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Poole Metaphor
Poole Metaphor
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singularities, but both indigene and analyst create contexts (of different kinds and for different purposes) that reduce some of the
singularity of events for pragmatic or philosophical ends and by
analytic, classificatory means. To be explicit and analytically useful,
folk models and intuitive apprehensions of similarity and differenceboth theirs (in the lived or reconstructed context) and ours (in the
analytic context)-must be hammered out on the anvil of logically
precise and consistent conceptual formulation. The in situ intuition
that is reconstructed a posteriori as method is rationalization of a
different order and yields neither insight nor theoretical advance in
comparative analysis.18
Smith (1978a, 1982b) brings us to what he calls a "gap" (perhaps
an abyss) created by the postulation of difference, for he properly
observes that comparison must formally involve a consideration of
both similarity and difference. On the one hand, the postulation of
identity precludes the possibility of comparison by obliterating the
"gap" and rendering comparison tautological. On the other hand, the
postulation of difference is meaningless for comparison without some
connective tissue of postulated similarity. Difference makes a comparative analysis interesting; similarity makes it possible.19 Neither
quality, however, is simply and unproblematically inherent in the
phenomena to be compared. Only abstract concepts can provide the
problems, lenses, and constructed patterns in terms of which we can
postulate analytically useful similarities and differences. Without
theoretical concepts, there can be no "methodical manipulation of
difference, a playing across the "gap" in the service of some useful
end" (my italics) (Smith, 1982b: 35).
Hempel (1966: 112-115), while defending his later and somewhat
reformulated logic of induction, acknowledges the impossibility of
eliminating a priori concepts from systematic inquiry, a perspective
documented at length by Kuhn (1970) and variously supported by
Kaplan (1964: 86), Medawar (1969: 128-173), Myrdal (1969: 9), and
Nadel (1964: 20-34). Indeed, in noting the common fallacy of assuming an antithesis between assembled facts and theory, Medawar
(1969: 149) correctly observes that, "...
unprejudiced observation is
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hand" (Spiro, 1972: 577). On the other hand, as Nadel (1964: 20-34),
following Whitehead (1938: 2f.), observes, both theory and data are
inextricably bound up together in analysis and mutually determine
their relative significance. Indeed, Quine (1951) properly doubts that
analytic questions of meaning and synthetic questions of fact can be
sharply or rigidly distinguished, and Hempel (1952: 10f.) suggests that
the project of "explication-the shaping and sharpening of more or
less vague notions of theoretical discourse in terms of the subject
matter at hand-blurs a precise distinction between conceptual analysis and empirical inquiry (Quine, 1960: 258f.). Thus, if the terms of
an empirical inquiry are generated in theoretical context, then there is
no possible movement from observations that are shorn of theory to
theoretical generalizations.20The problem of pure induction tends to
fade at the disintegration of an absolute faith in logical empiricism
20
Note that the view that observations, meanings, and facts are theory-laden refers
here to matters of interpretation and explanation in contexts of inquiry or discovery and
not to matters of confirmation, validation, or falsification. Indeed, the hermeneutical
claim that the rationale or grounds for constructing an interpretation or explanation and
for accepting that interpretation or explanation are the same is seriously tautological
(see Geertz, 1973, 1984; cf. Collin, 1985; Grtinbaum, 1984; Norris, 1985; Spiro, n.d.).
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(Sellars, 1963: 355). Indeed, Nadel's (1964) formulation of the interplay between theory and data is a sophisticated commentary on the
implications of Fortes' (1970: 129) famous anthropological dictum
that, "Every way in which facts are grouped in description involves
theories, implicit or explicit, about the connections between them that
are significant; and significance is a function of the kinds of questions
to which the observer seeks an answer.... Ethnographic facts [per
se] ... are meaningless.... "
If this brief portrayalof anthropological description and analysis is
a reasonable characterization of what anthropologists do, it implies
that both our ethnographic and our textual materials are selected,
described, and organized in relation to the interpretive frameworksor
theoretical models that we bring to bear on them at all stages of
research (albeit in different ways). In contexts of inquiry or discovery
where issues of initial insight, recognition of pattern, interpretation,
and formulation of explanation are focal (Gruinbaum, 1984; Spiro,
n.d.), the analytic and descriptive processes are intricately bound
together through an engagement in what Geertz (1973) so vividly
characterizes as "thick description." Through the metaphor of
Dilthey's (1962) notion of a hermeneutic circle, Geertz (1973, 1976)
endeavors to unpack layers of signification and to reveal patterns of
significance with the suggestion of a process of "dialectical tacking"
back and forth between the particularand the general, the experiencenear and the experience-distant, the emic and the etic. All of these
analytic contrasts invoke an image of the interweaving of theories and
data in the mold of webs of cultural signification that Geertz seeks to
disentangle without destroying their natural richness and fragile
coherence. But his is ultimately an impossible stance for any comparative analytic undertaking.
Although Geertz (1973, 1984) is skeptical about the possibility of
a comparative analysis (cf. Skocpol and Somers, 1980), he develops a
set of analytic models, strategies, and tactics that depend heavily upon
analogical or metaphorical relations.21 Whether exploring the
Balinese cockfight or theatre state, he elegantly maps significant
contours of a socio-cultural landscape by means of a sensitive, subtle,
21 On Geertz's own comparative endeavors, however, see Geertz (1968, 1976). In the
former work, Geertz utilizes a contrast in contexts-Moroccan
and Indonesian-to
explore both similarities and differences in two cultural modes of participation in a
common, yet problematic Islamic civilization. The ideal types of the Indonesian
mystical-aesthetic configuration and the Moroccan moral-warrior configuration figure
prominently in this comparison. Geertz (1968:96-97) notes, however, that in the
or 'belief in
process of comparison "we look not for a universal property-'sacredness'
the supernatural', for example-that divides religious phenomena off from nonreligious
ones with Cartesian sharpness, but for a system of concepts that can sum up a set of
inexact similarities, we sense to inhere in a given body of material" (my italics).
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iii
If there is some utility in perceiving our categories of analysis to
be "open-textured," then we must make sense of how that texture is
constructed. In this regard, the subject of theoretical problem formulation and of metaphoric or analogic images, mappings, and models
must re-emerge. Perhaps we must begin with our "prefigurations"of
scholarly interest and contextual description, interpretation, and explanation. By prefigurations, I mean those often diffuse assumptions,
interests, images, and theories that shape what we find to be intriguing, important, puzzling, or problematic, and, thus, central to our
analytic concerns in probing the significance of particular aspects of
cultural, psychological, and social phenomena in cultural history and
in anthropology (White, 1973:1-42). These prefigurations-always
subject to various forms of modification-provide us with a very
general set of guides and lenses in our set of assumptions about
"human nature" in its most fundamental biological, cultural, psychological, and social aspects.
When we construct descriptions, interpretations,and explanations
in (and of) particular cultural, historical, or social contexts (Scriven,
1959:450), we inevitably draw upon some notion of a problem to be
explained, an explanatory logic, and a relevant context to be explored
in empirical support of an explanation. All these matters rest upon the
epistemological foundation of the epistemes or paradigms that encase
our research traditions. Thus, we are engaged in the conceptual
shaping or construction of two interrelated contexts: the more or less
tentatively bounded cultural, historical, or social context that we claim
is empirically relevant to some decipherment (description, interpretation, and explanation) of a particular puzzle; and the intellectual
context that gives rise to our sense of relevance and to our sense of the
puzzle that informs the criteria of relevance. These contexts are given
focus and significance by the theoretical lenses that we bring to bear
on analytic puzzles. Berlin (1954:54) reminds us, however, that the
analytic process (despite its apparent goals) is often not "sufficiently
clear, sharp, precisely defined to be capable of being organized into a
formal structure which allows of systematic mutual entailments or
exclusions." When I "describe" a rite of am yaoor ("male initiation";
literally, "house of a forest fern") among the Bimin-Kuskusmin of the
remote West Sepik mountains of Papua New Guinea, I must intricately select from a diversity of data and shape a portrait of a facet of
ten-stage, decade-long ritual cycle (Poole, 1976, 1982). The process is
creative in constructing criteria of relevance for selecting and arranging, foregrounding and backgrounding, and partitioning or articulating the "important" and the "incidental" features of the focal rite. It
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iv
Let us review our analytic pathways. Our puzzles or problems and
our reasons or purposes, as well as the theoretical and ethnographic
contexts in which they are to be embedded, do not represent the only
arena of our negotiations. We must also recognize the formal properties and the implications of how we formulate our problems, and what
such formulations imply or entail for definition or classification, for
descriptive portrayal, interpretive understanding, and explanatory
argumentation about religious phenomena. Much of our initial, creative formulation of problems may be usefully perceived as a genre of
metaphoric construction that posits some critical "fiber" of resemblance and constitutes the preliminary grounds for an analogic mapping. Theoretically informed analysis then proceeds to explore the
implications of that particularconstruction and mapping. Metaphors,
by constructing an illuminating sense of similarity, allow us to see and
to understand one domain in terms of another through a mapping of
aspects of one onto aspects of the other. But the very nature of a
"domain" of experience is shaped by (and in) the construction of the
metaphor and of the analogic mapping that explicates metaphoric
intuitions (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). "Love is a journey," "Love is
madness," "love is bliss," and "love is war" (which, of course, "is
hell"), are all metaphors-indeed, only a few points on the English
metaphoric map of a complex landscape-that illuminate different
facets of a vague concept. But they do not collectively define the
phenomenon in any substantive, monothetic sense. Instead, by providing a complexly articulated set of different lenses, they fix the
reference(s) of the concept in a variety of ways, the precise articulation of which remains to be explored. Categories thus constructed are
essentially "open-textured."
Because these analytic categories derived from metaphoric constructions and analogic mappings are not monothetically closed, they
allow for the possibility of strategic and systematic elaboration and
extension in a variety of ways and for various purposes. The analogies,
metaphors, and hedges select or construct a prototype, exemplar,
center of variation, or aspectual focus, and define various kinds of
relationships to it. Each such relationship, and the coherences among
such relations, must be explored for its subtle analytic implications.
What is within or beyond the focus of analysis will vary from one
metaphoric construction or analogic mapping to another. Yet, the
partially overlapping foci of several more or less articulated metathe analogic mappings through which they are
phoric lenses-and
explicated and made explicit-may
provide an increasingly refined
illumination of the contours and internal structures of the "domain" of
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our inquiry with respect to the central puzzles that inform the linked
constructions of analytic metaphors or analogies. When we seek to
compare our analytic concepts with those of the "texts" composed by
indigenes, we note that both sets-ours and theirs-are often "opentextured," but that each tends to select, bracket, and focus differently.
This genre of comparative analysis is highly complex, for it involves
consideration of comparisons among our (theoretical) analytic concepts, among their (cultural)analytic concepts, and between both sets
of concepts. The relationship between tradition-bound folk models
and theory-bound analytic models is complex and poorly understood,
but it remains a central problem for the comparative study of religious
phenomena (Caws, 1974; D'Andrade, 1984; Holy and Stuchlik, 1981).
v
To the extent that we may learn something from linguistics about
the formal lexical structure, syntactic embeddedness, and semantic
organization of metaphors and perhaps other trope constructions, we
can compare these sets of analytic and cultural concepts-as metaphors-to note how they are opened, closed, focused, and bracketed
differently; how they overlap (if they do) or otherwise interrelate in
the coherence of their semantic networks or structures and their
logico-semantic implications or entailments; and how they draw
different or similar maps of similar or different "territories" of theoretical interest (Smith, 1978b). The intricate overlapping of metaphoric constructions may be revealed in shared metaphorical entailments and in partial correspondences among the metaphoric
networks, structures, or foci established by those entailments. There
are often many metaphoric constructions that partially structure a
concept or domain, each illuminating some facet of it. These various
constructions and mappings tend to set different perspectives and to
serve different analytic purposes by emphasizing varied aspects of the
concept or domain.
Evans-Pritchard's(1965) explication of the Nuer idea of kwoth by
reference to not only various cultural metaphors that implicate matters
of space, time, genealogy, ecology, et cetera, but also various facets of
different cultural notions of deity, power, spirit, refraction, and other
abstract notions, implicitly proceeds by analytic attention to metaphoric constructions and analogic mappings. He attempts to align
some aspects of the Nuer kwoth variously with the Latin spiritus, the
Greek pneuma, and the Hebrew ruah, and to bracket the relationship
between man and deity by reference to the concepts of agape and eros
as they are portrayed in Anders Nygren's theological scheme. Yet,
Evans-Pritchard (1956, 1965) is uncomfortable with this interweaving
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nomena involve metaphors that are structured and focused to highlight certain theoretical problems or puzzles. To claim that "religion is
X" does not necessarily imply that is all religion is, or even that a
monothetic definition of religion is in any way central to the analysis.
The recognition of such definitional limitations allows us to consider
formally the theory-constitutive aspects of metaphor or analogy
(Gentner, 1981, 1982).
If we encounter claims that religion-or myth, ritual, or some
other conventional aspect of religious phenomena-is performative
(in the different senses of Goffmanand Tambiah), a system of symbols
(in the different senses of Geertz and Turner), a functional design
focused on need-fulfillment (in the different senses of Freud and
Malinowski), or sacred, social, ideological, or what have you, we must
analyze those claims in the context of the descriptions, interpretations, and explanations in which they are embedded. We must
examine how those claims are put to use in shaping those descriptive,
interpretive, and explanatoryframeworks.In this critical way, we may
render explicit the essential structureand entailments of these claims
as metaphoric or analogic kinds of analytic constructions.
When Leach (1968) defines ritual as a mode of communication and
then forges a complex set of analytic metaphors in terms of the idioms
of information theory, linguistics, and structuralism,the critical point
of the definition is not a total encompassment of a phenomenologically closed category to be explored in a totalistic sense. Indeed,
Leach's analytic construction claims that if we explore certain (communicative) facets of what is conventionally called "ritual" through
the lens of this metaphor, the often postulated contrast between myth
and ritual may be usefully dissolved; and both myth and ritual
(together) may be innovatively analyzed by means of linked communicative metaphors that yield a similar pattern of analogic mappings in
each instance. Leach articulates the linkage or coherence among his
metaphoric constructions in terms of their entailments in information
theory, linguistics, and structuralism. He makes no claim that communication is a distinctive feature of a monothetic category of religion, but shows that certain metaphors enlighten the interpretation of
particular cases and produce comparative generalizations of broader
theoretical significance.
In another contribution focused on biblical texts, Leach
(1969:25-83) employs a structuralist metaphor of mythology as a
powerful intellectual device that both posits and mediates fundamental, existential contradictions. He draws significantly on L6viStraussianinsights into mythologiques, but his analysis is not encased
in a L~vi-Straussian epistemology or methodology in certain important respects. Leach assumes that sacred texts contain a mysterious
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consequences are considerable. When theoretically informed comparison and, thus, the possibilities of generalization are held to be central
and essential components of the academic enterprise of studying
religion by attending to religions, the choices are not open. Indeed,
the choices taken in this essay are clear: "ethnographic" description is
a constructed context for the interpretive unraveling of meaning and
the formulation of possible explanation with respect to matters of
discovery, which then must be articulated in a theoretical context and
form in the service of enabling comparison, generalization, explanation, and validation. The immediate concern of this essay, however,
has been to suggest that the structure of family resemblances,
polythetic categories, metaphoric constructions, and analogic mappings may shed important light on the formal nature of comparison.
That particular illumination is critical, for it focuses attention on
Smith's (1983b: 35) fundamental "question, 'How am I to apply what
the one thing shows me to the case of two things?' The possibility of
the study of religion depends on its answer." Amen. Let us center a
significant emphasis of our opening dialogue here.
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