G.R. No.

L-45772 March 25, 1988

PEOPLE vs. Hon. EDUARDO MONTENEGRO
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS: On 20 September 1976, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, thru Assistant Fiscal Virginia G, Valdez, filed
an Information for "Roberry" before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV-B, Quezon City, docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-6821, against Antonio Cimarra, Ulpiano Villar, Bayani Catindig and Avelino de Leon. Said
accused (now private respondents) were all members of the police force of Quezon City and were charged as
accessories-after-the-fact in the robbery committed by the minor Ricardo Cabaloza, who had already pleaded
guilty and had been convicted in Criminal Case No. QF-76-051 before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Quezon City. Ricardo Cabaloza was convicted for the robbery of the same items, articles and jewelries
belonging to Ding Velayo, Inc. valued at P 75,591.40. Upon arraignment on 25 October 1976, all of the accused
(now private respondents) entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge filed against them. Accordingly, trial on
the merits was scheduled by the respondent court. However, before the trial could proceed, the prosecuting
fiscal filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information, dated 28 December 1976, seeking to amend the original
information by: (1) changing the offense charged from "Robbery" to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place," (2)
alleging conspiracy among all the accused, and (3) deleting all items, articles and jewelries alleged to have been
stolen in the original Information and substituting them with a different set of items valued at P71,336.80.
Private respondents opposed the admission of the Amended Information. The respondent court resolved to
deny the proposed amendments contained in the Amended Information in the previously referred to order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of the said motion was valid?
RULING: YES.
Amendment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (formerly,
Section 13, Rule 110 of the old Rules on Criminal Procedure) may be made at any time before the accused
enters a plea to the charge. Thereafter and during the trial, amendments to the information may also be
allowed, as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test as to
when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a
defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or
information as amended.
On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already
contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime
charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime.
The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the instant case, are clearly substantial and have
the effect of changing the crime charged from "Robbery" punishable under Article 209 to "Robbery in an
Uninhabited Place" punishable under Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby exposing the private
respondents-accused to a higher penalty as compared to the penalty imposable for the offense charged in the
original information to which the accused had already entered a plea of "not guilty" during their arraignment.
Moreover, the change in the items, articles and jewelries allegedly stolen into entirely different articles from
those originally complained of, affects the essense of the imputed crime, and would deprive the accused of the
opportunity to meet all the allegations in the amended information, in the preparation of their defenses to the
charge filed against them. It will be observed that private respondents were accused as accessories-after-thefact of the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in the
original information. To charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime different from that
committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by the Court.

The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was not previously included in
the original information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with the need of a new
defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court.
This decision is immediately executory.

G.R. NO. 121211. APRIL 30, 2003

PEOPLE VS. RONETO DEGAMO
PER CURIAM:
Before us for automatic review is a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 12) of Ormoc City
imposing the supreme penalty of death on appellant Roneto Degamo alias Roy for the crime of rape with the
use of a deadly weapon and the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime.
On October 4, 1994, a complaint was filed before the trial court charging appellant with the crime of rape to
which, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty.
On January 17, 1995, before the start of the trial proper, the court a quo allowed the complaint to be amended
to include the allegation that by reason of the incident of rape, the victim has become insane.
In the early morning, RONETO DEGAMO alias Roy, being then armed with a bladed weapon, by means of
violence and intimidation, feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant herein ELLEN VERTUDAZO,
against her will and in her own house.
A discussion of certain procedural rules is in order before going into the merits of the case. It has not escaped
our notice that the complaint for rape with use of a deadly weapon was amended after arraignment of appellant
to include the allegation that the victim has become insane by reason or on the occasion of the rape. Although
the penalty for rape with the use of a deadly weapon under the original Information is reclusion perpetua to
death, the mandatory penalty of death is imposed where the victim has become insane by reason or on the
occasion of rape as alleged in the Amended Information.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amended complaint was valid?
RULING: YES.
Under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, an amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only
as to matters of form, provided: (i) leave of court is obtained; and (ii) such amendment is not prejudicial to the
rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned.
In Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, we had occasion to state that a substantial amendment consists of recital of
facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are
merely of form. The following were held to be merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only
to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which
does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional
allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and
affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) amendment, which does not adversely affect any
substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.
We further elucidated in the Teehankee case that the test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an
accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally
stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the

accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is
in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance.
Tested against the foregoing guidelines, the subject amendment is clearly not one of substance as it falls under
all of the formal amendments enumerated in the Teehankee case. The insertion of the phrase that the victim
has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape in the Information merely raised the penalty that may
be imposed in case of conviction and does not charge another offense different from that charged in the
original Information. Whatever defense appellant may have raised under the original information for rape
committed with a deadly weapon equally applies to rape committed with a deadly weapon where the victim has
become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial
right of appellant. Therefore, the trial court correctly allowed the amendment.
Furthermore, it is also settled that amendment of an information to charge a more serious offense is
permissible and does not constitute double jeopardy even where the accused was already arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to the charge, where the basis of the more serious charge did not exist, but comes as a
subsequent event. In this case the basis for the amendment was the psychosis of complainant which was
determined after the filing of the information.
Besides, the trial proper started only after appellant had been re-arraigned and appellant never objected to the
amendment at any stage of the proceedings. It is basic that objection to the amendment of an information or
complaint must be raised at the time the amendment is made, otherwise, silence would be deemed a consent to
said amendment. It is a time-honored doctrine that objection to the amendment must be seasonably made, for
when the trial was had upon an information substituted for the complaint or information without any objection
by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. It cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

G.R. NO. 148468. G.R. NO. 148769. G.R. NO. 149116. JANUARY 28, 2003
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of
the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion
to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein
petitioner is one of the accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada
and several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation. Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its
behalf a donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis
Chavit Singson through the latters assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. Petitioner received the donation and
turned over the said amount to the Foundations treasurer who later deposited it in the Foundations account
with the Equitable PCI Bank.
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly accused then President Joseph E. Estrada and his
cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, including its operation on the illegal numbers game known as
jueteng. This triggered the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of several criminal complaints against
Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together with other persons. Among such complaints were:
Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption, versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed
as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De Vera, Romeo T.

Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, Raul De
Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1757.
Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated February 21, 2001. The other respondents likewise
filed their respective counter-affidavits. The Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation
of the complaints and on April 4, 2001, issued a joint resolution recommending, inter alia, that Joseph
Estrada, petitioner and several others be charged with the criminal offense of plunder.
ISSUE: WAS the denial of the said motions and petitions of the herein accused- appellant valid?
RULING: NO.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.
The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the proper
judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts
and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definition and
elements of the specific crimes. The purpose of the requirement of alleging all the elements of the crime in the
Information is to inform an accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare for his defense. Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts
constituting the offense charged is sufficient.
In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all the accused, including petitioner, connived
and conspired with former President Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder through any or a combination or a
series of overt or criminal acts or similar schemes or means. And in paragraph (a) of the amended
Information, petitioner and his co-accused are charged with receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on
several instances money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00. In Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan (Third Division), et al., we held that the word series is synonymous with the clause on
several instances; it refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1(d) of the
law. We further held that the word combination contemplates the commission of at least any two different
predicate acts in any of the said items. We ruled that plainly, subparagraph (a) of the amended information
charges accused therein, including petitioner, with plunder committed by a series of the same predicate act
under Section 1(d)(2) of the law
According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the information charges more than one offense,
namely, bribery (Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code), malversation of public funds or property (Article 217,
Revised Penal Code) and violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (RA No. 3019) and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged in the information are not charged as separate
offenses but as predicate acts of the crime of plunder.
(read this case sobrang mahaba to but this is so IMPORTANT!) hindi ko na sinama pa ung ibang ruling kc
sobrang haba at iportante sana. Just ahave a quick review of this case. Its COOL! :p

G.R. NO. 143468-71. JANUARY 24, 2003

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FREEDIE LIZADA @ FREDIE LIZADA
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decisionof the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, finding accusedappellant Freedie Lizada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of qualified rape and meting on him
the death penalty for each count.
Ricardo Orillosa and his wife, Rose Orillosa, natives of San Isidro, Bohol, had three (3) children, namely:
Analia, who was born on December 18, 1985; Jepsy, who was 11 years old, and Rossel, who was nine years old.
However, the couple decided to part ways and live separately. Rose left Bohol and settled in Manila with her
young children. She worked as a waitress to make both ends meet.
IN 4 different dates the accused raped ANALIA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
RULING: YES. The contention of accused-appellant is well-taken. Article VIII, paragraph 14 of the 1987
Constitution provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. This requirement is reiterated and implemented by Rule
120, Section 2 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which reads:
SEC. 2. Form and contents of judgment.The judgment must be written in the official language, personally
and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the
facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof,
if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any,
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.
The purpose of the provision is to inform the parties and the person reading the decision on how it was reached
by the court after consideration of the evidence of the parties and the relevant facts, of the opinion it has
formed on the issues, and of the applicable laws. The parties must be assured from a reading of the decision of
the trial court that they were accorded their rights to be heard by an impartial and responsible judge. More
substantial reasons for the requirement are:
For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if permitted, he
may elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal. For another, the decision if wellpresented and reasoned, may convince the losing party of its merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in
good grace instead of prolonging the litigation with a useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full
exposition of the facts and the law on which they are based, especially those coming from the Supreme Court,
will constitute a valuable body of case law that can serve as useful references and even as precedents in the
resolution of future controversies.
The trial court is mandated to set out in its decision the facts which had been proved and its conclusions culled
therefrom, as well as its resolution on the issues and the factual and legal basis for its resolution. Trial courts
should not merely reproduce the respective testimonies of witnesses of both parties and come out with its
decretal conclusion.

In this case, the trial court failed to comply with the requirements under the Constitution and the Rules on
Criminal Procedure. It merely summarized the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and of accusedappellant on direct and cross examinations and merely made referral to the documentary evidence of the
parties then concluded that, on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellant is guilty of four
(4) counts of rape and sentenced him to death, on each count.
The trial court even failed to specifically state the facts proven by the prosecution based on their evidence, the
issues raised by the parties and its resolution of the factual and legal issues, as well as the legal and factual
bases for convicting accused-appellant of each of the crimes charged. The trial court rendered judgment
against accused-appellant with the curt declaration in the decretal portion of its decision that it did so based
on the evidence of the prosecution. The trial court swallowed hook, line and sinker the evidence of the
prosecution. It failed to explain in its decision why it believed and gave probative weight to the evidence of the
prosecution. Reading the decision of the trial court, one is apt to conclude that the trial court ignored the
evidence of accused-appellant. The trial court did not even bother specifying the factual and legal bases for its
imposition of the supreme penalty of death on accused-appellant for each count of rape. The trial court merely
cited seventh paragraph, no. 1, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The decision of the trial court is a good
example of what a decision, envisaged in the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, should
not be.
The Court would normally remand the case to the trial court because of the infirmity of the decision of the trial
court, for compliance with the constitutional provision. However, to avert further delay in the disposition of
the cases, the Court decided to resolve the cases on their merits considering that all the records as well as the
evidence adduced during the trial had been elevated to the Court. The parties filed their respective briefs
articulating their respective stances on the factual and legal issues.
In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) to accuse a man of rape is easy but
to disprove it is difficult though the accused may be innocent; (2) considering the nature of things, and only
two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized
with great caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and not be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. By the very nature of the crime of rape,
conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainants testimony because of the
fact that usually only the participants can testify as to its occurrence. However, if the accused raises a sufficient
doubt as to any material element of the crime, and the prosecution is unable to overcome it with its evidence,
the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond cavil of doubt and
hence, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.