Colloquium 4

Stoker G. (1995)
Regime Theory and Urban Politics
Regime theory gives us a new approach to the study of Urban Politics and the issue of power.
It provides us a framework to understand causal relationships and behaviour in urban politics.
Regime theory focuses on the cooperation and coordination of governmental and nongovernmental actors and their interdependence. In spite of differences between countries,
any advanced capitalist society needs some form of public/private cooperation in a moment
when the competition between cities for investment, decentralization of responsibilities,
financial problems or privatization of services have created many complexities in local
governments.
Regime theory provides a new perspective on the issue of power, and how is power applied
for achieving common purposes. Regime analysis focuses on the conditions which make longterm coalition emerge to achieve public purposes.
Regime theory; pluralism and neo-pluralism
Regime theory assumes that governmental institutions are subject to some degree of popular
control, while economy is mainly (not exclusively) guided by private investments decisions.
Regime theory have influence of neo Marxist (70s), who say that private business have
control over investment decisions. This control over gives them a privileged position in
governmental decision-making Systemic power.
The main premise of regime theory is that public decision-making have certain degree of
autonomy, but systemic power has influence in the process. This organisation of politics leads
to an inadequate forms of control and makes governments less responsible of disadvantaged
groups.
Regime theory has also influence of neo-pluralists, who accept the privileged position of
business, and this position limits effective democratic politics.
The contribution of regime theory
Regime theory starts approaching four questions from the side of pluralism strains:
1.
2.
3.
4.

What
What
What
What

are the implications of social complexity for politics?

has the advantage position of some 'interests' of the urban effect on politics?
forms of power dominate urban governance?
role is there for democratic politics and the role of disadvantaged groups?

Regime theory offers different answers to these questions and provides a framework for
analysis to examine the variety of politics within cities.
Clarence Stone: He applied in an advanced way regime analysis. But his main ideas are
related to details of his study case of Atlanta, and have an exclusive focus in the USA.
In regime perspective, complexity is in the centre. Urban Systems are characterized by
complex relationships between different actors and institutions, patterns of interdependence,
fragmentation and lack of coordination. This kind of society doesnt tend to auto-control. A
large domain is needed and only some segments of the society can take this social control.
Regime politics study how those segments of the society combine forces for a significant
result.
Because of this fragmentation and complexity, government cannot act as a controller. It can
act as a coordinator of forces. This activity of coordination is the objective of the regime

analysis. Sometimes, the government can impose its decision, some other times has to
negotiate it (bargaining) as a part of urban politics. Urban politics is making general objectives
and look for cooperation to make those objectives be achievable. Government needs nongovernmental actors, and this is the point. So governments and actors make regimes to
facilitate this activity.
Relationships within regimes tend to be long-term relationships, because politics is not issueby-issue. Those relationships need efforts to be built.
Politics is about achieving governing capacity, and this capacity have to be created and
maintained. Power to, no power over: The important is not the power to control (power over).
The important is the power to act (power to).
Urban regime theory argued that not all the groups are capable to exercise control. The
structure of society privileges the participation of certain interests in coalitions. There are
requirements: 1) possession of strategic knowledge of social transactions, and 2) control of
resources that makes a group attractive for a coalition.
In US-based literature, there are identified 2 main actors: public official and business. But
there are other groups with community interests based on minorities. But a 4 th collective of
actors, such are the professional/technical collective (like planners?) may be influential,
especially in Europe but also in USA.
Regime theory focuses in the relationships within the government, not between government
and citizens. When coalitions work, power is applied and doesnt matter if citizens agree or
not with this situation.
Regime theory gives also importance to elections and participation processes. When there are
social movements against the established agenda or when incorporate marginal groups.
The main task of regime formation is achieve a shared purpose and direction, so coalition
must agree about what is possible to achieve and what no, and what is possible depends of
the sources. Objectives more easily achievable will be over those who are more difficult to
achieve. A successful governing coalition must be able to mobilize enough sources to develop
their agenda the iron law (Stone 1993).
As more changes proposed, more sources mobilization is required. In American cities 4
different regimes can be found:
-

Maintenance regimes: No many changes. Task focused in routine service delivery.

Development regimes: Those kinds of regimes try to promote growth, so more
resources are required because agendas include more changes.
Middle-class progressive regimes: They want to achieve environmental protection
and overgrowth control, or bring the gains of growth to the community. The main task is
regulation.
Lower class opportunity expansion regimes: These regimes require mass
mobilisation, resources and coordination. Often absent in America.

Stones region theory argues that public policies are shaped by three factors:
1) Composition of the governing coalition of the society
2) The relationship between the members of this coalition government
3) The resources that the members of this coalition government contributions:

The application of regime theory.

Here is the Atlanta case. Difficult to make a summary about that.
Criticisms and developments

Regime approach distinct between 4 different kinds of power:

1) Systemic power: Actors can influence the decision making because of their privileged
position: Business, for instance, control investments, so they have access to decisionmaking process. It reflects the advantage or disadvantage of certain groups just for the
position occupied.
2) Command or social control: Less positional, bur more active in mobilisation of
resources to achieve some interest. It has only a limited domain in only some issues
and policies.
3) Coalition power: Often unstable coalition related to some specific goals trough
bargaining.
4) Pre-emptive: Its the grand contribution of Regime Theory. A leadership is needed to
build a long-term regime and capacity of govern. Is a result of group interests, not
ideology. Being in a regime makes improve its strategic position and control over
resources. Also need to attract participants, offering advantages
The real need to put regimes in context:
Urban regime analysis holds that public policies are shaped by the composition, relationships
and resources of the governing coalition. Socioeconomic environment frames the possible
options to governing coalitions. One of the problems of urban regime theory is that the model
needs a context because agents are too close to the action. In particular areas, some ideas
become dominant, this domination of some ideas can made some groups more capable to
build coalitions.
The need explain regime continuity and change.
Regimes are dynamic. Socioeconomic environment changes and thos change affect the
internal dynamics of coalitions. The stability of the regime depends of the solutions to
problems adopted, so new problems need new ideas that can attract more participants in the
regime.
There is a proposed model of regime transition (Orr and Stoker, 1994) through 3 steps:
1) Stablished regime is questioned in front of its capacity and goals when thare are
changes in environment. Doubts may lead in conflict and new potential leaders may
appear.
2) The purpose of the regime is redefined to see new policy directions. Is a period of
uncertainty, debate and conflict between actors, who can look for other new actors to
support new ideas.
3) Institutionalisation of the new regime.
Conclusion:
Regime theory contributes to the study of urban politics providing a framework for analysis
focusing in important aspects. Power is seen as a n issue of social control and is defined as
the ability to make another do anything that otherwise would not do. Politics is not only
domination, social domination (command power) has a cost, so no all the groups can
dominate limited actions.

Mossberger, K. & G. Stoker (2001)

The Evolution of Urban Regime Theory: The Challenge of Conceptualization
The purpose of this article is to re-establish the core components of the Urban Regime theory
and to identify the key fields where the theory has made a contribution. This is done by
studying a lot of literature who applied the theory.
The Urban regime theory is from origin a tool to explain public and private-sector relationships
in American cities. The theory has been used on different settings: regional level, sub city

level, and even in neighbourhood level. The concept has been used to examine whether or
how various interests are incorporated into governing coalitions (women, lesbians and gays,
African-Americans, neighbourhoods and the black middle class). Later the Regime analysis
has been used in new settings and for answering new questions. The authors of this article
want to examine and give critique on the use of the regime theory in this article.
Regime theory is more a concept or a model rather than a theory because it has limited ability
to explain or predict variation in regime formation, maintenance, or change. Later some
modifications has been proposed to give the model more prediction and explanation power.
This can also be done by comparing different cases. For example, the urban regime concept
does not explain regime change, but a cross-case analysis reveals that regime formation and
change is related to demographic shifts, economic restructuring, federal grant policies and
political mobilization. The urban regime concept has developed through case studies.
The genius of the concept is its synthesis of elements of political economy, pluralism, and
institutionalism. This synthesis, however, creates complexity. The authors use Stones (1989)
main ideas to examine the conceptualization of urban regimes.

SPECIFYING THE MAIN IDEAS

Regime analysis views power as fragmented and regimes as the collaborative
arrangements through which local governments and private actors assemble the
capacity to govern. The primary reason for the fragmentation of power is the division
of labour between market and state. Both local government and business possess
resources needed to govern (legitimacy and policy-making authority, for example, in
the case of government, and capital that generates jobs, tax revenues, and financing,
in the case of business).
The focus in regime analysis is on the internal dynamics of coalition building or on
informal modes of coordination across institutional boundaries. These internal
dynamics can be understood using the social production model of power. Stone
described the political power sought by regimes as the power to or the capacity to
act, rather than power over others or social control. Achieving the capacity to act is
by no means certain; cooperation needs to be created and maintained. Regimes
overcome problems of collective action and secure participation in the governing
coalition through the distribution of selective incentives such as contracts, jobs, and
facilities for a particular neighbourhood.
Cooperation does not imply consensus over values and beliefs but participation to
realize small opportunities. These regimes can reshape over time. Stability can
occurs because regimes structure resources and establish patterns of interaction.
Stone has defined four different regime types: (1) maintenance or caretaker regimes,
which focus on routine service delivery and low taxes; (2) development regimes that
are concerned with changing land use to promote growth; (3) middle-class progressive
regimes, which include aims such as environmental protection, historic preservation,
affordable housing, and linkage funds; and (4) lower-class opportunity expansion
regimes that emphasize human investment policy and widened access to employment
and ownership.
Several key aspects emerge in Stones work from 1989 to 1993:
1. A regime is an informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional
resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions
. Collaboration is achieved not only through formal institutions but also through
informal networks.
2. Regimes bridge the divide between popular control of government and private control
of economic resources. Beyond the inclusion of local government and businesses,

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

participants in regimes may vary, including neighbourhood organizations or

organizations representing middle-class African-Americans, for example.
Cooperation is not taken as a given but has to be achieved. Regimes cannot be
assumed to exist in all cities.
Regimes are relatively stable arrangements that can span a number of administrations.
Regime change is therefore not synonymous with change in city administrations.
Distinctive policy agendas can be identified (i.e. development regimes or middle-class
progressive regimes) that are influenced by the participants and the resources they
bring to the coalition.
Consensus is formed on the basis of interaction and the structuring of resources. This is
achieved through selective incentives and small opportunities.
Regimes may not feature complete agreement over beliefs and values, but a history of
collaboration would tend to produce consensus over policy.

THE LOGIC OF COMPARISON

Because regime research requires case study methodology, some consistency in
conceptualization is needed to be able to compare or to integrate the findings of case
studies conducted across a variety of cities. The problem is one of reliability and
validity. Because of this there is the need to develop a common language of
measurement (it is clear that you need to look at the same thinks first before you can
compare it with each other). There are four different pitfalls in comparison:
parochialism, misclassification, degreeism, and concept stretching.
Parochialism refers to the tendency for comparativists to continually invent new
terms or to use existing ones in an unintended way. Casual use of the term urban
regime to describe urban policy agendas or any type of public-private partnership
could be considered an example of parochialism.
Misclassification consists of ignoring important differences and clustering together
unlike phenomena. Not all cities can be assumed to be regimes. Whether a regime
exists in a particular place is an empirical question, and it entails a specific set of
relationships, including the ability to build public-private cooperation around a chosen
agenda. There needs to be an understanding what can be seen as a regime and what
not.
Degreeism refers to represent all differences as merely quantitative rather than
qualitativea matter of degree. It is less precise, for example, to say that democracy
exists in many countries to a degree rather than to develop specific criteria for
democracy and to distinguish between those countries that meet the criteria and
those that do not. So there needs to be a specific set of conditions for a regime to be
seen as a regime.
Concept stretching consists of removing aspects of the original meaning of the
concept so that it can accommodate more cases (you can stretch the meaning of
regime so that other cases also fall under the definition). As with the other mistakes in
comparative conceptualization, the problem is that if we never know when something
ceases to apply, the variation that may help to explain and predict is therefore
obscured by definitional sloppiness.
A common way of dealing with comparison is through classification of different types
and subtypes that are sensitive to national contexts. For example, DiGaetano and
Klemanski (1999, 244-45) devised a typology of modes of governance in which one
type of urban power structure is a regime, characterized by preemptive power and
enduring cooperation. This is an example of rising on the ladder of abstraction, with
the overarching category being modes of governance. The strategy of developing
categories with clear boundaries and properties is enormously helpful but not always

possible to execute in practice. One problem that emerges in cross-national

comparison is family resemblance. It may not be possible to sort out observations into
distinct categorieseach example may share five or six of seven attributes but in
different combinations. In this case, the concept is treated as an ideal type.
Multidimensional scaling may be used to score the different observations.
Whichever strategy is used, proper conceptualization entails identifying which aspects
of regime theory should be regarded as core elements. This should be related to
previous usage in the literature, to promote continuity and the ability to aggregate
observations.
CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON: POTENTIAL AND CHALLENGES
Cross-national application highlights the need for more precision in defining and
applying the core characteristics and conceptualizing variation. The application of
regime analysis outside its original setting has been attractive for several reasons
(original setting is in American cities). Because urban regime analysis has focused on
the internal dynamics of coalition building, it has not been able to explain how
changes in the larger environment affect regime development and formation.
The urban regimes described in European studies are often qualified as emerging or
limited or as similar to the American regime concept. There are several important reasons
for this. American cities exist in a substantially different policy environment than European
cities because American local government is more dependent on cooperation with business to
carry out projects such as downtown redevelopment. The weak local state in the United States
has fewer planning powers than European local authorities, but more important, it is much
more dependent on own-source revenues and is more fiscally sensitive to capital mobility and
investment. In Europe, public resources from central governments are often available for
economic development, lessening the need for reliance on private-sector finance for
redevelopment projects in city centers.
Public ownership of land (and long-term leasing of public land for private development)
also puts the European public sector in a position of greater control compared with the United
States. The traditional emphasis in European local government has been service delivery and
the politics of consumption rather than economic development, so regimes may be relatively
new and less stable in comparison with those in the United States.

The local business constituency for regimes is often smaller and less active in
European cities. This is partly because business is less localized than in the United
States.
There is more national influence in local growth politics as well, which could be
expected to alter the amount of local autonomy available for governing coalitions.
Partisan politics is more important in local politics throughout Europe, and it provides
linkages to national politics at the local level, sometimes resulting in ideological
conflict between central or local government or local policy shifts that follow changes
in national party platforms.
HOW CRITICAL IS BUSINESS PARTICIPATION IN DEFINING REGIMES?
Given the more limited business participation in European local development, some
scholars have debated whether the urban regime concept requires that business must
be a dominant partner or whether business involvement should be extensive or
broadly representative of the business community. Stone made the point that not all
private interests are business interests, and other nongovernmental participants are
included: Although the nature of business involvement extends from the direct and
extensive to the indirect and limited, the economic role of businesses and the
resources they control are too important for these enterprises

to be left out completely. DiGaetano and Lawless asserted that Stones social
production model reflects an American bias because American local governments are
dependent on the private sector for critical resources.

There is no contesting that the nature of the government-business relationship is different in

the European context, but it would be difficult to assert that there is no interdependence and
division of resources and that the social production model is worthless outside the United
States. Levine observed that there is a tendency toward local growth politics that transcends
borders and culture, but in Europe, it is focused more on local job creation rather than fiscal
concerns.

Even though European local governments are less fiscally dependent on own-source
revenues, it is unnecessary to surrender the idea that urban regimes include business
as a partner. There is ample evidence that some government- business partnerships
do exist in Europe. It can be useful to distinguish between cities that feature regimes
and those that do not, even if regimes do not represent the norm or if cities seem to
be developing only emerging forms Regimes may be most likely to form in cities
where there is a more localized business base (which varies from city to city within
countries). On the other hand, an indigenous and locally dependent business sector
may not be required. In some cases, studies have found that the branch plant
executives or small business owners involved were not locally dependent in the
sense that they had restricted mobility or profits tied to place.
APPLICATION TO NEW CONTEXTS
The urban regime concept was developed to describe interactions at the city level,
although much of the focus has been on economic development policy within that
context. This framework has begun to travel to other new contexts, such as regional
coalition building, urban education policy, and lesbian and gay politics. When
concepts are used at a different scale, careful application is needed to avoid
generating conceptual muddle or concept stretching. So far, however, these new
applications have indicated that regime analysis can be used productively in other
areas.
CORE CRITERIA AND CONCEPTUAL CHOICE
Stones usage of urban regimes provides a complex and nuanced concept that
synthesizes a number of ideas, promoting widespread application and also
subsequent modification in the course of its evolution. The identification of new
regime types or further specification of the concept can refine our understanding of
urban. Modifications are problematic, however, if they ignore or distort important
aspects of the concept.
Urban regimes are coalitions based on informal networks as well as formal
relationships, and they have the following core properties:
- Partners drawn from government and nongovernmental sources,
requiring but not limited to business participation;
- Collaboration based on social productionthe need to bring
together fragmented resources for the power to accomplish tasks;
- Identifiable policy agendas that can be related to the composition of
the participants in the coalition;
- A longstanding pattern of cooperation rather than a temporary
coalition.
Because urban regimes bring together resources in a complex policy environment
where government action alone is insufficient, they will by definition include
nongovernmental actors. The exact composition of regimes will vary because the
institutional resources available and the division of those resources will vary from one
city (and one country) to the next. Urban regimes, however, exist within a political

economy framework rather than a pluralist one, according to Stone, and so governing
coalitions that are specifically regimes will include participants from business.
To qualify as a regime requires that a coalition meet all of the above criteria. On the
issue of stability, however, short-term collaboration may be described as an emerging
regime or a failed regime, depending on the context. Regimes are also capable of
fading or deteriorating.
The core contribution of the urban regime concept, at least in terms of the impact of
its application, takes different forms in North America and beyond. Within North
America, the key contribution is to have broken the deadlock created by the stalemate
between the pluralist and elitist perspectives. The concept has helped analysts
develop a new understanding of the way that power works in urban settings, with its
emphasis on power to rather than power over. In a fragmented urban world, pressed
in by global forces from above and challenged by an active, if imperfect, democracy
from below, politics cannot be reduced to the control of the few, but equally the label
pluralist cannot assumed to be adequate. In cities today, a key power is the capacity
to mobilize a long-term coalition that is capable of achieving change on the ground.
Urban regimes are not simply networks or interorganizational collaboration.
Mollenkopf, J. (1992)
How to study Urban Political Power
Editors Introduction
J. Mollenkopf is one of the founders of the Program on Urban Studies, and now a professor of
political science and Director of the Public Policy Program at the Graduate School of the City
University of New York.
An important question since the Industrial Revolution is: Is Urban politics worth studying at
all, or is the urban political realm so subordinate to, dependent on, and constrained by its
economic and social context that factors from this domain have little independent explanatory
power?
Mollenkopf put the analysts of city politics into two camps (Urban political theory is a backand-forth struggle between the contending conceptual frameworks):
1. Pluralist = See urban politics as an autonomous realm that possessed real authority
and commanded important resources
2. Structuralists = Argue that the pluralist dispersion of power, especially to inner-city
minority communities, was mostly illusion, and that the imperatives of capitalism, in both the
economics and social structural realms, repeatedly and inevitably established the basic
parameters of local development policy. So they stress about the importance of underlying
economic forces. But some people think they lack in a well-developed theory of the state and
thus economy centred theorizing must always be tempered by polity centred thinking.
Mollenkopf proposes a synthesis that simultaneously avoids the pitfalls of one-dimensionality
and recognises the legitimate claims of each school. He ask himself the question: How can
we develop a vocabulary for analysing politics and state action that reconciles the political
systems independent impact on social outcomes with its observed systemic bias in favour of
capital? (than he comes back to the beginning question)
The article
There are 4 important questions to be asked about the debate between pluralists and their
critics: see page 259

The pluralist conception of the urban political order

The pluralist attacked the so-called elitists. They showed that no model of direct control by a
unified economic or status elite could easily explain what they saw.
Pluralist:
Do not dwell theoretically on the larger relationship between the state and the
economy
- They rejected the notion that some underlying structural logic subordinated local
politics to the private economy
- They see politics as an autonomous realm that possessed real authority and
commanded important resources.
- They rejected the notion that economic or social notables controlled the state in any
instrumental sense.
- Argues that the bargaining among a multiplicity of groups defined the urban power
structure.
- Coalition building in this view is central to the definition of power. The coalitions varied
from issue to issue and they tended to be short lived
In the 1950 and early 1960, the pluralist studies had been convincing and accurate portraits
of urban politics, but after 1960 (eruption of turmoil and political mobilization) and 1970
(fiscal crisis) basic flaws in the pluralist analysis revealed.
-

Robert Dahl (book: Who Governs?) lacked a context in economic and political
development and he denied that economic and social inequalities would overlap and
reinforce each other in the political arena.
- Other pluralist did not recognize the possibility that nonelite elements of the urban
population would feel systematically excluded from power and would react by pressing
for greater representation and more vigorously redistributive policies
After 1960, Urban politics as a kind of market equilibrium-reaching mechanism seem
anachronistic (stedelijke politiek als een mechanisme voor markt-evenwicht werd gezien als
anachronistisch, wat betekent dat het in strijd is met de tijd)
-

Structuralist critiques
A lot of structuralist critiques came;
- Bachrach & Baratzs: Two faces of power. They attacked pluralists for focusing on the first
face (its exercise) while ignoring the second face (the way that the relationship between the
state and the underlying socioeconomic system shapes the political agenda
- Stone: The unequal distribution of private resources creates a differential capacity among
political actors to shape the flow of benefits from the basic rules of the game, the construction
of particular agendas and the making of specific decisions
- Manley Marxist: Lacking a theory of exploitation and an objective standard of a just or equal
distribution.
So the structuralist provided the missing social and economic context from pluralism. And
they highlighted the ways that private property, market competition, welth and income
inquality, the corporate stystem, and the stage of capitalist development pervasively shape
the terrain on which political competition occurs
The structuralist studies:
flawed by economic determinism
are factually on target in observing and describing mechanisms that generate
systematic, cumulative, political inequality.
(this had a more profound impact on outcomes that the coalition patterns studied by
pluralists.)
-

Neo-Marxist critiques

Critiques to pluralism:
-

They refute the pluralist retort that non-decisions either must be studied just like
decisions or else are unobservable ideological constructs.
They have tended to argue that the mode of production stamps its pattern more or less
directly on the organization of the state and on the dynamics of the political
competition

Neo-marxist work is quite similar to Manley Marxist, both stressed the systematic
subordination of the state and politics to capital accumulation and de privat market.
But this lacked a well-developed theory of the state that either identifies the instrumental
mechanisms that link state actions to the power of capital or grants the relative autonomy to
the state.
A first group of the neo-marxists wanted capital to become more mobile and less tied to
specific locations. A result would be that the need for business to intervene directly in politics
would decrease. But certain classes of business are not mobile.
A second group of neo-marxist stressed the way urban politics serves to dampen and regulate
the conflicts inevitably generated by capitalist urbanization
They differ over how the state coopts movements that challenge urban governments.
They share the idea that this process is a central feature of urban politics in advanced
capitalist societies
Public Choice critiques (form of microeconomics)
An other source of structural criticism next to Neo-Marxism of the pluralist paradigm are the
critiques by the public choice. The critiques are quite similar to neo-marxist critiques of
pluralism, because of the notion that cities compete to attract well-off residents and private
investment.
Structuralism reconsidered
Because of the critiques to pluralism,
-

Cities can no longer be teaken as independent entities isolated from the large economic
and social forces that operate around them.

Analysts can no longer ignore the impact of global and national ecnomic restructuring
on large central cities.
Urban politics can no longer be considered to be unrelated to the cumulative pattern of
inequality in the economy and society
Structuralist focused attention on how the states dependence on private investment
fosters political outcomes that stystematically favor business interests. They explored
specific mechanisms:

o
o

The invidious competition among fragmented autonomous urban

governments for investment.
The segregation of local government functions intro quasi-private agencies
that promote investment and politically exposed agencies that absorb and
deflect protest.
The organization of the channels of politcal representation so as to
articulate interests in some ways but not others.

The strengths of the structuralist perspective:

conceptualize the political system as ulitmately subordinate to economic structure

tended to reduce urban politics to the fulfillment of ecnomic imperatives (even social
control achieved through political means serves capitalist ends.
The flaws of the structuralist perspective:
-

structuralist may not see that political actors can fail to fulfill or to maximize their
supposed imperatives
- stuctural theories tend to have a hard time explaining the real and important variation
over time and across places
- stystematic imperatives might conflict with each onther or generate systemthreatening conflict
- systematic imperatives might conflict with each onther or generate system-threatening
conflict
- to the extent that structuralist theorists held true to the logic of their argument, they
underplayed the importance of politics.
A satisfactory approach must operate at three interrelated levels, this is also an anwer to the
question of Mollenkopf: How can we develop a vocabulary for analyzing politics and state
action that reconciles the political systems indepent impact on social outcomes with its
observed systemic bias in favor of capital?.
-

The 3 levels:
1. how the local states relationship to the economy and society conditions its capacity to act
2. how the rules of the fame of local politics shape the competition among interrests and
actors to construct a dominant political coalition able to exercise that capacity to act
3. how economic and social change and the organization of political competition shape the
mobilization of these interests.
Toward a theoretical synthesis

Build the approach

- by recognizing that city government and its political leaders interact with the
resident population and constituency interests in its political and electoral
operating environment and with market forces and business interests in its
economic operating environments
- Two primary interactions:
- Between the leaders of city government and their political / electoral
base
- Between the leaders of city government and their economic
environment

Political entrepreneurs (who seek to direct the actions of city government) must
contend with 3 distinct sets of interests:
1. Public sector produces interests inside loval government
2. Popular or constituency interests,especially as they are organized in the elctoral
system
3. Private market interests
- Dominant political coalition: it is a working alliance among different interests
that can win elections for executive office and secure the cooperation it needs
from other public and private power centers in order to govern. So it organizes
working control over both its political and its private markter operating
environments.
To become dominant: you must win election to the chief executive office.
To remain dominant: use the powers of government to consolidate its
-

electoral base
This formulation improves both pluralist as structuralist approaches
-

Preemptive or systematic power, enjoyed by private interests whose command

over private resources is so great as to make their support crucial to the
dominant coalition. These systematic power made corporate interests ideal
allies for politicians seeking to achieve and substain political dominance.
Only explains part of how political actors construct a coalition to direct city
government in the exercise of its powers

The analysis of how Edward Koch and his allies constructued a new dominant political
coalition in NY must be framed in terms of three broad sets of factors:
1. Building on the structuralists (understand how the local political systems
interaction with private interests creates constraints an imperatives for the
local state but also opportunities that astute political entrepreneurs can
seize)
2. It must go beyond the structuralists (recognizing that how popular
constituencies are organized in the citys political and electoral arena has an
equally strong impact on the strategies pursued by coalition builders)
3. A sound theory must be sensitive to how the oraganization of interest within
the public sector, embodied in political practices as well as formal authority,
also influenced their choices and actions..

Brenner, N. (1999)

"Globalisation as Reterritorialisation: The Re-scaling of urban governance in

the European Union."
This article responds to the dominant literature on the despatializing effects of
globalization by stating that in the current round of globalization another paradoxal
process is taking place, namely the reterritorialisation of both the urban and the
national scale. Brenner first examines the rapidly growing literature that focuses on
the disembedding of social, economic and political relations from their local context as
a result of the globalization process. Examined here is the literature on the move from
the space of places to the space of flows and the rise of the network society, the ever
increasing mobility/circulation of people and capital and the statement that geography
itself is dissolving in a globalized world. Most importantly, this literature suggests that
national borders, nation states and other territorial and place-based institutions are
becoming obsolete now that social relations are increasingly becoming detached from
territory.
The author argues that this literature has a one-sided view on the process and consequences
of globalization and thus neglects the relatively fixed and immobile forms of territorial
organization that are and will remain necessary to enable the rapid movement of (among
other things) people and capital. By these more fixed and immobile forms of territorial
organization Brenner means in particular urban-regional agglomerations and state regulatory
institutions. Also, this literature does not elaborate upon the dialectic between the current
round of globalization and the major transformation of territorial organization. Brenner sees a
trend where contemporary cities and states are being reterritorialized and rescaled. This
article provides arguments for the acknowledgement of the necessity (and thus not the
disappearance) of these new forms of territorial organization for the globalization process be
understood and move forward.
Brenner then provides a historic framework that makes clear how from the late 19 th century
onwards cities and urban regions have become more and more important sites of global
capitalism and carriers of national economic growth and power. Especially the post-1970 wave

of globalization has significantly decentred the role of the national scale. In the current round
of globalization, it is the sub-national urban region that plays a major role, but also the supranational scale. These new territorial configurations lead to a restructuring on the governance
level of both states and cities. Territorialisation thus remains as fundamental as ever and an
important argument is that the state scale is not being eroded, but rearticulated and reterritorialized in relation to both sub- and supra-national scales.
Brenner does see that in order to accelerate circulation, capital has a tendency to eliminate
spatial barriers. However, this accelerated movement of commodities can only be achieved if
relatively fixed and immobile transport and communication systems as well as regulatory
institutions are put in place. In the words of David Harvey: spatial organization is necessary
to overcome space. Both cities and states provide this important territorially fixed
infrastructure. Brenner thus defines the process of globalization as having two dialectic sides;
on the one hand, the acceleration and expansion of the movement of commodities, people,
money etc. and on the other hand, the production and reconfiguration of relatively fixed and
immobile spatial infrastructures to enable such accelerated movement. The term
glocalisation, indicating the combined process of globalization and local-territorial
reconfiguration denotes this dialectic.
The rest of this article examines the various ways in which first, cities, second, states and
third, the European Union, are all currently being rescaled as a response to globalizing
capitalism.
For examining the rescaling of cities Brenner uses the theory on world cities. Global cities, in
the words of Saskia Sassen, are the territorially specific urban places that host (service)
industries and production processes that are crucial to globalization. Global cities provide the
necessary technological, institutional and social infrastructure and have become massive
polycentric urban regions (reterritorialisation). These global cities are prime examples of
glocal space. Important is that these regions are competing worldwide, increasingly
independent of nation states and have created a new global hierarchy. They have become
nodes within a global network that act as the regional motors of the global economy.
Brenner states that the process of reterritorialisation on the national scale has received
far less attention in contemporary urban studies. Most of the existing literature is based upon
a zero-sum conception: as globalization intensifies, the state declines in power. It is assumed
that this will lead to the erosion of state territoriality and a weakened ability to regulate
economic activities. Other authors emphasize the continued importance of state institutions
by stating that they are not fundamentally changing. Instead, they react to globalization by
constructing new forms of national policy to retain control over economic systems. Brenner
steps away from both views. He argues that the territorial organization of the state is indeed
changing in the sense that state power is transferred to both higher (for example the EU) and
lower (urban regional) governance levels which depriveliges nationally organized institutional
arrangements (hollowing out). However, state territoriality remains an important
geographical precondition for capital accumulation. In order to remain competitive in modern
times, the state tends to rescale (up and down) according to the necessities of the economy
and the circuits of capital; something that Lefebvre calls the fusion of economy and politics
and can be regarded as a neo-liberal strategy. The current round of globalization thus
promotes the re-scaling of state territoriality rather than eroding it. Brenner states that this rescaled configuration can be labeled as the glocal state.
Brenner continues on by introducing the concept of new state spaces to delineate
supranational forms of governance that can enhance each states capacity to mobilize their
urban and regional space as a competitive force in the currently by world cities dominated
capitalism. The emergence of supranational unions such as the EU does have implications for
the governance autonomy of member states and the major urban regions or world cities
within these states. Brenner describes how a debate has originated around the politics of
urban regions; since these are both important to the national and the supranational scale,

they gain a lot of bargaining power and are favoured over other regions. Brenner gives
multiple examples of this trend of promoting specific urban areas within different member
states but also on the EU level. This creates a highly hierarchic organization of spaces within
Europe. Finally, in order to deal with the re-scaling processes, a rescaling of politics within the
territorial state is considered necessary. As a consequence of the multiscalar properties of
world cities, Brenner describes how a politics of scale is currently unfolding in which the
appropriate political regulatory institutions of major urban regions is debated. World cities or
urban regions are currently being governed by institutions on administrative levels that cant
always deal with their global reach and influence. Brenner states that in the current debate,
governance and regulation on the regional level are considered the most appropriate.
However, there are some forces that work counter the establishment of such regional or
metropolitan governance. To conclude, Brenner states that problems of urban governance can
no longer be confronted merely on the level of cities or even regions; they must be analysed
with regards to the national, supranational and global scales as well.

Karen Mossberger: The Evolution of Urban Regime Theory: The

Challenge of Conceptualization
Urban regime Theory is a tool o explain public/private relationships in American cities and the
concept has been applied in different from the regional level to subcity and neighbourhood
scale. It explain how different interests are incorporated to governing coalitions. The
application of this theory to new questions and issues has made the theory develop.
The Urban regime theory is more a model than a theory, because it cannot really explain
regime formation, maintenance and change, but its application in many different cases
explain that regime formation and changes are related to democratic shifts, economic
restructuring, government restructuring (changes in relationship between central government
and local government), and political mobilisation, especially in to progressive coalitions for
social change.
The main problem to make a theory is developing it through different application, and its
more difficult when its applied in different countries, but in regime theory it is difficult also in
cities within the same country. Trying to generalize a prototype case makes uncertainty
appear.
Specifying the main ideas
In regime analysis, power is fragmented and regimes are the collaborative arrangements
between local governments and private actors to achieve capacity to govern. Power is
fragmented because labour is divided between market and state. Then, both private and
public actors resources that are needed to govern, so they have to join those sources (for
example, state has legitimacy and authority to make policies and business have capital to
generate jobs and financing).
Urban regime theory focuses in internal dynamics of coalition building (how coalitions are
made, not why are made). Those internal dynamics can be understood using the social
production model of power, in which political power is the capacity to act (power to), not
power over others or social control.
For Stone, achievement of the capacity to govern is by distribution of selective incentives.
Consensus in values and beliefs is not required. But preferences change and Stone didnt
theorize about this aspect. Business is a key participant because of the control of sources, but
the degree of compromise of those businesses in the coalitions, the presence of other actors
(environmental groups for example) will vary from place to place.
Stone identifies 4 different regimes:
1) Maintenance or caretaker regimes:
2) Development regimes:
3) Middle-class progressive regimes:

4) lower-class opportunity expansion regimes:

The last two regimes are most difficult to achieve because require a degree of regulation, not
only voluntary cooperation. But in all of them business is a key actor.
Main ideas:
1) A regime is an informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional
resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions.
Collaboration is achieved through formal institutions and informal networks.
2) Regimes are bridges between popular control of government and private control of
economic resources, but also other actors can participate in coalitions.
3) Cooperation has to be built.
4) Regimes are relatively stable and can be present in many administrations. Changes in a
regime dont mean changes in the city administration.
5) Different policy agendas can be identified, and are influenced by the participants in the
coalition and the resources every actor brings into to regime.
6) Consensus is achieved through selective incentives and small opportunities (benefits).
7) Sharing beliefs and ideology is not required.
But it is not clear if all these properties must be present in a regime, and in which degree of
importance.
The logic of comparison.
Regime research requires comparison between findings in different cities. A common
language is needed to compare different cities without obscuring significant differences,
especially if cities are from different countries.
Comparison has 4 pitfalls according to Sartori using the regime concept: parochialism,
misclassification, degreeism and stretching.
-

Parochialism: Tendency in comparison to use terms incorrectly or to invent new ones.

It makes difficult correct comparisons and tests different theories. For example, a
change of a Mayor is not a change in regime, while some comparisons say that. Urban
agendas are not regimes.
Misclassification: Ignoring important differences and clustering together unlike
phenomena. Not all the cities are a regime. Regime is related to the relationship
between public and private actors and the ability to built governing agendas around a
chosen agenda.
Degreeism: Matter of degree present all differences as merely quantitative.
Differences can be qualitative. If we say that there is cooperation in different degrees,
there will be cooperation everywhere. To know where is cooperation and where not, we
need to establish criteria for cooperation, and then look for where those criteria are
achieved and where not.
Stretching: Removing aspects of the original meaning of the concept, in order to
accommodate more cases. Urban regime describes the partnership between public and
private actors. Then, the relationship between local government and national
government cannot be qualified as a regime.

An advice for comparison is classification of different types or subtypes. Developing

categories with clear limits its helpful, but not always possible to apply. In national-cross
comparison, one problem that emerges is family resemblance. It may not be possible to sort
out observations into distinct categorieseach example may share five or six of seven
attributes but in different combinations. In this case, the concept is treated as an ideal type.
Multidimensional scaling may be used to score the different observations.
Whichever strategy is used, proper conceptualization entails identifying which aspects of
regime theory should be regarded as core elements. This should be related to previous usage
in the literature, to promote continuity and the ability to aggregate observations.

Cross-national comparisons: potential and challenges

Cross-national application proof that we need a more precise definition of the main
characteristics. Urban regime cannot explain how changes affect regime development and
formation because the analysis is focused in internal dynamics, but comparative research has
the potential to break this inward focus of the concept comparing processes within different
fiscal and intergovernmental contexts.
Regimes in Europe are qualified as emerging or limited for several reasons: American
cities are more dependent on cooperation between public and private actors than European
cities, where resources from the central government are more available. The traditional
emphasis in Europe has been service delivery, not economic development. So en Europe
regimes are new, less stable. Also the private set of actors in Europe is smaller because many
businesses are branch of big companies, not local firms. Business can be incorporated in
coalitions, but with a strong domain of public sector.
In summary, economic development partnerships in Europe are more likely to be led by the
public sector, with less participation from local businesses and with less policy autonomy from
national government, and agendas are more focused in services issues rather economic
development.
Police networks rather than regimes?
The limitation of public-private collaboration and the interference of the state government in
local issues made some authors describe regimes in Europe as policy network with both
horizontal and vertical ties (like Basset in Bristol, 1996). Urban regimes and other kind of
coalitions, with or without central government involvement, could be viewed as subcategories
of policy networks, so the concept of regime could be applied.
How critical is business participation in defending regimes?
Limited business participation in Europe has created a debate whether the urban regime
concept requires business be a dominant partner or if it must be representative of the
business community. Stone says that not all private interests are business interest. However,
the economic role f business and the resources controlled by business are too important to e
excluded. Business must be present in a regime, at least in a minimal level.
Some authors, like DiGaetano and lawless (1999) argue that Stones social production model
reflects an American characteristic and ask for a broader conception of urban governance.
Nobody can disagree that the government/business relationship in Europe is different than in
America, but there is difficult to affirm that there is no interdependence. Levine (1996)
observed that common tendency in urban development that breaks borders and culture, just
in Europe is more focused on local job creation than fiscal concerns.
Some other authors, like Dowding, mark the business participation as an optional criterion for
regimes. But they dont discuss their criteria and its relation with other literature.
Even though European local governments are more fiscally independent than American, there
are still partnerships with the private businessmen. It would be useful to distinguish between
cities that feature a regime and those that dont, even if the regime is not the main form of
governance.
Regimes are likely to form in cities with more localized business base, but this is not required.
Some branches can be interested in participate in coalition for restricting mobility or profits
related to the place. So the regime concept is useful to explore the existing business
participation in governance.
The role of selective Incentives

Another challenge in cross-national comparison is the question of selective incentives. This is

problematic even within the USA context because of the maintenance regimes and
progressive regimes identified in America. In those regimes there are not a lot of incentives
for business and a maintenance regime seems to need only coordination.
Other authors have made other classification of regimes in where caretaker and maintenance
regimes are subcategories.
Stoker and Mossberger made 3 categories of regime: organic, instrumental and symbolic
regimes.
-

Organic regime would be a more generic regime than maintenance regime of Stone. In
this case, a caretaker regime would be subcategories of organic regime. Maintenance
Stones regime is related to low fiscal rates, but organic regime would be maintenance
of the status quo, and it could include maintenance of the elites or racial class
exclusion. It would be just no change.
Instrumental regime its similar to development or progrowth regime in Stones studies.
Reflects the importance of benefits in coalitions.
Symbolic regime includes Stones progressive regime and also revitalizing the city
changing its image. Selective incentive are less informal because its often transitional,
especially revitalization regimes.

Application to new contexts

The urban regime theory tries to explain interaction in the city level, but much interest has
been put on economic development within that context. So this framework is now applied to
regional level, but also to other context, like education policy or gay and lesbian policy.
Application in other scales needs to be to avoid confusions.
Core criteria and conceptual choice.
Stones usage of Urban Regimes provides a complex concept that synthesizes a number of
ideas and promotes different applications and some modifications. But these application or
modification must be careful to no change or distortion some aspects of the concept.
In a comparison framework, several core criteria must be observed. Urban regimes are
coalitions based on both formal and informal networks and they have 4 core properties.
1) Coalitions between government and non-governmental actors and resources. Business
participation is required but not limited to this kind of actor.
2) Collaboration based on social production, bringing together fragmented resources need
to accomplish tasks.
3) Identifiable policy agendas that can be related to the actors forming the coalition.
4) Longstanding pattern, not only temporary coalition.
Urban regimes bring together resources because de fragmented environment makes
government action alone to be insufficient. The composition of regimes will be different from
cities and countries because the availability of resources will be different in each place. Urban
regimes exists in a political economy framework so to be considered regimes, coalitions must
include participants from business. Regimes must have an identifiable purpose, which will be
different according the composition of each coalition.
All coalitions must meet all these criteria to be qualified as a regime, but short-term
collaboration can be qualified as an emerging or filed regime, depending on the context.
It is possible to make subcategories beyond the general definition of regimes. Based on
agendas, incentives, structures or any other criteria.

Not all the urban systems need to be fit under a regime framework, boundaries have to be
specified.
The core contribution of the urban regime concept, at least in terms of the impact of its
application, takes different forms in North America and beyond. Within North America, the key
contribution is to have broken the deadlock created by the stalemate between the pluralist
and elitist perspectives. The concept has helped analysts develop a new understanding of the
way that power works in urban settings, with its emphasis on power to rather than power
over. In a fragmented urban world, pressed in by global forces from above and challenged by
an active, if imperfect, democracy from below, politics cannot be reduced to the control of the
few, but equally the label pluralist cannot assumed to be adequate. In cities today, a key
power is the capacity to mobilize a long-term coalition that is capable of achieving change on
the ground.
Urban regimes are not simply networks or interorganizational collaboration.

Stone, C. - Systemic power in Community Decision

Making: A Restatement of Stratification Theory
Students of power have been looking for imbalances under the surface of political equality.
Imbalances that are always present in the governance of communities. This is a difficult
research because power is often present but not visibly exercised. Trying to understand the
less visible influences around public decision making, scholars have developed concepts as
nondecisions, anticipated reaction or indirect influence. But it seems there is a dimension of
power that those concepts dont explain because it seems to be systemic.
Bi companies and firms seem to have an influence more important that their open
participation in local affairs should justify and this influence is not measured in elections. It
happens while lower-strata groups have only a little and transitory influence in politics and
they dont use politics to improve their positions.
Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1970) used the notion of nondecision making. This term
refers to the influence of the elite to restrict the extension of the community decision making.
Also the idea that elites can control de agenda and is ideological dominant. But nondecision
making in not possible to be found because is not possible to study events that never existed.
It is just a special kind of decision-making.
The main purpose of this article is to argue that this systemic pattern can be treated in
power terms.
Public officials form alliances and make decisions and plan the future in a context in which
strategic resources are hierarchically arranged. This is a stratified society which makes them
favor he upper levels over the lower interests. They are awarded if collaborate with upper
interested, and not awarded or even penalized if benefit lower interest. They experience
strategic dependencies. Those relationships make a general pattern of decision making that is
unplanned and unexpected.
The argument of the article is developed in three steps: definition of the concept of systemic
power; Show the systemic features underlying specified power imbalances; and examination
of empirical findings.
Systemic power: Toward an Explanation and Definition.
Any system feature affects power distribution. The question is how system features are
related to power relationship between determinate actors.
Power is seen as a purposive activity between individuals. But power relationships are more
complex.
1) Power is interpersonal and intergroup (included between classes).

2) Power is a matter of intention and a matter of context. Other students of power

agree with the phenomenon of anticipated reaction. It means that A can influence the
decision of B because B is afraid to the reactions of A. Or B will do the same than A
because B wants to have a good relationship with A.
Example: Elected officials keep electorates preferences in mind (or what officials think
electorate wants) because electorate is in power over officials. Electorate really doesnt
need to make sure that official take their preferences in mind. Official will do.
Its not required for the powerful actor do anything to achieve this position. In the
example between A and B, B is doing something because is afraid of A. But A didnt do
anything and probably doesnt know that its in position of power over B.
In anticipated reaction, the relationship is governed by vulnerability, not motivation.
Vulnerability hinges on the structure of the situation
3) Power relationships are direct and indirect. When there is a direct conflict, the exercice
of power is clear. A makes B to do something that B wouldnt do direct relationship
power over.
But it can be that A has more capacity than C to achieve goals. There is no problem if
the goal is different. But if their goal is make B do something, A is more powerfull than
C to make B do something and there is a conflict. This is power to and is an indirect
relationship. It is implied in nondecision-making. A has excluded Cs interests of the
agenda for an unequal relationship of power.
Defining Systemic power: To explain this, we assume now that we talk only about longterm and intergroup power relationships. Systemic power is the power more far away from
open competition.
The systemic power can be defined as those dimension of power which long-term features of
the socioeconomic system confer advantages or disadvantages on groups in ways
predisposing public officials to favor some interests among some others. In the example of
A,B, C A would be the long term features (situational element); B would be the officials; C
would be de disadvantages groups.
Long-term features dont have to make a lot of efforts to make the official serve their
interests. It means they have lower opportunity costs (opportunity costs is related to the
efforts some actors have to achieve goals. Less resistance, lower opportunity costs). A has
lower opportunity costs than C. It has an impact on the relationships within the whole
community.
Opportunity costs explain why the influence if one group (A) is bigger than the efforts that this
group has to do to achieve goals.
The conflict is between A and C, but there is a dependency between B and A, thats why B try
to favor A.
Social stratification and systemic power.
Modern systems of stratification tend to be diamond-shaped: Small top / large middle basis /
small bottom basis. Middle basis tend to be source of change and conflict. Literature shows 3
kinds of inequalities fitting the diamond-shaped distribution of opportunities and resources.
1) Economic position: The tops have money. The middle strata had jobs skills, a few
money and some properties. The bottom strata are economic dependent. The top will
be more revenue-producer, while the bottom is service demanding. Officials will try to
favor the top because their revenues are needed.
2) Associational position: Top possesses hierarchical power and command of resources.
They dont have collective action problem. Middle strata possesses mass power, and
they are organizes through voluntary associations (like employment-related). Their
organizations are stable and legally recognized. But they serving the mass class so they
have collective action problems. Bottom strata has also power, but they are badly or

not organized. Middle strata can be mobilized to achieve their goals, but it will require
coordination and community work, and it will be unstable. While upper strata have
more sources but they are less. Its easier having to deal when a few actors than with a
mass.
3) Social position and life style: Upper strata are well educated, self confident and its
supposed they have better skills for work and concern for the future. Middle strata are
also well-educated but within a limit. Bottom strata are supposed to have cultural
handicaps. Those perceptions through the social class make decision-makers think that
upper strata will be more fruitful to work with than bottom strata, which are less
admirable.
The system of stratification will affect the behavior of Public officials, who want to achieve
their careers and ensure their goals. So when officials make decisions, they take into account
economic considerations (if they need revenues); associational considerations (capacity of
engagement); and social status and life style.
To sum up, upper strata will have more influence in decision making for their position, than for
the actions they may take to influence decision making.
Examining the impact of Systemic Power.
We cannot see the systemic power but we can see their effects in the officials behavior, so
we have to study the decision making. Presence of systemic power results in:
a) Decision taken with a strategic dependence of public officials.
b) Patterns of interaction in which some groups (bottom strata) have more resistance than
others (upper strata)
Public officials actions are bases on popular support, but they need resources located into
upper strata. They act into a dual pressure.
The influence of the upper strata is different depending on the dimension: economical,
associational and social.
1: Business Influence and the Economic Dimension: Business will have more influence
in areas related to revenue production. Urban renewal is related to revenue production, so
influence will be greater than in governmental reform.
2: The Power of the Few and the Associational Dimension: The few are better
positioned to bring off complex projects and achieve tangible goals. It explains why
sometimes officials make decisions that affect badly their supports.
3: Agency Autonomy Reinterpreted in Light of the Social Dimension: Public
administration organisms have a strong autonomy and seem to be isolated from external
pressures. Even in issues like education, community groups dont have much impact. Often
when they have a concession, its frustrated by failures in implementation unmanaged
social conflict ungovernable city (neopluralist interpretation).
Lower strata needs more service, so they tend to be unhappy in service delivered. Then,
social services tend to serve better middle or upper class because they are likely to show their
improvement.
Class Bias in Program Implementation: The "Ungovernable City" Reconsidered:
Public agencies operating in a stratification system, in spite of the autonomy, tend to share
some patterns related to social class.
Local governments have to deal with all the areas of policy. They have to choose where not
act. So they will develop projects which have more pressure to be developed and tend to
leave those who have less support. Efforts to upgrade social housing, or give more
opportunities to poor people are likely to have more opposition, in part because it can make

change the composition of the city, while developing business districts or attractions for
middle and upper class tend to find more support.
When policies are made within apparently autonomous agencies through small decisions, the
accumulative impact has sometimes a class bias. It is incremental.
The Overt Behavior of Political Actors: Public officials tent to serve upper strata when its
not evident in front of the electorate. In Atlanta, pro-business demands were always attended
except when they encountered a strong opposition, while pro-neighborhood demands were
attended only when external pressure was so strong. Opportunity costs were different from
one group to another.
Conclusion:
Upper strata are strategically dominated, so they dont really exercise their influence. Just
officials are more predisposed to serve them.
Brief summary:
1: While public officials enjoy significant autonomy in decision making, their autonomy is
constrained by the fact that they operate in the broad context of a highly stratified
socioeconomic system.
2: This system predisposes officials to favor upper- over lower-strata interests
3: Predispositions are motivated by the officials themselves because they want career
success.
4: Looking for their career success, officials tend to increase opportunity cost for some groups,
and decrease opportunity costs for others.
5: The system influences the predispositions in 3 different ways: economic, associational and
social. In each, the systemic power influence has a different degree of impact.
6: Systemic power is more evident in the last phases of policy-making.
7: Systemic advantage is only a facet of the total community power, but it is so important.