originalni

nauni
rad

dr Sran Marinkovi
Univerzitet u Niu,
Ekonomski fakultet
srdjan.marinkovic@eknfak.ni.ac.rs

UDK 336.71:28

ISLAMSKO NASUPROT
KONVENCIONALNOM
BANKARSTVU:
UPOREDNA ANALIZA
ARANMANA
FINANSIRANJA

Rad je deo istraivakog projekta pod ifrom 179015 (Izazovi i perspektive

strukturnih promena u Srbiji: Strateki pravci ekonomskog razvoja i
usklaivanje sa zahtevima EU), finansiranog od strane Ministarstva prosvete
i nauke Republike Srbije.

Rezime

Kljune rei: Islamsko bankarstvo, teorija ugovora, kreditni ugovor, trokovi

agenture, finansijska struktura
JEL: G21, G24, K2
Rad primljen: 19.04.2013.
Odobren za tampu: 27.05.2013.

bankarstvo 3 2013

U radu istraujemo koncept islamskog bankarstva kroz poreenje osnovnih

odlika kljunih finansijskih aranmana karakteristinih za konvencionalno i
islamsko bankarstvo. U svom paradigmatskom konceptu islamsko bankarstvo
iskljuuje aranmane zasnovane na fiksno definisanom prinosu finansijera
i prednost daje vlasnikim modalitetima finansiranja, zasnovanim na
partnerskom odnosu izmeu finansijera i preduzetnika. Meutim, predloeni
koncepti se u praktinoj primeni sreu sa ozbiljnim tekoama (previsoki
trokovi agenture), trpe znaajne modifikacije, zbog ega se u vanim aspektima
udaljavaju od teorijskog ideala i u svojim ekstremima islamsku bankarsku
praksu pribliavaju konvencionalnom bankarstvu.

106

UDC 336.71:28

ISLAMIC VERSUS
CONVENTIONAL
BANKING: A
COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF
FINANCIAL
ARRANGEMENTS

original
scientific
paper

dr Sran Marinkovi
University of Ni,
Faculty of Economics
srdjan.marinkovic@eknfak.ni.ac.rs

This work is a part of the research project coded 179015 (Challenges and
perspectives of the structural changes in Serbia: Strategic directions of economic
development and harmonisation with the EU requirements), financed by the
Ministry of Education and Sciences of the Republic of Serbia.

Summary

bankarstvo 3 2013

The paper explores the concept of Islamic banking by making comparison

between the basic features of some key conventional and Islamic financial
arrangements. Paradigm version of Islamic banking forbids arrangements
based on a predetermined rate of return on financial investments, instead it
proposes equity based modes of finance which promote partnership between
financier and an entrepreneur. Nevertheless, the theoretically suggested
concepts in current practice are faced with serious difficulties (prohibitively
high agency costs), and are being consequently modified. Islamic banking
diverges in several important ways from the ideal version, and at the end of
the spectrum closely coincides with conventional banking.

107

Key words: Islamic banking, Contractual theory, loan agreement, agency costs,
financial structure
JEL: G21, G24, K2
Paper received: 19.04.2013
Approved for publishing: 27.05.2013

Islamsko bankarstvo predstavlja relativno

novu pojavu na svetskoj finansijskoj sceni. Prvi
pokuaji da se formira finansijska organizacija
koja e svoje poslovanje voditi potpuno u skladu
sa principima Islama datiraju kada je u Egiptu
1972. godine, formirana Nasser Social Bank,
mada je ova banka ostala privrena socijalnim
ciljevima, i do danas nije prerasla u pravu
komercijalnu organizaciju. Nekoliko godina
kasnije, u cilju koordinacije i podsticaja razvoja
ovog koncepta, formirana je i multilateralna
organizacija, Islamska banka za razvoj (Islamic
Development Bank). Po raspoloivim podacima
(Khan and Bhatti, 2008), trenutno oko 300 banaka
svoje poslovanje vodi u skladu sa islamskim
principima. Islamske banke su prisutne u 75
drava sveta, ukljuujui SAD i Evropu. Uprkos
dinaminom razvoju u poslednjim decenijama
ovaj sistem i dalje ima vrlo skromne kapacitete
u poreenju sa konvencionalnim bankarstvom.
Ukupna aktiva islamskih banaka procenjuje
se na svega pet stotina milijardi amerikih
dolara. Islamsko bankarstvo je uspelo da stekne
dominaciju u odnosu na konvencionalno
bankarstvo jedino u dravama koje su zabranom
finansijskih aranmana u sukobu sa erijatskim
pravom svoj finansijski sistem u potpunosti
islamizovale (Pakistan, Iran i Sudan). U ostalim
dravama u kojima je Islam zvanina religija
islamske banke posluju u konkurenciji sa
konvencionalnim bankama.
Koncept islamskog bankarstva zasnovan je
na nekoliko principa, ije je izvorite erijatsko
pravo. Kljuni princip islamskog bankarstva je
zabrana kamate (riba) kao prinosa ija je visina
unapred utvrena. To ne znai da finansijer
nema prava na prinos od uloenih sredstava,
ve da se visina prinosa mora dovesti u vezu sa
ekonomskim rezultatom finansiranog projekta.
Islam takoe zabranjuje poslovne aktivnosti u
kojima su akteri preterano izloeni neizvesnosti
(gharar), ili pekuliu (maysir) (Siddiqui,
2008, p. 681).
Zagovornici ovakvog sistema njegove
kljune prednosti vide u podeli rizika izmeu
finansijera i preduzetnika, veoj posveenosti
finansijera uspehu projekta, i po tom osnovu
veoj alokativnoj efikasnosti. Pretpostavljene
prednosti ovog koncepta takoe bi podsticajno

delovale na tednju, investicije i potpunije

ostvarenje ideala drutvene pravde.
U radu emo istraiti da li prethodna
konstatacija ostaje iskljuivo aksiomatska
tvrdnja, odnosno u kojoj meri su oekivanja
zagovornika ovog koncepta u konfliktu
sa finansijskom teorijom, ali i u sudaru sa
ekonomskom realnou. Rad ima sledeu
strukturu. Nakon uvoda, najpre dajemo
osnovnu tipologiju kljunih islamskih
finansijskih aranmana, da bi nakon toga
pristupili analizi pravnih i ekonomskih
obeleja kako islamskih tako i konvencionalnih
finansijskih aranmana. U etvrtom odeljku
blie emo analizirati izazove sa kojima se
paradigmatski koncept islamskog bankarstva
sree u praksi. Rad zavravamo zakljukom.

Finansijski aranmani u islamskom

bankarstvu
Teoretiari islamskog bankarstva (Zaher and
Hassan, 2001; Siddiqui, 2008) u velikoj meri
su saglasni da se arolika ponuda islamskih
banaka moe bez preteranog pojednostavljenja
redukovati na pet osnovnih oblika. Ne bi trebalo
previe da iznenadi to sve ove oblike moemo
u obino neto izmenjenoj formi nai i u ponudi
koja karakterie konvencionalno bankarstvo.
Zbog toga emo kod navoenja, pored engleskog
transkripta originalnih naziva, koristiti i nazive
za konvencionalne aranmane koji su najblii
konkretnim islamskim aranmanima.
U
islamskom
bankarstvu
sreemo
finansijske aranmane ija je namena
razliita. Jedan broj aranmana namenjen je
potroakom finansiranju, veina finansiranju
trgovine, dok su specijalni aranmani
posveeni investicionom finansiranju. Kod
aranmana koji podrazumevaju ugovoren
povraaj sredstava, pa su po tome veoma slini
klasinom kreditnom finansiranju, po pravilu
se u zajam ne daje novac ve materijalno dobro.
Pravna osnova ovakvih aranmana je ugovor
o prodaji na odloeno plaanje ili ugovor o
iznajmljivanju.
Trokovi plus profit (Murabaha) predstavlja
kupovinu od finansijera na odloeno plaanje.
Za raun korisnika, banka nabavlja dobro i
predaje mu ga na upotrebu obavezujui ga da
nabavnu cenu uveanu za naknadu isplauje

bankarstvo 3 2013

Uvod

108

bankarstvo 3 2013

Introduction

109

Islamic banking is a relatively new

phenomenon on the world financial scene.
The earliest attempts to form a financial
organisation which shall conduct its business
totally concordant with the principles of Islam
are dating back to 1972, when the Nasser Social
Bank was established in Egypt, although this
bank remained devoted to the social objectives,
and to this day had not grown into a proper
commercial organisation. Several years later,
for purpose of coordination and instigation of
the development of this concept, a multilateral
organisation was formed as well, the Islamic
Development Bank. According to the available
data (Khan and Bhatti, 2008), at present there
are some 300 banks operating in accordance
with the Islamic principles. Islamic banks are
present in 75 countries of the world, including
the USA and Europe. In spite of the dynamic
development, over the last decades, this system
still remains rather modest in its capacities in
comparison with conventional banking. The
total assets of the Islamic banks are estimated
at only five hundred billion US dollars. Islamic
banking succeeded in gaining predominance
over conventional banking only in countries
where the prohibition of financial arrangements,
opposed to the Shariah jurisprudence, have
in totality and in full adjusted their financial
system to the Islamic laws (Pakistan, Iran, and
Sudan). In the other countries where Islam is
the official religion, Islamic banks are operating
in competition with the conventional banks.
The concept of Islamic banking is based
on several principles finding their source in
the Shariah law. The key principle of Islamic
banking is the prohibition of interest to be
charged (riba) as the fixed or floating payment
on investment. This does not mean that the
financier is not allowed to collect return on funds
invested, but that the amount of return must
be linked with the economic result of the given
financial project. Islam also prohibits business
activities where the parties involved are over
exposed to uncertain outcome (gharar), or are
speculating (maysir) (Siddiqui, 2008, p. 681).
The supporters of such a system recognise its
key advantages in the sharing of risk between
the financier and the entrepreneur, in a high

connectivity between the financier and the success

of the given project, and on that basis on higher
allocation efficiency. The assumed advantages of
this concept would also have a boosting effect on
savings, investments and a more comprehensive
achievement of the social justice ideal.
In this paper we shall investigate whether
the previous assumptions have remained solely
within the axiomatic realm i.e. to what extent
expectations of the supporters of this concept
are conflicting with the financial theory but
also clashing with the economic reality. The
paper has the following structure. After the
introduction what follows is a basis offered
of the typology of the key Islamic financial
arrangements, to be followed by the analyses
of legal and economic characteristics of both
the Islamic and the conventional financial
arrangements. In the fourth part we shall
analyze in more detail the challenges facing
paradigmatic concept of Islamic banking in
practice. The paper ends with conclusion.

Financial arrangements in islamic

banking
Theoreticians of Islamic banking (Zaher
and Hassan, 2001; Siddiqui, 2008) to a great
extent agree that the diversified offer of
Islamic banks can be, without any excessive
simplification, reduced to five of its basic forms.
It should not come as any great surprise that
all of these forms are to be encountered, albeit
in a slightly changed form, also in the offers
which are characteristic for the conventional
banking. Hence for purpose of presenting
them, in addition to the English transcript of
the original names, we shall also use the names
of the conventional arrangements which are the
closest to the particular Islamic arrangements.
In the Islamic banking we encounter
financial arrangements with different purposes.
A certain number of arrangements are used for
consumer financing, mostly for trade financing,
while some other special arrangements are
rather devoted to the investment financing. In
case of arrangements specific for the contracted
repayment of funds borrowed, hence very
similar to the classic credit financing, the rule
is that money is not given as a lending fund but
rather in the form of material goods. Legal basis

aktivnosti. Ovu grupu, koju teoretiari

islamskog bankarstva nazivaju aranmanima
podele profita i gubitka (engl. Profit and Loss
Sharing arangements, PLS) ine dva aranmana:
mudarabah i musharakah.
Agentski aranman (Mudarabah). Najblii
temeljnim islamskim principima je aranman
podele profita i gubitka poznat kao mudarabah
(Hassan, 1999, p. 63). Ovaj aranman odgovara
konvencionalnom konceptu drutva sa
ogranienom odgovornou u kome jedna
strana obezbeuje sav potreban kapital, dok
je druga strana zaduena za upravljanje
poslovnim poduhvatom. Ovaj aranman
banke jednako primenjuju kod pribavljanja
i plasiranja sredstava. Banka pribavlja
sredstva od deponenta na bazi nenamenske
mudarabe (engl. unrestricted Mudarabah),
to znai da je banka slobodna da po svojoj
proceni izvri ulaganje sredstava poloenih u
depozit. Deponentu se ne garantuje povraaj
sume niti bilo kakav prinos na ulaganja.
Prinos koji pripada deponentu e zavisiti od
profita koji banka ostvari u datoj godini, a
koji e se deliti po utvrenom kljuu izmeu
deponenta i banke. Kod plasmana sredstava
banka primenjuje namensku mudarabu (engl.
restricted Mudarabah), odnosno sredstva
plasira u konkretan preduzetniki projekat, pa
e se prinos od tog projekta deliti takoe po
utvrenom kljuu izmeu banke i preduzetnika.
Ukoliko je iznos sredstava pribavljen na
ovaj nain jednak iznosu plasiranom na isti
nain, neto pozicija banke e biti iskljuivo
posrednika. Banku moemo posmatrati
kao investicionog agenta deponenata ija je
osnovna svrha postojanja da generie vrednost
za direktne investitore kroz specijalizaciju u
oblasti investicione analize (Diamond, 1984).
U ovoj svojoj ulozi banka takoe opravdava
svoje postojanje, jer omoguuje direktnim
investitorima da transformiu rizini u nerizini
finansijski tok diversifikacijom ulaganja
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).
Banka koja plasira sredstava na bazi
mudarabah principa takoe ulazi u agentski
aranman u kome klasian odnos finansijera
i preduzetnika evoluira u odnos investitora i
agenta, jer aktera koji upravlja projektom a ne
ulae sopstvena sredstva ne moemo smatrati
preduzetnikom u pravom smislu rei, ve

bankarstvo 3 2013

u vie otplatnih rata. Visina naknade (engl.

mark-up) odreuje se na osnovu poznatih
referentnih kamatnih stopa (LIBOR, prinos
na amerike dravne zapise i slino), ali i na
osnovu kreditnog rejtinga klijenta, obima
transakcije i tipa dobra (Zaher and Hassan,
2001). U nekim islamskim dravama (npr. u
Turskoj) formalni prenos vlasnitva nad dobrom
obavlja se tek nakon potpune otplate, to
aranman pribliava kolateralizovanom zajmu,
umanjuje rizik i neizvesnost finansijera, pa ga
samim tim i udaljava od ideala. Interesantno
da je ovaj aranman najire korien u praksi
islamskih banaka, a istovremeno najudaljeniji
od temeljnih principa Islama.
Aranmani iznajmljivanja (Ijara, Ijara
wa-Iqtina) su koncepti koji odgovaraju
aranmanima poslovnog i finansijskog lizinga
u konvencionalnim finansijskim sistemima. U
prvom modalitetu, davalac lizinga zadrava
vlasnitvo nad predmetom lizinga i zaduen je
za njegovo osiguranje i odravanje. U drugom
sluaju, koji je slian finansijskom lizingu,
korisnik lizinga preuzima obavezu da po isteku
lizinga otkupi predmet lizinga od davaoca. Ovi
aranmani u osnovi sadre fiksnu naknadu
finansijeru, zbog ega se i u meu islamskim
teoretiarima spori njihova utemeljenost na
erijatskom pravu.
Ugovor o koncesiji (Istinsa) je model
koji je prilagoen dugoronom finansiranju
nabavke kapitalnih dobara (npr. proizvodnog
kapaciteta). Kod ovog aranmana, koji u
praktinoj primeni moe biti jako slian
lizingu, finansijer kupuje dobro i predaje ga
na upotrebu preduzetniku, koji se obavezuje
da plaa naknadu slinu kao kod lizinga, ili
ustupa vlasnitvo nad dobrom preduzetniku
obavezujui ga da nabavku otplati u ratama,
po principu slinom aranmanima trokovi
plus profit. Razlika izmeu ovog i prethodnih
aranmana je pre svega u tome to ovde naknada
finansijeru moe ukljuivati brojne elemente, i
biti odreena kompleksnijim formulama.
Svi pomenuti aranmani imaju kao
zajedniko obeleje nastanak finansijske
obaveze. Aranmani koji su najvie u duhu
proklamovanih islamskih principa finansiranja
su aranmani koji podrazumevaju partnerski
odnos izmeu aktera koji obezbeuje
finansijska sredstva i nosioca preduzetnike

110

bankarstvo 3 2013

111

for such arrangements is the sales agreement on

deferred payment, or a leasing contract.
Costs Plus Profit (Murabahah) is a purchase
from the financer on deferred payment. For the
account of the beneficiary, the bank is procuring
goods and handing it over to the beneficiary
for his use imposing that he will be repaying it
at the purchase price plus the mark-up price
in several repayment instalments. The amount
of this fee, or rather the English term a markup price, is determined on the basis of the
recognized reference interest rates (LIBOR, the
return on the US treasury bills, and similar), but
also on the basis of the credit rating of the client,
the volume of transaction and the type of goods
(Zaher and Hassan, 2001). In some Islamic
countries (for example, in Turkey) the formal
transfer of ownership over the asset is being
done only after repayment in full is completed,
which makes this type of arrangement rather
similar to the collateralised loan, lowering the
risk and uncertainty for the financier, hence
removing it even further from the original ideal.
It is interesting to note that this arrangement is
most broadly applied in the practice of Islamic
banks, yet being the most distant from the
fundamental principles of Islam.
Renting Arrangements (ljara, ljara wa-Iqtina)
are the concepts corresponding to the business
and financial leasing in the conventional
financial systems. In the former modality,
the person granting the leasing of goods
retains ownership over the object of leasing
and remains in charge of its insurance and
maintenance. In the latter case, which is similar
to the financial leasing, the leasing beneficiary
takes over the liability to purchase the subject
of leasing once the leasing term expires, from
the person granting the leasing option. Such
arrangements basically contain the fixed fee for
the financier, resulting that even amongst the
circles of Islamic theoreticians their foundation
on the Sharia law is contested.
Concession Agreement (Istinsa) is the model
adjusted to long-term financing for purchase of
capital goods (for example, those of production
character). In case of such an arrangement,
which in its practical implementation may be
very similar to the leasing contract, the financier
is buying the goods and is handing it over for
use to the entrepreneur, who undertakes to

pay a fee similar as in the case of leasing, or

cedes the ownership of the relevant goods to
the entrepreneur making him liable to repay
it in instalments, along the principle similar to
that in the arrangements costs plus profit. The
difference between this one and the previous
arrangements is primarily in the fact that the fee
in this case due to the financier may comprise
numerous elements, and may be determined
through more complex formulae.
All of the above stated arrangements have
one thing in common, and that is the creation
of a financial liability. The arrangements
that are mostly in the spirit of proclaimed
Islamic financing principles are those which
involve partnership relations between the
party supplying financial resources and the
party engaged in entrepreneurship. This
group, which is named by the theoreticians of
Islamic banking as the Profit and Loss Sharing
arrangements PLS, is composed of two
arrangements: mudarabah and musharakah.
Agency Arrangement (Mudarabah) is the
closest to the fundamental Islamic principles
as this arrangement implies sharing of both
profit and loss, also known in the Islamic
world as the mudarabah (Hassan, 1999, p.
63). This arrangement corresponds to the
conventional concept of a joint venture with
limited liability where one party supplies all
of the necessary capital, while the other party
remains in charge of managing the business
venture. This arrangement is applied by banks
equally on supply and placement of funds.
The bank procures funds from the depositors
on the basis of an unrestricted Mudarabah,
which means that the bank is free, according to
its own assessment, to decide on investment of
funds deposited. Depositors are not guaranteed
return of the sum deposited and neither
any return on investment. Return on funds
deposited will depend on the profit that the
bank will make in the given year, and which
is to be divided according to a determined
key between the depositor and the bank. In
placement of funds the bank is applying the
restricted Mudarabah, i.e. it is investing funds
in concrete entrepreneurial ventures, where the
return from such a venture will be allocated
according to the key agreed upon between the
bank and the entrepreneur.

proseku, banka e na ovakvim aranmanima

generisati gubitke. Ovakvi aranmani
rezervisani su za socijalno ugroenu populaciju.

Analiza finansijskih aranmana

Pravna priroda kreditnog ugovora
U pogledu pravnih obeleja, bogata praksa
finansijskih ugovora ne omoguuje tako
nedvosmislenu kategorizaciju ugovora o dugu
i ugovora o vlasnikom ulaganju. Ako se kao
kljuna odrednica ugovora o dugu postavi
obaveza dunika da predata sredstva vrati, onda
je takav aranman veoma slian povlaenim
akcijama sa ogranienim rokom trajanja. Iako
retko korien, ovakav finansijski instrument je
prisutan u savremenim poslovnim finansijama i
tretiran kao oblik vlasnikog ulaganja.
Kako ogranien rok dospea sreemo kod
vlasnikih oblika ulaganja, tako isto sreemo
i dunika ulaganja na neogranien rok. U
ekonomskoj istoriji poznati su brojni primeri
duga sa neogranienim trajanjem. Prve hartije
od vrednosti (ital. prestiti) predstavljale su dug
grada-drave Venecije na koji se obavezala
da plaa kamatu godinje u iznosu od pet
procenata, sve do konanog otkupa duga.
Istoriari belee da izdavalac nije propustio da
isplati kamatu vlasnicima u itavom periodu
od 1262. do 1379. godine (Michie, 2008, p. 17).
I novija ekonomska istorija belei primere
takozvanih perpetualnih obveznica, koje se jo
nazivaju rente ili konzole.
Ugovaranje prinosa kao jedna od moguih
odrednica takoe ne prua uslove za jasnu
kategorizaciju. Interesantan je primer
enovljanskih hartija od vrednosti (ital. luoghi),
koje je ovaj grad poeo izdavati u 16. veku. Ove
hartije od vrednosti nisu imale fiksan dohodak.
Dohodak je zavisio od naplate specifinih
poreskih prihoda, zaloenih za isplatu ovih
hartija. I u savremenim finansijskim sistemima
funkcioniu vlasnike hartije od vrednosti sa
unapred definisanim prinosom. Na primer,
povlaene akcije redovno imaju prinos koji je
odreen ugovorom o emisiji. Prinos na ovakve
hartije od vrednosti je u sluaju kumulativnih
povlaenih akcija i definisan u velikoj meri

Na primer, u Indoneziji su bruto poslovni prihodi osnova za primenu kljua, pri emu je ugovaranje kolaterala redovna
praksa (Timberg, 2003).

bankarstvo 3 2013

agentom. Agentu pripada deo ostvarenog

poslovnog rezultata (profita ili bruto prihoda)1
koji se utvruje u pregovorima sa investitorom
kod zakljuenja ugovora, i ne moe se menjati
sve do okonanja projekta. U sluaju neuspeha
posla itav finansijski gubitak snosi finansijer,
osim ukoliko je agent (mudarib) neadekvano
koristio sredstva, kada e biti u obavezi da
finansijeru nadoknadi tetu, i to obino iz
kolaterala koji je prethodno ugovoren u korist
finansijera. Ovaj element sutinski modifikuje
aranman. Najpre, samo ugovaranje kolaterala
zahteva od agenta da raspolae izvesnim
sredstvima, posveti ih projektu, ali ne i angauje
kako bi ostvario prava na prinos srazmeran
ulaganjima. Sa druge strane, takav kolateral
ne pojednostavljuje odnos izmeu ugovornih
strana, jer se moe aktivirati tek nakon
kompleksnog postupka dokazivanja postojanja
eventualne zle namere i grube nepanje.
Zajedniko ulaganje (Musharakah) se
razlikuje od prethodnog oblika po tome
to kapital potreban za pokretanje projekta
obezbeuju obe strane u aranmanu. Na
taj nain se preduzetnik pojavljuje i u ulozi
sufinansijera projekta. Priroda aranmana ne
iskljuuje da se u konkretnom sluaju pojave i
vie od dva finansijera.
Prinos od projekta se deli po kljuu koji je
unapred dogovoren izmeu uesnika, a koji se
moe razlikovati od kljua koji se primenjuje
u sluaju srazmernog snoenja gubitka. U
prvom sluaju ostvareni profit e se deliti
prema strukturi finansiranja koja se dalje
koriguje izdvajanjem izvesnog dela naknade
preduzetniku za upravljanje projektom.
Kod alokacije gubitaka uvek se primenjuje
klju odreen prema srazmeri u finansiranju
projekta. Ova obeleja aranman kategoriu u
modele vlasnikog finansiranja.
Dobroini zajam (Qard Hassan). U
islamskom bankarstvu poznati su i aranmani
pozajmljivanja bez ugovorene naknade. U
praksi ovakvi aranmani nisu esti i svakako
ne predstavljaju znaajan deo aktivnosti
banaka. Takoe, izvesna naknada trokova
administriranja je praksa, ali ona ne bi trebalo
da zavisi od visine ili roka dospea zajma. U

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If the amount of funds mobilised in such a

way is equal to the amount of funds invested
in the venture, net position of the bank will
be exclusively the intermediary one. The role
of the bank may be deemed in this case to be
that of an investment agent on behalf of the
depositor, having the main purpose of such
an intervention to generate the value for direct
investors through specialisation in the field of
investment analysis (Diamond, 1984). In this
role, the bank is also justifying its very existence
as it allows for direct investors to transform their
risk into risk-free cash flow through diversified
investment (Diamonds and Dybvig, 1983).
The bank, which is placing funds based on
the Mudarabah principle, is also venturing into
an agency arrangement in which the classic
relationship between the financier and the
entrepreneur is evolving into a relationship
between an investor and the agent, because we
can not deem the party managing the venture
while not investing its own funds to be an
entrepreneur in the true sense of the word, but
may deem it to be solely an agent. The agent is
entitled to one part of the achieved business result
(profit or gross earnings)1 which is determined in
negotiations with the investor when contracting
the agreement, and may not be changed until
the completion of the venture. In case of failure
of the business venture, the entire financial loss
is borne by the financier, except in case when
the agent (Mudarib) had inadequately used the
funds, when he will be held liable to compensate
the financier for the loss, and this usually from
the collateral which was previously contracted
in favour of the financer. Primarily, contracting
of collateral requires the agent to dispose with
certain funds, to allocate them to the venture, but
not engage them in order to gain the right to the
return proportionate to his investment. On the
other hand, such a collateral does not simplify
the relationship between the contracting parties
as it can be activated only after a rather complex
procedure of proving in evidence the presence
of an eventual malicious intent and gross
negligence.
Joint Venture (Musharakah) is different from
the previous one by having the required capital
1

for setting the business venture in motion

supplied by both of the contracting parties. In
this manner the entrepreneur appears also in
the role of a co-financier of the venture. The
nature of this arrangement does not exclude in
any concrete case for more than two financiers
to appear.
Returns on the venture are allocated
according to the key agreed in advance by the
contracting parties, which may differ from the
keys applied in the case of a proportionate
covering of the losses. In the former case, profits
gained are allocated according to the financing
structure which is additionally corrected by
the allocation of a certain part of compensation
for the entrepreneur managing the venture.
In case of allocation of losses what is always
applied is the key proportionate to the venture
financing. These features of the arrangement are
categorised into the models of equity financing.
Good Loan (Qard Hassan). In the Islamic
banking there are also arrangements in lending
funds without any contracted fees. In practice
such arrangements are not very frequent and
certainly are not any significant part of banking
activities. In addition, certain compensation to
cover the fees of administration had become a
practice, but it should not depend on the amount
of or the maturity due for repayment of the loan.
On an average, the bank in such arrangements
will suffer losses. These arrangements are also
reserved for the socially endangered population
strata.

Finanical arrangement analysis

Legal nature of loan agreement
Regarding the legal terms of financial
agreements, an abundant practice does not
allow for any unambiguous categorisation
of either debt contracts or equity investment
agreements. If the crucial determinant for the
debt contract is to be set as a liability of the
obligor to repay the borrowed funds, then
such an arrangement is very similar to the
participating preference shares with limited
duration. Although very seldom to be used,
such a financial instrument is present in the

For example, in Indonesia, gross business earnings serve as basis for the implementation of the keys, where the contracting
of collateral is a regular practice (Timberg, 2003).

o obligacionim odnosima, u lanu 47. regulie

da je ugovor nitav kada je predmet obaveze
nemogu, nedoputen, neodreen ili neodrediv
[dodat italik], i dalje (lan 50) definie da je
predmet obaveze odrediv ako ugovor sadri
podatke pomou kojih se moe odrediti ili su
strane ostavile treem licu da ga odredi.
Iz navedenih izvoda iz teksta relevantnih
zakona zakljuujemo da su dva bitna elementa
koja odreuju ekonomsku poziciju ugovornih
strana kod ugovora o kreditu obaveza
korisnika da banci plati ugovorenu kamatu
i dobijeni iznos novca vrati, kao i da visina
kamate, pa samim tim i ukupne obaveze,
mora biti odreena ili odrediva. Po naim
zakonima, prinos kreditora ne moe da zavisi
od stanja u kome se nalazi dunik, ali to ne
znai da teret ugovorene obaveze ne moe biti
i umanjen ukoliko se o tome saglase ugovorne
strane. Naime, Zakonom o zatiti korisnika
finansijskih usluga, u odeljku o docnji (l.
32, stav 2) predvieno je da ukoliko u toku
trajanja ugovornog odnosa nastupe okolnosti
koje korisnika dovode u teko imovinsko
stanje, odnosno druge bitne okolnosti na koje
korisnik ne moe uticati - banka, ... [moe] na
zahtev korisnika, proglasiti zastoj u otplati
(moratorijum) za odreeni period, u kome
banka... ne obraunava zateznu kamata na
dospelo a neizmireno potraivanje. Takoe,
ovaj Zakon postavljen je na naelima (l. 5):
1) prava na ravnopravan odnos sa davaocem
finansijske usluge, 2) prava na zatitu od
diskriminacije, 3) prava na informisanje, 4)
prava na odreenost ili odredivost ugovorne
obaveze i 5) prava na zatitu prava i interesa.
Dakle, u savremenim zakonodavstvima,
kreditni ugovor je regulisan sa intencijom da
obezbedi pravnu i ekonomsku ravnopravnost
ugovornih strana, efikasnu primenu ugovora
kroz vrste i jasne ugovorne obaveze obe strane,
koje se dalje saglasnou njihovih volja mogu
prilagoavati izmenjenim okolnostima kako
bi se postigao sklad interesa ugovornih strana.
Kao osnovna pravna odlika kreditnog ugovora
namee se postojanje finansijske obaveze, koja
mora biti unapred odreena ili odrediva na bazi
elemenata na koje ne moe uticati jednostrana
volja nijedne od ugovornih strana.

bankarstvo 3 2013

nezavisno od rezultata, jer e akcionar pravo

na prinos zadrati (i preneti na naredne godine)
i u sluaju da drutvo u datoj godini ne ostvari
dobit. Bogata praksa savremenih finansijskih
trita poznaje i instrumente duga iji prinos
zavisi od ostvarenog poslovnog rezultata
dunika (tzv. dohodovne obveznice).
Izgleda da pregledom prakse nismo uspeli
da potvrdimo da su dospee i nain utvrivanja
prinosa ona obeleja koja izdvajaju kreditne
(dunike) od vlasnikih oblika finansiranja.
ta je onda to to definie kreditni ugovor?
Pravni institut ugovora o kreditu u
naem pravu odreen je odredbama Zakona
o obligacionim odnosima, ali dalje preciziran
Zakonom o zatiti korisnika finansijskih usluga.
Po Zakonu o obligacionim odnosima (l. 1065):
Ugovorom o kreditu banka se obavezuje da
korisniku kredita stavi na raspolaganje odreeni
iznos novanih sredstava, na odreeno ili
neodreeno vreme, za neku namenu ili bez
utvrene namene, a korisnik se obavezuje da
banci plati ugovorenu kamatu i dobijeni iznos
novca vrati u vreme i na nain kako je utvreno
ugovorom.
Ugovor o kreditu se razvio iz ugovora o
zajmu, ali se danas u komparativnom pravu
smatra posebnim tipom ugovora. Ugovor o
kreditu ima nekoliko obeleja koja ga ine
razliitim od ugovora o zajmu. Najpre, kod
ugovora o zajmu, zajmodavac moe biti
bilo koje lice, dok je kod ugovora o kreditu
zajmodavac uvek organizacija sa kreditnom
licencom. Dalje, kredit se uvek daje u novcu, to
je jasno iz prethodne definicije. Zajam moe ali
ne mora biti dat u novcu, ve moe biti izraen
i u drugim vrednostima. Konano, ugovor o
kreditu je uvek teretni pravni posao, dok zajam
moe biti i dobroin (Bejatovi, 2008, p. 86). Po
naim propisima, slino komparativnom pravu,
kreditni ugovor proizvodi pravno dejstvo samo
ukoliko postoji u pisanom obliku, te stoga
predstavlja formalni pravni posao, pa se i po
tome razlikuje od ugovora o zajmu.
Zakon o zatiti korisnika finansijskih
usluga definie kao obavezni element ugovora
o kreditu (l. 19, taka 6) visinu nominalne
kamatne stope uz odreenje da li je fiksna ili
promenljiva, a, ako je promenljiva - elemente
na osnovu kojih se odreuje. Pri emu, Zakon

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contemporary business finances and is treated

as a form of equity investment. As the limited
maturity is encountered in equity forms of
investment, so is also encountered the debt
investment with unlimited duration. In the
economic history there are many examples
of debt with unlimited duration. The earliest
securities (Italian prestiti) were the debt
certificates or bonds of the city-state of Venice
that were yielding a return of an annual interest
rate of five percent, throughout the duration and
until the final repurchase of debt. Historians
are recording that the issuer did not fail to pay
interest due dividend to the holders of these
certificates throughout the entire period from
1262 and up to 1379 (Michie, 2008, p. 17). Even
the more recent economic history records cases
of the so-called perpetual bonds, also known as
rents or consoles.
Contracting of return, as one of the possible
determinants, also fails to offer sufficient
grounds for a clear categorisation. There is an
interesting example of the Genoa securities
(Italian luoghi) which were issued by this city
during the 16th century. These securities did
not yield any fixed return. Return depended on
the collection of specific tax revenues, pledged
in favour of payment on these securities. In
the modern-day financial systems fixed-yield
securities are also functioning. For example,
preference shares are having a regular fixed
return as set out in the issuing agreement.
Yield on such securities, in case of cumulative
preference shares, is defined broadly
irrespective of results as the shareholder has
the right to retain the yield (and carry it on to
the next year), even in case the company in that
given year should fail to make profit. Abundant
practice of contemporary financial markets also
recognises debt instruments where the yield
depends on the achieved business result of the
obligor (the so-called income bonds).
It appears that by examining the practice we
did not succeed in establishing that maturity
and the manner of fixing the return are the
features that are distinguishing credit (debt)
from equity forms of financing. What is it, then,
that defines a loan agreement?
Legal institute credit agreement in our
jurisdiction is determined under the provisions
of the Law on Contracts, but also specified in

more detail in the Law on Protection of Users of

Financial Services. Under the Law on Contracts
(Article 1065) it reads as follows: Under the
loan agreement terms the bank undertakes to
make available to the credit beneficiary a certain
amount of monetary funds, for a determined
or undetermined period of time, for a certain
particular purpose or without specified
purpose, and the beneficiary undertakes to
repay to the bank the contracted interest and
the received amount of money, in the time and
manner prescribed in the agreement.
Credit agreement has evolved from the loan
agreement, yet today it is deemed to be, in the
comparative law, a special type of agreement.
Credit agreement has several features which are
making it different from the loan agreement.
Firstly, in case of loan agreement, creditor may
be any person so willing to oblige, while in
case of credit agreement creditor is always an
organisation licensed for crediting operations.
In addition, credit is always granted in money
which is clear from the previous definition.
Loan, however, may be but does not necessary
have to be in money, and may be expressed in
other values. Finally, credit agreement is always
a charging legal deal, while a loan may be a
benevolent affair (Bejatovic, p. 86). Our legal
framework, similar to the comparative law,
prescribed that the credit agreement produces
legal effect only if it is drawn in a form of a
written document, and hence it is a formal legal
document, which differs in this manner from a
loan agreement.
Law on protection of users of financial
services defines as a mandatory element in a
credit agreement (Article 19, item 6) the amount
of the nominal interest rate and stipulation
on the interest rate being a fixed or a floating
one, and in case it is a floating interest rate
the elements on the basis of which it shall be
determined. In this case the Law on Contracts,
in its Article 47, regulates that the agreement
will be nil and void what the liability objective
is impossible, impermissible, unspecified or
unspecifiable [italics added], and further on
(Article 50) specifies that the subject of liability
is specifiable if the agreement contains data on
the basis of which it can be determined, or the
contracting parties have assigned a third person
to determine it.

skladu sa kriterijumom objektivno dokazane

kompetencije. Zatitom svojih prava, poverioci
omoguuju da poslovnom imovinom u drutvu
uvek upravljaju najkompetentniji, odnosno
da se na nivou privrede produktivni resursi
uz najmanje gubitaka privode optimalnoj
upotrebi. Naravno, ovakav stav ne moe se
uzeti bez rezerve. Brojna istraivanja ukazuju
da trokovi steaja mogu biti znaajna
determinanta efikasnosti ekonomskog sistema
(Altman, 1984).
Savremena literatura iz oblasti poslovnih
finansija glavnu prednost kreditnog ugovora
vidi u ublaavanju sukoba interesa izmeu
investitora i lica koja za njihov raun upravljaju
projektom, kao to je spreavanje menadera
da investiraju u projekte sa negativnom neto
sadanjom vrednou, ili prinudna prodaja
poslovne imovine kada se ona efikasnije
moe upotrebiti izvan firme. Istom intuicijom
rukovodimo se kada utvrujemo loe strane
kreditnog ugovora. Na isti nain zajmodavac
moe spreiti da se pokrenu dobri projekti
ukoliko je kreditnim ugovorom predvieno
da se zajmoprimac dodatno ne zaduuje, ili
prinuditi zajmoprimca na likvidaciju kada to
nije reenje sa efikasnim ishodom.
Sud o prednosti jednog ili drugog
mehanizma finansiranja teorija daje imajui u
vidu kombinaciju oekivanih efekata kontrole i
oekivane efikasnosti u primeni kontrole. Spoljni
investitori lake mogu sebi obezbediti zatitu
preko kreditnog nego preko vlasnikog ulaganja,
zbog toga to su prava poverilaca jasnija pa je
krenje tih prava lake dokazati na sudu. To je
jedan argument. Za drugi argument mora se
istraiti uticaj veliine investitora na efikasnost
kontrole, koji osvetljava dilemu relativne moi
poverilaca i akcionara. Shleifer i Vishny (1997, p.
763) istiu da dug i akcijski kapital treba porediti
imajui u vidu kombinaciju pravne zatite i
lakoe koncentracije vlasnitva koju svaki od ova
alternativna ugovora moe obezbediti.
Najpre, da li ugovor o dugu stimulie
koncentraciju vlasnitva? Do sada pretena
forma kreditiranja u svetu je bila bankarsko
kreditiranje. Banke su po pravilu krupni
investitori, koje sebi mogu pribaviti brojna
prava na kontrolu firme kako pre tako i nakon
otkaza duga. Blokada rauna moe se obaviti
i bez sudske odluke. Kontrola firme moe se

bankarstvo 3 2013

Ekonomske odlike kreditnog i vlasnikog

ulaganja
U oblasti ekonomske interpretacije
pomenutih ugovora problem postaje dodatno
komplikovan. Islamska kritika konvencionalnog
kreditnog ugovora, kao finansijskog aranmana
kome se osporava ravnopravnost u poloaju
ugovornih strana, implicitno favoriziju
vlasnike oblike ulaganja, kao aranmane
kod kojih je nagrada koja pripada svakom
ekonomskom faktoru (kapitalu i nagrada za
menaderski angaman) dovedena u vezu sa
njegovim doprinosom ostvarenom rezultatu.
Pored same etiki motivisane argumentacije,
favorizovanje vlasnikih modela finansiranja
dodatno je podrano argumentom da podela
rizika meu investitorima podstie posveenost
svih strana i poveava efikasnost investiranja.
Odgovor na ovaj argument daemo osvrtom
na temeljne doprinose savremene teorije
poslovnih finansija, koja u znaajnom delu
opusa objanjava prednosti i nedostatke ova
dva konkurentna mehanizma finansiranja.
Kreditni ugovor je tip ugovora u kome
zajmoprimac dobija izvesnu sumu novca od
zajmodavca, uz obeanje da e zajmodavcu u
budunosti isplatiti unapred definisan novani
tok. Pored toga, zajmoprimac esto prihvata da
suzi poslovnu autonomiju usklaujui svoje
ponaanje prema nizu klauzula ukljuenih u
kreditni ugovor. Ukoliko zajmoprimac prekri
neku od ugovornih klauzula, ili ue u otkaz
plaanja, zajmodavac ima pravo na deo imovine
firme (kolateral) ili mogunost da pokrene
postupak steaja nad firmom. Dakle, esencijalna
ekonomska odlika kreditnog ugovora je da
neuspeh zajmoprimca u ispunjenju obaveza
iz ugovora pokree transfer izvesnih prava
kontrole sa njega na zajmodavca (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997, p. 762). Moe se rei da,
u ekonomskom smislu, u momentu kada
dunik u potpunosti iscrpi sopstveni kapital,
poloaj poverilaca postaje identian poloaju
vlasnika, zbog ega ugovorom definisan
transfer prava poloaj ugovornih strana samo
dovodi u sklad sa izmenjenom realnou.
Na taj nain, ponaanje dunika suprotno
onome definisanom u kreditnom ugovoru,
ureuje proces prenosa upravljakih prava sa
jednih na druge aktere na poslovnoj imovini.
Upravljaka prava se na ovaj nain alociraju u

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The above stated citations from the text

of the relevant laws lead to the conclusion
that there are two significant elements that
are determining the economic position of the
contracting parties in case of a credit agreement,
obligation of the credit beneficiary to pay to
the bank the contracted interest and repay the
amount of money received, and also that the
amount of the interest, hence the aggregate
liabilities, must be fixed or fixable. Under our
jurisdiction, the return in favour of creditor can
not depend on the credit rating of the obligor,
but that this does imply that the burden of
contracted liability can not be also reduced in
case both of the contracting parties should so
agree. Namely, the Law on protection of users
of financial services, in its sector on default
(Article 32, para 2) stipulates that in case
during the time contractual relation is in force
and effect, events should arise bringing the
beneficiary in distress regarding his material
status, i.e. some other significant circumstances
should occur that are beyond the beneficiarys
control the bank [may] at the request
of the beneficiary, proclaim a moratorium
on repayment for a certain period of time,
during which the bank will not charge the
default interest on the defaulted arrears. In
addition, the same Law stipulates that this is
based on the following principles (Article 5):
1) the right to an equitable relationship with
the creditor of financial service; 2) the right to
protection from discrimination; 3) the right to
receive information; 4) the right to a fixed or
fixable contractual liability; and 5) the right to
protection of rights and interests.
Therefore, in contemporary jurisdictions,
credit agreement is regulated with intent to
secure the legal and economic equality of the
contracting parties, an efficient implementation
of the agreement through strict and clear
contractual obligations binding for both
contracting parties, which may be in further
agreement between their expressed wills
adjusted to the changed circumstances in order
to achieve an equilibrium between the interests
of the contracting parties. What is imposed as
the basic legal feature of the credit agreement is
the presence of financial liability which must be
pre-determined, i.e. fixed or fixable, on the basis
of the elements which can not be a prerogative

for the influence of a single-sided will of either

contracting party.
Economic features of the credit and equity
investment
In the field of economic interpretation of
the above mentioned agreements, the problem
tends to become even more complicated.
The Islamic criticism of conventional credit
agreement, as a financial agreement where the
equality of contracting parties is being denied,
argues that they are implicitly favouring equity
forms of investments, as arrangements where
the rewards due to every economic factor
(capital, and managerial arrangement fee) is
brought in connection with its yield based on
the result. In addition to the ethically motivated
arguments themselves, favouring of equity
models of financing additionally is supported
by the argument that the division of risk
between investors instigates dedication of all
the parties and boosts efficiency of investment.
In response to this argument, we shall give a
survey of the fundamental contributions of the
modern theory of business finances, which in
its significant part of the opus elucidates on
the advantages and disadvantages of these two
competitive financing mechanisms.
Credit agreement is a type of agreement
where the credit beneficiary receives a certain
amount of money from the creditor on the
pledge to repay to the creditor in future the fixed
in advance cash flow. In addition, borrower often
accepts to narrow down business autonomy
by adjusting his conduct in accordance with a
number of clauses contracted under the credit
agreement. In case the credit beneficiary is to
breach some of the contract clauses, or come
into default, creditor is entitled to one part of
the firms assets (collateral), or has the option to
file procedure for receivership of the company.
Therefore, the essential economic characteristic
of the credit agreement is that the failure of the
credit beneficiary in servicing his contractual
liabilities will set in motion the transfer of certain
rights of control from himself on to the creditor
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 762). It can be
argued that, in an economic sense, at the moment
when the obligor has fully exhausted his own
capital, the position of the creditor becomes
identical to the position of the proprietor, as the

kada se grubo kre njihovi interesi.

Pored relativno slabe pravne zatite, glavno
pravo koje akcionar dobija je pravo glasa kod
izbora odbora direktora. Zato to je usklaena
akcija velike grupe akcionara neophodna
za preuzimanje kontrole preko glasakog
mehanizma, prava glasa imaju ogranienu
vrednosti osim ako nisu koncentrisana.
Mnogi mali akcionari ak nemaju ni motiv
da se adekvatno informiu o tome kako treba
glasati. Stupiti u kontakt i ubediti veliku
grupu manjinskih akcionara preko mehanizma
zastupanja njihovih interesa je teko i skupo,
naroito kada se tome protivi menadment.
Meutim, kada su glasovi koncentrisani postaju
izuzetno vredni, jer strana koja kontrolie
glasove moe doneti gotovo sve odluke u
korporaciji. Koncentrisana akcijska pozicija
je u tom smislu snanija od koncentrisane
poverilake pozicije. Vrednost svake akcije
pojedinano potie od vrednosti koju ova akcija
moe imati za one koji pokuavaju da preuzmu
kontrolu nad firmom, a zatita manjinskih
akcionara osigurava da oni koji kontroliu firmu
moraju podeliti neke od koristi sa manjinom.
Kako akcionari poseduju pravo glasa i
izvestan stepen pravne zatite (posebno u sluaju
manjinskih akcionara) raspolau i mogunou
da izvuku izvesne isplate od menadera u
obliku dividende. Na izvestan nain, dividenda
je za akcije isto to i kamata za dug, isplata koja
se zahteva od menadera podrana pravom
finansijera da kontrolie, osim to su u sluaju
akcija ova prava kontrole u obliku prava glasa
(Shleifer i Vishny, 1997. p. 765).
Nesavrena informisanost i islamski
finansijski aranmani
Pregledom osnovnih stavova savremene
teorije poslovnih finansija uoavamo da kreditni
ugovor ima znaajne prednosti u odnosu na
vlasnika ulaganja spoljnih investitora, jer
spoljni investitor lake uoava povredu interesa
i lake reaguje u cilju prevencije i to naroito
u sluaju kada ne raspolae koncentrisanom
pozicijom. Meutim, islamski finansijski
aranmani zasnovani na vlasnikom obliku
ulaganja uglavnom podrazumevaju visok
stepen koncentracije vlasnike pozicije, pa
brojne primedbe u vezi neefikasnosti zatite
interesa manjinskih akcionara ovde nisu od

bankarstvo 3 2013

dodatno ojaati direktnim vlasnikim statusom

poverilaca kao i implicitnom pretnjom
dominantnog kreditora. Suprotno akcijskom
kapitalu, kreditni ugovor na neobian nain
moe biti vri kada nije koncentrisan, pa
e efektivna pravna zatita koju uivaju
poverioci verovatno biti via od zatite koju
sebi mogu obezbediti manjinski akcionari.
Kljuno obeleje prava poverilaca je u tome to
koordinirana, usaglaena akcija vie poverilaca
nije neophodna da bi se preduzele akcije protiv
delikventnih dunika. Pravna obaveza firme je
obaveza prema svakom poveriocu pojedinano,
koji moe tuiti dunika nezavisno od ostalih
poverilaca. Naravno, kada se takva akcija
preduzme, ostali poverioci i sud e preduzeti
akciju da obezbede da prvi poverilac ne zapleni
nesrazmerno veliki deo za sebe. U stvari, ova
mogunost da jedan od kreditora unilateralno
pokrene plenidbu imovine u ambijentu u
kome dunik ima vie poverilaca predstavlja
teoretsko opravdanje regulacije steaja.
Kada dug nije koncentrisan, na primer kod
sindiciranog kreditiranja i investiranja u javne
oblike duga, poverilac gubi dominantnu poziciju.
U sluaju otkaza duga prema velikom broju
poverilaca, pregovori izmeu poverilaca mogu
biti izuzetno oteani, pa dunik moe biti gurnut
u steaj. Mnogo je lake restrukturirati dug prema
jednoj banci. Problemi sa restrukturiranjem, kao
i pozicija manjinskih poverilaca, moe objasniti
zato su mulitilateralni oblici duga izuzetno
retki oblik finansiranja, koji se upotrebljava u
nekolicini najrazvijenih drava, pa i tamo daleko
ree od bankarskog kredita.
Suprotno poveriocima, inidividualnim
akcionarima nije obeana nikakva isplata u
zamenu za ulaganje u firmu, mada po slobodnoj
odluci upravnog odbora esto dobijaju isplate
dividendi. Takoe, individualni akcionari
nemaju prava na konkretnu poslovnu imovinu
firme, niti pravo na kolateral (izuzetak
predstavljaju otvoreni investicioni fondovi,
gde akcionari fonda mogu pro rata likvidirati
aktivu fonda i dezinvestirati). Ne manje vano
je i obeleje da akcionari ne mogu raunati da
e sigurno, odreenog dana, dobiti novac nazad
(likvidacija firme je neizvesna). injenica da je
pozicija poverioca u finansiranom projektu
oroena predstavlja vrlo vanu odliku. Manjinski
akcionari esto nisu u stanju da dezinvestiraju i

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119

contractually defined transfer of rights in the

status of the contracting parties is only bringing
them in harmony with the changed reality. In this
manner, the conduct of the obligor opposed to the
one defined in the credit agreement, determines
the process of transfer of the management rights
from ones on to the other actors over the business
assets. Management rights in this way are being
allocated in accordance with the criterion of
an objectively substantiated competence. In
protection of their rights, creditors are allowing
for the business assets in the society to be always
managed by those most competent, i.e. at the
level of the real economy for the productive
resources, with the least of losses, to be brought
about to their optimum use. Such an attitude,
of course, can not be accepted without some
reserves. Numerous research studies show that
the costs of bankruptcy may be a significant
determinant for the efficiency of an economic
system (Altman, 1984).
Modern literature in the field of business
finances sees the main advantage of the credit
agreement in the mitigation of conflict of interest
between an investor and the persons who are
in his name managing the project, such as
prevention of managers to invest in projects
with a negative net present value, or a forcible
sale of business assets when they can be more
efficiently deployed outside of the company. We
are led by the same intuition when determining
the downsides of a credit agreement. In the same
way a creditor may prevent initiation of certain
good projects in case credit agreement prescribes
that the credit beneficiary must not venture into
additional borrowing, or force the beneficiary
to accept liquidation when this is not the best
solution with any efficient outcome in sight.
Judgment on the advantages of the former or
the latter financing mechanism is pronounced
by the theory in the form of combination of
the expected effects of control and expected
efficiency in the application of control. Exterior
investors may more easily secure for themselves
protection through the credit, rather than
through the equity investment, because the
rights of creditors are more clearly defined, so
that the breach of these rights is easier to prove
in the court of law. This is one of the arguments.
In support of the other argument what must be
investigated is the impact of the size of investor

on efficacy of control, which will reveal the

dilemma of the relative power of creditors and
the shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.
763) argue that the debt and the equity capital
should be compared when bearing in mind
the combination of the legal protection and
the easy ways that concentration of ownership
can be made, which both of these alternative
agreements can provide for.
Firstly, does the debt agreement stimulate
concentration of ownership? Until now the
prevailing form of crediting in the world was
banking crediting. Banks have been, as a rule,
major investors that can gain for themselves
many rights for control over companies, both
prior and after a loan call-in (cancellation).
Blocking of account may be imposed and
does not require any court order. Control over
company may also be additionally strengthened
through a direct ownership status of the creditor,
but also through an implicit threat by the
predominant creditor. Contrary to the case of
equity capital, credit agreement in an unusual
manner may become even stronger when it is not
concentrated, so that the effective legal protection
enjoyed by the creditors will be even higher than
the protection that can be won for themselves by
the minority shareholders. The key feature of the
creditor rights is in the fact that the coordinated,
harmonised action by several creditors is not
necessary in order to produce action against
delinquent obligors. Legal obligation of the
company is the obligation towards each one
of the creditors individually, who is free to
bring a law suit against the obligor irrespective
of the other creditors. When such an action is
undertaken, other creditors and the court of law
shall certainly undertake action to insure that the
first creditor does not acquire a disproportionate
share for himself. In actual fact, such an option
for one creditor to instigate unilaterally seizure
of assets in a climate where the obligor has
several creditors is a theoretical justification for
regulating bankruptcy procedure.
When debt is not concentrated, for example
in case of syndicated loans and investment into
public forms of indebtedness, creditor loses
a dominant position. In case of a debt callin or cancellation towards a large number of
creditors, negotiations between creditors may
be extremely difficult, so the obligor may be

odnos principala i agenta, zbog ega ak i

situacije zajednikog upravljanja projektom
nisu zatiene od pomenutog problema
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).
Dakle, savremene ekonomske teorije polaze
od pretpostavke da je ljudska priroda obeleena
ogranienom racionalnou, u smislu da smo
po namerama racionalni, ali smo u realizacije
svojih namera ogranieni. Takoe, podloni
smo oportunizmu, u smislu da smo motivisani
linim interesom i u tom procesu delujemo
mudro. Neminovna nekompletnost ugovora
je posledica prvog obeleja, a rizik koji nosi
ugovaranje, posledica drugog. Iz teorije
ugovora poznat je koncept savrenog ugovora.
Uloga savrenog ugovora je da stipulira sva
mogua stanja i odredi distribuciju koristi
i teta u svim moguim stanjima. Savreni
ugovor je teorijski ideal u kome se obaveza
svake ugovorne strane, u svim eventualijama,
moe u potpunosti predvideti i uneti u ugovor.
Na taj nain bi bilo mogue ouvati sva prava
ugovornih strana. Ukoliko bi ovakav ugovor
bio mogu, onda bi i kreiranje takvog ugovora
generisalo ex ante kompleks trokova nastalih
u pregovorima, izradi ugovora i obezbeenju
integriteta ugovora. Teorijski bi u ex ante
kompleks trokova trebalo ukljuiti i trokove
raznih instituta kojima se titi integritet ugovora,
npr. sufinansiranje projekata ili uspostavljanje
kolaterala. Kao teorijski koncept, savreni
ugovor se ne moe primeniti u ambijentu kada
ugovorne strane ne mogu sagledati sva mogua
stanja pa samim tim ni ugovorom precizirati.
U ambijentu u kome akteri ne raspolau
sa potpunim informacijama, pomenuti
konkurentni aranmani se kljuno razlikuju
po tome u kojoj meri je njihovo sprovoenje
osetljivo na problem informisanosti. Na primer,
nivo informacija potreban obema ugovornim
stranama
u
vlasnikim
modalitetima
finansiranja je neuporedivo vei, jer uee u
profitu zavisi od ostvarenog profita. Uee
finansijera je ovde jako osetljivo na bilo kakve
manipulacije visinom ostvarenog profita. Zbog
toga ne udi da Tariqullah Khan (1995, p. 40)
zakljuuje da primena principa podele profita
i gubitka zahteva idealan moral korisnika
sredstava. U realnosti, ako ovaj uslov nije
ispunjen, princip podele profita i gubitka ne
moe se primeniti efikasno.

bankarstvo 3 2013

posebnog znaaja. Naravno, kada ocenjujemo

uticaj ova dva aranmana na efikasnost
finansiranih firmi moramo imati u vidu da bolja
zatita interesa spoljnih investitora ne mora
uvek znaiti i bolje usmeravanje aktivnosti
finansirane firme.
Videli smo da savremena teorija poslovnih
finansija prednost razliitih finansijskih ugovora
izvodi na osnovu potencijala koji dati ugovori
imaju u ublaavanju sukoba interesa agenta i
principala. Kod finansijskih ugovora principal
je akter koji obezbeuje finansijska sredstva,
dok je lice koje de facto upravlja projektom u
poziciji agenta.
Agentski odnos se pojavljuje u svakom
ugovoru po kome neko lice, ili lica (principali),
angauju drugo lice (agenta) da izvri
izvesnu uslugu za njihov raun, kojim se
prenosi izvesno ovlaenje u odluivanju.
Agentski odnosi u krajnjoj liniji proistiu iz
asimetrinosti, tj. fundamentalnoj nejednakosti
u informisanosti partnera koji ulaze u ugovorni
aranman. Agentske odnose, usled asimetrine
informisanosti, prate problemi nesavrene
kontrole i oportunistikog ponaanja agenta.
Principal moe ograniiti mogunost otklona
od svog autentinog interesa uspostavljanjem
odgovarajuih pobuda za agenta ili prihvatanjem
trokova praenja agentovog ponaanja. Pored
toga, u nekim situacijama reenje e se nai u
ekstra nagradi za agenta (trokovi obavezivanja)
kao vidu garancije da agent nee preduzeti akcije
tetne po interes principala, ili kao garancija
da e principalu teta biti nadoknaena
ukoliko do toga doe. Ponekad, ni praenje
niti obavezivanje nije dovoljno da obezbedi da
agent postupa u cilju maksimizacije bogatstva
principala. Eventualni gubici koji nastaju u
tom sluaju ine treu kategoriju agentskih
trokova, rezidualne trokove. Dakle, principal
ne moe bez trokova obezbediti da agent uvek
donosi odluke optimalne sa stanovita samog
principala. Autori ovog koncepta, (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976, p. 308) koji se danas oznaava
kao ugovorna teorija firme, agentske trokove
definiu kao zbir (1) rashoda principala
nastalih u kontroli agenta, (2) rashoda nastalih
obavezivanjem agenta, i (3) rezidualnih
gubitaka. Agentski trokovi nastaju u svim
situacijama koje podrazumevaju kooperativne
napore, ak i kada ne postoji eksplicitno ureen

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121

pushed into a bankruptcy. It is much easier to

restructure debt owed to one single bank. The
problems with restructuring and the position of
minority creditors, may be the explanation why
the multilateral forms of debt are extremely rare
forms of financing, which is being applied only in
a few most developed countries, and even there
much less frequently than the banking credits.
Contrary to the creditors, individual
shareholders are not promised any return
for investment into the company although
according to a free decision made by the board
of directors they often receive payment of
dividends. In addition, individual shareholders
have no right to concrete business assets of the
company, and neither the right to collateral
(with the exception of the open-ended
investment funds where the shareholders of the
fund may pro rata liquidate assets of the fund
and disinvest). Not less important is the feature
providing for the shareholders that there is no
certainty for them to be sure that on a certain
fixed day, they shall receive their money back
(liquidation of the company is uncertain). The
fact that the position of the creditor in a financial
project is time limited is a very important
characteristic to be borne in mind. Minority
shareholders are often unable to disinvest even
when their interests are grossly breached.
In addition to a rather poor legal protection,
the main right gained by the shareholder is the
voting right in the selection of the board of
directors. In view of the fact that a coordinated
action by a large group of shareholders is
necessary in order to take control over the
voting mechanism, the voting rights have a
limited value except if they are concentrated.
Many small shareholders do not even have a
motivation to be adequately informed of the
way they should vote. To come in contact
and convince a large group of minority
shareholders through the mechanism of the
proxy of their best interest, is very hard and
rather costly, especially when this is opposed by
the management. However, when the votes are
concentrated they become extremely valuable,
as the side controlling the votes can become
able to pass almost all of the decisions in the
corporation. Concentrated action, in this regard,
is more powerful than the concentration of the
creditors position. The value of every share

equally derives from the value which such a

share may have for those who are trying to take
control over the company, while the protection
of the minority shareholders insures that those
who are controlling the company will be forced
to share some of the benefits with the minority.
As the shareholders are having the right of vote
and a certain degree of legal protection (especially
in the case of minority shareholders), they also
have the option to attract some of the payments
from the management in the form of dividend.
In a certain manner, dividend on shares is the
same as the interest charged on a debt granted,
payment requested from the management
supported by the right of the financier to control,
except that in the case of shares such control rights
are having the form of the voting rights (Shleeifer
and Vishny, 1997, p. 765).
Imperfect disclosure and the Islamic
financial arrangements
In reviewing the basic stands of contemporary
theory of business finances we note that the
credit agreement has a significant advantage
over the equity investments of exterior investors,
as the exterior investor can more easily identify
breaches of the interest and can more easily react
for purpose of prevention, and this especially
in the case when he does not dispose with a
concentrated position. However, the Islamic
financial arrangements based on the equity form
of investment mainly prescribe a high degree
of concentration of the equity position, so that
numerous objections regarding the inefficiency
of protection of interests of the minority
shareholders are not of any special importance
in this case. When assessing the impact of these
two arrangements, however, on the efficiency of
the financial firms, we must bear in mind that
better protection of exterior investors does not
necessarily imply better streamlining of activities
of the financed company.
We have already noted that the modern theory
of business finances is assessing advantages of
different financial agreements from the potential
which the agreements have in mitigation of
the conflict of interest between the agent and
the principal. In case of financial agreements,
principal is the actor who provides financial
assets, while the person who is de facto managing
the project holds the position of the agent.

Tabela 1: Uporedna analiza aranmana poslovnog finansiranja

Naknada
finansijeru

Finansijska
struktura

Dodatne
garancije

Konvencionalni Utvrena kao

Obavezno
Kolateral,
kreditni
procenat izvrenih uee agenta lina
ugovor
ulaganja
(zajmotraioca) jemstva
Trokovi plus /
lizing
(Mudarabah /
Ijara)
Agentski
aranman
(Murabaha)

Zajedniko
ulaganje
(Musharakah)

Utvren kao
Bez uea
Kolateral,
procenat izvrenih agenta
lina
ulaganja
(preduzetnika) jemstva
Utvren kao
procenat
ostvarenog
rezultata, saglasno
izvrenim
ulaganjima
Utvren kao
procenat
ostvarenog
rezultata, saglasno
izvrenim
ulaganjima

Bez uea
Kolateral,
agenta
lina
(preduzetnika) jemstva

Obavezno
uee
preduzetnika

U ambijentu asimetrine informisanosti

uesnika na tritu problemi nastaju ve u fazi
kada je potrebno doneti odluku o tome da li e
se neki realni projekat finansirati ili ne. Problem
koji nastaje pre samog sklapanja ugovora
(ex ante) izuavan je pod nazivom problem
nepovoljnog izbora (engl. adverse selection).
Naime, ako finansijer nije u stanju da pouzdano
proceni bonitet projekta, visinu naknade za
finansiranje odredie ne na osnovu boniteta
konkretnog projekta, ve na osnovu procenjenog
boniteta itavog skupa projekata. Tako
odreena visina naknade bie destimulativna
za projekte natprosenog boniteta, ali e i
dalje biti primamljiva potproseno bonitetnim
projektima. Kao posledica opisane interakcije,
finansijer e zavriti sa potproseno bonitetnim
projektima. Teorijski dobro elaborirano reenje
ovog problema je takozvani vieslojni ugovor
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Naime, finansijer e
ponuditi ugovore sa razliitim uslovima, koji bi
po pretpostavci trebalo da odgovaraju agentima
razliitog boniteta. Na osnovu opredeljenja
agenta, finansijer stie uvid (dobija signal) u stav
samog agenta o sopstvenim karakteristikama.
Na primer, ako je ponuen kreditni ugovor
koji kombinuje viu kamatnu stopu i manje
vredan kolateral, zajedno sa ugovorom koji
kombinuje niu kamatnu stopu i vredniji
kolateral, opredeljenje zajmotraioca za prvi tip

Bez
dodatnih
garancija

Period
finansiranja

Distribucija
vrednosti

Unapred utvren, Datumom dospea

krai od ivotnog ugovora, povraaj
veka projekta
duga, rezidual
agentu
Unapred utvren, Datumom dospea
krai od ivotnog ugovora, povraaj
veka projekta
duga, rezidual
agentu
Neoroen, do
Rezidualna
likvidacije firme
vrednost firme
finansijeru, ili puna
naplata uloga iz
kolaterala, agentu
nita
Neoroen, do
Rezidual
likvidacije firme
srazmerno
strukturi
finansiranja

ugovora ukazivae da on sm sebe procenjuje

kao natproseno rizinog. Slina je situacija
i sa stepenom samofinansiranja projekta koji
se moe na identian nain kombinovati sa
visinom kamatne stope. Kao to smo videli,
teorija ugovora prepoznaje da izvesni trokovi
nastaju i kod instituta kojima se titi integritet
ugovora (kolateral, samofinansiranje, druge
restriktivne klauzule), ali po definiciji povoljan
uticaj na pobude ugovornih strana pretee u
odnosu na trokove.
Kada se ugovor sklopi tako da se utvrdi visina
naknade finansijeru, bilo visinom kamatne stope
ili kljuem za podelu profita, preduzetnik moe
pokazivati sklonost da pribegne poslovnim
operacijama koje e uveati rizik projekta, u
smislu da projekat sada ima veu verovatnou
da ostvari natprosean profit, ali i gubitak. Ovaj
efekat poznat je kao devijantan odnos prema
riziku (engl. moral hazard). Klasian kreditni
ugovor zatien je od ovakve naknadne izmene
u relativnom ueu obe strane ugovoranjem
kolaterala, samofinansiranjem ili brojnim
drugim zatitnim klauzulama, koje su tu da
umanje afinitet preduzetnika prema riziku
ili poslovnu autonomiju. Ukoliko ovakvi
mehanizmi nisu raspoloivi finansijer mora
poveati svoj angaman na direktnom praenju
i kontroli poslovnih aktivnosti.
Informacioni problemi u realizaciji

bankarstvo 3 2013

Tip aranmana

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123

The agency relationship appears in every

agreement where a person or persons that the
principals are engaging is an additional person
- agent tasked to perform a certain service
for their account, thus transferring certain
authority in the decision making. The agency
relations, in the final instance, derive from an
asymmetry, i.e. from a fundamental inequality
in the information available to the partners
venturing into the contractual arrangement.
Agency relations, because of asymmetry of
information, are accompanied by problems of
an imperfect control and opportunistic conduct
by the agent. The principal may limit the options
for departure from his authentic interests by
establishing corresponding motivations for
the agent, or by accepting monitoring costs for
the surveillance of the agents behaviour. In
addition, in some situations the solution may
be found in an extra fee for the agent (binding
costs) as a form of a guarantee that the agent
will not undertake any action detrimental for
the interests of the principal, or as a guarantee
that the principal will be compensated for
damages caused if that should be the case. At
times, neither monitoring nor binding would be
sufficient to insure that the agent will proceed in
the manner maximizing wealth of the principal.
All eventual losses incurred in such a case
represent the third category of the agency costs,
residual costs. Thus the principal can not insure,
without costs, that the agent will always make
decisions which are optimal from the point of
view of the principal himself. The authors of
this concept (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.
308), which is designated today as the company
contractual theory, define agency costs as the
sum of the following: (1) expenditures of the
principal incurred in control over the agent; (2)
expenditures incurred in binding the agent; and
(3) residual losses. Agent expenditures occur
in all situations which comprise cooperative
efforts, even when there is no explicitly
regulated relationship between the principal
and the agent, where even the cases of a joint
project management are not protected from this
problem (Alehian and Demsetz, 1972).
Hence, the modern economic theories start
from the assumption that the human nature
is marked by limited rationality, in the sense
that in our intentions we are rational, but in the

realisation of our intentions we are limited. In

addition, we are susceptible to opportunism,
in the sense that we are motivated by private
interests and in this process are acting
prudently. The inevitable imperfect nature of
the agreement is the consequence of the former
feature, and the risk embodied in contracting,
is the consequent of the latter. In the contract
theory there is well known concept of the
perfect contract. The role of a perfect contract
is to stipulate all the possible conditions and
to determine distribution of costs and benefits
in all possible situations. Perfect contract is a
theoretical ideal in which obligations of both
contracting parties and in all eventualities, may
be fully predicted and entered into the contract.
In this manner it would be possible to preserve
all the rights of the contracting parties. If such
a contract would be possible, then the creation
of such a contract would generate ex ante
complex of costs incurred in the negotiations,
drafting of the contract and securing integrity
of the contract. Theoretically speaking, it would
be necessary to add to the ex ante complex of
costs also the costs of various institutes used to
protect integrity of the contract, for example,
co-financing of the project or setting up of a
collateral. As a theoretical concept, perfect
contract can not be applied in a climate when
the contracting parties can not assess all the
possible circumstances, and hence can not
specifically provide for them in the contract.
In an environment where the actors involved
do not have all the information available, the
above mentioned competitive arrangements
are crucially different in the sense to what
extent their implementation is sensitive to
the problem of information accessibility. For
example, the level of information necessary for
both contracting parties in the equity modalities
of financing is infinitely higher, as the sharing
of profit depends on the profit made. The share
due to the financier is very sensitive here to
any manipulation with the size of the profit
made. Hence it does not come as a surprise
that Tariqullah Khan (1995, p. 40) concludes
that the implementation of the profit and loss
sharing principle requires an ideal morality
from the funds beneficiary. In reality, if this
requirement is not to be met, the profit and loss
sharing principle can not be applied efficiently.

depozitima opada uporedo sa rastom

konvencionalne depozitne kamatne stope.
Nienhaus je eksplicitnim modelom dokazao
da e u konkurentnom ambijentu agent imati
motiv da precenjuje oekivanu profitabilnost
projekta, kako bi u pregovorima sa finansijerom
obezbedio za sebe povoljniji klju raspodele,
dok bi za islamsku banku korisna strategija
bila da potcenjuje oekivanu profitabilnost
projekata. Uz pretpostavku o asimetrinoj
informisanosti, u pregovorima oko visine svog
uea banke e insistirati na visokom ueu
to e dovesti do problema pogrenog izbora
(engl. adverse selection), odnosno samo oni
preduzetnici koji oekuju nisku profitabilnost
konkurisae za sredstva kod islamskih banaka,
to e ugroziti profitabilnost islamskih banaka.
Priroda poslovnog rezultata kao finansijske
osnove za raspodelu ini ove aranmane
posebno osetljivim i na oportunistiko ponaanje
agenta tokom vaenje ugovora i po okonanju.
Trokovi koje u sistem unosi asimetrina
informisanost ne mogu se izbei niti u jednom
tipu aranmana, ali su zbog prirode varijable
koja je kljuna za funkcionisanje aranmana
podele profita i gubitka ovde srazmerno vii.
Kod dunikih oblika finansiranja poverilac
nije zainteresovan za profitabilnost projekta
sve dok ona garantuje urednu otplatu zajma.
Kod PLS aranmana, uobiajeni instrumenti za
redukovanje agentskog konflikta nisu prisutni.
Samofinansiranje projekta je jedan od naina
kojim se reavaju problemi koji nastaju u
primeni kreditnog ugovora. Spremnost agenta
da uloi sopstveni novac ili da zaloi deo svog
bogatstva za obeteenje finansijera u sluaju
neuspeha, dokaz je njegove vere u uspeh
projekta, ali i garancija njegove posveenosti
uspehu. U agentskom aranmanu nedostatak
samofinansiranja esto se nadoknauje
ugovaranjem kolaterala, ali je upotreba
kolaterala ovde skopana sa problemima
u primeni, jer je uslovljena identifikacijom
specifinog postupanja agenta. Razlike
izmeu dunikih modaliteta finansiranja
i islamskog zajednikog ulaganja postoje i
kada razmatramo potencijal samofinansiranja
da rei konflikt izmeu ugovornih strana.
Kod konvencionalnog kreditnog aranmana
zajmoprimac po osnovu svog finansijskog
uloga (sufinansiranje) stie podreen status

bankarstvo 3 2013

finansijskog aranmana postoje i kod njegovog

ugovornog ili prinudnog okonanja (ex
post). Naime, u sluaju okonanja ugovora
potrebno je izvriti verifikaciju stanja da bi
se pristupilo konanoj distribuciji vrednosti
projekta (engl. costly state verification). I u
ovom aspektu kreditni ugovor je superioran
finansijski aranman, jer ga prati najnii nivo
trokova revizije stanja (engl. auditing costs)
(Spencer, 2000, p. 10). Kod kreditnog ugovora
distribucija se obavlja na bazi jednostavnog
pravila. Nominalna vrednost potraivanja
uveana za dospele kamate prioritetno se
naplauje iz konane vrednosti projekta,
dok rezidual pripada preduzetniku. Da bi
zatitio svoj interes, finansijer treba da prati
iskljuivo jedan parametar, tj. da reaguje
prinudnim okonanjem projekta ukoliko uoi
da se likvidaciona vrednost projekta kritino
pribliila iznosu duga. Kod vlasnikih oblika
ulaganja, bilo kakva, pa i najmanja, promena
u kvalitetu poslovanja uticae na vrednost
pozicije finansijera.
Posmatrajui obeleja razliitih finansijskih
aranmana (tabela 1) uoavamo da se islamski
aranmani zasnovani na dugu u sutini ne
razlikuju u odnosu na konvencionalni kreditni
aranman. Precizno definisana finansijska
obaveza, sa rokom kraim od ivotnog
veka firme ili rokom efikasne upotrebe
finansirane poslovne imovine, kao i kolateral,
ine distribuciju vrednosti izmeu agenta i
principala, kako u toku tako i po okonanju
aranmana,
prilino
pojednostavljenim
zadatkom, bez veih mogunosti da agent
oportunistikim ponaanjem nekanjeno
povredi interes principala.
Meutim, problemi koji nastaju zbog
nesavrene informisanosti ugovornih strana
redovan su pratilac islamskih aranmana koji
se zasnivaju na podeli profita i gubitka. Ovim
problemima se eksplicitno bavio Nienhaus
(1983). Autor je analizirao sluaj paralelne
egzistencije islamskih i konvencionalnih
aranmana, i zakljuio da u takvom ambijentu
klju za raspodelu profita predstavlja trino
determinisanu varijablu na koju utie i visina
kamatne stope. Ova pravilnost je i empirijski
dokazana. Ekonometrijskim istraivanjima
(Haron and Wan Azmi, 2008) utvreno
je da tranja za islamskim investicionim

124

bankarstvo 3 2013

Table 1 Comparative analysis of business financing arrangements

125

Type of
arrangement

Financier fee

Financial
structure

Additional Financing period

guarantees

Value distribution

Conventional
credit
agreement

Fixed as a
percentage of
investment made

Collateral, Fixed in advance,

personal
shorter than the
pledges
life span of the
project

Costs plus/
leasing
(Mudarabah/
Ijara

Fixed as a
percentage of
investment made

Mandatory
agent
participation
(credit
applicant)
Without agent
(entrepreneur)
participation

Agent
arrangement
(Murabahah)

Fixed as a
percentage of
result achieved,
concordant with
investments made

Without agent Collateral, Without time

(entrepreneur) personal
limits, until the
participation
pledges
liquidation of
company

Joint venture
(Musharakah)

Fixed as a
percentage of
result achieved,
concordant with
investments made

Mandatory
entrepreneur
participation

Agreement
maturity date,
debt repayment,
residual due to
agent
Agreement
maturity date,
debt repayment,
residual due to
agent
Residual company
value due to
financier, or full
repayment of
investment from
collateral, nothing
for the agent
Residual
proportionate
to the financing
structure

In an environment of asymmetric
information for the participants on the market,
the problems arise already in the phase when it
is necessary to decide whether to finance some
real project or not. The problem which emerges
prior to the contracting itself (ex ante) was
studied under the name of adverse selection.
Namely, if a financier is not able to make a
reliable assessment of the project solvency, the
amount of the financing fee will be fixed not on
the basis of the solvency of the concrete project,
but on the basis of an estimated solvency of an
entire set of projects. So determined amount of
the fee will not be attractive for that projects that
have higher-than-average solvency, but will
still be attractive for the below average solvency
projects. As a result of the described interaction,
financier will end up with the below average
solvency project. A solution to this problem,
well elaborated in theory, is the so-called
multi-layered contract (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981). Namely, a financier will offer contracts
under different terms, which are assumed to
correspond to the agents of different solvency.
On the basis of the agents decision, financier
will gain an insight (receive a signal) in the
attitude that the agent himself has towards
his own standing. For example, if a credit
agreement which combines a higher interest

Collateral, Fixed in advance,

personal
shorter than the
pledges
life span of the
project

Without
Without time
additional limits, until
guarantees the company
liquidation

rate and a less valued collateral is offered,

together with the agreement which combines
a lower interest rate and a higher value of
collateral, the choice of the credit applicant of
the former type of agreement will show that he
is judging himself to be an above average risky
one. Similar situation prevails with the degree
of self-financing of the project which may be
combined, in an identical manner, with the
amount of the interest rate. As we have already
seen, contract theory recognises that certain
costs are incurred even in the institutes which
are protecting contract integrity (collateral,
self-financing, other restrictive clauses), but per
definition a favourable impact on the motivation
of contracting parties in outweighing the costs.
When an agreement is concluded by fixing
the amount of financiers fee, either concordant
with the interest rate or the profit sharing key,
entrepreneur may show a tendency towards
taking recourse in business operations that
will increase the project risk, in the sense that
the project will now have a higher probability
to make an above average profit, but also loss.
This effect is known as a risk deviation attitude,
or as a moral hazard. Classic credit agreement is
protected from such an additional amendment
to a relative share of both parties by contracting
collateral, self-financing, and a number of

organizacije, ime banke implicitno priznaju da

ne raspolau ekspertskim resursima koje mogu
u znaajnijem obimu posvetiti upravljanju
realnim projektima.
Dakle, kljuna pitanja kojima testiramo
validnost iznetog argumenta je da li pojaana
potreba banke da se ukljui u upravljanje
realnim projektima moe i zaista imati povoljan
uticaj na kvalitet upravljanja, kao i da li to
uveava sklonost ka riziku kod druge ugovorne
strane. Ipak, ova pitanju su vie empirijske
nego teorijske prirode. Izvesna iskustva (Zaher
and Hassan, 2001) sa poetnom primenom
aranmana podele profita i gubitka u Pakistanu
potvrdila su da su sluajevi delikvencije od
strane preduzetnika daleko od sporadinih, to
je konano dovelo do kompromitacije ovakvog
koncepta. Rezultati ne iznenauju ukoliko se
uvai injenica da je poreska evazija u ovoj
dravi dostigla nesluene razmere.
Izvori sredstava islamskih banaka
Jedan od osnovnih argumenata koji
teoretiari islamskog bankarstva navode u
korist ovog koncepta je usklaenost finansijskih
izvora sa plasmanima banke. Naime, ako
izvori sredstava islamske banke nisu fiksirani
u nominalnom iznosu, jednako kao i plasmani,
onda islamske banke izbegavaju osnovni
rizik kojim su izloeni njihovi konvencionalni
konkurenti. Problem ouvanja likvidnosti i
solventnosti trebalo bi da bude daleko manje
akutan nego kod konvencionalnih banaka, kod
kojih je glavnina finansijskih obaveza kratkog
roka i nominalno odreena.
U pogledu izvora sredstava, islamske
banke trpe znaajna ogranienja u odnosu
na konvencionalne banke. Instrumenti za
pribavljanje sredstava sa finansijskog trita
nisu raspoloivi, pa se izvori svode na
razliito definisane depozitne aranmane.
Islamsko bankarstvo slino konvencionalnom
bankarstvu praktikuje depozite po vienju,
esto uz vrlo savremenu tehnologiju (ATM i
slini pristupni proizvodi). Razlika izmeu ova
dva sistema pojavljuje se u prirodi investicionih
depozita (engl. profit/loss participation
accounts). Objanjavajui aranmane podele

Napominjemo da je u modelu kreditnog rizika profitabilnost dunika samo jedan od elemenata u kompleksnoj formuli
za proraun kreditnog rizika (Merton, 1974).

bankarstvo 3 2013

u odnosu na zajmodavca. Interes zajmodavca

ostae zatien sve dok postoji ma koliko uee
zajmoprimca. Dakle, sve dok zajmodavac brine
da uee zajmoprimca ne iezne, degradacija
vrednosti firme bilo zbog nekompetencija, bilo
zbog delikvencije, nee ii na teret onog dela
vrednosti firme koji pripada zajmodavcu. Ovo
nije sluaj sa statusom investitora kod islamskog
aranmana zajednikog ulaganja, koji imaju
potpuno ravnopravan status. Zbog toga
ponaanje preduzetnika kojim bi sebi pribavio
line materijalne koristi na teret smanjenja
vrednosti zajedniki uloenih sredstava postaje
verovatnije, pa prevencija takvog ponaanja
zahteva daleko intenzivnije napore investitora.
Efekat koji se od ema podele profita i
gubitka moe oekivati kada je u pitanju
njegov uticaj na nivo tednje i investicija kljuno
zavisi od toga da li e vea zainteresovanost
finansijera za profitabilnost (su) finansiranog
projekta nadjaati eventualne nepovoljne efekte
koji se mogu oekivati od zaotrenog problema
neujednaene informisanosti ugovornih strana.
Izvesni islamski teoretiari (Bashair and Darrat,
1996, p. 37) navode da e u situaciji kada je
interes finansijera usklaeniji sa interesom
preduzetnika, finansijer biti spremniji da svoje
ekspertske resurse posveti uspehu projekta, za
razliku od finansijskih aranmana zasnovanih
na dugu, kod kojih je panja kreditora suena
na bonitet dunika, pre svega stepen njegove
zaduenosti (ili vrednost zaloge)2. Ovakav
argument poiva na pretpostavci koja je upravo
suprotna onoj od koje sline analize kreu u
savremenim poslovnim finansijama. Redovno
pretpostavljamo da je preduzetnik potpunije
informisana strana, svakako negirajui
sposobnost banke da posveti svoje resurse
upravljanju velikim brojem realnih investicionih
projekata. Potreba za znaajnijim ukljuenjem
osoblja banke u voenju realnih investicionih
projekata nastaje u sluaju otkaza u servisiranju
zajma. Kada doe do grupisanja ovakvih sluaja
briga o zajmovima u restrukturiranju obino
se izmeta iz redovnih bankarskih operacija,
formiraju se posebne organizacione jedinice
(engl. work-out units) ili se potraivanja po
diskontovanoj vrednosti prenose na posebne

126

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127

other protection clauses, which are there to

lower the risk appetite of the entrepreneur, or
business autonomy. If such mechanisms are not
available, financier will be forced to enhance his
engagement in direct monitoring and control of
business activities.
Information problems in the realisation of
financial arrangement are present also in its
contractual or forcible termination (ex post).
Namely, in case of contract termination it is
necessary to make a verification of the state of
facts in order to proceed with the final distribution
of the project value, or costly state verification. In
this aspect as well credit agreement is a superior
financial arrangement as it is accompanied with
the lowest auditing costs (Spencer, 2000, p. 10).
In the case of credit agreement, distribution
is taking place on the basis of a simple rule.
Nominal value of receivables increased for
interest due has the priority in collection from
the final project value, while the residue belongs
to the entrepreneur. In order to protect his
interest, financier should monitor exclusively
one parameter, i.e. he should react with forcible
project termination if it is identified that the
liquidation project value is critically getting
closer to the amount of debt. In case of equity
investment, any and even the smallest change
in the quality of business conducted will impact
the value of the financiers position.
When observing the features of different
financial arrangements (Table 1) we notice
that the Islamic arrangements based on debt
are essentially different from the conventional
credit arrangements. Precisely defined financial
liability with maturity shorter than the life span
of the company, or term for efficient use of
business assets financed, as well as a collateral,
present the core of value distribution between
the agent and the principal, both for the duration
and upon completion of the arrangement, and
it may appear rather a simplistic task, without
any broader option for the agent to engage in
an opportunistic behaviour and undermine
without sanction interests of the principal.
The problems arising because of the
imperfect information for the contracting parties,
however, are a regular feature to be found in
the Islamic arrangements based on profit and
loss sharing. These problems were an explicit
focus of study by Nienhaus (1983). The author

analysed the case of parallel existence of Islamic

and conventional arrangements, and concluded
that in such an environment profit distribution
ratio is a market determined variable which is
also impacted by the amount of the interest rate.
This regularity is also empirically substantiated.
Econometric research (Haron and Wan Azmi,
2008) determined that the demand for Islamic
investment deposits is falling parallel with
the growth of the conventional interest rate
on deposits. Nienhaus proved, on an explicit
model, that in a competitive environment the
agent will be motivated to overrate the expected
project profitability, so that he may secure for
himself in the negotiations with the financier a
more favourable key of distribution, while for
an Islamic bank the useful strategy would be
to underrate the expected project profitability.
On the assumption that there is asymmetry
of informationy, in the negotiations on the
amount of their participation, the banks will
insist on a high share which shall bring about
the problem of adverse selection, i.e. only
those entrepreneurs who are expecting low
profitability will compete for funds from the
Islamic banks, which shall in turn undermine
profitability of the Islamic banks.
The nature of business result, as financial
basis for distribution, makes these arrangements
especially sensitive also to an opportunistic
conduct by the agent for the duration of the
agreement and upon its completion. Costs
which will be introduced in the system by
asymmetric information accessibility can not
be avoided in either type of arrangement, but
because of the nature of the variable wich is
crucial for functioning of the profit and loss
sharing arrangement, they are proportionately
higher in this case. In the debt financing forms
the creditor is not interested in profitability of
the project for as long as it guarantees regular
loan repayment. In the case of a PLS (profitand-loss sharing) arrangement, the usual
instruments for reducing agents conflicts are
not present. Project self-financing is one of
the ways to resolve problems which arise in
the implementation of the credit agreement.
Readiness of the agent to invest his own
money or to pledge one part of his wealth for
indemnifying the financier in case of failure is
the proof of his belief in the project success,

profita i gubitka (mudarabah) pomenuli smo

da je intencija islamskog koncepta da poloaj
koji banka ima prema preduzetniku bude
preslikan u poloaj koji deponent ima prema
banci. Kako u ovim aranmanima banka ne
moe ugovarati prinos nezavisno od rezultata
finansiranog projekta, tako ni deponentima koji
kod banke polau investicione depozite banka
ne garantuje stopu prinosa, pa samim tim ni
ouvanje vrednosti uloenih sredstava. Ovakva
reenja konvencionalno bankarstvo ne poznaje,
ali se neto slino sree u praksi osiguravajuih
kompanija. Takozvano osiguranje uz profit
predstavlja modalitet ivotnih osiguranja u
kome osiguranik polae pravo na srazmeran
deo godinjeg profita osiguravaa, ali ovaj
neizvesni deo prinosa je samo dodatak na
garantovanu sumu koja ve u sebi ukljuuje
izvesnu fiksnu stopu kapitalizacije.
Ideja o ulaganjima sa neizvesnom
stopom prinosa, namenjenim prevashodno
individualnim ulagaima, nije nepoznata u
konvencionalnim finansijskim sistemima. Na
primer, ovakav modalitet ulaganja doiveo
je veliku popularnost sa pojavom otvorenih
investicionih fondova. Ipak, slinost izmeu
islamskih investicionih depozita i investicionih
jedinica otvorenih investicionih fondova
iscrpljuje se obelejem da kod oba oblika prinos
zavisi od rezultata ulaganja. Razlike su meutim
brojne i znaajne. Otvoreni investicioni fondovi
su izuzetno transparentne eme, preko kojih se
sredstva investiraju unapred jasno definisanim

i tipiziranim strategijama. Investicione jedinice

su izuzetno likvidna ulaganja koja sam fond
unovava otkupljujui jedinice od ulagaa
na dnevnoj osnovi. Likvidnost investicionih
jedinica je direktno izvedena iz likvidnosti
aktive fonda. Da bi ovi fondovi mogli
otkupljivati svoje investicione jedinice sva svoja
ulaganja moraju koncentrisati ka finansijskim
instrumentima kojima se trguje na ureenim
tritima. Aktiva (islamskih) banaka je po sebi
netransparentna i nelikvidna. Po ovom obeleju
poloaj deponenata vie odgovara poloaju
investitora u netransparentnim emama, kao
to su vrlo rizini privatni (hed) fondovi.
U konvencionalnim finansijskim sistemima
uporedo postoje i manje transparentne eme za
kolektivno ulaganja individualnih investitora,
dodue, daleko su manje i atraktivne od
otvorenih fondova. Ulagai takozvanih
zatvorenih investicionih fondova, zastupljeni su
u organima uprave, mogu izmeniti investicionu
politiku, pa ak i investicionog menadera.
Ulaganja mogu unoviti prodajom investicionih
jedinica na sekundarnom tritu. Dakle,
islamskim deponentima je preko investicionih
depozita ponuena izuzetno netransparentna
ema ulaganja, pri emu izostaju svi instrumenti
kojima se inae ublaava problem informisanosti
kod ema poznatih u konvencionalnom
bankarstvu. U narednoj tabeli (2) sumiraemo
obeleja konvencionalnih ema ulaganja i
islamskog modaliteta podele profita i gubitka,
kako bi se uporedila njihova atraktivnost.

Tabela 2: Uporedna analiza investicionih alternativa

Upravlja

Agent na
osnovu mandata
investitora
Homogena

Agent, ali i ulagai

preko organa
upravljanja
Struktura izvora
Sloena (u diskreciji
agenta)
Likvidnost imovine Garantovana
Negarantovana
ulagaa
(interno)
(mogua eksterno)
Strategija ulaganja Tipizirana i
Tipizirana ali manje
rigidna
rigidna
Likvidnost ulaganja Primarna (uslov) Poeljna (u diskreciji
uprave)
Transparentnost
Primarna
Relaksirana

Privatni (hed)
fondovi

Islamski investicioni
depoziti

Agent na osnovu
mandata investitora

Agent na osnovu
mandata investitora

Sloena (uz uee

investitora)
Garantovana uz
ogranienja
U diskreciji agenta

Sloena (u diskreciji
agenta)
Negarantovana
U diskreciji agenta

Poeljna (u diskreciji Izuzetno nelikvidna

uprave)
Ograniena
Ograniena

bankarstvo 3 2013

Otvoreni fondovi Zatvoreni fondovi

128

bankarstvo 3 2013

129

but also a guarantee of his devotion to the

project success. In the agency arrangement the
absence of self-financing is often compensated
by contracting collateral, but the use of
collateral is here linked with some problems
in the implementation as it is conditioned by
identification of a specific conduct by the agent.
The differences between the debt financing
modalities and the Islamic joint venture are
present also when we consider self-financing
potential as the means for resolving the
conflict between the contracting parties. In a
conventional credit arrangement the borrower,
based on his financial deposit (self-financing),
acquires a subordinate status in respect to the
creditor. The interest of the creditor will remain
protected for as long as it lasts, no matter what
the share of the borrower might be. Hence, for
as long as the creditor cares for the share of the
borrower not to disappear, any downgrading
of the company value due to incompetence, or
due to delinquency, will not be charged on that
part of the company value which belongs to the
creditor. This is not the case with the status of
investors in Islamic joint venture arrangement,
which have a fully equitable status. Hence the
conduct of an entrepreneur, aimed at acquiring
for himself material gain at the expense of
a reduced value of jointly invested funds,
becomes more probable, and the prevention
of such conduct requires much more intensive
efforts to be made by the investor.
The effect which may be expected from the
profit and loss sharing scheme, when speaking
of its impact on the level of savings and
investments, crucially depends on whether a
higher interest by the financier for profitability
(co-financing of project) will prevail over
eventual adverse effects that may be expected
from an intensified problem of asymmetry of
information for the contracting parties. Certain
Islamic theoreticians (Bashair and Darrat, 1996,
p. 37) state that in a situation when the interest
of the financier is harmonised with the interest of
the entrepreneur, financier will be more inclined
to devote his expert resources to the project
success, as opposed to the debt based financial
arrangements where creditors attention is
2

focused on the obligors solvency, most of all

on the degree of his indebtedness (or the value
of collateral).2 Such an arrangement is based
on the assumption that is actually opposite to
the one which is being taken as a starting point
in similar analyses in the modern business
finances. We are assuming on regular basis that
the entrepreneur if more substantially informed
party, certainly denying the ability of the bank to
devote its resources to the management of a large
number of real investment projects. The need for
significant engagement of the bank employees
in managing real investment projects arises in
case of cancellation in the regular loan servicing.
When a group of such cases occurs, the care for
restructuring loans is usually relocated from the
regular banking operations into specially formed
business units, known as the work-out units, or
the receivables at a discounted value are being
transferred on to the special organisations, as
the banks implicitly acknowledge that they do
not have available expert resources that may
be significantly devoted to the real projects
management.
Hence, the crucial questions that serve for
testing validity of the above stated argument
is whether an intensified need of the bank to
engage in the real projects management can
and really have a favourable impact on the
management quality, but also whether this
boosts a risk appetite of the other contracting
party. Nevertheless, these questions are rather
of an empirical than of a theoretical nature. Some
experiences (Zaher and Hassan, 2001) gained
from the initial implementation of the profit
and loss sharing arrangements in Pakistan,
have confirmed that cases of delinquency by the
entrepreneurs are far from sporadic, which has
finally caused this concept to be compromised.
Results do not come as a surprise in view of the
fact that tax evasion in this country has truly
reached enormous proportions.
Islamic banks funding sources
One of the basic arguments set forth by the
theoreticians of Islamic banking in favour of
this concept is the harmonisation of financial
sources with the bank placements. Namely, if

Let us note that in the credit risk model profitability of the obligor is only one of the elements in a complex formula for
calculation of the credit risk (Merton, 1974).

Islamsko bankarstvo u praktinoj

primeni
Moemo slobodno rei da konvencionalno
i islamsko bankarstvo rastu iz istih korena.
Savremene obrise konvencionalno bankarstvo
je dobilo u neprekidnoj evoluciji, u pokuaju da
se ree problemi, koje paradigmatski koncept
islamskog bankarstva jednostavno ignorie.
Na taj nain, koncept savremenog islamskog
bankarstva predstavlja nita drugo do povratak
na sam poetak.
Ignorantski odnos islamskog ideala prema
savremenim izazovima se moda najjasnije
oitava u problemima sa kojima se islamsko
bankarstvo sree kod same primene. Zaher i
Hassan (2001) navode nekoliko oblasti u kojima
se islamsko bankarstvo u primeni najizrazitije
udaljava od paradigmatskog koncepta. Najpre,
najvei deo aktivnosti islamske banke obave
zaobilazei aranmane podele profita i gubitka3.
Drugo, ak i kada se primenjuju, ovakvi
aranmani se znatno modifikuju. Na primer,
kod investicionih depozita esto se praktikuju
eksplicitne (zakonima i propisima) ili implicitne
garancije vrednosti depozita4. Na taj nain se
relativizira naglaavana veza izmeu prinosa
na angaovana sredstva i trokova pribavljenih
sredstava. Kod plasmana sredstava na bazi
aranmana podele profita i gubitka, umesto
potpuno neizvesnog prinosa na ulaganja
pribegava se sloenim emama utvrivanja

kljua za raspodelu u momentu ugovaranja uz

uvaavanje svih onih elemenata koji su inae
kljuni u konvencionalnim aranmanima
(karakteristike zajmotrailaca, privredna grana
i drugo).
Posebno je znaajna praksa ugovoranja
zaloge. Ugovaranjem zaloge aranmani
podele profita i gubitka pribliavaju se
konvencionalnim finansijskim instrumentima,
jer se time rizik realno prenosi sa finansijera na
preduzetnika. Suprotno intenciji paradigmatske
verzije islamskog bankarstva, praksa ugovaranja
zaloge je prilino prisutna, i u velikoj meri
je ostavljena na slobodan izbor banci. Ovo
je posebno sluaj kod aranmana koji se ne
zasnivaju na principu podele profita i gubitka,
ali se sree i kod agentskog aranmana. Ako se
finansiranje vri preko agentskog aranmana,
to znai da preduzetnik ex ante ne unosi
sopstveni kapital radi finansiranja projekta, ali
se finansijer obezbeuje ugovoranjem zaloge,
agentski aranman se transferie u specifian
aranman sufinansiranja projekta. Kolateral,
kao specifian deo imovine preduzetnika,
postaje uslovno ulaganje preduzetnika, koje e se
aktivirati u sluaju neuspeha projekta, to dalje
u specifinim sluajevima finansijeru garantuje
naplatu uloene sume transformiui po intenciji
vlasniko ulaganje u duniki tip ulaganja.
Sami teoretiari islamskog bankarstva
zakljuuju da se konkretnim reenjima islamsko
bankarstvo udaljava od teorijskog modela, tako
da se na kraju spektra islamsko bankarstvo
moe potpuno poklopiti sa konvencionalnim
bankarstvom, sa terminologijom kao jedinom
razlikom.
Jedno od znaajnijih pitanja, koje je takoe
istraivano, je u kojoj meri se udaljavanje
islamskih banaka od idela moe pripisati
razlozima koji determiniu ponudu, a u kojoj
meri razlozima koji determiniu tranju za
proizvodima islamskih banaka. Modalitet
trokovi plus profit (mark-up) kao kao sinonim
za duniki oblik finansiranja, apsolutno
dominira nad vlasnikim modelima finansiranja

O ovome svedoe nalazi brojnih empirijskih studija, npr. za Pakistan (Siddiqi, 2008, p. 688), Indoneziju (Timberg, 2003),
dok analize ireg obuhvata potvruju da jedva jedna petina svih plasmana islamskih banaka u islamskim dravama biva
plasirano preko aranmana koji iskljuuju fiksne prinose finansijeru (Sunderarajan and Errico, 2002).

U Turskoj investicioni depoziti uivaju tretman vlasnikih ulaganja kod primene politike obaveznih rezervi likvidnosti, pa
su po tom osnovu izuzeti, iako su potpuno pokriveni osiguranjem, ukoliko je deponent fiziko lice (Okumu, 2005, p. 56.).

bankarstvo 3 2013

Zakljuujemo da je poloaj ulagaa u

aranmanima podele profita i gubitka najmanje
povoljan od svih poznatih ema ulaganja
koje stoje na raspolaganju individualnim
investitorima u konvencionalnim finansijskim
sistemima. Po nekim aspektima ona je
nepovoljnija i od podregulisane investicione
eme privatnih investicionih (hed) fondova,
iako je pravo na pristup fondu jedna od retkih
oblasti u kojima je poslovanje privatnih fondova
regulisano, i to obino ogranienjem na bogatiju
u po pretpostavci bolje informisanu klijentelu.

130

bankarstvo 3 2013

131

the funding sources of Islamic banks are not

fixed in the nominal amount, equally as the
placements, then the Islamic banks are avoiding
the basic risk to which their more conventional
competitors are exposed. The problem of
preserving liquidity and solvency should be by
far less acute then in the case of conventional
banks, where the main financial liability is a
short-term one and nominally designated.
Regarding the funding sources, Islamic banks
are suffering substantial limitations in respect
to the conventional banks. The instruments for
mobilazing funds on the financial market are
not available, so the sources are being reduced
only to some differently defined depositing
arrangements. Islamic banking, not unlike the
conventional banking, is practicing receiving
demand deposits, often with the application
of state-of-the-art technology (ATM and
similar accessible products). The difference
between these two systems appears in the
nature of profit and loss participation accounts.
When explaining the profit and loss sharing
arrangements (Mudarabah), we have mentioned
that the intention of the Islamic concept is for
the position which the bank has towards the
entrepreneur to be reflected in full on the
position which the depositor has towards the
bank. As in the case of such arrangements the
bank can not contract the return irrespectively
of the financed project results, neither can the
depositors making their investment deposits
with the bank be guaranteed the rate of return,
or the preservation of the value of invested
funds. Such arrangements are not known in
conventional banking, but something similar is
encountered in actual practice of the insurance
companies. The so-called profit-related
insurance is a modality of the life insurance
where the person insured is granted the right to
a proportionate part of the annual profit of the
insurer, but this uncertain part of return is only
an addition to a guaranteed sum which already
contains in it a certain fixed capitalisation rate.
The idea of investing with an uncertain rate
of return, especially designed for individual
investors, is not known in conventional
financial systems. For example, such a modality
of investment has gained a great popular

acclaim with the emergence of the open-ended

investment funds. Nevertheless, similarity
between Islamic investment deposits and the
investment units of the open-ended investment
funds ends with the feature designating that in
both of these forms, return or yield depends
on the investment results. The differences,
however, are many and significant ones. The
open-ended investment funds are extremely
transparent schemes, through which funds are
invested through well in advance and clearly
defined and typical strategies. Investment units
are extremely liquid investments which the fund
itself is liquidating by purchasing units from
investors on daily basis. Liquidity of investment
units directly derives from liquidity of the
funds assets. In order to enable these funds to
repurchase their investment units, they must
concentrate their investments into financial
instruments which are traded in regulated
markets. Assets of (Islamic) banks are per se
non-transparent and not liquid. According to
these features, the position of the depositor is
rather more corresponding to the position of
an investor in non-transparent schemes, such
as the highly risk exposed private hedge funds.
In the conventional financial systems,
there is a parallel running of less transparent
collective investment schemes for individual
investors, albeit far less attractive than those
of the open-ended funds. Investors into the
so-called close-ended investment funds,
represented on the management boards, have
the power to change investment policies, and
even replace the investment manager. Their
investments may be cashed-in through the sale
of investment units on the secondary market.
Hence, the Islamic depositors, through the
investment deposits, are offered an extremely
non-transparent investment scheme, where
there is an absence of all the instruments that
are otherwise used to mitigate the problem
of information accessibility in the schemes
encountered in the conventional banking. In
the forthcoming Table (2) we shall sum up the
characteristics of the conventional investment
schemes and that of the Islamic profit and loss
sharing modality, in order to make comparison
between their attractions for business clients.

Rigidnost finansijske strukture projekata

kontinuirane egzistencije
Aranmani podele profita i gubitka, u svom
izvornom obliku, imaju dva obeleja koja
zajedniki stvaraju izuzetnu rigidnost i nameu
firmama neopravdana finansijska ogranienja.
Najpre, mudarabah kao i musharakah ne doputaju
reinvestiranje profita u preduzeu. Drugo,
u svom tradicionalnom obliku ovi ugovori
nemaju fiksno dospee (engl. perpetual). Ovi
aranmani e proizvoditi pravno dejstvo sve
do prestanka zajednikog poduhvata. Struktura
finansiranja zajednikog poduhvata, pa samim
tim i klju za raspodelu profita i gubitka
ostaju nepromenjeni sve do prestanka firme.
Etika opravdanost nepromenljivog kljua za
raspodelu zasluuje posebnu raspravu, mada
emo se mi ovde baviti iskljuivo posledicama
koje pomenuta obeleja imaju na efikasnost.
Preduzetnik nee moi da nakon potpisivanja
ugovora povea svoje uee u firmi, iako bi
on to eventualno eleo i bio u stanju bilo zbog
toga to je u meuvremenu stekao dodatna
sredstva, bilo zbog toga to su njegovi afiniteti
prema riziku uveani (po pretpostavci zbog
toga to su unapreeni njegove menaderske
sposobnosti). Zbog ove nefleksibilnosti, PLS
aranmani nee odgovarati zrelim firmama, dok
nove firme nee biti primamljive finansijerima
jer menaderske sposobnosti preduzetnika jo
uvek nisu proverene i dokazane. Ukoliko se
5

ovakav aranman uspostavi, preduzetnik e

sve vreme biti nagraivan srazmerno njegovim
poetnim kvalifikacijama.
Kao reenje za ovaj problem, imajui u
vidu prioritet koji reinvestiranje dobiti ima
u konvencionalnim finansijskim sistemima,
neki autori (Tariqullah Khan, 1995) predlau
osavremenjivanje PLS aranmana. Po
predlogu, nakon to preduzetnik stane na
svoje noge, banka bi postepeno naputala
aranman preputajui kompletno vlasnitvo
preduzetniku. Na taj nain bi banka povratila
angaovana sredstva, koja bi se dalje mogla
koristiti radi finansiranja novih projekata.
Vlasniki udeo od sufinansijera preduzetnik
bi mogao otkupiti svojim delom ostvarenog
profita, dakle u nejednakim tranama, sve do
konanog otkupa. Meutim, da li bi u interesu
banke bilo da dezinvestira, tj. napusti svoje
najbolje projekte. Ukoliko bi to prihvatila,
banka bi de facto dala bez naknade opciju
preduzetniku da povea stepen vlasnike
kontrole nad zajednikim poduhvatom kada
njegove privatne informacije ukazuju da
poduhvat oekuje natprosena profitabilnost.
Dakle, ako krene dobro preduzetnik dobija
firmu nazad, ako krene loe firma ostaje u
deliminom vlasnitvu partnera.
U klasinom kreditnom sistemu isplata
kredita je in kojim dunik vraa u svoj posed
poslovnu imovinu firme. Sve do tada u proces
upravljanja firmom ukljuen je i kreditor.
Restriktivne klauzule u kreditnim ugovorima
omoguuju da se kreditor aktivnije ukljui u
upravljanje finansiranim projektom, upravo u
trenutku kada preduzetnik dokazuje da nije u
stanju da samostalno upravlja projektom, to
se jednostavno dokazuje padom vrednosti
poslovne imovine i smanjenjem uea
preduzetnika u finansiranju projekta. Potpuni
prelazak firme u svojinu kreditora ureen je
steajnim postupkom. Na taj nain kreditor
nije iskljuen iz upravljanja projektom, ve se
ukljuuje u pravi momenat.
Na osnovu analiziranih obeleja moemo
uoiti da su islamski aranmani namenjeni za
dugorono finansiranje, a zasnovani na modelu
vlasnikog ulaganja, izuzetno nefleksibilni, i to

Ovo potvruju istraivanja ponaanja korisnika bankarskih usluga izvrena u Bahreinu (Metawa and Almossawi, 1998,
p. 310) i Turskoj (Okumu, 2005, p. 73).

bankarstvo 3 2013

u islamskom bankarstvu. Ovakva situacija

se dugo objanjavala iskljuivo sklonostima
banaka da favorizuju prvi oblik, jer je on inae
vie u duhu komercijalnog bankarstva, a i
iskustvo banaka je daleko vee u ovim oblicima
finansiranja. Meutim, i na strani tranje
oigledno postoje razlozi za smanjen interes
za drugim oblikom finansiranja. Istraivanja
sklonosti korisnika usluga5, pokazala su
da korisnici usluga islamskih finansijskih
organizacija ne ocenjuju interesantnim upravo
one aranmane koji su najblie usklaeni sa
islamskim principima (npr. musharakah). O
nekim moguim razlozima koji mogu objasniti
smanjen interes klijentele za ovim aranmanima
govoriemo u nastavku.

132

Table 2 Comparative analysis of investment alternatives

Open-ended
funds

Close-ended funds

Managed by

Agent mandated Agent but also

by the investor
investors through
the management
boards
Structure of sources Homogeneous
Complex (at the
agents discretion)

Private (hedge)
funds

Islamic investment
deposits

Agent mandated by
the investor

Agents mandated
by the investor

Complex (with
participation of
investor)
Investor assets
Guaranteed
Non-guaranteed
Guaranteed with
liquidity
(internally)
(possible externally) limitations
Investment strategy Typical and rigid Typical but less rigid At the agents
discretion
Investment
Primary
Desirable (at the
Desirable (at the
liquidity
(condition)
discretion of the
discretion of the
management)
management
Transparency
Primary
Relaxed
Limited

We may conclude that the position of investor

in the profit and loss sharing arrangements is
the least favourable from amongst all of the
other known investment schemes which are
available to the individual investors in the
conventional financial systems. In some aspects,
it is even less favourable than the sub-regulated
investment scheme of the private investment
(hedge) funds, although the right of access
to the fund is one of the few areas in which
business of private funds is regulated, and this
usually by restricting it to a more opulent and
purportedly better informed clientele.

Islamic banking implemented in

practice

bankarstvo 3 2013

We may feel free to state that both the

conventional and Islamic banking have grown
out from the same roots. Modern forms of
conventional banking have matured through
an uninterrupted evolution, in the attempts to
resolve some problems, which the paradigmatic
concept of Islamic banking is simply ignoring.
In this manner, the concept of modern Islamic
banking is nothing else but a return to the early
beginnings.
An attitude of denial that the Islamic ideal has

133

3
4

Complex (at the

agents discretion)
Non-guaranteed
At the agents
discretion
Extremely nonliquid
Limited

towards contemporary challenges is best reflected

in the problems which are facing Islamic banking
when implemented in practice. Zaher and Hassan
(2001) are mentioning several fields in which
the Islamic banking, when applied in practice,
is most emphatically distancing itself from the
paradigmatic concept. Firstly, the major part of
activities that the Islamic banks are conducting
is applying forms that are circumventing the
profit and loss sharing arrangements.3 Secondly,
even when applied, such arrangements are
being significantly modified. For example, in
case of investment deposits what is often done in
practice are the explicit (in laws and regulations
prescribed) or implicit guarantees for the deposits
value.4 In this manner the emphasised link
between the return on funds engages and costs for
provision of funds is expressed in rather relative
terms. In case of placement of funds on the basis of
the profit and loss sharing arrangement, instead
of a fully uncertain return on investment, what
is applied are complex schemes for determining
the key or ratio of distribution at the moment
of contracting, with due respect for all those
elements which are otherwise crucial also in
conventional arrangements (borrowers credit
rating characteristics, economic branch where the
enterprise operates, etc.).

This is testified by many empirical studies, for example in the case of Pakistan (Siddiqi, 2008, p. 688), Indonesia (Timberg, 2003),
while analyses of a broader scope confirm that barely one fifth of all the placements by Islamic banks in the Islamic countries is
being places through the arrangements which exclude fixed returns for the financier (Sunderarajan and Errico, 2002).
In Turkey, investment deposits are enjoying the treatment of equity investments in application of the required reserves
policy for liquidity, and on that basis they are exempt although they are fully covered by insurance, if the depositor is a
physical person (Okumus, 2005, p. 56).

Dezinvestiranje finansijera i ekonomske

posledice
Predlog dogradnje PLS aranmana, o kome
smo upravo diskutovali, podrazumeva ugovorom
ureeno, postepeno dezinvestiranje finansijera,
to dokazuje da je fleksibilnost finansijske
strukture potreba prepoznata i u islamskim
sistemima. U tradicionalnim PLS aranmanima
izmena finansijske strukture je mogua jedino
likvidacijom projekta, odnosno finansirane firme.
Firma bi se onda prodavala u celini ili ako to nije
ekonomski isplativo, vrila podela njene poslovne

imovine. U oba sluaja, likvidacija firme moe

stvarati posebno velike trokove kada alternativna
upotreba poslovne imovine nije raspoloiva
(Williamson, 1988). Poslovna imovina ili firma
mogu biti osnova novog projekta ije pokretanje
je mogue iznova finansirati.
U konvencionalnim, zapadnim finansijskim
aranmanima problem je reen prenosom prava
na preduzetnika da raspolae rezidualnom
vrednou projekta od momenta pune isplate
duga (vidi u tabeli 1). Zbog toga je nastavak
projekta kada neko od finansijera gubi interes za
svojim ueem, eventualno dodatno ulaganje
u projekat, kao i finansiranje ve kreiranih
projekata, daleko lake izvesti. Konvencionalni
finansijski aranmani omoguuju vrlo razliite
kombinacije duga i vlasnikog kapitala u
finansiranju realnih projekata, i to razliite u
brojnim aspektima, npr. moe se kombinovati
dug sa razliitim stepenom prioriteta. Upravo
model finansiranja zasnovan na kombinacijama
vlasnikog ulaganja sa konvencionalnim
dunikim aranmanima omoguuje firmama
potpunu slobodu u izboru finansijske strukture.
Na taj nain, finansijska struktura postaje
aktivna determinanta u kreiranju razvoja firme.
U islamskim aranmanim koji se zasnivaju na
dugu, npr. u finansijskom lizing aranmanu, ovaj
problem je reen slino reenju koje je u primeni
u konvencionalnom kreditnom finansiranju:
nakon otplate punog iznosa davaocu lizinga
korisnik lizinga ulazi u posed predmeta lizinga.
Meutim, ovi problemi su daleko izraeniji
kod PLS aranmana. Kahn Fahim (1995)
objanjavajui podelu rizika u agentskom i
aranmanu zajednikog ulaganja navodi da
finansijer u celini absorbuje gubitke sve do
okonanja projekta i otplate uloene sume. [dodat
italik]. Italikom istaknut deo konstatacije ukazuje
da autor pravi pogrenu analogiju PLS aranmana
sa aranmanima o dugu. Naime, ukoliko
finansirani projekat pripada tzv. kontinuiranim
ekonomskim projektima (engl. going concern),
a ne jednokratnom preduzetnikom poduhvatu
(engl. single venture) ostaje problematino kako
e se odrediti momenat okonanja projekta. U
oba PLS modaliteta finansijer kontinuiranih
ekonomskih projekata sredstva moe povratiti
jedino likvidacijom firme. Nije jasno ko moe
pokrenuti likvidaciju firme, i ta sve moe biti
osnov za pokretanje likvidacije. Kod agentskog

bankarstvo 3 2013

ne samo u pogledu izbora strukture finansiranja.

Distribucija nagrade na osnovu ostvarenog
rezultata, podrazumeva da do nje dolazi u
momentu kada je finansijska osnova za raspodelu
(poslovni rezultat) utvrena, i to po kljuu koji je
unapred utvren i nepromenljiv itav ivotni vek
projekta. Ukoliko bi zbog potreba finansiranja
razvoja firme, u meuvremeno dolazilo do
izmena u finansijskoj strukturi, moralo bi doi
i do prilagoavanja kljua, to bi uvek iznova
povlailo sloene pregovore o relativnom
ueu (menaderskog) rada i kapitala. U
konvencionalnim finansijama ovaj problem ne
postoji, jer je sistem raspodele jednostavniji:
uee poverilaca u raspodeli poslovnog
rezultata i imovine firme je odreeno nominalno,
a itav rezidual pripada preduzetniku.
Ovi modeli ostaju potpuno neprilagoeni
potrebama razvojnog finansiranja dinaminih
firmi. Ne samo to u meuvremenu ne moe
doi do dodatnog finansiranja iz eksternih
izvora, ve izvorni oblik ovih aranmana
iskljuuje bilo kakvo reinvestiranje ostvarenog
profita. Kako podela profita, zbog uea
menaderskog rada, nije srazmerna strukturi
finansiranja, eventualno reinvestiranje profita
bi dovelo do smanjenja uea u finansijskoj
strukturi aktera koji iskljuivo obezbeuje
kapital. Problem reinvestiranja profita ne postoji
u konvencionalnom modalitetu zajednikih
ulaganja, jer je struktura raspodele profita i
pokria gubitka saglasna strukturi kapitala.
Takoe, potrebe za dodatnim finansiranjem
mogu biti zadovoljene konvencionalnim
kreditiranjem, koje ima drugaiji tretman od
vlasnikih ulaganja, a nagrada zajmodavcu ima
tretman finansijskog rashoda koji se iskljuuje iz
ostvarenog rezultata i ne utie na klju raspodele.

134

bankarstvo 3 2013

135

Especially significant is the practice of

collateral contracting. By collateral contracting
the profit and loss sharing arrangements are
coming closer to the conventional financial
instruments, as in this manner the risk is
really transferred from the financier on to the
entrepreneur. Contrary to the intentions of
the paradigmatic version of Islamic banking,
the practice of collateral contracting is rather
broadly present, and to a great extent is made
available for the bank to make its free choice
in this regard. This is especially the case in
arrangements which are not based on the
profit and loss sharing principle, but is also
encountered in the agency arrangements.
If the financing is carried out through the
agency arrangement, which means that the
entrepreneur ex ante is not investing his own
capital for project financing, but the financier
is securing himself by contracting collateral,
the agency arrangement is transferred into
a specific arrangement of the project cofinancing. Collateral, as a specific part of the
entrepreneurs assets, becomes conditionally
speaking entrepreneurs investment, which is
to be activated in case of failure of the project,
which in turn guarantees the financier, in
specific cases, that he will be able to collect
the invested sum by transforming, per intent,
equity investment into debt investment type.
Theoreticians of Islamic banking themselves
are finding that in some concrete solutions
Islamic banking is departing from the theoretical
model, so that at the end of the spectrum Islamic
banking may be found fully compatible with
the conventional banking, with the terminology
remaining the only difference present.
One of the important questions, which
were also researched, was to what an extent
is the distancing of the Islamic banking from
its ideal to be ascribed to the reasons which
are determining the supply of, and to what
extent to the reasons which are determining
the demand for products of Islamic banks. The
modality of the cost plus profit, or the markup, as the synonym for the debt financing

form, is absolutely dominating over the equity

models of financing in the Islamic banking.
Such a situation was for a long time being
explained exclusively by the inclination of
banks to favour the former form, as it is more
in line with commercial banking, but also the
experience of banks is by far higher in these
forms of financing. However, on the side of
demand it is obvious that there are reasons for a
diminished interest in other forms of financing.
Research into preferences of the users of
services5 has shown that the users of services of
Islamic financial organisations have not found
interesting actually those arrangements which
are most closely harmonised with the Islamic
principles (for example, Musharakah). Some of
the possible reasons that may explain a reduced
interest of clients for these arrangements will be
discussed further in this paper.
Rigid financial structure of projects with
continuous existence
Profit and loss sharing arrangements, in
their original form, have two features which
are together creating an extreme rigidity and
imposing on the firms unjustified financial
constraints. Firstly, Mudarabah just like
Musharakah are not allowing reinvestment of
profit into the company. Secondly, in their
traditional form, these contracts do not have
a fixed maturity, they are perpetual. These
arrangements will continue to produce legal
effect for as long as the joint venture is not
terminated. Structure of the joint venture
financing, and thus the key for distribution of
profit and loss, remains unchanged through
the duration of the companys life span. The
ethical justification of this unchangeable key
for distribution deserves special discussion,
although we shall deal here exclusively with
the consequences that the above mentioned
features have on the efficacy.
Entrepreneur will not be able, after signing
the contract, to increase his share in the firm,
although he would be eventually willing to do
so and would be able either because he had in

This is confirmed by the research into the conduct of the users of banking services made in Bahrein (Metawa and Almossawi,
1998, p, 310), and in Turkey (Okumus, 2005, p. 73).

put primenjeno kod Holandske kompanije za

istonu Indiju, dovelo do naglog ekonomskog
rasta i uinilo srednjevekovni Amsterdam
finansijskom prestonicom zapadne civilizacije
(Michie, 2008, p. 25).
Rezerve koje smo izneli u ovom odeljku
odnose se gotovo iskljuivo na PLS aranmane.
Kod ostalih finansijskih aranmana ne bi se moglo
rei da dolaze u sukob sa praksom, jer su daleko
ei kod islamskih banaka. Meutim, primedbe
bi se ovde mogle koncentrisati oko sumnjive
utemeljenosti na izvornim principima Islama.

Zakljuak
Dva u islamu najee osporavana principa
konvencionalnog bankarstva su a) pravo
na povraaj date sume (bez obzira na ishod
projekta) i b) pravo zajmodavca na naknadu
koja nije utvrena u skladu sa rezultatima
finansiranog projekta. Meutim, u islamskim
finansijskim aranmanima zasnovanim na
dugu ova dva obeleja nisu iskljuena, ve
su samo prikrivena. Aranman trokovi
plus profit ukljuuje oba sporna elementa:
podrazumeva bezuslovni povraaj uloenih
sredstava i fiksni prinos finansijera. injenica
da se u zajam ne daje novac, ve se za novac
kupuje dobro koje se dalje daje u zajam, ne
predstavlja sutinsku razliku. Argument da
se banka u komercijalnom aranmanu izlae
rizicima, kojim se pravda fiksna naknada banci,
prilino je labav. Rizik eventualnog oteenja
dobra pre predaje korisniku moe se izbei
komercijalnim uslovima, dok se neodgovarajui
kvalitet nabavke po pravilu izbegava direktnim
ukljuenjem korisnika u proces nabavke. Rizici
vezani za dobro u procesu upotrebe dalje se
iskljuuju ugovaranjem kolaterala.
Sa druge strane, aranmani koji se zasnivaju
na principu podele profita i gubitka ostaju
osetljivi na niz problema, kao to su problem
nepovoljnog izbora, devijantnog odnosa
preduzetnika prema riziku i druge pojavne
manifestacije trokova agenture, i to u daleko
veoj meri od klasinog kreditnog aranmana.
U praksi, izvesni elementi konvencionalnog
kreditnog aranmana ugrauju se u islamske
finansijske aranmane, kako bi se ovi problemi
ublaili, ali to istovremeno udaljava ove
aranmane od teorijskog ideala.

bankarstvo 3 2013

aranmana do likvidacije moe doi i kada se

ustanovi da je agent pogreno vodio projekat. U
tom sluaju se prilikom likvidacije moe aktivirati
kolateral, to ovaj modalitet finansiranja ini jako
slinim modalitetu finansiranja privatnih (hed)
fondova, sa svim nedostacima i rizicima. Naime,
zbog potrebe zatite informacija o strategijama
ulaganja, hed fondove karakterie izuzetno
netransparentno poslovanje, visoka diskrecija
menadera i agresivno koncipirana struktura
nagrada menadera vezana za rezultate.
Konflikt interesa izmeu principala (finansijera)
i menadera ublaava se specifinim opcijama
ugraenim u finansijske aranmane. Na primer,
finansijerima se garantuje pravo na povlaenje
dela ili celine uloenih sredstava, to oni koriste
na prvi znak loih performansi. Rizik prinudne
likvidacije, pojaava averziju menadera prema
riziku, koji tada ine otklon od projekata koji,
iako dugorono mogu biti efikasni, u kratkom
roku bivaju praeni loim rezultatima (Shleifer,
2000, p. 106).
PLS modeli finansiranja imaju dva kljuna
nedostatka. Najpre, interesi firme grubo su
opstruirani ukoliko je dodatno finansiranje
neophodno za dinamine razvojne planove.
Na ovaj nain finansirane firme nee moi da
rastu, jer e ih u tome ograniavati nefleksibilni
finansijski aranman. Dakle, figurativno reeno
deak je prinuen da raste ostajui u istom
odelu itavo detinjstvo. Drugo, na nivou
privrede iroka primena ovakvog aranmana
suzila bi razvojnu podrku na projekte na koje
su sredstva inicijalno alocirana. Nove firme
mogle bi se finansirati jedino iz novih izvora
banaka. Koliko je ovakav koncept anahron
govori sledei primer iz ekonomske istorije.
Naime, prvi primeri finansiranja zajednikih
poslovnih poduhvata u zapadnom svetu
zabeleeni su u sluaju Britanske kompanije za
istonu Indiju. Svaki poduhvat se finansirao iz
posebnog kapitala. Ovakav model finansiranja
zahtevao je likvidaciju firme, odnosno fiziku
podelu imovine uvek kada je bilo potrebno da
se rezultat zajednikog poduhvata podeli meu
suvlasnicima, a to se deavalo po okonanju
svakog putovanja. Pomenuta kompanija je
nastavila da se finansira izdavanjem privremenih
akcija, koje su se odnosile na posebne poduhvate
sve do 1613. godine (Lavelle, 2004, p. 30). Tek je
otkrie transferibilnosti akcijskog kapitala, prvi

136

bankarstvo 3 2013

137

the meantime acquired additional resources,

or because his risk appetite had increased (at
the assumption that his managerial skills have
been enhanced). Because of this rigidity, the
PLS arrangements will not be suitable for more
mature companies, while the newly established
firms will not be attractive to the financiers as
the managerial skills of entrepreneurs have
not as yet been tested or proven. If such an
arrangement is to be set in place, entrepreneur
will be rewarded all the time in proportion with
his initial qualifications.
As a solution to this problem, bearing in mind
the priority which reinvestment of profit has in
the conventional financial systems, some authors
(Tariqullah Khan, 1995) suggest an upgrading
of the PLS arrangements. They propose that
after an entrepreneur had found his stable
feet the bank would be gradually leaving the
arrangement, leaving complete ownership in the
hands of the entrepreneur. In this way the bank
would return its engaged funds, which it would
be able to use further on for financing some new
projects. Equity share from the co-financier the
entrepreneur would be able to purchase with
his part of the profit made, therefore in unequal
tranches, until the final buy-out. However,
would it be in the best interest of the bank to
disinvest, i.e. to abandon its best projects? In
case it would accept such an arrangement, the
bank would hand over de facto the option to
the entrepreneur to increase the degree of his
ownership control over the joint venture, when
his private information are indicating that the
venture is expected to reach an above average
profitability. Therefore, if things would go
smoothly, entrepreneur is getting the firm back,
if things are going badly the firm remains in a
partial ownership of the partners.
In the classic crediting system, credit
repayment is an act where the obligor is returning
into his possession business assets of the firm.
Until then, in the process of the firm management
creditor was also involved. Restrictive clauses in
the credit agreements are allowing the creditor
to engage more actively in the management of
the project financed, actually at the time when
the entrepreneur is showing that he is not able
to independently manage the project, which is
simply reflected in the fall of value of his business
assets and the fall of share of the entrepreneur

in the financing of the project. The full transfer

of the firm into the ownership of the creditor is
regulated under the bankruptcy or a receivership
procedure. In this manner, creditor is not excluded
from the project management, but is joining the
firm at the right moment.
On the basis of the analysed features we can
note that the Islamic arrangements designed
for long-term financing, and based on the
model of equity investment, are extremely
rigid, not only regarding the choice of the
financing structure. Distribution of profit on
the basis of result achieved implies that it shall
take place at the moment when the financial
basis for distribution (business result) has
been determined, distribution to be made
according to the key determined in advance
and unchangeable for the entire life span of the
project. If in case of necessity to finance company
development, in the meantime there should be
some changes in the financing structure, what
would have to be adjusted is the key itself, which
would always and from the beginning involve
complex negotiations on the relative share
of the (managerial) work and capital. In the
conventional finances this problem does not exist,
as the system of distribution is much simpler:
the share of the creditor in the distribution of
the business result and the company assets is
fixed nominally, and the entire residual amount
belongs to the entrepreneur.
These models remain completely unadjusted
to the needs required for development financing
of dynamic companies. Not only is it impossible
in the meantime for additional financing to
come from external sources, but also the original
form of these arrangements is excluding any reinvestment of the profit made. As the division
of profit, because of the participation of the
managerial work, is not proportional to the
financing structure, any eventual reinvestment
of profit would bring about a reduced share
in the financing structure of the actor who is
exclusively providing capital. The problem of
profit reinvestment in conventional banking
modality of the joint ventures is non existent, as
the structure of profit distribution and covering
of losses is concordant with the capital structure.
In addition, the need for additional financing
can be satisfied by conventional crediting,
which has a different treatment from the equity

bankarstvo 3 2013

Dubai

138

bankarstvo 3 2013

investments, and the reward for the creditor

has the treatment of the financial expenditure
which is excluded from the result achieved, and
does not impact the key for division.

139

Disinvestment of financier and economic

consequences
The proposal for upgrading of the
PLS arrangement, that we have discussed
hereinabove, designates contractually regulated
and gradual disinvestment by the financier,
which proves that flexibility of financial
structure is a necessity well recognised also
in the Islamic systems. In the traditional PLS
arrangements the change of financial structure
is possible only in case of liquidation of the
project, i.e. liquidation of the financed company.
The company would then be sold in its entirety,
or if this should not be economically feasible,
division of its business assets would be made.
In both cases, liquidation of the company can
incur very high costs when an alternative use of
the business assets is not available (Williamson,
1988). Business assets of the company can serve
as basis for the new project and its initiation can
be financed from the beginning.
In the conventional western financial
arrangements the problem is solved through
the transfer of right on to the entrepreneur to
dispose with the residual value of the project
from the moment of full debt repayment (see
Table 1). Hence the continuation of the project,
when one of the financiers is losing interest in
his participation, would be in an additional
investment into the project, but also financing
of the already created projects, which would be
much easier to perform. Conventional financial
arrangements allow very diverse combinations
of debt and equity capital investments in the
financing of real projects, and this differs in
numerous aspects, for example, it is possible
to combine debt with various degrees of
priority or preference. Actually the model of
financing based on combinations between
equity investments and conventional debt
arrangements allows companies to have full
freedom in selection of the financing structure.
In this way the financial structure becomes
an active determinant in the creating of the
company development.
In the Islamic arrangements based on

debt, for example in the financial leasing

arrangement, this problem is solved in the
manner similar to the solution which is
applied on conventional credit financing:
after repayment of the full amount due to the
leasing agent, leasing beneficiary becomes the
proprietor of the subject of leasing. However,
these problems are far more emphatic in the
PLS arrangements. Khan Fahim (1995), when
explaining the sharing of risk in the agent
arrangement and the joint venture arrangement
states that the financier fully absorbs losses
until the completion of the project and repayment
of the sum invested [italics added]. Italics
underline the part of statement which points out
that the author is making an erroneous analogy
between the PLS arrangement and the debt
arrangement. Namely, if the project financing
belongs to the so-called continuous economic
projects, or rather the going concerns, and not
to the single entrepreneurial venture, what
remains problematic is the way to determine
the moment for project termination. In both the
PLS modalities financier of going concerns can
return funds only through the liquidation of
the company. It is not clear who will instigate
company liquidation, and what may serve
as grounds for instigating liquidation. In the
agency arrangement, liquidation may occur
also when it is established that agent had
wrongly managed the project. In such a case,
what is activated during liquidation is the
collateral which is rendering this financing
modality very similar to the modality of
financing private (hedge) funds, with all
the shortcoming and risks involved therein.
Namely, because of the need to protect
information on strategic investments, hedge
funds are characteristic for an extremely nontransparent business operation, high discretion
of its managers and aggressively conceived
structure of managerial rewards and bonuses
linked with results achieved. Conflict of interest
between the principal (financier) and manager
is mitigated with specific options embodied in
financial arrangements. For example, financiers
are guaranteed the right to withdraw a part
or entirety of funds invested, which they
avail themselves of at the first sign of poor
performance. The risk of forcible liquidation
in increasing the risk aversion of managers,

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bankarstvo 3 2013

141

which are then distancing themselves from the

projects, which although feasibly efficient on
long-term basis, over short-term are suffering
poor results (Shleifer, 2000, p. 106).
The PLS financing models have two crucial
shortcomings. Firstly, the company interests
are grossly obstructed if additional financing
is necessary for dynamic development plans.
Companies financed in this manner will not be
able to grow, as they will be prevented by a rigid
financial arrangement. Therefore, figuratively
speaking, what this means is that the boy is
forced to grow while clothed in the same suit
during his entire childhood. Secondly, on
the level of economy, the broad application
of such an arrangement would narrow down
development support for projects where the
funds were initially allocated. New companies
could be financed only from the new bank
sources. Just how much such a concept is an
anachronism is best illustrated by the following
example found in the history of economics.
Namely, the earliest examples of financing
joint business ventures in the Western world
were recorded in the case of the East Indies
British Company. Each venture was financed
from a special capital. Such a financing model
required liquidation of the company, i.e. a
physical division of assets always when it was
necessary for the result of the joint venture to
be divided between the co-owners, and this was
happening at the end of every voyage. The said
company continued to finance itself through
the issue of interim stock certificates, which
referred to special ventures up to 1613 (Lavelle,
2004, p. 30). It is only with the discovery of the
transferability of the equity capital, applied for
the first time in case of the Dutch Company
of the East Indies, that a sharp economic
growth occurred and made the mediaeval city
of Amsterdam to be financial capital of the
Western civilisation (Michie, 2008, p. 25).
The reserves that we have expressed in
this section pertain almost exclusively to the
PLS arrangements. In case of other financial
arrangements it can not be said that they are
conflicting with the practice, although by far
more frequent are those in the case of Islamic

banks. However, the remarks could be focused

here on their dubious grounding on the original
principles of Islam.

Conclusion
The two most often disputed principles
of conventional banking in Islam are the
following: a) the right to return of the given
amount (regardless of the project outcome);
and b) the right of the creditor to receive a fee
which is not predetermined in accordance with
the financial results of the project. However, in
the Islamic financial arrangements based on
debt these two features are not excluded, but
are only concealed. The profit and loss sharing
arrangement includes both of the disputable
elements: it comprises an unconditional return
of funds invested, and a fixed yield for the
financier. The fact that the loan is not granted
in the form of money, but money is given
for purchase of the good which is given on
loan, does not make a substantial difference.
The argument that the bank in commercial
arrangement is exposed to risks, which serves
as justification for prescribing fixed fee for
the bank, is rather a feeble one. The risk of a
possible damage caused to the goods before it is
handed over to the beneficiary may be avoided
by commercial terms, while an inadequate
quality of goods supplied as a rule is avoided
by direct involvement of the beneficiary in the
process of supply. The risks connected with
the goods in the process of its use are further
excluded by contracting collateral.
On the other hand, the arrangements based
on the profit and loss sharing principle remain
sensitive to a number of problems, such as
the problem of an adverse selection, a deviant
attitude of the entrepreneur towards risk, and
other manifestations featuring in the agency
costs, and this much higher than in the case of
a classic credit arrangement. In practice, certain
elements of conventional credit arrangement are
embodied in the Islamic financial arrangements,
in order to mitigate these problems, but this
also renders these arrangements more distant
from their theoretical ideal.