud upon the
Court)
2. Galangs persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case (which he later
admitted) and his failure to clear his name for 13 years indicate his lack of the requisite
attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy to be a
lawyer. (he did not offer any explanation for such omission).
3. Among other grounds for disbarment:
a. Misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the reqt on applicants
educational attainment
b. Lack of good moral character
c. Fraudulent passing of the Bar exams
32 IN RE CUEVAS
Facts:
Petitioner Arthur Cuevas Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations. His oath taking
was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution which permitted him to take the Bar
Exams subject to the condition that should he pass the same he shall not be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath pending approval of the court. This resolution was due to his previous
conviction for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide. The conviction stemmed from
Cuevas' participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in
the SAN BEDA College of Law, where Raul Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of
personal violence inflicted upon him.
Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. He was later discharged from
probation and his case considered closed and terminated.
In this petition, Cuevas prays that he be allowed to take the lawyer's oath at the court's most
convenient time.
Issue:
W/n Cuevas should be allowed to take the lawyers oath...
Held:
YES.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte shich resulted
to the latter's untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission
to the bar. The court nonetheless is willing to give Cuevas a chance in the same manner that
it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino (case sa legprof), petitioner's co-accused below, to
take the lawyer's oath.
His discharge from probation without any infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and
the various certification attesting to his righteous peaceful and civic-oriented character prove
that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character.
33 DIAO v MARTINEZ
Facts:
Telesfor Diao was admitted to the Bar in 1953.

Two years after, Severino Martinez charged him for having falsely represented his
application: that he had the requisite academic qualifications.
The Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diaos name be erased from
the roll of attorneys.
Diao has not completed BEFORE taking up law, the required pre-legal education
prescribed by the Department of Private Education:
o Diao did not complete his HS training; and
o Diao never attended Quisumbing College
Diao claims that he left HS in his third year, he entered the US Army, passed the
General Qualification Test, which according to him, is equivalent to a HS diploma, and
upon return to civilian life, the education authorities considered his army service as the
equivalent of 3rd and 4th year HS.
Also, he claims that he really got his college diploma from Arellano University in April
1949. He says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of
Quisumbing Collge, in his school records.
Issue:
W/N Diao should be removed from the roll.
Held:
Yes. Diaos name is removed from the roll.

The error or confusion was to his own making. Had his application showed that he
graduated from Arellano, it would have showed that he took up law 6 months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. He then would have not been permitted to take
the Bar.
Rule: That PREVIOUS to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily
completed the required pre-legal education as prescribed by the Department of
Education.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
The fact that he hurdled the bar is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study
in the regular manner is equally essential.
34 CALUB v SULLER
Facts:
Atty Suller raped the wife of his neighbor Cristino Calub.
A criminal complaint for rape was filed against Suller. A complaint for disbarment was
also filed by Calub before the SC.
The CFI acquitted Suller for failure of the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Issue:
Can Atty Suller be disbarred?
Held:
Yes. Acquittal in a criminal case is not determinative of an administrative case for disbarment.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows that he lacks moral character to continue as officer of the court.
The rape by a lawyer of his neighbors wife constitutes such serious moral depravity.
35 UI v BONIFACIO
FACTS
LESLIES side of the story
o LESLIE Ui married CARLOS and had 4 children with him
o Subsquently, LESLIE found out CARLOS was having illicit relations with Atty
IRIS Bonifacio and begot a daughter
o CARLOS admitted this relationship with LESLIE who confronted IRIS
o IRIS told LESLIE everything was over between her and CARLOS
o However, LESLIE found out later the illicit relations continued and IRIS even
had 2nd child with CARLOS
o LESLIE filed a complaint for disbarment against IRIS on ground of immorality
IRIS side of the story
o Met CARLOS who represented himself as a bachelor with children by a
Chinese woman with whom he had long been estranged
o CARLOS and IRIS got married in Hawaii
o Upon return to Manila, they did not live together because CARLOS wanted his
children with the Chinese woman to gradually know and accept his marriage
with IRIS
o When IRIS knew about the 1st marriage, she cut all ties with him

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
In proceedings before the IBP Commission, LESLIE filed a motion to cite IRIS in
contempt for making false allegations in her Answer to impress upon the IBP that her
1st child by CARLOS was within wedlock
o IRIS indicated in Answer she got married to CARLOS in Oct 22, 1985
o However, Certificate of Marriage certified by State Registrar revealed that date
of marriage was actually Oct 22, 1987
ISSUE
W/N IRIS SHOULD BE DISBARRED
HELD
NO
RATIO
Immorality
Requisites to admission to practice of law includes being a person of good moral
character and possession of such must be continuous
Loss of good moral character is a ground of revocation of the privilege of the practice
of law
In the case at bar, IRIS was imprudent in her personal affairs
Circumstances existed which should have at least aroused her suspicion that
something was amiss (i.e. not living together as husband and wife, children by another
woman, etc) but she did not do anything about it
However, the fact remains that IRIS relationship with CARLOS was clothed with
marriage and cannot be considered immoral
Moreover, such conduct to warrant disciplinary action must be grossly immoral that is
so corrupt and false to constitute a criminal act or moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community
IRIS act of immediately distancing herself belies the alleged moral indifference and
proves she has no intention of flaunting the law
Hence, IRIS should not be disbarred
False allegation
Any normal bride would recall date and year of marriage
Difficult to fathom how IRIS could forget the year of her marriage
Moreover, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment
to her pleading especially in this case since IRIS had personal knowledge of facts
stated therein
Hence, IRIS should be reprimanded for attaching marriage certificate with an altered
date
36 ROYONG v OBLENA
FACTS:
Royong, the niece it the common-law wife of Oblena, filed a rape case against the
latter.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
In her complaint, Royong alleged that in 1958 Oblena forced her to have intercourse
with her and that she refrained to report the incident because Oblena threatened to kill
her family.
As a result if the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to a child
Oblena denied all the allegations and argued that he and Royong had a relationship
and Royong consented to have intercourse with him.
The Solicitor General recommended that Oblena be permanently removed from the
roll of attorney eventhough the acts of the Royong before and after the rape incident
showed that she is more of a sweetheart than a victim because of the circumstances
behind the incident
The Solicitor General also charged Oblena of falsifying and deliberately alleging in his
application in the bar in1958 that he is a person of good moral character while having
an illicit and adulterous relationship with Angeles who is not only the aunt of Royong
but also has a legal husband in the province
Oblena moved to dismiss the case because the offenses charged are different from
those originally charged in the complaint but the court overruled his petition
After the hearing, the investigators concluded that A.) Oblena used his knowledge in
law to commit immoral acts without incurring any criminal liability; B.) he committed
gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with Angeles, his common-law wife, even
after he became a lawyer and C.) Oblena falsified the truth as to his good moral
character in his application to take the bar.
ISSUE:
W/N the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation with Angeles, a
married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause Oblenas disbarment
HELD:
YES!
Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape, seduction or adultery and he
is not guilty of any of the grounds for disbarment enumerated in Sec 25, Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court, the enumeration is not exclusive and the power of the court to
exclude unworthy members of the bar is inherent and is a necessary incident to the
proper administration of justice and can be exercised even without any statutory
authority, in all cases unless properly prohibited by statutes.
American jurisprudence provides that the continued possession of a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law. The
loss requires suspension or disbarment eventhough the statues do not explicitly
specify that as a ground of disbarment.
Oblenas argument that he believed himself to be a person with good moral character
when he filed his application to take the bar examination is wrong. Ones own
approximation of himself is not a gauge of his moral character. Moral character is not
a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is
what the person really is and not what he other people thinks he is.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
His pretension to wait for the 18th birthday of Royong before having carnal knowledge
with her shows the scheming mind of Oblena and his taking advantage of his
knowledge of the law.
Also, Royong is the niece of his common-law wife and he enjoyed moral ascendancy
over her. Oblena took advantage of Royongs trust on him.
Oblenas contention that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the
present complain which is entirely different from the original complaint filed is
untenable. There is nothing in the law requiring the Solicitor General to charge in his
complaint the same offence charged in the original complaint. What the law provides
is that if the Solicitor General finds sufficient grounds to proceed against the
respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint accompanied by the evidence
introduced in his investigation.
37 DE LOS REYES v AZNAR

Facts:
Delos Reyes filed a complaint against Atty. Aznar for gross immorality.
It appears that Atty. Aznar raped Delos Reyes. From the evidence, it appears
that Aznar was the Chairman of the Board of Southwestern University.
Delos Reyes failed her Pathology subject. As such, she approached Aznar for
reconsideration. Aznar assured her that she would pass. Despite her plea, she failed
the subject. Aznar told Delos Reyes that she should go with him to Manila or else she
will flunk. They went to Manila. After dining in a restaurant, Aznar raped her twice in the
evening and thrice the next morning inside the Ambassador Hotel.
Aznar denies all the allegations and says that when he went to Manila, he slept
at the house of his friends.
Issue: W/N Aznar is guilty of gross misconduct.

Held: Aznar is guilty of gross misconduct.
The court agrees with the Sol. Gen.s finding that Aznar committed gross
misconduct. While Aznar denied having taken Delos Reyes to the Ambassador Hotel
and had sexual intercourse with her, he did not present any evidence to show where he
was on that date. It is the duty of the lawyer, whenever his moral character is put
into question, to satisfy the court that he is fit and proper to enjoy continued
membership in the bar. He cannot dispense with the high exacting moral
standards of the profession. Good moral character is a continuing qualification
necessary to entitle on to continue in the practice of law
38 SOBERANO v VILLANUEVA
Facts:
Soberano filed a petition for disbarment alleging that after Atty. Villanueva had induced
her to take part in a fake wedding, the latter cohabited with her and later lived with her
as husband and wife. As a consequence of this, she bore him two children, and
subsequently, Villanueva abandoned them.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Soon thereafter, Soberano sent a letter to the court asking that no action be taken on
her petition until her mother has arrived and decided whether it should push though.
Soberano sent another letter saying that her mother has arrived and that the case
must case.
Soberano again wrote a letter saying that the filing of the petition was not sincerely her
own wish, and that she was finally withdrawing her complaint
the last letter written by Soberano to the court however, prayed that her motion to
withdraw the petition be denied, since Villanueva had procured the motion by means of
threat and intimidation.
Issue: W/N Villanueva should be disbarred

Held: NO
The letters of Soberano to Villanueva clearly indicated that intimate relations had
existed between them prior to the date when the alleged fake wedding occurred.
These indicate that there was o need for Villanueva to stage a fake wedding to induce
Soberano to cohabit with him.
Some of the letters showed that Soberano reminded him of his promise to marry her
after he passed the bar
As to whether the extra-marital relations between Soberano and Villanueva warrants
disciplinary action, SC held that in light of the circumstances in this case, these acts
are neither so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, nor so unprincipled as to warrant
a disbarment of disciplinary action.
Also, distinguished members of the bar had attested to Villanuevas good moral
character. One is no less than the Executive Judge of the CFI of Negros Occidental,
where Villanueva is practices his profession. The other is the Dean Montemayor of the
Ateneo College of Law. The last one is Hon. Guillermo Santos, former Chairman of
Agricultural Tenancy Commission, then Judge of CFI and Court of Agrarian Relations.
39 RAO SHENG v VELASCO
FACTS:
Rau Sheng Mao is a Taiwanese national who engaged the services of Atty. Angeles
Velasco as his legal consultant and counsel of his company Foreign Investors
Consultancy and Management, Inc (FICMI).
Haru Gen Beach Resort and Hotel Corporation ,represented by Atty, Velasco as its
director and stockholder, entered into a management agreement with FICMI
Atty Velasco sold to Rau Sheng his 10,000 shares in Haru Gen for P1,000,000 but the
former refused to deliver the certificates to the Taiwanese despite complete payment
made by the Taiwanese
Also, 3 lands of Atty. Velasco was bought by Rau Sheng for P3.3M with a remaining
balance of P300,000, but Atty. Velasco still refused to deliver the titles

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Rau Sheng filed an administrative case against Atty. Velasco. Rau Sheng presented
as evidence letters made by Atty. Velasco wherein the latter was asking money from
the former to be given to judges hearing his cases
An additional charge for immorality because of his illicit relationship with Lucy
Matienzo who is not his legal wife was filed by Rau Sheng wherein he presented the
baptismal certificate of Jenny Velasco which listed Atty. Velasco as its father together
with the affidavits of several people confirming Velascos illicit relationship with Lucy as
evidence
Atty. Velasco denied all the allegations of Rau Sheng with these arguments:
o He could not deceive Rau Sheng for the Taiwanese was always represented in
all their transactions by Atty. Purog
o He refused to deliver the certificate of stocks and the land titles because of the
Rau Shengs incomplete payment of the purchase price
o As to the immorality claim, Atty. Velasco presented affidavits of his wife and
Lucy Matienzo
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Velasco is guilty of all the allegations made by Rau Sheng
HELD:
YES! Atty. Velasco was found guilty of the having illicit relationship with Matieza and
giving Rau Sheng the impression that he was in the position to influence the court and
he was ordered suspended from the practice of law for 2 years
The court found it unlikely that Rau Sheng was deceived by Atty. Velasco in all their
transactions for he was always represented by Atty. Purog in all the dealings
But Atty. Velasco is guilty of having an adulterous relationship with Matienza with
whom he has 3 children all bearing his surname as seen in all the school records of
the children.
Velasco violated Canon 1, Rule 1.101 by engaging in unlawful and immoral acts.
Lawyers are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and thus must
handle their personal affairs with the greatest caution. Their exalted positions as
officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.
What is more, Velasco violated one of the basic tenets of legal ethics by giving Rau
Sheng the impression that he was in the position to influence the courts. Velasco
claimed that he has connections with judges and they were claiming money from Rau
Sheng.
A lawyer is duty bound to avoid improprieties which gave the appearance of
influencing the courts and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril.
No profession offers greater opportunity for public service than that of a lawyer. For
the privilege conferred upon him, a lawyer was tasked with the equally greater
responsibility of upholding the ideals and ethics established.
40 OLBES v DECIEMBRE
Facts:
Spouses Olbes (Franklin & Lourdes) were employees of the Central Post Office in
Manila. They filed this case for disbarment against Atty. Deciembre.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Lourdes, with the help of Deciembre, acquired a loan from Rodela Loans in the
amount of P10K.
Lourdes then issued 5 PNB blank checks to respondent to serve as collateral.
Subsequently, Lourdes paid Deciembre the amount of the loan plus interest and
surcharges.
Notwithstanding payment, Deciembre filled up the blank checks in the amount of P50k
each. Siyempre tumalbog yun mga cheke.
Deciembre then filed BP22 & estafa cases against the Olbes spouses.
Reklamo siyempre sila Olbes. They are even saying that some of their officemates
suffered the same fate under Deciembre.
Investigating officer: Deciembres version of the facts is highly doubtful. There are
discrepancies between his oral and written testimonies.
Issue:
W/N Deciembre should face disciplinary sanctions
Held:
Siyempre! He is in violation of Rule 7.03
He committed falsification when he filled up the blank checks even if this was not
agreed upon and despite knowledge that the loan had already been paid.
He even filed BP22 cases against the couple. This shows the vileness and
wretchedness of his soul. Franklin was even detained for 3 months because of the
cases.
Deciembre is found to be lacking good moral character. Good moral character includes
at least common honesty.
The penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for 2 years is too mild. Deciembre
is suspended from the practice of law indefinitely.
41 GRANDE v DA SILVA
FACTS:
Emilio Grande is the private offended party (of estafa and BP 22) against a certain
Sergio Natividad, the client of Atty. De Silva
De Silva tendered a check to Grande as settlement of the civil aspect of the case.
The check was returned with the notation that the ACCT CLOSED
Grande filed a suit against De Silva for violation of BP 22 and Estafa (sha naman ang
nakasuhan tuloy hehe)
De Silva refused to comment on notices of complaints sent to her.
IBP recommended that de Silva be suspended for two years.
ISSUE: WoN de Silva should be suspended?
HELD: YES

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
RATIO:
1. The nature of the office of an atty requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good
moral character. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyers moral character in serious
doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law. A lawyer may be
disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. The loss of moral character
of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment.
2. Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be
professional or non-pro, justifies disciplinary action. For a lawyers professional and
personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.
Her deliberate refusal to accept the notices served on her stains the nobility of the profession.
How else would a lawyer endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to
follow even simple directives. Also, Canon 1 says that a lawyer shall uphold the consti, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for the legal processes.
42 COJUANGCO v PALMA
Facts:
Complainant Cojuangco wa a client of Angara Concepcion Regala and Cruz Law Offices and
Palma was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Palma's relationship with the
Cojuangcos became intimate. He frequented theis house and even tutored Cojuangco's 22year old daughter Maria Luis Cojuangco.
Wihtout the knowledge of complainant Cojuangco's family, Palma married Lisa in Hongkong.
It was only the next day that Palma informed complainant of such fact. Complainant was
shocked, knowing fully well that Palma is a married man and has 3 children.
Complainant filed with CFI a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage between
respondent Palma and Lisa. CFI delared that marriage null and void. Thereafter, Cojuangco
fileed with the SC the instant complaint for disbarment.
Meanwhile, the first division of SC issued a resolution setting aside the CFI Decision
declaring the marriage null and void and remanding the case to the CFI for proper
proceeding. To this date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case.
Issue:
W/n Palma should be disbarred...
Held:
YES.
There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyer's
professional capacity or in his private life. Professional competency alone does not make a
lawyer worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensabel
requirement.
The truth is respondent married Lisa while he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Herosisima. Therefore he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of

him as a member of the bar. Respondent's culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was
just 22 years old and was under psychological treatment for emotional immaturity.
The subsequent judgment of annullment of marriage has no bearing to the instant disbarment
proceeding. A disbarment case is sui generis for it is an investigation by the court into the
conduct of its officers.
43 REYES v CHIONG JR.
Facts:
Atty. Ramon Reyes counsel for Zonggi Xu.

Atty. Victoriano Chiong, Jr for Chia Hsien Pan.
Xu, a Chinese-Taiwanese went into a business venture with Pan. Pan was supposed
to set up a Cebu-based fishball, tempura and seafood products factory. He did not
establish it, and so Xu asked that his money be returned.
Xu then filed a case of estafa against Pan. Prosecutor Salanga then issued a
subpoena against Pan.
Atty. Chiong then filed a motion to quash, but he also filed a civil complaint for the
collection of a sum of money and damages as well as for the dissolution of a business
venture against Xu, Atty Reyes, and Prosecutor Salanga.
He alleged that Salanga was impleaded as an additional defendant because of the
irregularities the latter had committed in conducting the criminal investigation he still
filed the complaint against Pan in spite of Pans motions.
Atty. Reyes was allegedly impleaded because he allegedly connived with Xu in filing
the estafa case which was baseless.
IBP recommended that Chiong be suspended for 2 years.
Issue:
W/N Chiong should be suspended.
Held:
Yes.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall
conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
If Chiong believed that the two had conspired to act illegally, he could have instituted
disbarment proceedings.
As a lawyer, Chiong should have advised his client of the availability of these
remedies. Thus the filing of the cases had no justification.
Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity
and civility.
Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct
and demeanor toward each other.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
44 ALCANTARA v PEFIANCO
Facts:
Atty Pefianco is counsel in a criminal case. One day the private offended party went to
the Public Attorneys Office to have her civil claims (in the criminal case) settled. Atty
Salvani attended to her.
While Atty. Salvani was talking to the woman, Atty Pefianco shouted at them and
questioned the actions of the woman (pertaining to the settlement).
Atty Pefianco was asked to calm down but he did not refrain from his outburst. District
Public Attorney Alcantara, as head of the agency, talked to Pefianco.
But Pefianco called Alcantara an idiot and a stupid (loud enough for other people to
hear). A commotion in the office ensued (Pefianco even tried to attack Alcantara).
A complaint was filed against Pefianco for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and for
using improper and offensive language.
Pefianco says that he was just moved by the sight of a crying woman whose husband
had been murdered. He also averred that it was Alcantara who punched him and
called him stupid.
Issue:
Did Pefianco violate the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Held:
Yes. Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code which requires lawyers to conduct themselves
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. It was Pefiancos meddling in a
matter in which he had no right to do so that caused the untoward incident (shouting at
Salvani and the woman). Though he thought that this is righteous, his public behavior can
only bring down the legal profession in the eyes of the public and erode respect for it.
Atty Pefianco was fined and reprimanded.
45 CAMACHO v PANGULAYAN
FACTS
9 students of AMA were expelled for having apparently caused to be published
objectionable features or articles in the school paper
Denial of the appeal to AMA President Aguiluz gave rise to Civil Case 97-30549
CAMACHO was the hired counsel of the expelled students in an action for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injuction in the said civil case
While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-admission Agreements
were separately executed by the expelled students without the knowledge of
CAMACHO
CAMACHO filed a complaint against lawyers comprising the PANGULAYAN AND
ASSOCIATES Law Firm (lawyers of AMA) because without his knowledge they
procured and effected on separate occasions compromise agreements (letters of
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
apology and Re-admission Agreements) with 4 of his clients which in effect required
them to waive all kinds of claims they may have with AMA
CAMACHO averred that such an act was unbecoming of any member of the legal
profession warranting either disbarment or suspension
PANGULAYAN in his defense claimed that the agreements were executed for the sole
purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case
ISSUE
W/N PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES SHOULD BE

SUSPENDED/DISBARRED
HELD
YES
RATIO
It would appear that when individual letters of apology and Re-admission Agreements
were formalized, CAMACHO was already the retained counsel of the expelled AMA
students
PANGULAYAN and associates having full knowledge of this fact still proceeded to
negotiate with the expelled AMA students and their parents without at least
communicating the matter to their lawyer CAMACHO
This failure of PANGULAYAN and associates, whether by design or oversight, is an
excusable violation of the canons of profession ethics and in utter disregard of a duty
owing to a colleague
The excuse that agreements were executed for settling the administrative case was
belied by the Manifestation which states 9 signatories agreed among others to
terminate ALL civil, criminal and administrative proceedings they may have against
AMA arising from their previous dismissal
Hence, PANGULAYAN should be suspended for 3 months
DOCTRINE
A lawyers should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the
matter with him but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most
particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel
and he should not undertake to advise him as to law.
46 TORRES v JAVIER
Facts:
This is an administrative case filed by Atty. Ireneo Torres against Atty. Jose Javier for
malpractice, gross misconduct in office as an attorney and/or violation of the lawyers
oath. There were 3 causes of action
First, the allegations stem from statements/remarks made by Javier in the pleadings
he filed in a petition for audit of all funds of the University of the East Faculty

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Association (UEFA) (Torres is the President). Javier implied that Torres had a motive
to burglarize the office of UEFA to get certain documents.
Second, Torres alleges that Javier used language that was clearly abusive, offensive,
and improper, inconsistent with the character of an attorney as a quasi-judicial officer.
This was with regard to Javiers Reply to Respondents Answer/Comment in the
attorneys fees case where Javier made a comment on the intellectual capacity of
Torres.
Third, Torres finds fault in Javiers statement that implies that it is normal for notaries
public to let their relatives sign the documents for them. Torres says that this
statement is demeaning to the legal profession and the notarial service.
IBP found Javier guilty and reprimanded him.
Issue:
W/n Javier should be held liable for his acts.
Held:
SC says only as regards the second cause of action. The court made mention that it is
well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for reasons of public policy, utterances
made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions
and motions, are absolutely privileged so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the
subject inquiry, however false or malicious they may be.
For the first cause of action, the SC held that such statements made by Javier were
necessary in order to resolve the petition for audit filed. These statements give a
possible scenario as to the reason for the burglary in the UEFA office. As to the third
cause of action, the SC gave Javier the benefit of the doubt that he issued these
statements only in the defense of his client.
As to the second (for which the SC found Javier guilty), the Court ruled that the
statements made regarding Torres intellectual aptitude were not relevant to the
attorneys fees case. The issue in the said case was whether the 10% attorneys
fees checked off from the initial backwages/salaries of UEFA members is legal (I
dont really understand this pero yan lang yun nakalagay).
The SC pointed out that Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility instructs
that respondents arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the court and
opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one
gentleman to another. Javier has disobeyed such mandate and is thus suspended
from the practice of law for 1 month.
47 CAMBALIZA v CRISTOBAL-TENORIO
Facts: Cambaliza, a former employee of Atty. Cristal-Tenorio, charged the latter with grossly
immoral conduct. Cambaliza alleged that Atty. has been falsely representing herself to
be married to Felicisimo Tenorio, when in fact Felicisimo was already married to another
woman (Atty. got a fake marriage license.). She also alleges that the Atty. caused the
dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit against a Makati Councilor. At the helm
of her complaint was the allegation that the Atty. cooperated in the illegal practice of law
by her husband Felicisimo, who is not a member of the bar.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Atty. denies all the allegations. She says that her firm is a sole-proprietorship;
hence, she had no partners in her law office.
Issue: W/N the lawyer is guilty of cooperating in the illegal practice of law.
Held: The lawyer is guilty.
The court agrees with the finding of the Commissioner on Bar Discipline.
According to the Commissioner, Atty. cooperated in illegal practice, in violation of Rule
9.01 based on the ff. evidence: (1) letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law office, with
Felicisimo as senior partner, (2) Sagip Radio Comm. Group card of Atty. Felicisimo
Tenorio (3) an ordered by the MTCC where Felicisimo entered his appearance as
counsel.
Any lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a
lawyer is guilty of violating rule 9.01. The lawyers duty to prevent or not assist in the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. The purpose is to
protect the public, the client, the bar, and the court from the incompetence and
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice.
48 TAN TEK BENG v DAVID
Facts:
Tan Tek Beng is a non-lawyer while David is a lawyer. David drafted a contract signed
by him and Tan Tek Beng stating among others that On all commissions and
attorneys fees that we shall receive from our clients, we shall divide fifty-fifty. In the
same contract, David also agreed not to deal directly with their clients.
The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last since there
were mutual accusations of doublecross.
Tan Tek Beng accused David of not complying with the agreement and denounced the
latter to then Presidential Assistant Ronaldo Zamora, to the Office of Civil Relations at
Camp Crame, and to the Supreme Court. He did not file any action to enforce the
agreement.
While the case was being investigated by the Solicitor General, Tan Tak Beng died.
This case was submitted for decision.
Issue:
W/N the agreement was valid.
Held: NO.
The agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is the practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers. This meaning is in consonance with the principle that the practice
of law is a profession, not a business.
The commercialization of law practice is condemned in certain canons of professional
ethics adopted by the American Bar Association:
34. No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer,
based
upon a division of service or responsibility.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
35. The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited

by any law agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and
lawyer
David should have known better than to enter and act upon such void and unethical
agreement.
He is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice.
49 PEOPLE v DE LUNA
FACTS:
De Luna, ET al., respondents, know that they did not pass the bas examination.
Although they sought admission under the Bar Flunkers Act, they were notified of the
decision of the SC denying their petitions. But notwithstanding their disqualification to
be admitted to the bar, they took their oaths as lawyers before a notary public and
formally advised the SC of such oath taking and that they will engage in the practice of
law in all courts of the Philippines
RTC: not guilty of contempt of court unless the respondents actually engaged in
the practice of law or held out to the public that they are lawyers by means of circulars
ISSUE:
W/N the act of the respondents of taking their oath before a notary public constitutes
contempt of court
HELD:
YES!
The oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may be taken only
before the SC by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice.
Respondents clearly defied and challenged the orders of the SC by willfully taking the
lawyers oath before the notary public despite the resolution of the SC denying their
petition to be admitted to the bar.
The ruling of the lower court is wrong for assuming to be an attorney, x x x, and acting
as such without authority, is only one of the grounds under Rule 64, section 3.
Also, by taking the oath of office as attorney-at-law and notifying the SC of what they
had done and their intent to practice law in all courts of the Philippines, the
respondents had, for all intent and purposes, held out to the public as such as
attorney-at-law
The case is remanded to the court of origin
50 PHILIPPINE LAWYERS v AGRAVA
Facts:
Agrava is the Director of the Philippines Patent Office (PPO).

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Agrava issued a circular announcing that there will be an examination to determine

who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the PPO.
Phil. Lawyers Assoc. (PLA) filed this case for prohibition and injunction against
Agrava.
PLA: one who passes the bar is licensed to practice law and is qualified to practice
before the PPO. Agrava is in excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the additional
qualification
Agrava: prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of
law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge. That like his US
counterpart, he can require additional requirements to practice before the PPO.
Take note Agrava has been issuing examinations before but it was only now that this
power has been contended
Issue:
W/N appearance before the PPO constitutes or is included in the practice of law
Held:
Yes, it is still within the ambit practice of law. Agrava is in excess of his jurisdiction
when he requires an additional examination for lawyers.
The SC has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines.
The practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience.
Although it is admitted that there is some technicality involved in the work for PPO, but
everything still goes back to the Patent law as well as other laws.
As to Agravas contention that he has the authority just like his US counterpart, this
contention is wrong. The Phil. Patent law and the US Patent law are different as to the
sections involving the powers of the director. Nowhere in the Philippine law is it
provided for that the director has the power to require additional examinations for
attorneys.
51 SANTOS v LLAMAS
FACTS:
Soliman Santos, a member of the Bar filed a complaint for misrepresentation and nonpayment of bar membership dues against Atty. Francisco Llamas
Santos bases his claims on the grounds that 1) Llamas has been dismissed as Pasay
City Judge and 2) his conviction for estafa
Llamas contends that 1) his dismissal was reversed and set aside 2) that his principal
occupation was a farm, which he had declared in his Income Tax Return. And
moreover, since he was a senior citizen, he was exempt in paying (in pursuant to Sec
4, RA 7432),and that Llamas believed in good faith that he is only allowed a limited
practice

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
ISSUE: WoN Llamas can be held administratively liable?

HELD: YES.
RATIO:
1) a lawyer by indicating BP- Rizal xxxx in his pleadings, thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP due, is guilty of violating
a. Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonet, immoral or deceitful
conduct
b. Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all timed uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the IBP
c. Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the Court
d. Rule 10.01- A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court, nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by an artifice
2) a lawyers failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings that he
filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty --- HOWEVER, in view of
Llamasadvanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law, the Court held a penalty of 1 year suspension or until he paid his dues,
as appropriate.
52 FAR EASTERN SHIPPING v CA
Facts:
M/V Pavlodar owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC) arrived at
the port of Manila. Senen Gavino was assigned by the Manila Pilot's Association (MPA) to
conduct docking manuevers for the safe berthing of the vessel. Gavino stationed himself in
the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him.
When the vessel was already about 2000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor
dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel. However the anchor did not
hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between
the crew members. When Gavino inquired about the commotion, Kavankov assured Gavino
that there was nothing to it.
The bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the
pier. PPA filed a complaint for a sum of money against FESC, Gavino and MPA. CA ruled in
favor of PPA holding them liable with MPA (employer of Kavankov) entitled to
reimbursement from Gavino.
Issue:
Are the counsels for the parties committed acts which require the exercise of the court's
disciplinary powers?
Held:
YES. The records show that the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario thru its associate,
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Atty Tria, is the the counsel of record for FESC in both GR no 130068 and GR no 130150.
GR 130068 which is assigned to the Court's second division, commenced with the filing of a
verified motion for extension of time which contained a certification against forum shopping
signed by counsel Tria stating that to the best of his
knowledge there is no action or proceeding pending in the SC, CA or any other tribunal.
Reviewing the records, the court finds that the petition filed by MPA in GR no, 130150 then
pending with the third division was duly filed with a copy thereof furnished by registered mail
to counsel for FESC (atty Tria). It would be fair to conclude that when FESC filed its petition
GR no 130068, it would aready have received a copy of the copy of the petition by MPA. It
wa therefore encumbent upon FESC
to inform the court of the pending action. But considering that it was a superfluity at that
stage of the proceeding , it being unnecessary to file such certification of non forum shopping
with a mere motion for extension, the court disregarded such error.
On the other hand it took the OSG, representing PPA, an ordinately and unreasonably long
period of time to file its comment, thus unduly delaying the resolution of these cases. In GR
no 130068, it took 210 days before the OSG filed its comment. FESC was not even
furnished with a copy. In Gr no 130150 it took 180 days before comment was filed. This
disinclination of the OSG to seasonably file required pleadings constitutes deplorable
disservice to the public and can only be categorized as inefficiency on the part of the govt law
office.
Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its asscociate
Tria is reprimaded and warned that a repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with severely.
The original members of the legal tean of the OSG are admonished and warned tha a
repetition shall also be dealt with more stringently.
Baka lang itanong kung ano ruling: The decision of the CA is affirmed. Gavino, MPA and
FESC are declared solidarily liable with MPA entitled to reimbursement from Gavino for such
amount of the adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of the amount equivalent to 75% of its
prescribed reserved fund.
53 COMELEC v NOYNAY
Facts:
Judge Tomas Noynay ordered the records of a certain election case to be withdrawn
and directed to the Comelec.
The case was against Diosdada Amor, a public school principal and other public
school teachers for having violated the Omnibus Election Code: for having engaged in
partisan political activities.
Comelec wanted to prosecute Amor et al. (This case is irrelevant to the main case)
Apparently, the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed 6
years.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
The judge dismissed the cases, using as basis the Judiciary Reorganization Act: Not
exceeding 6 years, not with RTC but with MTC.
But the Omnibus Election Code states that the regional trial court shall have the
exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation
of this code XXX
A closer reading of the Judiciary Reorganization Act (in its first sentence says):
Except in cases falling within the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court XXX
The Omnibus Election Code is an older law v the Judiciary Election Act
Judge Noynay did not read at all the opening sentence of the Judiciary Election Act
when he dismissed the cases.
Comelecs lawyer was Atty. Jose Balbuena from the Comelec legal department.
In his Motion for Reconsideration (see p 263), he quoted the memorandum of te Court
Administrator (not the SC) and made it appear that these were the words of the SC.
He cited a case, but erroneously:
o What he used: Alberto Naldeza/Alberto
o Alberto Naldoza
He said the case was in volume 245 of the SCRA, but it was really in volume 254.
Issue:
W/N Judge Noynay has the jurisdiction to handle the election cases in his sala.
Held:
(RC Note: parts of the SC decision were in the Facts portion, since you will not
understand the case if I placed it in the bottom
Yes.
Judge Noynay and Atty. Balbuena should also be admonished.
The judge should be reminded of his duty to be studious of the principles of law, to
administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, to
be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence.
Balbuena should also be admonished for his utter carelessness in his references.
Rule 10.02 mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
text of a decision or authority.
54 RIVERA v CORRAL
Facts:
A decision in a case for ejectment was sent to Atty Corral. His secretary received the
decision on Feb 23, 1990.
On March 13, 1990 Atty Corral filed a notice of appeal. The next day, Corral went to
the Office of the Clerk of Court to change the date of receipt of the decision from Feb
23 to Feb 29 (which was later changed to Feb 28 when Corral realized that there was
no Feb 29 that year). Para hindi siya ma-disqualify ng 15-day appeal period.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Rivera filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty Corral for tampering the courts
records without such courts permission or knowledge.
The IBP investigating committee affirmed the charges and recommended suspension.
Later on, the IBP Board ordered Corrals suspension.
Corral claims he was not afforded due process or hearing.
Issue:
Can Atty Corral be suspended?
Held:
Yes. Contrary to Corrals claim that he was not afforded due process, he was in fact given the
opportunity to present his evidence during the course of the proceedings. According to the
records, the hearings had to be rescheduled several times to accommodate his requests. But
he did not appear on the scheduled hearings. He cannot now claim that he was denied due
process.
It should be remembered that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard.
The Court finds that Atty Corral violated his oath by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, or
deceitful conduct. By altering the material dates to make it appear that the notice of appeal
was timely filed, Corral committed an act of dishonesty. A suspension for 1 year is warranted.
55 YOUNG v BATUEGAS
FACTS
YOUNG is the private prosecutor in People of the Phil v Arana
BATUEGAS, et al are the counsels for the accused in the said criminal case
On Dec 13, 2000, BATUEGAS filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail alleging that
the accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and, as such, is now
under detention
Upon verification with the NBI, YOUNG discovered that the accused surrendered on
Dec 14, 2000 (not 13)
BATUEGAS, et al in their defense alleged that
o On Dec 13, 2000, upon learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against
their client, they filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail
o They immediately fetched accused from Cavite and brought him to NBI to
voluntarily surrender
o However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at NBI at 2am the next day
o That was why the Certificate of Detention indicated that the accused
surrendered on Dec 14, 2000 and not 13
o As to lack of notice, YOUNG being a private prosecutor, is not entitled to such
as only the State and City prosecutors should be given notices
Investigating Commissioner recommended suspension of 6 months
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in a resolution approved said recommendation
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
ISSUE
W/N BATUEGAS, ET AL ARE GUILTY OF FALSEHOOD AND SHOULD BE

SUSPENDED
HELD
YES, CONCEALED TRUTH
RATIO
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth
He swore upon his admission that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of
any in court
As officer of the court, his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law
and facts of the case to aid it in arriving at the correct conclusion
The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them
His a lawyers solemn duty is to defend his client, his conduct must never be at the
expense of truth
In the case at bar, BATUEGAS, et al feel short of the duties and responsibilities
expected of them as members of the bar
Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the Court found that it had no
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth alleging
that the accused had voluntarily surrendered
To knowingly allege an untrue statement in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct
that the Court strongly condemns
BATUEGAS, et al violated their oath when they resorted to deception
Hence, BATUEGAS, et al should be suspended for 6 months
56 HUEYSUWAN FLORIDO v FLORIDO

Facts:
Natasha Hueysuwan-Florido (H-F) filed this administrative complaint against her

husband James Florido for violating his oath as a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting
and usng a spurious and bogus CA resolution/order.
H-F admits that she and her husband live separately. They have two children.
Sometime in Dec. 2001, Florido went to H-Fs house and showed her a photocopy of a
resolution issued by the CA apparently giving to Florido the legal custody of their
children. H-F doubted the authenticity of the CA resolution so she did not give her
children to Florido.
Then in 2002, while H-F and her children were in the ABC Learning Center, Florido
arrived accompanied by armed men. Florido demanded that H-F surrender custody of
their children to him. H-F, fearing for her childrens safety, called the police. In the
police station, H-F agreed to let the children sleep with Florido just for one night at a

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
hotel. But when H-F heard of news that Florido was planning to take the children to
Bacolod, she immediately took them away.
Florido then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of the CA
resolution he presented to H-F earlier. This petition was dismissed because Florido
did not appear and H-F presented a certification from the CA that there was no
resolution granting Florido with legal custody of their children.
Thus, this present action. The IBP has recommended that Florido be suspended from
the practice of law for 6 years.
Issue:
W/n Florido should be held liable for his actions.
Held:
SC says that Florido should be held liable. He violated Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01 and 10.02, by his act of making up
a spurious CA resolution and using such false resolution to his aadvantage.
The SC thinks that suspension of 6 years is too much so they lowered the penalty to
just a 2-year suspension.
57 ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Atty. Paguia is the counsel of Joseph Estrada in the case of Estrada vs. Arroyo. Atty.
Paguia asserts that the members of the Supreme Court should inhibit themselves from
hearing the petition because of Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
prohibits judges from participating in partisan political activities. According the Atty.
Paguia, the justices have violated the rule by participating in the EDSA 2 rally and
authorizing the assumption of office by President Arroyo.
The Sandiganbayan denied the petition and motion for reconsideration of Atty.
Paguia to dismiss all the criminal cases against Estrada. Atty. Paguia attacked the
decision of the Court in the case of Estrada vs. Arroyo by saying: similar in the
decisions involving admin. agencies, if the act of the justices is lawful, it is the act of the
Supreme Court, and if the act of the judges is not lawful, it is not the act of the Supreme
Court. As such, Atty. Paguia asserts that the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo being
unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of Code of Judicial Conduct, is not the act of the SC.
Atty. Paguia repeated his assault on the court in both broadcast and print
media. For that reason, the court asked him to show cause why he should not be
sanctioned.
Issue: W/N Atty. Paguia should be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming.
Held: Atty. Paguia is sanctioned. He is indefinitely suspended from practice of law.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates the lawyer
should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers. In
liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity,
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
and authority of the members of the court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded seeking to
impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public
statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
58 TIONGCO v AGUILAR
(Canon 10 Morada)
Facts:
Atty. Tiongco filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a review of a lower courts
decision.
The petition contained malicious and intemperate language. Tiongco stated that the
decision of the trial court Judge was crafted to fool the winning party, a hypocritical
judgment in plaintiffs favor, it was the devil who dictated it, the Judge was
confused, being born and raised amongst the non-propertied class
Tiongco also filed a pleading with the SC stating that it is hard to imagine that this
Honorable Court had read the petition and hold that the same failed to sufficiently
show that the respondent Court had committed grave abuse of discretion.
In a previous resolution, the SC required Atty. Jose B. Tiongco to show cause why he
should not be dealt with administratively for the violation of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In Tiongcos Compliance, he alleges that the SC failed to mention that he also called
the judge a robber, a rotten manipulator, and abetter of graft and shady deals.
Issue:
W/N Tiongco must be held administratively liable.
Held: YES
Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he should not be dealt with
administratively. While Tiongco tried to justify as true his descriptions of the Judge as
liar, thief, perfidious, and blasphemer, he did not offer any excuse for the other
intemperate words and phrases he used. Neither did he show their relevance to the
petition.
By insinuating that this Court did not at all read the petition, Tiongco exhibited gross
disrespect and attempted to discredit the Members of the First Division. He charged
them with violating their duty to render justice, and he thereby promoted distrust in
judicial administration.
He also showed disrespect to and contempt for the respondent judge, thereby
diminishing public confidence in the latter and in the judiciary.
Although a lawyer has the righteven the dutyto criticize the courts, this right must
be exercised responsibly. The criticism must be bona fide, without using language that
would tend to create or promote distrust in judicial administration and undermine the
peoples confidence in the integrity of the members of this Court.
59 RHEEM OF THE PHILS v FERRER
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
FACTS:
The SC issued an order directing Atty. Armonio and the senior partners in his law firm
to show to cause why they should not be dealt with for contempt of court
The law firm of Ponce Enrile. Sigiuon Reyne, etc. argued that:
o It has never been their intent to be disrespectful
o It was the result of overenthusiasm on the part of Atty. Armonio who thought
best to focus the attention of the court to the issue in the case and was not in
any way meant to slight or offend the court.
o It was because Atty. Armonio became emotionally involved in the case
o Not one of the partners was able to pass upon the draft or final form of the said
motion, and that Atty. Armonio, an associate, prepared, signed and filed the
motion without clearing it with any one of the partner of the firm
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Armonio and the partners in his firm must be held in contempt because of
the disrespectful language contained of the pleading prepared by Atty. Armonio.
HELD:
The SC decided that Atty. Armonio be warned that repetition of the incident will be
dealt with more severely and that necessary attention must be employed by the
partners in exercising adequate supervision and control of the pleadings submitted by
its associate
The pleading which contained one pitfall into which this court has repeatedly fallen
whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question and
the sweeping charge that the decisions of this court blindly adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statues
implies that the court is so patently inept in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial
court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of
perpetuation.
Implicit in the quoted statement is that the pronouncements of this court on the
jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. It detract much from the
dignity of and respect due this court.
It is the duty of lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice
and judicial officers. It is his obligation to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbents of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance.
It is proscribes to use unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts,
creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or which could have the effect of
harboring or encouraging discontent which, in many cases, us the source of disorder,
thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power .
The claim of Atty. Armonio that his statements was not in any way meant to slight or
offend this court, want of intention is no excuse for the language employed. One
cannot escape responsibility by claiming his words did not mean what any reader must
have understood them as meaning.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
60 ANDRES v CABRERA
Facts:
Stanley R. Cabrera (Cabrera) was a successful bar examinee in 1977.
Atty. Emilia Andres was a legal officer in the Ministry of Labor. She dismissed a case
filed by Cabreras mother against a certain Atty. Perez.
Because of the dismissal, Cabrera filed with the city fiscal of Manila criminal charges
against Andres (graft and corruption, falsification of public documents)
Andres then filed a case of disqualification against Cabrera. Cabrera apparently used
in his affidavit vile, incivil and uncouth language (e.g. moronic, unparalleled stupidity,
idiotic)
Cabreras oath-taking was therefore postponed. The SC required him to file an answer
to why he should not be disqualified. In Cabreras reply he still used unfit language
(e.g. calling Atty. Andres a moron). In subsequent motions by Cabrera, he used the
words a victim of the courts inhuman and cruel punishment through its supreme
inaction
1979: The court thereafter deferred his oath-taking until he has shown that he has
changed his ways. Cabrera then filed a motion for contempt of court. And guess what,
he still used unfit language (e.g. supreme stupidity, degradation of the administration of
justice)
Napikon yata yung SC, they required Cabrera to file a reply to why he should not be
held in contempt. Cabrera filed an apology but guess what, the language he used
were still unfit and even insincere.
Issue:
W/N Cabrera should be held in contempt
Held:
Yes! Fine of P500 and imprisonment for 50 days.
The duty to observe and maintain the respect due the courts devolves not only upon
lawyers but also upon those who will choose to enter the profession. Their failure to
discharge such duty may prevent them from being inducted into the office of attorney.
Pikon yung Supreme Court, huwag niyo silang subukan.
61 COBB-PEREZ v LANTIN
FACTS:
Ricardo Hermoso commenced a civil case against Damaso Perez and Gregorio
Sumbong, for recovery of sum of P17,309.44 representing unpaid purchases of leather
materials used in the shoe manufacturing business of Hermoso. Judgment was
rendered in favor of Hermoso, ordering the defendants to be held jointy and severally
liable.
The Sheriff of Manila levied upon the shares of common stock registered in Damaso
Perezname with the Republic Bank.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Petitioners used the rules of procedure to suspend the execution of judgment. (and
they managed to have the sale suspended 6x)
o They alleged that levy was highly excessive and unjust
o Even the wife of Damaso Perez, filed to lift the writ of execution alleging that the
shares of stock were conjugal assets and that the debt was a personal
obligation.
ISSUE: WoN petitioners restored to tricky, sneaky and maneuvering tactics to thwart the ends
of justice?
HELD: YES
RATIO:
1. During the protracted litigation, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions,
at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the
execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of
the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to
subvert the very ends of justice.
62 MAGAT v SANTIAGO
Facts:
For delaying the termination of an unlawful detainer case by filing multiple petitions before the
SC, involving the same subject matters and cause of action, which were attempts by the
same party and his counsel to delay enforcement of a judgment that has long become final
and executory, the SC suspended Atty Magat from the practice of law .
The court in ruling for the suspension of Magat stated that a lawyer owes the duty of good
faith and honorable dealing to the judicial tribunal before whom he practices his profession.
Inherent in that obligation is the duty to assist in the speedy disposition of cases.
Atty Magat and members of his family is now praying for judicial clemency, expressing their
profound regret for his past misconduct and his avowal ot amend his ways, in view if the said
family's financial and economic difficulties to his inability to earn his livelihood as a lawyer.
This plea has been reiterated for a period of more than 2 years since his suspension.
Issue:
W/n the suspension should be terminated...
Held:
YES. The court is satisfied that Magat appreciates the significance of his dereliction and he
has assured the court that he now possesses the requisite probity and integrity necesary to
guarantee that he is worthy to be restored to the practice of law.
63 MILLARE v MONTERO
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Facts:
(RC Note: The first part of the case is pointless. It just wants to impress on you that
Atty. Montero used procedure to circumvent the administration of justice)
Pacfica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment against
Elsa Co. The case was for ejectment filed with the MTC.
The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 1986.
Numerous appeals/complaints/petitions were filed to frustrate the execution of the
MTC judgment. The summary of which is in page 8. There is no need to know what
they are though.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Monteros acts are justified.
Held:
No.
Montero should be suspended for one year, as recommended by the IBP which found
him guilty of malpractice.
Judging from the number of actions filed, Montero is also guilty of forum shopping.
By having willfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a
favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondents violated the duty of a
member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as
he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws.
Montero has made a mockery of the judicial process. And disregarded the canons in
intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case
was rendered: thus abused procedural rules to defeat the ends of substantial justice.
64 ETERNAL GARDENS v CA
Facts:
Seelin spouses filed a case against Central Dyeing for quieting of title. The spouses
won and the decision in their favor became final an executory.
When the spouses filed a Motion for an Immediate Writ of Possession, Eternal
Gardens Memorial Park Corp opposed claiming that it is the true and registered owner
of the propertyhaving bought the same from Central Dyeing in good faith. It also
argued that it was not bound by the decision since it was not impleaded in the case.
But the trial court favored the spouses and dismissed Eternal Gardens claim since the
judgment (in the queting of title case) was binding upon the latter, being the successorin-interest of Central Dyeing. The CA, on the same grounds, denied Eternal Gardens
appeal.
So Seelin spouses filed for a second writ of execution. Dahil sa makulit (not to mention
optimistic) si Eternal Gardens, nag-file pa ito ulit ng motion reconsideration. It further
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
contended that since there is a pending issue on possession (a different case), such
should first be resolved before a writ of possession be issued to the spouses.
Said motion was initially granted but was later denied. So nag-file ng certiorari si
Eternal sa CA. And of course, they filed the case to the SC, essentially with the same
arguments.
Issue:
Is Eternal Gardens bound by the decision in the quieting of title case?
Held:
Yes. Having admitted that they bought the property from Central Dyeing, Eternal Gardens is
the formers successor-in-interest who will be bound by the judgment. Moreover, being a
transferee, it does not have to be included or impleaded by name in an action against the
transferoraccording to the Rules of Court.
As to the fear that owners of the grave lots will be disturbed by the writ, the order of the court
shows that it took into account the interests of such lot ownersin fact certain limits were
provided. Hence, the execution of the judgment need not necessarily desecrate these
properties.
*whats relevant to ethics:
The case has delayed the execution of a final judgment for 17 years. While lawyers owe
entire devotion to the interests of their clients rights, they should not forget that they are
officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. They should not misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of
justice or unduly delay a case, or impede the execution of a judgment.
65 SPS GALEN v PAGUIRIGAN
Spouses Galen, Rasdas and Villa (COMPLAINANTS) were defendants in a civil case for
recovery of a residential lot. PAGUIRIGAN was their attorney. Judgment was rendered in
favor of the COMPLAINANTS. Trusting in the able representation of Atty PAGUIRIGAN, the
COMPLAINANTS continued the services of the said lawyer when the plaintiff in the civil case
appealed.
The COMPLAINANTS were informed that the CA reversed the trial courts decision. Upon
inquiry in the CA, the COMPLAINANTS found out Atty PAGUIRIGAN failed to file an
appellees brief in their behalf. When COMPLAINANTS confronted PAGUIRIGAN, the lawyer
assured them that he would seek a review of the decision of the CA. The COMPLAINANTS
gave PAGUIRIGAN P10,000 for docket fees.
On Oct 14, 1997, PAGUIRIGAN filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review
on certiorari which the SC granted in its resolution dated Nov 19, 1997. On Nov 20, 1997,
PAGUIRIGAN filed the petition. However, it was denied for having been filed out of time, the
due date being Nov 14, 1997. Subsequently, the COMPLAINANTS were surprised to receive
a writ of execution issued by the trial court.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Hence, this petition.

PAGUIRIGAN alleges that he agreed to represent the COMPLAINANTS without
remuneration when their former counsel withdrew, that he did not file an appellees brief since
the filing of the same though required is not mandatory and that the Court granted his motion
for extension belatedly, considering that the 30 day extension was to expire on Nov 14, 1997
but the SC acted on it only on Nov 19, 1997.
ISSUE
HELD
W/N PAGUIRIGAN SHOULD BE PUNISHED FOR NEGLIGENCE

YES, FOR FAILING TO FILE PETITION AFTER BEEN GRANTED
EXTENSION OF TIME
PAGUIRIGAN was clearly negligent in the performance of his duties. He admits that he failed
to file the appellees brief which just shows the cavalier attitude he took towards his clients
cause. Although the failure to file the appellees brief in a case is not a ground for an adverse
ruling, the importance of filing an appellees brief cannot be gainsaid because upon appeal,
the appellate court, can only place great reliance on the briefs and memoranda of the parties.
Thus, the failure to submit these pleadings could very well be fatal to the cause of the client.
To make matters worse, PAGUIRIGAN did not only fail to file an appellees brief but after
being granted a 30 day extension of the time to file a petition for review of the decision of the
CA, he again lost through default by failing to file said petition. And PAGUIRIGANS
allegation about the SCs belated action on the petition only succeeds in showing his
ignorance of 2 basic principles: first, that a party cannot presume that his motion will be
granted, and, second, that any extension granted is always counted from the last day of the
reglementary period which is Oct 14, 1997 (not from the day the resolution was dated).
PAGUIRIGAN is thus guilty of violation of Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda and briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering
an explanation for his failure to do so.
Hence, PAGUIRIGAN is suspended from the practice of law for 6 months and ordered to
refund the COMPLAINANTS P10,000 with a warning that repitition of the same act will be
dealt with even more severely.
66 SANTIAGO v RAFANAN
Assignment no. 11
Santiago vs. Rafanan Lopez
Facts:

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
This administrative complaint was brought by Jonar Santiago against Atty. Edison
Rafanan, a notary public, because of the latters failure to (a) make the proper notation
regarding the community tax certificate of the affiants; (b) enter the details of the
notarized documents in the notarial register; and (c) make and execute the certification
and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation
of the Revised Administrative Code.
Santiago also points out that Rafanan made an affidavit in favor of his (Rafanan) client
and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he (Rafanan) was actively
representing his client.
The IBP found Rafanan guilty of violating the requirements of the Notarial Law and
imposed a fine of 3,000.
Issue:
W/n Rafanans acts were contrary to law.
Held:
SC says yes. It is mandated by the Notarial Law that a notary public should enter the
number, place of issue and date of the Community Tax Certificate of the affiant in his
affidavit. The law also says that a notary public should keep a notarial register to
record all affidavits they have notarized. They are required to enter the number of the
register and the page where a particular affidavit has been recorded. These
requirements are mandatory due to the degree of importance and evidentiary weight
attached to notarized documents. Having violated these requirements, Rafanan
should be fined.
As to the affidavit executed by Rafanan in favor of his client, the SC says that this is in
violation of Rule 12.08 of Canon 12, which says that a lawyer should avoid testifying in
behalf of his own client. The SC explained that appearing both as counsel and witness
of a client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the
truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested.
Obviously, if a lawyer appears as client and counsel, people would automatically think
that his testimony as a witness is biased in favor of his client.
Despite of this, Rafanan cannot be made administratively liable. First, the SC

considered that it is the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense for the
benefit of the client. Thus, in defense of his client, Rafanan is supposed to do
everything in his power. Since, he is a witness to the crime, his affidavit is essential to
the defense of his client. What he should have done though was to exempt himself
from being counsel. This would ensure his credibility as a witness.
In the end, because of his violation of the Notarial Laws and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Rafanan is fined 3,000.
67 BERBANO v BARCELONA

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Facts: The heirs of Hilapo appointed Atty. Daen as their atty.-in-fact. Atty. Daen was
subsequently arrested by the Muntinlupa police. The heirs of Hilapo tried to look for a
lawyer to secure the release of Atty. Daen. The heirs were recommended to Atty.
Barcelona. When the spouses visited Atty. Daen, they learned that Atty. Daen had
decided to engage the services of Atty. Barcelona. Atty. Barcelona then proceeded to
tell the heirs if they could produce P50K he could secure the release of Atty. Daen the
next day. Because the heirs could not produce the total amount, they merely gave
P15,700.
There were several meetings between the heirs and Atty. Barcelona regarding
the grease money to be used to allegedly bribe an SC justice. The heirs made another
payment via a check worth P24,000. On another occasion, the heirs went to the house
of Atty. Barcelona and gave P10,000. The total amount given by the heirs to Atty.
Barcelona reached P64,000.
Commissioner Bautista found Atty. to be guilty of malpractice and breach of duty
and recommended that he be disbarred.
Issue: W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.
Held: Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. Its intention is to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the court and public from the misconduct of the
officers of the court.
In this case, Atty. demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting that he had
connections to secure the release of Atty. Daen. Atty. Barcelona misrepresented to the
complainant that he could get the release of Atty. Daen with his connection with a
Supreme Court Justice. Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal processes,
Atty. Barcelona demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a client under the
pretext of having connections with a member of this court.
68 ALMARVEZ v PAAS
Facts:
Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Estrellita Paas administratively charged
Almarvez, a Court Aide/Utility Worker, with discourtesy to his fellow employees,
neglect in performing duties (by not maintaining the cleanliness around the court
premises and often being absent from work), and solicitation of money (from prisoners
before serving them their Release Orders, and from litigants by offering to divulge
confidential information in advance of its unauthorized release).
The Court found that the aforementioned charges were not supported by evidence
since those who filed affidavits as evidence against Almarvez were not presented at
the hearings. The only offense which Almarvez was found to commit was inefficiency
in the discharge of his duties. Thus he was suspended for 3 months.
Almarvez had filed a counterclaim alleging that Judge Paas ordered him to undergo a
drug test after the latter had already filed an administrative complaint against him.
Regarding this, the court held that this elicits the suspicion the Judge is just fishing for
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
more evidence to support the administrative case she had already filed against
Almarvez. This was held to constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the
judiciary, for which Judge Paas should be duly reprimanded.
In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was found that
Judge Paas husband, Atty. Paas, who is a private practitioner, was using his wifes
office address in his law practice, particularly in a criminal case he was handling which
was docketed at an RTC also in Pasay. In support of this charge, documents were
submitted such as 1) a Notice of Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, and 2) notices from
Pasay City RTC, and from the Supreme Court
This was admitted by Judge Paas, but she claims that this was done only to ensure
and facilitate the delivery of those notices.
Issue: W/N Judge Paas and Atty. Paas should be penalized for allowing the latter to use the
office of the former as his return address in his private practice.
Held: YES
Using the Judges address is a subtle was of sending a message that Atty. Paas is the
husband of a judge in the same building and should be given special treatment by
other judges or court personnel.
In SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, it was stated that court officials and
employees must never use their officesfor any other purpose that for court or
judicial functions.
Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a judge should avoid impropriety in all activities
and shall not allow the use of the judicial office to advance the private interests of
others.
SC Circular No. 3-92 prohibits the use of halls of justice for residential or commercial
purposes.
It is unprofessional and dishonorable to misuse a public office to enhance a lawyers
prestige. It violates canons 3, 10, 13, and 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Atty. Paas is suspended for 3 months from the practice of law, while Judge Paas
shall pay a fine of P12,000
69 NESTLE v SANCHEZ
FACTS:
From July 8-10, union members of Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly
Independent Labor Union, who filed a case in court intensified their pickets that they
had been conducting since June 17 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the SC
Despite of the warning given by the court to their leaders and counsel, the picketing
continued
The union members are obstructing the access to and egress from the courts
premises. They have also constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up
kitchens and littered the place. they took turns haranguing the court all day long with
the use of loudspeakers
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
ISSUE:
W/N the rallyists must be held with contempt
HELD:
The contempt charges were dismissed
The Counsel of the union members apologized to the court and promised that the
incident will not be repeated again
The picketing was actually done by the members of the PAMANTIK (Pagkakaisa ng
MAnggagawa sa Timog Katalugan), an unregistered loose allegiance of about 75
unions in the Southern Tagalog and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the
Kimberly Independent Labor Union.
But the court will not hesitate in future similar incidents to apply the full force of the law
and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the court to acting one way or
the other in any case pending before it.
The court is entitled to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner,
free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice.
Any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either
right amounts to an abuse thereof and is no longer within the ambit of constitutional
protection, and that any such efforts to influence the court constitutes contempt of
court.
70 REGALA v SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Petitioners in this case and private respondent Roco were all then partners of the law
firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (commonly known as
ACCRA)
ACCRA performed services for clients which included acquiring and/or organizing
business associations and/or organizations where it acted as incorporators or simply
as stockholders
As members of the law firm, petitioners and Roco admit that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition of companies included in Civil Case No. 0033. In keeping
with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders. Anong
kalokohan yan?
o Civil Case No. 0033 RP v. Eduardo Cojuangco et. al., for the recovery of illgotten wealth, which includes shares of stock in certain corporations
PCGG later on filed a motion to admit 3rd amended complaint, which excluded Roco in
Civil Case 33 as party defendant. PCGG was removing Roco because Roco was
going to make choochoo and reveal the identity of the principals.
The ACCRA lawyers then filed a comment and/or opposition saying that they should
also be removed the way that Roco was.
PCGG then said that it will ask for their exclusion only if they will also disclose the
identity of their clients

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
During the proceedings, Roco did not actually reveal the identity of the client for whom
he acted as nominee-stockholder
The ACCRA lawyers motion for exclusion was denied (they refused to comply with the
PCGGs offer) by the PCGG and the court. Hence, this motion for certiorari
Issue:
W/N the ACCRA lawyers should be excluded from the case
Held:
Yes. It is apparent that the ACCRA lawyers were only impleaded to force them to
disclose the identity of their clients.
PCGG has no valid cause of action
Issue:
W/N the attorney-client privilege prohibits the ACCRA lawyers from revealing the
Held:
General rule: a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery
o Exceptions: where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers
advice
o Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability
o Where revealing the identity would furnish the only link that would be necessary
to convict an individual of a crime
The prosecution should rely on the strength of their evidence and not on the weakness
of the defense
Roco merely stated that he was acting as nominee-stockholder for the client and is
part of legitimate lawyering. The ACCRA lawyers also made such statement and
should also be dropped.
In re: Canon 14
the relation of attorney and client is strictly personal and highly confidential and
fiduciary
the lawyer is more than a mere agent or servant because he possesses special
powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client
71 DAROY v LEGASPI
FACTS:
Complainants charged Atty. Ramon Chavez- Legaspi with malpractice for having
misappropriated the sum of P4,000.00 which he had collected for them. They prayed
that he be disbarred
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
FACTUAL EVIDENCE: Complainants hired Atty. Legaspi to represent them in the

intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the spouses Gonzaga. The
complainant-heirs in a joint petition, which Atty. Legaspi signed as counsel agreed that
the coconut land left by the decedents would be divided into 6 equal parts and that the
proceeds of the sale of the land would be distributed among them.
Atty. Legaspi wrote to the father of Mrs. Daroy, Teofilo Legaspi that the money
deposited could be withdrawn. However, Atty. Legaspi had already withdrawn the
money (therefore he acted in bad faith). It turned out that Atty. Legaspi was also an
heir (although it wasnt shown how).
ISSUE: WoN Atty. Legaspi should be disbarred because he violated the relation between
attorney and his client?
HELD: YES!
RATIO:
1. The relation between an atty and his client is higly fiduciary in nature and of a very delicate,
exacting and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith. In view
of that special relationship, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property
received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on money in his hands collected for his
clients does not relieve him from the duty of promptly accounting for the funds received.
2. The complainants, however, have to recover the money in an ordinary action, and not in
this disbarment proceeding.
72 DEE v CA
Dee and his father went to the residence of Atty Mutuc to seek his advice regarding the
problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioners brother Dewey Dee, to Ceasars Palace.
Petitioners father was apprehensive over the safety of his son, Dewey having heard of a link
between the mafia and Ceasars Palace and his possibility that his son may be harmed at the
instance of the latter.
Atty Mutuc assured petitioner and his father that he would inquire into the matter, after which
his services were reportedly contracted for P100,000.
Further investigations revealed that the alleged debt of Dewey had actually been incurred by
Ramon Sy, with Dewey merely signing for the chits. Atty Mutuc talked with the president of
Ceasars palace and advised the president that for the sake and in the interest of the casino it
would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The president told him that
if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey would be exculpated
from liability. Ramon Sy acknowledged the obligation, thereafter, the account of Dewey was
cleared.
Atty Mutuc sent demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000 as attorneys
fees. Petitioner Dee ignored said letters. Atty Mutuc filed a complaint against petitioner Dee
for the collection of attorneys fees.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Petitioner denied the existence of any professional relationship of attorney and client between
hin and Atty Mutuc. Dee insists that the visits made to Atty Mutuc was merely informal and
that Atty Mutuc had not been specifically contacted to handle the problem. The P50,000
given to Atty Mutuc was alleged to be given not in the nature of attorneys fees but merely
pocket money.
Issue:
W/n there was a lawyer-client relationship
Held:
YES. The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a
professional relationship which merits attorneys fees for professional services rendered. To
establish the relationship, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is
sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation
is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of a
request from the latter. Therefore, Mutuc is entitled to receive a reasonable compensation.
Atty Mutuc did not represent conflicting interests as claimed by Dee when Dee alleged that
Mutuc was acting as agent of Ceasars Palace. Mutucs representations in behalf of
petitioner Dee were not in resistance to the casinos claim but were actually geared toward
proving the liability of true debtor, Ramon Sy.
73 BR SEBASTIAN v CA
Facts:
Eulogio Reyes, before he died filed an action for damages against the Director of
Public Works, and BR Sebastian.
BR Sebastian (BRS) was held to be liable, but the Director of Public Works was
exonerated.
BRS appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, Reyes died. He was substituted
by his heirs (the Reyeses).
In 1974, BRS received notice to file Appelants Brief within 45 days from receipt.
Counsel for BRS (The Baizas, Alberto and Associates) failed to file the brief.
The appeal was then dismissed.
Much later, around 5 months after the deadline, Baizas Law Office (different daw from
the former one) file a motion for reconsideration. It alleged that as a result of the death
of Atty Crispin Baizas, senior partner, the affairs of the aid firm are still being settled
between Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin) and Atty Ruby Alberto. And that Atty
Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and who is believed to have
also attended to the preparation of the Appelants Brief but failed to submit it through
oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm.
Issue:
W/N the appeal of BR Sebastian should be reinstated.
Held:
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
No.
In this case, no fraud is involved. Only simple negligence on the part of the BRS
counsel.
The confusion in the office of the law firm following the death of Aty Crispin Baizas is
not a valid justification for its failure to file the brief.
The responsibility of the associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until
withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of
Court.
The law firm should have assigned the case to another associate. Or it could have
withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the
petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer.
The negligence of the counsel binds the client.
74 HILADO v DAVID
Facts:
Blandina Hilado (ganda ng pangalan!) brought an action against Selim Assad to annul
the sale of several houses and lot exected by Hilados husband.
Delgado et al. was counsel for Hilado, while Ohnick et al filed an answer for Assad.
Later on, Atty Vicente Francisco entered his appearance for Assad substituting Ohnick
et al.
The firm of Delgado urged Atty Francisco to stop representing Assad since there exists
an atty-client relationship between him (Francisco) and the other party (Hilado) in the
same case.
It was alleged that Hilado consulted Francisco regarding the case and that the former
turned over papers to the latter. From such documents, Francisco sent a written
opinion to Hilado.
Since makulit si Francisco, Delgado et al. sought to disqualify Francisco from
representing Assad in the case.
Franciscos defense was that he only met Hilado once and this was when the latter
informed him about the case. He added that when Hilado left documents in their office,
he told his assistant to tell Hilado that their firm would not handle her case. And that
the written opinion was made by his assistant, which he signed without reading, and
only for the purpose of explaining to Hilado why his firm rejected the case.
David is the judge trying the case who dismissed the complaint for disqualification
against Francisco. Said judge reasoned that no attorney-client relationship existed
between Hilado and Francisco.
Issue:
Was there an attorney-client relationship between Francisco and Hilado?
Should Atty Francisco be disqualified from representing Assad?
Held:
The firm of Francisco mailed a written opinion to Hilado on the merits of the case (with
Franciscos signature); this opinion was reached on the basis of papers submitted at his
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
office; and that Hilados purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Franciscos
professional services. From these ultimate facts, an attorney-client relationship between
Francisco and Hilado can be said to have ensued.
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed
the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer
should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. When
a person consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view of obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such
consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.
The existence of attorney-client relationship precludes the attorney from representing (and
receiving a retainer from) the opposite party in the same case.
An information professionally obtained by an attorney from a client is sacred to the
employment to which it pertains, and to permit it be used in the interest of another, or in the
interest of the adverse party is to strike at the element of confidence which forms the basis of
an attorney-client relationship.
The rule inhibiting an attorney from acting in behalf of both parties is implied in the Rules of
Court (wala pang codified codes of professional responsibility noon).
The defense that Francisco never read the written opinion nor the documents submitted by
Hilado will not preclude the existence of an attorney-client relationship. The fact remains that
his firm did give Hilado a formal professional advice from which emerged the relation. The
letter binds and estops him in the same manner and degree as if he wrote it personally. And
an information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of the firm is information
imparted to the firm.
The failure to object to counsels appearance does not operate as a waiver of the right to ask
for counsels disqualification.
Motion for disqualification against Attorney Francisco should be allowed.
*A retaining fee (just in case itanong) is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to
insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client.
75 SANTOS v BELTRAN
US.
76 NAKPIL v VALDES

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Facts:
Jose Nakpil was interested in a piece of property situated in Moran, Baguio. He went
into an agreement with Atty. Carlos Valdes for the latter to buy the property in trust for
Nakpil.
Valdes did buy the property by contracting 2 loans. The lands titles were transferred
to his name.
When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda Nakpil (his wife) acquired the services of Valdes and
his accounting and law firms for the settlement of the estate of Jose Nakpil.
What Valdes did was to exclude the property in Baguio from the list of assets of Jose
Nakpil (he actually transferred the property to his company, the Caval Realty
Corporation) while including the loans he contracted.
What Imelda did was to file a suit for reconveyance in the CFI. While the case was
pending, Imelda also filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Valdes.
The CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance. The CA reversed the CFI.
The complaint for reconveyance went up to the SC and was decided in favor of Nakpil.
The SC held that Valdes only held the lots in trust for Nakpil.
Issue:
W/n Atty. Valdes should be administratively sanctioned for his acts, namely:
o Excluding the property in Baguio from the estate of Jose Nakpil;
o Including his loans as claims on the estate; and
o Apparently, representing conflicting interests when his accounting firm prepared
the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN against the estate of
Jose Nakpil, which was represented by his law firm.
Held:
The SC found Valdes guilty of misconduct and suspends him for 1 year.
The Court held that the first two acts clearly show that Valdes broke the trust reposed
on him by Imelda Nakpil when the latter agreed to use his professional services as a
lawyer and an accountant. It was clear that Jose Nakpil and Atty. Came to an
agreement that the latter would be buying the property in trust for Jose. By his act of
excluding the property from the estate and including the loans he contracted (and used
for his own benefit) as claims, Valdes took for granted the trust formed between Jose
and him (they had a close relationship since the 50s), which was the basis for
Imeldas decision to use his services.
As to the third charge, we hold respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests
which is proscribed by Canon 15 Rule 15.03. In the case at bar, there is no question
that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other.
Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate
and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is
clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and
that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.
77 ARTEZUELA v MADERAZO

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Facts: Echavia had a vehicular accident in Mandaue City. Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar
owned by a Japanese national but in the name of his brother-in-law Villapez. The car
rammed into a small carinderia owned by Artezuela.
Artezuela engaged the services of Atty. Maderazo in filing a damage suit
against Echavia. Artezuela paid Maderazo the amount of P10,000 as attorneys fees
and P2,000 as filing fee.
Artezuela filed a suit for disbarment against Maderazo. She alleged that
Maderazo grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer. According to Artezuela, atty. did not
do anything to keep the case moving and atty. withdrew his services without obtaining
Artezuelas consent. Artezuela also alleged that Atty. Maderazo engaged in activities
inimical to her interests. She says that while acting as her counsel, Atty. Maderazo
prepared Echavias answer.
Atty. Maderazo claims that the document of Echavia was not prepared by him.
According to him, the answer by Echavia was only printed in his office.
Issue: W/N Atty. Maderazo represented conflicting interests.
Held: Atty. Maderazo represented conflicting interests. Suspension of 6 months.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one
party need not also be the counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to
hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party. It is enough that the counsel of one
party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of another party who is
claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of the original client.
Because of the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and the client, sound
public policy dictates that the lawyer be prohibited from representing conflicting
interests or discharging inconsistent duties.
78 HORNILLA v SALUNAT
Facts:
Salunat was a member of the Phil. Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA) Board,
which approved Atty. Salunats engagement as counsel of PPSTA
Complainants, who are members of PPSTA, filed an intracorporate case against its
Board of Directors. Atty. Salunat entered his appearance as counsel for the board
members in said cases.
Complainants contend the Atty. Salunat was guilty of conflict of interest because he was
engaged by PPSTA, of which complainants were members, and was being paid out of
its corporate funds where complainants have contributed.
Atty. Salunat pointed out that he entered his appearance as counsel for the board
members for and in behalf of ASSA Law and Associates. He also stated that it was
another partner of the firm, Atty. Agustin who handled the case.
Issue: W/N Atty. Salunat engaged in conflicting interests.
Held: YES.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
In a derivative suit such as the one filed by the complainants against the BOD of
PPSTA, the prevailing rule is that the lawyer engaged by the corporation may not
represent the directors, since that would give rise to a conflict of interest. The interest
of the corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by the interest of the
individual corporate officials.
That Atty.Salunat entered his appearance in behalf of ASSA Law Firm doesnt exonerate
him. He admitted that ASSA was the retained counsel of PPSTA.
Since this is the first offense, respondent is admonished to observe a high degree of
fidelity in the practice of his profession.
79 NATAN v CAPULE
FACTS:
Natan is the administrator of the estate of the deceased Maria Patero.
Natan had filed an action against Santiago, the husband of Maria Patero to recover
Marias share in the conjugal property. of Santiagos share in Hacienda Minit was
ordered to be delivered to Maria
Capule was contracted by Natan to file an action of forcible entry against Edonga, etc.
and he delivered to him various documents including the decision of the previous court
on the partition of the property of Santiago, specifically Hacienda Minit, which was
received by Maria.
Partial payments were received by Capule from Natan amounting to P275 but Capule
was unable to attend the hearing. Since the Judge refused to grant postponement,
Natan handled the case personally, being an attorney himself.
Thereafter, Capule represented Olimpio Patero, claiming that he is the sole heir of
Santiago Patero and in possession of Hacienda Minit, and filed an administrative case
against Natan asking the court to order Natan to return of Hacienda Minit.
ISSUE:
W/N Capule violated his duty as a lawyer
HELD:
YES! And the court sentenced him to be suspended him from the exercise of his
profession for the period of 2 years
Capule had utilized the papers, knowledge and information that he had received from
his former client Natan in connection to the Hacienda Minit against Natan and for the
benefit of his new client Olimpio Patero
Capule, because of his previous relationship with Natan, was disqualified to accept the
case of Olimpio who claims ownership over Hacienda Minit.
The fact the Capule retired from the forcible entry case prior to retaining the case of
Olimpio did not relieve him from his obligation of fidelity and loyalty to his former client.
The inconsistency between his position as attorney of Natan and that of Olimpio is so
apparent that it could not have escaped his attention

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
An attorney may not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any
matter in which he formerly represented him, nor may he, at any time, use against his
former client knowledge or information acquired by virtue of his previous relationship.
80 BAUTISTA v BARRIOS
Facts:
Rufina Bautista engaged the services of Atty. Barrios to draft an extra-judicial partition
between Bautista and her brothers and sisters and Rovero on the other side. Barrios
prepared the deed.
Rovero later on refused to comply with the terms of the deed. Bautista sued him.
Instead of representing Bautista, Barrios instead appeared for Rovero.
Barrios defense: it was Rovero who engaged his services in preparing the deed and
not Bautista
Issue:
W/N Barrios may handle a case nullify a contract which he prepared
Held:
No, he may not. Suspended for 2 years.
When Bautista approached Barrios to enforce the deed, Barrios merely said that she
has no cause of action. Barrios did not inform her that he was already representing
Rovero.
Supposing that Barrios was indeed representing both Bautista and Rovero, he could
not appear for one as against another.
81 GAMILLA v MARIO
FACTS:
Atty Marino, Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union and other union officers entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with the management of UST for the provision
of economic benefits amounting to P35 Milllion. The 1986 collective bargaining
agreement expired in 1988 but efforts to forge a new one unfortunately failed. In 1989,
the faculty members of UST went on strike and as a counter-measure UST terminated
the employment of 16 officers and directors of the UST Faculty Union including Atty
Marino, Jr.
The Sec of Labor prescribed the retroactivity of the collective bargaining agreement to
1988 when the 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired. In the same year, the
administration of UST and the UST Faculty Union also entered into a compromise
agreement for the payment to settle backwages.
The important fact in this case is that Atty, Marino, as president, negotiated with UST
as union attorney, even though he was an interested party since he was one of the
officers who were dismissed (conflict of interests)
ISSUE: WoN Marino should be reprimanded?
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
HELD: YES
RATIO:
1. Atty Marino failed to avoid conflict of interests, first, when he negotiated for the
compromise agreement wherein he played the diverse roles of union president, union
atty and interested party being one of the dismissed employees seeking his own
restitution, and thereafter, when he obtained the attys fees of P4,200,000.00 without
full prior disclosure of the circumstances justifying such clain to the members of the
UST Faculty Union.
2. As one of the 16 union officers and directors seeking compensation from the UST for
their illegal dismissal, Atty. Marino was involved in obvious conflict of interests when in
addition he chose to act as concurrent lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union
in forging the compromise agreement. The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an atty from the full discharge of
his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
or double-dealing in the performance thereof. In the same manner, it is undoubtedly a
conflict of interests for an atty to put himself in a position where self-interest tempts, or
worse, actually impels him to do less than his best for his client.
3. Atty Marino. Both as lawyer and president of the union was duty bound to protect and
advance the interest of the union members and the bargaining unit above his own.
This obligation was jeopardized when his personal interest complicated the negotiation
process and eventually resulted in the lopsided compromise agreement that rightly or
wrongly brought money to him at the expense of the other faculty members. He also
ought to have disclosed his interest (which he only did only years after the
consummation of his share.. tsk bad.)
82 SUNTAY v SUNTAY
Facts:
The complaint for disbarment was filed by Frederico Suntay against his nephew, Atty Suntay,
alleging that respondent was his legal counsel who was privy to all his legal, and political
affairs. Since they parted ways, Atty Suntay had been filing complaints and cases against
complainant making use of confidential information gained while their attorney-client
relationship existed.
In addition, complainant Suntay alleged that respondent Atty Suntay pursued a case against
him for violation of PD 296 for the alleged disappearance of 2 creeks traversing
complainants fishpond. Complainant alleged that Atty Suntay s possession of the TCT and
the blueprint plan of the property while he was still counsel for complainant provided him with
the information that there used to be 2 creeks traversing the fishpond
In one case, Magno Dinglasan demanded from complainant P150,000 as consideration for
the destruction of complainants record in the BIR, in which Dinglasan is an officer. When
complainat declined the demand, Dinglasan charged complainant with the crime of false
testimony and grave oral defamation. During the preliminary investigation, Atty Sntay acted
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
as counsel of Magno Dinglasan. Complainant testified that he consulted Atty Suntay about
the demand made by Dinglasan.
Issue:
Whether the acts of Atty Suntay in filing the complaints constitute malpractice
Held:
YES. Atty Suntay acted as counself for clients in case involving subject matters regarding
which he had either been previously helped complainant to administer as the latters counsel
and confidant. A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after
termination of the attorney-client relation.
It is also not necessary to specify the alleged confidential information used. To make the
passing of confidential information a condition precedent would not enhance the welfare of
the litigants. Hence, the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of
attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests.
Atty Suntay is suspended for 2 years.
83 DOCENA V LIMON
Facts:
Atty. Limon was the Docena spouses lawyer for their appeal in a Forcible Entry case.
He then required the Docena spouses to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of
P10,000.00 allegedly to stay the execution of the appealed decision
The Docenas obtained a loan of P3,000.00 from the Borongan, Eastern Samar
Branch of the Development Bank of the Philippines; borrowed P2,140.00 from a
private individual; and applied for an agricultural loan of P4,860.00 from the Borongan,
Samar Branch of the Philippine National Bank, wherein Limon himself acted as
guarantor.
When The Docenas went to the CFI to withdraw the bond after the case, they
discovered that no such bond was ever posted by Limon.
Limon claims that the P10T was just his attorneys fees.
Issue:
W/N Limon should be sanctioned.
Held:
He should be DISBARRED!
By extorting money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation, respondent
Limon has reduced the law profession to a level so base, so low and dishonorable,
and most contemptible.
He has sullied the integrity of his brethren in the law and has, indirectly, eroded the
peoples' confidence in the judicial system. By his reprehensible conduct, which is
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
reflective of his depraved character, respondent has made himself unworthy to remain
in the Roll of Attorneys.
84 SEVILLA v SALUBRE
Facts:
Salubre, prior to being a judge, was Sevillas counsel in a civil case for repurchase and
damages.
Upon advice of Salubre, Sevilla gave P45k to him to be consigned with the court as
repurchase money.
Instead of consigning it to the court, Salubre deposited the money in his own account
and later used personally by him.
Salubre promised Sevilla that he would pay the sum of money. He even issued a
promissory note for said amount. Several extensions were sought by Salubre but he
still failed to pay. Later on, checks were issued to cover the indebtedness. But these
were dishonored on the ground account closed. By the time the case was referred to
the Office of Court Administrator, the amount due was around P77k (45k as principal
and 32k as interest).
Salubres appointment as judge did not extinguish the obligation incurred by him when
he was still a trial lawyer.
Salubres defense was that the complaint was a result of misunderstanding and the
filing of an Affidavit of Desistance is proof that the matter was already resolved. It was
shown that Salubre later returned the funds to Sevilla after the case for estafa was
filed.
Salubre also claimed that the money he received from Sevilla was supposed to be the
latters payment for his appearance and other litigation expenses
Issue:
Should Salubre still be held liable for his acts despite the desistance of the complainant?
Held:
Yes. The Affidavit of Desistance did not divest the Court of its jurisdiction to impose
administrative sanctions upon Salubre. Complainants voluntary desistance does not confirm
nor deny Salubres non-culpability. The primary object of administrative cases against lawyers
is not only to punish and discipline erring lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of
justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove
from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyers oath have proven
them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.
Administrative cases against lawyers can still proceed despite the dismissal of civil and/or
criminal cases against them.
Salubre violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his failure to return
the funds of his client upon demand. His appointment as Judge is not a valid reason not to
properly address the demand of complainant. The fact that he was eventually appointed as
Judge will not exculpate him from taking responsibility of the consequences of his acts as an
officer of the court. His defense that the money was supposed to be Sevillas payment for his
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
services should have been made known to the latter at the earliest time when the demand
was made. Instead, he bombarded complainant with a long line of promises hoping that the
latter would allow the matter to be, eventually, left unsettled.
Salubre, by delaying payment of his obligation, failed to keep up with the exacting standards
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
There was an allegation of violation of Canon 17 but this was not substantiated. Salubre is
fined and given a stern warning.
85 CUNANAN v RIMORIN
FACTS
CUNANAN, a retired US citizen, engaged the services of ATTY RIMORIN in the matter
of settling his overstaying alien status with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation so tat he could attend the funeral of his son, Andrew Cunanan, in the
United States
CUNANAN verbally agreed to pay ATTY RIMORIN P40,000
This amount was to be paid out of the goodwill money to be paid by ABS-CBN,
represented by NOLI DE CASTRO, in exchange for an exclusive interview regarding
the story of CUNANANS son, Andrew
For the 1st partial payment, NOLI acting in behalf of ABS-CBN, issued a check for
P100,000 payable to ATTY RIMORIN
To complete payment, ABS-CBN deposited the balance of P100,000 in the bank
account of ATTY RIMORIN
According to the affidavit of NOLI, the 2 payments were intended for CUNANAN
ATTY RIMORIN sent a letter to CUNANAN stating due to rains there is no way of
checking whether the check deposited by ABS-CBN has been clearedIll try my very
best to produce the other P30,000 today
CUNANAN indeed received P30,000 but after that there was no more communication
from ATTY RIMORIN
Hence, CUNANAN filed an administrative case with the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline for the disbarment of ATTY RIMORIN and for failing to render the accounting
of P200,000 which the lawyer received in trust for him]
ISSUE
HELD
W/N ATTY RIMORIN SHOULD BE REPRIMANDED

YES, VIOLATED CANON 16 RULE 16.01
RATIO
It was established that the P200,000 were received by ATTY RIMORIN for the benefit
of and in trust of CUNANAN, as corroborated by NOLI in his affidavit

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
The highly fiduciary and confidential relation of attorney and client require that ATTY
RIMORIN should promptly account for the said funds which he received and held for
the benefit of his client, CUNANAN, because those funds properly belong to the latter
From the time of the filing of the administrative case until the present, CUNANANS
demand for accounting has not yet been satisfied by ATTY RIMORIN
Thus, ATTY RIMORIN fell short of his duty as a lawyer under Canon 16 Rule 16.01
and should be penalized accordingly
JUDGMENT
Suspended for 1 year and to render an accounting of P170,000 representing the balance of
P200,000
86 LICUANAN v MELO
Facts:
Leonila Licuanan won in an ejectment case against Aida Pineda. Her counsel in that
case was Atty. Manuel Melo.
The judgment ordered Pineda to pay rentals, in arrears and succeeding, to Licuanan.
It was Melo who demanded payment from Pineda. After being threatened with
another lawsuit, Pineda paid the rentals to Melo (worth P5,220).
Licuanan never got the payments so she filed an administrative complaint against
Pineda before the Chief of the Philippine Tuberculosis Society accusing her of moral
turpitude. In response, Pineda filed an action for damages (on the ground of
besmirched reputation and mental anguish) against Licuanan because Pineda
believed that she had already paid her debt by paying to Melo.
After 1 year, Licuanan, through another lawyer, then finds out that the money paid by
Pineda was with Melo. Melo then gives the rentals to Licuanan.
Licuanan then files this complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator against
Melo for breach of professional ethics.
Issue:
W/n Melo should be sanctioned for his acts.
Held:
Yes, he should be sanctioned. In fact, the SC disbarred him.
The acts of respondent in retaining for his personal benefit over a one-year period, the
amount of P5,220 received by him on behalf of his client, Licuanan, depriving her of
its use, and withholding information on the same despite inquiries made by her, is a
breach of the Lawyer's Oath to which he swore observance, and an evident
transgression of the Canons of Professional Ethics (16.01, 16.02, 16.03).
Respondent's unprofessional acts considered, the SC was constrained to find him
guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has displayed lack of
honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not to delay any man for
money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proven
himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He
deserves the severest punishment, which is disbarment.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
87 MARQUEZ v MENESES
Facts: Marquez was introduced by Atty. Peralta to Atty. Meneses as a prospective client.
Marquez retained the services of Atty. Meneses to prosecute a claim of P210 against
Igdanes. The agreement was that Marquez was to pay Meneses a fee of P100 whether
the case was won or lost. Marquez advanced the amount from time to time, totaling
P75.
The decision of the Justice of the Peace Court was in favor of Marquez,
ordering Igdanes to pay the P210 claim and P75 as attorneys fees. Marquez received a
letter from her brother saying that Igdanes had paid the P75 to the sheriff as partial
satisfaction and that Atty. Meneses had gotten all of the P75. Marquez went to see Atty.
Meneses to claim P50 of the P75 that the latter got. Marquez claims that Meneses was
only entitled to P25 of the amount paid because she had already given the Atty. P75.
Atty. Meneses contends that Marquez owes her money because he was entitled to the
retainer fee (P100) and whatever contingent fees that may be awarded by the court.
Sol. Gen. says that Atty. Meneses must return the amount of P50 to Marquez.
The Sol. Gen. also recommended the suspension of Atty. Meneses for at least 6
months.
Issue: W/N Atty. Meneses should return the amount.
Held: Atty. Meneses should return the amount of P 50. Suspension of 1 month.
It is highly improbable that Marquez would agree to pay P175 as fees to atty.
considering the fact that the claim was only for P210. An atty.s fee of P175 is
unconscionable. It is well-settled that money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a
judgment in favor of his client is money held in trust and must be immediately turned
over. Atty. Meneses should have made an accounting with his client of the amount he
received.
88 CASTILLO v TAGUINES
Facts:
Castillo alleged that Atty. Taguines failed to delver to him P500 representing the
monetary settlement of a civil suit between Castillo and Licup.
Taguines was the counsel of defendant Licup in the said case, where Castillo was the
plaintiff. It was agreed that Licup will give P500.00 for the settlement of the case to
Taguines, and Taguines will give the amount to Castillo. For this consideration, Castillo
had the case against Licup dismissed.
No money was given to Castillo, and the latter only found out in the second week of
January 79 that Licup had already given the money to Taguines since Dec.16, 78
Castillo found out when Licup showed him a certification signed by Taguines that the
latter received the amount.
Taguines defense is that although he received the money from Licup, he never bound
himself to go out of his way to personally deliver the money to Castillo or his lawyer, and
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Taguines said he does not know personally Castillo or his address.

Castillo states that Taguines set a date to meet with him but never showed up nor called
afterwards.
Taguines later on gave Castillo a bouncing check worth P500.
Issue: W/N Taguines must be held administratively liable for not delivering the money to
Castillo and for fooling the complainant by giving a bouncing check.
Held: YES.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall hold in
trust all money and property of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.03
of the same canon provides that a lawyer shall deliver the funds or property of his client
when due or upon demand.
Taguines is suspended for one year.
89 LEMOINE v BALON
FACTS:
Lemoine is a French national who filed an insurance claim with Metropolitan
Insurance.
His friend Jesus Garcia arranged for the engagement of Balons services as his
counsel
Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of the actual amount to being
recovered payable upon successful recovery. An advance payment of P50,000 to be
deducted from whatever amount would be successfully collected. P1,000 as
appearance and conference fee for each and every court hearing and legal expenses
and other miscellaneous will be charged to Lemoines account which would be
reimbursed upon presentment of account. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the
fee.
Lemoine signed an undated Special Power of Attorney authorizing Balon to bring any
action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of Lemoines claim as well as
to negotiate, sign, compromise, encash and receive payments
Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoines claim and Balon confirmed his
acceptance of the offer
December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a China Bank check payable to
Lemoine in the amount of P525,000 which was received by Balon
When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case, Balon answered that
Metropolitan Insurance was offering P350,000 for settlement which Lemoine
suggested that Balon accept to avoid litigation
December 1999, Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance to ask on the
status of the case and it answered that the case was long settled via a check given to
Balon.
Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of the check and that he is keeping the
check as attorneys lien pending Lemoines payment of his attorneys fee equivalent to
50% of the entire amount collected. He also threatened Lemoine that he will not
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
hesitate to make proper representation with the Bureau of Immigration and

Deportation, DOLE and BIR if Lemoine will make any trouble to Balon and that he has
good network with the mentioned agencies.
Balon later claimed that he gave P233,000 to Garcia on the representation of
Lemoine. No written memorandum of the turn-over was made because Garcia was a
co-Rotarian and co-attorney of Balon
Balon was in possession of the said check for 5 years
ISSUE:
W/N Balon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
YES! And he was ordered disbarred by the SC

The lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the client
agrees with the amount of attorneys fees to e charged. In case of disagreement,
however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the
payment of his fees. He can file the necessary action with the proper court to fix the
fees
Before receiving the check, he proposes a 25% attorneys fees, after receiving the
check, he was already asking for 50%.
under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful
acts , must observe fairness in all his dealings with his client and must hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client
a lawyer who practices deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his duty
of fidelity loyalty and devotion to the clients cause but also degrades himself and
besmirches the name of an honorable profession.
90 MELENDRES v DECENA
Facts:
(1st cause of action)
Aug. 5, 1975: Complainants (spouses Erlinda Dalman & Narciso Melendrez) obtained
from Atty. Reynerio Decena (Decena) a loan of P4K. This loan was secured by a real
estate mortgage.
It was made to appear in the REM that the amount borrowed was P5K. Decena
assured the spouses that the REM was a mere formality, and due to this assurance
the spouses signed the REM.
Despite the assurance, Decena collected from the spouses P500/month as usurious
interest. The spouses paid such usurious interest for 3 months.
Because of their failure to pay the amounts, Decena drafted a new REM
o New contract of mortgage in the amount of P10K with interest at 19%/annum
o A special power of attorney authorizing Decena to sell the mortgaged property
in public auction
Spouses never knew the implications of the new REM. They failed to pay their
obligation and so Decena acquired their property in pulic auction and later sold it to
Trinidad Ylanan for P12K
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Spouses then went to Decena with P10K in the hopes of getting their property back.
Decena then informs them that their debt has soared to P20.4K.
With shattered hopes and grief in their hearts (andrama!), the spouses filed this case
for disbarment.
(2nd cause of action)

Spouses filed a case for estafa against Reynaldo Pineda for recovery of P2K
Decena entered into a compromise agreement with Pineda. Pineda then paid P500 to
Decena. This settlement was never brought to the attention of the spouses nor were
they ever consulted about such.
Issue:
W/N Decenas acts show gross misconduct and should therefore be disbarred
Held:
Yes, Decena shall be disbarred
The acts of Decena as to the 1 st cause of action constitute deception, dishonesty and
conduct unbecoming a member of the bar.
As to the 2nd cause of action, Decena clearly failed to get the consent of the spouses
before entering into a compromise. Decena also failed to inform the spouses or turn
over to them the P500 given to him by Pineda as downpayment for the settlement of
the case.
Decenas failure to turn over to the spouses the money underscores his lack of
honesty and candor in dealing with his clients
91 JUNIO v GRUPO
FACTS:
Rosario Junio engaged the services of Atty. Salvador Grupo for the redemption
of a land belonging to her parents. She gave P25,000 to be used in the
redemption, yet Atty. Grupo did not redeem the property and has continuously
refused to refund the money given.
Junio filed a complaint for disbarment for malpractice and gross misconduct
Attu. Grupo contends that the land could really not be redeemed anymore, and
that since Junio knew that the mortgage has already expired, she knew that it
was just a last ditch effort to redeem the property. Atty. Grupo then borrowed
some of the money for himself to help defray his childrens educational
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
expenses. (personal request evidenced by a PN executed in favor of Junio

Atty. Grupo contends that their families were really very close and intimate with
each other Junios sisters were maids of Atty. Grupo)
Atty. Grupo claims that there was no atty-client relationship and further
contends that he did not ask for any fee, not even charity. He claims that his
services were just acts of a friend for a friend. (he claims that he is willing to
pay, though)
IBP found that Atty Grupo violated a rule forbidding lawyers from borrowing
money from their clients unless the clients interests are protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice and suspended him indefinitely.
what he violated was the rule that a lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all his dealing and transactions with his client. And that Atty Grupo
did Not violate Rule 16 because Junio consented to and ratified to the use of
the money, as evidenced by the PN. The court is constrained to give credence
to Atty. Grupos claims that the money previously entrusted to him was later
converted into a loan
ISSUE: WoN Atty. Grupo violated Rule 16?

HELD: YES
RATIO:
What he violated was the rule that a lawyer is bound to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealing and transactions with his client. ( he did
not give security for the loan and he refused to pay the amount)And that Atty
Grupo did not violate Rule 16 because Junio consented to and ratified to the
use of the money, as evidenced by the PN. The court is constrained to give
credence to Atty. Grupos claims that the money previously entrusted to him
was later converted into a loan
But in the dispositive portion, sabi he violated so ayun.
As to the contention that no atty- client relationship exists: it is not necessary

that any retainer should have been paid. All is needed is when a person
consults with his atty in his professional capacity to obtain professional advice.
Atty Grupo is suspended from practice of law for 1 month and to refund the
money
92 BUADO v LAYAG
Facts:
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Herein complainant Lising and her sister Rosita de Guzman ( mother of herein complianat
Susana Buado) were the plaintiffs in a civil case which was decided in favor of the plaintiffs.
Atty Layag represented the said plaintiffs in that case. Inland Trailways, the defendant in that
case, issued checks: (1)payable to Atty Layag for P15,000 (2) payable to Lising for P30,180
(3) payable to De Guzman, who had by then
passed away (for P45,000). The checks were received by Atty Layag. Atty Layag did not
inform the plaintiffs about the checks. Instead he gave the checks to one Marie Paz
Gonzales for encashment on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney, purportedly
executed by De Guzman constituting Gonzales as agent.
After discovering that checks have already been issued, Lising and Buado, as heir of De
Guzman demanded the delivery of the checks. Gonzales, the agent gave Lising P10,000.
No furhter amounts were remitted.
Issue:
W/n Atty Layag's act of delivering the checks to Gonzales, the purported agent, constitutes
malpractice...
Held:
YES. As a lawyer, with more than 30 years in practice, respondent is charged with
knowledge of the law. He should know that it was error for him to rely on a Special Power of
Attorney after the death of the principal, De Guzman. When De Guzman died, the Special
Power of Attorney ceased to be operative.
With respect to the check payable to Lising, Atty Layag should have delivered it directly to
Lising. The Power of Attorney did not cover Lising's case.
He is therefore, suspended indefinitely, subject to further orders by the SC.
93 DALISAY v MAURICIO
Facts:
This is the case against Batas Mauricio, the TV host.
Allegedly, Mauricio demanded and received exorbitant attorneys fees but did not take
any action on Valerina Dalisays case.
Initially, she paid P25T as acceptance fee.
In total, she paid Mauricio P56T: P8T filing fee (though the case was already filed) the
balance might be a combination of the ff:
o Additional acceptance fee P90,000.00, with the explanation that he can give a
discount should she pay in cash.
o P3,000.00 as appearance fee
notwithstanding her payments, respondent never rendered any legal service. She
terminated their attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money
and documents. Mauicio refused.
The IBP Board of Governors wanted to dismiss the case.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Issue:
W/N the case against Mauricio should be dismissed.
Held:
No. He should be suspended for 6 months.
When respondent accepted P56,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he
agreed to take up the latters case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was
established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve complainant with competence
and attend to her case with fidelity, care and devotion.
But there is nothing on record that Mauricio entered his appearance as counsel of
record.
He did not even follow-up the case which remained pending up to the time she
terminated his services.
Regarding the P8T: (allegedly as docket fees for other cases): there was no
evidence nor any pleadings submitted to show that respondent filed any case
considering that the filing fee had to be paid simultaneously with the filing of a case.
when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence
in protecting his rights.
Just like any other professional, a lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his services.
However, he should charge only a reasonable amount of fees.
94 MORTERA v PAGATPATAN
Facts:
The Morteras sued their mother, and 2 other personsAguilar and Bradfieldfor the
rescission of a contract of sale. They secured a favorable judgment in which they are
to receive P155k.
Pagatpatan was counsel for the Morteras. After judgment was rendered, he entered
into a secret agreement with Aguilar where he received P150k as partial payment of
the judgment sum.
This money was later deposited, by Pagatpatan, in his personal account without the
knowledge of the Morteras.
Morteras filed an action because Pagatpatan refuses to surrender the money despite
the successive Orders of the RTC and CA.
Pagatpatans defense is that the Morteras and their mother owed him money for
services he previously rendered the family, and that he wouldnt be paid if he did not
do what he did.
Issue:
Should Pagatpatan be held administratively liable? What is the proper penalty?
Held:

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Yes. Pagatpatan failed to observe Canon 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. As counsel he: owes candor to his clients; is bound to account whatever
money received for and from them; is obligated to keep his own money separate from his
clients and; although he is entitled to a lien over the funds in order to satisfy lawful fees, he is
bound to give prompt notice to his clients of such liens and to deliver the funds to them upon
demand or when due.
The claim that he need to protect his interests since there were other people claiming the
money from the Monteras was not proved.
The penalty of 1-year suspension recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the fault
done. Several factors warrant a more severe penalty: Considering that Pagatpatan is a
seasoned practitioner, his actions are inexcusable; Counsel tried to subvert both law and
proper procedure to recover his fees; Counsels actions were clearly tainted with bad faith,
deceit, and utter contempt of his sworn duty as a lawyer.
Pagatpatan is ordered to return the P150k and is suspended for 2 years.
95 HERNANDEZ v GO
FACTS
Sometime in 1961, HERNANDEZS husband abandoned her and her son
Shortly thereafter, creditors of HERNANDEZS husband demanded payment of his
loans
Fearful of mortgage foreclosures, HERNANDEZ engaged the legal services of ATTY
GO
ATTY GO advised HERNANDEZ to give him land titles of lots in Zamboanga City
belonging to her so that he may sell them to enable her to pay the creditors
Then, ATTY GO persuaded HERNANDEZ to execute deeds of sale in his favor without
any monetary or valuable consideration
ATTY GO also persuaded HERNANDEZ to execute deeds of sale involving the other
lots in Zamboanga City which were redeemed by HERNANDEZ when their mortgages
fell due
In 1974, HERNANDEZ came to know that ATTY GO did not sell her lots as agreed but
instead he paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles registered in
his name, depriving her of real property worth millions
HERNANDEZ filed a complaint with the IBP
IBP: ATTY GO violated Canon 17 and should be suspended for 3 years
ISSUE
HELD
W/N ATTY GO SHOULD BE REPRIMANDED

YES, FOR VIOLATING CANONS 16 AND 17
RATIO
ATTY GO violated Canon 16
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
o His acts acquiring for himself HERNANDEZS lots entrusted to him are acts
constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction
of duty, willful in character and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in
judgment
o Such conduct on the part of ATTY GO not only degrades himself but also the
honor of the legal profession
ATTY GO violated Canon 17
o Records show that HERNANDEZ reposed high degree of trust and confidence
in ATTY GO that when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land
titles and allowed him to sell the same
o ATTY GO, however, abused this trust and confidence when he did not sell her
properties to others but to himself
o ATTY GO is duty bound to render a detailed report to HERNANDEZ on how
much he sold the lots and the amounts paid to her creditors but failed to do so
In previous cases, the Court disbarred and expelled lawyers from the practice of law in
similar circumstances, thus, the penalty recommended by the IBP is too light
JUDGMENT
ATTY GO is disbarred
96 REONTOY v IBADLIT
Facts:
Corazon Reontoy lost a decision in a civil case in the RTC with Atty. Liberato Ibadlit as
her counsel.
Ibadlit received the notice of the decision but he opted not to file an appeal. He says
that he informed Reontoys brother, Proculo Tomazar, to inform Reontoy of his opinion
that he did not think that an appeal would prosper. This statement was refuted by the
testimony of Proculo saying that he was not given such info.
Reontoy also said that he would never authorized Proculo to represent her to the court
or to her lawyer because Proculo was unlettered.
Ibadlit only filed the notice of appeal after the reglementary period for appeal.
Obviously, the appeal was instantly dismissed.
Issue:
W/n Ibadlit should be sanctioned.
Held:
SC says yes, Ibadlit is suspended for 1 year.
A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client, warmth and zeal
in the defense of his rights. He must use all his learning and ability to the end that
nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He
must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of his
client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties
to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the
judge or the general public.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
A lawyer has no authority to waive his client's right to appeal. His failure to perfect an
appeal within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed
by Rule 18.03, Canon 18, of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."
97 DE LAINO v CA
De Liano vs. CA Mendiola
Facts: The prior case involves the cancellation of 2 real estate mortgages in favor of San
Miguel executed by Tango. De Liano was a senior executive of SMC.
The prior case was decided against SMC. De Liano appealed the decision to
the CA. Their counsel, Atty. Afable filed an Appellants Brief which failed to comply with
the Rules of Court. Tango noticed this flaw of the Brief and immediately moved for the
dismiss of De Lianos appeal. The CA decided that the Appellants Brief does not
contain a Subject Index or a Table of Cases and Authorities; and that these lapses
justify the dismissal of the appeal.
De Liano asserts that the CA erred in declaring that the appeal be dismissed on
the basis of the lapses in complying with the technical requirements in making of brief.
Issue: W/N the dismissal of the Appeal was proper.
Held: The dismissal of the brief was proper.
All appeals are merely rights that arise from statutes; thus, they must be
exercised in the manner prescribed by law. It is to this end that rules governing
pleadings must be exercised in the manner prescribed by law. These technical rules like
the inclusion of the statement of facts or the subject index in the brief are meant to
enable the appellate court to have a better grasp of the matter entrusted to it for
appraisal.
Relevant to the topic: Generally, the negligence of the counsel binds the
client. Even if Atty. Afable may be said to be SMCs counsel, this does not operate in
favor of De Liano. A corporation is an artificial being whose juridical personality is only a
fiction created by law and it can only exercise powers and transact its business through
its board of directors and its agents. That Atty. Afable was clothed with sufficient
authority to bind SMC is undisputable. SMCs board resolution attests to that. As
such, SMC must be held bound by the actuations of its counsel, Atty. Afable.
98 TABAS v MANGIBIN
Facts:
A deed of mortgage was delivered to Hilda Tabas evidencing a real property in La

Union that was mortgaged to her by Galvan. The deed of mortgage was registered in
the Register of Deeds of La Union.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Subsequently, a certain Lilia Castillejos represented herself as Tabas and appeared

before Mangibin, who was a notary public, and asked the latter to prepare a discharge
of the mortgage and to notarize it afterwards.
Mangibin prepared the discharge of real estate mortgage without asking Castillejos for
anything to serve as identification except for a Community Tax Certificate (CTC). This
enabled Galvan to mortgage the property again, this time to a rural bank
Tabas informed Mangibin that her signature in the questioned discharge of REM was
forged but Mangibin did nothing to help. He even threatened to file a counter suit
against her if she files a case against him.
Tabas filed this complaint for disbarment.
Mangibin admitted that the discharge of REM was a forgery but interposed the
defense that it was beyond the scope of his duty to ascertain the identity of persons
appearing before him, and that he had no available means of ascertaining their real
identities.
Issue:
W/N Mangibin should be held administratively liable for negligence in the performance of his
duty as a notary public to ascertain the identity of the person appearing before him.
Held:
YES, Mangibin was negligent in performing such duty.
Notarization is invested with public interest. It converts a private document into a

public one, making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Such
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative
agencies, and the public must be able to rely upon an acknowledgement by a notary
public appended to a document.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the
same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and truth of matters stated in the document.
Mangibin should have requested other forms of identification or asked questions to
ascertain her identity.
Mangibin violated the Notarial Law and Canon 1. His notarial commission is revoked
and he is disqualified from reappointment as notary public for 2 years.
99 SANTUYO v HIDALGO
FACTS:
Santuyo purchased a parcel of land covered by a deed of sale which was notarized by
Hidalgo and was entered in his notarial register
6 years after the date of notarization, Santuyo had a dispute with Danilo German over
the ownership of the land

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Germen presented an affidavit of Hidalgo denying the authenticity if his signature on

the deed of sale and that it was forged
Santuyo argued that:
o The deed of sale contained all the formalities of a duly notarized document
o They had no access to the dry seal of Hidalgo
Hidalgo on the other hand claimed that:
o He was on vacation at the time that the deed was allegedly notarized
o An examination of the document will prove that his signature was forged
o He would have remembered Santuyo for he requires that the parties exhibit
their community tax certificates and made them personally acknowledge the
documents before he notarize documents
IBP: the signature was really forged but Hidalgo must be suspended for 2 years as a
notary public
ISSUE:
W/N Hidalgo must be suspended
HELD:
YES!
The responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive. Hidalgo should have been
more discreet and cautious I the execution of his duties as such and should not have
wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries.
Hidalgo is negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in having
allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry
which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone and should not have relied on
somebody else.
100 ENDAYA v OCA
Facts:
A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against Artemio Endaya and his wife. An
answer was prepared by a Mr. Ramirez for the spouses.
At the beginning of the preliminary conference, spouses appeared without counsel.
Endaya sought the services of the Public Attorneys Office. Atty. Oca was assigned to
handle the case.
At the continuation of the prelim conference, Oca filed motion for amendment of
answer. Motion was denied.
The judge then ordered all parties to submit their affidavits and position papers. The
court also said that 30 days after the submission of the last paper or upon expiration of
the period for filing, judgment shall be rendered on the case.
Oca failed to submit any affidavit or position paper.
Nonetheless, the complaint for unlawful detainer was dismissed because those who
filed the case were not reall parties-in-interest.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
The case was appealed to RTC. Oca failed to submit anything again. RTC reversed
the MTC decision. Spouses were ordered to vacate the property and pay a certain
amount for rentals.
Endaya confronted Oca about the decision. Oca feigned that he did not receive
anything. Upon checking with the clerk of court, Oca did indeed receive a copy of the
decision (liar!).
Hence this administrative complaint.
Issue:
W/N Oca committed professional misconduct
Held:
Yes. Suspended for 2 months from practice of law.
Facts to show may problema talaga to si Atty. Oca:
o In his comment, Oca put up the defense that he did not file any paper in the
MCTC because it would just be a repetition of the answer. Endaya filed his reply
which just reiterated what he put in his complaint.
o SC ordered Oca to file a rejoinder. Guess what, Oca once again failed to file
anything. Oca explained that he failed to file a rejoinder because he believed in
good faith that it was no longer necessary.
o In the IBP investigation, Oca once again failed to submit anything.
Oca only appeared once in the MCTC and practically abandoned the spouses
thereafter.
The facts show that Oca failed to employ every legal and honorable means to advance
the cause of his client. For intentionally failing to submit the pleadings required by the
court, respondent practically closed the door to the possibility of putting up a fair fight
for his client.
Oca cannot just appear only once for the spouses. A lawyer continues to be a counsel
of record until the lawyer-client relationship is terminated.
Ocas story shows his appalling indifference to his clients cause, deplorable lack of
respect for the courts and a brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer.
Bakit hindi disbarred?
o Endaya misrepresented that the original answer was prepared by a non-lawyer
when in fact it was prepared by a lawyer
o Endaya assured Oca that he had strong evidence to support their case. Endaya
never gave anything to Oca to support their claim.
o The PAO is burdened with a heavy caseload.
101 DE JUAN v BARIA III
FACTS:
Emma de Juan dwas dismissed by Triple AAA without notice. She asked for the
assistance of Banahaw Broadcasting Company (BBC) to search for a lawyer. The new
lawyer, Atty. Oscar Barria III, who worked with BBC offering free legal services to
indigents became the counsel of de Juan in the NLRC case against Triple
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
AAA for illegal dismissal.

When an adverse NLRC decision was rendered against de Juan, she asked Atty Baria
as to what to do next. Atty replied "Paano ba yan, iha eh hindi ako marunong gumawa
ng Motion for Reconsideration?" and the secretary of Atty. Baria told de Juan and the
husband "wag na tumawag uli dahil galit..."
De Juan charged Atty Baria with negligence and threats to her person.
Atty. BAria contends that he forewarned his client not to expect too much from him
because of his limited legal experience since he was a new lawyer. Also, he alleges that
De Juan pocketed the money that Triple AAA has already paid off.
After that, the NLRC decision was reversed, and Atty. Baria accused de Juan that she
lied re: her employment, which made him lose his appeal.
May incident pa re: Raffy Tulfo (pero d na kelangan un.. gusto nya kasuhan ng libel kasi
may sinabing bad against him)
ISSUE: WoN Atty. Baria can be administratively charged?
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
1. Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
2. Rule 18.03 provides that the negligence of lawyers in connection with legal matters
entrusted to them for handling shall render them liable.
3. Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, Atty Baria remains
counsel of record and whether or not he has valid cause to withdraw from the case, he
cannot just do so and leave his client out in the cold.
102 EDQUIBAL v FERRER
FACTS:
Edquibal charged Atty Ferrer with professional misconduct and neglect of duty.
Edquibal engaged the services of Ferrer to assist his mother Ursula in cases she filed against
his sister Delia involving a certain property. In one of the cases, the trial judge rendered a
decision adverse to his mother. Atty Ferrer then advised complainant to appeal to the CA and
that the cost involved is P4,000. When complainant Edquibal informed respondent Atty
Ferrer that he does not have enough money, Atty ferrer said P2,000 is sufficient.
Edquibal followed up the appealed case. He then learned that the appeal was dismissed for
failure to file the required appelant's brief.
Respondent Atty Ferrer denied that he filed an appeal. He claimed that he never agreed to
handle the appeal.
ISSUE:
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
W/n Atty Ferrer is guilty of professional misconduct...

HELD:
YES. Records show that respondnet was the counsel of record for Edquibal. The resolution
of the CA clearly states that the "notice sent to counsel for defendants-appelants requiring
him to file appelants brief wihtin 45 days from receipt thereof, was received by him...".
However, respondent failed to file the appellants' brief despite receipt of such notice. Sec2
rule 44 of the Rules of CivPro provides that the counsel of the parties in the court of origin
shall be considered their counsel in the CA.
If it were true that Atty Ferrer did not agree to represent Edquibals, why did he not file with the
CA a motion to withdraw as their counsel? The practice of law does not require extraordinary
diligence. All that is required is ordinary diligence expected of a bonus pater familias.
Suspended for 3 mos.
103 CUIZON v MACALIN
Facts:
The legal services of the Atty Rodolfo Macalino was sought by the Susan Cuizon in
behalf of her husband Antolin Cuizon who was convicted for Violation of Dangerous
Drug Act.
Since they cannot pay, he suggested that he be given possession of their Mitsubishi
car.
He then offered to buy, and bought it for only P85T. (Too cheap, even if this happened
during the early 90s).
In spite of everything, he still failed to appear in the case of Antolin Cuizon. The
Cuizons got another attorney.
He (Macalino) was sanctioned by the lower courts, and was fined by the SC for P1000.
which he did not pay.
He was ordered to be arrested by the NBI, who was not able to serve the warrant
against him (allegedly, he no longer resided in his place)
The IBP wanted to suspend him for 3 years.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Macalino should be sanctioned.
Held:
He should be DISBARRED and not just suspended.
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes
to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion
The respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
By his repeated cavalier conduct, the respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of
respect for the authority of the Court
As an officer of the court, it is a lawyers duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the
court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyers
obedience to court orders and processes.
104 DE JUAN v BARIA III

Facts:
De Juan was an employee of Triple AAA. Based on a performance evaluation she was
terminated.
De Juan filed a case for illegal termination against the company. Atty Baria III was her
counsel.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of De Juan. When the company
appealed to the NLRC, the decision was reversed.
De Juan blamed Baria III for the reversal of the decision. She said that she only came
to know of the reversed decision a month after it was promulgated. And when she
asked counsel what to do, the latter said that he did not know how to make a Motion
for Reconsideration. And when her husband called the office of the lawyer, the
secretary told them not to talk with said counsel anymore.
Baria IIIs defense was that he forewarned his clients that he was just new in the
profession and that they should not expect much from him. He also claimed that did
not fail in informing his clients regarding the development of the case. And when the
NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, he advised De Juan to get a more
experienced lawyer. He also cited that he was lambasted on air by a radio announcer-Raffy Tulfo. And that he received death threats after De Juans husband called their
office and gave a warning to his secretary. In sum, Baria III asserts that he did not
commit any breach of his oath and that he has vigorously pursued his clients cause.
He further averred that it was De Juans negligence and folly that caused her to lose
the case.
Issue:
Whether Baria III committed culpable negligence, that would warrant disciplinary action, in
failing to file for De Juan motion for reconsideration from the decision of the NLRC.
Held:
Yes. Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause
and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. A lawyer should carry the
case of his client until its termination or until it has become final and executory. A lawyer may
only abandon his client and withdraw his services for a reasonable cause and only upon
appropriate notice.
Baria III did fail to file a motion for reconsideration. His excuse that he did not know how to
make one is inexcusable. After his client expressed her desire to file such motion, it is
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
incumbent upon him to familiarize himself with the procedure to carry out such task. Anyway,
filing a motion for reconsideration is not that complicated. Though he did inform his client of
his lack of experience, this cannot absolve him. A lawyer is expected to be familiar with the
rudiments of the law and procedure. It is his duty to serve his client with competence and
diligence and should exert his best efforts to protect the interests of his client.
There was no proper revocation of authority and withdrawal by Baria III. So he remained De
Juans counsel in the case. He did not obtain the written consent of his client or the
permission of the court to withdraw from the case.
Negligence of lawyers in connection with legal matters entrusted to them for handling shall
render them liable (Canon 18 Rule 3). Baria III abandoned the cause of his client without a
just reason. He was warned and fined in the amount of P5k.
105 ROLLON v NAVAL
FACTS
ROLLON, together with her SON, went to the office of ATTY NARAVAL to seek his
assistance in a case filed against her (Collection of Sum of Money)
After going through the documents, ATTY NARAVAL agreed to be ROLLONS lawyer
and required her to pay P8,000 as filing and partial service fee
As per instruction of ATTY NARAVAL, ROLLONS SON returned to his office to follow
up however ATTY NARAVAL told the SON that he was not able to act on the case
because he was busy
After several follow-ups and still no action, ROLLON decided to withdraw the amount
paid to ATTY NARAVAL for failure of the latter to comply with their mutual agreement
ATTY NARAVAL said that he could not return the documents because the same were
in his house and the P8,000 paid by ROLLON because he has no money
ROLLON decided to refer the matter to the IBP President of Davao City
INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER: suspend for 1 year for neglect of duty and/or
violation of Canons 15 and 18
IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS RESOLUTION: suspend for 2 years for violation of
Canons 15 and 18 and restitution of P8,000
ISSUE
HELD
W/N ATTY NARAVAL SHOULD BE REPRIMANDED

YES, FOR VIOLATION OF RULE 15.05 AND CANONS 16, 17 & 18
RATIO
Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as advocates of any
person who may wish to become their client. They may decline employment and
refuse to accept representation, if they are not in a position to carry it out effectively
and competently. But once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the
Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost
devotion.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney client-relationship and

gives rise to the duty of fidelity to a clients cause. And every case accepted by a
lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence. Hence, practicing
lawyers may accept only as may cases as they can efficiently handle. Otherwise, their
clients would be prejudiced.
In the case at bar, records show that after receiving P8,000, ATTY NARAVAL failed to
render any legal service to ROLLON and despite ROLLONS repeated demands,
ATTY NARAVAL failed to return the files of the case that had been entrusted to him
and kept the money ROLLOON had likewise entrusted to him
Furthermore, after going through her papers, ATTY NARAVAL should have given
ROLLON a candid opinion on the merits and status of the case. Apparently, the civil
suit against ROLLON had been decided against her and had long become final
executory. However, ATTY NARAVAL withheld such vital information from ROLLON
and even demanded P8,000 as filing and service fee giving her hope that her case
would be acted upon.
JUDGMENT
Atty. Camilo Naraval is found GUILTY of violating Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17 and
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Furthermore, he is ORDERED TO RESTITUTE, within thirty (30) days from notice of
this Decision, complainants eight thousand pesos (P8,000), plus interest thereon, at
the rate of six percent per annum, from October 18, 2000, until fully paid.
106 MIRAFLOR v HAGAD
Facts:
Nilo Miraflor, with the help of Primo Miraflor, filed a complaint against Insular Lumber
Co. Phils. (ILCOPHIL) for illegal dismissal. The Minister of Labor and Employment
initially denied the petition but the NLRC reversed the ruling, which was affirmed by the
Office of the President (OP).
Respondent Atty. Jose Aguirre, as the Executive Labor Arbiter, issued a writ of
execution to enforce the decision of the OP.
ILCOPHIL, through Atty. Juan Hagad, filed a motion for reconsideration. Aguirre
ordered ILCOPHIL to post a bond to stay the execution of the decision and ordered a
trial to determine the correct amount of backwages and benefits to be awarded to
Miraflor. Eventually, Aguirre lowered the amount adjudged by the OP (from 27k to
14k).
Mirfalor now complains to the SC that the respondent-lawyers conspired to thwart the
execution of the decision of the OP which may constitute malpractice, gross
misconduct or violation of the lawyers oath.
Issue:

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
W/n Aguirre and Hagad acted properly as lawyers.

Held:
SC says YES.
Respondent Atty. Hagad can never be faulted for having filed said motion for
reconsideration. As counsel for ILCOPHIL, he has the duty to pursue with zeal and
dedication the best interests of his client and the filing of the motion for reconsideration
was well within the scope of his authority and prerogatives as such counsel. Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence."
With respect to respondent Atty. Aguirre, Jr., his explanation is reasonable and
satisfactory. Complainants, except for their unsubstantiated allegations, never offered
any satisfactory evidence to warrant the conclusion that Atty. Aguirre, Jr. acted
maliciously in allowing ILCOPHIL to file the questioned motion for reconsideration. His
explanation that he "merely complied with due process by granting the respondent
company ILCOPHIL an opportunity to present evidence relative to its claim that
complainant (Nilo Miraflor) had gainful employment during the time he was dismissed"
is well taken. As a matter of fact, in allowing said motion for reconsideration, Atty.
Aguirre was merely complying with the presidential directive to have a further
adjudication on Nilo's salary differentials and other benefits due him.
107 PEOPLE v PRIETO
Facts: Prieto was prosecuted in the Peoples Court for 7 counts of treason. He entered a plea
of guilty on counts 1, 2, 3, and 7, and made a plea of not guilty on counts 4, 5, 6. Prieto was
found guilty on count 4, 1, 2, 3, and 7despite the fact that the prosecutor only presented
evidence on count 4.
Prieto seeks the reversal of the conviction alleging that the court failed to appoint another
counsel de officio to him in "spite of the manifestation of the atty. de officio that he would like
to be relieved for obvious reasons."
Issue: W/N Prieto was denied the right to counsel.
Held: Prieto was not denied the right to counsel.
The court places reasonable presumption in favor of the legality and regularity of all the
proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption that the accused was not denied the
right to have counsel. The fact that the atty. appointed by the trial court to aid Prieto in his
defense expressed reluctance to accept the designation (because he did not sympathize with
Prietos cause) is not sufficient to overcome the presumption. The statement of the counsel in
the court below did not necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect Prieto.
The court also finds the Prieto is not guilty of counts 1,2, 3, and 7, because of lack of
evidence. His guilt in count 4 is maintained and the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
due to aggravating (torture) and mitigating (plea of guilt) circumstances.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
108 MILLARE v MONTERO

Millare v Montero
Facts:
This is a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Montero
Pacifica Millare, the mother of complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the
MTC which ordered Co to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case.
Co, through Montero as counsel, appealed the decision to the RTC. She neither filed
a supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals adjudged by the MTC. Thus the appeal was
dismissed.
The CA also dismissed Cos appeal from the RTC decision for failure to comply with
BP Blg. 129 and with the Interim Rules and Guidelines. According to CA, Co should
have filed a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal.
After the dismissal, the judgment of the MTC had already become final and executory.
However, Cos counsel filed four more defective and dilatory petitions before the RTC,
CA, and SC for the purpose of delaying the execution of judgment by MTC.
Issue: W/N Millare should be disbarred for violating Canons 12 and 19
Held: Montero is suspended for one year.
Canon 19 requires a lawyer to represent his clients within the bounds of the law. He
must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client.
He must not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case. In short, a
lawyer is not a gun for hire.
The appeal from MTC to RTC was sufficient to protect Cos interest and fully ventilate
her defenses.
Montero is also guilty of forum shopping, considering the number of actions he filed.
109 PHIL LAND v CEBU PORTLAND

FACTS:
PLASLU asked the Court of Industrial Relations to order Cebu Portland to pay overtime
compensation and differentials due to them under the RA 1880 or the 40 Hours a
Week Law.
The Company argued that the sucurity guards are not under the said law and thery are not
entitled to additional compensation
CIR: PLASLU are not within the coverage of RA 1880
After 2 years form the decision of the CIR, PLASLU through their new counsel made ot of
record that their former counsel was not authorized by them to enter into stipulations of
facts.
According to PLASLU, the stipulation of their previous attorney which states that "they were
required by the company to work for 56 hours a week was due to the nature of thier
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
services and in the interest of public notice" is a legal conclusion and were not
authorized by them
therefore, PLASLU filed a petition to reopen the case
CIR: denied the motion to reopen the case
ISSUE:
W/N the court can reopen the case after it has long been final and executory
HELD:
NO!
It has been settled that clients are bound by the acts and even mistakes of counsel in
procedural techniques. The facts that were agreed upon were unfavorable to the client
does not detract from the binding effect of the stipulation.
the condition to reopen a case is: it must be upon grounds not already directly or indirectly
litigated and the grounds must not be available to the aprties in the previous
proceedings and the reopening must not affect the period already elapsed at the time
the order to reopen was issued.
110 CABALLERO v DEIPARINE
Caballero v. Deiparine
Facts:
There was a stipulation of facts stating the following:
o Plaintiffs are the children by the first marriage, defendants (Ragas) are the
children by the second marriage of Vicenta Bucao.
o Vicenta Bucao and Tomas Raga acquired land in Cebu. of this land was sold
to Antonio Caballero (one of the plaintiffs). Land was never transferred thru title.
o Later on, Deiparine acquired the whole lot through purchase from Tomas Raga.
TCT was issued to Deiparine.
The stipulation was only signed by Atty. Guba(for plaintiffs) and Atty. Davide(for
respondents).
From the stipulation of facts, the CFI rendered decision in favor of the defendants (that
Deiparine owns the whole lot).
Plaintiffs filed for reconsideration saying that they were never made to participate in
the preparation and formation of the stipulation of facts
Issue:
W/N the stipulation of facts is valid
Held:
The case is remanded to court of origin for further proceedings and the amended
complaint should be accepted.
It is puzzling why the petitioners signatures were not affixed in the stipulation.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
The conduct of Atty. Guba in entering into a compromise agreement without the
knowledge and consent of his clients is not in keeping with the sworn duty of a lawyer
to protect the interest of his clients. It amounts to fraud.
The stipulation of facts which was made the basis of the decision was null and void as
it contained serious unauthorized admissions against the interest of the plaintiffs who
had no hand in its preparation.
Attorneys cannot, without special authority, compromise their clients litigation.
111 PHIL WHEELS v FASGI

PHIL ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC v FASGI
FACTS:
FASGI and PAWI entered into a distributorship contract wherein PAWI obligated itself to
ship wheels for FASGI (foreign company)
FASGI paid PAWI the FOB value of the wheels but later found the shipment to be
defective and in non-compliance with their stated requirements (non stamping of
country of origin, weight load limits, no proper indications and markings on the wheels,
not fitted to the automobiles, etc)
FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of contract and recovery of
damages where I
was stipulated that PAWI and FPS would accept the return of not loess than 8,100
wheels after restoring to FASGI the purchase price via 4 irreovable letters of credit.
PAWI was unable to comply with the foregoing agreement alleging that it was due to a
restriction by the Central Bank (for approval of the L/C)
PAWI and FASGI undertook a STIPULATION OF JUDGMENT agreeing that if PAWI still
failed to undertake its
obligation, FASGI would immediately have a right to apply to the Court for entry of
judgment.THis was
executed by the FASGI president and PAWI Counsel (Mr. Thomas Ready).
PAWI still defaulted so FASGI filed with the US District Court of the Central District of
California. (case was decided against PAWI to pay)
FASGI filed with the Makati RTC for enforcement of foreign judgment but the latter held
that there was unjust enrichment since PAWI was to pay, while FASGI was not ordered
to return the wheels. FURTHERMORE, it held that the supplemental settlement
agreement were a
NULLITY for having been entered into by Mr. Thomas Ready, counsel for PAWI, without
the latter's authorization.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
ISSUE: WoN the decision is binding against PAWI?

HELD: YES
RATIO:
1. In this jurisdiction, it is clear that an atty cannot without a client's authorization, settle the
action or SM of the litigation even when he honestloy believes that such settlement will best
serve his client's best interest. BUT when a client, upon becoming aware of the compromise
and the judgment thereon, fails to promptly repudiate the action of his atty, he will not
afterwards be heard to complain
about it. (PAWI could have sent a disclaimer, and not have waited for more than a year to
mention the
alleged lack of authority)
2. A party, should not, after its opportunity to enjoy the benefits of an agreement, be allowed
to later disown the arrangement when the terms thereof ultimately would prove to operate
against its hopeful expectations.(PAWI was spared from possibly paying substantial amount
of damages and incurring heavy litigation fees, and was even afforded time to reimburse
FASGI)
112 MANALANG v ANGELES
FACTS:
This is an administrative case agaisnt Atty Angeles for grave misconduct as a lawyer and he
stanes charged with infidelity in the discharge of fiduciary obligations to his clients, herein
complainant Manalang.
Manalang alleged that they were the complainants in a case for overtime and separation pay
filed against their employer, the Phil Racing Club Restaurant. Atty Angeles was their counsel.
Judgment was rendered in favor of Manalang, in the amount of P6500. However,
without authority from his clients, Atty Angeles compromised the award and was able to
collect P5500 only.
Manalang made several demands upon Atty Angeles to turn over to them the amount
collected minus the agreed upon attorney's fees of 30%, but the lawyer refuese and offered
to give them only the sum of P2650.
Atty Angeles, in his defense, stated the he refused because he was ordered to deduct from
his attorney's fees the amount of P2000 representing the amount discounted by counsel of
the Phil Racing Club Restaurant together with sheriff legal fees.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Atty Angeles should be suspended from the practice of law because of
grave misconduct related to his clients' funds.
HELD:
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
YES. In the instant case, there is no dispute that complainants were awarded P6500 for
unpaid overtime and separation pay. 30% was agreed to be paid ot respondent as his
attorney's fees. Alleging difficulties in collecting te full amount awarded, respondent
compromised the award on execution and collected only P5500 from the losing party. This
compromise was allegedly without authority from his
clients. Atty Angeles failed to show any such authority.
Atty Angeles exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the interest of his clients as well as
want of zeal in the maintenance and defence of their rights.
Suspended for 6 months.
113 GARCIA v CA
Facts:
Angelina Guevarra, while talking to Consuelo De Garcia, owner of La Bulakena
Restaurant, recognized her (Guevarras) ring in the finger of Mrs Garcia. She inquired
where she bought it.
Apparently, Guevarras ring was stolen from her house in February 1952. Garcia
handed the ring to Guevarra and it fitted her finger.
They brought the ring to Mr. Rebullida, where the ring was allegedly bought, and he
concluded that it was indeed the ring that Guevarra bought from him in 1947.
But the ring was returned to Garcia, who later on didnt return the ring anymore.
Garcia claims it was lost.
A case was filed. During which an extra-judicial admission by Garcia was done. She
claims there that she bought the ring from different persons, the ultimate source being
Aling Petring. And that the ring of Guevarra might just be similar to hers.
Apparently, Aling Petring was just a hoax. As per the case: mysterious and
ephemeral figure. There was really no Aling Petring.
Issue:
W/N the extra-judicial admission of De Garcia, through his cousel, is binding on her.
Held:
Counsels admission binds the client.
Defendant (De Garcia) is refuted by her own extra-judicial admissions, although made
by counsel. For an attorney who acts as counsel of record and is permitted to act as
such, as the authority to manage the cause, and this includes the authority to make
admission for the purpose of the litigation.
Her explanation that her counsel misunderstood her is puerile (This means silly)
because the liability to error as to the identity of the vendor and the exchange of the
ring with another ring of the same value, was rather remote.
114 SANTIAGO v DE LOS SANTOS

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Facts:
Luis Santiago filed an application for registration of a piece of land in San Mateo,
Rizal.
The application was opposed by the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and by a
certain Pacita de los Santos.
Upon examination of the records, the property appeared to be a part of the public
domain. So Santiago was ordered to show cause to support his application.
Motions to Dismiss (the application), on the ground that the property was public
domain, were filed by the oppositors. (Mrs de los Santos was actually a lessee of the
land by virtue of a Pasture Lease Agreement)
(Whats funny is that) When Santiagos counselthe firm of Luna and Manalo
requested that the case be calendared for hearing, the pleading contained
attachments showing that the land is indeed part of the public domain (court said that
counsel probably wanted to prove that despite the public character of the property,
there was open and uninterrupted possession in the concept of an owner). This
admission led to the dismissal of the application.
Now, counsel wants to reverse the decision.
Issue:
Can Santiago (more appropriately his counsel) properly call for the reversal of the decision?
Held:
NO. The court has adhered to the doctrine that an admission made in the pleadings cannot
be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive to him, and that all
proofs submitted by him contrary or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether
objection is interposed by the party or not (Justice JBL Reyes in Joes Radio v Alto
Electronics). Even if there would be a full hearing of the case, the result would still be the
same. The lower court is constrained to dismiss the application.
In a desperate effort to save the case, counsel tried to rely on procedural doctrines
particularly citing that de los Santos has no interest in the case. However, even if such was
admitted, they still failed to show open, uninterrupted, peaceful, and adverse possession in
the concept of an owner. It should be noted that technicalities should give way (and even aid)
to substantial justice.
115 PINEDA v CA
FACTS
JOSE VICTORIA filed a complaint for recovery of possession of 2 parcels of land in
Taguig against EMMANUEL VICTORIA, ET AL praying after notice and hearing that
the latter be ordered to vacate the premises
Clerk of Court of Branch II issued a notice of pretrial to ATTY VICTORIA for JOSE
VICTORIA and ATTY GONZALES AND ASSOCIATES for EMMANUEL VICTORIA, ET
AL stating that the pre-trial will be held on May 29

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
On May 29, the designated judge, JUDGE NAVARRO was on leave so the Clerk of
Court of Branch II entered the following minutes: Presiding Judge of this Court being
on leave and as prayed by ATTY VICTORIA and ATTY CAPISTRANO* let the pre-trial
be transferred to July 3
On July 3, JUDGE NAVARRO was still on leave and entered similar minutes noting the
notification to ATTY CAPISTRANO as to the new date, Oct 16, of the pre-trial
The case was transferred to the sala of JUDGE PINEDA without knowledge of
EMANNUEL VICTORIA, ET AL or their lawyer
On Oct 16, neither EMANNUEL VICTORIA, ET AL nor ATTY CAPISTRANO appeared
so JUDGE PINEDA entered a default order against EMMANUEL VICTORIA, ET AL
and commissioned the deputy clerk to receive evidence for JOSE VICTORIA and to
submit a report
A few days later, an associate in the office of ATTY GONZALES while appearing in
another sala of the same court stumbled upon the scheduled reception of evidence of
JOSE VICTORIA as ordered by JUDGE PINEDA
EMMANUEL VICTORIA, ET AL filed a verified motion to reconsider and/or set-aside
the order holding them in default but the same was denied
On the contrary, a motion for execution pending appeal was granted
EMMANUEL VICTORIA, ET AL elevated the matter to the CA who reversed the
decision of the lower court and ordered JUDGE PINEDA to proceed with the pre-trial
Hence, this petition
Main argument of EMMANUEL VICTORIA, ET AL is that the minutes prepared by the
clerk of court merely singles out ATTY CAPISTRANO as having been notified so since
no notice was sent to them, the whole proceeding cannot stand the test of validity
ISSUE
W/N NOTICE TO COUNSEL REGARDING SCHEDULED DATE OF PRETRIAL IS NOTICE TO CLIENT
HELD
NO, THERE SHOULD ALSO BE NOTICE TO THE CLIENT
RATIO
Generally, notice to counsel operates as notice to the party/parties represented
However, application in a given case should be looked into and adopted according to
its surrounding circumstances, otherwise, it may foster dangerous collusions to the
detriment of justice
The case at bar involves Section 1 and 2 of Rule 20 of the Rules of Court which state
In any action after the last pleading has been filed, the court shall direct the parties
AND their attorneys to appear
The Court interpreting these provisions, uniformly emphasized that the pre-trial is
mandatory, that the parties as well as their counsel, who are required to appear
thereat, must BOTH be notified of the same
In other proceedings presence of parties is not necessary so notice to counsel
operates as notice to client but in a pre-trial, presence of parties is a must because
one of the purposes of a pre-trial is to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
(which a counsel cannot compromise absent express authorization) so notice to the

parties is necessary
Records show that since only the counsel for EMMANUEL VICTORIA, ET AL was
notified of the pre-trial, such notification is neither adequate nor sufficient for purposes
of a pre-trial
Judgment of CA affirmed
NOTE
*ATTY CAPISTRANO - not mentioned but I presume he is an associate of ATTY GONZALES
116 SALONGA v CA
Facts:
Astra Realty Development Corp. (Astra) leased its property to Alelie Montojima. The
latter tried to open a restaurant but it was not a success.
Montojima then entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Paul Geneve
Entertainment Corp. (Paul Geneve) where the latter purchased the lease rights of
Montojima over the property.
Paul Geneve paid Montojima but when it was about to start its business, the Bel-Air
Village Homeowners Association filed a complaint for violation of some municipal
ordinances.
Now comes George Salonga who was interested in buying the lease rights of Paul
Geneve. Since Salonga had no money, he suggested that he (along with his company
Solid Intertain) and Paul Geneve enter into a joint venture enterprise. The idea was
to form a new corporation to be named Solidisque Inc.
All the documents were prepared by the counsels of both parties (Atty. Garlitos for
Salonga and Atty. Sadili for Paul Geneve).
Paul Geneve signed the papers but Dalonga didnt.
Having possession of the unsigned papers, Salonga started operating Metro Disco on
the subject property. No corporation under the name Solidisque Inc. was ever
registered as agreed upon in the Securities and Exchange Commission. Paul Geneve
was totally left out.
Paul Geneve filed a complaint for specific performance against Salonga and his
company.
Salonga and his counsel failed to appear in the trial dates so he was declared in
default and judgment was rendered by the RTC in favor of Paul Geneve.
Salonga was also adjudged guilty of civil contempt for his failure to appear in an earlier
hearing. He was ordered arrested until he obeys the orders and judgment of the
Court.
The CA affirmed.
Issue:
W/n Salongas allegation of extrinsic fraud and denial of due process obtain to justify
annulment of the default judgment rendered by the RTC.
Held:
SC says NO.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Petitioners George Salonga and Solid Intertain Corporation allege that the "inimical
and antagonistic acts" of their counsel Atty. Onofre G. Garlitos constitute extrinsic
fraud (see p. 543 for list of acts). SC said that extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent
act of the prevailing party which is committed outside the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud
or deception practiced on him by his opponent. The nature of extrinsic fraud, as
discussed previously, necessarily requires that its cause be traceable to some
fraudulent act of the prevailing party committed outside the trial of the case. The Court
notes that the previously enumerated negligent acts attributed to petitioner's former
counsel Garlitos were in no way shown or alleged to have been caused by private
respondents. Atty. Garlitos neither connived nor sold out to the latter.
On the other hand, it is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This
is based on the rule that any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general
or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or
negligence of petitioners' counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable
judgment against them. Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the
Court in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of
due process of law, or when its application "results in the outright deprivation of one's
property through a technicality." None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown
in the present case.
Due process was never denied petitioners Salonga and Solid Intertain Corporation
because the trial court had given them a reasonable opportunity to be heard and
present their side in all the proceedings before it. In fact, petitioners were declared in
default only on the third ex parte motion filed by private respondents.
117 PEOPLE v VILLANUEVA

Facts: Villanueva was accused of raping his 11 year-old stepdaughter Nia. (The filing of the
complaint was brought about by a kiss mark that Nias brother saw on her neck.)
It was alleged that one night, Villanueva, holding a knife against Nias neck, threatened to kill
her if she ever told anyone of the odious act. Villanueva attempted to insert his penis, but it
would not fit. (According to Nia, it was too big.) Villanueva contented himself to licking Nias
genetalia.
In his defense, Villanueva gives an alibi that he could not have raped her and that the semen
found on the victims vagina could not have been his (he already had vasectomy). The lower
court, however, found Villanueva guilty of raping Nia and imposes the death penalty.
In this mandatory review by the SC, Villanueva alleges that he is entitled to a new trial
because of his counsels failure to present his common-law wife (Nias mother).
Issue: W/N Villanueva is entitled to a new trial.
Held: Villanueva is not entitled to a new trial.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
The failure of the defense to present Nias mother by reason of the alleged inexperience of
his lawyer is not a ground for new trial. The error of his defense counsel is neither an error of
law nor an irregularity that will merit a new trial. The client is bound by the action of his
counsel in the conduct of his case and cannot be heard to complain that the result of the
litigation might have been different had his counsel proceeded differently. If this were to be
allowed, then there would be no end to suits so long as new counsel could be employed who
could allege that the previous counsel had not been diligent.
Villanueva is still guilty of rape. There is no question about the credibility of the Nia as a
witness. The trial judge had occasion to determine the demeanor of the witness. The alibi of
Villanueva is also self-serving. It doesnt matter if Villanuevas [penis did not penetrate. What
is important is that there was contract between the peis and the labia of the vagina. The fact
that Nias hymen was intact does not negate rape, because it is not an element of rape.
However, the charge cannot qualify as qualified rape, because the allegation that the
accused is the stepfather (in fact he is not, he is merely a surrogate father and there exists no
legal relation of step-father and step-daughter) was not averred in the complaint.
118 AGUILAR v CA
Facts:
Aguilar and Salvador were charged with Estafa in an Information filed before the RTC.
Both were convicted by the trial court and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 17
years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the offended party the amount of P250,000.
Aguilar, thru his former counsel, Atty.Arandia, timely appealed to CA. Unfortunately,
Atty. Arandia failed to file petitioners brief on its due date. He neither communicated
to Aguilar nor withdrew his appearance as counsel. Aguilars attempts to contact his
counsel were futile.
Aguilar hired Atty. Arias as his new counsel, and the latter entered his appearance in
the case and asked an extension of 45 days to submit the appellants brief.
The motion was denied for having been filed out of time. CA subsequently denied
Aguilars motion to dismiss and his appeal.
On the other hand, Salvador was granted an extension of time to file her brief, and the
brief was admitted even though filed beyond the grace period.
Issue: W/N CA committed GAD when it dismissed Aguilars appeal for failure to file his
appellants brief on time.
Held: YES.
There is no reason to treat the two appellants differently. Both allegedly conspired in
committing the crime of estafa. Their cases rest on the same facts. Equal protection
of the law demands that persons situated similarly be treated alike.
Aguilar faces a jail term of 17 yrs and 4 mos to 20 yrs. He cannot lose his liberty
because of the gross irresponsibility of his lawyer.
Losing liberty by default of an insensitive lawyer should be frowned upon despite the
fiction that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. The said rule must only be
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
applied to advance the ends of justice, not when the circumstances of the case it
becomes a hindrance to justice.
In a criminal proceeding, where certain evidence was not presented because of
counsels error or incompetence, new trial may be granted if the defendant satisfies
the court that: 1) he has a good defense, and that 2) acquittal would in all probability
have followed the introduction of the omitted evidence.
CA should have considered the fact that the appellants brief was already filed and is
already in the records of the case. This shows earnest efforts of counsel and
petitioner to be heard and lack of intention to cause delay.
119 SALONGA v CA
FACTS:
Astra owned a propert located at Bel-Air Village, Makati.
Montojima leased this property and opened a restaurant which did not prosper
Montojima thereafter entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with Paul Geneve
Entertainment Corp (PGEC) with the consent of Astra under the following term:
Montojima will sell all his rights over the property to PGEC for 3M.
Montojima received 1M
Bt before PGEC can open the business, the homeowners association of Bel-Air filed a
complaint against PGEC for violation of some municipal ordinances
PGEC and Salonga entered into a JVA wherein the corporation of Salonga and PGEC will
form a new corporation.
but the new corporation never existed and PGEC asked for specific performance from
Salonga
during the scheduled hearing, Salonga did not appear and was held in contempt
salonga also asked for 2 motions foe extension of time but no answer was filed
becasue of salonga's failure to file an answer, salonga was held in default and cited in
contempt
Salonga is now claiming that he received a copy of the decision only on 10-7 yet a motion for
reconsideration was filed on 7-28
ISSUE:
W/N the decision must be annulled on the ground of fraud on the part of Salonga's counsel
HELD:
NO!
a decision can be annulle donly on 2 grounds: A. judgment is void for want of due process or
jurisdiction and B. it was obtained by fraud
there is no extrinsic fraud in the case
the negligence of counsel binds the client. this is based on the rule that any acts performed
by counsel within the scope of his general authority is deemed as an act of the client.
lawyer of Salonga, Garlitos, is only guilty of simple negligence. although he failed to file a
timely answer, hus efforts at defending thier cause is real.
simple negligence would not amount to a deprivation of right to due process.
to see all the negligent acts of Atty Garlitos see page 543 1st paragraph.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
120 LEGARDA v CA
*mahaba, di ko na sinama mga dissenting. Talo naman sila eh
Facts:
New Cathay House, Inc. (Cathay) and Victoria Legarda entered into a lease
agreement for a property in QC owned by Legarda.
For some reason, Legarda refused to sign the contract. Cathay made a deposit and
downpayment of rentals then filed for specific performance.
Legardas counsel, Dean Antonio Coronel, requested a 10-day extension to file an
answer which was granted. But Dean Coronel failed to file an answer within that
period.
Cathay presented evidence ex parte. Cathay won the case (Katay si Legarda). Service
of decision was made on Dean Coronel but he still did not do anything.
The QC property was then levied and auctioned off to pay for the judgment debt.
Cathays manager, Cabrera, was the highest bidder in the auction. Legarda did not
redeem the property within the 1 year period.
Kahit natalo na sila dahil walang ginagawa si Dean (hindi nga niya sinabihan si
Legarda kung ano na nangyari sa kaso nila, na wala na yung lupa), Legarda still did
not lose faith in her counsel.
Dean Coronel then filed a petition for annulment of judgment. Petition was denied. No
motion for reconsideration or appeal was made on the order of denial (ibang klase ka
dean!)
So, Legarda hired a new lawyer. New lawyer asked for annulment of judgment upon
the ground that the old lawyer was negligent in his duties. The petition was granted
and the sale of the QC property to be set aside.
The SC said that there was unjust enrichment on the part of Cathay because of the
reckless, inexcusable and gross negligence of Dean Coronel.
Hence this motion for reconsideration of SC decision.
Issue:
W/N Legarda can be bound by the gross negligence of her counsel
Held:
Yes. Original decision is reinstated (Legarda=loser)
As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend her interests in due course, she
cannot be said to have been denied due process of law.
If indeed Legarda is innocent, then all the more that Cathay is innocent. Between two
innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the
one to bear the resulting loss.
Legarda misjudged and hired the services of Dean Coronel who in the end sort of
abandoned her case.
Decision was res ipso final due to failure to appeal the decision.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
121 ALBANO v COLOMA

FACTS:
Angel Albano alleges that when he and his mom retained the services of Atty. Perpetua
Coloma as their counsel, Atty Coloma failed to expediet the hearing and termination of
the case, resulting to their having to procure another lawyer.
Atty. Coloma intervened in the case to collect her atty's fees and presented a document
showing that the complainants promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33 1/3% of
whatever could be recovered whether in land or damages.
Atty. Coloma likewise denied that she could have been removed for her failure to comply
with her obligations as counsel as she served "faithfully, efficiently, continuously and to
the best of her knowledge and capacity". Her dismissal, accdg to her, was made without
cause and without her consent and when she had already won the case for them in the
CFI and the CA.
The facts as found by the SolGen in so far as the services of Atty Coloma as counsel for
the complainants reveal the utmost diligence and
conscientiousness on her part. The SolGen further saight that if there was anyone guilty
of bad faith in
this case, it is the complainants who, after benefiting from the valuable services of atty
COloma, tried to renege on their agreement for the payment of the latter's contingent
atty's fees by dismissing her as their counsel after she had already won for them in the
trial court and the CA, and later, by attempting to impugn the authenticity and
genuineness of their written agreement for the payment of atty's fees
ISSUE: WoN Atty COloma is entitled to her atty's fees (as agreed upon in their written
agreement of contigent fee)
HELD: YES
RATIO:
1. Counsel is entitled to full recompense for his services He is entitled to the protection of any
judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is
indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he
represents, he himself would not get due.
2. Also, Atty COloma has good reputation.. SO his reputation as a lawyer must be protected.
122 TRADERS ROYAL BANK UNION v NLRC
FACTS:
Petitioner Union and private respondent Atty Cruz entered into a retainer agreement whereby
the former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee of P3,000 in consideration of
the Atty Cruz's undertaking to render the services enumerated in their contract. Petitioner
Union referred to Atty Cruz the claims of its members for Holiday, mid year and year-end
bonuses against their employer Traders Royal Bank (TRB). NLRC rendered a decision in
favor of the union members. On appeal to the SC, the court modified the decision of the
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
NLRC by deleting the award of mid year and year-end bonus. Bank complied with such
decision.
Atty Cruz, thereafter, notified the union , the TRB management and the NLRC of his right to
exercise and enforce his attorney's lien over the award of holiday pay. He demanded the
payment of 10% of the total award. Union opposed the demand. NLRC ruled in favor of Atty
Cruz.
The union insists that it is not guilty of unjust enrichment because all attorney's fees due to
Atty Cruz were covered by the retainer fee of P3,000 which it has been regularly paying to
Atty Cruz under their retainer agreement. To be entitiled to additional attorney's fees, it
contends that there must be separate mutual agreement prior to the performance of the
additional services of the counsel.
Issue:
W/n Atty Cruz is entitled to compensation other than the P3,000 retainer fee.
HELD:
YES. He is entitled to P10,000.
An attorney is entitiled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services
performed at the special instance and request of his client. As long as the lawyer was in
good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he should
have a reasonable compensation for such services. The P3,000 which the union pays
monthly does not cover the services the counsel actually rendered before the labor arbiter
and the NLRC. The monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the counsel's
commitment to render the services.
The P3,000 was a general retainer. It is not payment for counsel's execution or performance
of the services of the counsel. The fact that petitioner union and counsel failed to reach a
meeting of the minds with regard to the payment of professional fees for special services will
not absolve the client of civil liability for the corresponding remuneration. A quasi contract
arose between the union and counsel, from the counsel's lawful, voluntry and unilateral
prosecution of union's cause. Equity and fair play dictate that petitioner should pay the same
after it accepted and benefited from counsel's services.
The measure of compensation should be addressed by the rule of quantum meruit, meaning
"as much as he deserves".
123 ONG v GRIJALDO
Facts:
This is a case for disbarment of Atty. Jose Grijaldo.
Goretti Ong, the complainant, initially had Grijaldo as his counsel for a BP 22 case.
The opposing party owed Ong, but they reached a compromised in the amount of
P180T. Ong agreed to a compromise, provided he be paid in cash.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
When the time of payment came, Grijaldo (who facilitated the compromise deal)
handed over P100T in cash and an P80T check. Ong initially refused, but was made
to accept it. Grijaldo claims that the check is good, since it was drawn on the checking
account of the opposing partys counsel, Atty. Reyes.
Ong was made to execute an affidavit of desistance, but Ong instructed Grijaldo to file
it with the court, only when the check has been cleared.
But the check bounced. Later on, after many excuses, Ong went to Bacolod (where
the case was filed) to find out for himself the status of the case and to seek payment.
Ong found out that the affidavit was already filed in court and the case was already
dismissed.
Worse, Grijaldo already received the money from Reyesm but he used it to pay for his
(Grijaldos) financial obligations.
Hence this case.
Ong filed a number of affidavits by other disinterested persons who complained of
Grijaldos mischief. (bottom part of p 5) (irrelevant)
Issue:
W/N Grijaldo should be disbarred.
Held:
Yes.
It is clear that respondent gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed on him by
his client. Were it not for complainants vigilance in inquiring into the status of her
case, she would have not know that the case was already dismissed. Grijaldo
deliberately withheld the fat from her.
Grijaldo breached his futy wwhen he failed to inform the complainant of the status of
the criminal case. his negligence shows a glaring lack of the competence and
diligence required of every lawyer. His infraction is rendered all the more deplorable
by the fact that complainant is a resident of QC, but the case was filed in Bacolod.
That was the reason why Ong hired a Bacolod-based lawyer, to protect her interests.
This is a gross betrayal of the fiduciary duty: failure to look after the clients welfare.
And it is also a breach of the trust and confidence which was reposed on him.
124 SESBREO v CA
Facts:
Raul Sesbreo replaced Atty Pacquiao as counsel for 52 employees in a case against
the Province of Cebu and Governor Espina for reinstatement to work and backwages.
32 of the employees agreed that Sesbreno would be paid 30% of the backwages as
attorneys fees and 20% for expenses of litigation.
RTC granted employees petition. CA affirmed. Judgment became final.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Later on, a compromise was made between the employees and the Province of Cebu
whereby said employees waived their right to reinstatement. Cebu released P2.3M
(representing back salaries, terminal leave pay, gratuity pay) to Sesbreno for the
employees as Partial Satisfaction of Judgment.
10 of the employees asserted that they only agreed to give 40% of their back salaries
to Sesbreno. Lower court agreed with them and fixed attorneys fees for Sesbreno at
40% plus the 20% expenses.
Employees filed an MR asserting that there was inadvertence in placing 60% where it
should only be 50%. This was granted.
Sesbreno was not satisfied by the decision so he went to the CA. And kawawang
Sesbreno nabawasan pa lalo ang bayadCA deemed the award of 20% of the back
salaries as the fair, equitable, and reasonable amount for attorneys fees. Punta siya
ngayon sa Padre FauraSupreme Court
Issue:
Whether the court acted properly in reducing Sesbrenos attorneys fees despite a preexisting contract between the parties.
Held:
Yes. It is a settled rule that what a lawyer may charge and receive as attorneys fees is
always subject to judicial control. When the courts find the amount to be excessive or
unreasonable, public policy demands that the contract be disregarded to protect the client.
When a lawyer takes his oath, he submits himself to the authority of the court and subjects
his professional fees to judicial control.
A stipulation on a lawyers compensation in a written contract for professional services
ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, UNLESS
the court finds such stipulated amount unreasonable or unconscionable. Though generally, a
much higher compensation is allowed in a contingent fee agreement (as in this case) in
consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. But contingent fee
contracts are under the supervision of the court in order that clients may be protected from
unjust charges. Its validity rests largely on the reasonableness of the stated fees under the
circumstances of the case. An attorneys fee is unconscionable when it is so disproportionate
compared to the value of the services rendered. Nevertheless, the existence of an
unreasonable fee (no matter the degree) does not bar recovery. It is only that the courts will
fix a reasonable amount.
Quantum Meruit which means as much as he deserves is often the courts basis for
determining the amount.
Considering its a labor case, an award of 50% of back salaries is excessive. The 20% award
is justified.
125 FABILO v IAC
FACTS
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
JUSTINA Fabillo bequeathed to her brother FLORENCIO Fabillo a house in lot in San
Salvador St, Leyte (San Salvador property) and to her husband GREGORIO Brioso a
lot in Pugahanay, Leyte (Pugahanay property)
FLORENCIO filed a petition for probate of JUSTINAS will who approved of the
partition placed a reservation on the ownership of the San Salvador property
2 years later, FLORENCIO sought the assistance of ATTY MURILLO to recover the
San Salvador property
FLORENCIO and ATTY MURILLO entered into a Contract for Services wherein
o If the property is awarded to FLORENCIO, ATTY MURILLO will be constituted
as attorney in fact to sell and convey said property and will be given 40% of the
purchase price
o If mortgaged, ATTY MURILLO will be entitled to 40% of the proceeds of the
mortgage
o If leased, ATTY MURILLO will be entitled to 40% of the rentals
o If the property is just occupied by FLORENCIO, ATTY MURILLO will have the
option of occupying or leasing to any interested party 40% of the said property
ATTY MURILLO filed a case for FLORENCIO against GREGORIO which ended in a
compromise settlement wherein FLORENCIO was declared owner not only of the San
Salvador property but also of the Pugahanay property
ATTY MURILLO proceeded to implement the contract by taking possession of 40% of
the properties and even installed a tent in the Pugahanay property
FLORENCIO claimed exclusive right over the properties which prompted ATTY
MURILLO to file a complaint
LOWER COURT: ATTY MURILLO is owner of 40% of the properties
FLORENCIO argued that the contingent fee of 40% is excessive, unfair and
unconscionable
ISSUE
W/N THE CONTRACT OF SERVICES PROVIDING FOR CONTINGENT FEES

VIOLATED ARTICLE 1491
HELD
NO, CONTINGENT FEES NOT COVERED BY ARTICLE 1491
RATIO
Article 1491 prohibits lawyers from acquiring by purchase even at a public auction,
properties and rights which are objects of litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession
However, said prohibition applies only if the sale or assignment takes place during the
pendency of litigation involving the clients property
Following that principle, a contract between a lawyer and his client stipulating a
contingent fee is not covered by Article 1491 because payment of said fee is not made
during the pendency of litigation but only after judgment has been rendered
Hence, the Contract of Services entered into by FLORENCIO and ATTY MURILLO
having provided for contingent fees is not violative of Article 1491

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
ISSUE
W/N FLORENCIO IS OWNER OF 40% OF THE PROPERTIES
HELD
NO, CONTRACT OF SERVICES VAGUE AS TO WHO IS THE OWNER SO

MUST BE CONSTRUED AGAINST THE LAWYER WHO MADE IT, ATTY
MURILLO
RATIO
The Court disagrees with the lower court that FLORENCIO is the owner of 40% of the
properties for careful scrutiny shows that the parties intended 40% of the value of the
properties as ATTY MURILLOS contingent fee
The provisions are clear in cases where the properties are sold, mortgaged and leased
as ATTY MURILLO is entitled to 40% of the purchase price, proceeds of the mortgage
or rentals respectively
However, with respect to a situation wherein the properties are neither sold,
mortgaged or leased, the contract is vague and only provides that ATTY MURILLO
shall have the option of occupying or leasing to any interested party 40% of the
properties
The ambiguity of said provision should then be resolved against ATTY MURILLO as it
was he himself who drafted the contract
Moreover, if the parties intended that ATTY MURILLO should become the lawful owner
of 40% of the properties in case the same is not sold, mortgaged or leased, then they
would have clearly and unequivocally stipulated in the contract such
JUDGMENT
Considering the nature of the case, the value of the properties subject matter thereof, the
length of time and effort exerted by ATTY MURILLO, the Court holds that ATTY MURILLO is
entitled to P3,000 as reasonable attorneys fees (nyek lugi!)
126 BAUTISTA v GONZALES
Facts:
- Angel Bautista filed a complaint against Ramon Gonzales for the following acts:
o Accepting a case where he agreed to pay all expenses for a contingent fee of
50% of the value of the property in litigation;
o Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in a case where Eugenio Lopez, Jr. is one
of the defendants and, without said case being terminated, acting as counsel for
Lopez in another case;
o Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which
properties are the subject of the litigation, while the case was still pending;
o Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with
him for the development of the land involved in a case into a residential
subdivision, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as
attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said
property was already sold at a public auction;

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
o Submitting to the CFI falsified documents purporting to be true copies of

"Addendum to the Land Development Agreement" and submitting the same
document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection with the complaint
for estafa filed by respondent against complainant.
Issue:
- W/n Gonzales should be punished for these acts.
Held:
- Yes, SC suspends him for 6 months.
- For the first allegation, the SC pointed out that a lawyer may indeed advance
expenses of litigation but such payment should be subject to reimbursement. In this
case, the contingent fee agreement between the Fortunados and Gonzales did not
provide for such reimbursement. Such contract is against public policy because it
gives undue leverage in favor of the lawyer.
- Second, the Court found that Gonzales did not violate any law because the
Fortunados consented to his appearance for Lopez.
- Third act, the Court said that such is a violation of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, which
prohibits a lawyer from buying/acquiring the property of his clients which is the subject
of a pending case. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's
property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes
malpractice. And although the Code of Professional Responsibility does not anymore
contain Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he
lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he
is conducting," the Code still provides that a lawyer should follow the laws of the Phil.
At all times. By acquiring the property in litigation, Gonzales has violated Art. 1491 of
the Civil Code and can be administratively punished for such violation.
- The SC held that in withholding such information, respondent failed to live up to the
rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty
and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of
respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an
important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation.
- Lastly, the SC held that the original copies of the documents Gonzales submitted were
false because they bore the signatures of the Fortunados when, in fact, they did not
sign the original copy but only a photocopy of the original. Such conduct constitutes
willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner
consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice
or false statement of fact or law.
127 BIASCAN v LOPEZ
Facts: This controversy pertains to a 600 sq. m. lot.
The lot was in the name of Florencio Biascan. Florencio died intestate. When Florencio died,
Rosalina Biascan filed a complaint alleging that she is the administratrix of the estate of her
father, Florencio. However, Maria Biascan opposed the claim of Rosalina. At that instant, Atty.
Lopez entered his appearance as the counsel of Maria in the opposition.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Rosalina complained that, without the approval of the intestate court, Atty. Lopex caused the
registration of 210 sq. m. of the 600 sq. m. lot in his name (made through a deed of
assignment executed by Maria and Atty. Lopez). According to Rosalina, the registration was
made during the special proceedings regarding the settlement of the estate.
In his defense, Lopez says that the transfer of a portion of the land was valid since it was a
payment of his contingent fees. Atty. Lopez claims that Maria agreed to give him 35% of the
area of the disputed land. Atty. Lopez argues that due to the absence of a notice of lis
pendens on the TCT, he accepted the offer of Maria.
Issue: W/N the land was a lawful payment of contingent fees.
Held: The land cannot be regarded as contingent fees. Illegal. Suspend 6 months.
When Atty. Lopez entered his appearance as Marias counsel, Rosalina had submitted an
inventory report which listed the land as part of the estate of the deceased Florencio. As
respondent of Maria, Atty. Lopez should have gone over the records. Also, the deed of
assignment itself stated that the TCT was registered in Florencios name. Therefore, Atty.
Lopez had actual knowledge that the lot formed part of the estate of Florencio.
By registering the land in his name, Atty. Lopez transgressed Art. 1491, because he had
knowledge that the land was the subject of the litigation. Because the transfer was made
during the pendency of the Special Proceedings, Art. 1491 clearly applies.
128 DALISAY v MAURICIO
Facts:
This is the case against Batas Mauricio, the TV host.
Allegedly, Mauricio demanded and received exorbitant attorneys fees but did not take
any action on Valerina Dalisays case.
Initially, she paid P25T as acceptance fee.
In total, she paid Mauricio P56T: P8T filing fee (though the case was already filed) the
balance might be a combination of the ff:
o Additional acceptance fee P90,000.00, with the explanation that he can give a
discount should she pay in cash.
o P3,000.00 as appearance fee
notwithstanding her payments, respondent never rendered any legal service. She
terminated their attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money
and documents. Mauicio refused.
The IBP Board of Governors wanted to dismiss the case.
Issue:
W/N the case against Mauricio should be dismissed.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held:
No. He should be suspended for 6 months.
When respondent accepted P56,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he
agreed to take up the latters case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was
established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve complainant with competence
and attend to her case with fidelity, care and devotion.
But there is nothing on record that Mauricio entered his appearance as counsel of
record.
He did not even follow-up the case which remained pending up to the time she
terminated his services.
Regarding the P8T: (allegedly as docket fees for other cases): there was no
evidence nor any pleadings submitted to show that respondent filed any case
considering that the filing fee had to be paid simultaneously with the filing of a case.
when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence
in protecting his rights.
Just like any other professional, a lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his services.
However, he should charge only a reasonable amount of fees.
129 BARONS MARKETING v CA

FACTS:
- Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as its dealer of electrical wires and cables
- Barons was given a 60 day credit for the purchase of Phelps Dodges products
- Barons purchased electrical wires and cables worth P4.1M, on credit
- Under the sales invoice issued by Phelps Dodge, there is a stipulation: interests at
12% per annum will be charged on all overdue accounts plus 25% on said amount for
attorneys fees and collections
- Barons failed to pay Phelps Dodge. The former asked the latter for installment
payment but the request was refused
- An action for collection for sum of money was instituted by Phelps Dodge against
Barons with a prayer for attorneys fees amounting to 25% pf the amount demanded
- RTC: ruled in favor of Phelps Dodge and ordered Barons to pay P3.1M and 25% of the
preceding obligation for and as attorneys fees
- CA: corrected the amount due to Phelps Dodge and ordered Barons to pay P3.8M and
5% of the preceding obligation for and as attorneys fees
ISSUE:
- W/N Barons is liable to Phelps Dodge for interest and attorneys fees
HELD:

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
YES! But the amount stated in the sales invoice is reduced from 25% to 10% of the
principal amount for attorneys fees.
Barons is expressly liable as stated in the sales invoice of Phelps Dodge which
provides that: interests at 12% per annum will be charged on all overdue accounts
plus 25% on said amount for attorneys fees and collections
The attorneys fees stated are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation
is aptly called a penal clause. It is settled that as long as such stipulation does not
contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding.
BUT, the courts are empowered to reduce such penalty of the same is iniquitous or
unconscionable
In the case at bar, the interest alone runs to some P4.5M, even exceeding the principal
debt which is only P4M. 25% of the principal and the interest amounts to roughly
P2M. In real terms, therefore, the attorneys fees and collection fees are manifestly
exorbitant.
130 LIZARDO v MONTANO

FACTS:
Lizardo instituted a collection case against Eddie Mirano. Lizardo won.
Judgment included 25% of the amount payable as attorneys fees.
Miranos land was levied and Lizardo won the bidding.
13 years after the case, Atty. Montano, the lawyer of Lizardo, filed with the trial court
(same trial court as in the previous decision) an omnibus motion for payment of his
attorneys fees.
Without hearing petitioner, the trial court rendered an order that Lizardo pay Montano
25% of the property and/or annotate in the TCT the attorneys lien.
CA affirmed the RTC decision, hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court still has jurisdiction over the case 13 years after it rendered a final
judgment
HELD:
No, the court no longer has jurisdiction over the claim for attorneys fees.
Once a court acquires jurisdiction over a case, it retains such jurisdiction until the final
termination of the case. It loses its jurisdiction upon the finality of the decision
A final decision cannot be amended or corrected except for clerical errors, mistakes or
misprisions.
In the questioned order, the court ordered Lizardo to pay attorneys fees to counsel.
That is not decreed in the judgment. Such variance rendered the order void.
What the lawyer may do is file an independent action against petitioner for collection.
131 CUETO v JIMENEZ
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
FACTS:
- Engr. Alex Cueto engaged the services of Atty. Jose Jimenez Jr. as notary public, being the
father of the building of the Construction Agreement to be notarized. After notarizing the
agreement, Jimenez demanded P50,000 as notarial fee. Alex Cueto paid P30,000 in cash
and issued a check of P20,000. However, Cueto requested Jimenez not to deposit the check
for lack of sufficient funds. Cueto also informed Jimenez that his son had not yet paid his
services as general contractor.
- Jimenez still deposited the check, and of course, the check bounced (insufficient funds
nga!)and the check issued by Jimenez' son was also dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account.
- Atty. Jimenez filed a BP 22 case against Cueto. In return, Cueto filed his own administrative
complaint against Jimenez and alleged that he violated Code of Prof Responsibility and
Canons of Prof Ethics when he filed BP22 so that Jimenez can recover the balance of his
notarial fee.
ISSUE: WoN Jimenez can be held administratively liable?
HELD: YES. Atty. Jimenez is severely reprimanded.
RATIO:
1. It is highly improper for Jimenez in filing a criminal case for violation of BP 22 against
Cueto when the check representing the balance of his notarial fee was dishonored because
"A LAWYER SHALL AVOID CONTROVERSIES WITH CLIENTS CONCERNING HIS
COMPENSATION AND SHALL RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION ONLY TO PREVENY
IMPOSITION, INJUSTICE or FRAUD". In the
case at bar, there was clearly no imposition, injustice or fraud... 1)Cueto already paid more
than half of the fee 2) In all probablity, the reason why Cueto lacked funds was because of
Jimenez' son failure to pay (so dapat mas lenient si Jimenez sa delay ng payment sa kanya
ng balance)
2. AS to the contention that P50,000 was exorbitant--> IBP and SC held that is is reasonable
recompense (1% of the 5,000,000 of the contract price sought to be notarized.) and also
Cueto should have inquired first about the reasonableness. ALso, facts show that they
agreed on the amount.
132 LEMOINE v BALON
FACTS:
- Lemoine is a French national who filed an insurance claim with Metropolitan
Insurance.
- His friend Jesus Garcia arranged for the engagement of Balons services as his
counsel
- Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of the actual amount to being
recovered payable upon successful recovery. An advance payment of P50,000 to be
deducted from whatever amount would be successfully collected. P1,000 as
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
appearance and conference fee for each and every court hearing and legal expenses
and other miscellaneous will be charged to Lemoines account which would be
reimbursed upon presentment of account. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the
fee.
- Lemoine signed an undated Special Power of Attorney authorizing Balon to bring any
action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of Lemoines claim as well as
to negotiate, sign, compromise, encash and receive payments
- Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoines claim and Balon confirmed his
acceptance of the offer
- December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a China Bank check payable to
Lemoine in the amount of P525,000 which was received by Balon
- When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case, Balon answered that
Metropolitan Insurance was offering P350,000 for settlement which Lemoine
suggested that Balon accept to avoid litigation
- December 1999, Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance to ask on the
status of the case and it answered that the case was long settled via a check given to
Balon.
- Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of the check and that he is keeping the
check as attorneys lien pending Lemoines payment of his attorneys fee equivalent to
50% of the entire amount collected. He also threatened Lemoine that he will not
hesitate to make proper representation with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, DOLE and BIR if Lemoine will make any trouble to Balon and that he has
good network with the mentioned agencies.
- Balon later claimed that he gave P233,000 to Garcia on the representation of
Lemoine. No written memorandum of the turn-over was made because Garcia was a
co-Rotarian and co-attorney of Balon
- Balon was in possession of the said check for 5 years
ISSUE:
- W/N Balon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
- YES! And he was ordered disbarred by the SC
- The lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the client
agrees with the amount of attorneys fees to e charged. In case of disagreement,
however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the
payment of his fees. He can file the necessary action with the proper court to fix the
fees
- Before receiving the check, he proposes a 25% attorneys fees, after receiving the
check, he was already asking for 50%.
- under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful
acts , must observe fairness in all his dealings with his client and must hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client
- a lawyer who practices deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his duty
of fidelity loyalty and devotion to the clients cause but also degrades himself and
besmirches the name of an honorable profession.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
133 SCC CHEMICALS v CA

Facts:
SCC Chemicals Corporation, through its chairman and vice president, obtained a loan
from State Investment house (SIHI).
Loan amount was P130T, with a 30% interest rate p.a.
Surcharges: 2% per month on the remaining balance.
The officers above mentioned executed a comprehensive security agreement on the
loan.
But SCC failed to pay the loan. SIHI sent demand letters, but no payment was made.
SIHI presented one witness to prove his claim. The cross-examination was postponed
many times. SCC was finally declared to have waived its right to cross examine.
A lot of challenges were made by SCC on the validity of the document. But this is of
no moment. (and irrelevant)
Now, SCC is questioning the preponderance of evidence (irrelevant) and the amount
of attorneys fees awarded.
Issue:
W/N SIHI is entitled to attorneys fees.
Held:
No.
The appeal is partially granted. Attorneys fees are deleted.
Radio Communications of the Philippines v Rodriguez stated that the reason for the
award of the attorneys fees must be stated in the text of the courts decision. Since
the trial court did not state any reason for awarding the attorneys fees, the fees should
have been disallowed by the appellate court.
The award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule, \hence it is
necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring the
case within the exception and justify the grant of the award.
Given the failure of the trial court to explicitly state the rationale for the award of
attorneys fees, the same shall be disallowed.
134 IN RE HAMILTON
Facts:
L. Porter Hamilton advised and counseled Luciano Andrada in regard to a claim (by
Andrada) against Isabelo Alburo.
In lieu thereof, Hamilton received various documents (vouchers, notes) from Andrada.
Hamilton prepared a formal petition for Andrada, and also prepared papers relating to
attachment proceedings against the property of Alburo. It appeared, however, that
Hamilton was not noted as attorney of record for Andrada.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Later on, Hamilton entered appearance as attorney of record for Alburo (the defendant
in the same case). Hamilton only surrendered the documents received from Andrada
when the court ordered him to do so.
Another misconduct was committed by Hamilton when he proposed, through a letter,
to S.L. Joseph of Cebu that he be employed as attorney for S.L. Joseph Lumber Yard,
under a threat to compel said person to accept his proposition.
Judge Wislezinus said: Ah hindi pwede yan! He orderd the fiscal to file an action for
disbarment against Hamilton for professional misconduct.
Hamiltons defense was that there was no attorney-client relationship between him and
Andradasince he was not the attorney of record. On the second misconduct,
Hamiltons defense was that the letter (where he made the proposition) was privileged
communication so it cannot be used as evidence against him.
Issue:
Is Atty Hamilton guilty of professional misconduct?
Held:
Yes, and he should be suspended for 6 years. The existence of an attorney-client relationship
could be established by overt acts. By accepting papers relating to the claim, the confidential
relationship was established. Hamilton also counseled with Andrada regarding the subject
matter of the suit. The fact that he did not allow his name to be place by the clerk of court as
attorney of record for Andrada (when the papers were filed) can only be considered as proof
of lack of good faith with the client to whome he was rendering professional services. A
stipulated fee is not necessary to establish the relationship either.
By representing the opposing party in the same case (without the others consent) and by
refusing to surrender the documents received from Andrada (until there were court orders),
counsel violated the confidence between him and Andrada. He did not offer his services in
good faith to his client.
As to the claim that the letter to S.L. Joseph was privileged, there was no proof that there was
an attorney-client relationship between Hamilton and S.L. Joseph. Furthermore, in a
disbarment proceeding, where the alleged client himself is not insisting on the privilege,
counsel cannot be permitted to shield himself behind the privilege.
135 HILADO v DAVID
Facts:
Blandina Hilado (ganda ng pangalan!) brought an action against Selim Assad to annul
the sale of several houses and lot exected by Hilados husband.
Delgado et al. was counsel for Hilado, while Ohnick et al filed an answer for Assad.
Later on, Atty Vicente Francisco entered his appearance for Assad substituting Ohnick
et al.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
The firm of Delgado urged Atty Francisco to stop representing Assad since there exists
an atty-client relationship between him (Francisco) and the other party (Hilado) in the
same case.
It was alleged that Hilado consulted Francisco regarding the case and that the former
turned over papers to the latter. From such documents, Francisco sent a written
opinion to Hilado.
Since makulit si Francisco, Delgado et al. sought to disqualify Francisco from
representing Assad in the case.
Franciscos defense was that he only met Hilado once and this was when the latter
informed him about the case. He added that when Hilado left documents in their office,
he told his assistant to tell Hilado that their firm would not handle her case. And that
the written opinion was made by his assistant, which he signed without reading, and
only for the purpose of explaining to Hilado why his firm rejected the case.
David is the judge trying the case who dismissed the complaint for disqualification
against Francisco. Said judge reasoned that no attorney-client relationship existed
between Hilado and Francisco.
Issue:
Was there an attorney-client relationship between Francisco and Hilado?
Should Atty Francisco be disqualified from representing Assad?
Held:
The firm of Francisco mailed a written opinion to Hilado on the merits of the case (with
Franciscos signature); this opinion was reached on the basis of papers submitted at his
office; and that Hilados purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Franciscos
professional services. From these ultimate facts, an attorney-client relationship between
Francisco and Hilado can be said to have ensued.
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed
the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer
should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. When
a person consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view of obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such
consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established.
The existence of attorney-client relationship precludes the attorney from representing (and
receiving a retainer from) the opposite party in the same case.
An information professionally obtained by an attorney from a client is sacred to the
employment to which it pertains, and to permit it be used in the interest of another, or in the
interest of the adverse party is to strike at the element of confidence which forms the basis of
an attorney-client relationship.
The rule inhibiting an attorney from acting in behalf of both parties is implied in the Rules of
Court (wala pang codified codes of professional responsibility noon).
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
The defense that Francisco never read the written opinion nor the documents submitted by
Hilado will not preclude the existence of an attorney-client relationship. The fact remains that
his firm did give Hilado a formal professional advice from which emerged the relation. The
letter binds and estops him in the same manner and degree as if he wrote it personally. And
an information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of the firm is information
imparted to the firm.
The failure to object to counsels appearance does not operate as a waiver of the right to ask
for counsels disqualification.
Motion for disqualification against Attorney Francisco should be allowed.
*A retaining fee (just in case itanong) is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to
insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client.
136 REGALA v SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Petitioners in this case and private respondent Roco were all then partners of the law
firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (commonly known as
ACCRA)
ACCRA performed services for clients which included acquiring and/or organizing
business associations and/or organizations where it acted as incorporators or simply
as stockholders
As members of the law firm, petitioners and Roco admit that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition of companies included in Civil Case No. 0033. In keeping
with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders. Anong
kalokohan yan?
o Civil Case No. 0033 RP v. Eduardo Cojuangco et. al., for the recovery of illgotten wealth, which includes shares of stock in certain corporations
PCGG later on filed a motion to admit 3rd amended complaint, which excluded Roco in
Civil Case 33 as party defendant. PCGG was removing Roco because Roco was
going to make choochoo and reveal the identity of the principals.
The ACCRA lawyers then filed a comment and/or opposition saying that they should
also be removed the way that Roco was.
PCGG then said that it will ask for their exclusion only if they will also disclose the
During the proceedings, Roco did not actually reveal the identity of the client for whom
he acted as nominee-stockholder
The ACCRA lawyers motion for exclusion was denied (they refused to comply with the
PCGGs offer) by the PCGG and the court. Hence, this motion for certiorari
Issue:
W/N the ACCRA lawyers should be excluded from the case
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held:
Yes. It is apparent that the ACCRA lawyers were only impleaded to force them to
disclose the identity of their clients.
PCGG has no valid cause of action
Issue:
W/N the attorney-client privilege prohibits the ACCRA lawyers from revealing the
Held:
General rule: a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery
o Exceptions: where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyers
advice
o Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability
o Where revealing the identity would furnish the only link that would be necessary
to convict an individual of a crime
Suing the lawyer to force him to disclose the identity of his client in any of these
instances is improper and the suit, upon motion, may be dismissed on such ground.
The prosecution should rely on the strength of their evidence and not on the weakness
of the defense
Roco merely stated that he was acting as nominee-stockholder for the client and is
part of legitimate lawyering. The ACCRA lawyers also made such statement and
should also be dropped.
the relation of attorney and client is strictly personal and highly confidential and
fiduciary
the lawyer is more than a mere agent or servant because he possesses special
powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client
137 PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Honrada was the clerk of court and acting stenographer of the First MCTC. Paredes
was the Provincial Attorney of Agusan. Sansaet was the counsel of Paredes.
It appears that Paredes applied for a free patent and Certificate of Title over a lot. It was
initially approved, but the Director of lands subsequently filed for the cansellation of the
patent and title on the ground that the land had been reserved as a school site. The lower
court ruled to nullify the patent and title after finding out that Paredes obtained the same
through fraudulent misrepresentations.
An information for perjury was filed against Paredes. However, the fiscal directed the Deputy
Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground of prescription. After
some time, Gelacio, the one who filed the perjury case, sent a letter to the OMB seeking the
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
investigation of the 3 personalities for falsification of public documents. The alleged falsified
documents were documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment and stenographic notes
supposedly taken during the arraignment of the perjury charge.
In a sudden turn of events, Atty. Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the graft
case dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury case
had been dismissed by the trial court . Atty. Sansaet was, in effect, asking to be a state
witness against Paredes. However, the OMB denied the request of Atty. to be a state witness
on the ground that the confession made by Paredes to Atty. was privileged communication.
Issue: W/N the confession made by Paredes to Atty. is privileged communication.
Held: The confession made by Paredes is not covered by privileged communication.
This case is actually an exception to the rule. It can be assumed that there was confidential
information made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with the falsification case, because
Sansaet was the counsel.
A distinction must be made between communications relating to past crimes already
committed, and future crimes intended to be committed by the client. It is true that by now
those crimes had already been committed. But for the application of the atty.-client privilege
to apply, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was
made by the client to the atty. In other words, if the client seeks the advice of the atty. with
respect to a crime already committed at the time of the communication, it is privileged
information. But if the client consults the atty. regarding a crime he is about to commit after
the consultation, such is not privileged information.
In the present case, the confession made by Paredes to Sansaet were in reference to a crime
of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he later
committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are
outside the pale of the atty.-client privilege.
Besides, for the rule to attach, the purpose of the consultation must be for a lawfule purpose.
Without the lawful purpose, the privilege does not attach.
138 NGAYAN v TUGADE
Facts:
-Ngayan asked Tugade to prepare and affidavit to be used as basis for a complaint against
Soriano and Leonido as a consequence of the latters entry into complainants dwelling.
Ngayan signed the affidavit without thoroughly reading it but she noticed one paragraph
which did not mention that Leonido was with Soriano when they both barged into
complainants residence.
-Upon being informed of this omission, Tugade crossed out the said paragraph. Ngayan
asked Tugade to make another affidavit and the latter promised to do so.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
-Ngayan discharged Tugade as their counsel and found out that Tugade did not include the
name of Leonido in the criminal case filed.
-When the omission was remedied by their new counsel, the adverse parties filed a motion
for reinvestigation through their counsel, Atty. Gaminda, who was a former classmate of
Tugade.
-Tugade was also a lawyer of the brother of Leonido in an insurance company.
-In the hearing for the motion for reinvestigation, the adverse parties in affidavit which Tugade
prepared for Ngayan, with one paragraph crossed out. Tugade himself presented an affidavit
controverting the discarded affidavit which he prepared for Ngayan.
-Thus Ngayan charged Tugade for violation of paragraphs (e) and (f), Sec.20, Rule 138 Rules
of Court
(e) to maintain inviolate the confidenceand to preserve the secrets of his client
(f) to abstain from all offensive personality..against a party or witness
Issue: W/N Tugade must be disciplined for violation of the said Rule
HELD: YES, he is suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
-When Tugade furnished the adverse parties with a copy of the discarded affidavit, thus
enabling the adverse parties to use it as evidence against complainants, he betrayed the trust
and confidence of his clients in violation of paragraph (e) Sec.20 Rule 138
-Tugades actuations from the beginning show that he was partial to the adverse parties. This
could be explained by the fact that he was a former classmate of Atty.Gaminda, the adverse
parties counsel, and also by the fact that he was the lawyer of Leonidos brother in an
insurance company.
-Tugade submitted an affidavit containing facts prejudicial to his former client such as the fact
that the crime charged by Ngayan had already prescribed, and that Ngayan asked him to
make the offense more grave to prevent the offense from prescribing. This constitutes an act
of offensive personality against complainants, violative of par.(f) Sec.20 Rule 138.
139 PFLEIDER v PALANCA
FACTS:
- Palanca is the lawyer of Pfleider.
- Pfleider leased to Palanca an agricultural land, Hacienda Asia in Negros Occidental for
a period of 10 years
- It is stipulated in the lease agreement that a specified portion of the lease rentals
would be paid to Pfleider and the remainder would be delivered by Palanca to the
listed creditors of Pfleider
- Pfleider filed a suit for the rescission of the lease agreement of the ground of alleged
default in the payment of rentals of Palanca.
- Pfleider also filed for the disbarment of Palanca on the grounds of:
o Palanca did not follow the instructions of Pfleider to settle his estafa case
against Matiao in 1965 and the latter also failed to deposit the sum of P5,000
with the court

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
o Palanca has fraudulently charged the P5,000 as part of the lease rental of the
Hacienda Asia
o Palanca also falsely represented having paid one Guintos the sum of P866 for
the account of Pfleider when in truth and in fact, Guintos only received P86
o The list of creditors which Pfleider has confidentially supplied Palanca was
disclosed by Palance in violation of their attorney-client relationship
ISSUE:
- W/N Palanca committed a breach of fidelity owing form a lawyer to his client
HELD:
- NO!
- There is no substantial blame against Palanca inasmuch as the latters services were
implicitly terminated by Pfleider when he sued his lawyer.
- While the object of the suit is the rescission of the lease contract, the conflict of
interest became incompatible with the mutual confidence and trust essential to every
lawyer-client relationship.
- Also, Pfleider delivered the list of creditors to Palanca not because of the professional
relation then existing between them, but on account of the lease agreement. A
violation thereof would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of
fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.
140 MERCADO v VITRIOLO
FACTS:
Rosa F. Mercado (complainant) is a Senior Education Program Specialist of CHED.
Atty. Vitriolo is a Deputy Executive Director IV of CHED.
Complainants husband filed an annulment case entitled Ruben Mercado v. Rosa
Francisco. The case was dismissed.
Complainants counsel later on died. Atty. Vitriolo substituted the counsel who just
died.
Later on, Atty. Vitriolo filed a criminal action against complainant. (falsification of
documents: birth certificates of her children, making it appear that she was married to
a certain Ferdinand Fernandez when in fact she was legally married to Ruben
Mercado.
Complainant alleged that the criminal complaint disclosed confidential facts and
information relating to the civil case for annulment. She claims that in filing the criminal
case, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential relationship.
4 years later, the results of the investigation recommended that Vitriolo is indeed guilty
and should be suspended for a month. Complainant then wrote Justice Davide that
she is desisting from pursuing the case because she has found it in her heart to
forgive respondent. Such desistance has no bearing.
ISSUE:
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
W/N Atty. Vitriolo is indeed guilty of violating the privilege and confidential relationship
of attorney-client relationship
HELD:
NO. Case dismissed.
Complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed
by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity.
Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the
complainant must prove.
The confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on
privileged communication.
Burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the
privilege.
141 GENATO v SILAPAN
FACTS:
- Complaint for disbarment filed by William Ong Genato against Atty. Essex Silapan
- The various criminal and civil cases were not discussed, because it was left for the trial
courts to decide. (Genato lent Silapan money to purchase a new car. Silapan mortgaged his
house and lot. When SIlapan failed to pay, GEnato sought the foreclosure of the mortgage
and tried to encash a postdated check issued by Silapan, which subsequently bounced.) The
Court, in this case, cannot sanction Atty. Silapan
for his issuance of a bouncing check.
- When Genato filed a BP 22 case against Atty. Silapan, the latter alleged in his answer that
during the previous case (criminal case), Genato wanted Atty Silapan to offer bribe money to
members of DOJ, even the prosecutor, and presiding judge. Atty. SIlapan refused since such
acts are immoral and illegal but also because 'the complainant confided to him that he was
really involved in the commission of the crime
that was charged'.
ISSUE: WoN Atty. Silapan committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to Genato
illegal practices and disclosing alleged intention to bribe govt officials in connection with a
pending case?
HELD: NO. The privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or information is
limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a
lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime
or perpetuation of a fraud. A lawyer is not a gun for hire.
ISSUE: WoN disclosures were indispensable to protect Atty. Silapan's rights because they
were pertinent to the foreclosure case
HELD: NO. It was improper for the respondent to use it against Genato in the foreclosure
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
case because it was not the subject matter of litigation and ATty. SIlapan's professional
competence and legal advice were not being attacked in that case. A lawyer must conduct
himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond
reproach. (Atty Silapan was ordered 1 year suspension)
142 BACARRO v CA
FACTS:
Bacarro is the registered owner of a lot located in Cagayan de Oro city. He claims that he
was compelled by the Municipal Judge of Baungin, Bukidnon to appear before the judge's
ofice and then and there coerced and forced, under threat of prosecution and loss said
land, to execute a deed of reconveyance of 1/2 of the land to Gaerlan. Bacarro then filed a
complaint for the annulment of said deed of reconveyance.
Atty Luminarias and Caballero entered their appearance, in said cas as counsel of Bacarro in
collaboration with Atty Pacana.
The judge of the lower court ordered an amendment to th complaint of Bacarro. Mrs. Gaerlan
filed a written manifestation inviting attention to the fact that petittoner Bacarro had not
complied with said order. The judge then issued an order dismissing the
complaint.
A motion for new trial/ reconsideration was filed by Atty Caballero on behalf of Bacarro.
Motion was denied in an order issued by the judge dated November 14, 1966. Notice of said
order was not received by Atty Caballero until March 15, 1967, on which date he
filed a notice of appeal. Gaerlan objected to the approval of said notice of appeal, upon the
ground that the period to appeal should be reckoned from Nov 14, 1966, when a copy of the
order was served upon Atty Pacana. On this allegation, the motion was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not period to appeal from order denyingh motion for new trial/ reconsideration
began to run on Nov 14, 1966, when a copy of said order was served upon Pacana, or on
March 16, 1967, when notice was served upon Atty Caballero.
HELD:
March 16, 1967.
This is not a case of substitution. By entering his appearnce, Atty Caballero did not substitute
Atty Pacana but became one of the attorneys for Bacarro. Neither did Atty Caballero
substitute or try to substitute Atty Pacana. The statement in the motion for reconsideration to
the effect that, through Atty Caballero, petitioner Bacarro, "after duly relieving his previous
counsel moved for the reconsideration of
the order, had the effect of continuig the services of Caballero and dropping Pcana. (walang
substitution... sabay silang lawyer tapos na-terminate ung employment ni Pacana...)
Whether Bacarro could - as regards the Court of Gaerlan - validly dispense with the services
of Pacana, without securing his consent, or without proof that he had been notified of
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Bacarro's motion for reconsideration...

HELD:
YES. Client may at any time dismiss his attorney. The relatioship between Bacarro and
Pacana ceased to exist from the filing of the motion for reconsideration/ new trial, insofar as
the court is concerned and form receipt of copy thereof by Atty Salcedo, insofar as Gaerlan
was concerned.
143 PEOPLE v CASIMIRO
Facts:
Atty. Manuel Sanglay was filed an administrative complaint for his failure to file a brief
within the reglementary period for his clients Benjamin Icalla, Rodolfo Soriano and
Benjamin Cinco.
Sanglay was given 10 days from Feb 3, 1972 to explain, but his explanation came at
the end of the month.
He absolved himself from any blame as, in his view, no fault could be attributed to him.
According to him, he contacted the parents of the appellants. It was mentioned to him
that another lawyer whose services presumably were hired by the parents of
appellants Icalla and Cinco.
Sanglay then reminded them that failure to file the (appellants) brief would mean
automatic withdrawal of the appeal.
He was then assured that the new lawyer will file the brief, and that as a token for his
hard work, he shoud not withdraw.
Issue:
W/N Sanglay is liable for the late filing of the appellants brief.
Held:
No. (but he is reprimanded)
It was not a willful act on his part.
Nonetheless, the exculpation he seeks cannot be granted. Under the circumstances, the
least that was expected of him was that he would inform the Tribunal of the developments set
forth in his explanation and as that he be allowed to withdraw as counsel. Such a step he did
not take until after the Feb 3 resolution.
It did not wipe out the previous manifestation of negligence on his part. He cannot therefore
escape liability.
144 BICOL FEDERATION v CUYUGAN
Facts:
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Certain members of the Bicol Federation of Labor were hired by Doa Jacinta
Cuyugan to clear her land and plant coconut seedlings on it. These planters were also
allowed to plant other crops over the land.
When the coconut trees bore fruit, the planters were being given half of 1/3 of the
harvest. But the custom in the area was that the planter and the owner should share
50-50 in case the owner would not give monetary payment to the planters.
During the harvesting, the agent of the owner of the land hired other people. This, in
effect, was ousting the planters and preventing them from claiming their rightful
compensation.
Bicol Federation of Labor, in behalf of its individual members, filed an action before the
Agrarian court to change their arrangement with the owner from sharing to a leasehold system. Such desired arrangement would enable them to have a wider area to
cultivate and with the least intervention by the landowners agents.
During the pendency of the action, counsel for Bicol FederationAtty Quirico Fabul
declared that his authority to represent the group has been terminated and that the
retainer was in behalf of the individual claimants and not of the Federation. This fact
was used by the defendants (Cuyugans and the agents) as another defense.
The Agrarian Court dismissed the claim of Bicol Federation solely on the ground that
the action was not within its jurisdiction.
Issue:
Was the action by Bicol Federation within the competence of the Agrarian Court?
(Ethics iss
ue) Can Atty Fabul still represent the claimants despite the dismissal of his services (by Bicol
Federation)?
Held:
Yes, the Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction. Under the Code of Agrarian Reforms,
and considering the policy and objectives of such legislation, the Agrarian Courts has
jurisdiction over issues involving an individual(s) claiming for compensation from a landowner.
(the relevant issue)
Yes, Atty Fabul can represent the claimants in this case despite the declared termination.
This is one of those rare instances where an attorney, whose authority has been terminated
by his client, may be allowed to continue his representation. To prevent failure or miscarriage
of justice and pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, the names of the individual
claimants should be added to the complaint under the legal representation of Atty Fabul until
and unless each individual claimant should otherwise manifest before the court.
Case was remanded to the Agrarian Court.
145 DOMINGO SR. v AQUINO
FACTS

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Court of First Instance approved money claim of AQUINO against the Estate of
Domingo and ordered Administratrix STA MARIA to pay P20,000 to AQUINO
Both parties appealed
CA affirmed the ruling of the CFI
Copies of the judgment were sent to ATTY UNSON through registered mail
The new administratrix DE LOPEZ alleges the co-administratrix of STA MARIA, ATTY
DOMINGO, was removed from his trust by the intestate courts order for having
squandered cash so being the one (ATTY DOMINGO) who engaged the services of
ATTY UNSON, the removal of ATTY DOMINGO is in effect the removal of ATTY
UNSON as counsel of the estate
DE LOPEZ prays that the clerk of court be directed to serve a copy of the CA judgment
on her counsel instead of ATTY UNSON
(In other words, yun court nagsend ng copy ng decision ng ca kay atty unson pero sabi
ng estate hindi valid yun pagsend ng notice kasi hindi na nila lawyer si atty unson at the
time notice was served)
ISSUE
HELD
W/N SERVICE OF THE JUDGMENT ON ATTY UNSON WAS VALID

YES, EVEN IF ESTATE CLAIMS THAT ATTY UNSON WAS NOT THEIR
LAWYER AT THE TIME COPY OF THE JUDGMENT WAS SENT, ABSENCE
OF MANIFESTATION OR NOTICE OF DISCHARGE FILED WITH THE
COURT MAKES JUDICIAL NOTICE SENT TO THE COUNSEL OF RECORD
BINDING UPON THE CLIENT
RATIO
Records show that ATTY UNSON was the counsel of record of the ESTATE OF DOMINGO in
the appellate court and never filed any withdrawal as such counsel. Even after the removal
of ATTY DOMINGO as administrator of the estate, ATTY UNSON filed in the appellate court
his memorandum for the estate.
Moreover, while it may be true that ATTY UNSON ceased as counsel for the estate and for
the former administrator when the intestate court granted his motion to withdraw as counsel
by virtue of his appointment to and assumption of public office of Assistant Administrator of
the Sugar Quota Administration, this was true only as far as the intestate court was
concerned. He continued on record in the appellate court and did not file any withdrawal as
counsel. In addition to that, no appearance of new counsel for the estate was ever filed.
It follows that since notice and copy of the appellate courts decision were served by
registered mail on the estates counsel of record ATTY UNSON and the latter failed to claim
his mail on the 5th day after the first notice of the postmaster, such service was deemed
completed and effected and binding upon the client, in this case the Estate of Domingo.
As to the contention that removal of ATTY DOMINGO as administratrix means removal of
ATTY UNSON as the estates counsel because ATTY DOMINGO was the one who engaged
the services of ATTY UNSON, the fact that ATTY UNSONS services were engaged by ATTY
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
DOMINGO in his official capacity as administrator, did not make ATTY UNSON his personal
counsel. ATTY UNSON continued to be authorized to represent the estate as its counsel until
the new administrator DOMINGO DE LOPEZ should terminate his services which she never
did.
JUDGMENT
SC: ATTY REGINO (petitioners counsel in this case) is reminded that cooperation of litigants
and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with
unmeritorious cases may be avoided. Hence, petition is dismissed and ATTY REGINO is
ordered to pay treble costs.
146 AQUINO v BLANCO
Facts:
- Petitioners Santiago Aquio and Dionisia Aguirre filed a complaint against Dominga
Salveron in the CFI, which the petitioners won.
- Salveron was represented in that case by Atty. Basilio Sorioso. Atty. Sorioso was
appointed as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on Feb. 11, 1947.
- Despite the appointment, the judgment in the earlier mentioned case was served on
Atty. Sorioso.
- Salveron was only informed of the judgment on Mar. 26, 1947 when a writ of execution
was served on him.
- Salveron then filed a petition to vacate said writ of execution. This was granted by
Judge Blanco.
Issue:
- W/n the service of judgment made on Atty. Sorioso constitutes service upon his client,
Salveron.
Held:
- SC says NO.
- When Attorney Sorioso was appointed to the position of assistant provincial fiscal and
therein qualified, by operation of law he ceased to engage in private law practice, and
as a consequence he became simultaneously disqualified to continue representing his
former client, the herein respondent Dominga Salveron, in the above-mentioned case.
So that in contemplation of law the notice of the decision upon him on February 11,
1947, was not a notice upon said respondent, and the period for perfecting an appeal
on the part of the latter in reality did not then commence to run but only, if at all, when
she acquired knowledge of said decision upon the service on her of the writ of
execution on March 26, 1947.
147 WACKWACK GOLF v CA
Facts: Arcangel, a former employee of Wack Wack (WW), filed with the CFI a money claim
case for overtime services rendered to WW, for unenjoyed vacation, moral damages, and
atty.s fees. At the hearing of the case, neither WW nor its counsel, Balcoff et. al., appeared,
despite notification. As a result, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of Arcangel.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
The firm of Chuidian, on behalf of WW, filed a petition to set aside the judgment on the
ground of mistake, misunderstanding, and excusable neglect. According to the firm of
Chuidian, WW was first represented by Balcoff et. al. Thereafter, WW decided to replace
Balcoff et. al. with the Chuidian Law Office. When the representative of Chuidian went to the
firm of Balcoff to inform the latter of the replacement, Mr. Balcoff was not in the office. Atty.
Cruz of Balcoff et. al. declared that he had no authority to turn over the records of the case to
Chuidian Law Office. As a result, Atty. Chuidian called Atty. Balcoff. Atty. Chuidian said that,
inasmuch as Balcoff et. al. was still representing the WW, the Chuidian Law Office will send a
representative on the hearing day. However, no representative from the Chuidian Law Office
came. (This is the misunderstanding that was mentioned above. Balcoff thought that Chuidian
will be the one to appear instead of him.
Issue: W/N the judgment in favor of Arcangel should be set aside based on
misunderstanding.
Held: The judgment should not be set aside. Misunderstanding alibi not accepted.
The law firm of Balcoff and Cruz was still WWs counsel of record, because the firm of
Chuidian only entered appearance after the date of the hearing mentioned above. As such
counsel of record, Balcoff et. al. must have known that it is under obligation to protect WWs
interest until its final release from the professional relationship.
The lack of coordination and understanding between the two law firms cannot be considered
a legal excuse within the ambit of excusable negligence.
148 AMPIL v AGRAVA
Facts:
-Ampil was the counsel for Angela Perez in several cases. The principal cases handled by
Ampil were filed in the CFI by Angelas husband and son, Antonio and Benigno Perez, asking
that Angela be placed under guardianship and that a suitable person be appointed to
administer her properties. Later on, the parties submitted to court, which dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction. This dismissal was affirmed by SC.
-A case was later filed by Antonio and Benigno with the domestic court of Manila, seeking the
courts approval of the compromise agreement. The domestic court dismissed the proceeding
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because the case which was to be settled amicably by
the compromise agreement had already been dismissed by CFI as affirmed by SC.
-Ampil asserts that Angela terminated his services as counsel without just cause and without
paying him for his profiessional services, for which he presented his bill and asserted his
retaining lien over the three titles entrusted to him by Angela in the course of his professional
employment.
-Eventually, the compromise agreement mentioned above was approved by the Supreme
Court. Benigno and Antonio thus filed a case to obtain the titles held by Ampil. They claimed
that the attorneys lien must be exercised over the properties belonging to Angela, not over
the properties belonging to them in the compromise agreement. They also argued that the
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
compromise agreement was entered into 8 years before Ampil was discharged as Angelas
counsel, besides, Ampil took a position adverse to them by seeking to have the compromise
agreement annulled. They concluded that Ampil was therefore bound by the compromise
agreement.
Issue:
W/N whether Ampil has a right to keep his retaining lien over the said titles until his services
are paid for.
Held: YES.
-Three elements of attorneys retaining lien were met: 1) lawyer-client relationship; 2) lawful
possession of the clients funds, documents, and papers; and 3) unsatisfied claim for
attorneys fees.
-Ampil obtained possession of the titles when they still belonged to his client Angela. It was
only when Angela later on confirmed the compromise agreement that it became valid. The
transfer of the properties to Antonio and Benigno could not retroact to the time the
compromise was originally executed.
-The situation would be different where title to the property is the very subject in dispute in the
case and the court adjudges the clients adversary to be rightfully entitled thereto. In such as
case the titles to the property could not be said to be properties of the client. The attorney
may enforce his lien only over the properties of his client and not against those of his clients
adversary.
-Petitioner is in no way interfering with the taking possession of the properties and enjoyment
of the fruits thereof. All that petitioner asserts and exercises is his passive lien of retaining
the muniments of title thereto. Such retention only impedes the corresponding registration
and transfer of titles to respondents.
149 MATUTE v MATUTE
FACTS:
Jose Matute filed an action against the administrator Matias Matute.
Jose is asking Matias to surrender 17 titles to various properties of the estate
Probate court granted the prayer of Jose and ordere3d the surrender of the titles
Matias and his counsel Atty. Canlas appealed the decision
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Canlas may be compelled to surrender the titles even though he was not yet
paid his fees
HELD:
NO!
An attorney is entitled to retain documents in the case pending settlement of attorneys
fees.
Sec 37 of Rule 138 provides that attorneys cannot be compelled to surrender the
documents in his possession without prior proof that his fees has been duly satisfied
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
But the court may require the attorney to deliver the papers in his possession provided
that the client files proper security for the attorneys compensation
150 RUSTIA v ABETO

FACTS:
Atty. Rustia filed this case to annul orders of the CFI of Manila in the case of Intestate
Estate of Antonio de la Riva.
Atty. Rustia was the counsel of respondent, Milagros Schmid, the administrator of the
intestate estate.
When Rustia was relieved as attorney, he sent a bill for P32,330. He wanted to have a
lien over all funds and documents that he is currently holding for the administrator.
CFI of Manila ordered Atty. Rustia to hand over the certificate of a land. Atty. Rustia is
objecting saying that he has a lien over the TCT for his professional fees.
CFI nonetheless still went on with its previous order. Atty. Rustia obeyed the order. And
then this case was filed.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Rustia has a valid lien over the documents in his possession
HELD:
YES. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents, and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his possession, and may retain the same until his lawful
fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction
thereof.
The general or retaining lien of an attorney is dependent upon the possession and
does not attach to anything not in the attorneys hands.
The courts may require the attorney to deliver up the papers in his possession
provided the client files proper security for the attorneys compensation.
151 METROPOLITAN BANK v CA
FACTS:
- ANTECEDAL FACTS (up to you guys kung gusto nyo basahin tong paragraph na toh... not
pertinent to our lesson): Celedonio Javier bought 7 parcels of land owned by Eustaqio
Alejandro. Javier mortgaged with Metrobank the lots to secure a loan of Bautista?Int'l
Hotel Corp. Metrobank foreclosed on the properties. Alejandro alleged fraud in the sale, and
brought suits against Javier and Metrobank. During the pendency of these suits, Metrobank
sold lots to Service Leasing, resold to Herby Commercial, which mortgaged the same
to Banco de Oro.
- Arturo Alfariz and Associates handled the civil cases of Metrobank. All the civil cases were
for the declaration of nullity of certain deeds of sale, with damages. The lawyers did not have
any knowledge of any of the transfers made by Metrobank. They filed a
motion to enter its charging lien (25% of the actual and current market values of the litigated
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
properties as its attys fees.) Despite due notice, Metrobank failed to appear and oppose, so
the RD annotated the atty's liens on the TCTs.
- Alejandro (plaintiffs) filed a motion to dismiss which was granted with prejudice to the earlier
order of annotation. The lawyers filed a motion to fix the atty's fees based on quantum meruit.
CA affiremed order to Metrobank to pay ALfariz and ASsociates attys
fees.
ISSUE: WoN lawyers are entitled to atty's fees
HELD: NO
RATIO:
1. A charging lien to be enforceable requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for
money and execution in pursuance of such judgment. In the case at bar, the civil cases were
dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the full
satisfaction of their claims". The dismissal neither provided for any money judgment nor
made any monetary award to any litigant. The charging lien was WITHOUT ANY LEGAL
BASIS.
2. The lien of respondent is not of a nature which attached to the property in litigation but is at
most a personal claim enforceable by a writ of execution.
3. While a client cannot defeat an atty's right to his charging lien by dismissing the case,
terminating the services of his counsel, waiving his cause or interest in favor of the adverse
party or compromising his action, this rule cannot find application here as the termination of
the cases was not at the instance of the client, but of the opposing party.
4. There is an obvious necessity for a hearing because the persons who are entitled to or
who must pay attys fees have the right to be heard upon the question of propriety or amount.
5. Regarding American jurisprudence stating a contrary rule - the Court held that in the
absence of a statute or special agreement providing otherwise, the general rule is that an atty
has no lien on the land
152 DORONILA-TIOSECO v CA
FACTS:
AS a result of dispute among the heirs of the late Alfonso Doronila and their counsel Ramon
Gonzales, over his claim for attorney's fees, the RTC denied the heirs' Motion to Cancel
Attorney's lien and declare Ramon Gonzales entitiled to 10% of the shares of the heirs of the
late Doronila. Both of the parties appealed the decision.
Ramon Gonzales filed a motion to annotate attorney's lien, praying that his attorney's lien be
annotated on the title of parcels of land of the estate which the heirs had inherited.
Administrator of the estate opposed the said motion by contending that an attorney's lien
does not extend to land and that the proper remedy is attachment.
Trial court granted the counsel's motion for annotation.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
ISSUE:
W/n an attorney's lien extends to land...
HELD:
"We have ruled that an attorney's lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of
the litigation." (eto lang yung sinabi sa case... ung mga prior cases, applicable...)
ISSUE:
W/n the trial court retained jurisdiction to grand Ramon Gonzales' Motion to Annotate
Attorney's lien on the title of the parcels of land of the estate after the perfection of the appeal
of both the petitioners and respondent from the order declaring Ramon Gonzales entitled to
attorney' fees...
HELD:
Trial court has no jurisdiction. Motion was filed long after they have perfected their appeals,
therefore the trial court had no more jurisdiction.
153 GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS v NALDOZA
Facts:
Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. filed a disbarment case against Atty. Promo
Naldoza, their former counsel.
Naldoza appealed a decision of the POEA. In line with this, Gatchalian assers that the
disbarments should prosper since Naldoza committed the ff acts:
o Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already final and executory
o Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and fifty-five US dollars
(US$2,555) from complainant, allegedly for cash bond in the appealed case
o Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act.
Naldoza was claimed to ask for a Cash Bond in UNITED STATES DOLLAR
amounting to TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (U.S. $2,555.00) (for
payment) to the Supreme Court in order that the said appealed case could be heard or
acted upon by the Supreme Court.
Gatchalian came to know that there was no such Cash Bond paid to the SC, and in
fact, the fees were only nominal (P622). Moreover, the receipt that Naldoza presented
to Gatchalian which allegedly emanated from the SC was spurious.
An estafa case was filed against Naldoza. It was later on dismissed, but he was held
liable for the amount of $2,555.
Naldoza seeks that he not be suspended in the practice of law.
Issue:
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
W/N Atty Naldoza should be punished for his acts?
Held:
Yes.
Atty. Primo Naldoza is DISBARRED, not just suspended.
On the first issue:
o Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the appeal.
Neither has there been any showing that the appeal was dismissed on the
ground that the POEA Decision had become final and executory. Worse, there
has been no evidence that respondent knew that the case was unappealable.
Indeed, the records of this Court shows that the Petition for Review was
dismissed for petitioners (Gatchalians) failure to submit an Affidavit of Service
and a legible duplicate of the assailed Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to
stand on.
On the next two issues:
o When Naldoza paid P10,000 and issued a check to complainant as his moral
obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge. Normally, this is not the actuation
of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another. This is an
admission of misconduct. (RC Note: Naldoza claims that Gatchalian owes him
P180T in attorneys fees, and after accounting, he paid him P10T as his moral
obligation)
o the amount of $2,555 was not a part of his attorneys lien. He demanded the
money from his client on the pretext that it was needed for the Petition before
the Supreme Court, but he actually converted it to his personal gain.
Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to
cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official
receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to
continue being a member of the bar.
154 VDA DE BARRERA v LAPUT
Facts:
Casiano Laput was Nieves Rillas Vda de Barreras counsel in the settlement
proceedings for the estate of de Barreras husband.
One time, Laput presented a Notice for Rendition of Final Accounting and Partition of
Estate to de Barrera. Barrerra refused to signed and asked Laput to just leave the
document in order that she may ask someone to interpret it for her.
But Laput became angry and even placed a revolver on the lap of de Barrera (who
actually was 72 years old). This compelled the old lady to sign the document.
Laput denied the charges
Issue:
Should Laput be disciplined?

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held:
Naku po naman! Of course. Laput was suspended for 1 year.
It was found by the court that the documents were made by the counsel to end the
proceedings and be able to collect his fees. The act of placing the gun on the clients lap
cannot be interpreted other than as an act of threatening such client.
Laputs acts were improper and censurable (especially considering that de Barrerra was 72
years old). Being a member of the Bar, Laput should have set the example as a man of
peace and a champion of the Rule of Law. An attorneys client is a person who is supposed to
be defended and protected by such counsel.
155 BARRIENTOS v DAAROL
FACTS
Victoria BARRIENTOS is single, a college student and about 20 years and 7 months old
during her relationship with Transfiguracion DAVID, a lawyer and the General Manager of
Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative who was about 40 years old and married to
SUMAYLO.
Flashback Parang sine
DAVID had been known by the BARRIENTOS family for quite sometime being the former
student of Victoria BARRIENTOS father and a former classmate of Victoria BARRIENTOS
mother. DAVID courted BARRIENTOS and after a week of courtship, BARRIENTOS
accepted DAVIDS love. At this time, DAVID was separated from his wife for 16 years.
BARRIENTOS, with her parents permission, was DAVIDS partner during the Chamber
Commerce affair. After the event and before going home, they parked the jeep at the beach
and after the usual preliminaries (what a term), they consummated the sexual act. This was
their set up until BARRIENTOS got pregnant. DAVID suggested abortion but BARRIENTOS
disagreed. During her pregnancy until she gave birth, it was BARRIENTOS family who took
care of her.
BARRIENTOS then filed an administrative case against DAVID with the National
Electrification Administration which was however dismissed. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE
HELD
W/N DAVID SHOULD BE DISBARRED

YES, LACK GOOD MORAL CHARACTER --- A CONTINUING
REQUIREMENT TO BE ABLE TO PRACTICE LAW
RATIO

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
From the records, it is indubitable that BARRIENTOS was never informed by DAVID of his
real status as a married individual. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by DAVID
only after BARRIENTOS became pregnant. Moreover, DAVID misrepresented himself as
being eligible to re-marry for having been separated from his wife for 16 years and even
dangled a marriage proposal.
Interestingly enough, DAVID lived alone in Dipolog City though his son also studies in the
same area. Moreover, he never introduced his son and went around with his friends as
though he was never married. These circumstances belie DAVIDS claim that the
BARRIENTOS family knew about his marital status at the very start of the courtship.
But what surprises the Court is the perverted sense of DAVIDS moral values when he said
that I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being married. Worse, he even
suggested abortion.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting
standards of mental and moral fitness. DAVID having exhibited debased morality, the Court
is constrained to impose upon him the most severe disciplinary action --- disbarment.
156 FLORES v CHUA
Facts:
- Ban Hua Flores seeks the disbarment of Atty. Enrique Chua on the following grounds:
o Chua notarized a deed of sale which contains the forged signature of Chua
Beng (CB). The wife of CB says that CB could not have signed the deed
because she was with CB the whole time before his death. Flores points out
that Chua notarized the deed even if CB did not appear personally.
o Chua falsified a petition filed with the SEC in order to molest and harass Flores.
Apparently, Chua altered the petition to apply for a notice of lis pendens over
the property of Flores. But, his plan failed because the register of deeds denied
his application.
o Chua caused the publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Visayas of a portion of a SEC decision which ordered complainant and others to
pay 68 million. In these publications, Chua was always in the forefront claiming
to e the lawyer of the winning parties. However, this publication is false
because the order had not yet become final, it was still pending appeal. In his
defense, Chua submitted evidence to show that a complaint for libel filed by
Flores against him was dismissed by the prosecutors office.
o Chua had already and has the propensity to bribe judges to gain a favorable
judgment. Flores further alleges that there is a pattern of conduct on the part of
Chua that tends towards the frustration of justice. Chua apparently uses
dilatory tactics and has been reprimanded before.
o Chua is also charged with forum shopping.
Issue:
- W/n Chua is guilty of these acts and should be disbarred.
Held:
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
SC says YES. Chua is disbarred

On the first ground, SC finds Chua guilty of notarizing the deed of sale which contains
a forged signature. Chua failed to exercise the required diligence and fealty to his
office by attesting to the fact that CB appeared before him and signed the deed when
in truth and in fact said person did not do so. This is clearly a violation of the duties of
a notary public to certify that the person signing the instrument is known to him and
that he is the same person who executed it.
There was no basis for the second ground but the Court said that his filing of the
application for notice of lis pendens even if he was not counsel for the petitioners in
the SEC case meant that he knew of such case. Thus, he shouldnt have filed the civil
case involving the same issues. His act of filing the civil case amounted to forum
shopping.
The SC also found sufficient evidence to support the third ground. The other grounds
were dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court reiterated that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
157 BERBANO v BARCELONA

Facts: The heirs of Hilapo appointed Atty. Daen as their atty.-in-fact. Atty. Daen was
subsequently arrested by the Muntinlupa police. The heirs of Hilapo tried to look for a
lawyer to secure the release of Atty. Daen. The heirs were recommended to Atty.
Barcelona. When the spouses visited Atty. Daen, they learned that Atty. Daen had
decided to engage the services of Atty. Barcelona. Atty. Barcelona then proceeded to
tell the heirs if they could produce P50K he could secure the release of Atty. Daen the
next day. Because the heirs could not produce the total amount, they merely gave
P15,700.
There were several meetings between the heirs and Atty. Barcelona regarding
the grease money to be used to allegedly bribe an SC justice. The heirs made another
payment via a check worth P24,000. On another occasion, the heirs went to the house
of Atty. Barcelona and gave P10,000. The total amount given by the heirs to Atty.
Barcelona reached P64,000.
Commissioner Bautista found Atty. to be guilty of malpractice and breach of duty
and recommended that he be disbarred.
Issue: W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.
Held: Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. Its intention is to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the court and public from the misconduct of the
officers of the court.
In this case, Atty. demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting that he had
connections to secure the release of Atty. Daen. Atty. Barcelona misrepresented to the
complainant that he could get the release of Atty. Daen with his connection with a
Supreme Court Justice. Instead of promoting respect for law and the legal processes,
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Atty. Barcelona demeaned the legal profession by taking money from a client under the
pretext of having connections with a member of this court.
158 TABAS v MANGIBIN
Facts:
-A deed of mortgage was delivered to Hilda Tabas evidencing a real property in La Union that
was mortgaged to her by Galvan. The deed of mortgage was registered in the Register of
Deeds of La Union.
-Subsequently, a certain Lilia Castillejos represented herself as Tabas and appeared before
Mangibin, who was a notary public, and asked the latter to prepare a discharge of the
mortgage and to notarize it afterwards.
-Mangibin prepared the discharge of real estate mortgage without asking Castillejos for
anything to serve as identification except for a Community Tax Certificate (CTC). This
enabled Galvan to mortgage the property again, this time to a rural bank
-Tabas informed Mangibin that her signature in the questioned discharge of REM was forged
but Mangibin did nothing to help. He even threatened to file a counter suit against her if she
files a case against him.
-Tabas filed this complaint for disbarment.
-Mangibin admitted that the discharge of REM was a forgery but interposed the defense that
it was beyond the scope of his duty to ascertain the identity of persons appearing before him,
and that he had no available means of ascertaining their real identities.
Issue:
W/N Mangibin should be held administratively liable for negligence in the performance of his
duty as a notary public to ascertain the identity of the person appearing before him.
Held:
YES, Mangibin was negligent in performing such duty.
-Notarization is invested with public interest. It converts a private document into a public one,
making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Such document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies, and the public
must be able to rely upon an acknowledgement by a notary public appended to a document.
-A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is
the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and truth of matters stated in the document.
-Mangibin should have requested other forms of identification or asked questions to ascertain
her identity.
-Mangibin violated the Notarial Law and Canon 1. His notarial commission is revoked and he
is disqualified from reappointment as notary public for 2 years.
159 IN RE ALMACEN
FACTS:
Atty Almecen is the counsel of Calero in the case of Yaptinchay vs. Calero
The trial court, after the hearing rendered judgment against his client he moved for
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
reconsideration (MR) and served copy of the motion to the adverse party but failed to notify
the latter of the date and place of the hearing
In the CA, the court moved to also disamiss the case for the reason that the MR does not
contain a notice of time and place of hearing and is nothing but a useless piece of paper
The SC refised to tkae the cse and in a minute resolution denied the appeal
It was at this pont that Atty Almacen filed his "PETITION TO SURRENDER LAWYER'S
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE"
The pleading filed by Atty Almacen is interspersed from beginning to end with insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and deregoratory remarks agaist the court, as well as its
individual members.
Atty Almacen described the court as "a tribunal peopled by men who are calloused to our
pleas of justice, who ignore without reason thier own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. he also referred to his client as "on who
was deeply aggrieved by the court's unjust judgment" and has become " one of the sacrificial
victims before the altar of hypocrisy." He also referred to the member of the court as "justice
as administered by the present members of the SUpreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb."
The court asked Atty Almacen to show cause why no disciplinary actions must be taken
against him
Atty Almacen asked that he be given permission permission to give his answer in an open
and public hearing. He reasoned that since the court is the complainant, prosecutor and
judge, he preferred that he answer and be heard in an open and public hearing sa that the
court could observe its sincerity and candor.
The court allowed Atty Almacen to file a written answer and thereafter be heard in an oral
argument
But his written answer offers no apology but is full of sarcasm and innuendo (SEE PAGE 569572)
ISSUE:
W/N Atty Almacen is guilty
HELD:
YES! and he is indefinitely suspended until further order form the SC
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. The decisions of the courta public property and the press and the people have the
undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit.
BUT it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and rpopriety. A wide chasm exist between fair criticism, on the
one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and justices thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. it isn such misconduct
that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action
In his relations with the court, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney
at one time and a mere citizen at another. Statements made by an attorney in a private
conversation or in the course of political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to
bring scorn and disrepute to the administration of justice may subject the attorney to
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
disciplinary action.
post-litigation utterances or publication made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their
juducial actions, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcends the permissible
bounds of fair commetns and legitimate criticism constitute grave professional misconduct.
there is no comfort in the argument of Atty. Almacen that his utterances were made after the
judgments against his client attained finality. he could still be liable for contempt as if it had
been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal. THe pendency or non-pendency of
a case in court is of no consequence. the sole objective of the proceeding is to preserve the
purity of the legal profession.
160 RAYOS-OMBAC v RAYOS
Facts:
Mrs. Irene Rayos-Ombac (lola) is the petitioner in this case. The respondent is Atty.
Orlando Rayos (lawyer), her nephew.
Jan. 1985: lawyer induced lola, who was then 85 years old, to withdraw all her bank
deposits and entrust it to him for safekeeping.
Lawyer made lola believe that if she would do so, all the money will be excluded from
the estate of her deceased husband and therefore exclude the other heirs from
inheriting.
Lola then withdrew all her money (P588K) and deposited it in the account of lawyer in
Union Bank.
Upon demands that the amount be returned, lawyer informed lola that he can only
return P400K on installment. Pumayag na lang si lola kasi kelangan niya talaga ng
pera. They signed a MOA regarding this transaction.
However, the check given by lawyer to lola was dishonored due to insufficient funds.
Lola then filed an estafa case against lawyer. Lawyer offered as settlement 2 secondhand cars and cash amounting to P40K. Lola refused the offer.
Lawyer also filed cases against Lola. Estafa - because lola allegedly reneged on her
promise to sell a certain parcel of land. Another accusing lola of making false
statements in the testate proceedings of her deceased husband.
Lola then filed a case for disbarment on 2 grounds. (1) defrauding lola and (2) filing
frivolous cases against her.
IBP recommended that lawyer be suspended for 2 years.
Lawyer then filed this motion to lift the suspension stating that lola has already
withdrawn her complaint for disbarment
Issue:
W/N lawyer should be suspended for 2 years
Held:
Yes. In fact the SC raised the penalty to disbarment. (pinabayaan na lang sana niya
yung suspension, baka di pa siya disbarred)
The withdrawal of lola of her complaint has no effect on the disbarment proceedings.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Lawyer violated the CPR as well as his oath when he deceived his 85 year old aunt.
Lawyers wicked deed was aggravated by the series of unfounded suits he filed
against lola.
Lawyers deceitful conduct makes him unworthy of membership in the legal profession.
161 IN RE LOZANO
FACTS
- There was a complaint against a Judge of First Instance which was referred to the Atty
General for investigation, report and recommendation. There was an SC resolution which
makes such proceedings condiential in nature
-The investigation was conducted secretly. Notwithstanding, the editor of El Pueblo, Severino
Lozano, printed an article written by Anastacio Quevedo, indicating that the hearing was held
behind closed doors, and that the info of the reporter was obtained from outside the screen
and from comments in social circles. The testimonies of the witnesses were mutilated and the
report reflected upon the action of
the complainant to his possible advantage
ISSUE: WoN Lozano and Quevedo are quilty of contempt of court?
HELD: YES. They are each required to pay the nominal sum of P20
RATIO:
1. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the SC. This power extends to
administrative proceedings, as well as to suits at law.
2. As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the
rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary
162 CUENCO v FERNAN
See attachment=)
163 IN RE LAURETA
Facts:
This case is purely a discussion of Atty. Lauretas Motion for Reconsideration finding
him guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspending him indefinitely. Also,
there is a discussion on Eva Maravilla-Illustres Motion for Reconsideration holding her
in contempt.
Laureta is the counsel of Illlustre.
In my understanding, Illustre lost a case with the SC First Division. And because of
this, she filed a case with the Tanodbayan, in exasperation against those whom she
felt had commited injustice against her in an underhanded manner.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Laureta is in hot water for he had allegedly circulated/distributed copies to the press
copies of the complaint filed before the Tanodbayan. And with this, he has manifested
lack of respect for and exposed to public ridicule the two highest courts of the land.
He also said that he has not authorized or assisted and or abetted and could not have
prevented the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of Eva
Ilustre who was (allegedly) no longer his client. But he is sorry for the adverse
publicity generated by the filing of the complaint against the Justices before the
Tanodbayan!
Issue:
W/N Laureta should be punished for his alleged acts.
Held:
Yes.
Firstly, Laureta is really the counsel of Ilustre.
o The copy of the Tanodbayan resolution indicated that he is the counsel for the
complainant . And he didnt complain!!
o Lauretas wife received from the process server the documents/resolutions of
the court. If Laureta was really not the counsel, then the wife could have easily
not accepted.
o Atty. Laureta admitted that he is the counsel to a reporter of DZRH by the fact of
his commenting with alacrity (RC note: this means eagerness) regarding the
case.
Lauretas protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the dignity of
the Court are belied by environmental facts and circumstances. His apologetic stance
for the adverse publicity rings with insincerity.
He has deliberately sought to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of
collegiate acts to undermine the role of the SC as the final arbiter of all justiciable
disputes.
164 IN RE LONTOK
Facts:
Marcelino Lontok is a member of the Bar who was convicted, by final judgment, of
bigamy.
Subsequently, the Governor-General granted him absolute pardon.
However, the Attorney-General prays for the removal of Lontok from the roll of
attorneys despite such pardon. He argues that Lontok should still be disqualified from
the practice of law as he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Issue:
Should Lontok be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys?
Held:
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
No. An absolute pardon, unlike a conditional one, reaches not only the offense and the guilt
for which a person was convicted of, but it also releases the punishment and blots out the
existence of guilt, so that he may not be looked upon as never to have committed the
offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities; if
granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores the person to
all his civil rights. It does not, however, restore offices, property, or interests that have been
forfeited.
If the proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute
making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, the pardon operates to
wipe out the conviction and the attorney cannot be disbarred. But if the disbarment
proceedings are founded on the professional misconduct in a transaction which resulted in a
conviction for a felony, a pardon relieves the counsel of the penal offense but can still be
subject to disbarment on the ground of lack of good moral character.
Here, the motion for disbarment is based solely on the conviction for a crime for which Lontok
has been pardoned.
165 IN RE DE GUZMAN
FACTS
A complaint for ejectment was filed by FLORO against LAPATHA. Judgment was rendered
ordering LAPATHA to vacate the premises and surrender possession to FLORO. LAPATHA
filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, Orders & Other Proceedings (nax civpro ) alleging
that at the initial hearing, she appeared without counsel so she approached ATTY DE
GUZMAN, lawyer of FLORO, and begged for a 5 day postponement to which ATTY DE
GUZMAN verbally agreed to with the condition that she (LAPATHA) sign the courts
expediente of which she did. She then gave ATTY DE GUZMAN a check for P350 as partial
payment of her arrears in the rentals. That was why she was surprised later on to receive a
copy of a decision from the City Court wherein it appeared that she confessed judgment and
upon verification of the expediente which she signed, she discovered ATTY DE GUZMAN
wrote the words Confess Judgment below her signature without her consent.
FLORO filed his Answer alleging that the decision of the City Court was based on an open
admission by LAPATHA made in open court and it was after such open admission that the
words Confess Judgment was written on the expediente. Moreover, the check of P350 was
not given as partial payment of LAPATHAS arrears in rentals but was given to forestall the
execution of judgment.
ISSUE
W/N ATTY DE GUZMAN SHOULD BE PUNISHED FOR HIS ACTS
HELD
NO, NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE HENCE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY

RULE APPLIES
RATIO
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
The Clerk of the City Court testified that when the ejectment case was called for hearing, the
Trial Judge asked LAPATHA if she admitted the indebtedness alleged in the complaint filed by
FLORO to which LAPATHA answered in the affirmative. It was then that the word Confess
Judgment was written on the expediente which was afterwards signed by both ATTY DE
GUZMAN and LAPATHA. This testimony of the Clerk of court deserves credit because the
Clerk was present at the said hearing and is substantiated with the ruling of the City Judge
who, sans evidence to the contrary, is presumed to have regularly performed his official duty.
The only objective of LAPATHA in filing a Petition for Relief was to gain more time to stay in
the leased premises.
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that in the instant case, evidence is wanting to
sustain a finding that ATTY DE GUZMAN committed any deceit or misconduct. As held in Go
v Candoy, it is elementary in disbarment proceedings that the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant and that to be made the basis for suspension of disbarment, such proof must be
convincing. In the case at bar, LAPATHA failed to provide such convincing proof.
Hence, the administrative complaint is dismissed and ATTY DE GUZMAN exonerated of the
charge.
166 LACHICA v FLORDELIZA
Facts:
- One day, Dr. Amparo Lachica, the Municipal Health Officer of Jose Abad Santos,
Davao del Sur, was approached by Dina Masaglang and Norma Ruton, who were
asking Dr. Lachica to sign a death certificate. Dr. Lachica refused to sign saying that
the attending physician in Gen. Santos should be the one to sign.
- Later in the day, Dr. Lachica met the two again and the two told her that Judge
Rolando Flordeliza, MTC judge, was ordering her to sign the death certificate. Dr.
Lachica again refused.
- Later in the evening, at the Municipal Employees Night Party, Judge Flordeliza, who
was drunk, asked Dr. Lachica to sit beside him. Judge Flordeliza then said to Dr.
Lachica, in an angry manner, Bakit hindi mo pinirmahan and death certificate? Dr.
Lachica then tried to explain but to no avail, this is when Judge Flordeliza threatened
to bring an administrative complaint against Dr. Lachica.
Issue:
- W/n Judge Flordeliza should be penalized.
Held:
- SC says YES, Judge Flordeliza is fined 10,000
- The SC was convinced that the charge of misconduct against the respondent judge
was established by substantial evidence. Dr. Lachica presented the testimony of
certain witnesses confirming that Judge Flordeliza was indeed drinking that night.
There was also testimony debunking Judge Flordelizas excuse that he could not have
acted in such a manner because the mayor was sitting with them (the testimony
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
proved that the mayor was not with them). The Court believed that Judge Flordeliza
did threaten Dr. Lachica in order to coerce the latter to sign the death certificate.
Also, his inebriated demeanor and incoherent behavior during the festivities, as
attested to by a witness, is reprehensible in a judge. Allowing himself to get
intoxicated is not the conduct expected of a judge.
167 ESTOYA v ABRAHAM-SINGSON

Facts: A complaint signed by 47 employees and officers of several branches of the RTC
Antique was filed with the SC. The signatories allege that Judge Singson "treats her staff in a
dictatorial and terroristic manner without regard to the basic dignity and self-respect
of the individual," making the "working atmosphere entirely dependent on her
moods on the particular day which most often fluctuates with the moon" The
signatories allege that they could not understand the judges bizarre actuations and that
sometimes she is excessively generous but in most occasions she is "oppressive, dictatorial,
despotic, and unbearable, if not hysterical."
The judge was further accused of gross and culpable incompetence for having delegated her
authority to the Clerk of Court by requiring the latter to make orders or resolve or decide
cases for her.
Several persons testified regarding her attitude towards her workers (refer to P. 9).
The lower court adjudged her to lack the temperament required of a judge. Her acts,
according to the lower court, were not mere admonitions to correct the employees
wrongdoings.
Issue: W/N judge is guilty of gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.
Held: The judge is guilty of gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.
On gross ignorance of the law:
She is grossly ignorant of the law because she considered unlawful aggression as a
mitigating circumstance. She also made errors in the implementation of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. She also allowed the release on bail of several accused individuals without
giving the prosecution to prove if the evidence of guilt is strong (on the fact that the crime
committed by the accused individuals).
A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules. It is imperative that that he be conversant with basic legal principles. A
judge owes it to the legal profession he belongs and to the public who depends on him to
know the law which he is called to interpret and apply.
On gross incompetence:

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
According to the canons, a judge should organize his court with a view to a prompt and
convenient dispatch of its business and he should not tolerate abuses and neglect by clerks.
To be a good manager, one must be a good leader. The judge does not possess the virtues,
qualities, temperament, aptitude, and skill of a good manager of court employees. She is
tyrannical. (Please refer to the lengthy testimonies to have an idea of her tyrannical behavior.)
168 CUARESMA v AGUILAR
Facts:
-The Olarte, the Provincial Prosecutor of Mindoro charged Banite with the murder of Acosta,
a relative of herein complainants. The Information carried no recommendation for bail.
-The case was docketed in Branch 44 of the RTC, presided over by Judge Tarriela. Banite
was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty.
-Olarte amended the Information to homicide and recommended bail of P20,000 without
leave of court. Judge Tarriela ordered the Olarte to explain his action considering Banite had
already been arraigned.
-Mrs. Zubiri, a Steno-Reporter at the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor went to see Aguilar
the Executive and Presiding Judge of Branch 45 of the RTCin his chambers. Zubiri was
sent by Olarted to request for the release of the accused Banite on bail of P20,000.
-All pertinent papers, including the Property Bail Bond, the Order approving the bond and
directing the release of Banite were already prepared for the signature of respondent judge.
-On the same day, Judge Aguilar signed and issued the order approving the property bond.
Banite was released upon such order.
Issue: W/N Judge Aguilar committed grave abuse of authority in ordering the release of
Banite while the latters case was being tried in the sala of Judge Tarriela.
Held: YES
-Sec.14(a) Rule 114 states that : Bail in the amount fixed maybe filed with the court where
the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another
branch of the same court within the province or city
-Judge Aguilar violated this rule and had no power to act on the request to release Banite on
bail.
-The record does not show that at the time Aguilar ordered Banites release, Judge Tarriela
was absent or unavailable and could not have acted on said request.
-It was also irregular for the judge to entertain the request considering that it did not appear
that a formal motion had been filed by the accused to that effect.
-He did not even examine the records of the case as he merely signed the Orders allegedly
prepared by Olarte. His indifference prevented him from discovering that at the time he
ordered the release of Banite, the information had not been properly amended.
-The judge is ordered to pay a fine of P2,000 and is admonished to exercise greater care and
prudence in the performance of his official duties.
169 IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS
FACTS:
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
State prosecutor Formaran charged Yu Yuk Lai, together with her nephew before the
RTC Manila with violation of RA 6425
Accused of a non-bailable offense, both the accused were held at the detention cell of
PNP Narcotics Group in Camp Crame
Yu Yuk Lai filed a petition for bail on the ground that the evidence against her was not
strong. Denied!
Upon receiving information that the accused had been playing regularly in the casinos
of Heritage Hotel and Holiday Inn Pavilion, Formaran filed an urgent ex-parte motion to
transfer the detention of the accused to the city jail. Motion was granted by Judge
Laguio
Accused filed a Motion for Inhibition arguing that Laguio do not inspire the belief that
its decision would be just and impartial. Laguio inhibited himelf
Case was re-raffled to Branch 53 which was handled by Judge Muro.
Muro granted accused motion to order the confinement of the accused in a hospital
for a period not exceeding 7 days. He also granted the extension of medical
confinement of the accused for a period of 1 month or until such time that she is fit to
be discharged from the hospital
Muro also grnated the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence with
motion to admit demurrer to evidence.
Rumors started to circulate that Muro was partial towards the accused
Also, unidentified employees of the RTC manila calling themselves concerned court
employees wrote to the Secretary of Justice alleging that Muro ordered the
hospitalization of the accused even if she was not sick and there was already a rumor
circulating that Muro had given the go signal to the counsel of the accused to file a
motion to quash which would be granted for a consideration of millions of pesos and
that the contact person is the daughter of the judge who is an employee in the said
branch
Formaran filed a motion for inhibition praying that Muro inhibit himself from further
handling the case
Thereafter, yu Yuk lai was arrested inside the VIP room of the Casino Filipino at the
Holiday Inn Pavilion while playing bacarrat unescorted.
The motion for inhibition against Muro was submitted for resolution when Formarans
secretary informed Formaran that Demetria called and that he wanted to speak to
Formaran.
Demetria, Go Teng Kok and a close friend friend of Demetria went to the office of
Formaran in the DOJ. But even prior to that meeting, Go Teng Kok was already asking
Formaran to go easy on Muro and that Formaran has been politely declining the
request. But in this meeting, he told them that he would bring the matter to his
superior Zuno. When Demetrio heard this, he said:iyon pala, and left the office.
Zuno then received a call from Demetrio requesting him to instruct Formaran to
withdraw his motion for inhibition aginst Muro so that the judge could already issue an
order. Zuno politely replied that he would see what he can do.
The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that Justice Demetria and Go Teng Kok are
drug lawyers
ISSUE:
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
W/N Justice Demetria is guilty
HELD:
- YES! And is dismissed from service with prejudice to re-employment in any
government agency and GOCC with the forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits
- The timely call to Zuno was a logical follow up and no one could have made that call
except Justice Demetria.
- Even the requested help for Go Teng Kok, whom Demetria claims he did not know
and met only that time, could not have meant any other assistance but the withdrawal
of the motion to inhibit Muro
170 MARTINEZ v GIRONELLA
Facts:
Martinez was the principal accused in a murder case. Duclan and Bayongan were
alleged to be accessories after the fact. Gironella is the Judge of CFI of Abra that tried
the case.
Bayongan was the only one arraigned so trial proceeded only against him. Bayongan
was acquitted.
Thereafter, Martinez surrendered to the police. He pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Counsel for Martinez moved that the Gironella inhibit himself on the grounds that
Gironella already had a chance to pass upon the issue and has formed an opinion as
to who committed the murder. That the judge is no longer fair and impartial. Motion
was denied.
During the rebuttal stage, this petition for prohibition was filed.
Issue:
W/N there should be a new trial for Martinez
Held:
No.
Due process requires that a case be heard by a tribunal that is impartial and
disinterested.
In this case, there was no proof shown that the judge was unfair and impartial.
After the motion for inhibition was denied, petitioner no longer filed a motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner no longer took any action until the rebuttal stage.
The conclusion that can be inferred is that the trial was fair and impartial.
Issue:
W/N the judge should inhibit himself from proceeding in the case
Held:
Yes.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
A judge has the duty not only to render a just and impartial decision, but also to render
it in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality
and as also to the judges integrity.
The statement of the judge in the decision acquitting Bayongan to the effect that the
crime was committed by Martinez render it impossible for the judge to be free from
suspicion of impartiality.
171 COJUANGCO v PCGG

172 LUQUE v KAYANAN
FACTS:
Civil Case 4871 was commenced in the CFI of Quezon by Ilao, Enriquezes against Ona,
Luque (petitioner herein), Africao, Castillo, and the Baldeos. Ilao etc., sought to set aside the
decision in civil cases 6 and 26 approving the parties compromise agreement which was
alledgedly procured thru duress and intimidation.
Civil case 4871 was set for trial before Branch I of the CFI of Quezon presided over by Judge
Valero. On the date set for hearing, Judge Kayanan first took cognizance of said Civil Case
4871. It was alleged by the Ilaos attorney that he found that civil case 4871 was not included
in the calendar of cases scheduled for Branc I and that he found the case in the sala of Judge
Kayanan. Defendant Luque (petitioner) was absent therein. Luque alleged that he was at
Branch I. Hearings were rescheduled many times.
Petitioner lodged a motion to dismiss the case upon the ground of estoppel. The motion was
dismissed. Petitioner then moved to disqualify Judge Kayanan. He claimed that the judge
doctored the records of the case in that he suppressed the true and genuine proceedings in
open court in that the judge did not state that he moved the case to be dismissed.
Petitioner was then ordered by Judge Kayanan to explain why he should not be cited for
contempt. Petitioners explanations were filed and later on declared by the judge
unsatisfactory to warrant his disqualification from trying the case.
At a hearing, judge asked Luque to withdraw his pleading moving for the judges
disqualification. Luque refused. Judge then verbally ordered a guard to commit petitioner to
jail. Petitioner was restrained for 2 hrs.
ISSUE:
W/n Judge Kayanan should be disqualified
W/n Luque a lawyer, should be disciplined
HELD:
YES. The act of the judge ordering the restraint of Luque; that at one instance judge irately
told him I will have you disbarred!; that Judge Kayanan would not give Luque leeway to
speak in court, interrupting him and continuing to say things against him in a derisive tone
and in a humiliating and abusive manner; that after the judge became tired of talking, the
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
judge told petitioner, who wasn not given the chance to speak fully: that is enough, sit down,
and strongly banged the gavel
There was also an irregularity in the venue of the case as stated above. Taken all together,
respondent judge is ordered to refrain from taking cognizance of the case.
173 HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER
Facts:
Judge Nartatez issued a Hold Departure Order.

It was against Eileen Lope for alleged violations of BP 22.
The Secretary of Justice calls attention to the fact that the order in question is contrary
to Circular No. 39-97 of the SC, which limits the authority to issue hold departure
orders to the RTC in criminal cases within their exclusive jurisdiction.
Judge Nartatez admits his mistake, and thus recalls his hold departure order.
Issue:
W/N Judge Nartatez should be penalized?
Held:
The Court Administrator recommended, that the SC reprimand the Judge and remind
him to keep himself abreast of SC issuances so as not to commit the same mistake in
the future. SC finds this well taken.
The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence. They can live up to this expectation only by diligent effort to
keep themselves abreast of the legal and jurisprudential developments. The learning
process in law is never ending and ceaseless process.
174 DELGRA v GONZALES

Facts:
Martin Delgra was the assistant provincial fiscal of Davao. Gonzales was judge of the
CFI of Davao.
During the trial of a criminal case (entitled People v Suarez), where Delgra was the
prosecutor and Gonzales was the presiding judge, an incident occurred which
triggered this controversy.
It so happened that while a witness was being cross-examined by the defense
counsel, confusion arose as to the proper interpretation of the witness statement
(since it was in the Cebuano dialect).
Delgra objected to the translation (argued that it should be I called Angel instead of I
called their names), but the Judge overruled him immediately. Delgra insisted. Judge
Gonzales ordered that Fiscal Delgra be brought out of the court and into jail.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Delgra was not brough to jail. When the Judge learned of this, he declared Delgra in
direct contempt and called on the police for the Fiscals arrest.
Issue:
Was the action of Judge Gonzales proper?
Held:
No. The incident could have been prevented had the Judge listened with care to the Fiscals
observation on the allegedly wrong translation of the witness answer. The situation would not
have reached grave proportions if the judge only listened carefully to the pleas of the fiscal
and patiently allowed the fiscal to make his manifestation.
From the transcript of records, Delgra did not so misbehave as to obstruct or interrupt court
proceedings. Judge Gonzales abused his discretion in declaring the fiscal in contempt of
court. Judges should be temperate and patient, courteous to counsel. They should avoid
interrupting advocates in their arguments and shy away from a controversial tone in
addressing them. In conversations between judges and counsel, the judge should be
studious to avoid controversies.
Remember, restraint is a desirable trait in those who dispense justice... right class?! The
order adjudging Delgra in direct contempt was nullified.
175 FERNANDEZ v BELLO
FACTS
TIMOTEA Perreyras through ATTY MANUEL Fernandez, as her counsel, instituted

Special Proceedings for her appointment as guardian over her minor brothers
Upon her appointment, she petitioned the court for authority to sell a nipa land owned
in common by the wards for the purpose of paying outstanding obligations to
UMANGAY
The request was granted and the nipa land was sold to UMANGAY
However, the nipa land sold by the guardian had already been previously sold with
right to repurchase to RICARDO Perreyras and UMANGAY by FLORENTINO
Perreyras, the father of the guardian and wards
The interest of RICARDO and UMANGAY were in turn sold for P200 to ATTY MANUEL
and another P200 for services rendered by him
JUDGE BELLO issued an order requiring ATTY MANUEL to show cause why he
should not be suspended from the practice of law and declared in contempt for having
abused his relationship with the guardian and taken money from her without prior
approval from the court
ATTY MANUEL explained that when he received the P200, he was no longer the
attorney of the guardian as at that time, TIMOTEA secured the services of ATTY
BRAULIO Fernandez and that he was only paid P50 for his services to the guardian
However, the Court found
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
o ATTY MANUEL guilty of contempt because he had taken the amount of P400
from the proceeds of the sale without previous approval from the court and
o ATTY MANUELS conduct anomalous for the reason that he instituted the
guardianship proceedings only to enable him to collect the unpaid attorneys
fees
ISSUE
HELD
W/N ATTY MANUEL SHOULD REFUND THE P200 HE GOT

NO, WOULD DEPRIVE HIM OF HIS LAWFUL FEES
RATIO
While the reprimand is in order for ATTY MANUELS mistake, the mistake is no
sufficient ground for the non-payment of the fees he lawfully earned
Duty of the courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper manner but also that
they are paid their just and lawful fees
JUDGE BELLO justifies his order for return of the P200 on the ground that ATTY
MANUEL is below average standard of a lawyer
However, the opinion of the judge as to the capacity of the lawyer is NOT the basis of
the right to a lawyers fees but rather the contract between the lawyer and his client
In the case at bar, P200 is the amount admitted by the guardian TIMOTEA as due
ATTY MANUEL
ISSUE
W/N ATTY MANUELS CONDUCT WAS ANOMALOUS
HELD
NO, GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDING WAS THE PROPER REMEDY
RATIO
Wards were indebted to UMANGAY but they had no money with which to pay the debt
thus the only way to settle was to sell the nipa land
However, the nipa land could not be sold without the intervention of the guardian
Hence, ATTY MANUEL was justified in instituting the guardianship proceedings in
order to sell the nipa land, it being the proper remedy
ISSUE
W/N THE DESIRE OF THE JUDGE TO HAVE PORTIONS OF ATTY

MANUELS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BE STRICKEN OUT FOR
EMPLOYING STRONG LANGUAGE SHOULD BE GRANTED
HELD
NO, JUDGE BELLO STARTED IT
RATIO
JUDGE BELLO used language such as calling the act of ATTY MANUEL anomalous
and unbecoming and charging ATTY MANUEL of obtaining his fee through
maneuvers of documents from the guardian

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
If any one is to be blamed for the language used by ATTY MANUEL, it is JUDGE
BELLO himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders which provoked ATTY
MANUEL
If a judge desires not be insulted, he should start using temperate language himself
he who sows the wind will reap a storm!
176 TE v CA
Facts:
- Arthur Te civilly married Liliana Choa. They did not live together but occasionally met
until Choa gave birth to a girl, which was when Te stopped seeing her.
- Choa then found out that Te married another woman (Santillo).
- Thus, upon the complaint of Choa, a criminal case was filed against Te for bigamy.
- On the other hand, Te filed a case for annulment in the RTC.
- Choa also filed administrative complaints against Te and Santillo with the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) to revoke their engineering licenses on the ground that
they committed acts of immorality.
- Te filed a demurrer and motion to inhibit (directed at the Judge) in the criminal case.
Both were denied. Thus, Te filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
- Te also filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the PRC, which was also denied. Te
also filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
- CA consolidated the two petitions and denied both.
Issues:
- W/n the civil case constituted a prejudicial question to the criminal case and
administrative case.
- (More Important) W/n the motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo (on the ground of bias and
prejudice) in the criminal case should be granted.
Held:
- SC says that there was no prejudicial question. The validity of the marriage of Te to
Choa was considered valid at the time he contracted the marriage with Santillo even is
Te alleges that it was void ab initio. This is because jurisprudence at that time say that
there has to be a declaration of nullity before a marriage can be considered as void.
Without such declaration, the marriage is presumed valid.
- SC says that the motion to inhibit should not be granted. The grounds raised by
petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased
and had prejudged the case. While bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid
reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge, the rudimentary rule is that the mere
suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. The test for determining the
propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and
impartial
trial.http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/nov2000/126746.htm _edn40 The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and
partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial
trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioners motion to suspend the
criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that

petitioners counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered
an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently
imposed upon petitioners counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was not
hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judges duty to
disposing of the courts business promptly.
177 MANTARING v ROMAN
Facts:
Mantaring filed an administrative complaint against Judge Roman charging the latter of
conduct unbecoming of members of the judiciary.
Thereafter, Judge Roman issued a warrant of arrest against Mantaring and his son. The
Judge alleges that the warrant was issued against Gamo and it just so happened that the
place where the illegal firearms were seized was owned by Mantaring; hence, Mantaring
and his son were arrested for they were in constructive possession of the illegal firearms.
Mantaring now comes before this court alleging that it was improper for the Judge to take
cognizance of the application of the arrest warrant. According to Mantaring, the Judge should
have inhibited himself for there was a pending administrative case which involved him and
Mantaring. Mantaring claims that the judge
issued the warrant of arrest as a form of revenge against Mantaring and his son for filing the
administrative case.
Issue:
W/N the judge should have inhibited himself from taking cognizance of the application for the
warrant of arrest.
Held:
Yes, the judge should have inhibited himself. For the judge's failure to inhibit, he is
reprimanded and warned that commission of the same act shall be severely dealt with in the
future.
It is true that the court had consistently held that mere filing of an administrative complaint
against a judge does not constitute a ground for the disqualification of the judge. However,
the factual milieu of these cases is different from the case at hand. In those cases, the
administrative complaint was filed during the pendency of the criminal case. In the case at
hand, however, the admiinistrative
complaint was filed before the involvement of the judge in the criminal case against
Mantaring. It cannot be otherwise concluded that the judge's action in this case was dictated
by a spirit of revenge against Mantaring for having filed the administrative complaint. This
circumstance should have underscored for the judge the need of steering clear of the case
because he might be perceived to be suceptible to bias and partiality.
178 HECK v SANTOS
Facts:
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
-In a previous case entitled Flor v. Heck which was lodged at the Regional Trial Court,
defendants therein, including Heck, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC has
no jurisdiction since the case involved an intra-corporate matter which was within the
jurisdiction of the SEC.
-The motion was denied by Judge Santos.
-Counsel for therein defendants, Atty. Jardin, subsequently filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel which was granted by Santos, who reset the hearing date from April 1 to June 10.
-As the defendants never received a copy of the order granting Jardins motion to withdraw,
neither defendants nor their counsel appeared at the hearing on June 10.
-At the said hearing, Santos admitted the evidence of the plaintiff and considered the
defendants as having waived their right to present evidence.
-The judge then authorized the counsel for the plaintiffs, Atty.Singson, to draft the decision.
The defendants did not receive a copy of such order.
-In October, Santos rendered a decision which was copied verbatim from the draft decision
submitted by Atty. Singson.
Issue: W/N Judge Santos act of ordering the counsel for one of the parties to draft a decision
warrants disciplinary sanction.
Held:YES.
-Santos violated Canons 2* and 3** of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Section 1 Rule 36
(A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing, personally
and directly prepared by the judge) of the Revised Rules of Court.
-By such order, the judge abdicated a function exclusively granted to him by the Constitution.
Decision making is the most important duty of a judge. He must use his own perceptiveness
in analyzing the evidence before him and his own discretion in determining the proper action.
-Lack of malice or bad faith in issuing the questioned order is not an excuse.
-Such act falls under the classification of a serious charge. The sanctions provided by Rule
140 Sec.10 are 1) disbarment 2) suspension for 3 mos, or 3) fine P20,000 40,000.
-Since Santos had already retired, his dismissal or suspension is no longer feasible. He is
thus ordered to pay a fine of P20,000 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
*A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
**A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence
adjudicative responsibilities.
179 AVANCEA v JUDGE LIWANAG
FACTS:
- Avancena charged judge Liwanag of the MTC of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan with
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
- Avancena is the accused in a criminal case for violation of BP 22
- Her counsel filed a Motion to Postpone promulgation and to Re-Open Trial to Allow
Accused to Present Further Evidence but the judge denied the motion on the ground
that she was able represented by her counsel during the trial of the case

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Prior to the dismissal of her motion, Liwanag summoned Avancena to his chamber and
told her that she will be convicted unless she pay P1M.
Avancena refused to pay since her unpaid balance was only P140,000 and there is no
reason for her to pay P1M
Liwanag summoned Avancena again and told her to raise only P500,000 if she could
not afford the P1M
Also, Liwanag sent Raymunda Flores a common friend of Avancena and Liwanag who
was tasked to bring Avancena to the chambers of Liwanag but Avancena refused
Liwanag also made Cora Espanola, a court interpreter, to telephone Avancena and tell
her that the Judge is waiting for her until 4:30pm
Judge Liwanag denied the allegations of Avancena and argued that all the contentions
of Avancena are lies and fabricated.
The case was referred to Executive Judge Herrera of the RTC Malolos, Bulacan for
investigation, report and recommendation
Judge Herrera gave more weight to the testimonies of Avancena and concluded that
the charges against Liwanag are true. But he did not recommend a specific penalty to
be meted out to respondent
ISSUE:
- W/N Liwanag is guilty
HELD:
- YES! And Judge Liwanag is dismissed from service with prejudice to re-employment in
any government agency and GOCC with the forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits
- The period of almost 4 months which elapsed form May 7, 1999, the date originally set
for the promulgation of the decision of the criminal case and August 27,1999, the date
it was actually promulgated indicates a deliberate effort on the part of the Judge to
delay the promulgation of the decision in order to give complainant more time to raise
the money demanded by him
180 CITY OF TAGBILARAN v HONTANOSAS
Facts:
City of Tagbilaran is charging Judge Hontanosas with (1) open defiance of a higher
court ordering his inhibition from a case and (2) open and notorious habitual gambling
in casinos.
1st charge:
o RTC ordered MTC Judge Hontanosas to inhibit himself from a criminal case
filed by the city against Ong.
o Hontanosas forced the fiscal to rest its case and rendered a judgment of
acquittal despite the order for him to inhibit
nd
2 charge:
o Hontanosas goes to Cebu on the afternoon and goes back to Tagbilaran early
the next day in order to go to the casinos in Cebu

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
o Every Sunday, Hontanosas can be seen around cockpits

o That a favorable judgment can be bought from Hontanosas with prices ranging
from P500 P5K
Hontanosas answer to 1st charge:
o The order of the RTC was unlawful due to lack of hearing and failure to include
the real parties in interest
o Order was issued in connection with a petition for certiorari which is a prohibited
pleading in cases covered by rules on summary procedure
Hontanosas answer to 2nd charge:
o He is merely accompanying his wife to Cebu. That his wife just wants some
excitement and recreation.
o He admits that he goes to the cockpits on Sundays and holidays and gambles
sometimes on this occasions.
Issue:
W/N Hontanosas should be sanctioned for disobeying the order that he inhibit himself
Held:
No. The order was merely mandatory.
Rules of Court provide instances when a judge is under obligation to inhibit himself
from hearing a case. The judges case does not fall under any of those mentioned in
the provision.
His case falls under the 2nd paragraph which leaves it to his discretion whether or not
to inhibit himself.
Issue:
W/N Hontanosas should be sanctioned for gambling in casinos and cockpits
Held:
Yes. Fine of P12K for violation of Circular No. 4 of August 1980.
That circular prohibits actual gambling and mere presence in gambling casinos.
Bases for the circular was PD 1067-B and Par. 3 and 22 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
181 RE: APPOINTMENT OF JUDGE CUBE
FACTS:- Judge Cube was appointed Presiding Judge of MTC, Branch 22 of Manila.
Information was received by the Judicial and Bar Council that he had previously been
dismissed as Asst. Fiscal of Pasay City. It was bourne out of the records that an
administrative case for gross misconduct and dereliction of duty was filed against Fiscal Cube
by Sec of Justice Jose Abad Santos for failure to prosecute a criminal case which led to its
dismissal with prejudice. Fiscal Cube was found guilty as charged.
- Cube applied for appointment to the Judiciary and in the Personal Data Sheet that he was
required to accomplish he deliberately concealed the fact that he was dismissed. He
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
contended that he didnt act dishonestly in not disclosing such fact because his removal from
office was WITHOUT PREJUDICE which legally meant that he can still be recalled by the
govt to render public service, and that he was in fact RECALLED AND APPOINTED to
sensitive positions in the govt prior to the questioned appointment and that he was even
allowed by the same govt to avail of the Optional Retirement under RA 1145.
ISSUE: WoN Judge Cube acted dishonestly?
HELD: YES1.Judge Cube did not disclose the relevant fact that he had been dismissed for
gross misconduct in the discharge of his duties as ASst FIscal of Pasay. That fact was
deliberately suppressed. Judge Cube could not equate his dismissal with retirement and give
both modes of separation an innocent character. By such disclosure, the Council was led to
believe, on the strength of his misrepresentations, that he had a clean record and was not
disqualified from appointment to the Judiciary
2. The circumstance that the dismissal was without prejudice is not material, and neither is
his subsequent appointment to a municipal position. The fact remains that he was REMOVED
and that he DID NOT RETIRE. He was removed after investigation and found guilty of gross
misconduct and dereliction of duty in the prosecution of a smuggling case. He cannot now
brush his removal aside as if it had never existed at all. It is a blot on his record that has
spread even more because of his concealment of it.
3. Judge Cube committed an act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be appointed to, and
to remain now in, the Judiciary he has tarnished with his falsehood.
182 ALFONSO v JUANSON
FACTS:
Complainant a doctor of medicine by profession filed with this court a sworn complaint
charging the respondent with immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. He
accuses the respondent of maintaining illicit sexual relations with his wife Sol Alfonso.
Complainant received a phone call from the wife of the respondent, Mrs. Juanson who
informed him that Sol and respondent judge have been carrying on an affair and that she has
in her possession the love letters of Sol which she wants to show to the complainant. When
he told this to Sol, she denied it.
Sol and complainant left for the USA. Sol returned ahead of complainant. Mrs. Juansosn
called up father of complainant and divulged to the latter the illicit affair between respondent
judge and Sol. The father of complainant engaged the services of a private investigator who
discovered that Sol, after arrival from USA met with respondent judge at an apartment and
stayed there for 3 hours.
Complainant upon knowing this, complainant confronted Sol. At first she denied it but later,
however, admitted having an illicit sexual affair with the judge.
Respondent judge denied the allegations and claimed that they have been communicating
with each other casually and innocently and not as lovers. He alleges that he came to know
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
of Sol when Sol engaged his professional services prior to appointment to the office of RTC
judge.
ISSUE:
Is the judge guilty of the charge of immorality?
HELD:
NO. It must be stressed that the respondent is not charged with immorality or misconduct
committed before he was appointed to the judiciary. As to the post-appointment period, we
find the evidence for the complainant insufficient to prove that the respondent and Sol
continued their extramarital affair. In fact, no love notes were presented during trial that are
dated after the appointment. Proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be a basis for his
administrative discipline in this case. The respondent judge may have undergone moral
reformation after his appointment.
The imputation of the sexual acts upon the incumbent must be proven by substantial
evidence, which is required in admin cases. This the complainant failed to do.
However, judge should be held liable for becoming indiscreet. Such indiscretions indubitably
cast upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety. Respondent and
Sols meetings could incite suspicion of either the relationships continuance or revival. He
violated Canons 3 and 2 requiring judges official conduct to be free from appearance of
impropriety.
Sentence to fine of P2,000.
183 MACALINTAL v TEH
Facts:
Atty. Romulo Macalintal filed a case against Judge Angelito Teh, the Executive Judge
and the Presiding Judge of the RTC Branch 87 of Rosario Batangas.
His case stemmed from Atty. Macs Election case. In that case, Atty. Mac received an
adverse resolution from the Judge Teh. Mac then questioned the resolution, via a
petition for Certiorari with the Comelec.
While the case was pending with the Comelec, Judge Teh actively participated in the
proceedings by filing his comment on the petition, and by also filing an urgent
manifestation.
Mac filed a motion for inhibition, but what Judge Teh did was to hire his own lawyer
and files his answer before his OWN court.
Teh ordered that Mac pay P100T in attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Issue:
W/N Judge Tehs actions were correct.
Held:
No.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Judge Teh was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, and he is dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice for reemployment.
The active participation of Teh being merely a NOMINAL or FORMAL party in the
certiorari proceedings is not called for.
Judges cannot also act as both party litigant and as a judge before his own court.
Tehs gross deviation from the acceptable norm for judges is clearly manifest.
184 ZIGA v AREJOLA

Facts:
Nelia Ziga and Ramon Arejola are two of the heirs of Fabian Arejola. They inherited a
land from Fabiana and became co-owners (with 8 others) of the property.
Ramon Arejola was an attorney in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO). He filed in behalf
of his co-heirs an application for registration of title of the land. The petition was
granted.
A substantial portion of the lot was sold to the City of Naga. The unsold portion was
subject to a dispute between the heirs and a 3 rd party.
Meanwhile, Ramon Arejola was appointed judge of the MTC of Daet, Camarines
Norte.
Notwithstanding such appointment, Judge Arejola continued to appear in the Land
registration case (the dispute with the 3rd person). The court requested him to submit a
written authority from the SC to appear as counsel. He did not comply. A second
request was made but Judge Arejola insists that it is not needed.
Then Judge Arejola wrote the City of Naga for the terms of payment for the sale of the
land and his claim for contingent atty fees.
Now, Nelia Ziga filed a complaint praying that Judge Arejola be disciplined for
appearing before the court without the SCs permission and for asking contingent attys
fees and commission.
Judge Arejolas defense was that there was no need for the SCs permission, as he
was appearing as representative of the heirs and not as counsel. He argues that he
was a party-in-interest being one of the heirs. He also said that the complaint was filed
merely to harass him and that complainant Ziga had a disturbed mind.
The executive judge of the RTC found the charge of unauthorized legal practice to be
without basis. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Arejola
be found guilty.
Issue:
Was Judge Arejola guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct by engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law?
Held:
Yes and FINED 10,000. Practice of law is not confined to appearance in court as it also
covers the preparation of pleadings and giving of advice to clients. Based on the records,
Ramon Arejola engaged in the practice of law after he was appointed MTC Judge (And even
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
if the complaint was filed before he became judge, the fact that he continued to act as
counsel after the appointment sustains his liability). It was shown that he: prepared and
signed pleadings; appeared for applicants in the case; wrote a letter to the buyer asking for
checks and attys fees; etc. The representation made by Arejola was not just isolated as there
was a succession of acts. His argument that he appeared as co-heir was belied by the tenor
of the pleadings and letters showing that he was acting in representation of the heirs.
Judge Arejola violated the Rules of Court and Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits
members of the bench from engaging in the private practice of law. Note that the purpose of
the prohibition is founded public policythat is to ensure that judges give their full time and
attention to judicial duties and prevent them from advancing private interests.
The Civil Service Rules require him to secure a written permission to appear as counsel from
the SC. Judge Arejola was even requested by the RTC to procure this written authority. But
he did not comply. It appeared from the records that he tried to get a written authority later
on. But when he was told by the Court Administrator to provide the details of the case in
which he is appearing, he failed to comply. Nevertheless, his act of trying to procure authority
was an admission that he was appearing as counsel and that he was aware that he is
required to present such before the court.
*side issue: Judge Arejola argues that he was not afforded due process as there was no
hearing conducted by the Executive Judge. But due process does not require a hearing.
Opportunity to be heard is sufficient. In this case, he was given ample opportunity to be heard
when he was made to file oral arguments through pleadings.
185 OCA v SARDIDO
FACTS
In a Deed of Absolute Sale, MAGBANUA allegedly sold 2 parcels of land to DAVAO
REALTY represented by ONG with PAGUNSAN as broker
Judge HURTADO , who at that time was clerk of court and ex officio notary public but
now an RTC judge, notarized the said deed
However, MAGBANUA denies signing the Deed of Absolute Sale which states that the
consideration for the sale was P600,000 and asserts that what she signed was a deed
with a stated consideration of P16,000,000
MABGUNUA filed a case of falsification against PAGUNSAN, ONG and Judge
HURTADO
The case was raffled to JUDGE SARDIDO then presiding MTC judge
Judge HURTADO filed a motion praying that the criminal complaint against him be
forwarded to the SC pursuant to Circular # 3-89 requiring all cases involving justices
and judges of the lower courts, whether or not such complaints deal with acts
apparently unrelated to the discharge of their duties, forwarded to the SC
Provincial Prosecutor opposed arguing that Judge HURTADO is not within the scope
of Circular # 3-89 because the offense charged was committed when he was still a
clerk of court and ex officio notary public
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
JUDGE SARDIDO issued an Order excluding Judge HURTADO from the criminal
Information filed by MAGBANUA on the ground that Circular # 3-89 does not qualify
whether the crime was committed before or during his tenure of office and since the
law does not qualify, he must not qualify (this Court cannot and shall not try this case
against JUDGE HURTADO unless the Supreme Court shall order otherwise)
Court Administrator BENIPAYO issued a Memorandum pointing out that Circular # 389 refers only to administrative complaints filed with the IBP against justices and
judges of lower courts and does not apply to criminal cases before trial courts
Court asked JUDGE SARDIDO to explain in writing why he should not be held liable
for gross ignorance of the law for excluding Judge HURTADO from the Information
filed by MAGBANUA
ISSUE
W/N JUDGE SARDIDO COMMITTED GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
HELD
YES
RATIO
Under Circular #3-89, the Court has directed the IBP to refer to the SC for appropriate
action all administrative cases filed with the IBP against justices of appellate courts
and judges of lower courts
Thus, Circular # 3-89 does NOT refer to criminal cases against erring justices and
judges so trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of the offenses
committed
In the case at bar, the case filed against Judge HURTADO is not an administrative
case filed with the IBP but a criminal case filed with the trial court
Eto na ang mga pangaral ni lola basyang
A judge is a called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statues and procedural rules such that he must be conversant with basic legal
principles and well-settled doctrine
JUDGE SARDIDO failed in this regard when he excluded Judge HURTADO as one
of the accused in the Information and instead forwarded the criminal case to the
Supreme Court
Moreover, in a number of cases, JUDGE SARDIDO was reprimanded, fined and
even dismissed from service
With an unflattering service record, JUDGE SARDIDO eroded the peoples faith
and confidence in the judiciary
The Court still imposes a fine of P10,000 for gross ignorance of the law despite his
dismissal from the service
186 CASTILLO v CALANOG
Facts:

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
In a sworn complaint filed with the SC, Emma Castillo charged Judge Manuel
Calanog, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76, with
immorality and conduct unbecoming of a public official.
Castillo alleges that when she intervened for the intestate estate of her deceased
husband, a friend of hers referred her to Calanog who was supposedly going to help
her.
Castillo also alleges that when she met with Calanog, the latter brought her to a motel
and made sexual advances on her. When she refused, she says that Calanog offered
to her the proposition that he be her sub-husband and that he would give Castillo his
condominium unit in QC as well as provide financial support for her two minor children
and place them in an exclusive school for girls. Castillo agreed to such a proposition.
Their relationship also bore a son, who was allegedly named Jerome Christopher
Calanog.
Castillo is now complaining that Calanog has reneged on his promise. She says that
Calanog is not anymore giving support, that her two children are not in an exclusive
girls school and that Calanog has failed to pay the monthly installments on the
condominium.
While the complaint was being investigated on, Castillo filed an affidavit of desistance
with the SC. She was saying that everything in the complaint were all lies. However,
the Court had two witnesses (Ernesto Bustamante and Jose Javier) attesting to her
earlier complaint. Plus, the National Bureau of Investigation Intelligence Service, upon
the instruction of the Court, carried out a discreet verification of the facts raised in the
testimonies and found them to be true.
Issue:
- W/n Calanog should be held liable despite the desistance of the complainant, Castillo.
Held:
- SC says YES and Calanog is dismissed from the roll of judges.
- Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance,
especially when executed as an afterthought, as in the case at bar. Even if Emma
Castillo had not filed her "Affidavit of Desistance," the SC says that they would not
have been swayed solely by her allegations, and they actually found from the
testimony of Jose Javier that the Castillo's charges, indeed, rest on sufficient grounds.
- It is of no import that the evidence on record is not sufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the facts of concubinage having indeed existed and been
committed. This is not a criminal case for concubinage but an administrative matter
that invokes the power of supervision of this Court over the members of the judiciary.
- The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a
whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but
also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual.
- It is worth noting here that the respondent judge, in violating a judicial precept, has
also committed a grave injustice upon the complainant, who had sought his assistance
in expediting the intestate estate proceedings of her deceased common-law husband.
The judge, who was in the first place, prohibited by the Code of Judicial Conduct from
intervening in a case in any court, took advantage of the complainant's helplessness
and state of material deprivation and persuaded her to become his mistress. The

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
exploitation of women becomes even more reprehensible when the offender commits
the injustice by the brute force of his position of power and authority, as in this case.
Gutierrez, Dissent:
- He is mainly saying that Calanog should not be held solely liable and that the penalty
of dismissal is too harsh.
- He believes that Castillo is a liberated woman who was, at that time, willing to enter
into the sexual relationship for the perks it included.
- He is also saying that Castillo and Calanog are both offenders and victims. Thus, he
thinks that the dismissal of Calanog is too severe, considering the situation.
187 DIONISIO v ESCANO
Facts:
Dionisio filed a complaint against Judge Escano charging the Judge of illegally using court
facilities in advertising the hiring of attractive waitresses and personable waiters and cooks in
the restaurant of the judge. Admissions to the effect that he was hiring the waitresses for his
pub that will cater to the prurient desires of males was acquired through the help of the
program "Hoy Gising." The judge, in his comment, said that he was only establishing a
restaurant -- some sort of watering hole for friends. The judge said that the reason he posted
the ad at the Court Bulletin Board was due to the fact that conducting the interviews in his
office in the court will be more convenient for him. (He says that his house is too far from the
gate and difficult for the applicants to locate.) The judge further alleges that he immediately
ordered the removal of the ads when he learned of the displeasure of some people regarding
his use of the Court Bulletin Board.
The Investgating Justice of the CA who hadled the case recommended that the judge be
fined in the amount of 15,000 for the misuse of the court facilities.
Issue:
W/N the Judge is guilty of misuse of court facilities.
Held:
Yes, the judge is guilty of misuse. Suspended for 6 months with a warning.
It is of no import that the judge's act of using court facilities be motivated by good cause, no
matter how honorable. The moment such act deviates from purposes not directly related to
the functioning and operation for which the courts of justice have been established,
it must be immediately rectified. Judges are not only to avoid impropriety, but must also avoid
the appearance of impropriety. His act of
posting the ads at the Court Bulletin Board tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the
courts as the bastion of justice because there occured an interference in the judicial duties of
Judge Escano by reason of his own business interests.

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ARBITRARY DETENTION (ART. 124)

ASTORGA vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 154130)
Facts: On September 1, 1997, a team was sent to the island of Daram, Western Samar to
conduct intelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with the governments
campaign against illegal logging.
Upon investigation of the group, Mayor Astorga was found to be the owner of two boats. A
heated altercation ensued and Mayor Astorga called for reinforcements. Ten armed men
arrived in the scene. The offended parties were then brought to Mayor Astorgas house where
they had dinner and drinks and left at 2:30am. SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down
from the house, but not to leave the barangay. On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest
just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finally allowed to leave.1awphi1.nt
Issue: Whether Mayor Astorga is guilty of arbitrary detention.
Held: Yes. Mayor Astorga is guilty of arbitrary detention. Arbitrary Detention is committed by
any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person.The elements of
the crime are:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the
witnesses and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home. This refusal was
quickly followed by the call for and arrival of almost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed with
military-issue rifles, who proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the
complainants and the witnesses. Given such circumstances, we give credence to SPO1
Capoquians statement that it was not "safe" to refuse Mayor Astorgas orders. It was not just
the presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect these gunmen had on the actions
of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to
the extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent the
departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.
CAYAO vs. DEL MUNDO (A.M. No. MTJ-93-813)

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Facts: An administrative complaint was filed by Cayao charging Judge del Mundo with abuse
of authority.
A bus driven by the complainant almost collided head-on with an owner-type jeepney owned
by Judge del Mundo. Complainant was picked up by policemen and immediately brought
before the sala of the respondent judge where he was confronted by the latter. Without giving
complainant any opportunity to explain, respondent judge insisted that complainant be
punished for the incident. Whereupon, complainant was compelled by respondent judge to
choose from three (3) alternative punishments none of which is pleasant, to wit: (a) to face a
charge of multiple attempted homicide; (b) revocation of his driver's license; or (c) to be put in
jail for three (3) days. Of the three choices, complainant chose the third, i.e., confinement for
three (3) days, as a consequence of which he was forced to sign a "waiver of detention" by
respondent judge. Thereafter, complainant was immediately escorted by policemen to the
municipal jail. Though not actually incarcerated complainant remained in the premises of the
municipal jail for three (3) days W
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of the charge of warrantless arrest and
arbitrary detention.
Held: The actuations of respondent judge herein complained of, constitute abuse of authority.
While it is true that complainant was not put behind bare as respondent had intended,
however, complainant was not allowed to leave the premises of the jail house. The idea of
confinement is not synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to qualify
as confinement that a man be restrained, either morally or physically, of his personal liberty.
Under the circumstances, respondent judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention when he,
as a public officer, ordered the arrest and detention of complainant without legal grounds. In
overtaking another vehicle, complainant-driver was not committing or had not actually
committed a crime in the presence of respondent judge. Such being the case, the warrantless
arrest and subsequent detention of complainant were illegal.
It would be well to emphasize at this point that the gravity of the misconduct of respondent is
not alone centered on his order for the detention of complainant. Rather, it is ingrained in the
fact that complainant was so detained without affording him his constitutional rights.

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MILO vs. SALANGA (G.R. No. L-37007)

Facts: On the 21st day of April 1973, accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with the aid
of some other private persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong,
maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows and
immediately thereafter, without legal grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive said Armando
Valdez of his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas
Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, lodge and lock said Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag,
Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.
Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to
support the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed
an opposition thereto.
Issue: Whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain is a public officer who can be liable for the
crime of Arbitrary Detention.
Held: The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain
or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen
and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later
named barrio captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
In various cases, the Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of
Arbitrary Detention.
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that
other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be
guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that
they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial
jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be
and are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even
private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio
captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera,
Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS (ART. 125)

PEOPLE vs. GARCIA (G.R. No. 126252)
Facts: On November 28, 1994, Enmodias and SPO3 Panganiban boarded a passenger
jeepney from their to Baguio City. He took the seat behind the jeepney driver while SPO3
Panganiban sat opposite him. Accused Garcia boarded and sat beside the driver. The
policemen smelled marijuana which seemed to emanate from accused's bag. To confirm their
suspicion, they decided to follow accused when he gets off the jeepney.
The policemen followed the accused and later on identified themselves to him and asked the
latter if they can inspect his bag. Upon surrender of the bag, bricks of marijuana were
discovered. As a consequence, the accused was arrested and the bag seized.
The next day, the policemen executed their joint affidavit of arrest and transferred the
accused to the Baguio city jail. Verification by the arresting officers of the records at the
Narcotics Command revealed that the accused's name was in the list of drug dealers.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Issue: Whether the police officers were guilty of arbitrary detention and delay in the delivery
of detained persons.
Held: The police officers cannot be held liable for arbitrarily detaining appellant at the CIS
office. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes a public officer who
shall detain another for some legal ground and fail to deliver him to the proper authorities for
36 hours for crimes punishable by afflictive or capital penalties. In the present case, the
record bears that appellant was arrested for possession of five (5) kilos of marijuana on
November 28, 1994 at 2 p.m., a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. He was
detained for further investigation and delivered by the arresting officers to the court in the
afternoon of the next day. Clearly, the detention of appellant for purposes of investigation did
not exceed the duration allowed by law,i.e., 36 hours from the time of his arrest.
AGBAY vs. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN (G.R. No. 134503)

Facts: On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with a certain Sherwin Jugalbot, was
arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an alleged violation of R.A.
7610. The following day, or on September 8, 1997, a Complaint for violation of R.A. 7610 was
filed against petitioner and Jugalbot.
Counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan demanding the immediate release of
petitioner considering that the latter had "failed to deliver the detained Jasper Agbay to the
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
proper judicial authority within thirty-six (36) hours from September 7, 1997." Private
respondents did not act on this letter and continued to detain petitioner.
Petitioner filed a complaint for delay in the delivery of detained persons against herein private
respondents SPO4 Nemesio Natividad, Jr., SPO2 Eleazar M. Salomon and other unidentified
police officers stationed at the Liloan Police Substation, before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas.
Issue: Whether the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court constitutes to a
"proper judicial authority" as contemplated by Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held: Art. 125 of the RPC is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person
without informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go on bail . More
specifically, it punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the
periods prescribed by law. The continued detention of the accused becomes illegal upon the
expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125 without such detainee having been delivered
to the corresponding judicial authorities.
The words "judicial authority" as contemplated by Art. 125 mean "the courts of justices or
judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or
confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, the
Supreme Court and other such inferior courts as may be established by law.
The power to order the release or confinement of an accused is determinative of the issue. In
contrast with a city fiscal, it is undisputed that a municipal court judge, even in the
performance of his function to conduct preliminary investigations, retains the power to issue
an order of release or commitment. Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the
detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with
the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the
MCTC to order his release when he applied for and was granted his release upon posting
bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the
complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the postion of the Ombudsman that such filing of
the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.

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REBELLION (ART. 134)

PEOPLE vs. SILONGAN (G.R. No. 137182 )
Facts: On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaa went to Sultan Kudarat with
three other men to meet a certain Macapagal Silongan alias Commander Lambada. They
arrived in the morning and were able to talk to Macapagal concerning the gold nuggets that
purportedly being sold by the latter. The business transaction was postponed and continued
in the afternoon due to the death of Macapagals relative and that he has to pick his brother in
Cotabato City.
Then at around 8:30 PM, as they headed to the highway, Macapagal ordered the driver to
stop. Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his three companions were ordered
to go out of the vehicle, they were tied up, and blindfolded. Macapagal and Teddy were also
tied and blindfolded, but nothing more was done to them. Alexander identified all the
abductors including the brothers of Macapagal.
The four victims were taken to the mountain hideout in Maguindanao. The kidnappers
demanded P15, 000,000 from Alexanders wife for his release, but the amount was reduced
to twelve million. The victims were then transferred from one place to another. They made
Alexander write a letter to his wife for his ransom. But on several occasions, a person named
Mayangkang himself would write to Alexanders wife. The two other victims managed to
escape but Alexander was released after payment of ransom. The trial court convicted
Macapagal and his companions of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal
Detention.
Issue: Whether the crime committed was the crime rebellion and not kidnapping.
Held: Merely because it is alleged that appellants were members of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front or of the Moro National Liberation Front does not necessarily mean that the
crime of kidnapping was committed in furtherance of a rebellion. Here, the evidence adduced
is insufficient for a finding that the crime committed was politically motivated. Neither have the
appellants sufficiently proven their allegation that the present case was filed against them
because they are rebel surrenderees. This court has invariably viewed the defense of frameup with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can be just as easily concocted.
PEOPLE vs. LOVEDORIO (G.R. No. 112235)

Facts: Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along a street when a man
suddenly walked beside him aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired. The man
who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman
four times as he lay on the ground.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face,
the chest, and other parts of the body.
Accused-appellant was found by the trial court guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of murder.
Issue: Whether accused-appellant is guilty of murder or of rebellion.
Held: The crime committed by the appellant is murder and not rebellion. The gravamen of the
crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government. By its very nature,
rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot
be confined a priori within predetermined bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission
of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime
itself because they acquire a political character.
In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our
courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The
political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated. In such cases, the burden of
demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mind which the
accused, better than any individual, knows.
Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime
alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty could benefit from
the law's relatively benign attitude towards political crimes.
PEOPLE vs. DASIG (G.R. No. 100231)

Facts: In 1987, two teams of police officers, tasked to conduct surveillance on a suspected
safehouse of members of the sparrow unit, saw the group of Dasig trying to escape. The
police captured them and confiscated the guns and ammunitions.
Dasig confessed that he and the group killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and
a certain Nunes were members of the sparrow unit and their aliases were Armand and
mabi respectively.
Dasig contended that the procedure by which his extrajudicial confession was taken was
legally defective and contrary to the his constitutional rights. He further contended that
assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of
simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
Issue: Whether appellant is guilty of simple rebellion or of murder with direct assault.
Held: What the appellant committed was a political crime of simple rebellion, and hence he
should not be convicted of murder with direct assault.

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The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net
of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves
are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. 9 The act of killing a police officer,
knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of
rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a
separate charge.
ENRILE vs. AMIN (G.R. No. 93335)

Facts: Together with the filing of an information charging Enrile as having committed rebellion
complexed with murder, government prosecutors filed another information charging him for
violation of PD No. 1829. The second information reads:
That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmarias Village, Makati, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having
reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has
committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct,
impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan
by harboring or concealing him in his house.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the information (second
information) on the ground that the pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and
frustrated murder against Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honosan, on the basis of
their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for
harbouring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829. However, this
motion was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.
Held: No, Enrile could not be separately charged for violation of PD 1829.
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which
that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion.
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person cannot be charged with the complex
crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately
for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed
in furtherance of rebellion.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and
a complex net of intrigues and plots. Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance
of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
rebellion. In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere
component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot
therefore be made the basis of a separate charge.
PONCE ENRILE VS. SALAZAR (G.R. NO. 92163)

Facts: In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce
Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the NBI on the
strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the RTC of Quezon City Branch 103 in
Criminal Case No. 9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil Jr., charging
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the
crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the
period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the
arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator enrile, through counsel, filed a petition for
habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2,
1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.
Issue: Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compelio) arising from
an offense being a necessary for committing another which is referred to in the second clause
of Art. 48 of the RPC.
Held: There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the RPC
cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the
two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following
penalties would be imposable upon the movant namely; (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine
not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, dependingupon the
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for
the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present.
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In other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not
be imposed upon him. However, Art. 48 said penalty could not have to be meted out to him,
even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed
in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
The plaint of petitioners counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the
statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be
dismissed as a mere flight of rhethoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information
does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the RPC; simple
rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Courts
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioners case, and of the logical and
necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only
the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted
as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case
arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a
right or vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal
venue for invoking the petitioners right to have provisional libery pending trial and judgment.
The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course
was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a
right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that
remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief
was also available there.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners
are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Courts earlier grant bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners.
Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond
filed with this Court shall become functus oficio.
PEOPLE VS HERNANDEZ (G.R. NO. L-6025)

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Facts: This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal Case No.
15841, People vs. Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs.
Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for
Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and Robberies. The appellants are Amado V.
Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian
Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres Baisa, Jr. were among those
sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but they have withdrawn their appeal. In Criminal
Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for rebellion with murders, arsons and
kidnappings. The accused are Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all
appealed but Andres Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal.
A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the decision subject of the
present appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the defendants-appelants are liable for the crime of conspiracy and
proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection under Art. 136 of the RPC?
Held: The court found defendants-appellants Hernandez, member of the Communist Party of
the Philippines, President of the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), had close
connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and held continuous
communications with its leaders and its members, and others, guilty as principal of the crime
charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.
In the testimonies shown in court, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP leaders used to
send notes to appellant Hernandez, who in turn issued press releases for which he found
space in the local papers. His acts in this respect belong to the category of propaganda, to
which he appears to have limited his actions as a Communist.
However, in their appeal, defendants-appellants Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado
Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges contained in the
information, with their proportionate share of the costs de oficio.
But other defendants-appellants, namely, Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas, Bayani
Espiritu and Teopista Valerio were found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion,
as defined and punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and everyone of
them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five years, four months and twenty-one
days of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay their proportional share of the costs.
Advocacy of Communism put into Action
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as
a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In
the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
communist advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an
uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the
working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself.
Unless action is actually advocated or intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere
theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a Communist does not yet
advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet
actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the
Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of
conspiracy to commit rebellion.
PEOPLE VS GERONIMO (G.R. NO. L-8936)

Facts: In an information filed on June 24, 1954 by the provincial Fiscal in the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, Appellant Federico Geronimo, together with Mariano P. Balgos
alias Bakal alias Tony, alias Tony Collante alias Taoic, alias Mang Pacio, alias Bonny Abundio
Romagosa alias David, Jesus Polita alias Rex, Jesus Lava alias Jessie alias NMT, alias
Balbas, alias Noli, alias Noli Metangere, alias NKVD, Juan Ocompo alias Cmdr. Bundalian,
alias Tagle, Rosendo Manuel alias Cmdr. Sendong, alias Ruiz, Ernesto Herrero alias Cmdr.
Ed, alias Rene, alias Eddy, Santiago Rotas alias Cmdr. Jessie, Fernando Principe alias Cmdr.
Manding, Alfredo Saguni alias Godo, alias Terry, alias Terpy, Andres Diapera alias Maclang,
alias Berto, alias Teny, Lorenzo Saniel alias Wenny, Silvestre Sisno alias Tomo, alias Albert,
Teodoro Primavera alias Nestor, Lorenzo Roxas alias Argos, Vivencio Pineda alias Marquez,
Pedro Anino alias Fernandez, Mauro Llorera alias Justo, Richard Doe alias Cmdr. Danny and
John Doe alias Cmdr. Berion, alias Mayo, alias Cmdr. Paulito and many others, were charged
with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping committed.
In Camarines Sur, the above-named accused being then ranking officers and/or members of,
or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter
being the armed force of said Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) having come to an
agreement and decide to commit the crime of Rebellion, and therefore, conspiring together
and confederating among themselves with all of the thirty-one accused.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellants committed the crime of rebellion?
Held: Accused Federico Geronimo first entered a plea of not guilty to the information. When
the case was called for trial on October 12, 1954, however, he asked the permission of the
court to substitute his original plea with one of guilty, and was allowed to change his plea. On
the basis of the plea of guilty, the fiscal recommended that the penalty of life imprisonment be
imposed upon the accused, his voluntary plea of guilty being considered as a mitigating
circumstance. Geronimos counsel, on the other hand, argued that the penalty imposable
upon the accused was only prision mayor, for the reason that in his opinion, there is no such
complex crime as rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping, because the crimes of
murders robberies, and kidnapping being the natural consequences of the crime of rebellion,
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
the crime charged against the accused should be considered only as simple rebellion. On
October 18, 1954, the trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the complex
crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings; and giving him the benefit of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P10,000, to indemnify the heirs of the various persons
killed, as listed in the information, in the sum of P6,000 each, and to pay the proportionate
costs of the proceedings. From this judgment, accused Federico Geronimo appealed, raising
the sole question of whether the crime committed by him is the complex crime of rebellion
with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, or simple rebellion.
However, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for the simple
(non-complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for
the crime of murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accusedAppellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to
pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal
Code) for the rebellion; and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18
years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000;
and to pay the costs.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
DIRECT ASSAULT (148)

RIVERA vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 138553 )
Facts: On March 20, 1993 Leygo and two others were conducting routinary patrol on board a
police car when they came upon a truck unloading sacks of chicken dung at the stall of
accused. Leygo advised the driver to stop unloading the manure as it violates an ordinance
which prohibits, among others, the loading and unloading of chicken manure along the
sidewalks or road. The driver complied with the police directive. The policemen then escorted
the truck back to Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet and proceeded to the police headquarters.
Not long after, the two policemen were conducting patrol when they observed a truck loaded
with chicken dung. The two policemen followed and stopped the truck and informed Leygo
who later on proceeded to the area.
The accused arrived before the group of Leygo did and ordered the driver not to obey the
policemen but instead obey him, as he (accused) was the boss. The truck driver followed the
accuseds order. A chase ensued and the policemen were able to overtake the truck. The
driver informed the police that he was just following the order of the accused. Accused
alighted and was asked why he opted to defy the policemans order. Instead of answering,
the accused pointed a finger on the policeman and uttered words insulting and unsavory
words against the police. Leygo cautioned the accused to take it easy and informed him that
he was being arrested. The accused, however, answered by assuming a fighting stance and
later on punched Leygo on his face.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of direct assault as held by the trial and appellate
courts.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held: Yes. Accused is guilty of direct assault.

Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition;
and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ
force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.
Unquestionably, petitioners case falls under the second mode, which is the more common
form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b)
when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon a
person in authority.
PEOPLE vs. ABALOS (G.R. No. 88189)

Facts: The incident transpired during the barangay fiesta near the house of appellant at the
said barangay. Appellant was then having a drinking session in front of the shanty of one
Rodulfo Figueroa, Jr. which was situated just a few meters from his residence.
Basal, prosecution witness, said that he saw Police Major Cecilio Abalos, scolding his
employees in his transportation business. While Major Abalos was thus berating his
employees, appellant arrived and asked his father not to scold them and to just let them take
part in the barangay festivities. This infuriated the elder Abalos and set off a heated argument
between father and son.
While the two were thus quarreling, a woman shouted and asked for help. The victim then
appeared on the scene and asked Major Abalos, "What is it, sir?" The victim saluted Abalos
when the latter turned around to face him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at the victim,
appellant hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood. He then swiftly returned and
unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at the victim from behind, hitting the
policeman at the back of the right side of his head. The victim collapsed unconscious in a
heap, and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from that blow.
Issue: Whether or not appellant was correctly convicted by the lower court with the complex
crime of direct assault with murder.
Held: Yes. The accused is guilty of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of
committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under Article 148 of the Revised
Penal Code. The first is not a true atentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except
that there is no public uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more common
way of committing assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in the attack,
or the offender is a public officer, or the offender lays hands upon a person in authority.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be
an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his
agent; the assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the
occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority
or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the
offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter,
there arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide. The killing in the
instant case constituted the felony of murder qualified by alevosia through treacherous
means deliberately adopted Pfc. Labine was struck from behind while he was being
confronted at the same time by appellant's father. The evidence shows that appellant
deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood which he
deliberately got for that purpose. Obviously, appellant resorted to such means to avoid any
risk to himself, knowing fully well that his quarry was a policeman who could readily mount a
defense. The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and nocturnity, however,
were not duly proven, as correctly ruled by the court below. On the other hand, appellant's
voluntary surrender even if duly taken into account by the trial court would have been
inconsequential.
PEOPLE vs. DURAL (G.R. No. L-84921)

Facts: On January 31, 1988, while the two prosecution witnesses were on their way to the
tupadahan, they heard successive gunfires which caused them to run and hide. From the
place they were hiding, they saw three armed men firing upon the two Capcom soldiers. The
three gunmen positioned themselves as to immobilize the two Capcom soldiers. They left the
scene after they got the service pistol and armalite of the Capcom soldiers. Two days after
the incident eyewitnesses voluntarily went at the Capcom headquarters at to narrate what
they have witnessed, consequently the investigator brought them at the Capcom
headquarters at Bicutan then at Camp Panopio Hospital. At the said hospital, they identified
one of the three gunmen (referring to accused Dural) who shot the two Capcom soldiers.
Issue: Whether or not appellants are guilty of direct assault.
Held: Yes. The SC held that there is no doubt that appellant Dural and the two (2) other
gunmen knew that the victims, T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Mangligot, were
members of the Philippine Constabulary detailed with the CAPCOM as they were then in
uniform and riding an official CAPCOM car. The victims, who were agents of persons in
authority, were in the performance of official duty as peace officers and law enforcers. For
having assaulted and killed the said victims, in conspiracy with the other two (2) gunmen,
appellant Dural also committed direct assault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code.
The crimes he committed, therefore, are two (2) complex crimes of murder with direct assault
upon an agent of a person in authority. Pursuant then to Article 48 of the Revised Penal
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Code, the maximum of the penalty for the more serious crime which is murder, should be
imposed.
PEOPLE VS. TAC-AN (G.R. NOS. 76338-39)

Facts: Renato Tac-an and Francis Escanowere close friends being classmates in high school
and members of the local Bronx gang. Francis withdrew from the gang on the advice of his
mother who saw that Renato carried a handgun on his visits to their home. Things started
turning sour between the two, and came to a head on Dec 14, 1984. After an earlier
altercation on that day, Renato went home and got his gun. He entered the Mathematics
class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas in Rm15 and shouted for Francis. After locating the victim
he fired at him but missed. He was later able to hit him in the head as he was running to the
door with his classmates to escape. After this, Renato paced outside in the hallway. A teacher
unknowing that Renato was the culprit, asked him for help unwittingly informing him that
Francis was still alive. Renato immediately re-entered the room and saying "So, he is still
alive. Where is his chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the classroom floor,
Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once more. The bullet entered Francis' back
below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest just above the right nipple.
Meantime, as soon as Renato left Room 15, some teachers and students came to rescue
Francis but could not open the door which Renato had locked behind him. One of the
students entered the room by climbing up the second floor on the outside and through the
window and opened the door from the inside. The teachers and students brought Francis
down to the ground floor from whence the PC soldiers rushed him to the Celestino Gallares
Memorial Hospital. Francis died before reaching the hospital.
In his defense, Renato claimed that he was acting in self-defense. The trial court convicted
Renato guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation (treachery used to qualify the crime to murder) and the special
aggravating circumstances of acting while under the influence of dangerous drugs and with
the use of an unlicensed firearm and with insult to a person in authority.
Issue: Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities.
Held: The SC held that the trial court erred in finding the presence of the generic aggravating
circumstance of contempt of or with insult to the public authorities. A careful reading of the
last paragraph of Article 152 of the RPC will show that while a teacher or professor of a public
or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or
professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a
person in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the
agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of
Article 152 does not identify specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for the application of
which any person "directly vested with jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority."
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Because a penal statute is not to be given a longer reach and broader scope than is called
for by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary words used by such statute, to the disadvantage
of an accused, we do not believe that a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private
school may be regarded as a "public authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article
14 of the Revised Penal Code, 31 the provision the trial court applied in the case at bar.
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FALSE TREASURY/BANK NOTES (ART. 168)
TECSON vs. CA (G.R. No. 113218)
Facts: This case stemmed from a charge of illegal possession and use of counterfeit US
dollar notes.
A civilian informer personally informed the Central bank that a certain Mang Andy was
involved in a syndicate engaged in the business of counterfeit US dollar notes. A test-buy
operation and later on a buy-bust operation were conducted where the petitioner was
apprehended.
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty for violation of Art. 168 of the RPC.
Held: The SC affirmed the decision of the trial and appellate court in convicting the accused
guilty of illegal possession of false treasury/bank notes.
The elements of the crime charged for violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, are:
1 ) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to
bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer
is forged or falsified by another person; 2) that the offender knows that any of the said
instruments is forged or falsified; and 3) that he either used or possessed with intent to
use any of such forged or falsified instruments. Hence, possession of fake dollar notes must
be coupled with the act of using or at least with intent to use the same as shown by a clear
and deliberate overt act in order to constitute a crime, as was sufficiently proven in the case
at bar.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
FALSIFICATION (ARTS. 171, 172)

ADAZA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 154886)
Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause against the
spouses Mayor Adaza and wife Aristela Adaza. Two Informations filed before the
Sandiganbayan: falsification of voucher by counterfeiting the signature of PTA President
Mejoranda and falsification of DBP check by counterfeiting the signature of Mejoranda,
relating to the construction of a school bldg consisting of 2 classrooms. Sandiganbayan found
Mayor Adaza guilty in the first case, but acquitted him and his wife in the second case.
Issue: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction if there was no allegation showing that the
act of falsification of public document attributed to him was intimately connected to the duties
of
his
office
as
mayor?
Held: No. For an offense to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019,
as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten
wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on
bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or
(e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding
any of the positions enumerated in paragraph A of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is
in
relation
to
the
office.
Although petitioner was described in the information as a public officer there was no
allegation showing that the act of falsification of public document attributed to him was
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
intimately connected to the duties of his office as mayor to bring the case within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Neither was there any allegation to show how he made
use of his position as mayor to facilitate the commission of the crimes charged. For the
purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is this allegation that is controlling, not the evidence
presented by the prosecution during the trial.
However, the prosecution is not precluded from filing the appropriate charge against him
before the proper court.
LUMANCAS vs. INTAS (G.R. No. 133472)

Facts: Petitioners were regular employees of the Philippine Postal Corporation. They were
charged by their co-employee Virginia B. Intas for making false entries in their respective
Personal Data Sheets regarding their educational attainment, resulting in their promotion to
higher positions to the prejudice of other postal employees who had been in the service for a
longer period.
It appears that Consolacion A. Lumancas' highest educational attainment was Fourth Year
Pharmacy. Her official Transcript of Records showed that she took up Bachelor of Science in
Commerce Major in Management. Lumancas' answers however in her three (3) PDS
accomplished in 1989, 1991 and 1993 were inconsistent as to the university and course that
she took. When requested to submit the academic records petitioner, the IHU submitted
several records but the original of her Special Order was not among them. According Higher
Education Division, Lumancas' name could not be found in the IHU enrollment list filed with
her office from school years 1974-75 to 1978-79, meaning that she had not enrolled with the
school during those terms.
Issue: Whether appellants are guilty of falsification through the making of untruthful
statements in a narration of facts.
Held: Yes. All the elements of falsification through the making of untruthful statements in a
narration of facts are present: (a) That the offender makes in a document statements in a
narration of facts; (b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated
by him; (c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and, (d) That the
perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a
third person. In People v. Po Giok To the Court held that "in the falsification of public or
official documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary that
there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in
contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed." Hence, the last
requisite need not be present. Also, petitioners themselves have affirmed in their petition that
their Personal Data Sheets were not sworn to before any administering officer thereby taking
their case away from the confines of perjury. Nonetheless, they argue that they have no legal
obligation to disclose the truth in their PDS since these are not official documents. We
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
disagree. In Inting v. Tanodbayan the Court held that "the accomplishment of the Personal
Data Sheet being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection
with employment in the government, the making of an untruthful statement therein was,
therefore, intimately connected with such employment x x x x The filing of a Personal Data
Sheet is required in connection with the promotion to a higher position and contenders for
promotion have the legal obligation to disclose the truth. Otherwise, enhancing their
qualifications by means of false statements will prejudice other qualified aspirants to the
same position.
RECEBIDO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 141931)

Facts: Private complainant Caridad Dorol went to the house of petitioner Aniceto Recebido to
redeem her property, an agricultural land which she mortgaged to the petitioner. Petitioner
and Caridad Dorol did not execute a document on the mortgage but Caridad Dorol instead
gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale dated June 16, 1973 executed in her favor by her
father, Juan Dorol.
In said confrontation, petitioner refused to allow Caridad Dorol to redeem her property on his
claim that she had sold her property to him in 1979. Caridad Dorol maintained and insisted
that the transaction between them involving her property was a mortgage.
Caridad Dorol verified the existence of the Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979, allegedly
executed by Caridad Dorol in favor of petitioner and that the property was registered in the
latter's name. After comparison of the specimen signatures of Caridad Dorol in other
documents with that of the signature of Caridad Dorol on the questioned Deed of Sale, NBI
Document Examiner, found that the latter signature was falsified.
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of falsification.
Held: Yes. Under the circumstance, there was no need of any direct proof that the petitioner
was the author of the forgery. As keenly observed by the Solicitor General, "the questioned
document was submitted by petitioner himself when the same was requested by the NBI for
examination. Clearly in possession of the falsified deed of sale was petitioner and not
Caridad Dorol who merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial Assessor's Office of
Sorsogon." In other words, the petitioner was in possession of the forged deed of sale which
purports to sell the subject land from the private complainant to him. Given this factual
backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to be the author of the forged deed of sale, despite the
absence of any direct evidence of his authorship of the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only
person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found in his possession, it is
presumed that he is the material author of the falsification.
The prosecution has established that private complainant Dorol did not sell the subject land
to the petitioner-accused at anytime and that sometime in 1983 the private complainant
mortgaged the agricultural land to petitioner Recebido. It was only on September 9, 1990,
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
when she went to petitioner to redeem the land that she came to know of the falsification
committed by the petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner contends that the land in question
was mortgaged to him by Juan Dorol, the father of private complainant, and was
subsequently sold to him on August 13, 1983. This Court notes that the private offended party
had no actual knowledge of the falsification prior to September 9, 1990. Meanwhile,
assuming arguendo that the version of the petitioner is believable, the alleged sale could not
have been registered before 1983, the year the alleged deed of sale was executed by the
private complainant. Considering the foregoing, it is logical and in consonance with human
experience to infer that the crime committed was not discovered, nor could have been
discovered, by the offended party before 1983. Neither could constructive notice by
registration of the forged deed of sale, which is favorable to the petitioner since the running of
the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned earlier, have been done before
1983 as it is impossible for the petitioner to have registered the deed of sale prior thereto.
Even granting arguendo that the deed of sale was executed by the private complainant,
delivered to the petitioner-accused in August 13, 1983 and registered on the same day, the
ten-year prescriptive period of the crime had not yet elapsed at the time the information was
filed in 1991. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the crime had not prescribed at the
time of the filing of the information.
ALCANTARA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 101919)

Facts: The instant case arose due to jealousy and intrigue, resulting in vengeance by means
of misrepresentation, falsification of signatures and documents and entries thereon. It is not
understandable how the respondent court fell prey to a vindictive Orlando Abad, using
precious time and resources of the judicial system of the land.
During the change of administration after the EDSA revolution, accused Alcantara with a
designation as Management and Information Analyst, took over their office. Accused
according to Abad was already a Quezon City Hall employee being then a Technical Assistant
of the Mayor.
Witness Abad, being the nex-in-rank, filed a protest before the CSC against the petitioner
whom he learned to be applying and was being proposed for appointment to the vacant
position. Witness Abad averred that petitioner misrepresented himself when in his eligibility in
the CSC, he declared to have obtained a professional eligible when he is only a subprofessional eligible.
Isles, record officer of CSC, declared that the name of the accused does not appear in the
Master List for 1979 with respect to the Career Service Examination. The accused is not
eligible as a career service professional, but the CSC records show that the accused took an
examination in 1980 with a passing rating as career service sub-professional.
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of falsification of public document.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held: No. The prosecution was not able to prove the elements of the charge of Falsification
of Public Document as defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of People v. Guinto, this Court held, that:
"The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the barthat in this jurisdiction,
accusation is not synonymous with guilt. Theaccused is protected by the constitutional
presumption of innocencewhich the prosecution must overcome with contrary proof
beyondreasonable doubt. This Court has repeatedly declared that even if thedefense is weak
the case against the accused must fail if theprosecution is even weaker, for the conviction of
the accused must restnot on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of
theprosecution. Indeed, if the prosecution has not sufficiently establishedthe guilt of the
accused, he has a right to be acquitted and releasedeven if he presents naught a shred of
evidence. x x x The accused-appellants have been condemned x x x based on uncertain
evidence clearly insufficient to sustain their conviction. It is their guilt and not their innocence
that has been presumed. It is their innocence and not their guilt that should have been
pronounced. In these circumstances, only one thing that has to be done if the Constitution is
to be observed and justice is to be served." (184 SCRA 287)
GONZALUDO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 150910)

Facts: On the 20th day of January, 1993 in the City of Bacolod accused,
conspiring,confederating and acting in concert, with intent to gain, defrauded the herein
offended party, Anita Manlangit Vda. de Villaflor in the following manner, to wit: that
accusedRosemarie Gelogo alias Rosemarie G. commitedacts of falsification by
preparingand/or causing to be prepared a public document denominated as a Deed of Sale
datedJanuary 20, 1993 entered as Doc. No. 402, Page No. 81, Book No. XVII, Series of 1993
of the Notarial Register of Atty. Ramon B. Clapiz, to the effect that she is thelawful owner of
the said house and affixing or causing to be affixed thereon her nameand signature.
Issue: Whether the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documentsis the
right offense considering an element is missing in the crime of estafa?
Held: We find no cogent reason to depart from this settled principle that the deceit,which
must be prior to or simultaneously committed with the act of defraudation, must be the
efficient cause or primary consideration which induced the offended party to part with his
money or property and rule differently in the present case.While it may be said that there was
fraud or deceit committed by Rosemarie in thiscase, when she used the surname "Villaflor" to
give her semblance of authority to sellthe subject 2-storey house, such fraud or deceit was
employed upon the Canlas spouseswho were the ones who parted with their money when
they bought the house.However, the Information charging Rosemarie of estafa in the present
case, allegeddamage or injury not upon the Canlas spouses, but upon private complainant,
AnitaManlangit. Since the deceit or fraud was not the efficient cause and did not induceAnita
Manlangit to part with her property in this case, Rosemarie cannot be held liablefor estafa.
With all the more reason must this be for herein petitioner.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
GARCIA vs. CA (G.R. No. 128213)

Facts: On or about the month of January, 1991 in Pasay City Abella Garcia, beingthen in
possession of a receipt for Five Thousand Pesos dated January 21, 1991 issued by one
Alberto Quijada, Jr. as partial down payment of the sale of a house and lotsituated at No. 46
P. Gomez St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila by Albert Quijada, Jr. toaccused, made alterations
and wrote words, figures and phrases to the original receiptwhich completely changed its
meaning by making appear thereon that it was issued onJanuary 24, 1991 in the amount of
Fifty Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00) when intruth and in fact, the said accused fully well
knew that the receipt was only for theamount of Five Thousand Pesos.
Issue: Whether or not the charge of falsification of a privatedocument is proper?
Held: Given the admissions of Avella that she altered the receipt, and withoutconvincing
evidence that the alteration was with the consent of private complainant,the Court holds that
all four (4) elements have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.As to the requirement of
damage, this is readily apparent as it was made to appear thatAlberto had received P50,000
when in fact he did not. Hence, Avella's conviction
PERJURY (ART. 183)
BURGOS vs. AQUINO (A.M. No. P-94-1081)
Facts: In this administrative matter, the complainant Virginia Burgos charged the respondent
of immorality for maintaining illicit relations with complainants husband which eventually
begotthem a child, named Jocelyn Burgos. The respondent in her comment admitted that she
had anillicit relation with complainants husband but the illicit relation allegedly happened prior
to heremployment in the judiciary. She claimed that that the affair occurred in 1979 and their
lovechild was born on March 1980 and that she joined the judiciary only on 1981. She
furtherclaimed that she had severed her relation with Atty. Burgos arising from their
disagreement oversupport. In the complainants reply, she claimed that the respondents and
her husbandsrelationship still continues.
Issue: Whether the respondent should be suspended for immorality; and- Whether the
defense of the respondent is truthful or makes her liable for perjury
Held: The office of the Court Administrator found that indeed the respondent committed
animmoral act while in the government service regardless of whether it was committed
whenemployed in the judiciary. Whether the immoral relation still subsists is no longer
material. TheSupreme Court agreed with the findings of the OCA, further the evidence proved
that on somepleadings by Atty, Burgos and typed by the respondent; bear the initials of both
Atty.Burgos andthe respondent. The defense of the respondent that their relationship has
ended was not proveddue to these circumstances. The records also reveled that in some of
the documents submittedby the respondent; she did not revealed about her child. Under Art.
183 of the Revised PenalCode, perjury is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon
any material matter beforea competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
which the law so requires. Herdeliberate omission to disclose her child without a valid
justification makes her liable for perjury
DIAZ vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 65006)

Facts: Petitioner Reolandi Diaz was charged with the crime of Falsification of Official
Document beforethe Court of first Instance of Pampanga. He was found guilty as charged.
On appeal, the court modified its decision increasing the penalty of the accused. Hence this
petition. The facts of thecase are as follows:Reolandi Diaz was a Senior Clerk at Jose Abad
Santos High School in San Fernando Pampanga.He sought appointment as School
Administrative Assistant I, and as one of the requirements tosaid appointment, he filled up
Civil Service Form 212 and swore to the truth and veracity of thedate
and information therein that his highest educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B.(Liberal
Arts) allegedly pursued at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges. On that basis, he was
appointed to the position. But contrary to the claim of petitioner, he was never enrolled at the
Cosmopolitan Colleges certified by its Registrar, neither was he a student at the Harvardian
Colleges, certified by the schools president. The name of the petitioner was not also included
inall the enrollment lists of college students submitted to the then Bureau of Private Schools.
Issues: Whether the accused is guilty of falsification.
Held: The court held that the crime committed was not falsification but Perjury, which is the
willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority
of law on a material matter. The elements of which are; a) the accused made a statement
under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; b) that the statement or affidavit
was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; c.) that the
statement or affidavit, the accused made a deliberate assertion of a falsehood; d.) that the
sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a
legal purpose. All the elements enumerated therein are present in the case at bar, thus the
accused is guilty of perjury. The decision of Court of Appeals was modified, finding the
accused guilty of perjury, imposing the corresponding penalty therein and not of falsification.
CHOA vs. CHIONGSON (A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063)

Facts: This case arose from the alleged untruthful statements or falsehoods in the
complainants Petition for Naturalization.
When in truth and in fact said accused knew that his wife Leni Ong Choa and their two
children were not then residing at the said address at No. 46 Malaspina Street, Villamonte,
Bacolod City, having left the aforesaid residence in 1984, or about five (5) years earlier and
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
were then residing at Hervias Subdivision, Bacolod City, that contrary to his aforesaid
allegations in his verified Petition for Naturalization, accused while residing at 211, 106 Street,
Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City, has been carrying on an immoral and illicit
relationship with one Stella Flores Saludar, a woman not his wife since 1984, and begotting
two (2) children with her as a consequence, as he and his wife, the private offended party
herein, have long been separated from bed and boards [sic] since 1984; which falsehoods
and/ or immoral and improper conduct are grounds for disqualifications of becoming a citizen
of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether the petitioner is guilty of perjury.
Held: With respect to the complainants claim that the allegations in the information do not
constitute the offense of perjury, an administrative proceeding is not the forum to decide
whether the judge has erred or not, especially as complainant has appealed his conviction.
Even if the matter can be examined, we do not find any error in the Courts decision.
The elements of perjury as enumerated in the case of People of the Philippines vs. Bautista
(C.A., 40 O.G. 2491) are as follows:
(a)
Statement in the affidavit upon material matter made under oath;
(b)
The affiant swears to the truthfulness of the statements in his affidavit before a
competent officer authorized to administer oath;
(c)
There is a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood; and
(d)
Sworn statement containing the falsity is required by law.
It cannot be denied that the petition for naturalization filed by Alfonso C. Choa was made
under oath and before a competent officer authorized to administer oath as shown by the
records. This petition for naturalization is required by law as a condition precedent for the
grant of Philippine citizenship (Section 7 Corn. Act No. 473).
The question now boils down to whether there is a willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood.
VILLANUEVA vs. SOJ (G.R. NO. 162187)

Facts: On April 2, 1996, the Refractories Corporation of the Philippines (RCP) filed a protest
before the Special Committee on Anti-Dumping of the Department of Finance against certain
importations of Hamburg Trading Corporation (HTC), a corporation duly organized and
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
existing under the laws of the Philippines. The matter involved 151.070 tons of magnesitebased refractory bricks from Germany. The case was docketed as Anti-Dumping Case No. I98.
The protest was referred to the Bureau of Import Services (BIS) of the Department of Trade
and Industry, to determine if there was a prima facie case for violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7843, the Anti-Dumping Law. Sometime in February 1997, the BIS submitted its report to
the Tariff Commission, declaring that a prima facie case existed and that continued
importation of refractory bricks from Germany would harm the local industry. It adopted the
amount of DM 1,200 per metric ton as the normal value of the imported goods.
The HTC received a copy of the said report on February 14, 1997. However, before it could
respond, the chairman of the Tariff Commission prodded the parties to settle the matter
amicably. A conference ensued between RCP Senior Vice President and Assistant General
Manager Criste Villanueva and Jesus Borgonia, on the one hand, and HTC President and
General Manager Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen and Sales Manager Dennis Gonzales, on
the other. During the conference, the parties agreed that the refractory bricks were imported
by the HTC at a price less than its normal value of DM 1,200, and that such importation was
likely to injure the local industry. The parties also agreed to settle the case to avoid expenses
and protracted litigation. HTC was required to reform its price policy/structure of its
importation and sale of refractory bricks from Germany to conform to the provisions of R.A.
No. 7843 and its rules and regulations. Jesus Borgonio thereafter prepared and signed a
compromise agreement containing the terms agreed upon which Villanueva and Borgonia
signed. Bienvenido Flores, an Office Clerk of RCP, delivered the agreement to HTC at the 9th
Floor of Ramon Magsaysay Center Building, 1680 Roxas Boulevard, Manila by Von
Sprengeisens approval.
However, Von Sprengeisen did not sign the agreement. Borgonia revised the agreement by
inserting the phrase "based on the findings of the BIS" in paragraph 1 thereof. Villanueva and
Borgonia signed the agreement and had the same delivered to the office of HTC on April 22,
1997 by Lino M. Gutierrez, a technical assistant of RCP. Gonzales received the agreement
and delivered the same to Von Sprengeisen. After 20 minutes, Gonzales returned, with the
agreement already signed by Von Sprengeisen. Gonzales, who had also signed, then gave it
to Gutierrez. On the same day, Notary Public Zenaida P. De Zuiga notarized the
agreement. Gonzales delivered a copy of the notarized Agreement to HTC.
RCP submitted the compromise agreement to the Tariff Commission. During the May 9, 1997
hearing before the Commission for the approval of the agreement, a representative of HTC
appeared. He offered no objection to the Agreement. The Commission submitted its report to
the Special Committee which rendered a decision declaring that, based on the findings of the
BIS, the normal value of the imported refractory bricks was DM 1,200 per metric ton. HTC
received a copy of the decision on March 4, 1998. Neither RCP nor HTC appealed the
decision to the Court of Tax Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not, based on the records, there was probable cause for the private
respondents indictment for perjury.

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Held: Perjury is defined and penalized in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of
the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section shall suffer
the respective penalties provided therein.
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may affect the earnest concerns of the
parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated when the false statement is made.
The seminal modern treatment of the history of perjury concludes that one consideration of
policy overshadows all others the measures taken against the offense must not be so
severe as to discourage aggrieved parties from lodging complaints or testifying. As quoted by
Dean Wigmore, a leading 19th Century Commentator, noted that English law, "throws every
fence round a person accused of perjury, for the obligation of protecting witnesses from
oppression or annoyance, by charges, or threats of charges, of having made false testimony
is far paramount to that of giving even perjury its deserts."
Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation
administered by authority of law on a material matter. The elements of the felony are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive
and administer oath.
(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a
legal purpose.
A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The assertion must be
deliberate and willful. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the
accused. Willfully means intentionally; with evil intent and legal malice, with the
consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be
received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is equivalent to "knowingly." "Deliberately"
implies meditated as distinguished from inadvertent acts. It must appear that the accused
knows his statement to be false or as consciously ignorant of its truth.
Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as to its truth. A
false statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement is an
adequate defense. A false statement which is obviously the result of an honest mistake is not
perjury.
There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made by the
defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the defendant did not believe
those statements to be true.
Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his statement is an internal act. It may be proved
by his admissions or by circumstantial evidence. The state of mind of the accused may be
determined by the things he says and does, from proof of a motive to lie and of the objective
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
falsity itself, and from other facts tending to show that the accused really knew the things he
claimed not to know.
A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn statements
of the accused. The prosecution must prove which of the two statements is false and must
show the statement to be false by other evidence than the contradicting statement.
CABARRUSVS. BERNAS (A.C. NO. 4634)

Facts: On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for alleged violations of Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code and Code of Professional Responsibility.
Issue: Whether respondent Atty. Bernas transgressed Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular
No. 28-91, and Administrative Circular No. 04 - 94 on forum shopping.
Held: Explicitly, the functions of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely
investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is
incapable of granting any relief to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is an
investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation
of crimes upon its own initiative and as public welfare may require. It renders assistance
when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes which precisely what Atty. Bernas
sought in order to prosecute those persons responsible for defrauding his client.
The courts, tribunals and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No.
28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those vested with judicial powers or quasijudicial powers and those who not only hear and determine controversies between adverse
parties, but to make binding orders or judgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is
not performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those
forums contemplated by the Circular that can entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant
any relief, declaratory or otherwise.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
MACHINATIONS IN PUBLIC AUCTIONS (ART. 185)

OUANO vs. CA (G.R. No. L-40203)
Facts: The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel of land registered under RFC
(DBP). Said property was offered for bidding for the second time because the first bidding
was nullified due to Ouanos protest. It appears that prior to the second bidding, Ouano and
Echavez orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid, and that if it was accepted, they
would divide the property in proportion to their adjoining properties. To ensure success of
their enterprise, they also agreed to induce the only other party known to be interested in the
property-a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to desist from presenting a bid. They broached
the matter to Mrs. Bonsucan's group. The latter agreed to withdraw, as it did in fact withdraw
from the sale; and Ouano's wife paid it P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Issue: Whether Ouano committed machinations in public auction punishable under the RPC.
Held: These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has stressed. Ouano and Echavez
had promised to share in the property in question as a consideration for Ouano's refraining
from taking part in the public auction, and they had attempted to cause and in fact succeeded
in causing another bidder to stay away from the auction. in order to cause reduction of the
price of the property auctioned In so doing, they committed the felony of machinations in
public auctions defined and penalized in Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code, supra.
That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is a matter of record, as is the fact that thereby
only one bid that of Echavez was entered for the 'land in consequence of which Echavez
eventually acquired it. The agreement therefore being criminal in character, the parties not
only have no action against each other but are both liable to prosecution and the things and
price of their agreement subject to disposal according to the provisions of the criminal code.
This, in accordance with the so-called pari delicto principle set out in the Civil Code.
IMMORAL DOCTRINES (ART. 201)

FERNANDO vs. CA (G.R. No. 159751 )
Facts: Acting on reports of sale and distribution of pornographic materials, PNP officers
conducted police surveillance on the store bearing the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando
Music Fair (Music Fair). A search warrant was issued for violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a certain Warren

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Tingchuy. The warrant ordered the search of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair at 564
Quezon Blvd., corner Zigay Street, Quiapo, Manila, and the seizure of the following items:
a. Copies of New Rave Magazines with nude obscene pictures;
b. Copies of IOU Penthouse Magazine with nude obscene pictures;
c. Copies of Hustler International Magazine with nude obscene pictures; and
d. Copies of VHS tapes containing pornographic shows. 3
On the same day, police officers served the warrant on Rudy Estorninos, who, according to
the prosecution, introduced himself as the store attendant of Music Fair. The police searched
the premises and confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different magazines,
which they deemed pornographic.
The RTC acquitted Tingchuy for lack of evidence to prove his guilt, but convicted herein
petitioners
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty for violation of Art. 201 of the RPC.
Held: As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the
State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral
and indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation.
One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. To be held liable, the
prosecution must prove that (a) the materials, publication, picture or literature are obscene;
and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or gave away such materials. 13 Necessarily,
that the confiscated materials are obscene must be proved.
The SC emphasized that mere possession of obscene materials, without intention to sell,
exhibit, or give them away, is not punishable under Article 201, considering the purpose of the
law is to prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials to the public. The offense in any of
the forms under Article 201 is committed only when there is publicity.32 The law does not
require that a person be caught in the act of selling, giving away or exhibiting obscene
materials to be liable, for as long as the said materials are offered for sale, displayed or
exhibited to the public. In the present case, we find that petitioners are engaged in selling and
exhibiting obscene materials.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. CA (G.R. No. 119673)

Facts: Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television
program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel
13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs,
doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions.
Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992 petitioner submitted to
the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV
program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for
public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions
which is expressly prohibited by law."
Issue: Whether petitioner may be held guilty for violation of Art. 201 of the RPC.
Held: It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize" attack against any religion" as a
ground allegedly ". . . because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the showing of motion
pictures, television programs and publicity materials which are contrary to law and Article 201
(2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any
race or religion." We respectfully disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not
synonymous with the word "offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal
Code should be invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any
religion. It cannot be utilized to justifyprior censorship of speech. It must be emphasized that
E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included "attack against any religion" as a ground for
censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree
to disuse it. There can be no other intent. Indeed, even the Executive Department espouses
this view.
Anent the validity of Sec. 4 of the Board's Rules and Regulation authorizing MTRCB to
prohibit the showing of materials "which clearly constitute an attack against any race, creed
or religion . . .", I agree with Mr. Justice Vitug that the phrase "contrary to law" in Sec. 3-c
"should be read together with other existing laws such as, for instance, the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 201, which prohibit the exhibition of shows that
'offend another race or religion.'" Indeed, where it can be shown that there is a clear and
present danger that a religious program could agitate or spark a religious strife of such extent
and magnitude as to be injurious to the general welfare, the Board may "X-rate" it or delete
such portions as may reasonably be necessary. The debilitating armed conflicts in Bosnia,
Northern Ireland and in some Middle East countries due to exacerbated religious
antagonisms should be enough lesson for all of us. Religious wars can be more ravaging and
damaging than ordinary crimes. If it is legal and in fact praiseworthy to prevent the
commission of, say, the felony of murder in the name of public welfare why should the
prevention of a crime punishable by Art. 201 of the Penal Code be any less legal and less
praiseworthy.

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I note, in this connection, the caveat raised by the ponencia that the MTRCB Rule bans
shows which "attack" a religion, whereas Art. 201 merely penalize; those who exhibit
programs which "offend" such religion. Subject to changing the word "attack" with the more
accurate "offend". I believe Section 4 of the Rules can stand.
PITA VS. C.A. (178 SCRA 362)

Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor
of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group,
Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of
Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers
along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be
obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the
University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and
several officers and members of various student organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published
and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
On December 7, 1983, plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of
Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants
and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from otherwise preventing the sale
or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational
magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the
Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying the motion
for a writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit.
Issue:Whether appellant is guilty of a violation of the RPC (immoral doctrines)
Held: The Court states at the outset that it is not the first time that it is being asked to
pronounce what "obscene" means or what makes for an obscene or pornographic literature.
Early on, in People vs. Kottinger, the Court laid down the test, in determining the existence of
obscenity, as follows: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave
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or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a
publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." "Another test,"
so Kottinger further declares, "is that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men
as an indecency." Kottinger hastened to say, however, that "[w]hether a picture is obscene or
indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question
is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it."
Yet Kottinger, in its effort to arrive at a "conclusive" definition, succeeded merely in
generalizing a problem that has grown increasingly complex over the years. Precisely, the
question is: When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said to be
offensive to human sensibilities? And obviously, it is to beg the question to say that a piece of
literature has a corrupting influence because it is obscene, and vice-versa.
Apparently, Kottinger was aware of its own uncertainty because in the same breath, it would
leave the final say to a hypothetical "community standard" whatever that is and that the
question must supposedly be judged from case to case.
As the Court declared, the issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither
been drawn nor divided. It is easier said than done to say, indeed, that if "the pictures here in
question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes," 12 the
pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of
police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut
simply because one insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop,
adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization.
What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the
present generation. James Joyce and D.H. Lawrence were censored in the thirties yet their
works are considered important literature today. Goya's La Maja desnuda was once banned
from public exhibition but now adorns the world's most prestigious museums.
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As
we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men and women that have probably
compounded the problem rather than resolved it.
What the Court is impressing, plainly and simply, is that the question is not, and has not been,
an easy one to answer, as it is far from being a settled matter. We share Tribe's
disappointment over the discouraging trend in American decisional law on obscenity as well
as his pessimism on whether or not an "acceptable" solution is in sight.
In the final analysis perhaps, the task that confronts us is less heroic than rushing to a
"perfect" definition of "obscenity", if that is possible, as evolving standards for proper police
conduct faced with the problem, which, after all, is the plaint specifically raised in the petition.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although
not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of
the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
interference and action. But, so we asserted in Reyes v. Bagatsing, "the burden to show the
existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify adverse action ... lies on the. . .
authorit[ies]."
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence
of such clear and present danger." "It is essential for the validity of ... previous restraint or
censorship that the ... authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the public
welfare, peace or safety may require."
"To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to satisfy the
clear and present danger test."
The above disposition must not, however, be taken as a neat effort to arrive at a solution-so
only we may arrive at one-but rather as a serious attempt to put the question in its proper
perspective, that is, as a genuine constitutional issue.
It is also significant that in his petition, the petitioner asserts constitutional issues, mainly, due
process and illegal search and seizure.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to
justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had
been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding
the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and
seizure, by way of a search warrant.
PEOPLE VS. PADAN (G.R. No. L-7295)

Facts: That on or about the 13th day of September, 1953, in the city of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously exhibit or cause to be exhibited inside a
building at the corner of Camba Ext. and Morga Ext., Tondo, this City, immoral scenes and
acts, to wit: the said accused Jose Fajador y Garcia, being then the manager and Ernesto
Reyes y Yabut, as ticket collector and or exhibitor, willfully ,unlawfully and feloniously hired
their co-accused Marina Palan y Alova and Cosme Espinosa y Abordo to act as performers or
exhibitionists to perform and in fact performed sexual intercourse in the presence of many
spectators, thereby exhibiting or performing highly immoral and indecent acts or shows
thereat.
Issue: Whether all the accused were guilty of violating Art. 201 of the RPC.
Held: We believe that the penalty imposed fits the crime, considering its seriousness. As far
as we know, this is the first time that the courts in this jurisdiction, at least this Tribunal, have
been called upon to take cognizance of an offense against morals and decency of this kind.
We have had occasion to consider offenses like the exhibition of still moving pictures of
women in the nude, which we have condemned for obscenity and as offensive to morals. In
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
those cases, one might yet claim that there was involved the element of art; that
connoisseurs of the same, and painters and sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of
pictures in the nude, or the human body exhibited in sheer nakedness, as models in tableaux
vivants. But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of lasciviousness, can
have no redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it but clear
and unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing
as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting influence specially on the
youth of the land. We repeat that because of all this, the penalty imposed by the trial court on
Marina, despite her plea of guilty, is neither excessive nor unreasonable.
With the modification above-mentioned, the decision appealed from by Marina Padan and
Jose Fajardo are hereby affirmed, with costs against both.

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KNOWINGLY RENDERING UNJUST JUDGMENT (ART. 204)

DIEGO vs. CASTILLO (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673)
Facts: On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de
Perio, Jr., solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were
both Filipinos. In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name Crescencia
Escoto, with a civil status of single;
In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a Decree of Divorce and
purportedly issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris
County, Texas (247thJudicial District), it was ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the bonds
of matrimony heretofore existing between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio are
hereby
Dissolved, Cancelled and Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a Divorce.
Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with herein
complainants brother, Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr. Clemente T. Godoy,
parish priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that this time, the accused used
and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil status of single. [1]
The COURT orders her ACQUITTAL.
Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent Judge is manifestly
against the law and contrary to the evidence.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law?
Held: Yes. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and
penalized under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be
proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust.
This Court reiterates that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is
unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That
good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the
law.[]
There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
A judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision
he renders. The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad
faith. It is only in this latter instance, when the judge acts fraudulently or with gross
ignorance, that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court.

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In any event, respondent judge deserves to be appropriately penalized for his regrettably
erroneous action in connection with Criminal Case No. 2664 of his court.
Applying these precedents to the present case, the error committed by respondent Judge
being gross and patent, the same constitutes ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to
warrant disciplinary action.
DE VERA vs. PELAYO (G.R. No. 137354)

Facts: Petitioner is not a member of the bar. Possessing some awareness of legal principles
and procedures, he represents himself in this petition.
On August 28, 1996, petitioner instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City a special
civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the municipal trial court from
proceeding with a complaint for ejectment against petitioner.] When the Judge originally
assigned to the case inhibited himself, the case was re-raffled to respondent Judge Benjamin
V. Pelayo.]
On July 9, 1998, the trial court denied petitioners application for a temporary restraining
order. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The court denied the same on September 1,
1998.[
On September 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an affidavitcomplaint[ against Judge Pelayo, accusing him of violating Articles 206 [ and 207[ of the
Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 3019. [9]
On October 2, 1998, Associate Graft Investigation Officer, Erlinda S. Rojas submitted an
Evaluation Report recommending referral of petitioners complaint to the Supreme Court.
Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Apotadera approved the recommendation.
On October 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman referred the case to the Court
Administrator, Supreme Court.[12]
On November 6, 1998, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Evaluation Report.
On January 4, 1999, the Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration. [13]
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges filed
against a judge of the regional trial court in connection with his handling of cases before the
court?
Held: No. We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman did not exercise his power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice or personal hostility.[16] There was no evasion of positive duty. Neither was
there a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law.[17]
LOUIS VUITTON vs. VILLANUEVA (A.M. No. MTJ-92-643)

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
FACTS: In Criminal Case No. XXXVI-62431, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose V.
Rosario", Louis Vuitton, S.A. accused the latter of unfair competition as defined by paragraph
1 of Article 189, Revised Penal Code.
From the records of the case, the evidence presented and the arguments advanced by the
parties, the Court finds that the complaining witness in this case is the representative and
attorney-in-fact, counsel of Louis Vuitton, S.A. French Company with business address at
Paris, France; that private complainant is suing the accused for the protection of the trade
mark Louis Vuitton and the L.V. logo which are duly registered with the Philippine Patent
Office;
The accused, on the other hand, claimed: that he is not the manufacturer or seller of the
seized articles; that the said articles were sold in the store by a concessionaire by the name
of Erlinda Tan who is doing business under the name of Hi-Tech Bags and wallets.
The Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements of unfair
competition, to wit:
a. That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of another
manufacturer or dealer;
b. That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in the (2) wrapping
of their packages, or in the (3) device or words therein, or in (4) any other feature of their a
(sic) appearance.
In the complaint, pointed out that the respondent Judge did not consider the motion of
February 11, 1990. This omission of respondent judge allegedly constituted a clear and gross
violation of his ministerial duty in order to allow the accused to escape criminal liability.
Furthermore, complainant claimed that the respondent judge's failure to resolve the motion
exposed his gross ignorance of the law.
Complainant also assailed respondent judge's findings that there was no unfair competition
because the elements of the crime were not met, and that he seized articles did not come
close to the appearance of a genuine Louis Vuitton product, the counterfeit items having been
poorly, done.
Thirdly, complainant criticized respondent judge for his failure to consider the alleged lack of
credibility of Felix Lizardo, the lone witness for the defense, in rendering the assailed
decision.
Lastly, complainant pointed out that respondent judge violated the constitutional mandate that
decisions should be rendered within three (3) months from submission of the case. It
appeared that the decision was date June 28, 1991 but it was promulgated only on October
25, 1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust
judgment.
HELD: No.In this case, We are constrained to hold that complainant failed to substantiate its
claims that respondent judge rendered an unjust judgment knowingly. It merely relied on the
failure of respondent judge to mentioned the motion in the decision, on his alleged reliance

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on the testimony of defense witness and on the delay in the promulgation of the case. But
they are not enough to show that the judgment was unjust and was maliciously rendered.
A judge cannot be subjected to liability civil, criminal, or administrative for any his
official acts, not matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. 22 In Pabalan
vs. Guevarra, 23 the Supreme Court spoke of the rationale for this immunity.
In this case, The Court finds that the facts and the explanation rendered by Judge Villanueva
justify his absolution from the charge. However, while he is held to be not guilty, he should
avoid acts which tend to cast doubt on his integrity. Moreover, his delay in the promulgation of
this case deserves a reprimand from this Court as it is contrary to the mandate of our
Constitution which enshrines the right of the litigants to a speedy disposition of their cases.
UNJUST INTERLOCUTORY ORDER (ART.206)

LAYOLA vs. GABO (A.M. NO. RTJ-00 1524)
FACTS: Complainant Lucia F. Layola filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy of the
Ombudsman for the Military, charging SPO2 Leopoldo M. German and PO2 Tomasito H.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Gagui, members of the Santa Maria Police Station, Santa Maria, Bulacan, with homicide for
the death of complainant's son.
The complainant alleged that the respondent judge directed that accused SPO2 German be
held in the custody of his immediate superior, the Chief of Police of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, an
order sans any legal and factual basis, instead of ordering the arrest of the said accused
being indicted for murder, a heinous and non-bailable crime. Layola initiated a complaint
charging Presiding Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court in
Malolos, Bulacan, with a violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, for issuing an unjust
interlocutory order, and with gross ignorance of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge issued an unjust interlocutory order by granting the
petition of the Chief of Police, Sta. Maria Station to take custody of accused SPO2 German.
Held: No. The Office of the Court Administrator found the charge to be unfounded. Knowingly
rendering an unjust interlocutory order must have the elements: (1) that the offender is a
judge and (2) that he performs any of the following acts: (a) he knowingly renders unjust
interlocutory order or decree, or (b) he renders a manifestly unjust interlocutory order or
decree through inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
There was no evidence that the respondent judge issued the questioned order knowing it to
be unjust; and neither is there any proof of conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice.

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DIRECT BRIBERY (ART. 210)

MARIFOSQUE vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 156685)
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari, which assails the September 23, 2002,
decision and the January 3, 2003, Resolution of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner Nazario
Marifosque guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery, defined and
penalized under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner
averred that said money was not for him but as reward money for the police asset who
demanded that he be given 350 pesos per cylinder tank. Petitioner further averred that he
was only collecting on behalf of the police asset and that he already gave an advance of
1,000 pesos to said asset and only collecting the balance of 4,800.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting petitioner of direct bribery.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner committed Direct Bribery?
Held: Yes. Petitioner cannot feign innocence and profess good faith since all the indicia point
to his guilt and malicious intent. Petitioner did not introduce his asset or mention his name to
Yu So Pong or his daughter at the time of the illegal transaction. His claim that he previously
gave 1000 pesos to his asset, which purportedly represented a partial payment of the reward
money, was not corroborated by his asset. One of the arresting CIS officers testified that
petitioner attempted to give back the money to Yu So Pong when they were about to arrest
him, which showed that he was well aware of the illegality of his transaction because had he
been engaged in a legitimate deal, he would have faced courageously the arresting officers
and indignantly protested the violation of his person, which is the normal reaction of an
innocent man. His solicitous and overly eager conduct in pursuing the robbery incident, even
though he was no longer on duty, betrays an intention not altogether altruistic and denotes a
corrupt desire on his part to obtain pecuniary benefits from an illegal transaction. The
petitioner's persistence in obtaining the monetary reward for the asset although the latter was
no longer complaining about the 1000 pesos that he supposedly received earlier.
AGUIRRE vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. L-56013)

Facts: On or about November 24, 1978, in the City of Davao, the accused Liwanag Aguirre,
being then an Acting Deputy Sheriff of the NLRC was charged of having willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously demanded and obtained from Hermogenes Hanginon, an employee of the
business firm Guardsman Security Agency, the sum of 50 pesos, as a consideration for the

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said accused refraining, as he did refrain, from immediately implementing a Writ of Execution
of a final judgment of the NLRC Regional Branch XI against said security agency.
The Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner as principal of the crime charged. Petitioner
assailed that the judgment of conviction upon the ground that the evidence presented failed
to prove his guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and that the Sandiganbayan
erred in giving weight to the uncorroborated testimony of the lone prosecution witness.
Issue: Whether or not the accused Aguirre be held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of bribery, wherein the conviction was anchored upon the uncorroborated testimony of
a single prosecution witness?
Held: No. In this case, there are aspects of the testimony of the sole witness that do not
inspire belief. It appears unnatural for the petitioner to have demanded a bribe from him, a
mere employee of the security agency, without authority to accept any writ or legal paper and
without money. Furthermore, no entrapment was employed in this situation where it could
have been quite easy to catch the petitioner red handed with the bribe money. There is a
nagging doubt as to whether the testimony of Hanginon, the sole witness for the prosecution,
proves the petitioner's guilt. Thus, in the absence of evidence establishing the guilt of the
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds that the judgment of conviction under
review must yield to the constitutional presumption of innocence.
MANIPON vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. L-58889)

Facts: In its decision dated September 30, 1981, the Sandiganbayan found accused
Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., 31, guilty of direct bribery, Manipon came to this Court on petition
for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the judgment of conviction. The Court
dismissed the petition, "the question raised being factual and for lack of merit." 1 However,
upon motion for reconsideration, the Court reconsidered its resolution and gave due course
to the petition. 2
Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and
Benguet, Branch IV, was assigned to enforce an order of the Minister of Labor.
Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon sent a notice to the COMTRUST garnishing the bank
accounts of Dominguez. The bank agreed to hold the accounts. For one reason or another,
Manipon did not inform the labor arbiter of the garnishment nor did he exert efforts to
immediately satisfy the judgment under execution.
Dominguez sought Manipon's help in the withdrawal of the garnished account. Manipon told
Dominguez that the money could not be withdrawn.
However, when the two met again, Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy the
withdrawal so they will have something for the New Year." Dominguez interpreted this to
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mean that Manipon would withdraw the garnished amount for a consideration. Dominguez
agreed and they arranged to meet at the bank later in the afternoon. After Manipon left,
Dominguez confided the offer to NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then
hatched up a plan to entrap Manipon by paying him with marked money the next day. Col.
Sanchez and a Col. Aguana were able to put up P700.00 in fifty-peso bills which were then
authenticated, xeroxed and dusted with fluorescent powder.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused committed direct bribery?
Held: Yes. Manipon maintains that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge. He
said that in 1978 he and Flora had levied execution against several vehicles owned by
Dominguez, an act which the latter had openly resented.
The defense theory is so incredible that it leaves no doubt whatsoever in the Court's mind
that Manipon is guilty of the crime charged.
It is very strange indeed that for such an important agreement that would modify a final
judgment, no one took the bother of putting it down on paper. Of course Manipon would have
us believe that there was no need for it because he trusted Dominguez and Tabek. And yet
did he not also claim that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge? And if there
was really an agreement to alter the judgment, why did he not inform the labor arbiter about it
considering that it was the labor arbiter who had issued the order of execution? Manipon
could not give satisfactory explanations because there was no such agreement in the first
place.
The temporary receipt 20 adduced by Manipon, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, is a last-minute fabrication to provide proof of the alleged agreement for the trial
payment of the judgment debt. Contrary to Manipon's claim, it is hard to believe that
Dominguez was not interested in getting said temporary receipt because precisely that was
the proof he needed to show that he had partially complied with his legal obligation.
Indeed, Manipon's behavior at the very outset, had been marked with irregularities. As early
as November 9, 1979, he had already garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at
Comtrust, but he did not notify the labor arbiter so that the corresponding order for the
payment by the bank of the garnished amount could be made and the sum withdrawn
immediately to satisfy the judgment under execution. His lame excuse was that he was very
busy in the sheriff's office, attending to voluminous exhibits and court proceedings. That was
also the same excuse he gave for not informing the labor arbiter of the novation. In fact he
candidly admitted that he never communicated with the NLRC concerning the garnishment.
He returned the writ unsatisfied only on February 20, 1980 although by its express terms, it
was returnable within thirty days from October 29, 1979. 22 Clearly, Manipon had planned to
get Dominguez to acquiesce to a consideration for lifting the garnishment order.
Dwelling on one last point, Manipon has pointed out that the P1,000.00 was illegally seized
because there was no valid March warrant and therefore inadmissible.
The argument is untenable. The rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a
valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to the rule
recognized in this jurisdiction. These are: 1) search incidental to an arrest, 2) search of a
moving vehicle, and 3) seizure of evidence in plain view. This falls on the first exception.
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ARANETA vs. CA (G.R. No. L-46638)

Facts: Atty. Aquilina Araneta was charged with violation of Section 3, Subsection B of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
That on or about the 26th day of August, 1971, in the City of Cabanatuan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
employed as Hearing Officer in the Department of Labor, with station at Cabanatuan City, and
therefore, a public officer, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously demand and
receive for herself the amount of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency, from
one Mrs. Gertrudes M. Yoyongco, as a condition and/or consideration for her to act on the
claim for compensation benefits filed by the said Mrs. Gertrudes M. Yoyongco pertaining to
the death of her husband, which claim was then pending in the office wherein the
abovenamed accused was employed and in which, under the law, she has the official
capacity to intervene.
After trial, the lower court convicted the petitioner as charged.
The respondent appellate court modified the decision of the lower court and convicted the
petitioner instead of the crime of bribery under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of bribery.
Held: No. The petitioner submits that the criminal intent originated in the mind of the
entrapping person and for which reason, no conviction can be had against her. This argument
has no merit.
The petitioner confuses entrapment with instigation. There is entrapment when law officers
employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual
commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused was induced to commit the
crime (People vs. Galicia, [CA], 40 OG 4476). The difference in the nature of the two lies in
the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the
criminal. The Idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law
officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the
Idea and carries it into execution.
The legal effects of entrapment and instigation are also different. As already stated,
entrapment does not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does.
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.- While it has been said that the practice of entrapping
persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and
while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and
has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general
rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were
purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation of
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persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were
present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of
cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield
defendant, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence of the instigation of
the detective.
The contention of the petitioner was squarely answered in United States vs. Panlilio (28 Phil.
608) where this Court held that the fact that the information in its preamble charged a
violation of Act No. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the accused guilty of a violation of
an article of the Penal Code. To the same effect is our ruling in United States vs. Guzman (25
Phil. 22) where the appellant was convicted of the crime of estafa in the lower court, but on
appeal, he was instead convicted of the crime of embezzlement of public funds as defined
and penalized by Act No. 1740.
As long as the information clearly recites all the elements of the crime of bribery and the facts
proved during the trial show its having been committed beyond reasonable doubt, an error in
the designation of the crime's name is not a denial of due process.
SORIANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. L-65952)

Facts: Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City
Fiscal of Quezon City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964 and assigned for
investigation to the petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the
investigation the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the
case. Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of Investigation which set up an
entrapment. Because Tan was hard put to raise the required amount only P2,000.00 in bills
were marked by the NBI which had to supply one-half thereof. The entrapment succeeded
and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 7393 which reads
as follows:
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses LAURO G. SORIANO, for
Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
After trial the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding accused Lauro G. Soriano, Jr.,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as Principal in the Information, for Violation of Section 3,
paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
A motion to reconsider the decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence the instant
petition.
Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of Bribery?

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Held: Yes. The principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner
can be regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No.
3019. On this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit.
The petitioner states:
Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out a case of Direct Bribery
defined and penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a
violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.
The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all the offense of
Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged and is not likewise included in or is
necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for violation of Section 3, subparagraph
(b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the accused is a public
officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited, P2,000.00 of which was
allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complaint
pending preliminary investigation before him, which may or may not constitute a crime; that
the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending before petitioner was related to the
exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that the offense
proved, if at all is Direct Bribery. (Petition, p. 5.)
Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:
A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term 'transaction' as used
thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business transaction but
includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature,
pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would have so stated in the
"Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did not, perforce leaving no other interpretation
than that the expressed purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of transaction between
the government and other party wherein the public officer would intervene under the law.
(Comment, p. 8.)
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was
it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which
precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in
credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted
by the petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the
Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal
Code because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which
has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot
claim deprivation of the right to be informed.

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INDIRECT BRIBERY ( ART. 211)

FORMILLEZA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 75160)
Facts: Petitioner Leonor Formilleza has been with the government service for around 20
years. On the other hand, a certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia was an employee of the NIA. Her
appointment was coterminous with a project but nonetheless she continued to work despite
completion of the said project.
Mrs. Mutia reported to the Philippine Constabulary (PC) authorities that petitioner refused to
attend to her appointment papers unless the latter were given some money. The PC officials
told her that steps were to be taken to entrap the petitioner. Two entrapment operations were
planned against petitioner. The first of which failed and on the second where the petitioner
was arrested despite her objections.
Issue: Whether the facts and circumstances of the case substantial to convict the accused
guilty of indirect bribery defined under Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held: The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised
Penal Code 10 is that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material
consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift
so offered and consider the same as his own property from then on, such as putting away the
gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any
other sign, circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to
conclude that the crime of indirect bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise will

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encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting within their
physical custody some gift, money or other property.
As the petitioner was admittedly handed the money, this explains why she was positive for
ultra-violet powder. It is possible that she intended to keep the supposed bribe money or may
have had no intention to accept the same. These possibilities exist but We are not certain.
Moral certainty, not absolute certainty, is needed to support a judgment of conviction, Moral
certainty is a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who
are to act upon a given matter. 14 Without this standard of certainty, it may not be said that the
guilt of the accused in a criminal proceeding has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS (ART. 212)

CHUA vs. NUESTRO (A.M. No. P-88-256)
Facts: Complainant Rina V. Chua filed an administrative charge against the respondent for
allegedly delaying the enforcement of the writ of execution in her favor after demanding and
getting from her the sum of 1500 pesos.On September 12, 1988, when the court issued a writ
of execution, Chua and counsel asked respondent Deputy-Sheriff Edgardo D. Nuestro to
immediately enforce the writ of execution against the defendant, and for the purpose, they
agreed to give 1000 pesos to the respondent. Respondent received the amount of 1000
pesos on September 12, 1988; however, the next day, they saw the respondent talking with
counsel of defendant and that the respondent was hesitantin proceeding to carry out the writ
of execution. Respondent even asked for a additionalamount of P500.00; consequently, in
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the afternoon of the same day, respondent went to the premises in question and when he
arrived there, but he was told by the judge not to proceed because a supersede as bond was
filed. Nevertheless, he found the premises locked, and at the insistence of the complainant,
they broke the padlock and entered portion B of the premises. Later, counsel for defendant
arrived and showed them the official receipt of payment of the supersede as bond and so he
discontinued the execution proceedings.
Issue: Whether Chua and counsel be charged of corruption of public official when they gave
to therespondent the amount of 1500 pesos in consideration of enforcing the writ of
execution.
Held: While we cannot fault the sheriff for his hesitance to immediately carry out the writ of
execution because the defendant still had time to file supersedeas bond to stay execution, we
find duly proved by preponderance of evidence that the respondent Deputy Sheriff Edgardo
D. Nuestro received the amount of P1,500.00 from the complainant and her lawyer as a
consideration for the performance of his work. This amount is distinct from the sheriffs fee
and expenses of execution and was not intended for that purpose. It was indeed a bribe
given and received by respondent deputy sheriff from the complainant.
MALVERSATION (ART. 217)

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TABUENA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (268 SCRA 332)

Facts: Through their separate petitions for review, Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta
appeal the Sandiganbayan decision dated October 12, 1990, as well as the Resolution dated
December 20. 1991 denying reconsideration, convicting them of malversation under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code.
There were three (3) criminal cases filed (nos. 11758, 11759 and 11760) since the total
amount of P55 Million was taken on three (3) separate dates of January, 1986. Tabuena
appears as the principal accused he being charged in all three (3) cases.
Gathered from the documentary and testimonial evidence are the following essential
antecedents:
Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president's
office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC), to which Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do it." About a week later, Tabuena received
from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum
dated January 8, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as MARCOS Memorandum) reiterating in
black and white such verbal instruction.
In obedience to President Marcos' verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the
help of Dabao and Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of
three (3) withdrawals (January 10, 16 and 31, 1986).
The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves,
"out of the ordinary" and "not based on the normal procedure".
With the rejection by the Sandiganbayan of their claim of good faith which ultimately led to
their conviction, Tabuena and Peralta now set forth a total of ten (10) errors committed by the
Sandiganbayan for this Court's consideration.
Issue: Whether or not the justifying circumstance of obedience to a lawful order be
appreciated in absolving the appellants in the crime charged?
Held: The Court reversed the ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Accused Tabuena and Peralta are
ACQUITTED. It is settled that good faith is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation
for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused.
Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS
Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly
comply with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than
done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior the former being then the President of
the Republic who unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the
MIAA and PNCC.
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Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person who acts in
obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose."
Tabuena had reasonable ground to believe that the President was entitled to receive the P55
Million since he was certainly aware that Marcos, as Chief Executive, exercised supervision
and control over government agencies. And the good faith of Tabuena in having delivered the
money to the President's office (thru Mrs. Gimenez), in strict compliance with the MARCOS
Memorandum, was not at all affected even if it later turned out that PNCC never received the
money. Thus, it has been said that: Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public
officer from the crime of malversation. The principles underlying all that has been said above
in exculpation of Tabuena equally apply to Peralta in relation to the P5 Million for which he is
being held accountable, i.e., he acted in good faith when he, upon the directive of Tabuena,
helped facilitate the withdrawal of P5 Million of the P55 Million of the MIAA funds.
In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the
signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the
presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful
for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor
for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Obedientia est legis essentia.
DAVALOS vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 145229)

Facts: On January 14, 1988, petitioner Davalos, as supply officer of the Office of the
ProvincialEngineer of Marinduque, received from the provincial cashier a cash advance of
18000 pesos forthe procurement of working tools for a certain NALGO project. Petitioner's
receipt of theamount is evidenced by his signature appearing in Disbursement Voucher No.
103-880-08.Two demand letters were received by the petitioner from the Provincial Treasurer
to submit aliquidation of the 18000 pesos cash advance. The petitioner failed to do so.
Issue: Whether the petitioner be held guilty of malversation of public funds; and- Whether the
return of the misappropriated amount extinguish the criminal liability of theoffender.
Held: The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
whichhe is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence thathe has put such missing fund or property to personal uses. There can be no
dispute about thepresence of the first three elements. Petitioner is a public officer occupying
the position of asupply officer at the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Marinduque. In that
capacity, hereceives money or property belonging to the provincial government for which he
is bound toaccount.In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or
reimbursement of fundsmisappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not
extinguish the criminal liability of the offender which, at most, can merely affect the accused's
civil liability and be considered amitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary
surrender.

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CHAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (G. R. No. 149613)

Facts: Petitioner Pamela Chan seeks a reversal of the Sandiganbayan decision of August
28, 2001 finding her guilty of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217.
A routine audit examination of the accountability of the petitioner was conducted. The audit
was conducted during the leave of the petitioner. A second audit was conducted, where the
auditor found a shortage in petitioners cash accountability. A demand letter was issued to the
petitioner to restitute the missing funds and explain the shortage.
Petitioner was thus indicted before the Regional Trial Court for Malversation of Public Funds.
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of malversation of public funds.
Held: The burden of proof that the subject audit reports contain errors sufficient to merit a reaudit lies with petitioner. What degree of error suffices, there is no hard and fast rule. While
COA Memorandum 87-511 dated October 20, 1987[13] (which, as reflected in the abovequoted Deputy Ombudsmans Order of July 28, 1997,[14] was cited by COA Director Alquizalas
when he opposed petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation before the
Ombudsman) recognizes that a re-audit may be conducted in certain instances, it does not
specify or cite what those instances are.
The auditor thus committed no error when she charged to petitioners account the shortage in
the collections actually done by Bas.
Petitioner, nonetheless, could have shown that she was not remiss in her supervision of Bas,
by way of rebutting the disputable presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
which states:
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which
he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall beprima facie evidence
that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
Petitioner, however, failed to do so. Not only did she omit to report the shortages of Bas to
the proper authority upon her discovery thereof; she even practically admitted to having
assisted Bas in covering up such shortages.
PEOPLE vs. TING LAN UY (G.R. NO. 157399)

Facts: Sometime in July 1990, accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., a public accountable officer,
being theTreasurer of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), and Ernesto Gamus and
Jaime Ochoa, bothpublic officers being the Manager of the Loan Management and Foreign
Exchange Division andForeign Trader Analyst, respectively, of NAPOCOR; and accused Raul
Gutierrez, a privateindividual being a foreign exchange trader, falsify or cause to be falsified
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the NAPOCOR'sapplication for managers checks with the Philippine National Bank in the
total amount of 183 805 291.25 pesos, intended for the purchase of US dollars from the
United Coconut PlantersBank, by inserting the account number of Raul Gutierrez SA-111121204-4, when in truth and infact that the Payment Instructions when signed by the
NAPOCOR authorities did not indicate theaccount number of Raul Gutierrez, thereby making
alteration or intercalation in a genuinedocument which changes its meaning, and with the use
of the said falsified commercialdocuments, accused succeeded in diverting, collecting and
receiving the said amount fromNAPOCOR, which they thereafter malverse, embezzle,
misappropriate, and convert to their ownpersonal use and benefit to the damage and
prejudice of the NAPOCOR.Gamus, Uy, and Ochoa pleaded not guilty. Gutierrez remained at
large. During pretrial, it wasfound that Gamus does not have any custody to public funds.
However, because of preponderance of evidence, he is civilly liable for the damages.
Issue: Whether Ochoa be held guilty of malversation thru falsification of commercial
document withoutviolating his constitutional right to due process and to be informed of the
accusation againsthim, when the information alleged willful and intentional commission of the
acts complained of,whereas the judgment found him guilty of inexcusable negligence
amounting to malice.
Held: The Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, finding Ochoa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of thecrime of malversation thru falsification of commercial document and that, on the
ground of reasonable doubt, accused Ting Lan Uy, Jr., was acquitted of Malversation of public
funds thrufalsification of commercial document.Malversation may be committed either
through a positive act of misappropriation of public fundsor property or passively through
negligence by allowing another to commit suchmisappropriation. The felony involves breach
of public trust, and whether it is committedthrough deceit or negligence,
the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty.Even when the information
charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation throughnegligence may still be
adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense.
ILLEGAL USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS (ART. 220)

TETANGCO vs. OMBUDSMAN (G.R. NO. 156427)
Facts: This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Order of public
respondentOmbudsman which dismissed the Complaint of petitioner Amando Tetangco
against privaterespondent Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., for violation of Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code(RPC).On March 8, 2002, petitioner filed his Complaint before the
Ombudsman alleging that on January 26, 2001, private respondent Mayor Atienza gave
P3,000 cash financial assistanceto the chairman and P1,000 to each tano of Barangay

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105, Zone 8, District I. Allegedly, onMarch 5, 2001, Mayor Atienza refunded P20,000 or the
total amount of the financialassistance from the City of Manila when such disbursement was
not justified as a lawfulexpense.In his Counter-Affidavit, Mayor Atienza denied the allegations
and sought the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for forum-shopping. He
asserted that it was theCommission on Elections (COMELEC), not the Ombudsman that has
jurisdiction over the caseand the same case had previously been filed before the COMELEC.
Furthermore, theComplaint had no verification and certificate of non-forum shopping. The
mayor maintainedthat the expenses were legal and justified, the same being supported by
disbursementvouchers, and these had passed prior audit and accounting. The Investigating
Officer recommended the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of evidenceand merit. The
Ombudsman adopted his recommendation. The Office of the Ombudsman, through its Overall Deputy Ombudsman, likewise deniedpetitioners motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether accused committed a violation of the anti-graft law.
Held: In this case, the action taken by the Ombudsman cannot be characterized asarbitrary,
capricious, whimsical or despotic. The Ombudsman found no evidence to proveprobable
cause. Probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
bycircumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that
theperson accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Here, the Complaintmerely alleged that the disbursement for financial assistance was neither
authorized by lawnor justified as a lawful expense. Complainant did not cite any law or
ordinance thatprovided for an original appropriation of the amount used for the financial
assistance citedand that it was diverted from the appropriation it was intended for. The
Complaint charges Mayor Atienza with illegal use of public funds. On this matter, Art.220 of
the Revised Penal Code provides:Art. 220. llegal use of public funds or property. Any public
officer who shall apply anypublic fund or property under his administration to any public use
other than that for which such fund or property were appropriated by law or ordinance shall
suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from one-half
to the total of thesum misapplied, if by reason of such misapplication, any damages or
embarrassment shallhave resulted to the public service. In either case, the offender shall also
suffer the penaltyof temporary special disqualification.If no damage or embarrassment to the
public service has resulted, the penalty shall be afine from 5 to 50 percent of the sum
misapplied. The elements of the offense, also known as technical malversation, are: (1) the
offender isan accountable public officer; (2) he applies public funds or property under
hisadministration to some public use; and (3) the public use for which the public funds
orproperty were applied is different from the purpose for which they were
originallyappropriated by law or ordinance. It is clear that for technical malversation to exist, it
isnecessary that public funds or properties had been diverted to any public use other thanthat
provided for by law or ordinance.
To constitute the crime, there must be a diversion of the funds from the purpose for which
they had been originally appropriated by law orordinance.
Patently, the third element is not present in this case.
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DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES (ART. 247)

PEOPLE V. PUEDAN (G.R. No. 139576)
Facts: Florencio Ilar, accompanied by his grandson, Reymark, went to the house of appellant
Luceno Tulo to buy a piglet. Luceno was fashioning out a mortar for pounding palay near his
house when Florencio and Reymark arrived. Florencio told Luceno that he wanted to buy a
piglet from him.
Appellant suddenly arrived and stabbed Florencio five times using a sharp pointed knife
locally known as plamingco. Terrified of what he witnessed, Luceno fled towards the house of
his neighbor. Young Reymark ran back to his parents house and told his mother, Erlinda,
what transpired.
Erlinda ran swiftly to Lucenos place but Florencio was already dead, bathed in his own blood
and lying by the side of the rice paddy. The body remained where it had fallen until the arrival
of the police later that day.
Leah, wife of appellant, admitted having an illicit relationship with Florencio. Their relationship
had been going on for two years and was known in their Barangay. In the morning of
February 21, 1995, Florencio came to their house, while she was breastfeeding her child, and
was looking for her husband.
Issue: Whether the accused is entitled to invoke the defense of death under exceptional
circumstances under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that by raising Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as his
defense, appellant admitted that he killed the victim.
By invoking this defense, appellant waives his right to the constitutional presumption of
innocence and bears the burden of proving the following: (1) that a legally married person (or
a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years of age and living with him), in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he or she kills any or
both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury in the act or
immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his
wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.
To satisfy this burden, appellant must prove that he actually surprised his wife and the victim
in flagrante delicto, and that he killed the man during or immediately thereafter.
However, all that appellant established was the victim's promiscuity, which was
inconsequential to the killing. What is important is that his version of the stabbing incident is
diametrically opposed to the convincing accounts of the prosecution witnesses.

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PEOPLE VS. ABARCA (G.R. NO. L-74433)

Facts: Accused Francisco Abarca has a wife who had an illicit relationship with Khingsley
Paul Koh which started when he was reviewing for the 1983 Bar exam in Manila and his wife
was left in Tacloban.
Upon reaching home, he found his wife Jenny and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual
intercourse. When the wife noticed the accused, she pushed her paramour who got his
revolver. The accused who was peeping above the build-in cabinet ran away.
He went to look for a firearm and got a rifle. He went back to his house but was not able to
find his wife and her paramour so he went to the mahjong session where Khingsley
hangouts. He found him playing and then he fired at him 3 times with rifle. Koh was hit.
Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying the adjacent room of the mahjong room were
hit as well. Koh died instantaneously but the spouses were able to survive due to time
medical assistance. Arnold was hit in the kidney. He was not able to work for 1 and months
because of his wounds and he was receiving P1000 as salary. He spent 15K for hospital
while his wife spent 1K for the same purpose.
The lower court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder and sentenced him to suffer death penalty. However, considering the
circumstances of the crime, the RTC believes that accused is deserving of executive
clemency, not of full pardon but of substantial if not radical reduction or commutation of his
death sentence.
Issue: Whether the trial court is correctly convicted the accused of complex crime of murder
with double frustrated murder instead of entering a judgment of conviction under Art. 247
Held: The accused is entitled to the defense of death under exceptional circumstance under
Art. 247 of RPC. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour
in the act of illicit copulation.
The foregoing elements of Art. 247 of RPC are present in this case:
legally married surprises spouse in the act of sex with another person; and
that he kills any or both of them in the act or immediately after.
Although an hour has passed between the sexual act and the shooting of Koh, the shooting
must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused.
Articvle 247 only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But
the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse and must not have
been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's
rage.
Regarding the physical injuries sustained by the Amparado spouses, the Supreme Court held
that the accused is only liable for the crime of less serious physical injuries thru simple
negligence or imprudence under 2nd paragraph of Article 365, and not frustrated murder. The
accused did not have the intent to kill the spouses. Although as a rule, one committing an
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offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, the rule presupposes that the act done
amounts to a felony. In this case, the accused was not committing murder when he
discharged rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not
murder.
PEOPLE V. OYANIB (G.R. Nos. 130634-35)

Facts: Accused Manolito Oyanib and Tita Oyanib were married on February 3, 1979 and had
two children, Desilor and Julius.
In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita separated, with Manolito keeping
custody of their two children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house of Edgardo
Lladas, not far from the place where her family lived.
At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while Edgardo and his family were
watching TV at the sala located at the ground floor of their house, they heard a commotion
coming from the second floor rented by Tita. The commotion and the noise lasted for quite
some time. When it died down, Edgardo went upstairs to check.
Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and sprawled on the floor. He saw
Manolito stabbing Jesus Esquierdo while sitting on the latter's stomach. Jesus was wearing a
pair of long black pants. When Edgardo asked Manolito what he was doing, accused told
Edgardo not to interfere.
Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police. Meanwhile, the neighbors brought
Tita to the hospital. She died on the way to the hospital.
Accused admitted the killings. However, he argued that he killed them both under the
exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue: Whether the accused is entitled to invoke the exceptional circumstances provided in
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
Held: The Supreme Court acquitted the accused of the crime charged, finding that the
accused is entitled to the exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code.
At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her paramour. He invoked Article 247 of
the Revised Penal Code as an absolutory and an exempting cause. "An absolutory cause is
present 'where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment
there is no penalty imposed.'"
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following essential elements for such a
defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
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intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his
wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse
The accused was able to prove all the foregoing elements.
There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial fact that
accused must convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in
the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual
intercourse. The accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw his wife and
Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused
stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when
she reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as
well several times.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended spouse the
opportunity to avail himself of Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People
v. Wagas:
"The vindication of a Man's honor is justified because of the scandal an
unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to
chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is
so severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in
flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only with great caution so much so
that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or
immediately thereafter."
PEOPLE V. SABILUL (G.R. No. L-3765)

Facts: In the afternoon of September 14, 1949, while appellant Moro Sabilul was plowing in
the vicinity of his house and, he asked his wife, Mora Mislayan, for some water.
The latter proceeded towards the creek, but no sooner had she arrived at the place than the
appellant heard a noise.
This caused the appellant to rush to the scene where he found Moro Lario wrestling with and
on top of Mora Mislayan who was shouting "don't, don't".
Whereupon, picking up a pira (a Yakan bladed weapon) which he noticed nearby, the
appellant slashed Moro Lario on the right side of the face.
Appellants wife ran away upon appellant's arrival.

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Moro Lario also attempted to flee, but he was overtaken and slashed a few more times by the
appellant, after which Moro Lario fell and died.
Issue: Whether the defendant is guilty of murder for killing his wifes paramour
Held: The Supreme Court found appellant had killed Moro Lario in actual adultery with
appellant's wife, and thus was sentenced to destierro under article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The murder was committed while the deceased Lario was in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with appellant's wife, Mora Mislayan.
In the main it is argued that, if appellant's wife was really forced by Moro Lario, she would not
have run away upon appellant's arrival.
PEOPLE V. GELAVER (G.R. NO. 95357)

Facts: Appellant was married to Victoria Pacinabao, with whom he begot four children. They
lived together at their conjugal home until July 3, 1987 when she abandoned her family to live
with her paramour. He did not know the name of his wife's paramour nor the name of the
owner of the house where his wife and her paramour had lived together.
On March 24, 1988, after appellant was informed by his daughter that his wife and paramour
were living at a house in front of the Sto. Nio Catholic Church, appellant immediately
repaired to that place. Upon entering the house, he saw his wife lying on her back and her
paramour on top of her, having sexual intercourse. The paramour took a knife placed on top
of the bedside table and attacked appellant. The appellant was able to wrest possession of
the knife and then used it against the paramour, who evaded the thrusts of the appellant by
hiding behind the victim. Thus, it was the victim who received the stab intended for the
paramour.
Appellant also stabbed his wife because his mind had been "dimmed" or overpowered by
passion and obfuscation by the sight of his wife having carnal act with her paramour.
Issue: Whether the appellant can invoke the exceptional circumstance under Art. 247
Held: Before Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code can be operative, the following requisites
must be present:
1)
That a legally married person or a parent surprises his spouse or his
daughter, the latter under 18 years of age and living with him, in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person.
2)
That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of
them any serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter.
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3)
That he has not promoted or facilitated that prostitution of his wife or
daughter, or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse."
Implicit in this exceptional circumstance is that the death caused must be the proximate result
of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of
infidelity.
In this case, the appellant failed to prove that he caught his wife and the latters paramour in
the act of sexual intercourse. There are several contradictions in appellant's testimony. It is
contrary to human nature appellant's claims that he went to confront the paramour of his wife
unarmed and that he never learned the name of the paramour inspite of the fact that his wife,
allegedly, had been living with the paramour in the same town for almost a year before the
incident. Furthermore, as noted by the Solicitor General, the natural thing for a person to do
under the circumstances was to report to the police the reason for killing his wife. However, in
this case, appellant failed to inform the police that he killed his wife. Therefore, appellant is
guilty of parricide for killing his wife.
MURDER/HOMICIDE (ARTS. 248, 249)

PEOPLE V. ENGUITO (G.R. NO. 128812)
Facts: Appellant Thadeos Enguito bumped and hit the motoreala which Wilfredo Achumbre
was riding. As a consequence, his driver Felipe Requirme and his wife Rosita Requirme
sustained bodily injuries while Achumbre was able to run towards the railings at Marcos
Bridge.
However, appellant with intent to kill Achumbre, immediately rammed and hit the latter with
his driven vehicle cutting the latters right leg. Unsatisfied, appellant further ran over
Achumbre thereby causing mortal harm which was the direct and immediate cause of
instantaneous death of the latter.
Appellant was charged with murder with multiple less serious physical injuries.
Issue: Whether appellant is guilty of murder by use of a motor vehicle
Held: The Supreme Court held that appellant is guilty of complex crime of murder. The killing
of Wilfredo Achumbre was attended with the aggravating circumstance of by use of motor
vehicle.
The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the same was perpetrated by
means thereof.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Appellant's claim that he merely used the motor vehicle, Kia Ceres van, to stop the victim
from escaping is belied by his actuations. By his own admission, he testified that there was a
police mobile patrol near the crossing. Moreover, accused-appellant already noticed the
deceased trying to jump out of the motorela but he still continued his pursuit. He did not stop
the vehicle after hitting the deceased. Accused-appellant further used the vehicle in his
attempt to escape. He was already more than 1 kilometer away from the place of the incident
that he stopped his vehicle upon seeing the police mobile patrol which was following him.
Moreover, accused-appellant already noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the motorela
but he still continued his pursuit. Accused-appellant was allegedly "still very angry" while he
was following, bumping and pushing the motorela which was in front of him. Clearly, accusedappellant's state of mind after he was mauled and before he crushed Achumbre to death was
such that he was still able to act reasonably. In fact, he admitted having seen a police mobile
patrol nearby but instead, he chose to resort to the dastardly act which resulted in the death
of Achumbre and in the injuries of the spouses Requerme.
PEOPLE V. WHISENHUNT (G.R. NO. 123391)

Facts: Elsa Santos Castillo was brought to accused-appellants condominium unit. The
following day, accused-appellants housemaid Demetrio Ravelo was looking for her kitchen
knife and accused-appellant gave it to her, saying that it was in his bedroom. The accusedappellant and Ravelo collected the dismembered body parts of Elsa and disposed of Elsas
cadaver and personal belongings in Bataan.
Ravelo, after being convinced by his wife, reported the incident to the authorities. The police
and the NBI agents found the mutilated body parts a female cadaver, which was later
identified as Elsa, where Demetrio pointed. The hair specimens found inside accusedappellants bathroom and bedroom showed similarities with hair taken from Elsas head, and
that the bloodstains found on accused-appellants bedspread, covers and in the trunk of his
car, all matched Elsas blood type.
Accused appellant was charged with the crime of murder. The lower court convicted him as
charged and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether accused-appellant is guilty of murder
Held: The trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder,
qualified by outraging and scoffing at the victims person or corpse. This circumstance was
both alleged in the information and proved during the trial.
The mere decapitation of the victim's head constitutes outraging or scoffing at the corpse of
the victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
In this case, accused-appellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body like
pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road in
the countryside, leaving them to rot on the ground. Therefore, accused-appellant is guilty of
murder.
PEOPLE VS. MALLARI (G.R. NO. 145993)

Facts: Joseph Galang was watching a basketball game at the barangay basketball court
when appellant Rufino Mallari and his brothers attempted to stab him. Galang ran away but
appellant pursued him with the truck. Appellant continued chasing Galang until the truck ran
over the latter, which caused his instantaneous death.
Appellant was charged with the crime of murder, qualified by use of motor vehicle.
The lower court convicted appellant guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of death.
Hence this automatic review.
Issue: WON appellant is guilty of murder qualified by means of motor vehicle
Held:
Yes.The Supreme Court held that appellant is guilty of murder qualified by means of motor
vehicle. Appellant deliberately bumped Galang with the truck he was driving. The evidence
shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing Joseph. Upon catching up with him,
Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear
that the truck was the means used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another by means of motor
vehicle is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder. The
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery, which were alleged in the information, were not proved. What
was proved was the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender through the testimonies of
Rufino and Myrna, which were not rebutted by the prosecution. In view of the absence of an
aggravating circumstance and the presence of one mitigating circumstance, reclusion
perpetua, not death, should be the penalty to be imposed on Rufino.
PEOPLE VS. TEEHANKEE (G.R. Nos. 111206-08)
Facts: Jussi Leino invited Roland Chapman, Maureen Hutlman and and other friends for a
party at his house. They later proceeded to a pub and returned to Leino's house to eat.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
After a while, Hultman requested Leino to take her home. Chapman tagged along. When they
entered the village, Hultman asked Leino to stop the car because she wanted to walk the rest
of the way to her house. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and
listened to the radio.
Leino and Haultman started walking on the sidewalk when appellant Claudio Teehankee, Jr.,
alighted from his car, approached them and asked: "Who are you? (Show me your) I.D."
Leino took out his plastic wallet, and handed to accused his I.D. Chapman saw the incident
and inquired what was going on. Accused pushed Chapman, pulled out a gun and fired at
him. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave
Chapman alone. Appellant then pointed his gun at Leino. Haultman became hysterical and
started screaming for help. Appellant ordered them to sit on the sidewalk. Leino was later hit
on the upper jaw. Leino heard another shot and saw Haultman fall beside him. He lifted his
head to see what was happening and saw appellant return to his car and drive away.
Appellant was charged with murder.
Issue: Whether appellant is guilty of murder qualified by treachery
Held: The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of
Chapman, but found it present in the wounding of Leino and Hultman.
Absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant should only be held liable for Homicide for the
shooting and killing of Chapman. The shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left
him with no chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that
appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the
accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. It appeared that appellant acted
on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each other.
The time between the initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The
shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous impulse on the part of
appellant rather than a deliberate act of will. Mere suddenness of the attack on the victim
would not, by itself, constitute treachery.
However, as to the wounding of Leino and the killing of Hultman, the Supreme Court held that
treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. After shooting Chapman, appellant
ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Haultman became hysterical and wandered to the side
of appellant's car. When appellant went after her, Haultman moved around his car and tried to
put some distance between them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Haultman and
ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for
mercy, the two were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two
victims in a completely defenseless position before shooting them. There was an appreciable
lapse of time between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman a
period which appellant used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of
the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated by the trial court
against appellant insofar as the killing of Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO (G.R. NO. 128900)

Facts: An amiable game of cards that started the night before turned into tragic event that
resulted in the fatal shooting of Arnulfo Tuadles by Alberto Antonio. The victim, Arnulfo
Tuadles, a former professional basketball player, succumbed instantaneously to a single
gunshot wound right between the eyes, inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a .9mm
caliber Beretta pistol.
Antonio was charged with murder.
Issue: WON appellant is guilty of murder qualified by treachery
Held: No. The Supreme Court held that appellant Alberto Antonio is liable for the crime of
homicide, not murder. There was no treachery in this case. There is no basis for the trial
court's conclusion "that accused Antonio consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of
attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself." It is not
only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a conscious and
deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose. Since the sudden shooting of
Tuadles was preceded by a heated verbal altercation between Tuadles and appellant
Antonio, then it cannot be concluded that the shooting was committed with treachery. The
evidence clearly shows that the incident was an impulse killing. Consequently, Antonio can
only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.
PEOPLE VS. MANERO (G.R. NOS. 86883-85)

Facts: On 11 April 1985, the Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, along with
Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao, were
inside the eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades. They were conferring with three others of
a plan to liquidate a number of suspected communist sympathizers.
Among their
targets are: Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and
Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having links
with the communist movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is
the complaining witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay
leader, while the others are simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the
conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter
Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead. They later on nailed a
placard near the carinderia bearing the names of their intended victims.
Later, at 4:00 pm, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants, all
with assorted firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim, which
was also in the vicinity of Deocades'carinderia. After a heated confrontation, Edilberto drew
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
his revolver and fired at the forehead of Bantil who was able to parry and was hit at the lower
portion of his ear. Bantil tried to run but he was again fired upon by Edilberto. Though Bantil
was able to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo Gomez, Norberto Jr. ordered his
men to surround the house so that Bantil would die of hemorrhage. Moments later, while
Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him with a burst of gunfire from his M-14
Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with both hands clenched at the back of his
head. This again drew boisterous laughter and ridicule from the dreaded desperados. At 5:00
o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of
Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleago towed the motorcycle
outside to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some
fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and
rejoiced. Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter
simply stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked
the priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon
ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash,
Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands
clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to
kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3)
times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr.
Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the
terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their
comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible
assistance.
From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleago
and Roger Bedao appealed with respect to the cases for Murder and Attempted Murder. The
Manero brothers as well as Rodrigo Espia did not appeal; neither did Norberto Manero, Jr., in
the Arson case. Consequently, the decision as against them already became final.
Issue: Whether or not the appellants can be exculpated from criminal liability on the basis of
defense of alibi which would establish that there is no conspiracy to kill.
Held: The court did not appreciate the defense of alibi of the Lines brother, who according to
them, were in a farm some one kilometre away from the crime scene. The court held that It is
axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some other
place but that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission. There is no physical impossibility where the accused can be at
the crime scene in a matter of 15-20 minutes by jeep or tricycle. More important, it is wellsettled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the authors of
the crime by the prosecution witnesses. In this case, there were two eyewitnesses who
positively identified the accused.
Contrary to the claim of the Lines brothers, there is a community of design to commit the
crime. Based on the findings of the lower court, they are not merely innocent bystanders but
in fact were vital cogs in the murder of Fr. Fuvali. They performed overt acts to ensure the
success of the commission of the crimes and the furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
While accused-appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective
action showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and
decide to commit it. It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every
act constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed
where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present
While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter
Geremias whom the group targetted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good
substitute in the murder as he was an Italian priest. The accused agreed that in case they fail
to kill the intended victims, it will be suffice to kill another priest as long as the person is also
Italian priest.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
DEATH CAUSED IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY (ART. 251)

PEOPLE vs. UNLAGADA (G.R. NO. 141080)
Facts: ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUE alias Lapad " was charged and subsequently
convicted by thecourt a quo and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the
heirs of thevictim P100,000.00 as moral damages,P50,000.00 as temperate damages,
andanother P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.In the evening Danilo Laurel left his house
togetherwith Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to attend a public dance at Rizal St.,
Mag-asawang Taytay, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. Two (2) hours later, or around 11:00
o'clockthat evening, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to their
personalnecessities outside the dance hall. Once outside, they decided to have a drink and
bought two(2) bottles of Gold Eagle beer at a nearby store.Not long after, Danilo, halfway on
his first bottle, left to look for a place to relievehim. According to Edwin, he was only about
three (3) meters from Danilo who was relievinghimself when a short, dark bearded man
walked past him, approached Danilo and stabbed himat the side. Danilo retaliated by striking
his assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost simulitaneously, a group of men
numbering about seven, ganged up on Danilo and hit him with assorted weapons, i.e.,
bamboo poles, stones and pieces of wood. Edwin, who waspetrified, could only watch
helplessly as Danilo was being mauled and overpowered by hisassailants. Danilo fell to the
ground and died before he could be given any medical assistance.
Issue: Whether the testimony of prosecution witness was credible; andWhether the lower
court is right in convicting the accused of murder qualified by treachery andnot death in a
tumultuous affray.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held: Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not
composinggroups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally,quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the
course of theaffray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased, but theperson or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified,
such person orpersons shall be punished by prision mayor. Verily, the attack was qualified by
treachery. Thedeceased was relieving himself, fully unaware of any danger to his person
when suddenly theaccused walked past witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and
stabbed him at theside. There was hardly any risk at all to accused-appellant; the attack was
completely withoutwarning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no chance to put up
any defense. Thepenalty for murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal in itsmaximum period to death. Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance,
the penaltyshould be imposed in its medium period which, as correctly imposed by the court
a quo, is reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE vs. MARAMARA (G.R. NO. 110994)

Facts: The case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate
convicting theaccused CresencianoMaramara of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusionperpetua and to pay the victims heirs the amount of P10,000 as medical
and funeral expensesand P50,000 as moral damages. The accused challenged the findings
of the trial court in order tosecure an acquittal or, at the least, being held liable only for the
death of MiguelitoDonato in atumultuous affray as defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal
Code.The information against the accused alleged that in the evening of November 18, 1991,
inBarangay Calpi, Claveria, Masbate, the accused, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation,treachery and taking advantage of nighttime, assaulted and shot with a hand
gun MiguelitoDonato and hit the latter on the chest, thereby inflicted the wound which caused
hisd eath.
Issue: Whether accused is guilty of death caused in tumultuous affray instead of murder.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held: There was no merit in accuseds position that he should be held liable only for death
caused intumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code. It was in such
situation thataccused came at the scene and joined the fray purportedly to pacify the
protagonists whenMiguelito attacked him causing four stab wounds in different parts of his
body. Assuming that arumble or a free-for-all fight occurred at the benefit dance, Article 251 of
the Revised Codecannot apply because prosecution witnesses Ricardo and RegarderDonato
positively identifiedthe accused as Miguelitos killer. While the accused himself suffered
multiple stab wounds, whichat first, may lend verity to his claim that a rumble has ensued and
that Miguelito inflicted uponhim these wounds, the evidence was inadequate to consider them
as mitigating circumstancebecause defenses version stood discredited in light of the more
credible version of theprosecution as to the circumstances surrounding Miguelitos death.
However, the Supreme Courtdid not subscribe to trial courts appreciation of treachery, which
was discussed only in thedispositive portion of the decision and which was based solely on
the fact that the accused useda firearm in killing the victim Miguelito. In the absence of any
convincing proof that the accusedconsciously and deliberately adopted means by which he
committed the crime in order to ensureits execution, the Supreme Court resolved the doubt in
favor of the accused. And since treacherywas not adequately proved, the accused was
convicted of homicide only. The Supreme Courtmodified the judgment appealed from and
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, for the killing of MiguelitoDonato without the
attendance of any modifying circumstance. Accordingly, the Courtsentenced the accused to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor, asminimum, to seventeen
years, and four months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all itsaccessory penalties,
and to pay the heirs of Migueltio in the amount of P10,000 as actualdamages and P50,000 as
death indemnity.
SISON VS. PEOPLE (G.R. NOS. 108280-83)

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Facts: On July 27, 1986, in support to the Marcos government, Marcos loyalists had a rally at
Luneta. At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden.
There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos,
jogging around the fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and
Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then she
continued jogging around the fountain chanting. A few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was
arrested by the police. However, a commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette
vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato took
off his yellow shirt. He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of
persons shouting. The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be
Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried
to extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on him and pummelled him with
fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang,
an electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he
could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing
him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed
to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo
away from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man
boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed Salcedo twice on the
head and kicked him even as he was already fallen. Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel
Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and ear. Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo
on his nape. Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim again.
Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell.
Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he
tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed him. 6 Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the
victim but did not notice what he did.
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until
Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of
a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission.
So they took him to the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim
and offered their respective alibis.The trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison,
Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the
crime of murder qualified by treachery. On appeal, the CA modified the decision of the trial
court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except
for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide
Issue: Whether accused are guilty of violation of Art. 251 of the RPC.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held: Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of conspiracy
among the principal accused and in convicting them of murder qualified by abuse of superior
strength, not death in tumultuous affray. A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel
occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the
course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained.
Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. When, while several persons,
not composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused
and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it
cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or
persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or
persons shall be punished by prison mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the
deceased, the penalty ofprision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall have used violence upon the
person of the victim.
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be several persons; (2)
that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting
and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled and
assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (4) someone was killed
in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or
who used violence can be identified. 62
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they
engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or
wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. 63
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group
and one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the
rallyists, but this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It
was only a while later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked
on one defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches,
kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was
there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
DISCHARGE OF FIREARM (ART. 254)

DADO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 131421)
Facts: The present case is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
thedecision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Kudarat finding the Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso guilty of the crime of homicide.
Theinformation charged both Dado and Eraso with murder allegedly committed by said the
accused,armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, and
shotSilvestre Balinas thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which caused his
instantdeath.The antecedent facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses Alfredo Balinas and
Rufo Alga wereas follows: On the night of May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat
Police Station formedthree teams to intercept some cattle rustlers. The Team composed of
the petitioner SPO4Geronimo Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, AflredoBalinas
and Rufo Alga waitedbehind a large dike. Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga, who were both
armed with M14 armaliterifles, were positioned between the petitioner, who was armed with a
caliber .45 pistol, andaccused Francisco Eraso, who was carrying an M16 armalite rifle. At
around 11:00 of that sameevening, the team saw somebody approaching at a distance of 50
meters. When he was about 5 meters away from the team, Alfredo Balinas noticed that
Francisco Eraso was making somemovements. Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas
could beam his flashlight, Eraso firedhis M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man.
Immediately thereafter, petitioner fired a singleshot from his .45 caliber pistol. The victim

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
turned out to be Silvestre Butsoy Balinas, thenephew of Alfredo Balinas. Eraso embraced
Alfredo Balinas to show his repentance for his deed.
Issue: Whether accused is guilty of homicide instead of illegal discharge of firearm only.
Held: In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that
conspiracyattended the commission of the crime. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner
Dado andaccused Eraso conspired in killing the deceased, thus, it is no longer necessary to
establish whocaused the fatal wound in as much as conspiracy makes the act of one
conspirator the act of all.Although the agreement need not be directly proven, circumstantial
evidence of such agreementmust nonetheless be convincingly shown. In the case at bar,
petitioner and accused Erasosseemingly concerted and almost simultaneous acts were more
of a spontaneous reaction ratherthan the result of a common plan to kill the victim. Evidently,
the prosecution failed to provethat the metallic fragments found in the fatal wound of the
victim were particles of a .45 caliberbullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by
petitioner. Hence, the Supreme Courtset aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
the conviction of petitioner for the crimeof homicide and acquitted the petitioner of the crime
charged on the ground of reasonabledoubt. A new decision was entered finding petitioner
Geronimo Dado guilty of the crime of illegaldischarge of firearm and sentenced him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years
and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, asmaximum.
UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION (ART. 257)

PEOPLE vs. GENOVES (G.R. NO. 42819)
Facts: Crispin Genoves and deceased Soledad Rivera were laborers in adjoining cane fields.
Riveraclaimed that the yoke of the plow which the accused was repairing belonged to her and
tried totake it by force. The accused struck her with his fist causing her to fall to the ground.
She got upand returned to the quarrel where she received another fist blow on the left cheek
causing her
tofall again to the ground. Immediately after the incident, the deceased proceeded to themuni
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
cipal building, she complained to the chief of police of pain in the abdomen as she
waspregnant at the time. For a few days, the deceased suffered from hemorrhage and pain
whichresulted in the painful and difficult premature delivery of one of the twin babies that she
waycarrying, but the other baby could be delivered. Both babies were dead.Genoves was
convictedin the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros of the complex crime of homicide
withabortion. An appeal was made by the accused.
Issue: Should the accused be held guilty for the death of the victim and her unborn child?
Held: It is generally known that a fall is liable to cause premature delivery, and the evidence
shows acomplete sequel of events from the assault to her death. The accused must be held
responsiblefor the natural consequences of his act.However, the mitigating circumstances of
lack of intentto commit so grave a wrong as that inflicted and provocation are present, as the
offended partyby force induced the accused to use force on his part.The abortion in this case
is unintentionalabortion denounced by Article 257 of the Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE vs. SALUFRANIA (G.R. NO. L-508804)

Facts: Before the court is information, dated 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was
chargedbefore the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch I, with the complex
crime of parricide with intentional abortion, committed that on or about the 3rd day of
December, 1974,in Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of the HonorableCourt the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, andfeloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on MARCIANA ABUYOSALUFRANIA, thelawfully wedded wife of the accused, by then and there boxing and
stranging her, causing uponher injuries which resulted in her instantaneous death; the
accused likewise did then and therewillfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause the death of the
child while still in its maternalwomb,thereby committing both crimes of PARRICIDE and
INTENTIONAL ABORTION as to the damageand prejudice of the heirs of said woman and
child in the amount as the Honorable Court shallassess.
Issue:Should Filomeno Salufrania be held liable for for the complex crime of parricide withuni
ntentional abortion?
Held: The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused
FilomenoSalufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of parricide wi
thunintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence that
causedthe death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein
accusedupon his victim.It has also been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was
seven (7) to eight (8) monthspregnant when she was
killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by herhusband accused; and (c)
that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together withthe foetus in her womb.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
MUTILATION (ART. 262)

AGUIRRE vs. SECRETARY (G.R. NO. 170723)
FACTS: On June 11,2002 petitioner Gloria Aguirre instituted a criminal complaint for the
violation of Revised Penal Codeparticularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic
Act No.7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz,Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and
several John/Jane Doe alleging that John/Jane Doe upon the apparent instructions
of respondents Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz and Pedro Aguirre actually scouted, prospected,
facilitated solicited and/or procured the medical services of respondents Dr. Pascual and Dr.
Agatep on the intended mutilation via bilateralvasectomy of Laureano Aguirre.Olondriz denied
that the prospected, scouted, facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement
mutilatedor abused his common law brother, Laureano Aguirre. She further contends that his
common law brother went through avasectomy procedure but that does not amount to
mutilation.Dr. Agatep contends that the complainant has no legal personality to file a case
since she is only a common lawsister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the person
of Pedro Aguirre. He further contends that Vasectomy does not inany way equate to
castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an organ in the context of law
andmedicine.The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged did not amount to
mutilation, the vasectomy operationdid not deprived Larry of his reproductive organ.Gloria
Aguirre then appealed to the Secretary of the DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor dismissed the
petition statingthat the Secretary of Justice may motu propio dismiss outright the petition if
there is no showing of any reversible error inthe questioned resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are liable for the crime of mutilation
HELD: No, the court held that Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code provides that Art. 262.
Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
anyperson who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or partially,
of some essential organ for reproduction. Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished
by prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods. A straightforward scrutiny of the
above provision shows that the elements of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art.262 of
the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs
necessary for generation;and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that
is, to deprive the offended party of some essentialorgan for reproduction. According to the
public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined
andpenalized above, i.e., [t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic)
Larry of his reproductive organ,which is still very much part of his physical self.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (ART. 266)

LI vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 127962)
Facts: One morning in April 1993, street brawl ensued between Christopher Arugay and his
neighbor, Kingstone Li. Arugay sustained multiple stab wounds causing his death while Li
sustainedhack wounds on the head and contusions. Two different versions of the incident
were presented. According to the first version, Arugay was watching the television with his
sisters Cristy and Baby Jane and Tan, boyfriend of Baby Jane, when they heard a noise
caused by Li and Sangalang who were then bathing naked outside their house. Enraged,
Arugay went outside and confronted the two which eventually ended up with Li striking
Arugay with a baseball bat on the head and later stabbing him with a knife. Sangalang was
also seen stabbing the victim at least once with a knife. The second version, offered by Li
however presented that Li was watching the television with a friend when Arugay and his
girlfriend hurled objects and kicked the gate of his house. Upon seeing that Arugay has
gotten himself two kitchen knives, Li armed himself with a baseball bat. Li managed to evade
Arugays thrusts and successfully hit him with the bat on the shoulder with which Arugay ran
back to his house and emerged carrying a bolo. Arugay tried to hit Li with the bolo but Li
raised his right hand to protect himself but Arugay was able to hit him on his right temple,
right wrist, and right shoulder. Li passed out. Sangalang was also present when the incident
started. Arugay died of multiple stab wounds while Li was brought to the hospital.
RTC charged Li with homicide and ruled the existence of conspiracy although concluded that
it was Sangalang, and not Li, who stabbed Arugay. Court of Appeals affirmed RTCs decision
but opined that since it has not been established which wound was inflicted by either one of
them, they should both be held liable and each one is guilty of homicide, whether or not a
conspiracy exists.
Issue: Whether or not there was conspiracy between Li and Sangalang. If there is not, what
acts are imputable to Li.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held: No, RTC erred in concluding an implied conspiracy. The facts that Li and Sangalang
were in the same house at the same time; and that they both armed themselves before going
out to meet Arugay are not in themselves sufficient to establish conspiracy.
Sangalang stabbed Arugay only after petitioner had become unconscious. Before that point,
even as Li struck Arugay with a baseball bat, it was not proven that Li had asked for, or
received, any assistance from Sangalang. Based on these circumstances, Sangalang and Li
had not acted in concert to commit the offense. After Arugay had struck hack wounds on Li
and as Li lay incapacitated, possibly unconscious, it remained highly doubtful whether he had
any further participation in the brawl. At that point, Sangalang, emerged and stabbed Arugay
to death. In fact, the stabbing of Arugay could very well be construed as a spur-of-themoment reaction by Sangalang upon seeing that his friend Li was struck by Arugay. It cannot
be assumed that Sangalang did what he did with the knowledge or assent of Li, much more
in coordination with each other. It was also proved that Li, already weak and injured, could
possibly inflict fatal stab wounds on Arugay.
Absent any clear showing of conspiracy, Kingstone Li cannot answerfor the crime of Eduardo
Sangalang. Petitioner Kingstone Li is ACQUITTED of the charge of Homicide for lack of
evidence beyond reasonable doubt. However, he is found GUILTY of the crime of SLIGHT
PHYSICAL INJURIES.
RAPE (ART. 266-A)

PEOPLE VS. SALALIMA (G.R. NOS. 137969-71)
Facts: 15 year old Miladel Q. Escudero was left alone by her mother one day when the latter
went to work as a manicurist. She was left with her younger sister, Lovelymae, whom she
took care of constantly while her mother was away at times. That same morning, the accused
arrived and ate breakfast at their house, and afterwards went to attend to some work up in
the mountains. Miladel then went to her sisters room to get some sleep. She was awakened
by the presence of the appellant, who managed to have sexual intercourse with the victim
after threatening to kill her and holding a bolo to her throat. After satisfying his lust, appellant
walked away, warning again complainant not to reveal what had happened, otherwise he will
kill her and her mother. Complainant recalled that she was also sexually abused by appellant
the following month that year. It took place in the kitchen of their house while her mother was
in the poblacion. Another assault was repeated that same year. The victim was not able to
report the three incidents to the authorities and to her relatives since the accused threatened
to kill her and her family.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
The victim also testified that the sexual assaults were all committed by appellant during
daytime. When asked if the penis of appellant was able to penetrate her vagina, she frankly
declared that in the first encounter only half of the penis penetrated her vagina but in the
second and third incidents, appellants entire penis penetrated her vagina.
One time, the victims mother had an altercation with appellant. The quarrel became quite
serious that appellant said something about his relation with complainant by telling Erenita,
Ang imong anak dugay na nakong nakuha, siguro buntis na (I have had sexual intercourse
with your daughter a long time ago, maybe she is already pregnant). When confronted by
her mother, Miladel revealed the sexual abuses done to her by appellant. Asked why she did
not reveal these abuses, complainant told her mother that appellant had threatened her.
Erenita immediately brought complainant to the doctor for medical examination. Assisted by
her mother, lodged complaints for rape against appellant. Afterwards, appellant was arrested
and detained. After trial, the accused was convicted of the crime of rape.
Issue: Whether or not the informations are defective because the date and time of
commission of the crimes are not stated with particularity.
Held: The Supreme Court overruled this argument and affirmed the guilt of the accused,
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make
the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when
the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact
of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as
near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient.
In this case, although the indictments did not state with particularity the dates when the
sexual assaults took place, we believe that the allegations therein that the acts were
committed sometime during the month of March 1996 or thereabout, sometime during the
month of April 1996 or thereabout, sometime during the month of May 1996 or thereabout
substantially apprised appellant of the crimes he was charged with since all the elements of
rape were stated in the informations. As such, appellant cannot complain that he was
deprived of the right to be informed of the nature of the cases filed against him. Accordingly,
appellants assertion that he was deprived of the opportunity to prepare for his defense has
no leg to stand on.
PEOPLE VS. LOYOLA (G.R. NO. 126026)

Facts: 16 year old Stecy Gatilogo took a trip from Cebu City to visit her grandmother in
Lanao del Sur. It was during this trip that she saw and became acquainted with accused
Mauricio Loyola, a bus conductor, who seemed to take special interest in her. He saw to it
that he could sit by her side after issuing bus tickets to the other passengers, and striking a
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
conversation with her. The bus was not able to reach its destinationthat day because the road
became too slippery for the bus to continue. As she was about to get down from the bus,
Loyola blocked her way and advised her not to go anymore as it was getting dark. Stecy was
prevailed upon to stay in the bus. The bus turned around and traveled back to the nearest
town known as Kalilangan, Bukidnon. At about seven-thirty, the bus parked at the terminal,
where she was invited by the accused to have dinner at a local carinderia. Afterwards, the
two went back to the bus to get some rest.
At about midnight, Stecy was startled when she felt that someone had touched her breast.
When the person told her not to shout, Stecy recognized accused by his voice. Stecy begun
to cry and became frightened when accused threatened to kill her if she would cry for help.
She found herself unable to rise because her arm had stuck into a small gap between the
seat and seat armrest during her sleep. With her feet touching the floor, accused rode on top
of her and begun to open the button and zipper of her pants. Stecy's pleas were unheaded.
With one arm trapped by the seat armrest, Stecy's resistance was futile. Accused drew down
her pants and panty, spread her legs and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.
Afterwards, the accused stood up and said "keep quiet, anyway it was already finished". Then
he sat by Stecy and tried to comfort and reassure her even as she continued to sob. Because
her own shirt had been badly soiled, she agreed to the offer of the accused to put on his shirt.
The next morning, the bus with only Stecy as its passenger, The driver decided to return to
Cagayan de Oro City instead. When the bus passed by Pangantucan, Stecy got off at her
mother's house. Stecy did not have the heart to report the incident to her mother. However, a
close friend noticed that the victim was distraught and managed to get the whole story of the
incident; the friend reported the incident to her brother, who was a policeman. Maribel and
her grandmother with other relatives brought Stecy to the police station.
After trial on the merits of the case, the accused was found guilty of rape. The accused now
argues that the incident between him and the victim was consensual and free from duress,
since he actually courted the victim and the latter agreed to be his girlfriend.
Issue: Whether or not the sweetheart defense may relied upon as a ground for acquittal in
the crime of rape
Held: The Supreme Court said that this was not a valid defense, and that the accused was
guilty nonetheless.
The "sweetheart defense" has often been raised in rape cases. It has been rarely upheld as a
defense without convincing proof. Here, the accused bears the burden of proving that he and
complainant had an affair that naturally led to a sexual relationship. Jurisprudence tells us
that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit she had been raped unless that
was the truth. Even in these modern times, this principle still holds true.
The accused was not able to present any proof to show that he and the complainant were
indeed lovers, that he had courted her and that she had accepted him. Other than his selfAnastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
serving statement, "no documentary evidence of any sort, like a letter or a photograph or any
piece of memento, was presented to confirm a liaison between accused and the complainant.
The Court found that the same is but a mere concoction by appellant in order to exculpate
himself from any criminal liability.
The SC also said that even if indeed accused and complainant were sweethearts, this fact
does not necessarily negate rape. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will.
Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancee and, worse, employ
violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.
PEOPLE vs. PARAISO (G.R. No. 131823)

Facts: One day from mid morning to noon, the victims father was having a drinking spree
with the defendant and some other people at the place of a copra dealer. The defendant then
told his buddies that he had to proceed to the place of the 'pamanhikan' which concerned his
son. Defendant likewise asked the victims father who were the persons in their house, and
the latter told the defendant that his children Arlene(the victim) and two year-old Dona Janice
will be left in their house, as the other two children will buy rice.
On the same day late that afternoon, one of the neighbors of the victim heard the voice of a
young child shouting 'Diyos ko po, Diyos ko po, tama, na po, tama na po.' He was thus
impelled to proceed to the place where the shout came from. When he was already near, he
saw defendant Isagani Paraiso carrying a child face down, with his two hands. He hid himself
in a shrubby place where there were several anahaw trees. The he saw appellant put down
the child with her face up on .the ground. The child was Arlene Recilla. He saw appellant
remove the shorts of Arlene then raise her upper clothes and pull down his pants. Paraiso
then placed himself on top of Arlene and raped her for about five minutes. Thereafter, the
accused hacked Arlene on the neck with a bolo. Because of fear, the witness. He reported
the incident to Barangay Captain who in turn summoned his barangay kagawad and they
went to the place where they found the victim already dead.
After trial on the merits, the trial court found the defense of alibi of the defendant unavailing,
and convicted him.
Issue: Whether or not there is merit in the defense of the accused - that the commission of
the crime was improbable because it was committed during daytime
Held: The SC affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting the defendant, based mainly
on the testimony of the primary witness.
The SC ruled that the assertion that the commission of such crime during broad daylight was
highly improbable is illogical. It said that lust is no respecter of time and place. Rape can be
committed in places where people congregate, in parks, alongside the road, within school
premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
where there are other members of the family who are sleeping. How much more in a remote
hilly place where houses are distantly situated, such as in the instant case. While the defense
tried to establish through prosecution eyewitness Reoveros that there were other houses
near the victim's, it has not shown that there were occupants present during the perpetration
of the crime who could have witnessed or perceived it, but failed to. Nothing on record
contradicts the eyewitness' testimony as to the commission of the crime by appellant during
that fateful hour and day at the place where the victim was found.
The defense of alibi, as a rule, is considered with suspicion and is always received with
caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it can be
easily fabricated. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by a credible
eyewitness who has no ill motive to testify falsely. For such defense to prosper, it must be
convincing enough to preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the
accused at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.
But, according to Paraiso, his house was merely about two thousand meters from that of the
Recilla's. Even by foot, such distance is not impossible to trek in less than an hour.26 By the
eyewitness' account, the victim's unlawful defilement took no more than five minutes and,
immediately thereafter, appellant savagely hacked her neck. All these could, therefore, have
happened when defense witness Buizon was out gathering bamboo trees. She simply
presumed that appellant was asleep all throughout. Given the positive identification of
appellant by a credible eyewitness -- his own nephew -- as the rapist-killer, his defense of
alibi must necessarily fail.
PEOPLE vs. BALACANO (G.R. No. 127156)

Facts: The 14 year old victim, Esmeralda Balacano, alleged that she was raped five times by
her stepfather, the accused. She could not anymore remember the dates she was ravished
except that which happened on August 9, 1995. She also narrated that on the said date, at
around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, she and her sister Peafrancia were in their residence
when the appellant entered the room, asked her sister to go out, and ordered her (victim) to
undress. Sensing that appellant was drunk and afraid of his anger, she complied. Appellant
then inserted his penis into her vagina. After satisfying his lust, he slept. She then went out of
the house to look for her sister and they waited for their mother. Upon the arrival of the latter,
they went to the police station where the investigation of the incident took place.
Balacano denied the whole thing. According to him, on the alleged date of commission of the
crime, he was alone, sleeping inside their rented room. He denied having raped the victim.
No other witness was presented to corroborate his testimony. The trial court found the
evidence for the prosecution enough to convict appellant Jaime Balacano for raping his stepdaughter Esmeralda Balacano.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Issue: Whether or not the lone testimony of the victim of the crime of rape is sufficient to
convict the accused
Held: The SC said yes. An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove
but even more difficult to disprove by the person charged, though innocent; (2) in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence
of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
The Court has repeatedly ruled that the lone testimony of the victim may suffice to convict the
rapist. When a victim says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape has been committed and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.
In this case, the SC agrees with the lower court that the credibility of the victim has not been
impaired by her alleged inconsistencies alluded to by the defendant. Although there may be
some inconsistencies in her testimony, but these are minor ones that do not destroy her
credibility neither weakens the case of the prosecution. It even impressed of the mind of the
Court that the same is not fabricated. It is expected also considering the nightmare she has
gone through which some people would like to forget.
The relationship between a stepfather and stepdaughter is akin to the relationship of a natural
father and a natural daughter especially if the stepdaughter grew up recognizing him as her
own. Such relationship necessarily engendered moral ascendancy of the stepfather over the
step-daughter.
PEOPLE vs. WATIMAR (G.R. Nos. 121651-52)

Facts: 20 year old Myra Watimar testified that one evening, she slept together with her
brothers and sisters, namely Bernardo, Marilou, Leonardo, Ariel and Lea, without her mother
who went to the hospital as her aunt was about to give birth; that her father slept with them in
the same room. At early dawn, she felt that somebody was on top of her and kissing her
neck. The defendant proceeded to threaten the victim and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse against her will. Another incident happened shortly thereafter; when the victim
was again assaulted in their communal kitchen while she was preparing her meals.
Afterwards, she was threatened by her father not to tell anyone about the incident. The
accused denied the incident and alleged the defense of alibi, and that he was not at home
when the said crime happened.
Issues: Whether or not the possibility of rape is negated by the presence of family members
in the place where the crime happened
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held: The possibility of rape is not negated by the presence of even the whole family of the
accused inside the same room with the likelihood of being discovered. For rape to be
committed, it is not necessary for the place to be ideal, or the weather to be fine, for rapists
bear no respect for locale and time when they carry out their evil deed. Rape may be
committed even when the rapist and the victim are not alone, or while the rapist's spouse was
asleep, or in a small room where other family members also slept, as in the instant case. The
presence of people nearby does not deter rapists from committing their odious act.
Rape does not necessarily have to be committed in an isolated place and can in fact be
committed in places which to many would appear to be unlikely and high-risk venues for
sexual advances.
Whether or not the rape victim has to prove that she resisted the assault
The law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance, especially
where there is intimidation. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when
intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the
rapist's lust because of fear for her life or personal safety. In rape cases, it is not necessary
that the victim should have resisted unto death or sustained injuries in the hands of the rapist.
It suffices that intercourse takes place against her will or that she yields because of a genuine
apprehension of great harm. In incestuous rape, actual force and intimidation is not even
necessary. The reason for this is that in a rape committed by a father against his own
daughter, the moral ascendancy of the former over the latter substitutes for violence and
intimidation.
Whether or not there must be medical findings presented as evidence of the alleged
crime
A medical examination is not indispensable to the prosecution of rape as long as the
evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction for rape is proper. Although the results
of a medical examination may be considered strong evidence to prove that the victim was
raped, such evidence is not indispensable in establishing accused-appellant's guilt or
innocence.
A medical examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Medical findings or
proof of injuries, virginity, or an allegation of the exact time and date of the commission of the
crime are not essential in a prosecution for rape.
ORDINARIO vs. PEOPLE

Facts: The case before the Supreme Court relates to an affirmance by the Court of Appeals
of the jointdecision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City convicting Geronimo
Ordinario ontwelve (12) counts, of having committed punishable acts under Article 266-A of
the
RevisedPenal Code. The charges, under the twelve (12) separate informations filed involved
thecommission of acts of sexual assault by Ordinario against Jayson Ramos, a ten (10) year
oldmale, by inserting his penis into the complainants mouth. The accused plead not guilty
to all thecharges. Complainant Jayson Ramos and the accused were student and teacher,
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
respectively, atNicanor Garcia Elementary School during the time the alleged crime was
perpetrated.The accused vehemently denied the accusations against him and claimed that
his class scheduleat the school starts in the morning and ends at 1:00 P.M. so it would have
been impossible forhim to have molested the child at 6:00 in the evening. However, he
occasionally went back tothe school late in the afternoon to feed the chicken as part of his
duty as overseer of the schoolspoultry project. In addition, witnesses were presented by
the defense who claimed that they didnot notice any change in the attitude or appearance of
the complainant, that nothing unusualwas noted during the moments of the alleged
molestations, etc.
Issue: Whether accused is guilty of rape.
Held: Alibi cannot be sustained where it is not only without credible corroboration, but it also
does noton its face demonstrate the physical impossibility of the accuseds presence at the
place andtime of the commission of the offense. Appellant himself has admitted that while his
class wouldend at one oclock in the afternoon, he occasionally would still go back to school
late in theafternoon to oversee the schools poultry project. The appellate court was correct
in holding thatthe exact date of the commission of the offense of rape is not an element of the
crime. Thedefinition of the crime of rape has been expanded with the enactment of Republic
Act No. 8353,otherwise also known as the Anti-Rape Law
of 1997, to include not only "rape by sexualintercourse" but now likewise "rape by sexual
assault." The Supreme Court observed that boththe trial court and the appellate court failed
to provide civil liability ex delicto, an indemnityauthorized by prevailing judicial policy to be an
equivalent of actual or compensatory damages incivil law. The award of P50,000.00 civil
indemnity and P100,000.00 moral damages adjudged bythe trial court for each count of
sexual assault were excessive and were reduced to
P25,000.00civil indemnity and P25,000.00 moral damages for each count. The award of exe
mplarydamages was deleted for lack of legal basis. The Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment appealedtherefrom and convicted Geronimo Ordinario of rape by sexual assault on
twelve (12) counts.
PEOPLE vs. DELA TORRE

Facts: On or about the 2nd week of September at Barangay Tumarbong, in the Municipality of
Roxas,Palawan, the accused Butchoy Dela Torre in conspiracy and confederating with his
wife, Fe DelaTorre, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully andfeloniously have carnal knowledge with one Baby Jane Dagot, a girl of 16
years of age against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. Nine criminal cases
were consolidated and joint trial conducted before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and
Puerto Prinsesa City. OnMarch 1995, the appellants were found guilty and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua for eachcount. They were also ordered to indemnify the complainant the
sum of Php 5000.00 as actualdamages and Php 90000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages, and to pay the costs.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Issue: Is the accused guilty in conspiracy and confederating with his wife to have caused
Baby JaneDagot damage and prejudice?
Held: The credibility of witnesses can also be assessed on the basis of the substance of their
testimonyand the surrounding circumstances. The greatest weight is accorded to the findings
andconclusions reached by the lower court, owing to the courts unique position to see, hear
andobserve the witnesses testify. The judgment of the RTC is hereby MODIFIED. The
appellants arefound guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify theoffended party the sum of Php 50000.00 as civil indemnity, 50000.00 as moral
damages and25000.00 as exemplary damages. With the respect to cases 11313 11320, the
appellants areacquitted for failure of prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
KIDNAPPING & SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION (ART. 267)

PEOPLE vs. SURIAGA (G.R. no. 123779)
Facts: Edwin Ramos was cleaning the car of his older brother, Johnny who was taking care
of his 2-year old daughter, Nicole, playing inside the car. Suriaga, a cousin of the Ramos
brothers, arrived. He was accompanied by his live-in-partner Rosita. Suriaga requested
Edwin if he could drive the car, butte latter declined, saying he did not have the keys.
Meanwhile, Johnny returned to his house because a visitor arrived. At this instance, Rosita
held Nicole and cajoled her. Rosita asked Edwin if she could take Nicole with her to buy
barbeque. Having been acquainted with Rosita for a long time and because he trusted her,
Edwin acceded. When Rosita and the child left, Suriaga joined them. More than an one hour
has passed but the two failed to return with Nicole. Edwin, Johnny and his wife, Mercedita,
then began searching but they could not find their daughter and Rosita. Nicoles grandfather
then receive a call from Suriaga asking for ransom in the amount of P100,000.00. Johnny
immediately reported the call to the PACC Task Force.
The next day, Suriaga called Mercedita, introduced himself and asked her if she and her
husband would give the amount to which the latter responded in the positive. Suriaga
instructed Mercidita as to the how the money should be delivered to him with a warning that if
she will not deliver the money ,her daughter would be placed in a plastic bag or thrown in a
garbage can. Thereafter, with the cash money, and while being tailed by PACC agents,
Mercida proceeded to deliver the money to Suriaga. The PACC agents arrested Suriaga and
his companion Isidera after Mercida gave the money to them. Prior thereto, Nicole was
rescued in a shanty where Rositas sister lived.
Issue: Whether or not there was a deprivation of the victims liberty in this case
Held: The Supreme Court said that there was, and affirmed the guilt of the accused. The
essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled
within dubitable proof of the accuseds intent to effect the same. And if the person detained is
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
a child, the question that needs to be addressed is whether there is evidence to show that in
taking the child, there was deprivation of the childs liberty and that it was the intention of the
accused to deprive the mother of the childs custody. Undoubtedly, the elements of
kidnapping for ransom have been sufficiently established by the prosecution considering the
following circumstances:
appellant, a private individual, took the young Nicole without personally seeking
permission from her father
Here, appellant took the girl and brought her to a shanty where Rositas sister lived,
without informing her parents of their whereabouts
He detained the child and deprived her of her liberty by failing to return her to her
parents overnight and the following day; and
He demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 through telephone calls and gave instructions
where and how it should be delivered.
PEOPLE vs. UBONGEN G.R. No. 126024

Facts: The victim Rose Ann Posadas was three years and ten months old at the time of the
alleged kidnapping. She lived with her mother Rosalina at their beauty parlor / house at La
Trindidad, Benguet. Her mother testified that one afternoon, Rose Ann went to the parlor and
told her that an old man invited her to go with him to buy a banana and an orange. Since
Rosalina was then attending to a customer, Rosalina didnt bother to check on the old man
and just told her daughter to sit behind her. A few minutes later, she noticed her daughter
was nowhere in sight. She inquired around and sought the help of her neighbors. They
reported Rose Anns disappearance to the police.
Two search teams in two cars were organized. A certain Rosaline Fontanilla, a child who
lived in the neighborhood, informed the searchers that she saw Rose Ann with an old man
walking towards Buyagan Road. Rosaline thought the old man was Rose Anns grandfather.
The searchers drove towards Buyagan road. After 45 minutes, the first car reached Taltalas
Store located one kilometer from the beauty parlor. Garcia, one of the searchers, entered the
store and found Rose Ann with the old man who was later identified as the defendant. When
asked why he had the child with him, he just kept silent. While on the way to the police
station at La Trinidad, Philip Leygo, Jr., one of the searchers, allegedly slapped
At the police station, Rosalina executed a sworn statement. The defendant was charged with
kidnapping.
The defendant alleged that en route to the police station, he merely chanced upon the child
and wanted to help the child reach her home, but the three men on board the police car
started to slap him. While he was detained in the police station, a certain Sgt. Salvador
called for the brother of appellant. When the brother arrived he noticed that appellants face
and eyes were swollen and his nose was bleeding. Appellant told his brother that he had

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been mauled. The following day, appellant was brought to the provincial jail. A lawyer met
with him four days later.
After trial on the merits, the accused was convicted of the crime alleged.
Issue: Whether or not intent to deprive the victim of liberty is essential in the crime of
kidnapping & serious illegal detention
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that it was, and that the absence of the same in this case
warrants the acquittal of the accused. Kidnapping or serious illegal detention is committed
when the following elements of the crime are present: (1) that the offender is a private
individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (3) that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of
the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) that the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than 5 days; or (b) that it is committed simulating public authority; or (c) that
any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to
kill him are made; or (d) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer.
The primary element of the crime of kidnapping is actual confinement, detention and restraint
of the victim. A review of the prosecutions own narration of events shows that the prosecution
did not establish actual confinement, detention or restrain of the child, which is the primary
element of kidnapping. Since the evidence does not adequately prove that the victim was
forcefully transported, locked up or restrained, the accused cannot be held liable for
kidnapping. Here, there is no indubitable proof of a purposeful or knowing action by the
accused to forcibly restrain the victim, hence there was no taking coupled with intent to
complete the commission of the offense.
In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the latters
liberty, in any manner, needs to be established by indubitable proof. But in this case, we are
constrained to rule against the prosecutions attempt to establish that appellant had intended
to deprive the child of her liberty.
PEOPLE vs. ACBANGIN (G.R. No. 117216)

Facts: One evening, Danilo Acbangin was worried when his daughter, four-year old Sweet
Grace Acbangin did not come home. He last saw Sweet on the same day, at six o'clock in the
evening, playing in Jocelyn's house.Jocelyn was the common-law wife of his second cousin,
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Remy Acbangin. Danilo went to Jocelyn's house and looked for Sweet. There was no one
there. Thereafter, Danilo reported to the Barangay and the Bacoor Police Station that Sweet
was missing. Later that evening, Jocelyn arrived at Danilo's house without Sweet. When
asked where the child was, Jocelyn denied knowing of the child's whereabouts.
The next day, Danilo made a second report to the Bacoor Police Station, stating that Jocelyn
returned without the child.m Jocelyn informed Danilo's mother-in-law that Sweet was in Niu's
house in Tondo, Manila. Jocelyn then accompanied Danilo, Sweet's grandfather and police
officers to Niu's house. Jocelyn personally knew Niu and was first to enter the house.
Jocelyn went up to the second floor of the house. She went down with Niu and Sweet. Sweet
was well-dressed and smiling. She ran to her father and embraced him. Niu then voluntarily
turned Sweet over to her father and the policemen.
A complaint for kidnapping a minor was filed against Acbangin Niu and two others who were
unidentified.
For her part, Jocelyn testified that for six years, she was employed as Niu's housemaid.
While working for Niu, she took care of several children of different ages. The number of
children in Niu's household would vary from seven to fourteen. According to Jocelyn, Niu was
in the business of selling children. On April 23, 1993, Sweet was brought to Niu's house by a
certain Celia and Helen. Jocelyn recognized Sweet as her niece. Upon seeing Sweet, she
decided to go to Sweet's parents in Bacoor, Cavite. She then accompanied Sweet's father,
along with some policemen to Niu's house.
After trial on the merits, the court convicted the accused of the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention.
Issue: Whether or not there was intention on the part of the defendant to deprive the parents
of the custody of the child
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative and upheld the decision of the lower court.
In cases of kidnapping, if the person detained is a child, the question is whether there was
actual deprivation of the child's liberty, and whether it was the intention of the accused to
deprive the parents of the custody of the child. The intention to deprive Sweet's parents of her
custody is indicated by Jocelyn's hesitation for two days to disclose Sweet's whereabouts and
more so by her actual taking of the child. Jocelyn's motive at this point is not relevant. It is
not an element of the crime.
In this case, Jocelyn knew for two days where Sweet was. In fact, it was she who brought
Sweet to Niu's house. The fact that she later on felt remorse for taking Sweet to Tondo,
Manila and showed Sweet's father where the child was, cannot absolve her. At that point, the
crime was consummated. Jocelyn's repentance and desistance came too late. Sweet was
deprived of her liberty. True, she was treated well. However, there is still kidnapping. For
there to be kidnapping, it is not necessary that the victim be placed in an enclosure. It is
enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Given Sweet's tender age, when
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Jocelyn left her in Niu's house, at a distant place in Tondo, Manila, unknown to her, she
deprived Sweet of the freedom to leave the house at will. It is not necessary that the
detention be prolonged.
PEOPLE vs. PAVILLARE (G. R. No. 129970)

Facts: The victim, an Indian national named Sukhjinder Singh testified in court that at about
noon of one day, while he was on his way back to his motorcycle parked at the corner of
Scout Reyes and Roces Avenue, three men blocked his way. The one directly in front of him,
whom he later identified as herein Pavillare, accused him of having raped the woman inside
the red Kia taxi cab parked nearby. Singh denied the accusation, the three men nevertheless
forced him inside the taxi cab and brought him somewhere near St Joseph's College in
Quezon City. One of the abductors took the key to his motorcycle and drove it alongside the
cab. Singh testified that the accused-appellant and his companions beat him up and
demanded one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) for his release but Singh told him he
only had five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) with him.
Pavillare then forced him to give the phone numbers of his relatives so they can make their
demand from them. Singh gave the phone number of his cousin Lakhvir Singh and the
appellant made the call. The private complainant also stated in court that it was accusedappellant who haggled with his cousin for the amount of the ransom. When the amount of
twenty five thousand was agreed upon the complainant stated that the kidnappers took him to
the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Boston streets and parked the cab there. The accusedappellant and two of the male abductors alighted while the driver and their lady companion
stayed with the complainant in the car. When the complainant turned to see where the
accused-appellant and his, companions went he saw his uncle and his cousin in a motorcycle
and together with the kidnappers they entered a mini-grocery. Later the kidnappers brought
the complainant to the mini-grocery where he met his relatives. The ransom money was
handed to the appellant by the complainant's cousin, after which the accused-appellant
counted the money and then, together with his cohorts, immediately left the scene.
Pavillare alleged in his defense that on the whole day of the incident, he was at the job site in
Novaliches where he had contracted to build the house of a client and that he could not have
been anywhere near Roces Avenue at the time the complainant was allegedly kidnapped.
One of his employees, an electrician, testified that the accused-appellant was indeed at the
job site in Novaliches the whole day of February 12, 1996.
After trial on the merits, the lower court found the accused guilty and convicted him of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Issue: Whether or not the accused should instead be liable for simple robbery instead of the
crime alleged, since they were only motivated with the intent to gain

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held: The Supreme Court said no; and affirmed his conviction. The Court did not consider
Pavillaras argument that he should have been convicted of simple robbery and not
kidnapping with ransom because the evidence proves that the prime motive of the accusedappellant and his companions is to obtain money and that the complainant was detained only
for two hours
The crime is said to have been committed when: any private individual who shall kidnap or
detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death;
1......If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2......If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3......If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4......If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above mentioned were present in the commission of the offense. When the victim is killed or
dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is the subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
The testimonies of both the private complainant and his cousin are replete with positive
declarations that the accused-appellant and his companions demanded money for the
complainant's release. The pretense that the money was supposedly in exchange for the
dropping of the charges for rape is not supported by the evidence. The complainant's cousin
testified that at the agreed drop-off point Pavillare demanded the ransom money and stated,
"Andiyan na ang tao ninyo ibigay mo sa akin ang pera". Pavillare released the complainant
when the money was handed over to him and after counting the money Pavillare and his
companions immediately left the scene. This clearly indicated that the payment of the ransom
money is in exchange for the liberty of the private complainant.
The duration of the detention even if only for a few hours does not alter the nature of the
crime committed. The crime of kidnapping is committed by depriving the victim of liberty
whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply restrained from going home. As squarely
expressed in Article 267, above-quoted the penalty of death is imposable where the detention
is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, and the duration of the detention is not
material.
PEOPLE vs. CORTEZ (G.R. Nos. 131619-20)

Facts: The kidnap victim Lolita Mendoza was in her house, in Sitio Catmon, San Rafael,
Rodriguez, Rizal, when Cortez and two others, all armed with bolos, arrived. They were
looking for Lolita's cousin, and were threatening to kill him on sight. Unable to find Santos,
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
they decided to abduct Lolita to prevent her from reporting the incident to the police.
Accompanied by the other two, accused Callos pointed his bolo at Lolita's back and dragged
her to the mountain. They brought her to the house of Pablo Torral, an uncle of accused
Cortez, and thereafter continued their search for Santos. Hours later, the policemen and the
barangay captain rescued Lolita in the house of the Torrals.
A witness rushed to the Montalban municipal hall and reported Lolita's abduction. Police went
back to the crime scene to gather more information, and thereafter they proceeded to the
residence of accused Cortez. The police officers then saw Lolita outside the nipa hut of the
Torrals, conversing with Pablo Torral. Lolita told them that the Torrals did not prevent her from
leaving their house. However, she did not attempt to escape for fear that the accused would
make good their threat to kill her. One officer brought her back to the house of accused
Cortez where she identified the three accused as her abductors. The police then took the
accused into custody.
The accused argues that at the time of the rescue, Lolita was not physically confined inside
the house as they found her standing outside, conversing with Pablo Torral. They stress that
Lolita herself declared that she was not prevented by the Torrals from leaving the house; that
she was not under duress at that time. This was not appreciated by the lower court, and the
accused were tried and convicted of the crime alleged.
Issue: Whether or not the victim was deprived of her liberty in this case
Held: The Court affirmed the findings of the RTC on the guilt of the accused. In a prosecution
for kidnapping, the State has the burden of proving all the essential elements of an offense.
For the crime of kidnapping to prosper, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his
liberty, in any manner, has to be established by indubitable proof. However, it is not
necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of
locomotion.
In the case at bar, the deprivation of Lolita's liberty was amply established by evidence. When
the appellants failed to find Lolita's cousin, they forcibly dragged her to the mountains and
kept her in the house of the Torrals. Appellant Cortez even bound her hands with a belt.
Although at the time of the rescue, she was found outside the house talking to Pablo Torral,
she explained that she did not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the appellants
would make good their threats to kill her should she do so. Her fear is not baseless as the
appellants knew where she resided and they had earlier announced that their intention in
looking for Lolita's cousin was to kill him on sight: Certainly, fear has been known to render
people immobile. Indeed, appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to kill or
similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual force or violence which is one of the
elements of the crime of kidnapping under Article 267 (3) of the Revised Penal Code.

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PEOPLE vs. SINOC (G.R. Nos. 113511-12)

Facts: In the morning of September 21, 1991, Isidoro Viacrusis, manager of Taganito Mining
Corporation, was on his way from the company compound to Surigao City, on a company
vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero. As Viacrusis and his driver were approaching the public
cemetery of Clarer they were stopped by several armed men who identified themselves as
member of the New People's Army. Upon reaching Barobo, Surigao del Norte, Viacrusis and
his driver were ordered to alight and proceed to a coconut grove with their hands bound
behind their back. After the two were made to lie face down on the ground, they were shot
several times. Viacrusis miraculously survived, while the driver died.
In an affidavit executed by Viacrusis, he was able to identify by name only one Danilo
Sinoc. In the morning of September 21, 1991, a secret informant reported to the Police
Station at Montkayo, Davao del Norte that the stolen (carnapped) Pajero was parked behind
the apartment of a certain Paulino Overa at Poblacion, Monkayo. A police team went to the
place and posted themselves in such a manner as to keep it in view. They saw a man
approach the Pajero who, on seeing them, tried to run away. They stopped him and found out
that the man, identified as Danilo Sinoc, had the key of the Pajero, and was acting under
instructions of some companions who were waiting for him at the Star Lodge at Tagum,
Davao del Norte. The police turned over Sinoc to the 459th Mobile Force, together with the
Pajero.
Sinoc was brought to the Public Attorneys' Office in Butuan City where he asked one of the
attorneys there, Atty. Alfredo Jalad, to assist him in making an Affidavit of Confession. Atty.
Jalad told Sinoc that he had the right to choose his own counsel, and to remain silent. Sinoc
said he wanted to make the affidavit nonetheless, and be assisted by Jalad in doing so. Atty.
Jalad then had Sinoc narrate the occurrence. Jalad asked Sinoc if the CIS had promised him
anything for the affidavit he would execute. Sinoc said no. Only then did the CIS officers
commence to take Sinoc's statement. Jalad read to Sinoc the contents of his statement. The
statement was thereafter signed by Sinoc and by Jalad, the latter being described as "witness
to signature."
Since was next brought to Prosecutor Brocoy so that he might take oath on his statement.
City Fiscal Brocoy told Sinoc that the statement was very damaging. Sinoc stood by his
answers, saying that they had been voluntarily given. Evidently satisfied of the voluntariness
of the statement, Brocoy administered the oath to Sinoc.
Sinoc's assault against the propriety of his interrogation after his warrantless arrest because it
was conducted without advice to him of his constitutional rights, is pointless. It is true that the
initial interrogation of Sinoc was made without his first being told of his corresponding rights.
This is inconsequential, for the prosecution never attempt to prove what he might have said
on that occasion. The confession made by him afterwards at the Public Attorneys' Office at
Butuan City shows it to have been executed voluntarily.
Issue: Whether or not kidnapping was the principal objective of the defendant in this case

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held: The Supreme Court said that it was not. The "kidnapping" was not the principal
objective; it was merely incidental to the forcible taking of the vehicle. Unfortunately, by
reason or on the occasion of the seizure of the "Pajero" and (as far as the proofs
demonstrate) without fore-knowledge on Sinoc's part its driver was killed, and the lone
passenger seriously injured. There was thus no kidnapping as the term is understood in
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code the essential object of which is to "kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty." The idea of "kidnapping" in this
case appears to have been the result of the continuous but uninformed use of that term by
the peace officers involved in the investigation, carelessly carried over into the indictments
and the record of the trial, and even accepted by the RTC.
The offense actually committed is Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
Penalties. Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against any person shall
suffer: 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson. . . ." It is germane to observe
that even if the intent to deprive of liberty were as important or primordial an objective as the
asportation of the "Pajero," the kidnapping would be absorbed in the robbery with homicide;
and that the term, "homicide," is used in the quoted article in the generic sense i.e., as
also including murder, the nature of the offense not being altered by the treacherous
character, or the number, of the killings in connection with the robbery.
In this case, there is no avoiding the fact that a homicide although not agreed to or
expected by him was committed on the occasion of the robbery, of the "Pajero," and he
could not but have realized or anticipated the possibility of serious harm, even death, being
inflicted on the person or persons in the "Pajero" targeted for robbery, since two of his
companions were armed with guns, even if in his mind, to repeat, his agreement with them
did not include killing. The most that can be conceded is to credit him with the mitigating
circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. Sinoc
may not be held liable in Case No. 3565 for the separate offense of frustrated murder as
regards Viacrusis. In this particular case, the evidence shows that he agreed only to the plan
to "carnap" the "Pajero," but not to any assault or killing. Nor is it logical to convict him twice
of robbery of the same property under the same circumstances. Hence, he may not be
pronounced responsible for the separate offense of robbery of the same "Pajero," in addition
to being declared guilty of robbery, (of that same "Pajero") with homicide under Article 294.

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SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION (ART. 268)

People vs. Llaguno (G.R. No. 91262)
Facts: On February 5, 1987 the appellant Judy Reyes, chief security and rattan controller of
an export company informed Tomas Banzon, the company duty guard, that he caught a thief
on February 4, 1987. Appellant then took Banzon to his room where a person named
Bienvenido Mercado was found tied to a wooden post in the room. Appellant told Banzon
that Mercado was the thief he caught.
In the afternoon of February 6, 1987, the company manager, called up Banzon by phone
inquiring if there was any unusual incident. Banzon replied that he would give a report after 2
hours. However, appellant warned Banzon to keep quiet about Mercados detention or be
killed. Appellant at the time was armed with a .45 caliber pistol. When the company manager
went to the office she was told by the appellant that it was all finished and that he is going to
Sto. Nino to confess that he had killed someone.
The following day, Banzon asked appellant about Mercado and appellant said that he had
disposed of him. Banzon, at that time, noticed that appellants arm had teeth marks, which
according to the appellant, was hit by a piece of wood.
On the same day, the body of Bienvenido Mercado was found by the police with gunshot
wound on the forehead and multiple abrasions in the arms and body.
In the place where they found the body, the police also found an empty shell of a .45 caliber
bullet.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of kidnapping with murder as charged in the
information or of murder as convicted by the lower court or of slight illegal detention only.
Held: The SC found that the appellant is liable only for slight illegal detention and not of
murder nor of kidnapping with murder.
The evidence presented by the prosecution, which was sustained by the trial court, clearly
established that appellant had in fact detained the victim without authority to do so. Banzon
testified that he witnessed the victim hanging by the arms in appellant's room. Banzon's
testimony significantly jibes with the physical evidence showing that the victim sustained
multiple abrasions in both arms. Furthermore, Dr. Ceniza narrated that several employees
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
called her up in the morning of February 5, 1987 asking for permission to go home because
there was a "man hanging at the back in one of the buildings of GF International." Dr.
Ceniza's testimony was unrebutted. All these ineludibly prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the victim was deprived of his liberty by appellant.
Sc held that the trial court merely made a finding that appellant could not be convicted of
serious illegal detention for the sole reason that the victim's detention did not exceed five
days. The lower court, however, found that appellant illegally detained the victim for at least
one day, which act by itself constitutes slight illegal detention. Besides, the trial court
appreciated the act constituting slight illegal detention as a qualifying circumstance, i.e.,
employing means to weaken the defense. While we find no proof beyond reasonable doubt to
sustain a conviction for murder, the records indisputably prove culpability for slight illegal
detention.
PEOPLE vs. DADLES (G.R. No. 118620-21)

Facts: This case involves the alleged kidnapping of two farmers, Alipio Tehidor and Salvador
Alipan and their respective sons, Dionisio and Antonio from their homes in Barangay
Amontay, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental on May 24, 1989. Among the accused, only the
appellant was arraigned where he pleaded not guilty.
On May 24, 1989, the appellant together with 5 others arrived at the residence of one of the
victims, Alipio Tehidor, his wife and their two sons were awakened from their sleep when the
appellant and his companions called Alipio from downstairs. The group which was known to
the Tehidor family was allowed to enter by Alipio's wife. They told Francisca that they wanted
to talk to Alipio downstairs. Alipio's wife requested the group to talk to her husband inside
their house but her request was unheeded. When Francisca protested, the appellant's group
told her that they would free Alipio and Dionisio if they surrender the firearms of their two
other sons. Unable to surrender the said firearms, the appellant's group forced Alipio and
Dionisio to walk with them to an unknown place. Since then Francisca has not heard from
either her husband or her son.
On the same day, a few minutes after the Alipio Tehidor and his sons were forcibly taken by
the appellant's group, while salvador and his family were in their house, they heard
somebody calling them from outside which they have identified as the appellant and 9 others,
all of whom are armed. Salvador and his son left with the group to an unknown destination.
And like Francisca, Luzviminda never saw her husband and son again after that night.
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of kidnapping as charged.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held: The court ruled that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping.
However, "since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the RPC (kidnapping
with serious illegal detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping . . . was
established, SC ruled that the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article
268. Moreover, in the execution of the crime against the first two (2) victims, Salvador and
Antonio Alipan, more than three (3) armed malefactors acted together in its
commission. Thus, since the generic aggravating circumstance of band attended the
commission of the crime and there being no mitigating circumstance present, the penalty
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. For the slight illegal detention of the latter two (2)
victims, Alipio and Dionisio Tehidor, the aggravating circumstance that the crime was
committed by a band as alleged in the information finds no sufficient factual basis since the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not disclose that at least four (4) of the
malefactors were armed. Hence there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance
attendant in the commission of the crime, the penalty of reclusion temporal should be
imposed in its medium period.
PEOPLE vs. ROLUNA (G.R. No. 101797)

Facts: In an Information dated June 26, 1990, eight (8) persons were charged with the crime
of Kidnapping with Murder. Only the appellant was arrested, tried and convicted.
On May 27, 1984, Sombilon was on his way to attend to the pasture of his carabao. He saw
his neighbor, Anatalio Moronia, stopped in his tracks and taken captive by accused Abundio
Roluna. Roluna was then accompanied by seven (7) other persons. Accused Roluna was
armed with an armalite while his companions were carrying short firearms. Using an abaca
strip, he saw Carlos Daguing tie up the hands of Moronia at the back. Frightened, he did not
shout for help and proceeded on his way. With the exception of his wife, he did not inform
anyone about what he saw that fateful day.
From that time on, both witnesses testified that Moronia was never seen or heard from.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant is guilty of the crime of kidnapping with murder.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held: However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution would not be enough to hold
accused-appellant responsible for the death of Moronia.
There being no evidence to the contrary, the disputable presumption under Section 5 (x) (3),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court would apply, but only insofar as to establish the presumptive
death of Moronia. Whether accused-appellant is responsible for the death of Moronia is a
different matter. The Rules did not authorize that from this disputable presumption of death, it
should be further presumed that the person with whom the absentee was last seen shall be
responsible for the subsequent unexplained absence/disappearance of the latter. The
conviction of accused-appellant for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder cannot be
allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous facts established by the prosecution. As discussed
earlier, the evidence presented by the prosecution surrounding the events of that fateful day
are grossly insufficient to establish the alleged liability of accused-appellant for the death of
Moronia.
Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping of
Anatalio Moronia was established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal detention
under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. In the execution of the crime, more than three
(3) armed malefactors acted together in its commission. Thus, since the generic aggravating
circumstance of band attended the commission of the crime and there being no mitigating
circumstance present, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period as maximum
and prision mayor as minimum should be imposed on accused-appellant.
FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR (ART. 270)

PEOPLE vs. PASTRANA (G.R. No. 143644)
Facts: Sometime in January 1997, while in Canada, Erma was introduced by her sister to
spouses Leopoldo and Rebecca Frias who informed her that their daughter, accusedappellant Rubirosa Pastrana, can help process Willys travel documents to Canada. Erma

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
agreed to hand the processing of her sons papers to accused-appellant and consequently
sent her, on various occasion
Accused went to the house of Erma and introduced herself to the children of Erma as the one
who will work out the processing of their travel documents to Canada. On several occasions,
accused solicited money from Erma on account of the illness and such other needs of the
latter's children.
Erma later on found out from Aresola that accused did not return Willy to Caloocan. Few days
after such knowledge, accused went to Caloocan to inform Doroteo that Willy is missing.
They searched for Willy but their efforts were fruitless. The same propmted Erma to return to
the Philippines.
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the charges against her.
Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of kidnapping and failure to return the minor.
Held: Yes. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal
Code has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted with the custody of a
minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or
guardians. What is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the
deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or
guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply something more than mere
negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and
maliciously wrong.
In the case at bar, there is no question that accused was entrusted with the custody of 9-year
old Willy. Erma and her children trusted accused-appellant that they sent her money for the
processing of Willys travel documents, and more importantly, they allowed Willy to stay in her
apartment. Regardless of whether Willy stayed in accused-appellants apartment
permanently or temporarily, the first element of the offense charged is satisfied because
during said period Willy was entrusted to accused-appellant who undertook the responsibility
of seeing to it that he was well-taken care of.
Evidence of the case showed that the accused deliberately failed to return Willy to their
house.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
PEOPLE vs. BERNARDO (G.R. No. 144316)

Facts: On May 13, 1999, 12-year old Maria Roselle and her 15-day old sister, Rosalyn, were
with their mother at the Fabella Memorial Hospital.
While Rosita was undergoing medical check up inside the hospital, her two daughters waited
at the lobby. Roselle was seating on a bench with her 15-day old sister on her lap when the
appellant sat beside her and befriended her.
The appellant deceived Roselle by asking her to buy ice water. She saw the accused running
away with her baby sister. She chased the appellant and when she caught up with her, the
appellant told her that she was running after her mother. The chase ensued as Roselle tried
to prevent appellant from running away.
A kagawad came to help Roselle. He took the baby from the appellant and looked for the
mother of the two children inside the hospital where he confirmed Rosita's identity.
Appellant was convicted by the lower court of kidnapping and failure to return a minor.
Issue: whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of kidnapping and failure to return a minor.
Held: The crime committed by appellant in the case at bar falls under Article 267 of the RPC.
It has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted with the custody of a
minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or
guardians. In People vs. Ty (263 SCRA 745 [1996]), The Court stated that the essential
element of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor is that the offender is
entrusted with the custody of the minor, but what is actually being punished is not the
kidnapping of the minor but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to
restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Indeed, the word deliberate as used in Article
270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply something more than mere negligence it must
be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
When Roselle entrusted Roselyn to appellant before setting out on an errand for appellant to
look for ice water, the first element was accomplished and when appellant refused to return
the baby to Roselle despite her continuous pleas, the crime was effectively accomplished. In
fine, we agree with the trial courts finding that appellant is guilty of the crime of kidnapping
and failure to return a minor.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
PEOPLE vs. TY (G.R. No. 121519)

Facts: Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty were charged with the crime of kidnapping and failure to
return a minor. On November 18, 1987, complainant Johanna Sombong brought her sick
daughter Arabella, then only 7 months old, for treatment to the Sir John Medical and
Maternity which was owned and operated by the accused-appellants. Arabella was
diagnosed to be suffering bronchitis and diarrhea, thus complainant was advised to confine
the child at the clinic for speedy recovery. Few days later, Arabella was well and was ready to
be discharged but complainant was not around to take her home. Arabella stayed in the clinic
and later on in the nursery as complainant has no money to pay the bills.
From then on, nothing was heard of the complainant. She neither visited her child nor called
to inquire about her whereabouts. Efforts to get in touch with the complainant were
unsuccessful as she left no address or telephone number where she can be reached.
Two years after Arabella was abandoned by complainant, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the
clinic, suggested during a hospital staff conference that Arabella be entrusted to a guardian
who could give the child the love and affection, personal attention and caring she badly
needed as she was thin and sickly.
In 1992, complainant came back to claim the daughter she abandoned some five (5) years
back. When her pleas allegedly went unanswered, she filed a petition for habeas
corpus against accused.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of kidnapping and failure to return a minor.
Held: Under the facts and ruling in Sombong, as well as the evidence adduced in this case
accused-appellants must perforce be acquitted of the crime charged, there being no reason
to hold them liable for failing to return one Cristina Grace Neri, a child not conclusively shown
and established to be complainant's daughter, Arabella.
The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we were to consider Cristina Grace Neri and Arabella
Sombong as one and the same person, still, the instant criminal case against the accusedappellants must fall.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the
Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has
been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore
said minor to his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that the offender is
entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not the kidnapping
of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or
refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Said
failure or refusal, however, must not only be deliberate but must also be persistent as to
oblige the parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain
custody. The key word therefore of this element is deliberate
In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the
accused-appellants to restore the custody of the complainant's child to her. When the
accused-appellants learned that complainant wanted her daughter back after five (5) long
years of apparent wanton neglect, they tried their best to help herein complainant find the
child as the latter was no longer under the clinic's care.
It is worthy to note that accused-appellants' conduct from the moment the child was left in the
clinic's care up to the time the child was given up for guardianship was motivated by nothing
more than an earnest desire to help the child and a high regard for her welfare and wellbeing.
PEOPLE vs. MENDOZA (G.R. No. L-67610)
Facts: On September 28, 1982 spouses Ernesto and Eugenia Policarpio along with their two
children were at the Luneta Park. A woman who turned out to be accused Angelina Mendoza,
but who had introduced herself as 'Rosalinda Quintos' accosted them. She struck a
conversation with the spouses and even offered them food particularly to Edward.
Subsequently, accused played with Edward and lured him away from his mother. Shortly, the
accused carried Edward and took him away with her.
It developed that from the Luneta the accused brought the child to Tramo Street, Pasay City
where she claimed before some residents that the child was that of a hostess friend of hers
who being gravely ill of leprosy was in dire need of money, and that she was asked to sell the
child for P 250.00.
The accused offered Mrs. Navarette to buy the child. She, she however declined the offer
because of its illegality. Accused insisted on momentarily leaving the child with Mrs.
Navarette. Intending to have the child returned to his mother, Mrs. Navarette asked her sister
to go with the accused to look for the child's mother
Sometime later, the accused reappeared at the Luneta Police Station obstensibly to visit a
detainee thereat. It was then that the police officer on duty recognized her. She was
questioned regarding the whereabouts of the boy. Threatened with arrest, she revealed that
she had left the boy with Mrs. Navarette in Pasay City. That led to the recovery of Edward

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Policarpio and his eventual return to his parents twenty days after the accused took him
away.
Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of kidnapping and failure to return a minor.
Held: The court held that accused-appellant is guilty of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention beyond reasonable doubt. It has been established by the clear, strong and positive
evidence of the prosecution that the taking of the minor child Edward was without the
knowledge and consent of his parents.
While the Information against accused-appellant is captioned "Kidnapping and Failure to
Return a Minor", the allegations in the body thereof properly constitute the crime of
kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. Thus, instead of alleging the elements of
kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor that the offender had been entrusted with the
custody of a minor person and that said offender had deliberately failed to restore the latter to
his parents or guardians, the text of the Information alleged the elements of the crime of
kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
It is well-settled that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption
or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information.
GRAVE COERCION (ART. 286)

PEOPLE vs. SANTOS (G.R. No. 140074)
Facts: It is not unknown that a debtor occasionally would suffer from the malady of selective
amnesia.The case is a tale of one unfortunate creditor who might have sought to rouse her
absent-minded debtor from the haze of forgetfulness.
On 10 December 1996, at six o'clock in the morning, Leonida de la Pea was at home
inBarangay Resurreccion, Umingan, Pangasinan, with her eight-year old niece, Christine
LovelyMae Delanos, when a passenger jeepney arrived. Five decently dressed men
stepped down from the vehicle and entered the house. The first, who was attired in a
business suit, introducedhimself as Rocky Alberto and his companions as agents of the
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Criminal Investigation Service("CIS").[1] Alberto asked Leonida about her unpaid obligation
to Josephine Santos. Leonidaanswered that she had already paid the debt before the
barangay captain of Umingan. Momentslater, another vehicle, a brown colored car, stopped
in front of the house. Henry Salimbay (thebarangay captain of Umingan), Josephine Santos,
Manny Baltazar and two unidentified malesand one unidentified female, alighted. Leonida
rushed to confront Salimbay, telling him thatJosephine had sent the CIS agents to demand
payment of her debt and that it was Josephinewho should instead be accosted. Sensing an
escalating tension between the two women, thebarangay captain decided to leave, telling
the parties that it was best for both of them to justamicably settle their differences.
Issue: Whether or not accused -appellant is guilty of grave coercion.
Held: The circumstances that have surfaced instead warrant a conviction for grave
coercion. Grave coercion is committed when a person prevents another from doing
something not prohibited by law or compelling him to do something against his will, whether it
be right or wrong, and without any authority of law, by means of violence, threats or
intimidation. Its elements are - First, that the offender has prevented another from doing
something not prohibited by law, or that he has compelled him to do something against his
will, be it right or wrong; second, that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence,
either by material force or such display of force as would produce intimidation and control
over the will of the offended party; and, third, that the offender who has restrained the will and
liberty of another did so without any right or authority of law. Where there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved and the offense
charged necessarily includes the lesser offense established in evidence, the accused can be
convicted of the offense proved.
PEOPLE vs. VILLAMAR (G.R. No. 121175)

Facts: Marilyn Villamar was charged with the crime of illegal detention and frustrated murder
in an information.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
On February 11, 1993, Villamar went to the house of the private offended party Cortez and
inquired if the latter was interested in adopting her daughter, explaining that her offer was due
her husband's hasty departure. Unable to refuse, Cortez accepted the offer and immediately
prepared a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to formalize the adoption. Unfortunately, on June 5,
1993, Villamar, apparently regretting her decision, went to the house of Cortez and decided to
take her daughter back. This sudden reversal was, of course, not taken lightly by Cortez, who
vehemently refused to relinquish custody of the girl to Villamar.
Thereupon, a scuffle ensued between the two, during which Villamar managed to hit Cortez
with a chisel on the head rendering the latter weak and immobilized, after which she
threatened her with a pair of scissors. Villamar was demanding that Cortez reveal where the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" was located. Meanwhile, attracted by the commotion, a curious
crowd was already gathering outside the Cortez residence. Sensing imminent danger,
Villamar demanded money and a get-away vehicle to extricate herself from her predicament.
However, on her way to the car, a melee ensued resulting in her immediate arrest by the
responding policemen.
Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of serious illegal detention.
Held: No. The court is of the opinion that the accused had no intention to kidnapor deprive
Cortez of her personal liberty.
What actually transpired was the rage of a woman scorned. The undeniable fact that the
purpose of Villamar was to seek the return of her child was never assailed by the prosecution.
Until the defendant's purpose to detain the offended party is shown, a prosecution for illegal
detention will not prosper.
Under the law, as presently worded, it is essential that the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. In the instant case, there is no showing
whatsoever that Villamar wanted to extort money from Cortez prior to their confrontation.
When accused-appellant coerced Cortez to reveal the whereabouts of the "Sinampaang
Salaysay" for the purpose of destroying the same, the act merely constituted grave coercion,
as provided in Article 286 of the RPC. The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a)
that any person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention
or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would
produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c)
that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in other
words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful
right.
While Villamar did compel Cortez to do something against the latter's will, it must be stressed
that the same cannot be categorized as an act of illegal detention. Still, when Villamar was
erroneously charged for illegal detention, such oversight will not preclude a guilty verdict for
the crime of grave coercion. In the early case of U.S. v. Quevengco, and, recently, in People
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
v. Astorga, we ruled that the offense of grave coercion is necessarily included in illegal
detention; as such, an information for illegal detention will not bar the accused from being
convicted of grave coercion, instead of the original charge.
PEOPLE vs. ASTORGA (G.R. No. 110097)

Facts: Appellant Astorga tricked Yvonne to go with him by telling her that they were going to
buy candy. When Yvonne recognized the deception, she demanded that she be brought
home, but appellant refused and instead dragged her toward the opposite direction against
her will. While it is unclear whether Appellant Astorga intended to detain or "lock up" Yvonne,
there is no question that he forced her to go with him against her will.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of kidnapping.
Held: No. The accused-appellant should be convicted only of grave coercion.
Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by
another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against
his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by
violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and,
consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains
the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not
made under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right. When appellant forcibly
dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan. Appellant
presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from going home, and we cannot find any.

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UNJUST VEXATION (ART. 287)

BALEROS vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 138033)
Facts: On December 13, 1991, Malou was awakened by the smell of chemical on a piece of
cloth pressed on her face. She struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her
down on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering
her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight. Still, she continued fighting off her
attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free. With this the opportunity
presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed.
Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He had access to the room
of MALOU as Room 307 where he slept the night over had a window which allowed ingress
and egress to Room 306 where MALOU stayed. Not only the Building security guard, S/G
Ferolin, but Joseph Bernard Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was wearing a black
"Adidas" shorts and fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the
morning of December 13, 1991. Though it was dark during their struggle, MALOU had made
out the feel of her intruders apparel to be something made of cotton material on top and
shorts that felt satin-smooth on the bottom.
From CHITOs bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot where witness Renato
Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were discovered the most incriminating evidence: the
handkerchief stained with blue and wet with some kind of chemicals; a black "Adidas" satin
short pants; and a white fraternity T-shirt, also stained with blue. A different witness, this time,
Christian Alcala, identified these garments as belonging to CHITO. As it turned out, laboratory
examination on these items and on the beddings and clothes worn by MALOU during the
incident revealed that the handkerchief and MALOUs night dress both contained chloroform,
a volatile poison which causes first degree burn exactly like what MALOU sustained on that
part of her face where the chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed.

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Issue: Whether the offender's act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or
disturbance to themind of the person to whom it is directed, which is a paramount question in
a prosecution forunjust vexation?
Held: In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with the other pieces of evidence
constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that
petitioner was the intruder in question.
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge
in the present case. Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or
preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course,
without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape,
as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the
2nd paragraph of Article 287 of the RPC. There is no need to allege malice, restraint or
compulsion in an information for unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even
without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to
include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material
harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.
ONG CHIU KWAN vs. CA (G.R. No. 113006)
Facts: On January 31, 1991, Bayona filed an information charging petitioner with unjust
vexation for cutting the electric wires, water pipes and telephone lines of Crazy Feet, a
business establishment owned and operated by Mildred Ong.
On April 24, 1990, at around 10:00am, Ong Chiu Kwan ordered Wilfredo Infante to relocate
the telephone, electric and water lines of Crazy Feet, because said lines posed as a
disturbance. However, Ong Chiu Kwan failed to present a permit from appropriate authorities
allowing him to cut the electric wires, water pipe and telephone lines of the business
establishment.
After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the lower court found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust
vexation, and sentenced him to imprisonment for twenty days." The court also ordered him
to pay moral damages,exemplary damages and to pay attorney's fees.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of unjust vexation.
Held: Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and telephone lines
of complainants business establishment because these lines crossed his property line. He
failed, however, to show evidence that he had the necessary permit or authorization to
relocate the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric, water and telephone services
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
during peak hours of the operation of business of the complainant. Thus, petitioners act
unjustly annoyed or vexed the complainant. Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is
liable for unjust vexation.
ROBBERY (ART. 293)

PEOPLE VS. BASAO
Facts: On the testimony of Gilbert Basao, in the afternoon of April 14, 1994, the accusedappellantPepe Iligan shot Lt. Joerlick Faburada and wife, Dra. Arlyn Faburada who was four
monthspregnant, with an armalite rifle as the spouses were riding a motorcycle. When Dra.
Faburadaattempted to reach her husbands firearm, she was again shot by the accusedappellant.Afterwards, Iligan took away Lt. Joerlick Faburadas PNPA gold ring, one .45
caliber pistol andthe latters radio handset.On April 19, 1994, Basao and accused-appellant
went to the apartment of one Reynaldo Angelesin Butuan City. Iligan asked Angeles to pawn
a ring. He acceded to the request.
Issue: Whether the accused-appellant has committed robbery with murder.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held: No. The accused-appellant did not commit robbery with murder. The ruling in People
vs. Salazar is doctrinal. If the original criminal design does not clearly comprehend robbery
but robberyfollows the homicide as an afterthought or as a minor incident of the homicide, the
criminal actshould be viewed as constitutive of two offenses and not of a single complex
crime. Robberywith homicide arises only when there is a direct relation, an intimate
connection, between therobbery and the killing, even if the killing is prior to, concurrent with,
or subsequent to therobbery.In the instant case, it is apparent that the taking of the personal
properties from the victim
wasan afterthought. The personal properties were taken after accused-appellant has already
successfully carried out his primary criminal intent of killing Lt Faburada and the taking did
notnecessitate the use of violence or force upon the person of the victim. Thus the crime is
theftunder Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code which provides, viz.: Wherefore, the
decision of theRegional Trial Court was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
People vs. Danilo Reyes (G.R. No. 135682)
FACTS: PO1 Eduardo C. Molato saw the victim being held up by two persons. The one in
front of the victim forcibly took his wristwatch while the other one stabbed him at the
back. He fired one warning shot which caused the three to run towards Phase I, Lapu-lapu
Avenue. He chased them but when he saw the victim, he hailed a tricycle and asked the
driver to bring the victim to the nearest hospital. He continued chasing the suspects up to
Phase II until he reached Agora, but the suspects were gone. The incident happened swiftly
but PO1 Molato had a good look at the face of the one who stabbed the victim as he was
about 8 to 10 meters away from them.
After trial, the lower court rendered a judgment of conviction
According to accused - appellant, the vital element of animus lucrandi was not sufficiently
established as the taking of the watch could have been a mere afterthought and the real
intent of the malefactors was to inflict injuries upon the victim. Moreover, there was no
evidence of ownership of the wristwatch, as it may have belonged to the two persons who
attacked the victim. Lastly, there was no evidence of conspiracy.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of robbery with homicide is warranted.
HELD: A conviction for robbery with homicide requires proof of the following elements: (a) the
taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons or with force upon
things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with animus
lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof,
homicide in its generic sense was committed. The offense becomes a special complex crime
of robbery with homicide under Article 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim is killed on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery
Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt
acts of the offender. Although proof of motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of
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the robbery is circumstantial, intent to gain oranimus lucrandi may be presumed from the
furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a
different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The intent to gain may be presumed from the
proven unlawful taking.[6] In the case at bar, the act of taking the victims wristwatch by one of
the accused Cergontes while accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife behind him sufficiently
gave rise to the presumption.
In conspiracy, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a condition
precedent. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
committed or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest.
People vs. Suela et.al (GR No. 133570-71)
FACTS: Brothers Edgar and Nerio Suela, and Edgardo Batocan sporting ski masks, bonnests
and gloves, brandishing handguns and knife barged into the room of Director Rosas who was
watching television together with his adopted son, Norman and his friend Gabilo. They
threatened Rosas, Norman and Gabilo to give the location of their money and valuables,
which they eventually took. They dragged Gabilo downstairs with them. Upon Nerios
instructions, Batocan stabbed Gabilo 5 times which caused the latters death. The trial court
sentenced Edgar, Nerio and Batocan to suffer the penalty of death appreciating the
aggravating circumstance of disguise which was not alleged in the Information against the
three.
The Information against Edgar Suela reads as follows:
"xxx the said accused, with intent to gain, and by means of intimidation against person, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob/extort one John Doe (not his real name)
in the manner as follows: on the date and place aforementioned, the said accused called up
by phone the Executive Secretary of said complainant and demanded the amount
of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, in exchange for the information regarding the robbery
case and slaying of Geronimo Gabilo on July 26, 1995, as in fact said accused, took, robbed
and carried away the aforesaid amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party."
When arraigned on September 24, 1996, appellants, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded
"not guilty." In due course, they were tried and found guilty by the court a quo.
ISSUE: Whether or not Suela is guilty of robbery.
HELD: "Simple robbery is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons
as distinguished from the use of force upon things, but the extent of the violence or
intimidation does not fall under pars. 1 to 4 of Article 294 (Revised Penal Code)
"Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove that appellant Edgar Suela
employed force or intimidation on private complainant John Doe (not his real name) by
instilling fear in his mind so as to compel the latter to cough out the amount of P200,000.00.
Instead, what was established was that he had agreed to give the P200,000.00 in exchange

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
for information regarding the identity and whereabouts of those who robbed him and killed his
friend.
There was no showing that appellant Edgar Suela had exerted intimidation on him so as to
leave him no choice but to give the money. Instead, what is clear was that the giving of the
money was done not out of fear but because it was a choice private complainant opted
because he wanted to get the information being offered to him for the consideration
of P200,000.00 In fact, the money was delivered not due to fear but for the purpose of
possibly having a lead in solving the case and to possibly bring the culprit to justice (ibid.).
As such, the elements of simple robbery have not been established in the instant case,
hence, appellant Edgar Suela should be acquitted of that charge."
People v. Donato Del Rosario (G.R. No. 13106)

FACTS: An information was filed against Donato del Rosario charging him of robbery with
homicide committed as follows:
That accused steal and carry away jewelries, belonging to Emelita Paragua, and on the
occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take, steal and carry away
the items and taking advantage of superior strength and with intent to kill treacherously
attack, assault, hit her with a hard object on the head and then strangle and tie the neck of
Raquel Lopez (niece of Emelita Paragua) to prevent her from breathing and making an
outcry, inflicting upon said Raquel Lopez asphyxia injuries which directly caused her death.
Emelita Paraguas house was set on fire, some of her jewelries were missing and niece
Raquel Lopez was found dead at the kitchen. The police received information that Donato
Del Rosario was seen outside the house of Paragua before the incident happened and
disappeared since then.
A few days later, Del Rosario surrendered himself to a police officer and volunteered that he
will accompany them in recovering the stolen jewelries from where he sold them. After the
jewelries were recovered, with the assistance of his lawyer, the suspect signed a waiver and
confession for killing Raquel Lopez, robbery and setting the house of Paragua on fire.
Del Rosario was charged for Robbery with Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City. During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty for the crime charged.
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt hence, an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the essential requisites of the crime of Robbery with Homicide are
present?
HELD: Yes, the essential requisites of the crime of robbery with homicide are present.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Case law has it that when a stolen property is found in the possession of a person who is not
the owner thereof, will be presumed the thief if he cannot satisfactorily explain his
possession. The accused knew exactly where he can recover the stolen jewelries and was
positively identified by witnesses.
Intent to gain is assumed in an information where it is alleged that there was unlawful taking
and appropriation by the offender of the properties stolen. The jewelries recovered were
pawned and sold by the accused and was positively identified by the owner of the
establishments.
Homicide may occur before or after robbery, what is important is there is an intimate
connection between the killing and the robbery.
People v. Zinampan (G.R. No. 126781)

FACTS: Appellant Elvis Doca and his co-accused, Calixto Zinampan alias Gorio, Artemio
Apostol alias Temy, Ignacio Cusipag, Robert Cusipag, Roger Allan and Miguel Cusipag were
charged with the crime of robbery with homicide defined and penalized under Article 294(1) of
the Revised Penal Code
Elvis Doca, Artemio Apostol, Calixto Zinampan and Roger Allan entered the sari-sari store of
Henry and Gaspara Narag of Linao, Tuguegarao, Cagayan and forced their way into the
house adjacent to the store. The housekeeper, Marlyn Calaycay was pulled back to the store
by Elvis Doca as Henry was taken to the sala. Henry was repeatedly ordered to produce his
gun and money and when he refused Artemio hit him in the head with his gun. Henry gave
them money but insisted that he did not have a gun for which Calixto hit him with the butt of a
gun at the back of his head while Gaspara pleaded for their lives. The intruders then carried
away property and money that they had obtained from the couple. Henry died five days later
due to the injuries suffered from the robbery. Gaspara Narag passed away while the criminal
case was pending with the trial court leaving Marlyn as the lone witness left. The trial court
found Elvis Doca guilty of robbery with homicide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
It appears that the spouses Henry and Gaspara Narag, together with their housemaid Marlyn
Calaycay, were the only persons present when four (4) men robbed their house in Linao,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in the early evening of December 8, 1988. Henry Narag died five (5)
days after slipping into coma due to the severe head injuries which he suffered from the
hands of the robbers. Incidentally, Gaspara Narag passed away while the instant criminal
case was pending with the trial court, before she could testify as witness for the
prosecution. Marlyn Calaycay was the prosecutions lone eyewitness.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of the accused for the crime of robbery with homicide was
proven by the testimony of the single witness?
HELD: Yes, the guilt of the accused was sufficiently proven by the sole prosecution witness
for the crime of robbery.
ART. 294. Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any
person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of from reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed; or when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal property is
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to
another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on the
occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed. [29]
Contrary to appellants contention in the second assignment of error, his guilt for the crime of
robbery with homicide was adequately proven primarily by the testimony of the sole
prosecution eyewitness which we found to be honest and credible. Unless expressly required
by law, the testimony of a single witness, if found credible and positive such as in the case at
bench, is sufficient to convict for the truth is established not by the number of witnesses but
by the quality of their testimonies.
The court found the testimony of the sole prosecution eyewitness as honest and credible and
further holds that a credible and positive testimony of a single eyewitness is sufficient. A
conviction for the truth is determined by the quality of the testimony and not by the number of
witnesses.
People vs. Apolinario (G.R. No. 97426)

FACTS: Romeo Apolinario and Antonio Rivera appeal from a decision of the RTC finding
them guilty of robbery with homicide.
Appellants were charged in an information which reads as follows:
Xxx the above-named accused, armed with bolos and with intent of (sic) gain, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, by means of force upon things entered the
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
house of the Spouses SIMON HIBALER and RESTITUTA HIBALER through the window
jealousy (sic) and once inside, by means of violence and intimidation did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away personal properties including
Cash money, silver coings. Assorted jewelries et.al and that on the occasion and in the
furtherance of the robbery, Simon Hibaler was boloed several times causing death thereafter.
Appellants contend that they could not be convicted of robbery with homicide because the
robbery had not been proven as there was no conclusive evidence that they had carried the
money and other personal properties away from the Hibaler house
ISSUE: Whether appellants are guilty of special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
HELD: The element of taking or asportation in the crime of robbery, in the instant case, was
completed when appellants and Mario Sion took the personal property, even if (and this is not
true in the case at bar) they had no subsequent opportunity to dispose of the same. Restituta
had testified that after the robbery, she made an inventory and found many of their personal
belongings missing. The later disposition of the property taken, or the failure to dispose of
such property, is without moment so far as the characterization of the crime as robbery is
concerned. In People v. Puloc, it was held that:
. . .. As early as People v. Patricio, the settled rule is that when the fact of asportation has
been established beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction of the accused is justified even if,
as in this case, the thing subject of the robbery was abandoned by the accused and
recovered by the owner.
In People v. Salvilla, the Court held that in robbery, the element of asportation which
requires the taking of personal property out of the possession of its owner, without his privity
and consent and withoutanimus revertendi is present once the property is in fact taken
from the owner:
Severance of goods from the possession of the owner and absolute control of the property by
the taker, even for an instant, constitutes asportation.
In the case at bar, all the elements of robbery, i.e., (a) personal property belonging to another;
(b) was unlawfully taken; (c) with intent to gain; and (d) with the use of force upon things
were present. Because the homicide was committed by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery, appellants are guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE (ART. 294 [1])

People vs. Legaspi (GR 117802)
FACTS: For the robbery-slay of Police Officer Carlos Deveza and the physical injuries
inflicted on Wilfredo Dazo, the RTC convicted accused-appellants Dennis Legaspi and Emilio
Franco, for the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Legaspi and Franco were charged and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. They were identified as perpetrators of the crime by someone from a group of
eleven residents who were invited for questioning by the police. The accused now claims
that their rights during custodial investigation were violated.
ISSUE: Was the special complex crime of robbery with homicide duly established by the
evidence presented by the prosecution?
HELD: The evidence adduced established all the elements of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide. For in the crime of robbery with homicide, the homicide may precede
the robbery or may occur after the robbery, as what is essential is that there is a direct
relation, an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing.
This special complex crime is primarily a crime against property and not against persons,
homicide being a mere incident of the robbery with the latter being the main purpose and
object of the criminal. In the instant case, the records show that the fatal shooting of Carlos
Deveza, while it preceded the robbery, was for the purpose of removing an opposition to the
robbery or suppressing evidence thereof. New miso
The phrase "by reason" covers homicide committed before or after the taking of personal
property of another, as long as the motive of the offender (in killing a person before the
robbery) is to deprive the victim of his personal property which is sought to be accomplished
by eliminating an obstacle or opposition, or to do away with a witness or to defend the
possession of stolen property.
Obviously, the killing of Carlos Deveza and the shooting of Wilfredo Dazo were perpetrated
by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery. Thus, the physical injuries sustained by Dazo
are deemed absorbed in the crime of robbery with homicide. Taken in its entirety, the overt
acts of accused-appellant Legaspi prove that the lone motive for the killing of Deveza and the
shooting of Dazo was for the purpose of consummating and ensuring the success of the
robbery.
The shooting of Dazo was done in order to defend the possession of the stolen property. It
was therefore an act which tended to insure the successful termination of the robbery and
secure to the robber the possession and enjoyment of the goods taken. Accused-appellants
argument that the element of "taking" was not proved is thus unavailing.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
People vs. Robles (GR No. 101335)

FACTS: Patrolmen were on board a police vehicle patrolling. The police car came alongside a
taxicab with two male passengers. When the policemen noticed that the passengers were
acting suspiciously and could not look directly at them, they signalled the taxicab driver to
stop for routine inspection. The one seated beside the driver was identified as Manas, while
the one at the back seat was appellant Robles. The policemen saw two bags on the floor of
the back of the taxicab. When asked whether the bags belonged to them, the two men initially
refused to answer. However, Robles broke down and admitted that they had robbed the
house of one Jose Macalino in Makati. Detective then went to the house of Macalino and
there they discovered two dead persons inside the house, later identified as household
helpers of Macalino.
Appellant was convicted of robbery with homicide. He was apprehended after admitting the
crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not complex crime of Robbery with Homicide was committed.
HELD: Robles is guilty of Robbery with Homicide.
The unexplained possession of stolen articles gives rise to a presumption of theft, unless it is
proved that the owner of the articles was deprived of possession by violence, intimidation, in
which case the presumption becomes one of robbery.
In robbery with homicide cases, the prosecution need only to prove these elements: the
taking of personal property is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a
person; property taken belongs to another; the taking is characterized by intent to gain or
animus lucrandi, and on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof the crime of
homicide, here used in a generic sense is committed.
The homicide may precede the robbery or may occur after the robbery. What is essential is
that there is an intimate connection between robbery and the killing whether the latter be prior
or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes be committed at the same time. The rule
is that whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on occasion of the
robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as
principals of the crime of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the
homicide, unless it clearly appears they endeavored to prevent the homicide.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
PEOPLE vs. DANIELLA (G.R. No. 139230)

FACTS: An Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed against Manuel and Jose in the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which reads:
That the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping each
other, armed with bladed weapons and handguns, with deliberate intent and with intent to kill,
did then and there attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Ronito Enero by
stabbing him on the vital parts of his body with said bladed weapons, thereby inflicting upon
him physical injuries thus causing his instantaneous death, and with intent of gain, did then
and there take and carry away there from jewelries consisting of earrings, necklaces,
wristwatch and rings.
The defense argues that appellant never had the original design to rob when he went to the
Co compound.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution proved the crime of robbery with homicide
HELD:
HELD: The elements of Robbery with Homicide are as follows:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
A conviction for robbery with homicide requires certitude that the robbery is the main
purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the
robbery. The animo lucrandi must proceed the killing.
If the original design does not comprehend robbery, but robbery follows the homicide either
as an afterthought or merely as an incident of the homicide, then the malefactor is guilty of
two separate crimes, that of homicide or murder and robbery, and not of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, a single and indivisible offense. It is the intent of the actor to
rob which supplies the connection between the homicide and the robbery necessary to
constitute the complex crime of robbery with homicide.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
However, the law does not require that the sole motive of the malefactor is robbery and
commits homicide by reason or on the occasion thereof. Even if the malefactor intends to kill
and rob another, it does not preclude his conviction for the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide. In People v. Damaso, this Court held that the fact that the intent of the felons
was tempered with a desire also to avenge grievances against the victim killed, does not
negate the conviction of the accused and punishment for robbery with homicide.
A conviction for robbery with homicide is proper even if the homicide is committed before,
during or after the commission of the robbery. The homicide may be committed by the actor
at the spur of the moment or by mere accident. Even if two or more persons are killed and a
woman is raped and physical injuries are inflicted on another, on the occasion or by reason of
robbery, there is only one special complex crime of robbery with homicide. What is primordial
is the result obtained without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, cause, modes
or persons intervening in the commission of the crime.
Robbery with homicide is committed even if the victim of the robbery is different from the
victim of homicide, as long as the homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery. It is not even necessary that the victim of the robbery is the very person the
malefactor intended to rob.
People vs. Ricardo Napalit (G.R. Nos. 142919)

FACTS: The Information charges accused-appellant with robbery in band with homicide
defined and penalized under Article 294 (as amended by R. A. 7659) and Article 296 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Accused-appellant argues nevertheless that assuming that he had indeed participated in the
incident, he should only be held liable for robbery and not for the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide. For, so he claims, the shooting of Gomez by his companions was
beyond his contemplation and he never intended to perpetrate any killing, hence, only the
actual perpetrators of the killing should be held liable therefore and the killing should not be
appreciated to increase his liability. He further adds that his carrying of a firearm was only for
the purpose of threatening the victims so that they would not offer any resistance to him and
his companions.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused shall be held liable for robbery and not for the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide.
HELD: Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, provides:
Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Penalties. Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
suffer:

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the

robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall
have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
That accused-appellant did not shoot Gomez is immaterial. Article 294 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code is clear and leaves no room for any other interpretation. For, for robbery with
homicide to exist, it is sufficient that a homicide results by reason or on the occasion of
robbery.[35] The law of course exculpates a person who takes part in the robbery from the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide and punishes him only for simple robbery
when there is proof that he tried to prevent the homicide. No such proof, however, was
offered.
Whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, all
those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals in the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the
homicide, unless it is clearly shown that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.
As conspiracy has been established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since, in conspiracy, the act of one
is the act of all.
People vs. Montinola (G.R. Nos. 131856-57)

FACTS: Two criminal cases were filed against Montinola and he was later on sentenced to
reclusion perpetua for robbery with homicide and death for illegal possession of firearm.
Montinola boarded a passenger jeepney driven by Hibinioda. Among the passengers was
Reteracion. All of a sudden, appellant drew his gun, an unlicensed firearm, .380 cal pistol and
directed Reteracion to hand over his money or else he would be killed. Montinola aimed the
firearm at the neck of Reteracion and fired successive shots at the latter. As a result
Reteracion slumped dead. Montinola was charged with robbery with homicide and illegal
possession of firearm. He entered a plea of not guilty but withdrew the same after the
prosecution presented 3 witnesses. When rearraigned, he pleaded "guilty" to the 2 charges.
ISSUE: Whether the use of an unlicensed firearm on the killing perpetrated by reason or on
occasion of the robbery may be treated as a separate offense or as an aggravating
circumstance in the crime of robbery with homicide?
HELD: Where either homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
such use shall constitute an aggravating circumstances. but the same cannot be given
retroactive effect to herein accused.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Sec. 1 of P.D.1866 provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. Said Presidential Decree was
however, amended by R.A. 8294, while Montinolas case was still pending.
R.A. 8294 provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
No separate conviction for illegal possession of firearm if homicide or murder is committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm; instead, such use shall be considered merely as an
aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. Hence, insofar as the new
law will be advantageous to WILLIAM as it will spare him from a separate conviction
for illegal possession of firearm, it shall be given retroactive effect.
Pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294,
use of an unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance in the homicide or
murder committed. At any rate, even assuming that the aggravating circumstances present
in the commission of homicide or murder may be counted in the determination of the penalty
for robbery with homicide, we cannot appreciate in this case the special aggravating
circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294. Such law was not yet enacted when the crime
was committed by WILLIAM; it cannot, therefore, be given retroactive effect for being
unfavorable to him.
The Court further held Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which are both
indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the same Code provides that in all cases in which the law
prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be
applied when the commission of the deed is attended by one aggravating circumstance. If we
would apply retroactively the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm
under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, the imposable penalty
would be death. Conformably with our ruling in People v. Valdez, insofar as the new law
would aggravate the crime of robbery with homicide and increase the penalty from reclusion
perpetua to death, it would not be given retroactive application, lest it would acquire the
character of an ex post facto law. Hence, we shall not appreciate that special aggravating
circumstance. There being no modifying circumstances, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon accused-appellant WILLIAM.
In this case, the accused had been charged with two offenses: robbery with homicide and
illegal possession of firearms. During the pendency of the case, the amended law came into
force. The court then held that insofar as R.A. 8294 was favorable to the accused in that it
spared him from separate prosecution for illegal possession, the charge for illegal possession
was dropped. Insofar, however, as it increased the penalty for robbery with homicide, the
aggravating circumstances of the use of unlicensed weapon could not be appreciated.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
PEOPLE vs. HIPONA

Facts: On or about June 12, 2000 at 1: 00 am in Cagayan de Oro, appellant Michael Hipona
togetherwith Romulo Seva, Jr. and one John Doe conspired and feloniously had a carnal
knowledge withthe offended party AAA who is the aunt of accused Michael Hipona. On
occasion of the said rape,accused, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of
superior strength and dwelling,choked and strangulated the victim. The victims brown bag
worth P3,800; cash money in theamount of no less than P5,000; and gold necklace were
stolen by all the accused but the goldnecklace were later on recovered and confiscated in the
person of accused Michael Hipona.For failure to prove the guilt of accused Romulo Seva, Jr.
beyond reasonable doubt, he is dulyacquitted.
Issue: Whether appellant is liable of the crime of robbery with homicide.
Held: Yes. Robbery was the main intent of appellant. AAAs death resulted by reason of or on
occasionthereof. Following Article 294 (1) and Article 62 (1)1 of RPC, rape should have been
appreciatedas an aggravating circumstance instead. Wherefore, the decision of CA is affirme
d withmodification. Michael Hipona is guilty of robbery with homicide.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
ROBBERY WITH RAPE (ART. 294 [2])

PEOPLE cs. VERCELES
Facts: On October 19, 1996, in the morning, in barangay Malibong in Pangasinan, the
accused, MarioVerceles, Felix Corpus, Mamerto Soriano, Pablo Ramos and Jerry Soriano,
entered the house of Mrs. Rosita Quilates by forcibly destroying the grills of the window which
they used as an ingressand once inside, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully cart away
the following personalproperties: 1 colored TV, 1 VHS, assorted jewelries, 1 alarm clock and
1 radio cassette, allvalued at P60,000.00, and that on the same occassion, the said accused
feloniously have sexualintercourse with Maribeth Bolito against her will to the damage of the
said victims.
Issue: Whether accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape.
Held: On the matter of whether rape was committed, the SC agree with the trial court's ruling
that thehealed lacerations on the vagina of the victim nor the absence of spermatozoa
negates rape.Thevictim's delaration of her sexual ordeal given in a convincing manner, shows
no other intentionthan to obtain justice for the wrong done to her. Wherefore, the court finds
the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape and punished to suffer
penalty of

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
ReclusionPerpetua, and to award damages in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages a

ndP50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the rape victim.
PEOPLE vs. TAMAYO

Facts: On March 29, 1998, Mary Ann Guazon, a 24-year old sewer, was alone in her home in
Tatalon,Quezon City, her husband at work in Baliwag, Bulacan, while her children are with her
aunt inFairview Quezon City,. At 1 in the morning, she was suddenly roused from her sleep
by a man,who simulteneously covered her mouth and poked a knife to at the side of her
neck. She wastold not to move or she would b killed. The light on her house has been turned
off, but sherecognized the man as accused-appellant Nelson Tamayo, because of the light
coming from themarket outside.Despite the fierce resistance Mary Ann showed, the accused
succeeded in rapingher. After he had finished, she sensed that the accused was going to kill
her. She thus pretendedthat she enjoyed the encounter and pleaded with him to spare her.
Accused relented and warnedher not to report the incident or else she will be killed. He told
her to get dressed and handedover her clothes. It was then that she discovered that the
P500.00 she earned from doinglaundry that day, which she kept in her shorts' pocket, was
gone.
Issue: Whether the the trial court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty of the special
complex crimeof robbery with rape, despite his guilt not having been proven beyond
reasonable ground.
Held: Yes. That the accused is the person who raped complainant and stole the P500.00 is
beyonddoubt. The court finds his identification as the pepetrator of the crime to be positive
and certain.It was sufficiently explaines that the light coming from the market was bright
enough to enablecomplainant to identify him as the one who raped her.She also took note of
specific details thatwould ascertain the identity of the rapist. The contention of fabrication
must be rejected as thecomplainant has no ill motive to falsely implicate him in the
commission of the offense. Also, herconducts after the crime, strenghtened her account and
fortified her credibility. No decent andsensible woman will publicly admit being a rape victim
and thus run the risk of public contemptunless she is, in fact, a rape victim.
THEFT (ART. 308)

LAUREL vs. ABROGAR
Facts: On or about September 10-19, 1999, or prior thereto in Makati City, the accused,
conspiring andconfederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent togain and without the knowledge and consent of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone (PLDT),did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
and use the international longdistance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International
Simple Resale (ISR), which is amethod of routing and completing international long distance
calls using lines, cables, antenae,and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the
local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively
stealing this business from PLDT while using itsfacilities in the estimated amount of
P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of PLDT, inthe said amount.
Issue: Whether international long distance calls and the business of providing
telecommunication ortelephone services are considered as personal properties subjected to
theft.
Held:In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting variouse
quipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDTs telephone system, through which
petitioneris able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent PLDTs
facilitiesconstitutes all three acts of subtraction mentioned above.
LUCAS vs. CA
Facts: Herminigildo Lucas was charged with theft before the Regional Trial Court of
Binangonan, Rizal,together with Wilfredo Navarro and Enrique Lovena. The Information
alleged that on or about 8June 1990 the three (3) accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another,with intent to gain, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stole and
carried away one stereocomponent, a 14-inch colored TV, an electric fan, twenty-three (23)
pieces of cassette tapes,one (1) box of car toys, four (4) pieces of Pyrex crystal bowls, cash
of P20,000.00 and jewelryworth P10,000.00, valued at P100,000.00 all belonging to Luisito
Tuazon.Petitioner HerminigildoLucas and his co-accused Wilfredo Navarro pleaded not guilty.
Their co-accused Enrique Lovenaremains at large.
Issues: Whether the trial court erred to prove the conspiracy between the accused;- Whether
the trial court erred in proving the credibility of the witnesses; and- Whether the trial court
erred in imposing the penalties therein of the accused-appellant
Held: The court ruled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of a prior
agreement tocommit the crime. It may be deduced from the concerted acts of the accused,
indubitablydemonstrating their unity of purpose, intent and sentiment in committing the crime.
Thus, it isnot required that the accused were acquainted with one another or that there was
an agreementfor an appreciable period prior to the occurrence.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
QUALIFIED THEFT (ART. 310)

QUINAO vs. PEOPLE
Facts: A petition was filed for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision of the
CA findingConchita Quinao and Salvador Cases guilty of the crime Usurpation of Real
Property. Bothaccused and complainant are claiming ownership over the land in question.
The land was alreadylitigated and awarded to the parents of the complainant in a decided
Civil Case. Complainant'switness Bienvenido Delmonte declared that on February 2, 1993 at
around 9 o'clock in themorning while he was busy working in the agricultural land which he
owns in common withcomplainant Francisco Delmonte, accused together with their other
close relatives suddenlyappeared and while there, with the use of force, violence and
intimidation, usurped and tookpossession of their landholding, claiming that the same is their
inheritance from their ascendantsand while there, accused immediately gathered coconuts
and made them into copra.Complainant was forcibly driven out by the accused from their
landholding and was threatenedthat if he will try to return to the land in question, something
will happen to him.
Issue: Whether accused-petitioner who claims to be the owner of the land in question could
be heldliable of usurpation of her own property.
Held: As ruled by the trial court and affirmed by the CA, the issue of ownership over the land
inquestion having been decided in Civil Case No. 3516 in favor of the complainant in 1949,
thesame will not be disturbed. The accused has to respect the findings of the court.
The Court fullyagreed with the findings on the issue of the ownership of the lot involved in this
case. Theevidence on record sufficiently refuted petitioner's claim of ownership. In order to
sustain aconviction for "usurpacion de derecho reales
," the proof must show that the real propertyoccupied or usurped belongs, not to the occupant
or usurper, but to some third person, and thatthe possession of the usurper was obtained by
means of intimidation or violence done to theperson ousted of possession of the property.
The trial court and the CA ruled in the affirmativebased on the testimony of prosecution
witness Bienvenido Delmonte. The petition was denied forlack of merit, and the decision of
the CA was affirmed.
ROQUE vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 138954)

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
FACTS:Petitioner Asuncion Roque was charged of qualified theft in the Regional Trial Court
of Guagua Pampanga.
On November 16, 1989, accused Asuncion Roque, a teller of the Basa Air Base Savings
and Loan Association Inc. (BABSLA) with office address at Basa Air Base, Floridablanca,
Pampanga. As a teller he was authorized and reposed with the responsibility to receive and
collect capital contributions from its member/contributors of said corporation, and having
collected and received in her capacity as teller of the BABSLA the sum of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00), Roque, with intent to gain, and with grave abuse of confidence and without the
knowledge and consent of the corporation, take away the amount of P10,000.00, by making it
appear that a certain depositor by the name of Antonio Salazar withdrew from his Savings
Account No. 1359, when in truth and in fact said Antonio Salazar did not withdraw the said
amount of P10,000.00.
The RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. On
appeal, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified theft.
2. Whether or not qualified theft may be committed when the personal property is in the lawful
possession of the accused prior to the commission of the alleged felony?
HELD: The Supreme Court acquitted the accused for the crime of qualified theft. The
prosecution failed to prove by direct or sufficient circumstantial evidence that there was a
taking of personal property by petitioner.
Theft as defined in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code requires physical taking of
anothers property without violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things.
The crime of theft is akin to the crime of robbery. The only difference is in robbery there is
force upon things or violence or intimidation against persons in taking of personal properties.
In the crime of theft the taking of the personal property with intent to gain is without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things and the taking shall be without the
consent of the owner. In robbery, the taking is against the will of the owner.
Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the elements of the crime of
theft:
1. Intent to gain;
2. Unlawful taking;
3. Personal property belonging to another;

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
4. Absence of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things.

The foregoing requirements presume that the personal property is in the possession of
another, unlike estafa, [where] the possession of the thing is already in the hands of the
offender.
The juridical possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the perpetrators of the
crime, but remained in the owners; they were agents or servants of the owners and not
bailees of the property. But it has been suggested that one of the essential elements of the
crime of theft is that the intent to misappropriate the property taken must exist at the time of
the asportation and that while this element clearly existed in the De Vera case, it is not as
apparent in the case at bar.
In the present case, what is involved is the possession of money in the capacity of a bank
teller. In People v. Locson,[15] cited above, this Court considered deposits received by a teller
in behalf of a bank as being only in the material possession of the teller. This interpretation
applies with equal force to money received by a bank teller at the beginning of a business
day for the purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is only material possession. Juridical
possession remains with the bank. In line with the reasoning of the Court in the above-cited
cases, beginning with People v. De Vera, if the teller appropriates the money for personal
gain then the felony committed is theft and not estafa. Further, since the teller occupies a
position of confidence, and the bank places money in the tellers possession due to the
confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed.
PEOPLE vs. BUSTINERA (G. R. No. 148233)

FACTS: Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano, who manages ESC Transport hired appellant,
Luisito Bustinera as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo Racer. It was agreed
that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he would return it
to ESC Transports garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of P780.00 per day.
On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did
not return it on the same day as he was supposed to.
The following day, Cipriano went to appellants house to ascertain why the taxi was not
returned. Arriving at appellants house, he did not find the taxi there, appellants wife telling
him that her husband had not yet arrived. Thereafter, Cipriano went to the Commonwealth
Avenue police station and reported that his taxi was missing.
On January 9, 1997, appellants wife went to the garage of ESC Transport and revealed that
the taxi had been abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City. Cipriano recovered the
said taxi. Bustinera was charged for the crime of qualified theft.
The RTC convicted the accused for the crime of qualified theft.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty of the crime of qualified theft.

HELD: The Supreme Court acquitted Luisito D. Bustinera for the crime of qualified theft but,
convicted him for the crime of carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539.
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified,
with respect to certain vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as
"AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING."
When statutes are in pari materia or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the
same class of persons or things, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter, or
have the same purpose or object, the rule dictates that they should be construed together.
In construing them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter should be compared
with the new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so
construed that effect may be given to every provision of each. However, when the new
provision and the old relating to the same subject cannot be reconciled the former shall
prevail as it is the latter expression of the legislative will
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3)
that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of
the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.
Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is
committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence;
(3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the
property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property
stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion
of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or
civil disturbance.
On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines "carnapping" as
"the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things." The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs
to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent
to gain.
Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of unlawful
taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being the same.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anticarnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply.
The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as one for qualified
theft notwithstanding, appellant may still be convicted of the crime of carnapping. Amistake in
the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal
defect as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts alleged in the information
which determines the real nature of the crime.
In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with intent to gain, took the taxi
owned by Cipriano without the latters consent. Thus, the indictment alleges every element of
the crime of carnapping, and the prosecution proved the same.
PEOPLE vs. SALONGA (G.R. No. 131131)

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
FACTS: Accused-appellant Abelardo Salonga was employed by Metrobank as an acting

assistant cashier. In such capacity, he was in charge of managing money market placements
and payments of maturing money placement investments. Accused-appellant was the
custodian of the blank Metrobank cashiers check which was processed and
encashed. When a spot audit was conducted by Arthur Christy Mariano it was discovered
that there was a discrepancy in the proof sheet brought about by the issuance of a cashiers
check numbered 013702 made payable to Firebrake Sales and Services in the amount
P36,480.30. In order to facilitate the illegal transaction, accused-appellant falsified the
signature of the bank manager.
Hence, he was charged of the crime of qualified theft through falsification of commercial
document.
On July 19, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision finding Salonga guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abelardo Salonga is guilty of the crime of qualified theft through
falsification of commercial document with the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. with the
modification that the penalty is reduced to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The crime charged is Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Document. The
information alleged that the accused took P36,480.30 with grave abuse of confidence by
forging the signature of officers authorized to sign the subject check and had the check
deposited in the account of Firebrake Sales and Services, a fictitious payee without any
legitimate transaction with Metrobank.
Theft is qualified if it is committed with grave abuse of confidence. The fact that accusedappellant as assistant cashier of Metrobank had custody of the aforesaid checks and had
access not only in the preparation but also in the release of Metrobank cashiers checks
suffices to designate the crime as qualified theft as he gravely abused the confidence
reposed in him by the bank as assistant cashier. Since the value of the check is P38,480.30,
the imposable penalty for the felony of theft is prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods and one year of each additional ten thousand pesos in accordance with Article 309,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of qualified theft is
punished by the penalties next higher by two (2) degrees than that specified in Article 309 of
the Revised Penal Code. Two (2) degrees higher than prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods.
In addition, forging the signatures of the bank officers authorized to sign the subject cashiers
check was resorted to in order to obtain the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the
accused.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Since falsification of the subject cashiers check was a necessary means to commit the crime
of qualified theft resulting in a complex crime. Hence, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
applies, which provides that, x x x where an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be
imposed. Considering that qualified Theft is more serious than falsification of bank notes or
certificates which is punished under Article 166 (2) of the Revised Penal Code with prision
mayor in its minimum period, the correct penalty is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
CARIAGA vs. CA (G.R. No. 143561)

FACTS: Luis Miguel Aboitiz, employed as Systems Analyst of the Davao Light & Power
Company, Inc. (DLPC), received reports that some private electricians were engaged in the
clandestine sale of DLPC materials and supplies. He initiated a covert operation and sought
the assistance of Sgt. Fermin Villasis, Chief, Theft & Robbery Section, San Pedro Patrol
Station, DavaoHe also hired one Florencio Siton, a welder as undercover agent under the
pseudonym 'Canuto Duran', an 'electrician from Kabakan, Cotabato.
Canuto Duran struck an acquaintance with one Ricardo Cariaga, who offered to supply
'Canuto Duran' with electrical materials, saying that he has a cousin from whom he can
procure the same. His cousin is petitioner Jonathan Cariaga.
Petitioner Jonathan Cariaga was an employee of DLPC; he was permanently assigned as
driver of Truck "S-143" had charge of all the DLPC equipment and supplies kept in his
vehicle, including lightning arresters, cut-out and wires, which were generally used for the
installation of transformers and power lines; and specifically stored therein for emergency
operations at night when the stockroom is closed that he had access to the electrical supplies
of said company; and that with grave abuse of confidence, he stole electrical materials
belonging to DLPC.
The RTC found Jonathan Cariaga guilty of theft, qualified by grave abuse of confidence,
under Article 310, in relation to Article 309, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code, as charged,
aggravated by the use of motor vehicle which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jonathan Cariaga is guilty of the crime of qualified theft.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.
The SC states that while the mere circumstance that the petitioner is an employee or laborer
of DLPC does not suffice to create the relation of confidence and intimacy that the law
requires to designate the crime as qualified theft, it has been held that access to the place
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
where the taking took place or access to the stolen items changes the complexion of the
crime committed to that of qualified theft. Thus, theft by a truck driver who takes the load of
his truck belonging to his employer is guilty of qualified theft as was proven in this case.
PEOPLE vs. SISON (G.R. No. 123183)

FACTS: Appellant Ruben Sison is the Assistant Manager of the Philippine Commercial
International Bank (PCIB). He concurrently held the position of Branch Operation Officer of
PCIB Luneta Branch. As such, appellant was able to changed the account name from Solid
Electronics, Inc. to Solid Realty Development Corporation and that appellant made the back
office withdrawals in behalf of Solid Realty Development Corporation. He also facilitated the
crediting of two (2) fictitious remittances in the amounts of P3,250,000.00 and P4,755,000 in
favor of Solid Realty Development Corporation, an equally fictitious account, and then later
the withdrawal of P6,000,000.00 from the PCIB Luneta Branch.
The trial court convicted appellant of qualified theft.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ruben Sison is guilty of qualified theft?
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the RTC decision convicting the accused for qualified
theft.
Art.'s 308 and 310, respectively of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter's consent.
Qualified Theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two
degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a
domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle,
mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation,
fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake,
typhoon, volvanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Under Article 308 of the said Code, the elements of the crime of theft are:
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
1. that there be taking of personal property;

2. that said property belongs to another;
3. that the taking be done with intent to gain;
4. that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against intimidation of persons
or force upon things.
Theft becomes qualified when any of the following circumstances is present:
1. the theft is committed by a domestic servant;
2. the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence;
3. the property stolen is a (a) motor vehicle, (b) mail matter or (c) large cattle;
4. the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises plantation;
5. the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and
6. the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or
any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
The crime perpetuated by appellant against his employer, the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB), is qualified theft. Appellant could not have committed the crime had
he not been holding the position of Luneta Operation Officer which gave him not only sole
access to the bank vault but also control of the access of all bank employees in that branch,
except the Branch Manager, to confidential and highly delicate computerized security
systems designed to safeguard, among others, the integrity of telegraphic fund transfers and
account names of bank clients. The management of the PCIB reposed its trust and
confidence in the appellant as its Luneta Branch Operation Officer, and it was this trust and
confidence which he exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of PCIB in the
amount of P6,000,000.00.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
USURPATION OF REAL PROPERTY (ART. 312)

QUIANAO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 139603)
FACTS: On February 2, 1993, at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning, at Sitio Bagacay, Bgy.
Petong, Lapinig, Northern Samar, accused Salvador Cases and Conchita Quinao, together
with their other close relatives suddenly appeared and with the use of force, violence and
intimidation, usurped and took possession of a real property owned by Francisco F. del
Monte, claiming that the same is their inheritance from their ascendants and while there,
accused immediately gathered coconuts and made them into copra. Complainant was
forcibly driven out by the accused from their landholding and was threatened that if he will try
to return to the land in question, something will happen to him. Complainant was thus forced
to seek assistance from the Lapinig Philippine National Police.
The trial court rendered judgment finding both accused guilty of the crime of Usurpation of
Real Rights in Property. On 25 September 1997, it was learned that accused Cases died on
April 9,1995.

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The trial court convicted the accused for the crime charged. Petitioner appealed her
conviction to the CA. The appellate court, however, affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty for the crime of the usurpation of real property.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner
Conchita Quinao and Salvador Cases guilty of the crime of Usurpation of Real Property.
Article 312 of Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of usurpation of real
property as follows:
Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. - Any person
who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take possession of any
real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, in addition to the
penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him shall be punished by a fine from
P50 to P100 per centum of the gain which he shall have obtained, but not less than P75
pesos.
If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine from P200 to P500 pesos shall be
imposed.
The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of another's real property
or usurped real rights in another's property; that the possession or usurpation was committed
with violence or intimidation and that the accused had animo lucrandi. In order to sustain a
conviction for "usurpacion de derecho reales," the proof must show that the real property
occupied or usurped belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and
that the possession of the usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or violence done to
the person ousted of possession of the property.
More explicitly, in Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the Court stated that the elements of the offense are
(1) occupation of another's real property or usurpation of a real right belonging to another
person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed in possessing the real property or in
usurping the real right, and (3) the accused should be animated by the intent to gain.
Thus, in order to absolve herself of any liability for the crime, petitioner insists that the
elements of the crime are not present in this case. Petitioner maintains that she owns the
property involved herein.
However, the issue of ownership over the land in question have been decided in Civil Case
No. 3561 in favor of the complainant in 1949.Further, as established by the commissioner
appointed by the trial court to look into petitioner's defense, it was found out that the area
claimed by the accused encroached the area of the plaintiffs.

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ESTAFA (ART. 315)

ONG VS. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 165275
FACTS: Petitioner Goretti Ong, had for years been buying jewelry from Gold Asia which is
owned and operated by the family of Rosa Cabuso (the private complainant). While she
normally bought jewelry on cash basis, she was allowed to issue postdated checks to cover
the jewelry she bought in December 1994 up to February 1995, upon her assurance that the
checks would be funded on their due dates. When, on maturity, the checks were deposited,
they were returned with the stamp "Account Closed."
Hence, petitioner was indicted for Estafa. She was likewise indicted for 10 counts of violation
of B.P. 22 before the RTC of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 213645-CR to 213654CR.
However, the Information dated August 10, 1995, petitioner was charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila for Estafa, without specification under what mode in Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code the offense was allegedly committed.
The RTC convicted petitioner of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on appeal but modified the penalty
and the amount of indemnity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant can be convicted of the crime of estafa
despite the failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: The Supreme Court acquitted Goretti Ong, of the crime charged for failure of the
prosecution to establish all the elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
RPC.
Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution grants the accused the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation. This is to enable the accused to adequately prepare
for his defense. An accused cannot thus be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly
charged in the complaint or information.
From the allegations in an information, the real nature of the crime charged is determined.
In the case at bar, the Information alleged that petitioner issued the questioned checks
knowing that she had no funds in the bank and failing to fund them despite notice that they
were dishonored. These allegations clearly constitute a charge, not under paragraph 2(a) as

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the lower courts found but, under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
which is committed as follows:
xxxx
(a) 2(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover
the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount
necessary to cover this check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank
and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of
funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
xxxx
Although the earlier quoted paragraph 2(a) and the immediately quoted paragraph 2(d) of
Article 315 have a common element - false pretenses or fraudulent acts - the law treats
Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating a check or issuing a bouncing check differently.
Thus, under paragraph 2(d), failure to fund the check despite notice of dishonor
creates a prima facie presumption of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent
act, which is not an element of a violation of paragraph 2(a).
Under paragraph 2(d), if there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of
funds cannot be presumed, and unless there is a priori intent, no Estafa can be deemed to
exist. In the case of People v. Ojeda.
x x x [N]otice of dishonor is required under both par. 2(d) Art. 315 of the R[evised] P[enal]
C[ode] and Sec. 2 of BP 22. While the RPC prescribes that the drawer of the check must
deposit the amount needed to cover his check within three days from receipt of notice of
dishonor, BP 22, on the other hand, requires the maker or drawer to pay the amount of the
check within five days from receipt of notice of dishonor. Under both laws, notice of
dishonor is necessary for prosecution (for estafa and violation of BP 22). Without proof of
notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed and no
crime (whether estafa or violation of BP 22) can be deemed to exist. Notice of dishonor
being then an element of a charge under Article 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly
charged, failure to prove it is a ground for acquittal thereunder.
In the case at bar, petitioner was charged under paragraph 2(d), but there is no evidence that
petitioner received notice of dishonor of all, except one (Allied Bank Check No. 7600042 for
P76,654), of the questioned checks. Hence, with respect to all but one of the checks,
the prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.
Petitioner's defenses of good faith and lack of criminal intent, defenses to a malum in se like
Estafa. On notice of the lack of sufficient funds in her bank account, to cover the Allied Bank
check, petitioner offered to pay in installment, to which the private complainant agreed, the
amount covered by the said check, as well as the others. As reflected above, the prosecution
stipulated that petitioner had made a total payment of P338,250, which amount is almost onethird of the total amount of the ten checks or more than the amount covered by the P76,654
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Allied Bank check.
VELOSO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 149354)

FACTS: Shangri-la Finest Chinese Cuisine, at No. 4 Times Street, West Triangle, Quezon
City, is a restaurant owned and operated by the Developers Group of Companies, Inc.
Ramon Sy Hunliong (Ramon) was its president and general manager. Petitioner Roland
Veloso, claiming to be a consultant of then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco, was an
occasional guest at the restaurant.
Before the May 1995 elections, petitioner and then Congressman Cuenco, while at the said
restaurant, had a conversation with Ramon. This led to a friendly bet between petitioner and
Ramon on whether or not Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. would win as a Senator. Ramon assured that
Marcos, Jr. is a sure winner, but petitioner claimed otherwise. They both agreed that the loser
will host a dinner for ten (10) persons. After the elections, official results showed that Marcos,
Jr. lost in his senatorial bid. Hence, petitioner won in the bet.
On August 22, 1995, Congressman Cuencos secretary called Eva Anne Nanette Sto.
Domingo, the restaurants assistant dining manager, to reserve a dinner for one table
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
corresponding to ten persons on behalf of petitioner. Ramon, the loser, informed Eva that he
would pay for one table, his commitment to petitioner.
However, when petitioner arrived at the restaurant on August 23, 1995, he asked that four (4)
additional tables be set, promising he would pay for the same. Hence, Eva had four additional
tables prepared in addition to the one under Ramons account. The Sales Invoice for the
additional four tables amounted to P11,391.00.
When the Sales Invoice was presented to petitioner, he refused to pay, explaining he was a
guest of Ramon. Due to petitioners stubborn refusal to pay, Eva asked him where she should
send the bill. Petitioner instructed her to send it to Congressman Cuencos office as he was
always present there. It turned out, however, that he was no longer reporting at that office.
Hence, the bill was sent to his address at 63 Benefit Street, GSIS Village, Quezon City, but
still, he refused to pay.The lawyer for the restaurant sent a demand letter to petitioner, but to
no avail.
Consequently, petitioner was charged with estafa before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 31, Quezon City.
After trial on the merits, the MeTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime
charged. The said decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC Decision finding petitioner
guilty of estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner
Roland V. Veloso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa.
The Court found that petitioner and his guests, occupying four tables, ate the food he
ordered. When asked to pay, he refused and insisted he was a mere guest of Ramon. It
bears emphasis that the understanding between petitioner and Ramon was that the latter
would pay for only one table. Further, it agreed with the Solicitor Generals brief that petitioner
employed fraud in ordering four additional tables, partaking of the food ordered and then
illegally refusing to pay, which makes him liable for estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the
Revised Penal Code.
BONIFACIO VS. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 153198)

FACTS: On March 21, 1996, petitioner Crisanta Bonifacio received several pieces of jewelry
from private complainant Ofelia Santos, who is a businesswoman and a buy-and-sell agent of
jewelry. Bonifacio signed a document acknowledging receipt of the jewelry and agreeing to
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
sell these items on commission basis. She also promised to remit the proceeds of the sale or
return the unsold items to Santos within 15 days.
Petitioner failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale within the given period. She,
however, returned some of the unsold items at a later date. The value of the pieces
unaccounted for amounted toP154,000.
On March 28 and April 3, 1996, petitioner asked Santos for new sets of jewelry to sell
under the same terms and conditions. In both transaction, petitioner failed to account.
Santos sent a letter to the petitioner demanding from the latter the payment of the total
amount of P244,500. Petitioner gave her two checks amounting to P30,000 as partial
payment. However, the checks, bounced for being drawn against insufficient funds and being
drawn against a closed account, respectively.
Petitioner was thereafter charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The trial court rendered a decision, finding accused Crisanta Bonifacio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the RTC decision but modified the penalty:
ISSUE: Whether or not the element of misappropriation or conversion was proved to convict
petitioner for the crime of estafa under article 315 (1)(b), RPC.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The essence of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b), RPC is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received, to the prejudice of the owner. The words convert and
misappropriate connote an act of using or disposing of anothers property as if it were ones
own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.
In an agency for the sale of jewelry, it is the agents duty to return the jewelry on demand of
the owner. The demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust and the failure of the
accused-agent to account for it are circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
Here, petitioner admitted that she received the pieces of jewelry on commission. She likewise
admitted that she failed to return the items or their value on Santos demand. On the other
hand, the testimony of her lone witness, Lilia Pascual, failed to rebut the prosecutions
evidence that she misappropriated the items or their corresponding value. She also never
appeared in the trial court to refute the charge against her. Hence, the trial and appellate
courts conclusion of guilt by misappropriation was a logical consequence of the established
facts.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
RECUERDO VS. PEOPLE G.R. No. 168217

FACTS: Private respondent Yolanda Floro is engaged in the business of buying and selling of
jewelry. She regularly conducts business at her residence located in Poblacion, Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Petitioner Joy Lee Recuerdo, is a dentist by profession, who was introduced to
Floro by the latters cousin Aimee Aoro. Recuerdo became her customer. Sometime in the
second week of December 1993, at around 7:30 in the evening, Recuerdo went to the house
of Floro and purchased from her two pieces of jewelry, to wit: a 2.19 carat diamond round
stone in white gold setting worth P220,000.00 pesos, and one piece of loose 1.55 karat
marquez diamond with a value of P130,000.00 pesos.
For the 2.19 carat diamond stone, accused issued and delivered to the complainant then and
there ten post-dated checks each in the amount of P22,000.00 drawn against Unitrust
Development Bank, Makati Commercial Center Branch. Only six (6) postdated checks, are
subject of Criminal Case. For the 1.55 carat marquez loose diamond, accused issued and
delivered to complainant then and there ten (10) postdated checks, each in the amount of
P13,000.00 drawn against PCI Bank, Makati, Dela Rosa Branch. Six of those checks are
subject of Criminal Case.
In another transaction that transpired on February 7, 1994, Recuerdo once again bought
another set of jewelry, this time a pair of diamond earrings worth P768,000.00 pesos. She
was given seven (7) postdated checks one for P168,000.00 as downpayment and another six
(6) postdated checks drawn against Prudential Bank, Legaspi Village, Makati Branch, each
for P100,000.00 representing the balance in the aggregate amount of P600,000.00 pesos
(Checks Nos. 100783, 01184, 01185, 011786, 011787 and 011788, Record, Criminal Case
No. 2750-M-94, pp. 138-150) subject matter of Crim. Case No. 2751-M-94.
Floro deposited the aforementioned checks at Liberty Savings & Loan Association,
Meyc[a]uayan, Bulacan. Upon presentment for encashment by said depositary bank with the
different drawee banks on their respective maturity dates, the six (6) Prudential Bank checks
were all dishonored for having been drawn against closed accounts. With her pieces of
jewelry still unpaid, Floro, through counsel, made formal demands requiring Requerdo to pay
the amounts represented by the dishonored checks (Record, supra, pp. 123, 138, and 151).
Floros efforts to obtain payment, though, only proved futile as Requerdo continuously
refused to pay the value of the purchased pieces of jewelry.
The trial court found the petitioner Recuerdo guilty of two (2) counts of estafa, defined and
penalized under Article 315, par. 2[b] (sic) of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, , the CA
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision of the RTC as to the penalty
meted on the appellant
Estafa through false pretense or fraudulent act under Paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, is committed as follows:
By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had
no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover
his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima
facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The essential elements of the felony are: (1) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time it is issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the
check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof. It is criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a
check which is made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-payment of
a debt. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct by
false or misleading allegations or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed
which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury.
Concealment which the law denotes as fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide facts
which the other party ought to have. The postdating or issuing of a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein are not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check is a false pretense or a fraudulent act.
There is no false pretense or fraudulent act if a postdated check is issued in payment of a
pre-existing obligation.
Estafa is a felony committed by dolo (with malice). For one to be criminally liable for estafa
under paragraph (2)(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, malice and specific intent to
defraud are required.
There can be no estafa if the accused acted in good faith because good faith negates malice
and deceit.
In the present case, petitioners defense of good faith is belied by the evidence of the
prosecution and her own evidence. Petitioner never offered to pay the amounts of the checks
after she was informed by the private complainant that they had been dishonored by the
drawee banks, the private complainant thus charged her with estafa before the RTC.
Moreover, estafa is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the State on
its own motion even though complete reparation had been made for the loss or damage
suffered by the offended party. The consent of the private complainant to petitioners payment
of her civil liability pendente lite does not entitle the latter to an acquittal. Subsequent
payments does not obliterate the criminal liability already incurred. Criminal liability for estafa

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
is not affected by a compromise between petitioner and the private complainant on the
formers civil liability.
RAMOS-ANDAN vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 136388

FACTS: On February 4, 1991,petitioner, Anicia Ramos-Andan, and Potenciana Nieto
approached Elizabeth E. Calderon and offered to buy the latters 18-carat heart-shaped
diamond ring. Elizabeth agreed to sell her ring. In turn, Potenciana tendered her three (3)
postdated checks
Since the three checks were all payable to cash, Elizabeth required petitioner to endorse
them, the latter complied. When Elizabeth deposited the checks upon maturity with the
drawee bank, they bounced for the reason "Account Closed." She then sent Potenciana a
demand letter to pay, but she refused.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
The Provincial Prosecutor filed the corresponding Information for Estafa with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Malolos, Bulacan. Subsequently, petitioner was arrested but
Potenciana has remained at large.
During the hearing, petitioner denied buying a diamond ring from Elizabeth, maintaining that
she signed the receipt and the checks merely as a witness to the transaction between
Elizabeth and Potenciana. Thus, she could not be held liable for the bounced checks she did
not issue.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty as charged. The trial
court held that while it was Potenciana who issued the checks, nonetheless, it was petitioner
who induced Elizabeth to accept them and who endorsed the same.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with modification as to the
penalty.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution has proved petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and
In the present case, while Potenciana, who remains at large, was the drawer of the checks,
however, it was petitioner who directly and personally negotiated the same. It was she who
signed the receipt evidencing the sale. It was she who handed the checks to Elizabeth and
endorsed them as payment for the ring. It is thus clear that petitioner and Potenciana acted in
concert for the purpose of inducing and defrauding Elizabeth to part with her jewelry.
The elements of the offense as defined and penalized by Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, are:
(1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the
check was issued;
(2) lack of or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and
(3) the payee was not informed by the offender and the payee did not know that the offender
had no funds or insufficient funds.
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution proved that the checks were
issued in payment of a simultaneous obligation. The checks bounced when Elizabeth
deposited them for the reason "Account Closed." There is no showing whatsoever that before
petitioner handed and endorsed the checks to Elizabeth, she took steps to ascertain that
Potenciana has sufficient funds in her account. Upon being informed that the checks
bounced, she failed to give an adequate explanation why Potencianas account was closed.
Citing the case of Echaus v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that "the fact that the
postdated checkswere not covered by sufficient funds, when they fell due, in the absence
of any explanation or justification by petitioner, satisfied the element of deceit in the crime of
estafa, as defined in paragraph 2 of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code."

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
OTHER DECEITS (ART. 318)

CHUA vs. PEOPLE
Facts: On November 25, 1982, petitioner Anita Chua issued to Araceli Estigoy, complainant,
fivepostdated checks drawn against Pacific Bank in payment of imported items. Petitioner
wentagain to Estigoys house to purchase some imported items and issued eight postdated
checksdrawn against the same bank. On their due dates, complainant deposited the checks
but thesame were dishonored. She then notified the petitioner and demanded payment, to
which thepetitioner failed to redeem or pay the amounts of the checks.Appellant admitted
using the checks but interposed the defense that she issued the checks ascollateral and by
way of accommodation of the complainant who requested for the checks.
Issue: Whether issuance of unfunded checks as collateral or security for the goods does not
constituteestafa under Art 315 (2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Held: All the elements of estafa are present in the case. Petitioners defense is not worthy of
credence.Trial court correctly found and affirmed by CA clearly showed that they were
intended aspayments for the items she obtained from complainant. Complainant would not
have parted withhis goods in exchange of bum checks. It is likewise contrary to ordinary
human experience andto sound business practice for petitioner to issue so many unfunded
checks as collateral or byway of accommodation. As an experienced businesswoman,
petitioner could not have been sonave as not to know that she could be held criminally liable
for issuing unfunded checks. TheSupreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit.
GUINHAWA V PEOPLE (GR 162822)

FACTS: Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new motor vehicles,
including Mitsubishi vans, under the business name of Guinrox Motor Sales. On March 17,
1995, Guinhawa purchased a brand new Mitsubishi L-300 Versa Van with Motor No. 4D56AC8929 and Serial No. L069WQZJL-07970 from the Union Motors Corporation (UMC) in Paco,
Manila. The van bore Plate No. DLK 406. Guinhawas driver, Leopoldo Olayan, drove the
van from Manila to Naga City. However, while the van was traveling along the highway in
Labo, Daet, Camarines Norte, Olayan suffered a heart attack. The van went out of control,
traversed the highway onto the opposite lane, and was ditched into the canal parallel to the
highway.
Sometime in October 1995, the spouses Ralph and Josephine Silo wanted to buy a new van
for their garment business. They went to Guinhawas office, and were shown the L-300 Versa
Van which was on display. The couple inspected its interior portion and found it beautiful.
They no longer inspected the under chassis since they presumed that the vehicle was brand
new. Unaware that the van had been damaged and repaired on account of the accident in
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Daet, the couple decided to purchase the van for P591, 000.00. Azotea suggested that the
couple make a down payment ofP118, 200.00, and pay the balance of the purchase price by
instalments via a loan from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Naga Branch, with the
L-300 Versa Van as collateral. Azotea offered to make the necessary arrangements with the
UCPB for the consummation of the loan transaction. The couple agreed. On November 10,
1995, the spouses executed a Promissory Note for the amount of P692, 676.00 as payment
of the balance on the purchase price, and as evidence of the chattel mortgage over the van in
favor of UCPB.
ISSUE: Whether or not Guinhawa violated paragraph 1, Art. 318 of the RPC, or the crime of
other deceits?
HELD: Yes. The false or fraudulent representation by a seller that what he offers for sale is
brand new is one of those deceitful acts envisaged in paragraph 1, Art. 318 of the RPC. This
provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those enumerated in Arts. 315 to
317 of the RPC. It is intended as the catchall provision for that purpose with its broad scope
and intendment. It is evident that such false statement or fraudulent representation
constituted the very cause or the only motive for the spouses to part with their property.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
ARSON (ART. 320/ P.D. 1613)

PEOPLE V. MALNGAN (GR. NO. 170470)
FACTS:On January 2, 2001, Edna, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa Sr. was
accused of setting fire the house of his employer resulted in the destruction of his employers
house and the death of six persons including his employer Roberto Separa Sr., some seven
adjoining residential houses, were also razed by fire.
She was apprehended by the Barangay Chairman and was brought to the Barangay Hall.
She was then identified by a neighbor, whose house was also burned, as the housemaid of
the Separas and upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellants
bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant confessed to the Barangay Chairman.
On January 9, 2001, an information was filed before the RTC of Manila, charging the
accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with multiple homicide. The RTC as well as the
Court of Appeals finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson with
multiple homicide.
ISSUE: Whether or not Edna Malngan was guilty of the crime of destructive arson or simple
arson?
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
HELD: The crime committed by the accused-appellant is Simple Arson and not Arson with
Multiple Homicide. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no complex crime of Arson with
Multiple Homicide. There are two laws that govern the crime of arson where death results
therefrom Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 5 of Presidential Decree
1613, quoted hereunder, to wit:
Revised Penal Code
Art. 320. Destructive Arson xxxx If as a consequence of the
commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed.
Presidential Decree No. 1613
Sec. 5. Where Death Results from Arson if by reason of or on the
occasion of the arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed.
Both laws provide only one penalty for the commission of arson, whether considered
destructive or otherwise, where death results therefrom. The reason is that arson is itself the
end and death is simply the consequence.
The case falls under simple arson since from a reading of the body of the information it
can be seen that it states that the accused, with intent to cause damage, xxx deliberately set
fire upon the two-storey residential house, xxx that by reason and on the occasion of the said
fire, xxx which were the direct cause of their death xxx. It is clear that her intent was merely
to destroy her employers house through the use of fire.
When fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be in a house and
that objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal
Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be
purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take
life. In other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by means of fire, the offense is
murder. But if the main objective is the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be
absorbed by the crime of arson. The latter being the applicable one in this case.
PEOPLE V. OLIVIA (GR. NO. 170470)

FACTS: On August 23, 1993, at around eleven o'clock in the evening, Avelino and his family
weresleeping in their house. Avelino went out to urinate. He saw the accused-appellant set
roof of their house on fire with a lighted match. One of the neighbors, Benjamin, went to the
nearbyriver and fetched water with a pail. As Benjamin was helping put out the fire, he was
shot by theaccused. The gunshot wound caused Benjamin's death. Information for arson and
for murderwas filed separately against the accused and the other three co-accused.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of arson.

HELD: Whether the victim was shot while he was on the street or when he was pouring water
on theburning roof is irrelevant to the crime. The two witnesses on that aspect are not
necessarilyinconsistent. The Court agrees with the solicitor general that Benjamin could have
been on thestreet while pouring water on the burning roof. There is no need to prove that the
accused hadactual knowledge that the was burned is inhabited. There was treachery where
the victim, whilehe was merely acting as good neighbor, innocently helping out the fire, when
shot, unaware of the fatal attack on him.
PEOPLE V. ACOSTA (GR. NO. 126351)

FACTS: Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident of
Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a good
friend of Almanzor "Elmer" Montesclaros, the grandson of private complainant, Filomena M.
Marigomen. On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the fire, Montesclaros, in the belief
that appellant and his wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from him, stormed the
house of appellant and burned their clothes, furniture, and appliances. Montesclaros lived in
the house owned by said complainant and located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights
Subdivision, Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City. It was this house allegedly set on fire by
appellant.
At about 4:00 to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew of
prosecution witness Mona Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting that appellant
Raul Acosta, their neighbor, was carrying a stove and a kitchen knife. She went out of her
house and approached appellant who, when asked why he was carrying a stove and a knife,
replied that he would burn the house of complainant Filomena M. Marigomen.
Owing to the fearsome answer of appellant to witness Aquinos query, she returned
immediately to her house. A few minutes after closing the door, she heard the sound of
broken bottles and the throwing of chair inside the house of complainant. When she peeped
through her kitchen door, she saw appellant inside complainants house, which was
unoccupied at that time. Thereafter, appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag) and
lighted it with cigarette lighter. The fire was easily put off by appellants wife who arrived at the
place.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of arson.
HELD: In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstances
taken together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logical
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
conclusion, that accused started the fire which gutted the house of private complainant.
Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we agree with the trial
court in holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved and
on record:
First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it is
frequently impossible for the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for the
commission of the crime charged, nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the
existence or non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the
witnesses. Appellant had every reason to feel aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate in
kind against Montesclaros and his grandmother.
Second, appellants intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to set
on fire a bed ("papag") inside the same house (private complainants) which was burned later
in the night. Prosecution witness Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of
the same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas stove and knife. When she asked him what
he was going to do with the stove, he answered that he was going to burn the house of
private complainant.
Third, appellant was not only present at the locus criminis before the incident, he was seen
inside the yard of the burning house during the height of the fire. At around 1:00 in the
morning of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness Lina Videa was awakened by the
barking of their dog, so she went to the back of their house to investigate.
Fourth, appellants actions subsequent to the incident further point to his culpability. At around
12:00 noon of the same day, private complainant went with prosecution witness Lina Videa
to the place of Kagawad Tecson. They were about to leave when appellant arrived. Private
complainant asked him why he burned her house and appellant answered, "So what if I
burned your house?" Then appellant stared meanly at private complainant, who got nervous
and had to take medications. The following day, appellant threatened prosecution witness
Mona Aquino, saying that if she would testify against him, he would also burn her house.

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ADULTERY/ CONCUBINAGE (ART. 333. 334)

BELTRAN V PEOPLE (GR. NO. 137567)
FACTS: Petioner and wife Charmaine Felix were married on June 16, 1973. On February 7,
1997, after twenty- four years of marriage
petitioner filed for nullify of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. In the answer
of Charmaine, he alleged that petitioner abandoned theconjugal home and lived with a
certain woman. She filed a criminal complaint for concubinage.Petitioner argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriageposed a prejudicial question
to the determination of the criminal case. The RTC denied hismotion as well as his motion for
reconsideration. Thus, the petitioner filed an instant petition forreview.
ISSUE:
Whether the pendency of the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage based onpsych
ological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code is a prejudicial question that should merit
the suspension of criminal case for concubinage.
HELD:
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullify of petitioners marriage is not a
prejudicialquestion to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a
criminalaction, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon
which thecriminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue
raised in theaforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined.The subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void does not acquit him
from the crime of concubinage. He who cohabits with a woman other than his wife before the
judicial declarationof nullity of marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
VERA-NERI VS PEOPLE (GR. NO. 96602)

FACTS:
On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs. Linda Sare and
witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around 11:00 a.m., theydropp
ed first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at Crystal Cave, Baguio City
thenproceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium of the Neri spouses. At around 7:00 o
clock evening, accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the Neris condominium. Witness
opened thedoor for Arroyo who entered, he went down to and knocked at the masters
bedroom whereaccused Ruby Vera Neri and her companion Linda Sare were. On accused
Ruby Vera Nerisrequest, Linda Sare left the masters bedroom and went upstairs to the sala
leaving the twoaccused. About forty-five minutes later, Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda
Sare that she couldalready come down. Three of them, thereafter, went up to the sala then
left the condominium.(Court of Appeals Decision.)
ISSUE: Whether Dr. Neris alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from filing the criminal
complainton the ground of pari delicto
HELD:
Deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602, the Court believes thatpetit
ioner Arroyo has failed to show any ground that would warrant the Court reversing
itsResolution dated 24 April 1991; and on the Petition for Review docketed as G.R. No.
96715, the Court considers that petitioner Ruby Vera Neri has failed to show reversible error
on the part of the Court of Appeals in issuing its Decision dated 21 May 1990 and its
Resolution, dated 18December 1990. Petitioner Arroyo did not convince this Court in G.R.
No. 96602 to dismiss the criminal case on the basis of Dr. Neris pardon.ACCORDINGLY, the
Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 96602 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and this
denial is FINAL. The Petition for Review in G.R. No. 96715 is hereby similarlyDENIED for
lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS (ART. 336)
PEOPLE V MONTERON (GR. NO. 130709)
FACTS:
On March 7, 1996, at 12:10 p.m., fifteen year-old Mary Ann Martenez was walking home
fromWangan National Agricultural School, Davao City. While she was walking on a secluded
portionof the road, Mary Ann was hit on the head by a slingshot. She turned to see where the
stonecame from; she was hit again on the mouth. She fell down unconscious. When Mary
Ann cameto, she found herself lying on the grass naked. Accused-appellant was lying on top
of her, alsonaked. She struggled but accused-appellant, who was stronger, restrained her. He
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placed hispenis on top of her vagina, which caused her to feel pain. She frantically grabbed
his erect penis and pushed it away from her.
ISSUE:
Whether accused is guilty of consummated rape.
HELD:
Time-tested is the rule that between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses and the
negative averments of the accused, the former undisputedly deserves more credence andenti
tled to greater evidentiary weight. In the case at bar, Mary Ann Martenez positively
identifiedaccused-appellant as her molester. Mary Anns testimony pointing to accusedappellant as theauthor of th crime is corroborated by her cousin Arnel Arat. Accused-appellant
has commencedthe commission of the rape directly by overt acts, i.e., that of undressing
himself and the victimand lying on top of her, but he did not perform all the acts of execution
which should producethe felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. case at bar, it was Mary Anns violent resistance which prevented
the insertion of accused-appellants penis in her vagina. The foregoing conclusion is
supported by the medical findings of Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma that Mary Anns hymen was intact
and had no laceration.
PEOPLE vs. GIANAN (135288-93)

FACTS:
The first incident of rape happened sometime in December 1992, at around 9 oclock in the
evening, Myra (then eleven years old) asked permission forom his father if she could go to
hebut told Myra to stay and give him a massage. Myra obeyed her father. Afterwards, she
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again asked permission to go to their neighbors house and was already at the door when
accused-appellant pulled her and started kissing her. Startled, she resisted by pushing and
hitting her father, but she was warned to keep quiet or else she would be killed. She was
made to lie down by accused-appellant who then took off her clothes. He also undressed and
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. After accused-appellant was through, he got
up, dressed and then left. For fear that her father would make good his threats, Myra kept to
herself what happened.
A few days later, while Myra was taking a bath in their house in Tondo, accused-appellant
entered the bathroom and started kissing her on the lips, neck and genitalia. Because she
resisted and pushed him away, accused-appellant left.
Still, in the same month of December 1992, Myra was again molested by accusedappellant. She was cleaning the room of their house and her father was the only other person
in the house. Accused-appellant suddenly seized her and started kissing her. As before, her
father succeeded in undressing her despite her resistance and eventually consummated the
sexual act. Like the first incident, she did not mention this incident to her mother for fear that
accused-appellant would carry out his earlier threats.
Shortly afterwards, the Gianans house was destroyed by fire, as a result of which the family
moved to Barangay Pag-asa in Dasmarias, Cavite. Myras mother was able to land a job as
bookkeeper at the Santos Pension House where she was required to work from 7:30 in the
morning to 9 oclock in the evening. Accused-appellant, who was unemployed, was left in
their house with the children.[7]
Under this setup, the abuses against Myra continued. One morning in March 1993, while
Myra was taking a bath, accused-appellant entered the bathroom, removed his shorts, then
started embracing and kissing her. Myra, who was only in her undergarments, tried to push
him away, but was unsuccessful. Accused-appellant, while seated on the toilet bowl, made
Myra straddle him as he did the sexual act. [8]
The fourth rape incident took place in the evening of April 1993, after Myra and her two
younger siblings had gone to bed. Their mother had not yet arrived from work. Myra was
awakened as accused-appellant was undressing her. She instinctively kicked him, but she
was warned not to make any noise. Accused-appellant then started kissing her and pinned
down her left leg with his feet while undressing. He then proceeded with the sexual
intercourse with Myra who was crying while her father violated her.[9]
The fifth rape took place in November 1995. During the wake for her grandfather, while Myra
was serving coffee to those who came to condole with the family, she was told by accusedappellant to go home. A short while after complainant arrived, her father followed. They were
the only ones in the house. She was then told to prepare the beddings and, while she was
doing so, accused-appellant embraced and started kissing her. She resisted but was told to
keep quiet. Although accused-appellant was only able to lower her pants and underwear
down to her knees, he succeeded in abusing her.

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ISSUE: Whether accused-appellant is guilty of multiple rape and that the information against
him is void.
HELD: The evidence shows that accused-appellant was able to consummate each of the
rapes through force and intimidation. Myra testified that her father threatened to kill her and
the other members of their family if she revealed the sexual attacks to anyone. The threats
cannot be minimized considering the moral influence of accused-appellant over her. Indeed,
we have consistently ruled that in cases of incestuous rapes, the fathers moral ascendancy
over the victim substitutes for violence and intimidation. This especially holds true in the case
of Filipino children who are traditionally raised to obey and to respect their elders.
With regard to the incident in December 1992 during which accused-appellant kissed
complainant in various parts of her body in the bathroom where she was taking a bath, the
crime committed was acts of lasciviousness. The elements of the crime are: (1) that the
offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force
or intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious,
or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is
another person of either sex. Although the information filed was for multiple rape, accusedappellant can be convicted of acts of lasciviousness because the crime of acts of
lasciviousness is included in rape.
PEOPLE V COLLADO (GR. NO. 135667-70)

FACTS: The first of four (4) unfortunate occasions was on 27 April 1993 when Julie and her
oldest son Reggie went to Cubao. Messeah was resting in her bedroom upstairs when
Jessie suddenly barged into her room. Jessie then parted her legs and tied them apart,
pulling down her garterized shorts and panties until her ankles. He tried forcing his penis into
her vagina, but when he failed in his attempt, he inserted it into her anus instead. Messeah
felt pain in her anus and something sticky like paste flowed out from his penis. Her vagina
ached from Jessies earlier attempt to defile her. She saw Jessie close his eyes as though he
was enjoying himself.
On 5 June 1993 Julie and Reggie went to the Marikina public market, again leaving
Messeah and Metheor alone with Jessie. Messeah was resting on the sofa while Metheor
was in the garage when Jessie grabbed Messeah and dragged her upstairs. She screamed
and Jessie tried to cover her mouth. She was crying as Jessie told her to take off her shorts
and panties, took off his shorts, pressed her legs apart with his two (2) legs, and rubbed his
penis against her thighs, until it touched her vagina. She told him to stop because she was
hurting but he did not heed her plea. The intimate encounter went on for some ten (10) to
fifteen (15) minutes.
The third molestation happened on 7 July 1993. Again, only Metheor, Jessie and
Messeah were at home. Metheor was upstairs sleeping while Messeah was resting on the
sofa when Jessie suddenly entered the living room armed with a knife. Messeah called for
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her older brother twice, but Reggie had already gone out. She only stopped when Jessie
pointed the knife at her and threatened to stab her if she shouted again. He then forced her
to walk backwards to the kitchen where he told her again to remove her shorts and
panties. She resisted but Jessie insisted and even tried twice to stab her if she did not
comply. He used one of his hands to remove his shorts and briefs. He forced Messeah to sit
on a steel chair and told her to spread her legs. She sat with her legs closed together but he
got mad and threatened to stab her if she did not open her legs. She reluctantly opened her
legs slightly and Jessie spread them wider with his free hand as the other hand was holding
the knife. Jessie then told Messeah to sit at the edge of the steel chair, like before. He stood
with one hand holding on to her shoulder, the other holding the knife, and stood straddling her
legs. He then inserted his penis between her thighs and used his legs to press her thighs
together (apart?). Then he rubbed his penis against her thighs for some three (3) to five (5)
minutes until it touched her vagina.
Jessie again took advantage of the situation on 17 October 1993 when everybody in the
Dumaoal household, except for the two (2) youngest children, were away from home. As
Messeah was changing her clothes after coming from the party, Jessie again entered her
room, told her to remove her panty, and inserted his smallest finger (kalingkingan) into her
vagina while telling her to keep silent. He then removed his pants and briefs and went on top
of her. This time, he was not able to touch her vagina with his penis because Messeah cried
and screamed and called for Metheor who again went up and told Jessie, Get away from my
sister. Jessie stopped but threatened to throw the children to the sharks if they told their
parents what happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of multiple rape
HELD: The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellant guilty of three (3) counts of
acts of lasciviousness. The SC took however to its finding that statutory rape was committed
by him on 5 June 1993. A thorough evaluation of the records will show that accused-appellant
should only be convicted for acts of lasciviousness and not for consummated rape.
The SC held that absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.
touching of either the labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated
rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
The SC found accused guilty of 4 counts of acts of lasciviousness, aggravated by obvious
ungratefulness. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant was sentenced
to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and twenty (20) days of arresto mayor
maximum as minimum, to four (4) years six (6) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional maximum as maximum, in each count of Acts of Lasciviousness. Accusedappellant was further directed to pay the private complainant P30,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P40,000.00 for moral damages, P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, in each of the four (4)
counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, and to pay the costs.

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DULLA V. COURT OF APPEALS (GR. NO. 123164)

FACTS: On February 2, 1993, Andrea, who was then three years old, came home crying, with
bruises on her right thigh. She told her guardian, Iluminada Beltran, that her uncle, herein
petitioner, touched her private part. In her own words, she said, Inaano ako
ng uncle ko, while doing a pumping motion with the lower part of her body to demonstrate
what had been done to her. She also said that petitioner showed his penis to her.
The matter was reported to Barangay Councilor Carlos Lumaban who, with the child, the
latters guardian, and three barangay tanods, went to the house of petitioner to confront him.
As petitioners father refused to surrender his son to Lumaban and his party, Lumaban sought
assistance from the nearby Western Police District (WPD) Station No. 7. It appears, however,
that petitioner took advantage of the situation and ran away.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of crime of acts of lasciviousness
HELD: Petitioner questions the competence of Andrea as a witness. He argues that Andrea is
not capable of understanding the questions propounded to her. Moreover, she did not take an
oath and the fact that she was asked purely leading questions shows that she was only
coached by her guardian. The contention has no merit. As a general rule, all persons who
can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses. Under Rule 130, 21 of the Rules of Court, only children who, on account of
immaturity, are incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of
relating them truthfully are disqualified from being witnesses. In People v. Mendoza, the Court
held:
It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully
facts respecting which he is examined. In the 1913 decision in United States vs. Buncad, this
Court stated:
Professor Wigmore, after referring to the common-law precedents upon this point, says: But
this much may be taken as settled, that no rule defines any particular ageas conclusive of
incapacity; in each instance the capacity of the particular child is to be investigated.
(Wigmore on Evidence, vol. I, p. 638)
...
The requirements then of a childs competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity of
observation, (b) capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of communication. And in
ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing, it is settled
that the trial court is called upon to make such determination.

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In the case at bar, Andrea was three years and 10 months old at the time she testified.
Despite her young age, however, she was able to respond to the questions put to her. She
answered yes and no to questions and, when unable to articulate what was done to her by
petitioner, Andrea demonstrated what she meant. During her interrogation, she showed an
understanding of what was being asked. She was consistent in her answers to the questions
asked by the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and even by the judge.
PEOPLE vs. PEREZ (G.R. No. 141647-51)

Facts: Jobelyn Ramos, then eleven (11) years old, was with her four younger siblings
sleeping in the sala of their house. The accused, said to be an uncle of Jobelyn, entered the
house, approached Jobelyn and unceremoniously pulled down her shorts and underwear.
Followingly, the accused removed his shorts, pinned the girl down and "pressed" his penis
against her vagina. Her struggles failed to dissuade the accused. He sucked her breast and
attempted to penetrate Jobelyn. With his penis still touching Jobelyn's private part, he
threatened to kill her family if she were to report the incident to anyone.
In the early morning of 23 January 1998, Jobelyn was roused from slumber when she felt the
accused caressing her hair. He covered her with a blanket upon seeing her awake. He pulled
down her shorts and underwear and placed himself on top of her. He tried to force his penis
into her but she struggled to forestall the assault. Amidst sobs, Jobelyn told the accused that
she would report his abuses to her mother. He repeated his prior threat and, again, she was
forced into silence.
The incident was repeated once more when Jobelyn was pretending to be asleep while
accused forced her to lie face-up and he inserted his penis into her anus after removing her
shorts and underwear.
The incident of rape was repeated twice.
Issue: Whether the accused was correctly convicted by the lower court for the crime of acts
of lasciviousness.
Held: In Criminal Case No. 19120, the trial court correctly found appellant guilty of acts of
lasciviousness. Appellant was shrouded with lust in trying, although unsuccessfully, to get the
young girl to suck his penis.
The elements of this crime are that: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness; (b) by using force or intimidation, or when the offended party is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious, or the offended party is under 12 years of age. In acts of
lasciviousness, the acts complained of are prompted by lust or lewd design where the victim
has not encouraged such acts. In cases of acts of lasciviousness, the offender is deemed to

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have accomplished all the elements necessary for the existence of the felony once he has
been able, by his overt acts, to actually achieve or attain his purpose.

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QUALIFIED SEDUCTION(ART. 337)

PEOPLE vs. JAVIER, (G.R. No. 126096)
FACTS: Under review are three separate complaints filed against accused-appellant charging
him with rape committed against his daughter, Julia Ratunil Javier, on October 20, 1994 and
sometime in November, 1994 and December, 1994.
The complainant is a minor of 16 years of age. She testified that on October 20, 1994, at
more or less 1 oclock in the afternoon, by means of force, violence, and intimidation, while
inside their dwelling house, accused-appellant and her daughter, herein complainant were
alone in their house. complainants mother during that time was out doing laundry work as a
laundry woman. The accused-appellant pulled complainant to his bedroom in and as she
refused, wrestled and shouted for help, accused-appellant boxed and hit her stomach to
unconsciousness and there, against complainants will and consent, had carnal knowledge
with her. The complainant noticed upon regaining consciousness that she was already raped,
and the accused threatened her of death if she would reveal the incident to her mother or to
anybody else. This incident happened again sometime in November and December 1994,
which resulted to the complainants pregnancy.
Accused-appellant denied the charges against him alleging that the same were engineered
by his mother-in-law, who despises him for being a drunkard. He further declared that Julia is
an errant daughter, who after reaching the age of 14, started attending dances and acquired
several sweethearts but only one of them paid visits at their house. Thus, he beat her,
especially when he discovered her to be pregnant.
The accused-appellant also posed the defense of alibi contending that he was working at the
time the rape incidents happened.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment finding accused-appellant Amado Sandrias Javier,
guilty of rape in Criminal Case No. 95-136 and of Qualified Seduction in Criminal Cases Nos.
95-147 and 95-148.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court correctly found the accused-appellant guilty of the crimes charged.
HELD
The trial court correctly convicted accused-appellant of the crime of rape in Criminal Case
No. 95-136. However, this court cannot agree with RTC judgment insofar as Criminal Cases
No. 95-147 and 95-148 are concerned.
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RATIO
The Trial court erred when it proceeded to convict accused-appellant merely of qualified
seduction under Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code in the aforementioned cases.
This court finds that the accused-appellant employed practically the same force and
intimidation in committing the crime on October 20, 1994, November 18, 1994 and December
19, 1994. The commission of rape with force and intimidation under Article 335 (par. 2) of the
Revised Penal Code is clearly established by the testimony of complainant herself. Said
testimony plainly shows how accused-appellant took advantage of his moral ascendancy
over complainant despite her struggle and resistance.
Moreover, assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the use of force by accusedappellant, the latter cannot be convicted of qualified seduction. It is only when the complaint
for rape contains allegations for qualified seduction that the accused may be convicted of the
latter in case the prosecution fails to prove the use of force by the accused. To do otherwise
would be violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be informed
of the accusation against him. The accused charged with rape cannot be convicted of
qualified seduction under the same information. Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are
not identical offenses. While the two felonies have one common element which is carnal
knowledge of a woman, they significantly vary in all other respects.
What the trial court should have done was to dismiss the charges for rape in Criminal Cases
No. 95-147 and 95-148, if indeed, in its opinion, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish
the existence of force and intimidation, and order instead the filing of the appropriate
information. Be that as it may, this Court believes otherwise and is fully convinced that
accused-appellant is guilty as well of these two other counts of rape.
PEOPLE vs. MANANSALA (G.R. Nos. 110974-81)

FACTS: Eight (8) criminal cases for rape were commenced against accused-appellant, upon
complaint of his daughter Jennifer, in the RTC of Manila.
Accused-appellant was a taho vendor. He lived in the taho factory located at 1223
Asuncion Street, Tondo, Manila, after separating from Jennifers mother with whom he had
lived in common law relation.
The prosecutions version of the facts of the case is quite vague. Its principal witness,
Jennifer Manansala, declared during her direct examination that, on November 1, 1991, she
was taken by her father to the taho factory in Tondo and she was ordered to proceed to a
room on the upper floor of the factory where the Accused-appellant proceeded to do the
sexual act or rape. She further testified that this sexual torture was repeatedly happened
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eight times on 2nd , 3rd ,4th ,6th and 8th of November. These all happened in the taho factory
in Tondo. .
However, on cross examination, Jennifer changed her statement that the rapes were
committed in the taho factory. She told the court that only the first one was committed there
and that was on November 1, but the rest were committed in Tarlac, from November 2, 1991
to November 8, 1991. When again queried by the defense counsel where she had been
raped - whether in Tarlac or at the taho factory in Manila - she said at the taho factory.
On March 20, 1992, the next hearing, she was again asked, this time by the court, where she
had been raped on November 3, 1991 and she said, without limiting herself to November 3,
that what actually happened is that she was raped in Tarlac. She explained that the reason
why she claimed she had been raped at the taho factory in Manila was because she was
afraid her complaints might be dismissed for improper venue.
Accused-appellant denied the accusations against him. He testified, among others, that he
was in Tarlac from October 31, 1991 up to November 14, 1991; that Jennifer was with him in
Tarlac on those dates; that he did not do any of the acts alleged in the complaints; [and that
the reason the complaints were filed against him was because his wife Teresita was angry at
him for his refusal to give her money. Accused-appellant said that Teresita was a very violent
person and that she beat Jennifer whenever she was angry. On several occasions, Jennifer
showed him the scratches and marks caused by her mother. He said at one time even he
had been chased by his wife with a knife.
He insisted that Jennifer had been instigated by her mother to file the cases against him.
Dantes testimony that he did not rape Jennifer and that he and Jennifer were both in Tarlac
from October 31, 1991 up to November 14, 1991 was corroborated by the testimonies of the
accused-appellants mother, Adriana Manansala and his aunt Rebecca M. Bautista.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of having raped his daughter in the taho
factory in Tondo, Manila on November 1, 1991. However although said court found that the
accused-appellant had also raped his daughter from November 2, 1991 to November 8,
1991, but since he committed these rest of the crimes in Tarlac, it is beyond the court a quos
jurisdiction. Accordingly, it held accused-appellant Dante Manansala guilty of rape committed
in Manila on November 1, 1991, as charged in Criminal Case No. 91-100766, but dismissed
the complaints in Criminal Case Nos. 100767 to 100773, with respect to rapes committed
from November 2, 1991 to November 8, 1991.
ISSUES: Whether the appellant is guilty of the crime of rape as charged? Whether the
appellant could be convicted of the crime of qualified seduction?
HELD:
This Court is constrained to reverse the conviction of the accused-appellant on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

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Since the charge does not include qualified seduction, the appellant could not be convicted
thereof
RATIO
The trial court finding was based solely on the testimony of the complainant. In so doing, the
trial court disregarded the contradictory testimony of Jennifers own mother, Teresita, who
stated on cross examination that Jennifer was with accused-appellant in Tarlac from
November 1, 1991 up to November 13, 1991 and that Jennifer told her the sexual assaults
took place in Tarlac. Accused-appellant could not therefore have raped his daughter in Manila
on November 1, 1991.
This court in many instances sustained the conviction of an accused on the basis of the lone
testimony of the victim, especially because the crime is generally committed with only the
accused and the victim present. But in order to justify the conviction of the accused, the
testimony must be credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature.
In the case at bar, the trial court erred in relying on the claim of complainant as basis for its
finding that although seven rapes had been committed by accused-appellant against her in
Tarlac on successive days from November 2 to 8, 1991, one was committed on November 1,
1991 in Manila, in view of inconsistencies in her statements as to the place of commission of
the crime. If, as the complainant implied one rape the one allegedly committed on
November 1, 1991 was committed in Manila, there would be no basis for her fear of total
failure of prosecution in Manila.
The truth is that complainant ran into a series of contradictions because her mother, on
February 11, 1992, had told the court that complainant was in Tarlac with accused-appellant
from November 1-13, 1991. Complainant could not therefore have been raped in Manila as
she had claimed before.
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, especially the complainant
herself, cannot be dismissed as trivial. They call into question the credibility
of complainant. It was error for the trial court to rely on complainants testimony for evidence
that accused-appellant had raped her on November 1, 1991 in Manila. Trial courts must keep
in mind that the prosecution must be able to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt to justify the conviction of the accused. The
prosecution must stand or fall on its own evidence; it cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.
The prosecutions evidence is not only shot through with inconsistencies and contradictions, it
is also improbable. If complainant had been raped on November 1, 1991, the Court cannot
understand why she went with her father to Tarlac on November 2 and stayed there with him
until November 14, 1991. She was supposed to have gone through a harrowing experience
at the hands of her father but the following day and for thirteen more days after that she
stayed with him. It is true the medico-legal examination conducted on November 17, 1991
showed that she was no longer a virgin and that she had had recent sexual intercourse. But
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the fact that she had voluntarily gone with her father to Tarlac suggests that the crime was not
rape but, quite possibly qualified seduction, considering the age of complainant (14 at the
time of the crime). This is especially true because she said she had been given money by
her father everytime they had an intercourse.
The fact that she could describe the lurid details of the sexual act shows that it was not an
ordeal that she went through but a consensual act. One subjected to sexual torture can
hardly be expected to see what was being done to her. What is clear from complainants
testimony is that although accused-appellant had had sexual intercourse with her, it was not
done by force or intimidation. Nor was the rape made possible because of accusedappellants moral ascendancy over her, for the fact is that accused-appellant was not living
with them, having separated from complainants mother in 1986.
Thus, considering the allegations in the complaint that the rape in this case was committed
by means of force, violence and intimidation, accused-appellant cannot possibly be
convicted of qualified seduction without offense to the constitutional rights of the accused to
due process and to be informed of the accusation against him. That charge does not include
qualified seduction. Neither can qualified seduction include rape.
This court reversed the decision of the RTC acquitting accused-appellant Dante Manansala Y
Manalansang on the ground of reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
PEOPLE vs. SUBINGSUBING (G.R. Nos. 104942-43)

FACTS

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Accused-appellant Napoleon Subingsubing was charged with the crime of rape in three (3)
separate informations in CRIMINAL CASES NO. 772. 773 and 774.
The complainant, Mary Jane Espilan testified that she is sixteen years old, unmarried and
lived with her grandmother for the past three years at the latter's house at Bo. Fiangtin,
Barlig, Mountain Province. The accused Napoleon Subingsubing is the complainant's uncle,
who was then living with his mother and his niece in the same house as mentioned. On Nov.
25, 1989, at 1:00 P.M., Mary Jane and Napoleon were alone in the house, the grandmother
having gone to the fields. When Mary Jane was about to go out to attend her afternoon
classes in school, Napoleon forcibly pulled her to the bedroom of the grandmother, pointed
his Garand rifle at her, then punched her in the stomach, as a result of which, the former lost
consciousness. When the complainant regained her senses, she noticed that she was en
dishabille and her vagina was bloody. She felt pain in her private parts and is quite certain
she was raped or abused. The accused who was then standing outside the room warned the
complainant not to tell anybody what happened or else he will kill her. In the morning of
November 28, 1989, at 10:30 o' clock A.M., Mary Jane arrived from school and Napoleon was
alone in the house. The latter again sexually abused or took advantage of the complainant
second time around. All the while, Napoleon was holding unto his rifle and Mary Jane was
afraid to scream for he might squeeze the trigger. Immediately thereafter, the complainant
gathered up all her clothes and went to their own family house at Bo. Pat-tog, Barlig, which is
less than a kilometer away from her grandmother's residence. She wanted to get away from
her uncle, hence she stayed alone in the house until November 30, 1989 in the morning
when the accused followed her. She was cleaning the ceiling of their house when Napoleon
sneaked up behind her, and when the former tried to scream, the accused placed a piece of
cloth with some sort of chemical over the nose of the complainant and the latter fainted.
When she awoke, Mary Jane found herself lying on the floor stark naked. She felt that she
had again been sexually molested. The accused who was outside the house menacingly
ordered the complainant to pack her clothes and go back home with him. The afternoon of
the same day, Mary Jane and Napoleon went back to the house of the former's grandmother.
The complainant did not reveal to anybody the things that happened to her for fear that the
accused might really kill her as the accused had threatened to do. Months later, when she
was with her parents in Baguio, Mary Jane finally divulged everything to her mother Rosita
Espilan. They went back to Barlig and reported the incidents to the police station where the
statement of the complainant was taken. Thereafter, she had herself physically examined at
the Barlig hospital by a government physician and was found pregnant. On August 29, 1990
in Baguio, the complainant delivered a baby boy. The latter before all these things happened
to her was a virgin with no prior sexual experience. She did not even have a boyfriend. In
open court, Mary Jane Espilan singled out the accused Napoleon Subingsubing as the culprit
in all of the incidents she earlier testified to.
The accused Napoleon Subingsubing denied the charge of rape as narrated above and
proferred a different story. He interposed consent on the part of the complainant as a
defense.
To bolster the claim of the accused, his mother, Rufina Subingsubing, who is also the
grandmother of the complainant, testified among others, that the three (3) of them were living
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
in one house and that their relationship was happy, even after the month of November 1989;
that the complainant left her house in March 1990 for a vacation and was fetched by her
mother; that the only thing she observed about the complainant was that her breasts were
becoming bigger; that the complainant and the accused got food for the pigs on Saturdays
and that when the latter would receive his monthly salary, the complainant would ask him to
take her to the movies.
Three (3) other witnesses for the defense were presented who corroborated the story of the
accused and testified that indeed, the complainant and the accused were seen going out
together and sharing happy moments months after November 1989 (when the alleged rapes
were committed).
The trial court found the case meritorious for the prosecution in Criminal Case Nos. 772 and
774 in view mainly of the testimony of the complainant which was found credible. Accusedappellant was, therefore, convicted for rape in said cases. However, he was acquitted in
Criminal Case No. 773.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the correctly found the accused guilty of the crime of rape in Criminal Cases
No. 772 and 774.
HELD
The accused is guilty of the crime of Qualified Seduction instead of rape under Criminal Case
No. 774, while acquitted in Criminal Case No. 772 based on reasonable doubt.
RATIO
Records of this case reveals, even if were to assume arguendo that the defense of consent
on the part of the complainant was not sufficiently established, that the evidence for the
prosecution cannot, on its own, stand and suffice to establish the guilt of the accused for the
crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt.
The records and the testimony of the complainant disclose contradictions and inconsistencies
on vital details which lead one to seriously doubt the veracity of her story. The complainant on
05 March 1991 testified that on 25 November 1989 and 28 November 1989, the accused
employed force and threats which rendered her unconscious and unable to feel anything
when ravished by the accused.
However, her testimony on 05 March 1991, and which rendered her "unconscious," is belied
by her own testimony on 02 April 1991, when she gave a detailed description of what
transpired during those incidents.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
The Court also cannot help but question the conduct of the complainant after the alleged
incidents of rape. The complainant did not reveal the incidents to her grandmother allegedly
because the accused told her not to and that he would kill the complainant and her
grandmother if she told anyone. Neither did she tell her mother upon the latter's arrival at
barlig on 28 April 1990 or soon after the complainant was brought by her mother to Philex
Mines in Baguio City. The mother was told of the alleged incidents only on 15 May 1990. It is
quite unnatural for a girl not to reveal such assaults on her virtue (if indeed they occurred)
immediately after they happened or when the alleged threat on her life and her grandmother's
had ceased, as in this case, when complainant had gone to Baguio. The complainant likewise
admitted that after the alleged incidents in November 1989, she still went out with the
accused to watch betamax movies or get food for the pigs in the ricefields. Such behaviour
directly contradicts the normal or expected behaviour of a rape victim. There is no way she
could possibly forgive, to say the least; and yet, complainant interacted immediately with her
assailant. Viewed in its entirety, such behaviour of the complainant appears to be inconsistent
with her charge of rape.
The accused, on the other hand, while admitting that indeed he had sexual intercourse with
the complainant on 25 November 1989, set up the defense that the latter consented to such
act. The Two (2) succeeding incidents were however denied by the accused. While we find
such defenses weak, we nevertheless stress once more the time-honored principle that the
prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence rather than on the weakness of the
defense.
Appellant's exculpation from the offense of rape does not mean, however, that his
responsibility is merely moral and not penal in character.
For failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the court set aside the trial court's
judgments of conviction for rape. However, the Court finds conclusive evidence (no less than
the accused-appellant's admission) that on 25 November 1989, the accused Napoleon
Subingsubing had sexual intercourse with Mary Jane Espilan when she was only 16 years of
age. The complainant and the accused were living in the same house. The accused is the
uncle of the complainant, brother of her own mother.
Qualified seduction is the act of having carnal knowledge of a virgin over 12 years to 18 years
of age and committed by any of the persons enumerated in Art. 337 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit: any person in public authority, priest, home-servant, domestic, guardian,
teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education and
custody of the woman seduced. Abuse of confidence is the qualifying circumstance in the
offense. Notably, among the persons who can commit qualified seduction is a "domestic".
And a "domestic," for purposes of said legal provision, has been interpreted judicially as
. . . Upon the word domestic being employed in said legal provision segregating it from that of
a servant, the term is applied to persons usually living under the same roof, pertaining to the
same house, and constituting, in the sense, a part thereof, distinguishing it from the term
servant whereby a person serving another on a salary is designated; in this manner, it has
been properly used.
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Under the circumstances of the case at bench, the court holds that a conviction for qualified
seduction is proper in Criminal Case No. 774. The verified complaint for rape contains
allegations, sans averment on the use of force, which impute the crime of qualified seduction.
Any deficiency in the complaint is supplied by the supporting affidavit, where complainant
averred that the accused Napoleon Subingsubing, her uncle, who was living in the same
house as the complainant, had sexual intercourse with her. The accused took advantage of
his moral ascendancy if not dominance over the complainant. She was presumably a virgin.
As already stated, the accused was a domestic in relation to the complainant within the
meaning of Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code.
Hence, the court modified the judgement of the trial court and convicted the accused of the
crime of Qualified Seduction instead of rape under Criminal Case No. 774 and was acquitted
in Criminal Case No. 772 based on reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE vs.ALVAREZ (G.R. No. L-34644)

FACTS
A complaint for rape by the offended party was filed against appellant Nicanor Alvarez. It was
alleged in said complaint that on or about June 6, 1969, the accused rape and have sexual
intercourse Loreta T. dela Concepcion, a virgin, 13 years of age and sister-in-law of the
accused while she was asleep.
The complainant in her testimony identified the appellant and stated that the latter was a
brother-in-law, his wife being an elder sister of the complainant. She was in his house
because the appellant asked permission from her father to take care of the appellants
son. She admitted that the son, then almost one year old, and her sister were in the house
during the incident. When she arrived in the afternoon at five o'clock the day before, the
accused was not present, returning only at around 9:00 o'clock that evening. She and the
appellants wife were sleeping in the sala when the appellant arrived and afterwards raped
her. She maintained that she was asleep at the outset, but after waking up she resisted but
she could not overcome the accused strength. She added that during that time, he
threatened to kill her if she ever revealed to anybody what was done. She also said that she
reported to her sister the following morning but the sister did not say any word. She did not,
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
however, report to her mother or father allegedly because she was afraid and that she might
be punished, because she knew that what had happened to her was bad. The complainant
informed her parents about the incident only in January of 1970.
The trial court then sentenced Nicanor Alvarez to reclusion perpetua for committing a crime of
rape.
ISSUE
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of rape.
Whether or not the accused-appellant could be convicted of the crime of qualified seduction.
HELD
No. The holding that appellant was guilty of rape through the use of force or intimidation
cannot stand.
Yes. For having taken advantage of a young teenager over whom appellant did exercise
moral ascendancy, it is fitting and appropriate that such act falls within the concept of
qualified seduction to which the appellant should be held responsible.
RATIO
The story of the incident as elicited in the complaining witness's testimony, that is, that, she
was raped before the very eyes of her sister, wife of herein accused-appellant, without the
latter raising a finger, challenges human credulity. Viewed from human observation and
experience not even a confirmed sex maniac would dare do his thing before the eyes of
strangers, how much more for a healthy husband before the eyes of his very wife? Then,
again, testimony that her sister before whose very eyes the alleged raping incident took place
did not lift a finger to her, mocks at human sensibility. In the natural course of things, this
piece of evidence is repugnant to common experience and observation in that the natural
reaction wife would be that of righteous indignation rather than passive [acquiescence]and
the natural response of a sister would be to protect the virtue of a younger sister from abuse
of her husband.
Appellant is therefore entitled to a reversal of the decision insofar as it would hold him liable
for rape.
It does not follow, however, that appellant's exculpation from the offense of rape means that
his responsibility is merely moral and not penal in character. It is clear from the information
that the elements of the crime of qualified seduction were included in the facts alleged. He
cannot be heard to complain thereafter that he is entitled to complete acquittal. As a matter of
fact, in his defense, rightfully given credence by us, he did admit his having taken advantage
of an inexperienced adolescent, the younger sister of his wife, to whom he ought to have

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been bound by the closest ties of affinity, considering also, as testified to by him, how close
she felt towards him.

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SIMPLE SEDUCTION (ART. 338)

PEOPLE vs. PASCUA (G.R. Nos. 128159-62)
FACTS
Private complainants Liza and Anna, both surnamed Paragas, are twins born on July 12,
1983. The appellant was their neighbor. Liza and Anna considered appellant as their
grandfather although he was not related to them.
On August 6, 1995, private complainants were playing near the house of the appellant when
the latter called Liza and instructed her to buy juice at the store. Liza obeyed. After she
returned from the store, the appellant ordered Liza to go inside his house and lie down on the
floor. Appellant then removed Lizas pants and underwear, went on top of her, inserted his
penis into her vagina and made push and pull movements. Liza tried to scream but appellant
threatened to kill her. After the sexual intercourse, the appellant gave Liza P10 and warned
her not to reveal the incident to her mother. Liza then went home but did not tell her mother
what happened for fear that her mother would punish her.
The same thing happened on January 27, 1996 when Liza was called by the appellant as she
was passing by his house. After her ordeal, this time, the appellant gave Liza P5 and
reminded her not to tell her mother what happened. So Liza went home without telling her
mother that she was sexually abused by the appellant.
Lizas twin sister, Anna, suffered the same fate at the hands of the appellant sometime in
August 1995 and on January 20, 1996. Anna was not able to shout because she was afraid
that the appellant would kill her and, just like Liza, she did not tell her mother that the
appellant molested her out of fear.
Private complainants mother, Leticia Paragas, learned of her daughters ordeal through her
older daughter, Rosalina, who, in turn, came to know of the rape incidents from the
appellants granddaughter. Apparently the granddaughter witnessed the appellant as he was
raping Liza and told Rosalina about it.
At the trial, the appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with private complainants but
insisted that Liza and Anna freely consented to the repeated sexual acts in exchange for
money ranging from P5 to P10. On several occasions, Liza and Anna allegedly visited him at
home asking for money and sexual satisfaction. In fact, it was private complainants
supposed persistence which drove him to accede to their demands to have sex, even if he
was having difficulty achieving erection as he was suffering from hernia. Thus, there was
never an instance when the appellant forced or threatened private complainants into having
sexual intercourse with him.
On November 14, 1996, the trial court rendered its assailed decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape.
ISSUE
Whether or not the private complainants voluntarily consented to the sexual desires of the
accused-appellant, thus, should be acquitted with the crime of rape.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for simple seduction.

HELD
The appellants defense that the victims consented to his lascivious desires is simply too
preposterous to deserve serious consideration. The appellant actually employed force or
intimidation on the two victims to satisfy his lust, hence liable for two counts of rape.
The argument of the appellant that, if he is at all liable for anything, it should only be for
simple seduction is untenable.
RATIO
Indeed, after admitting that he had carnal knowledge of private complainants on several
occasions, the appellant assumed the burden of proving his defense by substantial evidence.
The record shows that, other than his self-serving assertions, the appellant had nothing to
support his claim that private complainants were teenagers of loose morals and that the
repeated acts of sexual intercourse were consensual.
This court entertains no doubt that Liza and Anna told the truth. It is clear from their testimony
that private complainants tried to scream but the appellant prevented them by threatening to
kill them. Also, after each rape incident, private complainants were warned by the appellant
not to tell their mother what happened to them. It is settled that a rape victim is not required
to resist her attacker unto death. Force, as an element of rape, need not be irresistible; it
need only be present and so long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of
whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. Indeed, physical resistance need
not be established in rape when, as in this case, intimidation was used on the victim and she
submitted to the rapists lust for fear of her life or her personal safety. Jurisprudence holds
that even though a man lays no hand on a woman, yet, if by an array of physical forces, he
so overpowers her mind that she does not resist or she ceases resistance through fear of
greater harm, the consummation of unlawful intercourse by the man is rape. Without
question, the prosecution was able to prove that force or intimidation was actually employed
by the appellant on the two victims to satisfy his lust. Hence the crime committed is not
merely simple seduction.

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PEOPLE vs.TEODOSIO (G.R. No. 97496)

FACTS
Fernando Teodosio y Carreon was charged of the crime of rape filed by Elaine R. Cesar in
the Regional Trial Court. In the case at bar, it was established that at time of the incident on
December 19, 1985, the offended party, Elaine Cesar, was only 12 years and 6 months old
and a mere 6th grader while the accused was already 20 years old and a 4th year college
student; and that the accused is a sexually hot individual as borne by the fact that he
admittedly masturbates at least once a week. The offended party, Elaine Cesar, testified in a
simple, honest and straight-forward manner whereas the accused testified in an evasive and
sometimes incredible and inconsistent manner. Elaine, at the time of the incident, being only
12 years and 6 months old and a mere Grade 6 student, was quite gullible and easily
deceived by the accused. This court also noted that the accused admitted, on crossexamination, that he and Elaine agreed that they would stay in the Champion Lodging House
for only 'a short time which would be for 3 to 4 hours' only.
The accused claimed that when they first arrived at that motel in the afternoon of December
19, 1985, he phoned his house and talked to her sister, Imelda, to tell his family that he would
arrive home late that day. In order to satisfy his lustful desires, the accused who is a sexually
hot person, drugged the softdrink or pineapple juice which Elaine later drank inside the room

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
in that motel so that she became dizzy and eventually lost consciousness. Once Elaine was
unconscious, the accused raped her.
When she woke up at 5:00 A.M. on the following morning, December 20, 1985, Elaine found
blood on her private part or vagina and she felt pain in her body; when she asked the
accused what happened, the accused lied by saying that nothing happened. On the following
day, December 21, 1985, when Elaine told her mother what happened at the motel, her
mother got angry and lost no time in bringing her to the PC Crime Laboratory before 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon to have Elaine physically examined by the expert Medico-Legal
Examiner, Col./Dr. Gregorio Blanco. Dr. Blanco testified positively that in the course of his
physical examination of Elaine, he found her hymen to have a fresh laceration at 5:00 o'clock
and that said fresh laceration meant that there was a very recent sexual intercourse, and he
also concluded that the child, Elaine Cesar, was therefore in a non-virgin state because of
that fact. Considering that the accused first met Elaine Cesar only on September 11, 1985, it
is difficult to believe that the said young girl, being only 12 years and 6 months old at that
time, would have consented to go with the accused to a motel on December 19, 1985 for the
purpose of submitting her virginity to him. The accused also admitted on cross-examination
that while he and Elaine were inside the room in that motel that he kissed and embraced
Elaine and that he asked Elaine to give her virginity to him "three times". The accused, being
much older than Elaine, took advantage of, deceived and abused the latter sexually by raping
her when she was unconscious on account of her having drunk the drugged softdrink or
pineapple juice.
After trial, a decision was rendered by the trial court convicting the accused of the offense
charged as penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUES
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of the crime of rape.
Whether the appellant could be held liable of the crime of simple seduction.
HELD
No. appellant cannot be held liable for rape as it was a consensual affair.
No. appellant cannot be held liable for simple seduction either because such was not alleged
in the information.
RATIO
Elaine admitted that she knew appellant some three months before the alleged incident took
place because they were neighbors. Apparently, they fell in love with each other for Elaine
gave appellant her photograph with her handwritten dedication.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
The contradictions in the testimony of Elaine where she attempted to prove that their coition
was involuntary rather than fortify the case of the prosecution, served to demolish the same.
What is obvious and clear is that these two young lovers, carried by their mutual desire for
each other, in a moment of recklessness, slept together and thus consummated the fruition of
their brief love affair. Appellant cannot be held liable for rape as there was none committed. It
was a consensual affair.
Based on the evidence the crime committed by appellant is simple seduction. Article 338 of
the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 338. Simple seduction. The seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of good
reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age, committed by means of deceit, shall
be punished byarresto mayor.
All the elements of the offense are present. That;
Elaine was over 12 and under 18 years of age.
She is single and of good reputation.
The offender had sexual intercourse with her.
It was committed by deceit.
Appellant said he planned to marry Elaine and for this reason he successfully persuaded her
to give up her virginity. This is the deceit contemplated by law that attended the commission
of the offense.
Unfortunately, the essential ingredients of simple seduction are not alleged nor necessarily
included in the offense charged in the information. The only elements of the offense alleged
in the sworn complaint of the offended party is that she is over 12 years of age when
appellant had carnal knowledge of her. Thus, appellant cannot be convicted even for simple
seduction either.
This court rendered its judgment acquitting the appellant of the offense charged.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION (ART. 342)

PEOPLE vs. LINING (G.R. No. 138401)
FACTS Gerry Lining and Lian Salvacion were both charged with the crime of Abduction with
Rape.
On October 4, 1997, at around 12:30 in the afternoon, Emelina Ornos, then fifteen (15) years
old, requested permission from her parents to visit her aunt Josephine at Oriental Mindoro
where she was supposed to spend the night. She arrived at her aunts house at around one
oclock in the afternoon. While in her aunts house, Emelina was invited by one Sajer to a
dance party to be held at the barangay basketball court. Emelina accepted the invitation and
at around seven oclock in the evening of the same day, she went to the party, accompanied
by her aunt. Josephine then left Emelina at the party, telling her that she had to go home but
she would return later to fetch her.
At around 12:30 in the morning, the party ended but Josephine still had not returned. Emelina
decided to go home alone. On her way to her aunts house, Emelina was accosted by Gerry
Lining and Lian Salvacion, both of whom were known to her since they were her former
neighbors. Lining poked a kitchen knife at Emelinas breast and the two held her
hands. Emelina was dragged towards the rice field and was forcibly carried to an unoccupied
house owned by Mila Salvacion. [
Inside the house, Lining removed Emelinas t-shirt, pants and undergarments. She was
pushed to the floor and while Salvacion was holding her hands and kissing her, Lining
inserted his penis inside her vagina. Emelina shouted and tried to ward off her attackers, but
to no avail. After Lining had satisfied his lust, he held Emelinas hands and kissed her while
Salvacion in turn inserted his penis inside her vagina. Thereafter, the two directed Emelina to
put on her clothes. The accused then looked for a vehicle to transport Emelina to Barangay
Maningcol. Emelina saw an opportunity to escape. Accompanied by the friend of her father,
the complainant went to the barangay captain then to the police station where she was
subjected to a medical examination. The Chief of Police immediately ordered the arrest of
Lining but Salvacion was able to escape.
Accused Lining denied the accusations against him and disputed the findings of the trial
court. He interposed an alibi that he was not able to attend the dance party because his
brother-in-law, Artemio, requested him to look after the palay in his house.
After trial, the court found Gerry Lining guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
forcible abduction with rape, and for another count of rape.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape.
HELD: No. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape in this case.
RATIO

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The accused-appellant could only be convicted for the crime of rape, instead of the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape. Indeed, it would appear from the records that the main
objective of the accused when the victim was taken to the house of Mila Salvacion was to
rape her. Hence, forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape.
The Court sustains the trial court in not appreciating the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity, abuse of superior strength and the use of a knife in the commission of the crime of
rape.
Accused-appellant is deemed a co-conspirator for the act of rape committed by his coaccused Lian Salvacion. Thus, he is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case.
PEOPLE vs. EGAN (G.R. No. 139338)

FACTS
Lito Egan alias Akiao, thirty-six (36) years old, was an avid admirer of a twelve (12)-year
old girl named Lenie T. Camad. Both the accused and Lenie were members of
the Manobo indigenous cultural community in Mindanao and residents of Sitio Salaysay,
Marilog, Davao City.
On 6 January 1997 Lenie and her cousin Jessica Silona were fetching water at a deep well
several meters from Lenies house in Sitio Salaysay. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
the accused appeared from nowhere and forcibly dragged and pushed Lenie towards Sitio
Dalag, Arakan, Cotabato. He threatened to kill her if she resisted. Before leaving the site of
the deep well, he likewise terrorized Jessica by brandishing his hunting knife which forced the
girl to scamper for safety. About 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon, Jessica was able to report
to Lenies father, Palmones Camad, the abduction of his
daughter. Palmones with a friend proceeded to Sitio Dalag to look for Lenie. They sought
the help of the barangay captain of Sitio Dalag while the accused and Lenie stayed that same
night in a house in Sitio Dalag.
On 7 January 1997 accused Lito Egan forced Lenie to escort him to Sitio Sayawan, Miokan,
Arakan, Cotabato, still threatening to kill her if she shouted or resisted, and there stayed in
the house of a sister of Lito. It was in this place where under the cover of darkness and
desolation he allegedly raped Lenie. (She would however change her recollection of the
alleged rape when she later testified that the crime had happened on 6 January 1997 at the
house where they lodged in Sitio Dalag and that no other incidents of rape subsequently took
place).
For four (4) months the datus of Sitio Salaysay, who interceded for Lenies safe
release, attempted a customary settlement of the abduction in accordance
with Manobo traditions. It appears that the accused agreed to give two (2) horses to the
family of Lenie in exchange for her hand in marriage. The accused however reneged on his
promise to give two (2) horses. So since the amicable settlement was not realized, the
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
accused forcibly relocated Lenie to Cabalantian, Kataotao, Bukidnon, where she was
eventually rescued on 15 May 1997.
Lenie lost no time in denouncing the accused and exposing to her village elders the disgrace
that had befallen her. She and her father also reported the crime at the police station in
Lamundao, Marilog, Davao City. She was turned over to the Balay Dangupan, a shelter
house of the DSWD, which helped her in obtaining a medico-legal examination and executing
the necessary affidavit-complaint against accused Lito Egan.
Information for forcible abduction with rape was filed against the accused and was finally
arrested.
The trial court rejected the defenses of accused Lito Egan and convicted him of a complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape; hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of forcible abduction with rape.
HELD: No. Accused-appellant is instead declared guilty of Forcible Abduction only under Art.
342 of The Revised Penal Code.
RATIO
All the elements of forcible abduction were proved in this case. Accused-appellant Lito Egan
was charged with forcible abduction with rape of twelve (12)-year old Lenie T.
Camad. Although from the records it appears that Lenie was less than twelve (12) years old
as shown by her birth certificate when the abduction took place and the alleged rape was
perpetrated a day after, the criminal liability of accused-appellant would nevertheless be
confined only to the crime alleged in the Information.
Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of forcible
abduction. The elements of forcible abduction are; that the person abducted is a woman,
regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; that the abduction is against her will; and,
That the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand, Art. 335 of the same Code
defines the crime of rape and provides for its penalty. The elements of rape pertinent to this
case are: that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and,
That such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation.
Nonetheless even assuming that the accused and the complainant were engaged by virtue of
the dowry he had offered, this fact alone would not negate the commission of forcible
abduction. An indigenous ritual of betrothal, like any other love affair, does not justify forcibly
banishing the beloved against her will with the intention of molesting her. It is likewise wellsettled that the giving of money does not beget an unbridled license to subject the assumed
fiance to carnal desires. By asserting the existence of such relationship, the accused seeks
to prove that the victim willingly participated in the act. But, as shown by the evidence, she
certainly did not. The evidence clearly does not speak of consensual love but of criminal lust
which could not be disguised by the so-called sweetheart defense or its variant as in the
instant case. Finally, as held in People v. Crisostomo, the intention to marry may constitute
unchaste designs not by itself but by the concurring circumstances which may vitiate such an
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intention, as in the case of abduction of a minor with the latter's consent, in which the male
knows that she cannot legally consent to the marriage and yet he elopes with her. In the
case at bar, there is no denying the fact that Lenie was incapacitated to marry accusedappellant under Manobo or Christian rites since she was still a minor thereby demonstrating
the existence of lewd designs.
As to the charge of rape, although the prosecution has proved that Lenie was sexually
abused, the evidence proffered is inadequate to establish carnal knowledge. Sexual abuse
cannot be equated with rape. In the case at bar, there is no evidence of entrance or
introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum. Lenie's testimony did not
establish that there was penetration by the sex organ of the accused or that he tried to
penetrate her. The doctor who examined Lenie's vagina would in fact admit upon questioning
of the trial judge that "there was no interlabia contact."
Under the circumstances, the criminal liability of accused-appellant is only for forcible
abduction under Art. 342 of The Revised Penal Code. The sexual abuse which accusedappellant forced upon Lenie constitutes the lewd design inherent in forcible abduction and is
thus absorbed therein. The indecent molestation cannot form the other half of a complex
crime since the record does not show that the principal purpose of the accused was to
commit any of the crimes against chastity and that her abduction would only be a necessary
means to commit the same. Surely it would not have been the case that accused-appellant
would touch Lenie only once during her four (4)-month captivity, as she herself admitted, if his
chief or primordial intention had been to lay with her. Instead, what we discern from the
evidence is that the intent to seduce the girl forms part and parcel of her forcible abduction
and shares equal importance with the other element of the crime which was to remove the
victim from her home or from whatever familiar place she may be and to take her to some
other. Stated otherwise, the intention of accused-appellant as the evidence shows was not
only to seduce the victim but also to separate her from her family, especially from her father
Palmones, clearly tell-tale signs of forcible abduction.
Verily the single sexual abuse of Lenie although accused-appellant had other opportunities to
do so was itself the external manifestation of his lewd design, and hence he could not be
punished for it either separately or as part of a complex crime.
PEOPLE vs. GARCIA (G.R. No. 141125)

FACTS
The victim, Cleopatra Changlapon, was 19 years old and a sophomore student of B.S.
Physical Therapy at the Baguio Central University. On July 14, 1998, she left school at 6:30
p.m. to go home. As she was crossing Bonifacio Street, Baguio City, she saw a white van
approaching so she stopped to let it pass. Suddenly, the van stopped in front of her. The rear
door slid open and Cleopatra was pulled by the arms into the van. She struggled as the door
closed and the van sped away. Something was sprayed on her face which made her eyes

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
sting and feels dizzy. She shouted, then she felt a fist blow on her stomach and she fell
unconscious.
When Cleopatra woke, she was inside a room. She was totally undressed and was lying flat
on her back on a bed. In the room with her were four men. One of them, who
had Bombay features, was also totally naked while the other three were clad in briefs and
smoking cigarettes. The Bombay-looking man lay on top of her. She tried to push him away
but he held her left arm. Another man with long hair, whom she later identified as accusedappellant Jeffrey Garcia, burned her right chin with a lighted cigarette. Cleopatra fought back
but accused-appellant held her right arm. While accused-appellant was seated on her right
side and holding her, the Bombay-looking man proceeded to have sexual intercourse with
her. She tried to kick him and close her legs, but two men were holding her feet. The two men
boxed her thighs and burned her legs with cigarettes.
After the Bombay-looking man finished having sexual intercourse with Cleopatra, accusedappellant and then the other two men took their turn, successively. After the fourth man
finished raping her, he got up. She felt dizzy and her private parts were aching. She opened
her eyes and tried to move, but accused-appellant hit her on the abdomen.
One of the men again sprayed something on Cleopatras face which made her vision blurred.
She heard somebody say that it was 1:30. After that, she blacked out. When she regained
consciousness, she was lying by the roadside somewhere between Tam-awan and Longlong.
It was still dark. She already had her clothes on. She felt pain all over her body and was
unable to move. A taxi passed by and picked her up. Although she was afraid to ride the taxi,
she boarded it just to get home. The taxi brought her to her house. At home, after when she
was able to regain her composure, she told her aunt and siblings that she had been raped by
four men.
The following day, July 15, 1998, Cleopatra was brought to the Baguio City Police Station and
gave her testimony. She was also brought to the Crime Laboratory of the Baguio City Police
for examination. Two days after, she came back to the said police station and gave a
description of the four rapists to the cartographer.
Meanwhile, accused-appellant was arrested at 4:30 p.m. of July 17, 1998 in connection with
another rape charge against him filed by a certain Gilda Mangyo.
The cartographic sketches were published in the Sun-Star newspaper. Police Officers
Gilbert Bulalit and Archibald Diaz saw the sketches and noticed that one of the suspects
depicted in the cartographic sketch bore a striking resemblance to accused-appellant, who
was in their custody. On July 26, 1998, Cleopatra was summoned to identify accusedappellant. she recognized accused-appellant and then gave a supplemental statement to the
police, confirming her identification of accused-appellant as one of her rapists.
Formal charges for forcible abduction with rape were brought against accused-appellant and
three John Does. In the trial , accused-appellant denied the charges of rape and interposed a
defense of alibi.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
ISSUE: Whether or not the is accused-appellant guilty of one count of forcible abduction with
rape aNd three counts of rape as charged.
HELD: Yes. The trial court did not err in convicting accused-appellant of the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape.
RATIO
The two elements of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code,
are: the taking of a woman against her will and with lewd designs.
The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when there is carnal
knowledge with the abducted woman under the following circumstances: by using force or
intimidation; when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and when
the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
In the case at bar, the information sufficiently alleged the elements of forcible
abduction, i.e., the taking of complainant against her against her will and with lewd design. It
was likewise alleged that accused-appellant and his three co-accused conspired,
confederated and mutually aided one another in having carnal knowledge of complainant by
means of force and intimidation and against her will.
Aside from alleging the necessary elements of the crimes, the prosecution convincingly
established that the carnal knowledge was committed through force and intimidation.
Moreover, the prosecution sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt that accusedappellant succeeded in forcibly abducting the complainant with lewd designs, established by
the actual rape.
Hence, accused-appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. He
should also be held liable for the other three counts of rape committed by his three coaccused, considering the clear conspiracy among them shown by their obvious concerted
efforts to perpetrate, one after the other, the crime. As borne by the records, all the four
accused helped one another in consummating the rape of complainant. While one of them
mounted her, the other three held her arms and legs. They also burned her face and
extremities with lighted cigarettes to stop her from warding off her aggressor. Each of them,
therefore, is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him but for the rape
committed by the others as well.
However, as correctly held by the trial court, there can only be one complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape.
Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes
of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently
of the forcible abduction. Therefore, accused-appellant should be convicted of one complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape and three separate acts of rape.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
PEOPLE vs. ABLANEDA (G.R. No. 131914)

FACTS
On February 18, 1993, at around 7:00 oclock in the morning, six-year old Magdalena Salas,
a Grade I pupil was walking to school. Along the way, accused-appellant Jaime Ablaneda,
also known as Joey Capistrano, approached her and asked if he could share her umbrella,
since it was raining. Suddenly, accused-appellant boarded a trimobile with Magdalena and
brought her to a small hut. While inside, accused-appellant removed his underwear and the
childs panties. He applied cooking oil, which he had bought earlier, on his organ and on
Magdalenas. Then, he proceeded to have sexual intercourse with the little girl. Magdalena
felt pain but was too terrified to speak or cry out. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant
ordered Magdalena to go home.
When Magdalena arrived at their house, Ailene Villaflores, her uncles sister-in-law, noticed
that she looked pale and weak, and found traces of blood on her dress. Ailene asked her
what happened, but Magdalena merely said that her classmate had pushed her. Ailene did
not believe this, so she brought her to a quack doctor. The latter told her that Magdalena had
been raped. Ailene then brought Magdalena to the Daet Police Station and, later, to the
Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital to have her medically examined. When Ailene saw
Magdalenas bloodied panties, she again asked her what happened. This time, Magdalena
confessed that she was raped by a man who had a scar on the stomach.
Dr. Nilda Baylon, the Medico-Legal Officer who examined Magdalena, found that the latters
hymen was completely lacerated, thus confirming that she had indeed been raped.
Sometime thereafter, Magdalena and Ailene were summoned by the police because a man
had been apprehended. At the precinct, Magdalena positively identified accused-appellant
as her rapist.
Consequently, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Daet,
Camarines Norte, with the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
At his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered
judgment finding the accused guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape as
defined and penalized by Art. 342 of the Revised Penal Code in conjunction with Art. 335
(S.3) of the Revised Penal Code and Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Hence this appeal
ISSUE; Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the accused-appellant conviction for
the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
HELD: Yes. All the elements of both the crimes of forcible abduction and rape were proven in
this case.
RATIO
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised
Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil
status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with
lewd designs. On the other hand, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
by force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or when
she is under twelve years of age.
All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a woman, was taken against
her will, as shown by the fact that she was intentionally directed by accused-appellant to a
vacant hut. At her tender age, Magdalena could not be expected to physically resist
considering that the lewd designs of accused-appellant could not have been apparent to her
at that time. Physical resistance need not be demonstrated to show that the taking was
against her will. The employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking,
especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Finally, the evidence shows that the
taking of the young victim against her will was effected in furtherance of lewd and unchaste
designs. Such lewd designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the
victim.
In the case at bar, Magdalena testified in open court that accused-appellant inserted his penis
into her private parts. The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by the medical findings
wherein it was found that the victim suffered from complete hymenal laceration. Whether or
not she consented to the sexual contact is immaterial considering that at the time thereof, she
was below twelve years of age. Sex with a girl below twelve years, regardless of whether
she consented thereto or not, constitutes statutory rape.
The imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for the crime of forcible abduction with
rape was correct. No qualifying or aggravating circumstance was proven in this case and
there was none alleged in the information.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
PEOPLE vs. NAPUD (G.R. No. 123058)

FACTS: At around 1:00 A.M. on September 21, 1994, appellant with his co-accused, Tomas
Amburgo and Romel Brillo, went to the house of the spouses Esmaylita and Ernesto
Benedicto at Barangay Jibolo, Janiuay, Iloilo. Amburgo called aloud for the occupants of the
house to come down. The Benedictos were awakened by the call, but just kept quiet since
they sensed that it would be dangerous to respond. Unable to elicit any response from the
Benedictos, the trio then approached the house of Esmaylitas parents, the spouses Evelyn
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
and Manuel Cantiller, just a few meters away. Again, they called for the residents of the
house to come down. The Cantillers were awakened by the call but chose to remain
silent. Their grandson Greg Cantiller, who was staying with them, also remained quiet.
Minutes later, Amburgo forcibly pushed the door of the Cantillers house open. He found
Evelyn and Manuel lying on the floor. Amburgo at once pinned down Manuels
head. Meanwhile, appellant broke into the chicken coop beneath the Benedictos house,
caught ten (10) chickens, and handed them to Brillo who was waiting outside. Appellant then
barged into the Cantillers house. He asked Manuel if he had a daughter in the house. The
latter said he didnt. Appellant then told the 59 year-old Evelyn Cantiller to step out of the
house. He led her to the back of the house and told her to undress. When she refused,
appellant threatened her with a knife. Out of fear, Evelyn removed her skirt, appellant then
raped her. After a few minutes of coitus, appellant asked Evelyn to assume the woman-ontop position. Warning her that she and her husband would be killed should she attempt to
flee, appellant then had Evelyn mount him. The rape was ended when Amburgo saw them
and asked appellant to stop, reminding the latter that Evelyn was an old woman. (Criminal
Case No. 44262)
Amburgo then grabbed Greg Cantiller and ordered him to summon the Benedictos. Greg did
as he was told, but the Benedictos would not respond. Angered, Amburgo threatened to burn
down their house. Left with no choice, the Benedictos stepped out. Amburgo then ordered
Greg to return to the Cantillers residence.
Once outside, Esmaylita explained that her husband, Ernesto, had a stomach
ailment. Ernesto then asked permission to answer a call of nature. Amburgo acceded to his
request but warned Ernesto not to flee or report to the authorities. When Ernesto failed to
return, Amburgo then grabbed Esmaylita and brought her to a banana plantation located in
Barangay Calansonan, some 1-1/2 kilometers away from her house. Still wielding his knife,
Amburgo commanded her to lie down. He removed her lower garments, lay on top of her,
and had sexual intercourse with her. Esmaylita pleaded with him to stop as she had a small
child, but Amburgo threatened to knife her. After Amburgos lust was spent, he told Esmaylita
to put on her clothes and brought her over to appellant, who had been watching the whole
affair from a short distance. (Criminal Case No. 44264)
Appellant dragged Esmaylita some distance away from Amburgo. He forcibly stripped her
naked. He then told her to lie down. When Esmaylita refused, appellant poked a knife at her
and made signs that he would kill her. Faced with imminent death, Esmaylita
obeyed. Appellant had intercourse with her. After some minutes, appellant made Esmaylita
stand up. Esmaylita begged to be allowed to go home, but appellant ignored her and ordered
her to sit on top of him. Esmaylita remained motionless as he put his organ into her
vagina. Angered, appellant ordered her to do what she usually does with her
husband. Esmaylita then made up-and-down motions with her buttocks. After some five
minutes of sexual intercourse, appellant made her stand up, forced her legs apart, and again
inserted his penis inside her vagina. Appellant then had sexual intercourse with her until his
lust was satisfied. At around four oclock in the morning, Esmaylita was finally released and
allowed to go home. (Criminal Case No. 44263)

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Meanwhile, Esmaylitas husband, Ernesto, had fled to the house of their barangay councilor
located a kilometer away from the Benedicto house and reported the incident. The barangay
official then accompanied Ernesto to the nearest police detachment. When Ernesto and the
law enforcers arrived at the Benedicto house, Esmaylita was already there. She told them
that she had been raped.
On November 3, 1994, the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo filed an information for Robbery with
Rape against appellant and his co-accused with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City.
On the same day, Esmaylita also filed two separate complaints, one for rape and another
for forcible abduction with rape
When arraigned in each of the three cases, both Napud and Amburgo pleaded not guilty to
the charges. The third accused, Romel Brillo, has remained at large. Both Amburgo and
Napud raised the defense of denial and alibi.
The trial court declared Napud and his co-accused, Amburgo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the charges against them.
Only Napud seasonably filed his notice of appeal. His co-accused, Amburgo, opted not to
appeal his conviction.
ISSUES: Whether the appellant is correct in alleging that the trial court erred in convicting the
appellant of rape by means of force and intimidation absent physical injuries found on the
bodies of either complainants.
Whether the penalties imposed for the offenses committed by the appellant is proper.
HELD
No. The absence of external injuries does not negate rape.
Yes. The trial court correctly held that the crime of rape charged and proved in Criminal Case
No. 44263 already absorbed the forcible abduction with rape complained of in Criminal Case
No. 44264 and also found the accused-appellant guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with rape under Criminal Case No. 44262
RATIO
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman by force or intimidation and against her will or without her consent.
What consummates the felony is penile contact, however slight, with the labia of the victims
vagina without her consent. Consequently, it is not required that lacerations be found on the
private complainants hymen. Nor is it necessary to show that the victim had a reddening of
the external genitalia or sustained a hematoma on other parts of her body to sustain the
possibility of a rape charge. For it is well-settled that the absence of external injuries does
not negate rape. This is because in rape, the important consideration is not the presence of
injuries on the victims body, but penile contact with the female genitalia without the womans
consent. Hence, appellants reliance upon the findings of Dr. Renato Armada, who testified
that he examined Evelyn and found no lacerations or hematoma in any part of her body could

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
not prevail over the positive testimony of the offended party and her witnesses that she was
sexually abused.
As to the propriety of the penalties imposed on appellant, the trial court found that the forcible
abduction with rape alleged in Criminal Case No. 44264 was absorbed by the rape charged
in Criminal Case No. 44263. The evidence for the prosecution shows that Esmaylita was
brought by Amburgo and appellant to a banana plantation some 1-1/2 kilometers away from
her house for the purpose of raping her. Both men then successively had carnal knowledge
of her at said place. Where complainant was forcibly taken away for the purpose of sexually
assaulting her, then the rape so committed may absorb the forcible abduction. The trial court,
thus, correctly held that the rape charged and proved in Criminal Case No. 44263 already
absorbed the forcible abduction with rape complained of in Criminal Case No. 44264.
Coming now to Criminal Case No. 44262, the information charged appellant and his coaccused with robbery with rape. When appellant forcibly entered the Cantillers chicken coop
and took their chickens, while his confederate Amburgo was threatening the Cantiller
spouses, he committed the crime of robbery. The elements of the offense -viz: (a) personal
property belonging to another; (b) unlawful taking; (c) intent to gain; and (d) violence or
intimidation - were all present. Though robbery appears to have preceded the rape of Evelyn,
it is enough that robbery shall have been accompanied by rape to be punished under the
Revised Penal Code (as amended) for the Code does not differentiate whether the rape was
committed before, during, or after the robbery. Thus, Accused- appellant is found guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with rape and sentenced by this court to reclusion perpetua
with damages.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
PROSECUTION OF THE CRIMES OF ADULTERY, CONCUBINAGE, SEDUCTION,

ABDUCTION, RAPE AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS (ART. 344)
Beltran v. People
Facts: The petitioner Meynardo Beltran and his wife Charmaine Felix got married. After 24
years and having four children, Beltran filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine Felix, in her Answer, alleged that it was
Beltran who abandoned the conjugal home and cohabited with another woman named
Milagros. Thereafter, she filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against Beltran and his
paramour.
Beltran argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage posed
a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case of concubinage against him.
Issue: Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case of concubinage.
Held: It is not a prejudicial question. Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, it is provided that the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In view of such provision, it follows that for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is
acceptable. Therefore in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner, need
not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the
criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his
marriage void.
A subsequent pronouncement that marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a
concubinage case. He who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
People v. Tipay
Facts: This is a criminal case of rape filed by Susan Pelaez, 15, suffering from mild mental
retardation and transient psychotic illness, assisted by her grandmother Flora Deguino
against her stepfather named Romeo Tipay.
The prosecutions evidence showed that the accused raped his stepdaughter several times
whenever the latters mother and siblings were out of the house. The victim was threatened
by the accused that he would kill Susans family member if she would tell anyone about it.
One day, Susan complained to her grandmother that her head was aching. Flora had Susan
checked up by a midwife. The midwife found out that Susan is 4-months pregnant and it was
at this moment that Susan confided to her grandmother that she was being raped by her
stepfather.
Sometime in 1996, the lower court convicted the accused of the crime of rape under Art. 344
of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 and sentenced the accused to Death
Penalty which caused the automatic review by the Supreme Court.
Issues: Is the criminal complaint fatally defective due to the fact that it was the grandmother
of the victim and not her mother who assisted her in filing the complaint?
Held: No. Under the Rules of Court, in Sec. 5, par. 3 of Rule 110, it is provided that where
the offended party is a minor, her parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the complaint.
The right to file the action granted to parents, grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of
all other persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided. However,
with the advent of RA 8353, which reclassified rape as a crime against person and no longer
a private crime, the complaint can now be instituted by any person.
It is also worthy to note that in the case of People vs. Estrebella, it was held that any
technical defect in a complaint for rape would be remedied by testimony showing the consent
and willingness of the family of the complainant who cannot give her consent (due to minority
or mental retardation, for instance) to have the private offense publicly tried. In the case at
bar, Marilyn Deguino (complainants mother) herself requested Susans grandmother to take
care of the case.
Alonte v. Savellano
Facts: This is a case praying for the reversal of the decision convicting Bayani M. Alonte and
Buenaventura Concepcion of rape.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
An information for rape was filed on December 5, 1996 against petitioners Alonte and his
accomplice Concepcion based on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. It was alleged
that the accused Concepcion brought Juvie-lyn to Alontes resthouse and left her to Alonte
after receiving P1,000.00. Alonte gave Juvie-lyn water to drink which made her dizzy and
weak. Afterwards, against her will, Alonte raped her.
Sometime in 1996, during the pendency of a petition for change of venue, Juvie-lyn, assisted
by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance.
Upon arraignment, petitioners both pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial ensued and they were both found guilty.
Issue: Whether or not the affidavit of desistance filed by the offended party extinguished the
criminal liability of the accused?
Held: An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called
"private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has
been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated, possibly constitute
evidence whose weight or probative value, like any other piece of evidence, would be up to
the court for proper evaluation.
Paragraph 3 of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a prosecution for seduction,
abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been
expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibit
the continuance of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender after the case has
not been instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said case.
Note: Rape is now a public crime.
Arroyo v. CA
Facts: Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery against his wife, Ruby Vera
Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo committed on 2 November 1982. Both defendants pleaded not
guilty but were subsequently found guilty by the trial court.
When the case was pending with the CA on certiorari, Ruby Neri filed a motion for
reconsideration or a new trial alleging that her husband already pardoned her and had
contracted marriage to another with whom he is presently cohabiting. Dr. Neri also filed a
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
manifestation praying that the case against petitioners be dismissed as he had "tacitly
consented" to his wife's infidelity. The co-accused petitioners then filed a motion praying for
the dismissal of the case citing as basis the manifestation of Dr. Neri.
CA did not grant the motions.
Issue: Whether or not Dr. Neri's affidavit of desistance and the compromise agreement
operate as a pardon meriting a new trial.
Held: No. The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:
ART. 344. ... The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon
a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both parties, if they
are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
xxx xxx xxx
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that consent
is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair, nevertheless,
for either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a
criminal complaint. In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was executed only after the
trial court had already rendered its decision dated.
It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code provides that the
crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's complaint, once the
complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor.
Enforcement of our law on adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of
vindication of the private honor of the offended spouse; much less is it a matter merely of
personal or social hypocrisy. Such enforcement relates, more importantly, to protection of the
basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State has
the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind.
In U.S. v. Topio, the Court held that:
... The husband being the head of the family and the only person who could institute the
prosecution and control its effects, it is quite clear that the principal object in penalizing the
offense by the state was to protect the purity of the family and the honor of the husband, but
now the conduct of the prosecution, after it is once commenced by the husband, and the
enforcement of the penalties imposed is also a matter of public policy in which the
Government is vitally interested to the extent of preserving the public peace and providing for
the general welfare of the community. ...

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
Facts: Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married to private respondent Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national. Due to conjugal disharmony, the private respondent initiated a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany and the petitioner then filed an action for
legal separation, support and separation of property. A divorce decree was granted.
The private respondent then filed two complaints for adultery alleging that while still married
to Imelda, she had an affair with William Chia and another man named Jesus Chua.
Issue: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner for adultery even though they are
no longer husband and wife as a decree of divorce was already issued.
Held: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. In
this case, private respondent is the offended spouse who obtained a valid divorce in his
country. The said divorce decree and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in
so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
ART. 349: BIGAMY
Manuel v. People
Facts: Eduardo Manuel was prosecuted for bigamy. The prosecution were able to adduce
evidence that Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa in Makati. Eduardo met complainant
Tina B. Gandalera and proposed to her on several occasions, assuring her that he was
single. He even made his parents meet her and assure her that he was single.
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. However, Manuel
started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was
jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.
After a while, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving
financial support. Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured
an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract. She was so embarrassed and humiliated
when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own
vows.
For his defense, Eduardo claimed Tina knew he was already married. He also claimed that
he stated that he was still single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in
good faith that his first marriage was void. He also claimed he was forced to marry Tina
because she threatened him that she would commit suicide.
Upon conviction in the trial court, Eduardo, on appeal, claimed that his first wife Gaa had
been "absent" for 21 years since 1975 and under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was
presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still
alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second
paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to succession.
Issue: Whether or not Manuel should be acquitted on the bigamy charge on the ground of
presumption of death of his first wife due to absence.
Held: No, he is liable for bigamy.
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa and such
marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.
The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant long after the
effectivity of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the
private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid
defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent.
However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the
law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private
complainant, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years. He
should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive
death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the
petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married
the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such
case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not
an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection
from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could
be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is
found incredible.
Diego v. Castillo

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Facts: An administrative complaint was filed against RTC Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for
allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or rendering
judgment in gross ignorance of the law.
The Administrative complaint stemmed from the Judgment of the Judge in a Bigamy case
filed against Lucena Escoto by Jorge de Perio, Jr.
Prior that filing of the case, the Family District Court of Texas granted a decree of Divorce on
Lucena Escoto and Jorge de Perio, Jr.s marriage. Later on, Lucena Escoto contracted
marriage with the brother of the complainant, Manuel P. Diego. After the trial of the bigamy
case, respondent Judge acquitted the accused and stated that his main basis was the good
faith on the part of the accused.
Issue: Whether or not the acquittal in the bigamy case was proper.
Held: No. The Supreme Court, in People v. Bitdu, carefully distinguished between a mistake
of fact, which could be a basis for the defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from a mistake
of law, which does not excuse a person, even a lay person, from liability. Bitdu held that even
if the accused, who had obtained a divorce under the Mohammedan custom, honestly
believed that in contracting her second marriage she was not committing any violation of the
law, and that she had no criminal intent, the same does not justify her act. The Supreme
Court further stated therein that with respect to the contention that the accused acted in good
faith in contracting the second marriage, believing that she had been validly divorced from
her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to know the law, and the
fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him
from the consequences thereof.
Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal case for bigamy, is People v. Schneckenburger,
where it was held that the accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in the
Philippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy.
People v. Abunado
Facts: Salvador Abunado married Narcisa Arceno sometime in 1967. Salvador later
contracted a second marriage with Zenaida Binas. A case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa
against Salvador and Zenaida. Salvador was convicted of the crime of bigamy.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling appreciating the mitigating circumstance that the
accused was seventy six years of age then.
Salvador avers that the information filed against him was defective as it stated that the
alleged bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989.
He claims that he should be acquitted on the ground that he was not sufficiently informed of
the nature and the cause of the accusation against him.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted of bigamy on the ground that he was
not sufficiently informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Held: No, the conviction is upheld. The statement in the information that the crime was
committed in January 1995 was merely a typographical error, for the same information
clearly states that petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Abunado on
January 10, 1989. The petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the Information
during the trial and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court of
Appeals.
Morigo v People
Facts: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete got married sometime in 1990. A year after, a decree
of divorce was granted to them by a court in Ontario. In 1992, Lucio Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago. A bigamy case was then filed against him. In 1993, the accused filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place.
The trial court convicted Morigo of bigamy.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy.
Held: No, the first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been
legally married.
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of
bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is
no first marriage to speak of.
No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
Te vs. CA
Facts: Arthur Te and Liliana Choa got married in civil rites on 1988. They did not live
together after marriage although they would meet each other regularly. In 1989, Liliana gave
birth to a girl. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her.
Arthur contracted a second marriage while his marriage with Liliana was still subsisting.
Liliana then filed a bigamy case against Arthur and subsequently an administrative case for
revocation of his engineering license for grossly immoral act.
For his defense, Arthur alleged that his first marriage was null and void.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Issue: Whether or not the nullity of the first marriage of the accused is a defense in a bigamy
case.
Held: The formed decisions of the Supreme Court holding that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is ab initio is overturned. The
prevailing rule is Art. 40 of the Family Code which states that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Mercado vs. Tan
FACTS: Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he
contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not know. Tan
filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado
and Oliva null and void.
ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of the
former marriage.
HELD: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even
if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva right
after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. He
contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the
first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
LIBEL (ARTS. 353, 354)

FERMIN vs. PEOPLE
Facts: On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo (Eddie) Gutierrez,
two (2) criminal informations for libel were filed against Cristinelli S. Fermin and Bogs C.
Tugas.
The June 14, 1995 headline and lead story of the tabloid says thatit is improbable for
Annabelle Rama to go to the US should it betrue that she is evading her conviction in an
estafa case here in thePhilippines for she and husband Eddie have more problems/casesto
confront there. This was said to be due to their, especiallyAnnabelle's, using fellow Filipinos
money, failure to remit proceedsto the manufacturing company of the cookware they were
sellingand not being on good terms with the latter.
Annabelle Rama and Eddie Gutierrez filed libel cases againstFermin and Tugas before RTC
of QC, Br. 218.
RTC: Fermin and Tugas found guilty of libel.
CA: Tugas was acquitted on account of non-participation butFermin's conviction was
affirmed.
Fermin's motion for reconsideration was denied. She argues thatshe had no knowledge and
participation in the publication of thearticle, that the article is not libelous and is covered by
the freedomof the press.
Issue: Whether petitioner is guilty of libel.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Held: A Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect,
real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory
of one who is dead. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to
be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain and ordinary meaning as they
would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were
used and understood in another sense.
To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs one's sensibilities; it would
certainly prick one's conscience. There is evident imputation of the crime of malversation, or
vices or defects for being fugitives from the law. and of being a wastrel. The attribution was
made publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation. The victims were
identified and identifiable. More importantly, the article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainants.
Petitioner claims that there was no malice on her part because allegedly, the article was
merely a fair and honest comment on the fact that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez was issued a
warrant of arrest for her conviction for estafa before Judge Palattao's court.
It can be gleaned form her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make defamatory
imputations against complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by simply making a general
denial, convince us that there was no malice on her part. Verily, not only was there malice in
law, the article being malicious in itself, but there was also malice in fact, as there was motive
to talk ill against complainants during the electoral campaign.
Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of
the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public officials
in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of public
interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected
speech. If the utterances are false, malicious, or unrelated to a public officer's performance of
his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give
rise to criminal and civil liability. While complainants are considered public figures for being
personalities in the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue
writers such as petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity
by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or
in print, about their personal lives.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the conviction of petitioner for libel should be upheld.
With respect to the penalty to be imposed for this conviction, we note that the Court issued on
25 January 2008, Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 entitled Guidelines in the Observance
of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases. The circular expresses a
preference for the imposition of a FINE rather than imprisonment, given the circumstances
attendant in the cases cited therein in which only a fine was imposed by the Court on those
convicted of libel. It also states that, if the penalty imposed is merely a fine but the convict is
unable to pay the same, the RPC provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should apply.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
However, the Circular likewise allows the court, in the exercise of sound discretion, the option
to impose imprisonment as penalty, whenever the imposition of a fine alone would depreciate
the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to
the imperatives of justice.
BUATIS vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 142509)

Facts: On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty. Jose J. Pieraz (Atty. Pieraz),
retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to her husband. The letter was open, not
contained in an envelope, and Atty. Pieraz wife put it on her husbands desk. On that same
day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the letter and made out its content.
Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty. Pieraz, nevertheless, responded and sent
a communication by registered mail to said Buatis, Jr. who dispatched a second letter later
on.
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: "Satan, senile, stupid,
[E]nglish carabao," Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject
letter and its contents came to the knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as well
and they all chided him telling him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."
Issue: Whether accused is guilty of libel.
Held: Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be
defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be
identifiable.8
The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution. There is publication in
this case. In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known
to someone other than the person against whom it has been written. 9 Petitioners subject
letter-reply itself states that the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner
had dictated the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained of
has communicated it to a third person.10 Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox,
was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply was addressed to
respondent himself.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
We shall then resolve the issues raised by petitioner as to whether the imputation is
defamatory and malicious.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in
their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would
naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.11
For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous, we laid
down the rule inJimenez v. Reyes,12 to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341), the court had the
following to say on this point: "In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se,
two rules of construction are conspicuously applicable: (1) That construction must be adopted
which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and
ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered. (2) The
published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole."
In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle
or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account. The whole
question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not
having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to
have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the words used in the publication. 13
Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in the letter dated August 18, 1995
sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using words such as "lousy", "inutile",
"carabao English", "stupidity", and "satan", the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the
character, integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule.
No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of
petitioner have caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have told him:
"Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."14
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the general rule laid
down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the
imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner
(malice in fact), for the law already presumes that petitioners imputation is malicious (malice
in law).15 A reading of petitioners subject letter-reply showed that he malevolently castigated
respondent for writing such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There was nothing in the said
letter which showed petitioners good intention and justifiable motive for writing the same in
order to overcome the legal inference of malice.
PROBATION LAW

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
VICOY VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: On August 24, 1995, MTCC of Tagbilaran promulgated a judgment of conviction
against Vicoy for violation of City Ordinance No. 365-B for peddling fish outside the Agora
Public Market and of the crime of Resistance and Serious Disobedience To Agents Of A
Person In Authority.
Petitioner then filed an application for probation on the same day. On September 18, 1995,
however, petitioner filed a motion to withdraw her application for probation and
simultaneously filed a notice of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari was validly dismissed by the RTC on the
ground of petitioners failure to comply with its Order dated August 2, 1996.
HELD: Yes
RATIO: The trial court categorically directed petitioner, in its August 2, 1996 Order, to furnish
the City Prosecutors Office with a copy of her memorandum and of the assailed judgment.
Petitioners counsel did not comply, prompting the court to dismiss the petition for certiorari.
Even assuming that the Regional Trial Court did not order the said dismissal, petitioners
special civil action, questioning the denial of her notice of appeal, would still fail. Petitioner
filed an application for probation. Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is
explicit that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final when the accused has applied for
probation. This is totally in accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation
Law of 1976, as amended), which in part provides that the filing of an application for
probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Thus, there was no more opportunity for
petitioner to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment having become final by the filing of an
application for probation.
PABLO vs. CASTILLO

FACT: Petitioner Pablo was charged with a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise
known as the Bouncing Checks Law, in three separate Informations, for issuing three bad
checks to complainant Mandap. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00197-D, 94-00198-D
and 94-00199-D, respectively, the three cases were not consolidated. The first two were
raffled and assigned to Branch 43 while the third case to Branch 41 of the RTC in Dagupan
City.
ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of petitioners application for probation valid.
RULING: Yes
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
RATIO: Section 9 paragraph (c) of the Probation Law, P.D. 968 provides that those who have
previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not
less than one month and one day and/or fine of not less than two hundred pesos cannot avail
of the benefits of probation. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that if a statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any
interpretation. Not only that; in the matter of interpretation of laws on probation, the Court has
pronounced that the policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot prevail against the
categorical provisions of the law.
In the present case of petitioner, when she applied for probation in Criminal Cases Nos. 9400197-D and 94-00198-D, she had a previous conviction in Criminal Case No. 94-00199-D,
which thereby disqualified her from the benefits of probation.
SANTOS VS. CA (G.R. No. 127899)

FACTS: Petitioner issued fifty-four (54) checks in the total amount of Three Million Nine
Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Five and 10/100 (P3,989,175.10)
Pesos, all of which checks were dishonored upon presentment to the drawee bank.
On October 12, 1993, the petitioner was charged with fifty-four (54) counts of violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 ("BP 22") in fifty-four (54) separate Informations, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 102009 to 102062, respectively, before Branch 160 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City. To the said accusations, petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
After trial, she was found guilty in a Decision promulgated on December 20, 1994, sentencing
her to a total prison term of fifty-four (54) years and to pay P3,989,175.10 to the private
respondent.
Petitioner therefore, filed an application for probation, which was referred by Presiding Judge
Umali to the Probation Officer of Marikina, for investigation, report, and recommendation.
Private respondent opposed subject application for probation on the grounds that: the
petitioner is not eligible for probation because she has been sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of fifty-four (54) years, and she failed to pay her judgment debt to the private
respondent.
The trial court judge approved the probation but the Court of Appeals reversed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to probation.
RULING: No
RATIO: Probation is a just privilege the grant of which is discretionary upon the court. Before
granting probation, the court must consider the potentiality of the offender to reform, together
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
with the demands of justice and public interest, along with other relevant
circumstances. 10 The courts are not to limit the basis of their decision to the report or
recommendation of the probation officer, which is at best only persuasive.
It can be gleaned unerringly that petitioner has shown no remorse for the criminal acts she
committed against the private respondent. Her issuing subject fifty-four (54) bouncing checks
is a serious offense. To allow petitioner to be placed on probation would be to depreciate the
seriousness of her malefactions. Worse, instead of complying with the orders of the trial court
requiring her to pay her civil liability, she even resorted to devious schemes to evade the
execution of the judgment against her. Verily, petitioner is not the penitent offender who is
eligible for probation within legal contemplation. Her demeanor manifested that she is
incapable to be reformed and will only be a menace to society should she be permitted to comingle with the public.
People v. Que Ming Kha

Facts:
On May 16, 1997, members Central Police District received a phone call from an informant
that a blue Kia Pregio van with plate number UPN 595 which was being used in the transport
of shabu has been seen within the vicinity of Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City. A tem was
immediately dispatched to the reported place.
Around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the team spotted the blue Kia van on the opposite side
of the street going toward the direction of Commonwealth Avenue. Before reaching
Commonwealth Avenue, in front of Andok's Litson Manok, the van hit. A concerned motorist
picked up the boy and rushed him to the hospital.
When the police finally intercepted the van, they introduced themselves as police officers to
the driver and passenger of the van and informed them that they committed the crime of
reckless imprudence and asked for his driver's license. The police noted that Go was on the
driver's seat while Que sat on the passenger's seat.
The police peered through the window of the van and noticed several sacks placed on the
floor at the back of the van. They opened one of the sacks and noticed that it contained
several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance.
The arresting officers thereafter forwarded the seized substance to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. Each of the nine sacks contained 253 plastic bags which
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
contained around one kilo of the white crystalline substance. Upon examination, the
substance was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. 5
Both Go and Que claim ignorance about the presence of shabu at the back of the van.
Issue: Whether appellants are guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
Held:
The Supreme Court found appellant Go guilty of transporting prohibited drugs, but
acquitted appellant Que.
It has been established that Go was driving the van that carried the contraband at the
time of its discovery. He was therefore caught in the act of transporting a regulated drug
without authority which is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Section 15, Article III of
the Dangerous Drugs Act penalizes "any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distributed any regulated drug."
To exonerate himself, Go claimed that he was not aware of the existence of the contraband at
the back of the van. We are not persuaded. The crime under consideration is malum
prohibitum. In such case, the lack of criminal intent and good faith do not exempt the accused
from criminal liability. Thus, Go's contention that he did not know that there were illegal drugs
inside the van cannot constitute a valid defense. Mere possession and/or delivery of a
regulated drug without legal authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act
Regarding the criminal liability of appellant Que, the Supreme Court acquitted Que.
Que had nothing to do with the loading and transport of the shabu. Not one reliable
eyewitness pointed to him as having been with Go inside the van when it hit Elmar Cawiling.
No less than the Solicitor General himself entertains doubt on the guilt of Que and
recommends his acquittal. When the prosecution itself says it failed to prove Que's guilt, the
Court should listen and listen hard, lest it locks up a person who has done no wrong.
In People v. Pagaura, the Supreme Court made a cautionary warning that "the court
must be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the
unusually heavy penalties for drug offenses. In our criminal justice system the overriding
consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it
entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES

Serena v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the UP-Cebu. She was
appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of
UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of the OSRFI was
the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.
President Estrada gave P15,000,000 to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed
renovation. The source of the funds was the Office of the President. However, the renovation
of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.
The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman,
Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within
the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and
Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D.
Serana for estafa and filed the case to the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not
have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP
student regent. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied with finality.
Issue: Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the estafa case filed against petitioner, a
student regent of UP
Held:
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible
construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Every section, provision or
clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the
effect contemplated by the legislature.
Evidently, from the provisions of Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation
to their office.
Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even if she does not have a
salary grade 27, as she is placed there by express provision of law.
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under
this category.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of
trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Chang v. People
Facts:
Petitioner Roberto Estanislao Chang (Chang) was the Municipal Treasurer of Makati
who was tasked to, among other things, examine or investigate tax returns of private
corporations or companies operating within Makati, and determine the sufficiency or
insufficiency of Income Tax assessed on them and collect payments therefor. Petitioner
Pacifico San Mateo was the Chief of Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit
Division, Makati Treasurer's Office.
Makati Treasurer's Office examiners Vivian Susan Yu and Leonila Azevedo conducted
an examination of the books of accounts and other pertinent records of GDI, and found that
GDI incurred a tax deficiency inclusive of penalty in the total amount of P494,601.
The Office of the Treasurer thus issued an Initial Assessment Notice dated January 25,
1991 to GDI for it to pay the tax deficiency within four days from receipt.
No word having been received by the Office of the Treasurer from GDI, it issued a
Second Assessment Notice 6 dated February 14, 1991, reminding GDI to settle the amount
due within three days from receipt.
The assessment notices were personally received by Mario Magat, Chief Operating
Officer of GDI, in April 1991.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Magat was later able to talk via telephone to San Mateo who had been calling GDI's
Accounting Department and requesting for someone with whom he could talk to regarding the
assessment.
On May 15, 1991, Magat and San Mateo met for lunch at the Makati Sports Club. 8
Chang later joined the two, and the three agreed that if GDI could pay P125,000 by the end
of May 1991, the assessment would be "resolved."
During their second meeting, on May 29, 1991, petitioners offered GDI that if they
could pay P125,000, the tax would be settled. Thinking that it was the right tax assessment,
GDI prepared P125,000 in check. Petitioners made it clear that it was not the tax due and
gave two options: either to pay the petitioners P125,000 or pay the Municipality P494,000.
GDI then alerted the NBI and the petitioners were caught in an entrapment operation.
Issue: Whether the petitioners were guilty of corrupt practices under Sec. 3(b) of R.A. 3019
Held:
Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides:
SEC. 3.
Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b)
Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction
between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity
has to intervene under the law.
The elements of violation of Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act are:
the offender is a public officer
who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or a benefit
on behalf of the offender or any other person
in connection with a contract or transaction with the government
in which the public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right to
intervene.
In this case, all the above-stated elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution.
Petitioners were undisputedly public officers at the time of the commission of the offense.
Mere denial by the petitioners refusal to request anything from GDI to settle its assessed
deficiency is contrary to evidence since San Mateo met Magat on various meetings to
negotiate the settlement of the assessed deficiency tax. Petitioners told to Magat that GDI
only had two options to prevent the closure of the company, either to pay the assessed
amount of P494,601 to the Municipality, or pay the amount of P125,000 to them.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Furthermore, the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the presence of
conspiracy between San Mateo and Chang. The burden of the evidence having shifted to
him, it was incumbent for Chang to present evidence to controvert the prosecution evidence.
He opted not to, however. He is thus deemed to have waived his right to present evidence in
his defense.
ILLEGAL POSSESSION
Sayco vs People
Facts: Petitioner is a planter who was recruited to assist in the counter-insurgency campaign
of the AFP. He offered no evidence that he is in the regular plantilla of the AFP or that he is
receiving regular compensation from said agency. He presented the following evidence: 1.
Memorandum Receipt for Equipment; 2. Mission Orders. He was convicted of illegal
possession of firearms.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Sayco insists that he is a confidential agent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
and it was in that capacity that he received the subject firearm and ammunitions from the
AFP. As said firearm and ammunitions are government property duly licensed to the
Intelligence Security Group (ISG) of the AFP, the same could not be licensed under his name,
instead, what he obtained were a Memorandum Receipt and a Mission Order whereby ISG
entrusted to him the subject firearm and ammunitions and authorized him to carry the same
around Bacolod City. Petitioner further argues that he merely acted in good faith when he
relied on the Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order for authority to carry said firearm and
ammunitions; thus, it would be a grave injustice if he were to be punished for the deficiency of
said documents.
Issue: WON the petitioner, who is not in the regular plantilla of the AFP nor receive regular
compensation from AFP is licensd to carry the subject firearm and ammunition.
Held: Sayco cannot be considered a regular civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian
agent. As such, he was not authorized to receive the subject government-owned firearm and
ammunitions. The memorandum receipt he signed to account for said government properties
did not legitimize his possession thereof. The rules governing memorandum receipts and
mission orders covering the issuance to and the possession and/or carrying of governmentowned firearms by special or confidential civilian agents may be synthesized as follows:
First, special or confidential civilian agents who are not included in the regular plantilla of any
government agency involved in law enforcement or receiving regular compensation for
services rendered are not exempt from the requirements under P.D. No. 1866, as amended
by R.A. No. 8294, of a regular license to possess firearms and a permit to carry the same
outside of residence;
Second, said special or confidential civilian agents are not qualified to receive, obtain and
possess government-owned firearms. Their ineligibility will not be cured by the issuance of a
memorandum receipt for equipment covering said government-owned firearms. Neither will
they qualify for exemption from the requirements of a regular firearms license and a permit to
carry firearms by the mere issuance to them of a government-owned firearms covered by a
memorandum receipt; and
Third, said special or confidential civilian agents do not qualify for mission orders to carry
firearms (whether private- owned or government-owned) outside of their residence.
The foregoing rules do not apply to special or confidential civilian agents in possession of or
bearing private-owned firearms that are duly licensed and covered by permits to carry the
same outside of residence. Set against the foregoing rules, it is clear that petitioner is not
authorized to possess and carry the subject firearm and ammunition, notwithstanding the
memorandum receipt and mission order which were illegally issued to him.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
People v. Comadre (G.R. No. 153559)

Facts: At around 7:00 oclock in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy
Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree on
the terrace of the house of Roberts father, Jaime Agbanlog. Jaime was seated on the
banister of the terrace listening to the conversation of the companions of his son.
As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre,
George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While
his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which fell on the roof of the
terrace. Appellants immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby school.
The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the
house. Robber Agbanlog and his companions were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious
on the floor. They were all rushed to the hospital for medical treatment. However, Robert
Agbanlog died before reaching the hospital for wounds sustained which the grenade
explosion inflicted. Roberts companions sustained shrapnel injuries.
The appellants were arrested the following day but denied any participation in the incident,
claimed they were elsewhere when the incident occurred and that they had no animosity
towards the victims whatsoever.
After trial, the court a quo convicted appellants of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple
Attempted Murder for having conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with intent to kill and by means of treachery and with the use of an explosive.
Issue: Whether or not the use of explosive qualifies the crime to murder?
Whether or not appellants conspired to kill the victims?
Held: Yes, the killing by means of explosives qualifies the crime to murder. The information
alleges that both treachery and the use of explosive attended the crime.
Since both circumstances can qualify the killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, the Supreme Court held that when the killing is perpetrated with treachery and
by means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not only
does jurisprudencesupport this view but also, since the use of explosives is the principal
mode of attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
instead of treachery which will then be relegated merely as a generic aggravating

circumstance.
No, there was no conspiracy. The undisputed facts show that when Antonio Comadre was in
the act of throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on
without uttering a single word of encouragement or performed any act to assist him.
A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to
exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a
person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends
companionship.
The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation
in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the
scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are insufficient to establish
conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime. There
being no conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must answer for the crime.
People vs Tadeo
Facts: RA 8294 took effect only on 6 July 1994 while the crimes involved herein were
committed on 4 November 1993. Said RA decriminalized violations of PD 1866 where the
unlicensed firearm is used in carrying out the commission of other crimes Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Fifteen Thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such
as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any firearm or ammunition. Provided, that no other crime was committed x x x x If
homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Issue: WON the use of unlicensed firearm can be appreciated as a speacial aggravating
circumstance in the instant case
Held: The use of an unlicensed firearm cannot be considered however as a special
aggravating circumstance in Crim. Case No. 23-498 and Crim. Case No. 23-494. For one, it
was not alleged as an aggravating circumstance in the Informations for murder and frustrated
murder which is necessary under our present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Moreover, even if alleged, the circumstance cannot be retroactively applied to prejudice
accused-appellant; it must be stressed that. In any event, as correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, there is no evidence proving the illicit character of the .38 cal. revolver used
by appellant in killing Mayolito Cabatu and in trying to kill Florencia Cabatu, as to which
requisite of the crime the record is eerily silent.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
The foregoing amendments obviously blur the distinctions between murder and homicide on
one hand, and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder or homicide on the
other. We have declared that the formulation in RA 8294, i.e., "[i]f homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance," signifies a legislative intent to treat as a single
offense the illegal possession of firearms and the commission of murder or homicide with the
use of an unlicensed firearm. Thus where an accused used an unlicensed firearm in
committing homicide or murder, he may no longer be charged with what used to be the two
(2) separate offenses of homicide or murder under The Revised Penal Code and qualified
illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder under PD 1866; in other words,
where murder or homicide was committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no
longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance.
ANTI-PIRACY (PD 532)

PEOPLE vs. AGOMO-O (G.R. No. 131829)
Facts: On the evening of September 22, 1993, a passenger jeepney driven was stopped by
three men, among them was the accused in this case, Ronnie Agomo-o, who, armed with a
gun, announced a hold-up and ordered the driver to turn off the engine.
As a consequence of gunshots fired during the hold-up, the driver of the jeep died while few
of its passengers were wounded.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of highway robbery?
Held: Highway robbery is now governed by P.D. No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy
and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974. This law provides:

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Sec. 2. (e). Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The seizure of any person for ransom, extortion
or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of
violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means,
committed by any person on any Philippine highway.
In the case of People v. Puno, it was held that P.D. No. 532 amended Art. 306 of the Revised
Penal Code and that it is no longer required that there be at least four armed persons forming
a band of robbers. The number of offenders is no longer an essential element of the crime of
highway robbery. Hence, the fact that there were only three identified perpetrators is of no
moment. P.D. No. 532 only requires proof that persons were organized for the purpose of
committing highway robbery indiscriminately. "The robbery must be directed not only against
specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims." In
this case, the accused, intending to commit robbery, waited at the Barangay Mapili crossing
for any vehicle that would happen to travel along that road. The driver Rodito Lasap and his
passengers were not predetermined targets. Rather, they became the accused's victims
because they happened to be traveling at the time when the accused were there. There was,
thus, randomness in the selection of the victims, or the act of committing robbery
indiscriminately, which differentiates this case from that of a simple robbery with homicide.
PEOPLE vs. CERBITO (G. R. No. 126397)

Facts: On the 3rd day of September 1992 at around 2:20 p.m. the passengers of a Philippine
Rabbit Bus travelling on the North Expressway on its way to Manila were victimized in a holdup committed by four men who boarded the bus as it was approaching the Tabang tollgate. A
policeman who was a passenger in the bus shot one of the holduppers. The policeman was
shot in turn by another holdupper; the policeman died.
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
After these accused divested her co-passengers of their cash and belongings, Jimboy
pointed the gun to the driver and Vicente Acedera was also near him was seated at the right
side of the driver, while Cerbito was divesting all passengers.
The accused raised the defense of denial and alibi. The lower court convicted the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide penalized under PD
532.
Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellants were correctly convicted by the lower court of
the crime of robbery with homicide under PD532.
Held: After a careful examination of the entire evidence, the SC resolved to affirm the
judgment of conviction. SC agreed with the trial courts rejection of the defense of alibi for the
reason that said defense cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the two
eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution. Confronted with contradictory declarations and
statements, the trial court cannot be faulted for giving greater weight to the positive
testimonies of the witnesses who have not been shown to have any motive to falsely
implicate the accused-appellants, and whose credibility has not been placed in doubt. Alibi
has generally been regarded with disfavor by the court because it is easily fabricated and we
have no reason to deviate from this rule.
Highway robbery/brigandage is defined in Section 2(e) of P. D. 532 entitled "Anti-Piracy and
Anti-Highway Robbery Law" as "(t)he seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other
unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence
against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by
any person on any Philippine Highway." The robbery must be directed not only against
specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims. All the
above elements were established.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22

GARCIA VS. CA G.R. No. 138197
FACTS:
Sometime in 1994, petitioner Ma. Eliza C. Garcia introduced herself as a stockbroker to
private complainant Carl Valentin and convinced him to invest in the stock market.
Consequently, Garcia purchased and sold shares of stocks for the account of Valentin as
evidenced by the purchase and sale confirmation slips issued to him by petitioner.
In the course of their business dealings, petitioner Garcia issued to private complainant
Valentin, two checks drawn against City Trust Banking Corporation . Both checks were
payable to private complainant. Upon presentment of the checks for payment, the drawee
bank dishonored them for the reason "account closed..". Valentin notified petitioner of the
dishonor and the latter promised to pay the value thereof within a period of three (3) months.
Thereafter, petitioner gave Carl Valentin a check in the amount of P100,000. However, the
said check bounced.
Despite repeated demands, petitioner failed to pay her obligation.Thus, private complainant
file an action against her in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 for violation
of B.P. 22.
After trial, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City rendered a verdict of conviction.On
appeal, the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City affirmed the lower courts decision.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review which the
respondent court denied in the first assailed decision, affirming the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Ma. Eliza C. Garcia has been erroneously convicted and
sentenced for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Bilang 22).
HELD: Yes.
The elements of the violation of B.P. 22 are: (1) the accused makes, draws, or issues any
check to apply on account or for value; (2) the accused knows at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 14
We find the foregoing elements present in this case. Petitioner issued City Trust Check No.
057066, dated January 8, 1996, in the amount of P323,113.50 and payable to Carl Valentin,
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
representing proceeds of his stock market investments which she brokered. She also issued
for the same purpose City Trust Check No. 057067, dated January 24, 1996, in the amount
of P146,886.50 also payable to Carl Valentin. It is undisputed that she did not have sufficient
funds to cover the checks at the time she issued it. The checks, which were deposited on the
date indicated on each, were subsequently dishonored because the account from which the
money should have been drawn against was closed by petitioner. Despite demands made on
her by private complainant to pay the value of the check, petitioner failed to pay. Neither did
she make arrangements for payment in full of the checks by the bank within five banking
days after notice of dishonor so as to absolve her of any liability for issuing a bouncing check.
LIM vs. PEOPLE

GR. 149276. September 27, 2002
FACTS: In December 1991, petitioner spouses issued to private respondent two postdated
checks, namely, Metrobank check no. 464728 dated January 15, 1992 in the amount of
P365,750 and Metrobank check no. 464743 dated January 22, 1992 in the amount of
P429,000. Check no. 464728 was dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn
against insufficient funds while check no. 464743 was not presented for payment upon
request of petitioners who promised to replace the dishonored check.
An Information for the crime of estafa was filed with the RTC against petitioners. Thereafter,
the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of herein petitioners,
Petitioner Jovencio Lim was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the trial court
and was detained at the Quezon City Jail. However, petitioner Teresita Lim remained at
large.
Petitioners contend that, (by virtue of BP22) inasmuch as the amount of the subject check is
P365,750, they can be penalized with reclusion perpetua or 30 years of imprisonment. This
penalty, according to petitioners, is too severe and disproportionate to the crime they
committed and infringes on the express mandate of Article III, Section 19 of the Constitution
which prohibits the infliction of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 818 violates the constitutional provisions on due process, bail and
imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
HELD: The Court upholds the constitutionality of PD 818RATIO
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
RATIO
PD 818 section 1 provides;
SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or
fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the later sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed
thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termedreclusion perpetua;
2nd. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3rd. The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but
does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By prision mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos.
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or
disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and
wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for
a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this principle, the Court has
consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment
authorized by the statute involved is cruel and degrading.
Petitioners also argue that while PD 818 increased the imposable penalties for estafa
committed under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, it did not increase the
amounts corresponding to the said new penalties. Thus, the original amounts provided for in
the Revised Penal Code have remained the same notwithstanding that they have become
negligible and insignificant compared to the present value of the peso.
Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a
laudable purpose, namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the
countrys commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a necessary precaution to deter
people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that PD 818 did not increase the amounts
corresponding to the new penalties only proves that the amount is immaterial and
inconsequential. What the law sought to avert was the proliferation of estafa cases
committed by means of bouncing checks. Taking into account the salutary purpose for which
said law was decreed, we conclude that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of Article III of
the Constitution.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Moreover, when a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its
constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of
the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. The burden of proving the invalidity of
a law rests on those who challenge it. In this case, petitioners failed to present clear and
convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of PD 818.
With respect to the issue of whether PD 818 infringes on Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution, petitioners claim that PD 818 is violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution as it was not published in the Official Gazette. This claim is incorrect and must
be rejected. Publication, being an indispensable part of due process, is imperative to the
validity of laws, presidential decrees and executive orders. PD 818 was published in the
Official Gazette on December 1, 1975.
Domagsang v. CA
Facts: The petitioner was convicted of 18 counts of violation of BP22. It would appear that
the petitioner approached complainant Ignacio Garcia, an AssistantVice President of
METROBANK, to ask for financial assistance. Garcia accommodated petitioner and gave him
a loan in the sum of P573,800.00. In exchange, the petitioner issued and delivered to the
complainant 18 postdated checks for the repayment of the loan. When the checks were, in
time, deposited, the instruments were all dishonored by the drawee bank for this reason:
Account closed. The complainant demanded payment allegedly by calling up petitioner at
her office. Failing to receive any payment for the value of the dishonored checks, the
complainant referred the matter to his lawyer who supposedly wrote petitioner a letter of
demand but that the latter ignored the demand.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
During trial, the notice of dishonor was not offered in evidence.

Issue: Whether or not conviction of a violation of BP 22 is proper.
Held: The conviction is not proper. Penal statutes are strictly construed against the State. In
this case, a demand letter was sent by a counsel of the complainant because of the failure
of the prosecution to formally offer it in evidence. Courts are bound to consider as part of the
evidence only those which are formally offered for judges must base their findings strictly on
the evidence submitted by the parties at the trial. Without the written notice of dishonor, there
can be no basis for establishing the presence of "actual knowledge of insufficiency of funds."
The law enumerates the elements of the crime to be the following: (1) the making, drawing
and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds inor credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank
to stop payment. There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of
the maker, drawer or issuer of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank of the
check issued if the dishonored check is presented within 90 days from the date of the check
and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to make arrangement with the drawee bank
for that purpose. The statute has created the prima facie presumption evidently because
"knowledge" which involves a state of mind would be difficult to establish. The presumption
does not hold, however, when the maker, drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon or make sarrangement for payment in full by the drawee
bank of such check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee bank

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
Anti-Wire Tapping
Navarro v. CA
Facts: Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan went to the police station to
report an alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment in the City. At the station,
a heated confrontation followed between Lingan and Navarro who was then having drinks
outside the headquarters. Lingan was hit by the handle of the accused's gun below the left
eyebrow, followed by a fist blow which resulted in his death. The exchange of words was
recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation
that it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena testified and
presented in evidence the voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at the police
station between the police officer Navarro and the deceased, Lingan, which was taken
without the knowledge of the two.
Issue: Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200,
which prohibits wire tapping.
Held: Yes. The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private
communications (Ramirez v Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
DANGEROUS DRUG ACT

42. FRANCISCO IMSON y ADRIANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 193003
13 July 2011CARPIO,
J
.:
Facts:
PO1 Gerry Pajares, PO1 Noli Pineda, the confidential informant, and other policemen arrived
at around 10:30 p.m. to theplace where a buy bust operation was about to be conducted by
reason of a report that accused Francisco Imson was sellingshabu. Said buy bust operation
was not undertaken because they saw Imson talking with Dayao. Thereafter, they sawImson
giving Rolando S. Dayao a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
Pajares approached thetwo men and introduced himself. He immediately apprehended Imson
while Pineda ran after Dayao who tried to escape.The policemen confiscated two plastic
sachets containing the suspected shabu.Imson and Dayao were brought to the Police Station
where they executed their joint sworn statements and where the twoplastic sachets were
marked with RDS and FIA ,the initials of the two. The two plastic sachets were examined
and bothtested positive for shabu.Two informations for illegal possession of dangerous drugs
against Imson and Dayao were filed.In its Decision, the RTC found Imson and Dayao guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.When appealed, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC.Imson and Dayao filed a
motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied said motion. Hence, the present
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the two plastic sachets containing shabu were inadmissible in evidence
because the integrity of the chain of custody was impaired.
Resolution:
The failure of the policemen to make a physical inventory and to photograph the two plastic
sachets containing shabu donot render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence.
Likewise, the failure of the policemen to mark the two plasticsachets containing shabu at the
place of arrest does not render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. In People
v. Resurreccion, the Court held that the failure of the policemen to immediately mark the
confiscated items does notautomatically impair the integrity of chain of custody. The Court
held:

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2nd Sem 2005-2006
Jurisprudence tells us that the failure to immediately mark seized drugs will not automatically
impair the integrity of chain of custody.The failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of
RA 9165 does not necessarily render an accuseds arrest illegal or theitems seized or
confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and theevidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.To be able to create a first link in the
chain of custody, then, what is required is that the marking be made in the presence of the
accused and upon immediate confiscation. Immediate Confiscation has no exact
definition. Thus, in People v. Gum-Oyen,testimony that included the marking of the seized
items at the police station and in the presence of the accused was sufficient inshowing
compliance with the rules on chain of custody. Marking upon immediate confiscation
contemplates even marking atthe nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.
The presumption is that the policemen performed their official duties regularly. In order to
overcome this presumption,Imson must show that there was bad faith or improper motive on
the part of the policemen, or that the confiscated itemswere tampered. Imson failed to do so.
50. People vs Narvasa
GR. No. 128618 November 16, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
FELICISIMO NARVASA, JIMMY ORANIA and MATEO NARVASA, accused, FELICISIMO
NARVASA and JIMMY ORANIA, appellants.
FACTS: Three informations were filed against accused-appellants, two for aggravated illegal
possession of firearm and one for homicide.
The trial court in convicting the accused guilty of aggravated illegal possession of firearm
accorded credibility to the prosecution witnesses and held that mere denial could not
overcome the prosecution evidence showing that appellants used high-powered firearms to
shoot at the prosecution witnesses, thereby resulting in the death of SPO3 Primo Camba.
Further supporting said testimonies were the results of the paraffin test conducted on
appellants and the recovery of various cartridges and shells matching the firearms
purportedly used in the crime. Though these unlicensed firearms were not presented as
evidence, the trial court, citing People v. Ferrera, ruled that appellants may still be convicted
of illegal possession of firearms.
Appellants question the credibility of Witnesses Laderas and Nagal because of an alleged
inconsistency in their testimonies. Laderas testified that there was an exchange of fire
between appellants and PO2 Simeon Navora, while Nagal declared that only the appellants
fired. Appellants point out that conflicting testimonies on a material and relevant point casts
doubt [on] the truthfulness or veracity 17 of such testimonies.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
ISSUE1: W/N the inconsistencies in the witnesses testimonies affected their credibility
HELD1: Appellants contention is untenable. The circumstances of the instant case explain
the seeming inconsistency in the testimonies of the two witnesses. At the time, they were
under fire and in fear of losing their lives. Moreover, they did not take cover in the same place
that Navora did.
Nonetheless, their uncertainty on whether Navora had fired back is immaterial to the crime
charged and too insignificant to impair their credibility. In any event, the Court has ruled that a
witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection of minute
details.
ISSUE2: W/N the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the appellants conviction
HELD2: Appellants cite People v. Lualhati, wherein this Court ruled that in crimes involving
illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof,
viz: the existence of the subject firearm and the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the
same. Appellants contend that the existence of the firearms was not sufficiently proven
because the prosecution had not presented the firearms as evidence. It is necessary, they
argue, that said firearms allegedly possessed by the accused-appellants and allegedly used
in the killing of Policeman Primo Camba be presented in evidence as those firearms
constitute the corpus delicti of the crime with which they are sentenced. 20
Appellants argument is not persuasive. In People v. Lualhati, this Court merely stated that
the existence of the firearm must be established; it did not rule that the firearm itself had to be
presented as evidence. Thus, in People v. Orehuela, the Court held that the existence of
the firearm can be established by testimony, even without the presentation of the said
firearm. In the said case, Appellant Orehuela was convicted of qualified illegal possession of
a firearm despite the fact that the firearm used was not presented as evidence. The existence
of the weapon was deemed amply established by the testimony of an eyewitness that
Orehuela was in possession of it and had used it to kill the victim.
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS Case Digests 30july 2011
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RA 3019 Case Digests under Judge Abbu of Liceo Law
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4
hanipaporo2013
said that after the CFIs decision, they discovered that there was an overdraft for thepurchase
of subject deflectors. In other words, there were no funds available to coversaid purchase. At
first, the Solicitor General did not object to such motion. Thus theCA grant the motion.
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
However, Acting Mayor Luciano et. Al questioned the grant of the motion for new trial alleging
that NDE could have been discovered even beforeCFIs decision by exercise of due
diligence. Also, Luciano et. al averred that NDEwould not change the result of the trial when
taken into consideration the evidencealready on record. Solicitor Gen. sided with Luciano.
Estrella objected and said thatthe Solicitor Gen. as representative of the Republic is already
estopped to correct itserror.
ISSUE:
WON the grant of a new trial for allegedly NDE was granted improvidently andin grave abuse
of discretion?
RULING:
YES. The grant of new trial on the ground of NDE was granted improvidently and ingrave
abuse of discretion. Auditors testimony fell short of the requirements forholding of a new trial.
For NDE to be validly invoked as a ground for petition for newtrial, the following must
concur:1.
New and material evidence has been discovered after the trial, which thedefendant could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered andproduced during trial2.
Such evidence if introduced and admitted would change the judgment.The alleged overdraft
could not have been deemed as an NDE as they could haveknown it all along and presented
during the hearing of the case. Auditors affidavitactually admitted that the Municipality
already knew of the lack of funds when hesaid that it used the trust fund of the municipality to
partially pay the purchaseddeflectors. Introduction of the alleged NDE could not
have influence the result of thecase in view of the clear and convincing evidence already in
record.The violation is malum prohibitum. It is the commission of the act as defined by
lawand not the character/effect thereof that determines WON provision has beenviolated.
98. ARTURO MEJORADA VS.SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: Mejorada was a right of way agent employed in the Office of the Highway District
Engineer in Pasig, Metro Manila. His work was to negotiate with property owners affected by
highway constructions/improvements for the purpose of compensating them for the damages
that they may incur. Mejorada required the claimants de Leon et.al to sign blank copies of
Sworn Statement on the Correct Assessment and Fair Market Value of Real Properties as
well as an Agreement to demolish, remove and reconstruct improvements. Claimants did sign
without bothering what those documents were about as they were more concerned with just
compensation supposedly due them. In the signed documents, Mejorada made it appear that
the value of the properties of the claimants were much higher than actual value claimed by
the de leon et. Al. What was reflected in the Agreement was the value of improvements that
was P2,000 lower than the value declared by the owner/claimants. Also, declarations of
property were attached to the documents, which declarations were actually falsified as they
were registered under different names other than the claimants. Claimants were later
accompanied by Mejorada to receive the proceeds of their checks. But Mejorada took part of
the proceeds. Claimants could not complain as they were afraid of Mejoradas armed
companions. Claimants de leon et.al later filed complaints against Mejorada (assisted by their

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counsel) with the Provincial Fiscal Office in Pasig. Consequently, 8 informations were filed
against Mejorada.
Mejoradas contentions 1. He cannot be guilty of violating S3 of RA 3019 as he is not charged
with the duty of granting licenses, permits as mentioned in the provision. 2. His act was not
done while in the performance of his official functions 3. Claimants were not injured party 4.
The most that can be charged against him is Robbery not liable under RA 3019
ISSUES: WON Mejoradas act constitute the offense in S3 of RA 3019 (i.e. causing undue
injury to any partygiving party unwarranted benefits... thru manifest partiality, evident bad
faith / gross inexcusable negligence.) and have been clearly and convincingly proven by
the prosecution?
Other Issues (Crimpro related):
WON offense proved during trial should prevail over offense charged in the info
WON Sandiganbayan is the competent court with jurisdiction over the case
RULING: YES. Mejorada is guilty under RA3019 for violating S3 of the law. He is a public
officer who took advantage of his position by making claimants sign agreements which
contained falsified declarations of the value of improvements and lots. There was manifest
evident bad faith on his part when he inflated the values of the true claims and when he
divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due them. The claimants are not the
only injured party but also the State because the latter was disadvantaged with Mejoradas
act of inflating said values of property. The law is not limited to those public officials who
committed the prohibited act while discharging their duty of granting licenses, permits but
also those who committed prohibited acts while being public officers. Offense charged in the
info should prevail over offense proved during trial. Since this is the case, the appropriate
penalty that should be imposed upon Mejorada is 56 years and 8 days and this did not violate
the 3 Fold rule of the RPC. Art. 70 speaks of service of sentence, duration of penalty and
penalty to be inflicted and not on the imposition of penalty. It merely provides that the prisoner
cannot serve more than 3x the most severe of the penalties of 40 years. The Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over Mejoradas case as he is deemed to have committed the prohibited act
while being a public officer.
90. Merencillo v People (521 scra 31)
Facts: Juanito Merencillo was charged of violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and Direct
bribery. Petitioner demanded from private complainant Ma. Angeles Ramasola Cesar
P20,000.00 in exchange for the approval of the Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR).
Due to the repeated demand of the petitioner and delaying the release of CAR, private
complainant seek the help of the authorities. As a result, petitioner was caught in the
entrapment instituted by the police. After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged.
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Petitioner appealed the decision to the Sandiganbayan which was denied affirming the RTC
decision. Hence, this petition for review of certiorari, contending that he was twice in jeopardy
when he was prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and for direct bribery.
Issue: WON the petitioner was placed in double jeopardy.
Holding: No. Section 3(b) of RA 3019 begins with the following statement: Sec.3 In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following acts
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared unlawful: XXX
XXX
One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in addition to a felony under the
RPC for the same delictual act, that is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged
with a felony under the RPC. There is no double jeopardy if a person is charged
simultaneously of successively for violation of the Sec.3 of RA 3019 and the RPC. The rule
against double jeopardy prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to
commit it or a frustration thereof; or whether one offense necessarily includes or os
necessarily included in the other, as provided in Sec.7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. An
offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint, constitute the latter; and an
offense charged is necessarily included in an offense proved when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery defined and punished under
RPC and those violation of Sec.3 (b) of RA 3019 shows that there is neither identity nor
necessary inclusion between the two offenses although the two charges against the petitioner
stemmed from the same transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct
offense.

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JUDICIAL PROCEEDING THAT INTERRUPTS THE PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME

82. PEOPLE V. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012
Perez, J:
FACTS:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for
estafaand violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan(respond
ent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaintalleges that
respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of
NineMillion Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two P
esos(P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored uponpresentmen
t for payment.Consequently the case was modified, and only on February 3, 2000 that two
countsfor violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan inthe
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. On 17 June 2000, respondent filed anOmnibus
Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before
MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liabilityhas been extinguished
by reason of prescription.In defense of her claim, Pangilinan said that the prevailing law that
governs theprescription of special penal law, B.P. 22, is Section 2 of Act No. 3326
(An Act ToEstablish Periods Of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts)
where theright to file an action to a proper court and not to merely to prosecution office
forB.P. 22, prescribes four (4) years from the commission of the crime. The imputedviolation
occurred sometime in 1995, and only on February 3, 2000 that a case
wasformally filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court, therefore the action alreadyprescribes.
RTC granted the motion.On the other hand, the complainant argued that the filing with the
office of cityprosecutor constitutes an interruption to the prescription.
ISSUE:
Is filing complaint to city prosecutor office considered a judicial proceeding thatcan interrupt
prescription of crime under B.P. 22?
HELD:
YES. Following a catena of cases, the court held that, there is no more distinctionbetween
cases under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and those covered by
speciallaws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription; that theinstitution of
proceedings for preliminary investigation in the office of prosecutoragainst accused interrupts
the period of prescription.Following the factual finding the crime was committed sometime in
1995, the filingof complaint on September 1997, two (2) years from the commission of the
crime
validly interrupts the running of prescription. Therefore the action against therespondent
Pangilinan did not prescribe.
People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, March 10, 2000
Crim Pro - Rule 110
Facts:
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Ma. Theresa Pangilinan, the respondent in this instant case allegedly issued 9 checks
with the aggregate amount of P9,658,692 in favor of Virginia Malolos. But, upon Malolos'
presentment of the said checks, they were dishonored. So, on Sept. 16, 1997, Malolos filed
an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22 against Pangilinan.
On December 5, 1997, Pangilinan filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of
commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance
against Malolos before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Later, Pangilinan also filed on December
10, 1997, a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question".
On March 2, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended
Pangilinan's petition which was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Malolos,
then, raised the matter before the DOJ.
On January 5, 1999, Sec. of Justice Serafin Cuevas reversed the resolution of the
City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of the informations for violation of BP 22 in connection
with Pangilinan's issuance of two checks, the charges involving the other checks were
dismissed. So, two counts of violation for BP 22, both dated Nov. 18, 1999, were filed against
Pangilinan on Feb. 3, 2000 before the MeTC of Quezon City.
On June 17, 2000, Pangilinan filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and
to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City, alleging
that the criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription. The motion was
granted. Malolos filed a notice of appeal and the RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC.
According to the RTC, the offense has not yet prescribed "considering the appropriate
complaint that started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on
16 September 1997". Dissatisfied, Pangilinan raised the matter to the Supreme Court for
review but it was referred to the CA "for appropriate action".
On October 26, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and recognized Feb.
3, 2000 as the date of the filing of the informations.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22
against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September
1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.
Held. Yes. Under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 which is the law applicable to B.P. 22 cases,
[v]iolations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe
in accordance with the following rules: after four years for those punished by imprisonment
for more than one month, but less than two years. Under Section 2 of the same Act, [t]he
prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
Since B.P. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than
thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore prescribes
LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period,
however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16
September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000
because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition
before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial
question. The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor
approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so
ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of
Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the
filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
122. DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government(PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec.
3(h), inconnection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the
DoromalInternational Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million
worth ofelectronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the
Department ofEducation, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and
Youth Council (orNMYC).
An information was then filed by the Tanodbayan against Doromal for the said violation and
a
preliminary investigation was conducted. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to file the information without the
approval of the Ombudsman.
The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor
under the 1987Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to
the Ombudsman) isclearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct
the filing of criminalcases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman.
Subsequently annulling the information filed by the Tanodbayan.
A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully,
participate in a business through the DoromalInternational Trading Corporation, a family
corporation of which he is the President, and which company participatedin the biddings
conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National Manpower
&Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution. The
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid since
therehad been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed against
him. The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigatio
n isunnecessary because both old and new informations involve the same subject matter.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.(2)
Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations involve the
samesubject matter.(3) Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the
absence of preliminaryinvestigation.
HELD:
Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the
SupremeCourt.RATIO:(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of
Doromal as part of the applicationto bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having
participated in a business which act isabsolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the
Constitution" because "the DITC remaineda family corporation in which Doromal has at least
an indirect interest."Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the
President, Vice-President, themembers of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall
not... during (their) tenure, ...directly orindirectly ... participate in any business.(2) The right of
the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial over hisopposition
is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law" provided by the Constitution.Since the first information
was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that time shallalso be considered as
void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted.(3) The absence of
preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case.Nor do they
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there wereno
preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention
ofthe court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct
such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so
that thepreliminary investigation may be conducted. WHEREFORE, the petition for
certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shallimmediately remand Criminal
Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminaryinvestigation and shall hold in
abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation.
130. G.R. Nos. 147706-07 | February 16, 2005 | PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and
EFREN L. ALAS, respondents | J. Corona
FACTS: Two separate informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, were filed with the Sandiganbayan on November
17, 1999 against Efren L. Alas. The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous
advertising contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President and Chief Operating
Officer of the Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing
Company which purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the government.
On October 30, 2002, Alas filed a motion to quash the informations for lack of jurisdiction,
which motion was vehemently opposed by the prosecution. After considering the arguments
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of both parties, the respondent court ruled that PPSB was a private corporation and that its
officers, particularly herein respondent Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.
-
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over public officers unless private persons are
charged with them in the commission of the offenses.
The records disclosed that while Philippine Postal Savings Bank is a subsidiary of the
Philippine Postal Corporation which is a government owned corporation, the same is
not created by a special law.
said entity is formed was primarily for business
The People, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed this petition arguing, in
essence, that the PPSB was a government-owned or controlled corporation as the term was
defined under Section 2(13) of the Administrative Code of 1987.
RA 8249 (act defining jurisdiction of sandiganbayan) did not make a distinction as to the
manner of creation of the government-owned or controlled corporations for their officers to fall
under its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under
the Corporation Code for purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
HELD: Petition granted. More than 99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to
the government while the rest is nominally held by its incorporators who are/were themselves
officers of PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of RA
7354, otherwise known as the Postal Service Act of 1992, for purposes of, among others, to
encourage and promote the virtue of thrift and the habit of savings among the general public,
especially the youth and the marginalized sector in the countryside xxx and to facilitate
postal service by receiving collections and making payments, including postal money orders.
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish
Constitution: The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and
corrupt practices and such other offense committed by public officers and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to
their office as may be determined by law.
People v. Garcia (G.R. No. 138470)
Facts:
Joselito Cortez, a taxicab operator based in Marilao, Bulacan, wasapproached by Garcia and
Bernabe because they wanted to borrow his brandnew Mitsubishi L300 van for their trip
to the Bicol region. Cortez refused, sayingthat the van was unavailable. Instead, he got in
touch with Ferdinand Ignacio,who had just purchased a brand new Toyota Tamaraw
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2nd Sem 2005-2006
FX. Ignacio agreed tolease his vehicle to Cortez for two days at the daily rate of P2,000.00.
Bernabeand Garcia, on the other hand, rented the vehicle from Cortez for P4,000.00 aday
inclusive of the P500.00 drivers fee. They agreed to pay the rental fee upontheir return from
Bicol. Cortez and his driver, Wilfredo Elis, picked up IgnaciosTamaraw FX at his residence in
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Elis drove the same backto Marilao, Bulacan and, at 8:00 a.m., he
and the two accused left for Bicol.However, four days passed without a word from Garcia and
Bernabe.Cortez began to worry about the vehicle he had borrowed from FerdinandIgnacio so
he informed the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan. It waslater found out that
the two accused attempted to sell the vehicle. They stabbedand dumped Elis him along the
highway near the sabana in San Rafael, Bulacanwhen Elis refused to join their plan to sell
the Tamaraw FX. The RTC found Artemio Garcia and Regalado Bernabe guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of specialcomplex crime of carnapping with homicide. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the two accused are guilty of the crime charged?
Decision:
Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as "An Act Preventing andPenalizing Carnapping",
defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain,of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latters consent, or by meansof violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things."More specifically, the elements of the crime are as follows: 1. That
there is anactual taking of the vehicle; 2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking
of the vehicle; 3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender
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2nd Sem 2005-2006

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006

LEGAL ETHICS
2nd Sem 2005-2006
himself; 4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that thetaking was
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things. A careful examination of the evidence presented shows that all theelements of
carnapping were proved in this case. In the case at bar, it cannot bedenied that the nature of
the appellants possession of the Tamaraw FX wasinitially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful
killing of the deceased for the purposeof taking the vehicle radically transformed the
character of said possession intoan unlawful one. Cortez categorically stated that during his
first visit to theMoncada Police Station where appellant and his co-accused were detained,
thetwo separately admitted to him that they killed the deceased when the latter refused to join
their plan to sell the
vehicle.Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed by appellantconstituted the
crime of carnapping even if the deceased was the driver of thevehicle and not the owner. The
settled rule is that, in crimes of unlawful taking of property through intimidation or violence, it
is not necessary that the personunlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner
thereof. What is
simplyrequired is that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actualpossession of
the property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as
thereis apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latter's willthrough viole
nce or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful taking of aproperty belonging to another is
imputable to the offender.


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LEGAL ETHICS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006

2nd Sem 2005-2006

W/N ALAUYA VIOLATED THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL

YES, PARTICULARLY SECTION 4

NO, RESERVED ONLY FOR THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS

2nd Sem 2005-2006

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006

The 1987 Constitution

The Supreme Court shall have the

The Supreme Court shall have the

2nd Sem 2005-2006

2nd Sem 2005-2006

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006

2nd Sem 2005-2006

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006

2nd Sem 2005-2006

W/N SON WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006

2nd Sem 2005-2006

2nd Sem 2005-2006

2nd Sem 2005-2006

Bayot was charged with malpractice by publishing Marriagelicense promptly secured

ISSUE: WoN Bayot can be charged with malpractice?

2nd Sem 2005-2006

constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006

23 SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS V ROMANILLOS

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006

It is inconsequential that SJHAI never questioned the propriety of respondents

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006

o Ordered arraignment despite: a motion to defer proceedings; a ten-day period

2nd Sem 2005-2006

W/N TRIESTE IS GUILTY UNDER THE ANTI GRAFT AND CORRUPT

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006

27 PNB v ATTY CEDO

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006

Planters Machinery Corporation (PLAMACO) mortgaged to Traders Royal Bank (the

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006

2nd Sem 2005-2006

Anastacio, Beron, Calinisan, Fernandez, Gana

2nd Sem 2005-2006