Why was the Provisional Government overthrown by the Bolsheviks

in October 1917?
Arguably the most important event in the political history of the twentieth
century,1 that wrought havoc on modern Europe leaving scars that can still be seen
today. It is therefore crucial to understand exactly what led to the downfall of the
Provisional Government. Its ultimate downfall was inevitable, as the name suggests
the government was after all only supposed to be provisional. However, there is
much historiography on the subject of why the Provisional Government was
overthrown in October 1917 and especially by a minority party like the
Bolsheviks. In August 1913 Lenin estimated party membership as something
between 30,000 and 50,000However, this was probably an exaggeration. 2
Although, Sheila Fitzpatrick identifies a total of 350,000 members, including 60,000
in Petrograd3 by October 1917. Even in 1913 the partys numbers were minute in
comparison to Russias entire population of an estimated 100million. How then
could such a small party gain mass support in little under a year to result in the
upheaval of the Provisional Government? An orthodox Soviet historians account,
may suggest that the Provisional Government was overthrown because it was the
right time for the Great Socialist Revolution. Bolshevism pitted the bourgeois
controllersagainst the proletariat, the class destined to bring about socialism, 4
and had instilled a real understanding of the revolutionary process, furthermore
placing state power in the hands of the working masses. Western historians
however, would argue that the revolution was a chain of unfortunate accidents that
led to the Bolsheviks becoming increasingly popular. After all the years of violence
following the revolution suggests they did not have popular support, if this was the
case why exactly did the Provisional Government collapse?
The precise reasons behind the fall of the Provisional Government have been argued
by many historians such as Robert Service, Edward Acton and Sheila Fitzpatrick
however, the debate now turns to whether this change in authority was inevitable
or just an unfortunate accumulation of events. Acton, for example suggests that
without the warthere would not have been a revolution in Russia; 5 for there
would have been few problems that highlighted the inner flaws of the governmental
1 Wood, A. The Origins of the Russian Revolution: 1861-1917, (London, 1987), p.1.
2 Cliff, T. Lenin 1: Building the Party, 1893-1914, (London, 1975), p.122.
3 Fitzpatrick, S. The Russian Revolution, (Oxford, 1982), p.46.
4 Acton, E. The Revolution and its Historians: the Critical Companion in Context in
Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution: 1914-1921, ed., E. Acton, V.Iu.
Cherniaev, W.G. Rosenberg, (London, 1997), p.6.

system. For although, the war may not have broken out at such a delicate time in
Russias modernisation, one must refute this by suggesting that the war was a mere
catalyst and that revolution would still have been inevitable due to the brewing
social unrest below the surface of the regime.
It is vital to understand the context in which the Revolution occurred. For instance
when the Provisional Government took over from the Romanov dynasty the
economic system was one of particular instability, which was further destabilised by
Russian involvement in the war. In appearance and substance it was modern and
capitalist with a large industrial labour force however eighty percent of the
population still remained overwhelmingly agrarian. 6 As Wood suggests, this
existence of a modern industrial societywith a large, land hungry peasantry
whose economic interests were long neglected by the government is a key factor in
an understanding of the nature of the 1917 Revolution. 7 Another point to make is
the key role the military played, in particular the Russian military was utilised in
maintaining internal order. However, with continued involvement in World War One
it could not be used for this purpose as it had previously for the tsar. Therefore the
Provisional Government, particularly Kerensky, was careful to avoid outright unrest
within the population by attempting to sate demands.
According to Rabinowitch, to understand the dynamics of the October Revolution, it
is essential to take account of the results of the February revolution. 8 Especially
significant was the emergence of two potential governing bodies from the aftermath
of Tsarism. One being the internationally recognised Provisional Government,
initially dominated by liberals, although later encompassing a coalition between
liberals and moderate socialists (Menshevik and SR ministers). The other, the
Soviet, controlled by moderate socialists. The Dual Power situation was instigated
initially as a complementary system to stem political radicalism and it was hoped
that the Soviets support would quell worker, peasant and soldier unrest and
demands.9 Conversely the Dual Power led to increased friction as it became clear
that the Kadets of the Provisional Government had expansionist war aims and the
dual power only served to mask a power vacuum. Furthermore the publication of a
5 Acton, E. The Battleground in The Russian Revolution: the Essential Readings,
ed., M.A. Miller, (Oxford, 2001), p.9.
6 Wood, A. The Origins of the Russian Revolution, p.5.
7 Wood, A. The Origins of the Russian Revolution, p.5.
8 Rabinowitch, A. The October Revolution in Critical Companion to the Russian
Revolution: 1914-1921, ed., E. Acton, V.Iu. Cherniaev, W.G. Rosenberg, (London,
1997), p.81.

note from the Foreign Minister, Milyukov, assuring the Allies that Russia would fight
the war to victory led to angry public protests. 10 As a result of the collaboration
between government and moderate socialists the Bolsheviks were the only political
party with an unswervingly anti-war policy.
Most important to the collapse of the Provisional government was arguably the
mistakes of Minister for War and Prime Minister, Alexander Kerensky. Above all he
was adamant that whilst Britain, France and the USA continued to fight successfully
then Russia should continue its fight on the Eastern Front and so uphold the
Alliance. This fast became unpopular with the Russian population as it also had a
knock-on effect whereby middling and working class people shared the fear that
bread and potatoes might soon become unobtainable. 11 Moreover the cost of living
sharply rose as wage rises did not keep pace with inflation. Due to foreign financial
support becoming increasingly harder to obtain Kerensky was forced to raise money
through circulating more bank notes. This inevitably led to inflation and peasant
unrest as lower harvest yields led to peasants withholding more grain and a
countrywide food shortage. It became increasingly clear to Kerensky that if he was
to begin satisfying demands Russia would need to withdraw from the war. Perhaps
his reluctance or lack of clear strategy to do so led to the collapse of the Provisional
Government. White suggests that most Modern Western Historians have agreed
that the government could not have resolved social problems and won public
confidence without abandoning its own values. 12 Although, it could be debated that
there may have been many times in history when a government has given up its
values in order to retain power; what was to stop them doing precisely that. For one
the Bolshevik party according to Acton became immensely popular and was
confirmed by explosive growth in the partys membership10,000 in February to
some 250,000by October.13 However there were other factors that prevented the
Provisional Government from retaining power, some in the form of political crises.
9 Service, R. The Russian Revolution: 1900-1927, Second Edition, (London, 1991),
p.32.
10 Wood, A. The Origins of the Russian Revolution, p.46.
11 Service, R. A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Putin, (London, 2003),
p.55.
12 White, H in The Provisional Government in Critical Companion to the Russian
Revolution: 1914-1921, ed., E. Acton, V.Iu. Cherniaev, W.G. Rosenberg, (London,
1997), p.391.
13 Acton, E. Rethinking the Russian Revolution, (London, 1990), p.193.

One particularly notable political crisis came in the form of Kerenskys June offensive
at Galicia. It was initially promising yet unsurprisingly transformed into another
military failure after the Russian military was repelled by German forces and
thousands of troops defected or deserted; which consequently resulted in a
disheartened population that was also mentally weakened. Kerensky states that:
Fellow-soldiers you must know that only by a stubborn struggle will you win
Yielding before the troops of the German Emperor, you lost both your land and your
freedom.14 Therefore it may be due to the lack of war morale that soldiers were
encouraged to forgo commands from officers, Bolshevik support was bolstered and
the danger of a counterrevolution appeared to be even increasing. The military
catastrophe was matched by a fresh outbreak of public disorders in Petrograd in July
which according to Wood was the most menacing manifestation of popular
discontent with government since the February Revolution. 15 The July days showed
that both in domestic eyes and in those of foreign powers that the Provisional
Governments power over Russia was seriously challenged and that Russia had
become exhausted militarily.16 The Bolsheviks managed to tailor a mass
demonstration of strength by the Soviet leadership into an expression of underlying
Bolshevik support by use of their slogans Peace, Bread and Land!, however it was
decided that at this point a revolution would be premature. Despite the
governments speed in arresting key socialists such as Trotsky and disbanding
mutinous regiments, problems continued. Rural revolt continued over low grain
prices, in October the state was obtaining only fifty-six percent of the grain
produced.17 In addition industry and the military began to collapse from lack of
foreign funding, which consequently led to rampant inflation upon the governments
decision to circulate more bank notes. With the disbanding of regiments, fewer
sections of the army were available to help contain internal unrest. Coupled with the
reluctance to tackle the land problem, to convene a Constituent Assembly and to
question the war led to the Bolsheviks promise of immediate Peace, Bread and
Land becoming increasingly popular. 18
14 Alexander Kerensky, Manifesto of Russian Council of Workmen and Soldiers, 23 July 1917,
accessed via firstworldwar.com: a multimedia history of world war one, primary documents,
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/calltopower.htm on 28/11/13.

15 Wood, A. The Origins of the Russian Revolution, p.47.

16 Kocho-Williams, A. Russias International Relations in the Twentieth Century,
(Oxon, 2013), p.29.
17 Service, R. A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Putin, p.52.
18 Wood, A. The Origins of the Russian Revolution, p.48.

In addition the appointment of Kornilov was also one that backfired upon Kerensky.
Kornilovs attempt to introduce martial law failed to resonate with a military tired of
war and hungry to return home to the land promised to them. It continued to
highlight Kerenskys poor decision making skills and his inability to judge the mood
of his people. Initially appointed to restore order in the Army, reimpose the
governments authority in the towns at the front[and] to secure a more regular
supply of food,19 Kerensky soon found however, that a coup from the right was upon
him. Misunderstanding between the two men led them to distrust each other,
especially on Kerenskys part who felt threatened by Kornilov. Kerensky had released
political prisoners in August 1917 in order to protect Petrograd from a rightist coup,
amongst them were key Bolshevik figures; on the other hand Kornilov believed that
Kerensky had been kidnapped by the Bolsheviks and were forcing him to withdraw
from the war and so sent troops to Petrograd to protect it from a leftist overtaking. 20
The Bolsheviks part in defending Petrograd was vital to them gaining strong
support. According to Rabinowitch the defeat of Kornilov had the dual effect of
further enhancing the stature of the Bolsheviks at a popular level and providing a
powerful stimulus to the idea of all socialist groups banding together for the success
of the revolution.21
Kerenskys failures although damaging to the Provisional Governments position
could not alone have brought about its entire collapse. Lenins personality and his
efficiency on capitalising upon Kerenskys mistakes created legitimate opposition to
the Provisional Government and provided the proletariat with a viable option of
immediate action. Lenin predicted the Sovietswould be the key institutions in
transferring power from the bourgeoisie to the proletariat. 22 Furthermore
Rabinowitch suggests that Lenin assumed that revolutionary Russian workers,
having helped bring down the regime of Nicholas II, would instinctively see that a
bourgeois government would do no more than the tsarist regime to fulfil their
keenest aspirations.23 In effect they may have concluded that the Provisional
Government was doing no better to fulfil promises than the late Nicholas II and
instead called for All Power to the Soviets in order to see change instigated.
19 Service, R. The Penguin History of Modern Russia: From Tsarism to the TwentyFirst Century, Third Edition, (London, 2009), p.52.
20 Kocho-Williams, A. Russias International Relations, p.29.
21 Rabinowitch, A. The October Revolution, p.83.
22 Fitzpatrick, S. The Russian Revolution, p.44.
23 Rabinowitch, A. The Bolsheviks Come to Power, (New York, 1979), p.xix

Furthermore Lenins April Thesis promised Peace, Bread and Land in essence he
wanted power on the basis that the war was brought to an end, private land
ownership was abolished [with all land being distributed equally], industry
nationalisedand the groundwork laid for socialism. 24 As such this gained a lot of
support with a population tired of a failing and unpopular war. The Bolsheviks
appeared more organised and militant that other political parties, they had also
consolidated their power by gaining support through the soviets through their main
spokesperson, Trotsky. With the [Bolshevik] partys encouragement, garrison
soldiers quickly concluded that history was repeating itselfthe government was
once again bent on stifling the revolution. 25 So great was the mistrust of the
Provisional Governments intentions that the garrisons would not obey orders unless
controlled by the Petrograd Soviet; and by default Trotsky. Trotsky further proved to
be a great asset to the Bolsheviks in overthrowing the Provisional Government as he
co-ordinated the Military Revolutionary Committee. This bodys [The MRCs]
influence of the capitals garrison soldiers made it a perfect instrument to organise
the armed measures for Kerenskys removal.26 By operating through the Military
Revolutionary Committee of the City Soviet allowed Lenin to take control whilst
avoiding The Congress of Soviets who order a coalition be formed with the
moderate socialists. In his Call to Power Lenin suggests that we are confronted by
problems which are not to be solved by conferences or congresses (even
congresses of Soviets), but exclusively by peoples, by the masses, by the struggle
of the armed people.27 It may suggest that Lenin did indeed amass popular support
from below to overthrow the Provisional Government, for example in the factory
committees of Petrograd, the Bolsheviks had assumed a dominant position by the
end of May 1917.28
In conclusion as Acton so simply puts it The Provisional Government failed to solve
the major problems confronting the country and therefore forfeited much of the
24 Acton, E. The Revolution and its Historians: the Critical Companion, p.6.
25 Rabinowitch, A. The October Revolution in Critical Companion to the Russian
Revolution: 1914-1921, ed., E. Acton, V.Iu. Cherniaev, W.G. Rosenberg, (London,
1997), p.88.
26 Service, R. A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Putin, p.61.
27 Lenin, Call to Power, 24 October 1917 accessed via firstworldwar.com: a
multimedia history of world war one, primary documents,
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/calltopower.htm on 28/11/13.
28 Fitzpatrick, S. The Russian Revolution, p.47.

support it had initially enjoyed.29 Taking a look back to the causes of the February
revolution, a pattern may be found which could explain why the government fell. For
instance, Nicholas II and the tsarist autocracy was replaced due to lack of clear
leadership and inability to lead in wartime, plus shortages of food, arms and
ammunition helped to declare that Tsarism was no longer working. In comparison to
that situation, by October 1917, the provisional government had highlighted its
inability to lead in wartime via Kerenskys mistakes, in addition to this food
shortages were striking the country and economic problems in the countryside had
led a majoritively agrarian society to unrest. The Provisional Governments minimal
achievements against these problems perhaps suggest that it was more the
leadership qualities and successes of Lenin and the Bolsheviks that helped to
overthrow the Provisional Government. For example Acton may suggest that liberal
demands were satisfied by freedom of the press, speech, association and religion 30
however, these were all overshadowed by military and social failures. However the
problems they faced were neigh impossible to overcome due to the situation they
bought into. Since the fall of the Romanov dynasty power had been drained from
the government rendering them incapable of fighting off mass demands. In addition
to this the duality of powerand the consequent anarchy prevailing in the country
made its normal existence difficult.31 October 1917 and its revolutionary events
were shaped by a long history of tension between the forces of authoritarian politics
and opposition and resistance from below. As such this perhaps suggests that the
Provisional Government were doomed to inevitable failure as their situation and
structure made it hard to reach decisions and escape the war. On the other hand
pressure grew on the Soviet to take matters into their own hands to combat the
worsening economic and social conditions caused by the war that the Provisional
Government were not openly tackling.
In short the fall of the Provisional Government was inevitable due to the inherent
situation. The fact that they were overthrown by the Bolsheviks in particular leads
something to sheer luck and good timing on the part of Lenin who capitalised on
many of the Provisional Governments mistakes. Furthermore Lenin and Trotsky
made sure Bolsheviks were in positions in which they could alter the status quo
quickly and efficiently when an opportunity presented itself.

29 Acton, E. Rethinking the Russian Revolution, p.129.

30 Acton, E. The Battleground, p.30.
31 Alexander Guchkov on Military and Civil Unrest in Russia, 10 May 1917, accessed
via firstworldwar.com: a multimedia history of world war one, primary documents,
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/calltopower.htm on 28/11/13.

Bibliography
Primary Sources
Alexander Kerensky, Manifesto of Russian Council of Workmen and Soldiers, 23 July 1917,
accessed via firstworldwar.com: a multimedia history of world war one, primary documents,
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/calltopower.htm on 28/11/13.
Lenin, Call to Power, 24 October 1917 accessed via firstworldwar.com: a multimedia history
of world war one, primary documents, http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/calltopower.htm
on 28/11/13.

Secondary Sources
Books
Acton, E. Rethinking the Russian Revolution. London. 1990.
Cliff, T. Lenin 1: Building the Party, 1893-1914. London. 1975.
Fitzpatrick, S. The Russian Revolution. Oxford. 1982.
Rabinowitch, A. The Bolsheviks Come to Power. New York. 1979.
Service, R. The Penguin History of Modern Russia: From Tsarism to the Twenty-First Century.
London. 2009.
Service, R. The Russian Revolution: 1900-1927. Second Ed. London. 1991.
Service, R. A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Putin. New Ed. London. 2003.
Wood, A. The Origins of the Russian Revolution: 1861-1917. London. 1987.

Chapters in edited collections

Acton, E. The Battleground in The Russian Revolution: the Essential Readings, ed., M.,A.,
Miller. Oxford. 2001. p.9-30.
Acton, E. The Revolution and its Historians: the Critical Companion in Context in Critical
Companion to the Russian Revolution: 1914-1921, ed., E., Acton, V.,Iu., Cherniaev, W.,G.,
Rosenberg. London. 1997. p.3-17.
Rabinowitch, A. The October Revolution in Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution:
1914-1921, ed., E., Acton, V.,Iu., Cherniaev, W.,G., Rosenberg. London. 1997. p.81-90.
White, H. in The Provisional Government in Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution:
1914-1921, ed., E., Acton, V.,Iu., Cherniaev, W.,G., Rosenberg. London. 1997. p.391-403.