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Contra Eunomium 105-113 One Ought Not To Attribute Greater and Lesser To The Divine Being Including An Elaborated Statemente of Church Doctrine
Contra Eunomium 105-113 One Ought Not To Attribute Greater and Lesser To The Divine Being Including An Elaborated Statemente of Church Doctrine
bodily senses, with reference to which the differences of qualities admit consideration of more and less, since differences of
quantity and quality and other characteristics apply to them.
273 . As to the intelligible nature, the created one I mean, the
sort of principle of differentiation which was perceived in the
case of sensible things cannot operate, but another means is found
for indicating the difference between greater and less.
27( .
Because the fount and origin and supply of every good is
considered to be in the uncreated nature, and the whole creation
inclines towards the good, clasping at and partaking in the
supreme nature through sharing in the first good, it follows of
necessity that in proportion to their participation in the higher
things some receive 11 larger share and others 11 smaller according
to their freely exercised choice, and so more and less are known
in the creation proportionately to the desire of each . 275 . Since
the intelligible nature on the created side stands at _the border
between good things and their opposite, so as to be capable of
receiving either by inclining to those which it prefers, as Cp.1071
we learn from scripture, C336MJ there is room to speak of more
and less in the one who excels in virtue in proportion to his
rejection of the worse and approximation to the better. 276. The
uncreated nature is far away from such 11 distinction, inasmuch as
it does not have good as something acquired, nor does it receive
moral virtue into itself by participation in some higher moral
virtue, but because tt is by nature what goodness is in itself,
and is perceived as goodness, and is attested even by our opponents to be the fount of goodness, simple, uniform and uncompounded. 277 . It has a distinction of its own appropriate to the
majesty of its nature, not thought of in terms of more and less,
as Eunomius supposes; for one who lessens his conception of the
good in any member of the holy Trinity we believe in, will surely
be making out that some of the opposite state has been mixed in
in the case of the one who falls short in goodness, which it is
not pious to hold either about the Onlybegotten or about the Holy
Spirit . Rather, being thought of as in utter perfection and
incomprehensible transcendence, it possesses unconfused and clear
differentiation through the characteristics to be found in each of
the hypostases, being invariable in the common possession of
uncreatedness, and singular in the special characteristics of each.
278 . The particularity attributed to each of the hypostases
plainly and unambiguously distinguishes one from another. Thus
the Father is confessed to be uncreated and unbegot ten, for he is
neither begotten nor created . This uncreatedness therefore he has
in common with the Son and the Cp. 1081 Holy Spirit. But he is
both unbegotten and Father; this is personal and incommunicable,
and it is not perceived in either of the others . 279. The Son is
connected to the Father and the Spirit in uncreatedness, but has
his individuation in being and being called Son and Onlybegot ten,
which does not belong the God over all or of the Spirit. The Holy
Spirit, who has 11 share with the Father and the Son in the
uncreated nature, is again distinguished from them by recognisable
features . His feature and mark is quite uniquely to be none of
those things which reason envisaged as peculiar to the Father and
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the Son.
280. To be neither unbegotten nor onlybegotten, but
certainly to be, provides his special personal difference from the
others mentioned. Connected with the Father in uncreatedness, he
is conversely separated from the Father by not being. Father as he
is. His connexion with the Son in uncreatedness is not continued
when it comes to the personal characteristic, since he did not
come to be onlybegotten from the Father and has been Cp.1091
manifested through the Son himself.
Again, since the creation
came to exist through the Onlybegotten, lest the Spirit be thought
to have anything in common with it because he was manifested
through the Son, the Spirit is distinguished from the creation by
changelessness and immutability and independence of outside goodness. Creation C337MJ does not have changelessness in its nature,
as Scripture says when it relates the fall of Lucifer <Is 14,12>,
of which the Lord also speaks when he tells mysteries to his
disciples: "I saw Satan fallen as lightning from the sky" <Lk
10,18>. What separates him from the creation is the same as what
unites him intimately to the Father and the Son. In the case of
those whose nature admits nothing bad one and the same account
must be given of changelessness and immutability.
282. After these preliminary remarks it is now perhaps time to
examine our opponents account . In his artful statement about the
Son and the Holy Spirit he says, Necessity requires that the
beings are greater and lesser. Let us enquire by what logic he
arrives at the necessity of such a difference, whether some
material comparison has been made between things measured against
each other, or whether it is conceived in terms of the intelligible
as one exceeds or falls short in virtue, or whether it is in the
being itself. 283. In the case of being however it has been shown
by those who are skilled in such philosophy that no difference can
be predicated, if one examines it by itself in accordance with its
own Cp.1101 principle of being, stripped bare of the qualities and
characteristics attributed to it. To conceive such a distinction
in connexion with the Onlybegotten and the Spirit in terms of
success or failure of virtue, and consequently to suppose that the
nature of each of them is necessarily defectible, equally
receptive of opposites and lying on the boundary between good and
its opposite, is utterly profane . 284. One who says this will be
arguing that it is one thing in its own proper definition, and
becomes something else by participation in good and evil. Thus
with iron it happens that, if it associates for a long time with
fire, it takes on the quality of heat, while remaining iron, but if
it gets into snow or ice, it changes its quality towards the prevailing influence, taking the cold of the snow into its own
intimate parts.
285. Therefore , just as we do not give the material the name of
the quality
to the iron, for we do not call something
fire or water because it has been affected by one of these, so if
it be gnnted that, as the impious argue , in the case of the
lifegiving power goodness does not essentially inhere in it, but
that it is acquired by participation, it will no longer have the
right to be called by the title the gqod , but such an understanding will demand some other conception, such that goodness is
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