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White-Paper-Safety-DNA Why Acc at Work Keep Happening
White-Paper-Safety-DNA Why Acc at Work Keep Happening
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2011 SHL
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Risk tolerance is
influenced by deep
dispositions held by
individuals who are
more likely to be
involved in accidents.
Our work clearly shows that risk tolerance is influenced by deep dispositions held
by individuals who are more likely to be involved in accidents. These dispositions
influence the way they feel about risk as well as their perceptions of events which,
in turn, are reflected in the way they behave. Later in this paper we will share case
study materials that will show the relationship between these deeper dispositions
and actual accidents at both the individual and work group levels. For now, we will
explore these dispositions in a little more detail.
Our model of risk tolerance or orientation to safety is founded on five key behaviours.
These behaviours reflect underlying dispositions to take or to avoid risk that relate to
processes, whether the person has the disposition to plan ahead, pay attention to the
detail and to comply with policies and procedures. The model also encompasses the
disposition for someone to consider the impact of their behaviour and approach to
risk on others. This is reflected in providing support to the team or wider work group
and, irrespective of whether the person works alone or not, to keep people informed,
as well as showing responsibility by addressing safety issues and promoting the value
of safety in the workplace and across the organisation.
Figure 1: The Safety Five Behaviours
Processes Behaviours
People Behaviours
Planning ahead
Think forward, anticipate issues and plan for
contingencies
Attention to detail
Check the detail and reward efforts and
achievements for getting quality right
Showing responsibility
Build awareness of responsibility to the
bigger team beyond immediate work tasks
and colleagues
Following procedures
Ensure that procedures and policies are
followed correctly
2011 SHL
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Planning ahead
Think forward, anticipate issues and
plan for contingencies
Attention to detail
Check the detail and reward efforts and
achievements for getting quality right
Following procedures
Ensure that procedures and policies are
followed correctly
People Behaviours
Showing responsibility
Build awareness of responsibility to the
bigger team beyond immediate work
tasks and colleagues
So, have recent organisational safety initiatives already embraced the SHL Safety Five
behaviours? To the extent that they are implicitly providing a basis for feedback and
for safety education, then the answer is maybe. However, in terms of direct and valid
intelligence on these behaviours and what that intelligence says about the people
factor in safety, then, with very few exceptions, the answer has to be no.
Why? Let us take the case of safety surveys. Such surveys will tell us about
how people perceive compliance with safety procedures, how well safety
is communicated within an organisation, and about the commitment that an
organisation is showing to best practice. But the one thing such surveys will not tell
you is how people will act and, directly, the behavioural risks that underlie and drive
risk at the individual and work group levels.
We argue that this direct data not only complements current safety practice and data
gathering in the form of surveys, but actually addresses a blind spot in current safety
practice. To put this argument across, we will now look at two case studies showing
how information on behavioural safety predicts actual accidents and incidents,
and we will follow these case studies with a description of how the data gathered
from a simple and efficient tool can be used to strengthen safety management in
organisations.
2011 SHL
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Those classified as
higher behavioural risk
on the questionnaire
were five times more
likely to be responsible
for a vehicle accident.
If we observe a series of events and the outcomes are that eighty percent of the
time the outcome that we expect happens, then the odds are 80 : 20 or 4 to 1. In
the context of a financial investment, most of us would be happy with an investment
that has those odds and the associated likelihood of providing us with growth in that
financial investment.
Let us come back to safety and ask the question of the odds of an individual, the
potential source of human error, having an accident. Our argument is that, with data
on the dispositions that relate to the Safety Five, you can significantly improve your
knowledge of those odds. The first case study will serve to explain.
A major global provider of security services was concerned about why accidents and
other counterproductive outcomes seemed to be concentrated in some work groups
and not others, despite conducting safety audits and running regular educational and
training programmes.
Following administration of a short behavioural questionnaire3 to a sample
of employees, covering the Safety Five described earlier, the results were
evaluated alongside records of vehicle accidents, attacks on personnel as well as
absenteeism for a six month period. The data showed that those classified as
higher behavioural risk on the questionnaire were five times more likely to
be responsible for a vehicle accident 4, and were three times more likely to
be involved in an attack when compared to the rates for all employees in the
sample. The same high behavioural risk employees were also two and a half times
more likely to have been absent without authorisation in the six month period
examined. In summary, those who were lower on the Safety Five were far more likely
to be a source of accidents and other counterproductive outcomes in the workplace.
The substance of this finding is emphasised when the likelihood of an accident or an
attack is considered. In general, the odds of a vehicle accident were 19 to 1 against
while the odds of an employee experiencing an attack while performing their duties
were 3 to 1 against.
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Odds (A:B)
80%
20%
4:1
All employees
95%
5%
19:1
Attack Incidents
Odds (A:B)
58%
49%
1:1
All employees
74%
26%
3:1
Unauthorised Absences
Zero Absences(A)
Odds(A:B)
80%
20%
4:1
All employees
90%
10%
10:1
%s show the relative proportions for zero versus one or more recorded incidents for each type of incident
and for high behavioural risk versus all employees in the sample. High behavioural risk indicates low scores
on the Safety Five.
So, despite an environment where the chances of an accident were low, and where
the employer pursued an active programme of safety management, staff training and
communication, those lower on the Safety Five were much more likely to be involved
in an accident or an incident.
Why? Further research on the SHL safety model shows that those higher on the
Safety Five are far more likely to take a considered approach to their work and to
safety critical tasks, while those lower on the Safety Five are far more likely to
act impulsively, deviate from procedures and to fail to consider the consequences of
their actions.
We will come back to how the data gathered from such a study can be used to
improve safety management a little later in this paper, and we will now shift the focus
to look at entire populations of employees through a second case study in the oil
and gas industry. This case study focuses on the relationship between the frequency
of behavioural risk at different installations and the history of safety incidents at those
installations.
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Records of 571 incidents gathered over a two year period and classified into low,
medium and high severity by the client were analysed to identify the historical safety
profiles across the three offshore sites. Relatively few incidents were recorded as
high severity, but discussion with the company indicated that many of the medium
risk incidents represented near misses where a higher severity event could have
occurred. Accordingly, incidents were classified into the proportion of medium and
high versus low severity incidents at each site.
Incidents were also examined in terms of whether they affected an asset (e.g. a piece
of equipment) or involved injury to an employee or a contractor. The analysis showed
that the risk profiles across sites remained the same whether the incident data was
broken out into these specific types of incident or grouped into an overall safety
profile. As such, this overall profile was used to evaluate the relationship between
historical risk and behavioural risk across the three sites.
Data on behavioural risk were gathered through an online survey using the SHL
behavioural questionnaire which was well received by employees as indicated by high
completion rates (65% of questionnaires were completed within the first two weeks).
This data covered 195 employees and contractors, and provided information on the
site employed, their job level as well as their job role (i.e. the specialist role in which
they operated).
Figure 4 shows the association found between levels of behavioural risk (the
proportion of respondents classified as higher behavioural risk) and the two year
history of safety incidents at each site (the proportion of medium and high severity
incidents at each site).
At Site B, the odds over two years of a medium to high versus a low risk incident
occurring were approximately 60% : 40% or 1.5 : 1, approaching twice that expected
by chance alone. In contrast, the odds at Site C were essentially the opposite at
30% : 70% or around 1 : 2. Effectively, the odds were 2 : 1 against a medium to high
incident happening at Site C.
The data on levels of behavioural risk showed a clear association with the likelihood
of medium to high risks happening. At Site B, 40% of those surveyed were identified
as high behavioural risk, while at Site C 20% were identified as high behavioural risk.
That is, the odds of an employee or contractor being identified as high behavioural
risk were 2 : 1 at Site B when compared to Site C.
We have since expanded the analysis to show specifically where levels of behavioural
risk sit in the organisation and which behaviours need to be focused on to address
the people risks identified. In the next section of this paper, we will describe how
the data gathered from such a behavioural audit can be used to strengthen an
organisations management of safety and mitigation of the people risks critical to
successful safety management.
2011 SHL
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Figure 4: Case of three North Sea platforms and comparison of behavioural risk
using the SHL safety model and previous two years incidents
60
Will perceptions of
safety actually result in
safe behaviours?
50
40
30
20
10
0
Site A
% behavioural risk
Site B
Site C
% actual safety incidents
2011 SHL
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At the micro level, feedback will be provided to individual work groups and their
managers and supervisors to help them understand the key behaviours they need to
address, and to enable them to develop, commit to, and track progress against.
As shown in the figure 5, the project will provide intelligence that will enable the
organisation to take a holistic and systemic approach to addressing risk tolerance
and safety by addressing how staff are recruited, and where they are assigned and
supervised, by building a clearer behavioural focus into training programmes, as
well as reviewing policies and procedures for potential gaps where key Safety Five
behaviours need greater emphasis. The data will also be used to develop and specify
behaviourally focused safety leadership programmes.
Gather data
and evaluate
Safety culture /
climate survey
SHL Model
Am I encouraged
to be safe?
Am I likely
to act safely?
Action Plan
Staffing
Training
Leadership
Development
Policies and
Procedures
2011 SHL
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Further information
More information on the Dependability and Safety Instrument (DSI) used can
be found via: http://www.shl.com/uk/solutions/products/docs/Fact_SheetDependability_and_Safety1.pdf
The technical manual for DSI can also be accessed and downloaded free of charge
from: http://central.shl.com/en-gb/TheLibrary/Pages/Library.aspx
Please visit our Thought leadership page page on which you will find articles,
manuals as well as access to the presentations that our scientists deliver at
professional events: http://www.shl.com/uk/resources/thought-leadership/
2011 SHL
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References
1.
2.
3.
4.
The odds are worked out from the data shown in Figure 3. For all
employees, the odds of an accident were low at 95 : 5 or 19 : 1.
For the high behavioural risk group low on the Safety Five, the odds
were 80 : 20 or
4 : 1. 19 divided by 4 gives a result that is close to 5 and is why the
high behavioural risk group are seen as five times more likely to be
responsible for an accident.
5.
If you think back to the last case study set in the oil and gas industry,
Site C clearly had stronger sources of behavioural best practice that
could be drawn upon to provide tangible examples to the wider
workforce on effective approaches to safety.
2011 SHL
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