RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Criminal Due Process [Sec 14 (1), Article III]

Galman v. Sandiganbayan (2nd MR)
Facts: Ninoy was assassinated, together with his suspected
assassin Rolando Galman. Immediately thereafter, Pres.
Marcos orderedan investigation for which he formed a 5member Fact Finding Board (a.k.a. Agrava Board)
Said Agrava Board conducted hearings and received
evidenceregarding the assassinations. Upon resolution, it
submitted 2reports to Pres. Marcos
(1) Minority Report (solely writtenand subscribed to by
Board Chairman Agrava); and
(2) Majority Report (subscribed to by the remaining 4
membersof the Board)
Both reports rejected the militarys version of what took
place during the assassination.
Both reports instead found:
(1) that Galman was not an NPA-hired assassin and that he
was not theassassin period;
(2) that only the soldier-escorts in thestaircase with Ninoy
could have shot him; and
(3) that the same escorts gunned down Galman to be their
fall guy
The only difference between the 2 reports is that the
majorityreport found all 26 private respondents of this case
(headed byAFP Chief Gen. Fabian Ver) to be involved in the

militaryconspiracy to assassinate Ninoy

indictable for his and Galmans killing

and

therefore

Chairman Agravas minority report, on the other hand,

would exclude 19 of herein named private respondents and
limit culpability to the 6 soldiers who were on the service
stairs with Ninoy.
Curious enough, the minority report was submitted one
dayahead of the majority report. Said minority report was
receivedcongenially and cordially by Pres. Marcos, forthwith
referringit to the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) for final
resolutionthrough the legal system and for trial in the
Sandiganbayan.
The majority report, submitted the next day, was
coldlyreceived by Marcos, to which he paid practically no
attention
Despite Pres. Marcoss initial order, the Tanodbayan filed
charges against all 26 herein private respondents
(consistent with
the
majority
report)
before
the
Sandiganbayan
But before the Sandiganbayan could hand down the verdict
inthe
Ninoy-Galman
double
murder
case,
herein
petitioners(heirs of Galman PLUS epals, e.g. Fr. Bernas,
Mareng Winnie,Frank Chavez, Cecilia Munoz-Palma, JBL
Reyes, etc) filed thispresent action for certiorari and
prohibition alleging that public respondents (Tanodbayan
and
Sandiganbayan)committed
serious
irregularities
constituting mistrial andresulting in miscarriage of justice
and gross violation of theconstitutional rights of the
sovereign people of the Philippinesto due process of law
Petitioners prayed:

(1) for a TRO to restrain theSandiganbayan from rendering a

decision on the merits of theNinoy-Galman criminal case;
(2) for declaration of a mistrialand nullifying the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan; and
(3) ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by
anunbiased prosecutor
Petitioners principally argued that the Tanodbayan did
not represent the interest of the people when he failed to
exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and
important testimonial and documentary evidence for the
prosecution andthat the Sandiganbayan Justices were
biased, prejudiced andpartial in favor of the accused.
The Court initially granted TRO but later resolved to lift
thesame and dismiss the instant petition. With the lifting of
theTRO, the Sandiganbayan was able to render its
verdict 2 acquitting all the accused of the crime charged,
declaring theminnocent and totally absolving them of any
civil liability.
while the Sandiganbayan acquitted all the named accused
in thecriminal case, it convicted the very victim Rolando
Galman (whowas not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy
contrary to theinformation presented before it!
Petitioners filed for an MR. But due to the verdict of
acquittal,the Court agreed with respondents that the case
has beenrendered moot and academic, hence the MR was
denied
Later, one of the Deputy Tanodbayans who prosecuted
theNinoy-Galman case (i.e. Manuel Herrera) wrote a tell-all
published in the Manila Times entitled Aquino Trial a Sham

where he revealed several orders 3 from Pres. Marcos to

theTanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan Justices to
whitewash thecriminal cases and produce a verdict of
acquittal.
On the basis of such startling revelations, herein
petitionersfiled their 2nd MR, which the Court admitted.
Respondents opposed 2nd MR interposing double jeopardy as
specialdefense. Respondents also questioned the remedy
beingsought by petitioners, they allege that petitioners
remedy isa direct action to annul the judgment where the
burden of proof falls upon them to establish by clear,
competent andconvincing evidence the cause of the nullity.
ISSUES:
1. WON Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed
seriousirregularities constituting mistrial and gross
violation of theconstitutional rights of the sovereign
people of thePhilippines to due process of law [YES]
2. WON double jeopardy has attached in favor of accused
[NO]
3. WON the proper remedy was a direct action to
annuljudgment [NO]
HELD:
Petitioners' 2nd MR is GRANTED. Judgment is herebyrendered
nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and
its judgment of acquittal and ordering a RE-TRIAL of the said
cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch
and with careful regard for the requirementsof due process,
so that the truth may be finally known and justice done.
Against Self-Incrimination (Section 17, Article III)
Pp v. Rondero

FACTS: The accused was seen by the victims father with an

ice pick and washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9
year old victim was later found dead and half naked with
lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. He was convicted of
homicide only. For his conviction, several circumstantial
pieces of evidence were submitted including strands of his
hair for comparison with the strands of hair found in the
victims right hand at the scene of the crime as well as
blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from his
house. The accused-appellant avers the acquisition of his
hair strands without his express written consent and without
the presence of his counsel, which, he contends is a
violation of his Constitutional right against self-incrimination
under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to
wit:
Sec. 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or
any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness

against himself.
ISSUE: WON the evidence gathered, particularly accusedappellants hair strands can be admitted as evidence
against him
HELD: Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is
actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the accusedappellant and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when
it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the
body of the accused may be received as evidence in
prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced
out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as
evidence against him. Consequently, although accusedappellant insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from
him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the
hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him,
forwhat is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or
any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress.
On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short
pants taken from the accused are inadmissible in evidence.
They were taken without the proper search warrant from the
police officers. Accused-appellants wife testified that the
police officers, after arresting her husband in their house,
took the garments from the clothesline without proper
authority. This was never rebutted by the prosecution. Under
the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the fruit of the
poisonous tree, evidence illegally obtained by the state
should not be used to gain other evidence because the
illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently
obtained. Simply put, accused-appellants garments, having

been seized in violation of his constitutional right against

illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as
evidence.
Pp v. Gallarde
Facts: Radel Gallarde was charged with the special complex
crime of rape with homicide. Hewas accused of causing such
harm to a ten year old Editha Talan, since according
towitnesses, he was the last person seen talking to the
child, the night before herdeath. Also, the when they were
looking for her, Gallarde was seen several meterswhere
Editha's slipper was found, with his hands and knees
covered with soil. Thechild's body was later found in the
same area.During trial, the court rejected photographs of
Gallarde immediately after the incidenton the ground that
"the same were taken while was already under the mercy of
thepolice." Still, based on circumstantial evidence, he was
convictedof the crime of murder only, not of the complex
crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of
carnal knowledge.
Issue: WON Gallarde's constitutional right against selfincrimination was violated.
Held: No. The taking of pictures of an accused even without
the assistance of counsel,being a purely mechanical act, is
not a violation of his constitutional right against selfincrimination.The constitutional right of an accused against
self-incriminationproscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from theaccused and
not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be
material. Purelymechanical acts are not included in the
prohibition as the accused does not therebyspeak his guilt,
hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not
required. Theessence of the right against self-incrimination

is testimonial compulsion, that is, thegiving of evidence

against himself through a testimonial act.
Custodial Rights (Section 12, Article III)
Miranda v. Arizona
Brief Fact Summary. The defendants offered incriminating
evidence during police interrogations without prior
notification of their rights under the Fifth Amendment of the
United
States
Constitution
(the
Constitution).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Government authorities need to
inform individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional
rights prior to an interrogation following an arrest.

Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme

Court) consolidated four separate cases with issues
regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained during
police
interrogations.
The first Defendant, Ernesto Miranda (Mr. Miranda), was
arrested for kidnapping and rape. Mr. Miranda was an
immigrant, and although the officers did not notify Mr.
Miranda of his rights, he signed a confession after two hours
of investigation. The signed statement included a statement
that Mr. Miranda was aware of his rights.
The second Defendant, Michael Vignera (Mr. Vignera), was
arrested for robbery. Mr. Vignera orally admitted to the
robbery to the first officer after the arrest, and he was held
in detention for eight hours before he made an admission to
an assistant district attorney. There was no evidence that he
was notified of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.

The third Defendant, Carl Calvin Westover (Mr. Westover),

was arrested for two robberies. Mr. Westover was questioned
over fourteen hours by local police, and then was handed to
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, who were
able to get signed confessions from Mr. Westover. The
authorities did not notify Mr. Westover of his Fifth
Amendment constitutional rights.
The fourth Defendant, Roy Allen Stewart (Mr. Stewart),
was arrested, along with members of his family (although
there was no evidence of any wrongdoing by his family) for
a series of purse snatches. There was no evidence that Mr.
Stewart was notified of his rights. After nine interrogations,
Mr. Stewart admitted to the crimes.
Issue. Whether the government is required to notify the
arrested defendants of their Fifth Amendment constitutional
rights against self-incrimination before they interrogate the
defendants?
Held. The government needs to notify arrested individuals
of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, specifically:
their right to remain silent; an explanation that anything
they say could be used against them in court; their right to
counsel; and their right to have counsel appointed to
represent them if necessary. Without this notification,
anything admitted by an arrestee in an interrogation will not
be admissible in court.
Dissent. Justice Tom Clark (J. Clark) argued that the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the Constitution would apply to interrogations. There is not
enough evidence to demonstrate a need to apply a new rule
as
the
majority
finds
here.
The second dissent written by Justice John Harlan (J.
Harlan) also argues that the Due Process Clauses should

apply. J. Harlan further argues that the Fifth Amendment rule

against self-incrimination was never intended to forbid any
and all pressures against self-incrimination.
Justice Byron White (J. White) argued that there is no
historical support for broadening the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution to include the rights that the majority extends
in their decision. The majority is making new law with their
holding.

Discussion. The majority notes that once an individual

chooses to remain silent or asks to first see an attorney, any
interrogation should cease. Further, the individual has the
right to stop the interrogation at any time, and the
government will not be allowed to argue for an exception to
the notification rule.

Pp v. Lucero
Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted for robbery with
homicide.
While
he
was
in custodial investigation
the accused cannot afford a lawyer thus one was provided
for him in the person of Atty. Peralta as his counsel. Counsel
explained to the accused his constitutional rights but Atty.
Peralta observed no reaction from the accused. He left to
attend the wake of a friend and the police authorities
started to take statements from the accused. Apparently
during the custodial investigation no counsel was around
whileaccused gave his extrajudicial confession which was
used against him as evidence in court and merit his
conviction.

Issue: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of

the accused may
be
admissible
during
the
trial.

wanted from the house, in addition to giving them

P100,000.00 after one month from the killing of Estrellita.

Held: Appellant's
extrajudicial

Two of the accused, Reyes and Lara, gave their sworn

statement detailing what transpired from the planning until
the
execution
of
the
crime.

conviction

cannot

be

based on his
confession.

The constitution requires that a person under investigation

for the commission of a crime should be provided with
a counsel. This is a constitutional guarantee to protect
the accused against the hostility and duress from the
authorities during custodial investigation. Any confession or
statement made without the presence of a counsel during
the investigation is deemed to be inadmissible as evidence
in court. It appears that when the accused was taken with
his statements his counsel was not around. Therefore his
extrajudicial confession cannot be used as evidence against
the accused during his trial. The court erred in admitting it
as evidence and as a basis of conviction therefore
the accused is acquitted.

Relying on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and

on the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution,
the trial court found Suarez, Reyes and Lara guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
While Suarez and Reyes have already accepted the trial
court's verdict, Lara now questions the lower court's
decision by challenging the admissibility of their
extrajudicial declarations. He claims that their extrajudicial
confessions were obtained through force and intimidation
and without the benefit of an effective counsel.

ISSUES: WON accused Laras extrajudicial confessions were

freely and voluntary given and without the benefit of an
effective
counsel.
Pp v. Suarez
FACTS: On or about the 8th day of December, 1987 in the
Municipality of Pasig, Estrelita Guzman was robbed and was
killed
in
her
own
house.
Suarez wanted his aunt killed so that he and his wife,
Marivic Suarez, also the victims adopted daughter, could
get at once any property that Marivic might inherit from
Estrellita upon the latter's death. In exchange for the job,
Suarez would allow the other accused to steal what they

HELD: After a thorough review of the records of the case,

we agree with the lower court's factual finding and
conclusion that the extrajudicial confessions of accused
Reyes and appellant Lara were freely and voluntarily given
and that their retraction and claims of violence and coercion
were merely belated contrivances and efforts at exculpation.
Their claim that they were forced to sign their respective
statements was sufficiently refuted by the witnesses for the
prosecution who were present on the day and time the duo
gave and signed their sworn statements.

We find no merit in herein appellant's contention that Atty.

Saunar was not Reyes' own choice as counsel for the
interrogation. While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases
where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford
the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he
may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another
one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed
engaged by the accused where he never raised any
objection against the former's appointment during the
course of the investigation and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the
swearing officer.
Here, while the lawyers of the accused were provided by the
NBI, the accused never signified their desire to have a
lawyer of their own choice. Thus, we also disagree with
appellant's claim that the lawyer who assisted him in his
waiver came in only after he had executed his waiver. His
own statements show that he waived his rights in the
presence and with the advice of Atty. Rodolfo Dahiroc.
Bail (Section 13, Article III)
Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile
FACTS: The case is an application for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 14 detainees. Sabino
Padilla and 8 others out of the 14 detainees were then
having a conference in the dining room at Dr. Parong's
residence. Prior thereto, all the 14 detainees were under
surveillance as they were then identified as members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines. engaging in subversive
activities. They were arrested and later transferred to a
facility only the PCs know, hence, the present petition of
Josefina, mother of Sabina, for writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE:Whether or not the arrests done to the present

detainees
are
valid
HELD: The suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus raises a political, not a judicial, question and that the
right to bail cannot be invoked during such a period. PD
1836 and LOI 1211 have vested, assuming a law is
necessary, in the President the power of preventive arrest
incident to the suspension of the privilege of the writ. In
addition, however, it should be noted that the PCO has been
replaced by Preventive Detention Action (PDA) pursuant to
PD 1877. As provided for in the said decree, a PDA
constitute an authority to arrest and preventively detain
persons committing the aforementioned crimes, for a period
of one year, with the cause or causes of their arrest
subjected to review by the President or the by the Review
Committee created for the purpose.
Yap v. CA
Facts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of
abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two
resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at
P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of
residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts
equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of
estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision
mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year for each
additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case
shall it exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of
appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under
the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings.

Issue: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accuseds

bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel?
Held: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render
meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances of
this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been
imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight,
particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order
and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any
change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an
increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal
may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount
at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and
constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.
Right to be Heard (Sec. 14 (2), Art. III); to be
Informed of the Nature and Cause of the Accusation
Pp v. Alcalde
Facts: ARNEL convicted of two counts of parricide
committed against his wife and his 11-month-old son and
two counts of frustrated parricide committed against his two
daughters.
Upon his arraignment, ARNEL, who was assisted by a
counsel de parte, acted strangely in a manner as if he [was]
out of touch with the world and would not utter any word.
The trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty in each of
the cases. On the same occasion, the defense waived pretrial. The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried.

After the prosecution finally rested its case, Defense counsel

for ARNEL, Atty. Vasquez Sr., informed the trial court of his
inability to communicate with ARNEL because of ARNELs
out of touch of the world behavior. Atty. Vasquez
manifested that the defense was constrained to submit the
case for decision.
In these cases neither accused nor his counsel de parte
asked for the suspension of the arraignment on the ground
of mental incapacity. The OSG maintains that such failure
was tantamount to an admission that ARNEL was not
suffering from any mental disorder or to a waiver of the right
to move for suspension of arraignment.
ISSUE: Whether or not ARNELs arraignment was valid (as
he was in a questionable mental state).
Held: Invalid.
It must be recalled that ARNELs arraignment was on 22
October 1997. At the time, what was applicable was Section
12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Nowhere in that Section was it required that a motion by the
accused be filed for the suspension of arraignment. Hence,
the absence of such motion could not be considered a
waiver of the right to a suspension of arraignment.
Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which was invoked by the OSG, requires a motion by the
proper party. This new requirement of motion by the proper
party could not be applied to these cases because the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which prescribes such
requirement, took effect only on 1 December 2000.
Besides, a waiver must be knowingly and intelligently made
by the person possessing such right. Unfortunately, ARNEL
was apparently deprived of such mental faculties. Thus, no
waiver, impliedly or expressly, could have been made by

ARNEL at the time of his arraignment by reason of his

mental condition.

The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and

cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of Rights
carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey
to the accused the information to enable him to effectively
prepare for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair
trial. While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of
mental deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to
justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be
fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with
the assistance the law secures or gives
Even if Atty. Vasquezs zeal for ARNELs cause fell short of
that required of him, that is, for him to have asked the court
to suspend the arraignment of ARNEL on the ground of the
latters unsound mental health, the greater demand of due
process overwhelms such inadequate zeal.
Speedy Trial (read RA 8493, the Speedy Trial Act of
1998)
Perez v. Estrada
FACTS:

13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa

Pilipinas sent a request letter to SC for media
coverage of the Plunder Trial of former President
Estrada in the Sandiganbayan.
Less than a month later, Cesar Sarino sent a 2nd
letter to CJ Davide for the same request, later
followed suit by Sen. Cayetano and Atty. Ricardo
Romulo.

12 days later, Sec. Nani Perez, Secretary of Justice,

filed this petition to allow "Radio and Television
Coverage of the Court Hearings on the Plunder and
Other Criminal Cases of Joseph Estrada" alleging
that:
o

the foregoing criminal cases involve the

previous acts of the former highest official in
the land et al, and therefore it cannot be
overemphasized that the prosecution thereof,
definitely involves a matter of public concern
and interest, or a matter over which the whole
citizenry has a right to be aware of.

that the constitutional right of the people to

be informed on matters of public concern can
best be recognized, served and satisfied by
allowing the media coverage of the said trial.

media coverage will also serve the dual

purpose of ensuring the desired transparency
in the administration of justice in order to
show the supporters of the past regime that
there will be no attempt whatsoever to
"railroad" the instant criminal cases against
the former President, despite all unfounded
notions.

In effect, the petition is asking for a re-examination

of the resolution of the COurt in this matter, in a case
of libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino,
which in part read, "The records of the Constitutional
Commission are bereft of discussion regarding this
matter of cameras in the courtroom. Similarly,

Philippine courts have not had the opportunity to rule

on the question squarely."
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT TELEVISION AND
COVERAGE OF THE PLUNDER CASES BE ALLOWED.

RADIO

RULING: NO.

In Estes v. Texas, US SC held that television coverage of

judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of due
process rights of the criminal defendant:
"witnesses might be frightened, play to the cameras,
become nervous. they are then subject to extraordinary
out-of-court influences that might affect their testimony."
"telecasting increases the trial judge's responsibility to
avoid actual prejudice to the defendant.
"for the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental
harrassment and subjects him to excessive public
exposure and distracts him from an effective
presentation of his defense."
"finally, the television camera is a powerful weapon
which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an
accused and his case in the eyes of the public."
the right of people to information does not prescribe that
TV cameras be installed in the courtroom. this right
might be fulfilled by less distracting, degrading and more
judicial means.
in a criminal case, a life is at stake, and the due process
rights of the accused shall take precedence over the
people's right to information. the accused has the right
to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to
make, because it is his life and liberty that is in the
balance.
a public trial is not the same as a publicized trial.
IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion
of the witness intended to ensure a fair trial...could allow

the 'hooting throng' to arrogate upon themselves the

task of judging the guilt of the accused...will not
subserve the ends of justice, but will only pander to the
desire of publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers."
court is not unmindful of the recent technological
advances but to chance forthwith the life and liberty of
any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even
before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns
heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too
high to pay.

Prohibited Punishments (Sec. 19)

Echegaray v. Secretary
Facts: The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of
petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the
10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse. The
supreme penalty of death was to be imposed upon him. He
then filed motion for recon and a supplemental motion for
recon raising constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and
the death penalty for rape. Both were denied. Consequently,
Congress changed the mode of execution of the death
penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed
Republic Act No. 8177, designating death by lethal injection.
Echegaray filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out
the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it
constituted 1. cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, 2.
Being violative of due process, 3. a violation of the
Philippines obligations under international covenants, 4. an
undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an
unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to
legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by

the Secretary of Justice. In his motion to amend, the

petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has
already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty
Law, and has declared that the death penalty is not cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by
lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the
questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the
most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and
easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); in
addition to that, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the
imposition of the death penalty.
Issues:
1.
Is the lethal injection a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment?
2.
Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3.
Is it discriminatory (pertaining to sec 17)?
Held: 1. No 2. Yes 3rd. Petition denied.
1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection
constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment
because (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be
used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each
drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering
said drug/s into the accused; (2) its implementing rules are
uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of
notification, the court which will fix the date of execution,
which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for
the convict; and (3) the possibility of mistakes in
administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently
cruel. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death

penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman

punishment. In Harden v. Director of Prisons- punishments
are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but
the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of
that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than
the mere extinguishment of life. Would the lack in
particularity then as to the details involved in the execution
by lethal injection render said law cruel, degrading or
inhuman? The Court believes not. Petitioner contends that
Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which court will
fix the time and date of execution, and the date of execution
and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner
already knows, the court which designates the date of
execution is the trial court which convicted the accused. The
procedure is that the judgment is entered fifteen (15) days
after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records
are remanded to the court below including a certified copy
of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any
uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of
notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the
implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last
sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that
the death sentence shall be carried out not earlier than one
(1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time
the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and
executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President
of his executive clemency powers at all times. Hence, the
death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months
from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty
became final and executor wherein he can seek executive
clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.
Petitioner also contends that the infliction of wanton pain
in case of possible complications in the intravenous injection
that respondent Director is an untrained and untested

person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal

injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel,
degrading
and
inhuman
punishment.
This
is
unsubstantiated. First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor
presented evidence that lethal injection required the
expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel
and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or
ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United
States wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly
resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict,
without any other evidence whatsoever. Second. Petitioner
overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177
which requires that all personnel involved in the execution
proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of
such task. We must presume that the public officials
entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty will
carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment. Third. Any
infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in
carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall
within the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. In a limited sense,
anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress,
and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the
convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of
course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this
reason, is to go unpunished. The cruelty against which the
Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in
the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering
involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely.
2. Violation of international treaties? In countries which have
not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with
the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime

and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant

and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out
pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent
court. The punishment was subject to the limitation that it
be imposed for the most serious crimes. Included with the
declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming
at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the
General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines
neither signed nor ratified said document.
3. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing
Rules is unconstitutional for being discriminatory. SEC. 17.
SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE.
Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a
woman within the three years next following the date of the
sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over
seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death
penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40
of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner contends that Section
17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be
suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A.
No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be
inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one
(1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy
years of age. While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends
the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is
pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of
the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period
following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is
suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence

no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code

as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman
is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioners view,
tantamount to a gender-based discrimination. Being an
implementing rule, Section 17 must not override, but
instead remain.
Double Jeopardy (Sec. 21)
Olaguer v. Military Commision
Facts: In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by
military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong
Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were
charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and
incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President
and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinatecabinet
members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente
Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo
Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine
buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez,
Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian
Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,
and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners
went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition
and habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be
granted.
HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and
academic because by the time the case reached the SC

Olaguer and his companions were already released from

military confinement. When the release of the persons in
whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was
filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ
becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein
petitioners have been released from their confinement in
military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for
having become moot and academic. But the military court
created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it
rendered) still continues to subsist.
ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a
military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the
civil courts are open and functioning.
HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions
rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the
period of martial law in all cases involving civilian
defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law,
over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as
long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that
any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is
null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
military tribunal concerned.