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Fae
Fae
ISSUE
Did the RTC have jurisdiction? Yes.
RATIO:
2. NPC v. JOCSON
206 SCRA 521 February 25, 1992
FACTS:
ISSUE
GAOD.
Under PD 42, after depositing the assessed value of amount equal to assessed
value to taxation, they are entitled to WP.
Judge ignored it and himself made the provisional amounts, not based on assessed
value.
Afterall, PD 42 was reiterated in other laws.
It removed discretion of Judge to fix provisional amount.
Here he even allowed the owners to affix their conformity subordinating his
judgement for theirs.
If indeed as found in ordere that no objecton, should have appointed 3
commissioners to help determine JC.
Remand.
3)
clearance issued in her favor by the HSRC was a legal bar to the expropriation suit
was not a ground for dismissal under Rule 16. She evidently meant to prove the
Municipality's lack of cause of action; but lack of cause of action is not a ground for
dismissal of an action under Rule 16; the ground is the failure of the complaint to state
a cause of action, which is obviously not the same as plaintiff's not having a cause of
action.
Nothing in the record, moreover, discloses any circumstances from which a waiver by
the Municipality of the right to present contrary proofs may be inferred. So, in deciding
the issue without according the Municipality that right to present contrary evidence, the
trial court had effectively denied the Municipality due process and thus incurred in
another reversible error.
No. The locational clearance did become a worthless sheet of paper, as averred by the
Municipality, upon the lapse of 1 year in light of the explicit condition in the clearance
that it shall be considered automatically revoked if not used within a period of one 1
year from date of issue, and the unrebutted fact that Francisco had not really made
use of it within that period. The failure of the Court to consider these facts, despite its
attention having been drawn to them, is yet another error which must be corrected.
streets in the City of Manila was to be extended through the municipality of Pasay, thereby
making the land affected practically a part of the City of Manila and giving it a frontage on one
of the citys principal boulevards. The property had further increased in value when the
commissioners held hearings a year and a half after these proceedings were filed. In other
words, the value of the property was enhanced by the purpose for which it was taken. The
owners of the land have no right to recover damages for this unearned increment resulting
from the construction of the public improvement for which the land was taken. To permit them
to do so would be to allow them to recover more than the value of the land at the time when it
was taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just compensation, and would
discourage the construction of important public improvements. The property is to be
considered in its condition and situation at the time it is taken, and not as enhanced by
the purpose for which it is taken.
It is generally held that the valuation of the property taken should be made as of the
time of the filing of the condemnation proceedings. That is a fixed and convenient date, and it
usually precedes or coincides with the taking of the property; but in the case at bar the plaintiff
appropriated the property with the consent of the landowners, and without the filing of any
expropriation proceedings, in the expectation that the parties would be able to reach an
agreement out of court as to the value of the property taken, and the condemnation
proceedings were not filed until it was found much later that no such agreement could be
reached as to part of the property. Under those circumstances the value of the property
should be fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of the
proceedings.
The defendants are entitled to recover legal interest on the value of their
property from the time when it was taken by the plaintiff.
Note: Fifty-two lots and the improvements on ten lots were involved in the appeal, and the
Supreme Court indicated in the decision how much each lot was appraised by the
commissioners and by Hoskins before fixing the amount each lot was worth. This is why the
decision was kinda lengthy.
6. REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVIN
No. L-20620
August 15, 1974
Facts:
Philippine Government filed an eminent domain case against the estate of Castellvi
for a 760,000 sqm. Parcel of land in Pampanga. Government alleged that the valuation should
not be more than 2000 pesos per sqm or a total of 259000 peso and prayed that the
provisional value should be set at that price. Castellvi contended that it is actually worth 15
pesos per sqm or a total of 11,400,000.00. The alleged taking started when the Government
through the Philippine Air Force has been occupying the lot under lease since 1947 but on
1956 Castellvi refused to renew lease contract and opted to have the lot subdivided and sold
to the public. Government opposed since they introduced improvements to the lot worth
500,000 pesos.
The Government alleged that the taking should be counted from 1947 by virtue of
the lease agreement. Castellvi insists that it should start from the time the lease contract had
expired on 1956. They filed the case on June 1959.
Issue:
Is the Governments position correct?
The President issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the
public domain situated in Cebu, for the establishment of an export processing zone by
petitioner EPZA.
However, the proclamation included 4 parcels of land registered in the name of private
respondent San Antonio Devt. Corp. (SADC). Since the parties failed to reach an
agreement as to the purchase and sale of the properties, EPZA filed a complaint for
expropriation against SADC.
Respondent Judge Dulay authorized the petitioner to take possession of the property
immediately, and appointed commissioners to ascertain just compensation. The
commissioners reported a value of P15.00/sq.m.
Petitioner filed a MR and objection to the Commissioners Report on the ground that
PD No. 1533 has superseded Rule 67 on the ascertainment of just compensation
through commissioners. The MR was denied, hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
W/N Rule 67 has been repealed or deemed amended by PD No. 1533. Stated differently, is
the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD No. 1533 valid
and constitutional?
Petitioner: Respondent judge acted with GADALEJ, because under PD No. 1533, the
basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared by the
owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
Ruling:
THE PROVISIONS OF THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.
DECREES
ON
JUST
COMPENSATION
ARE
The decrees categorically and peremptorily limited the definition of just compensation,
thus: For purposes of just compensationthe basis shall be the current and fair market
value declared by the owner or administrator, or such value as determined by the
Assessor, whichever is lowe.
This method constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Although
the court would technically still have the power to determine just compensation, its task
would be relegated to simply stating the lower value; and it would be useless to appoint
commissioners. Thus, its strict application would be a mere formality; and the court
cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair.
The trial court correctly stated that the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or
one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts
own judgment.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It
means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the
conditions of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities,
should be considered.
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for
expropriation. The values given out by the assessor are usually uniform, so the individual
differences of the property are not taken into account. The value of the land is based on
generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops.
The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of
Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the just-ness of the decreed compensation.
The complaint alleged that the property in question was necessary for the purpose of
opening or building a street running from Calle Marques de Comillas to Calle
Nozaleda, crossing Calle San Marcelino and Taft Avenue.
After hearing the respective parties agreed that the opening or construction of said
proposed street was necessary. By agreement of all the parties, Prieto, Tiaoqui, and
Mahoney were appointed as commissioners to view and appraise the property
involved in the present action and to report their findings and conclusions to the court.
The commissioners allowed as the reasonable value of said land the sum of
P10,637.28. The commissioners, however, reduced said total amount by the sum of
P1,353.13, which was the necessary cost, in their estimation, to properly grade the
street.
The defendant-appellants insist that they should have been allowed the sum of
P13,617.63. In support of their claim they cite the declaration of several of the
witnesses who testified during the trial of the cause with reference to the value of the
land in question.
The plaintiff-appellant argues that the commissioners arbitrarily, without any proof
whatever, reduced the cost of filling the street and grading the land
Plaintiff claims that amount to be paid for the tienda should be based on reconstruction
costs, while defendant claims it should include the value of the rent at the time of
expropriation
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether the amount allowed for all of the land belonging to the defendants,
appropriated for the opening or construction of the street was correct
Whether the value of the tienda can be deduced from its rental value at the time of
expropriation or from the cost of its reconstruction
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
In taking private property for public use under the power of eminent domain, the
persons whose property is thus taken, should be paid the reasonable market price of
their property. The owners of property should not take advantage of the necessity of
the public for the purpose of requiring the Government to pay more than their property
is worth, neither should the Government be permitted to take the property of private
persons at a less price than it is reasonably worth at the time of the expropriation.
Market value of property taken under the power of eminent domain means the value,
which purchasers generally would pay for it. This does not mean what a purchaser
would pay who had no particular object in view in purchasing, and no definite plan as
to the use to which to put it. The owner has a right to its value for the use for which it
would bring the most in the market.
It is difficult to understand upon what theory the plaintiff could insist upon having the
actual value of the land at the time of expropriation reduced by what it would cost to
grade the street after the land had been turned over to it. The plaintiff was attempting
to expropriate the land in the condition under which it was found. The commissioners
were appointed for the purpose of ascertaining its value in that condition. The question
was as to the value then, not its value after it was appropriated for public street purposes.
It is difficult to understand upon what theory the plaintiff could require the defendants to
bear the cost of the construction of the proposed street. In fact, a condition might be
imagined where the street might be so graded as to result in actual damaged to the rest
of the property of the defendants. For example, if the city should establish a grade much
higher than the property belonging to the defendants, actual damages might result to the
defendants by virtue of the grading of the street. We do not believe that the cost of
grading the proposed street should be charged to the defendants. We are of the opinion,
therefore, and so hold, that the value of the property, P10,637.28, should not have been
reduced by P1,353.13
2nd Issue:
There may be cases where the value of property can be fixed upon its actual rental
value. For example, where the property has been rented for a number of years at a fixed
rate, then such rate ought to be used as the basis of the actual value of the property. It
must not be overlooked that there is a difference between the actual rental value of the
property and the price for which it is rented at any particular time. What property will rent
for is a variable quantity. The amount paid for the use of property is not always a constant
quantity. The amount, which the tenant will pay, may depend upon his particular
necessities at the time.
The theory of the defendants would fix the rent for all time as a constant quantity. The
constant changing of centers of population and of business, as well as the fluctuation of
business, depending upon good or so-called hard times, affect that value of property for
rental purposes. For example, had property been expropriated upon the Escolta in the
city of Manila early in the year 1898, and had its value been capitalized upon the basis of
its rental value then, the owner would have received a much less amount for his property
than if the same property had been expropriated in the year 1906, the difference
depending upon what the particular property rented for in the two periods. Thus, within a
period of seven or eight years, an absolute readjustment of the value of the properties
had taken place. Thus it will be seen that the contention of the defendants that the rental
value of the property should be fixed for all time by what happens to be its rental value at
the time of the expropriation would seem to be untenable.
Neither can the rental value be determined upon a consideration of the cost of the
construction of the property. For example, a building in the principal part of the city might
be worth much more than one on the outskirts, which cost twice as much. A building on
the Escolta, in the city of Manila, which cost P50,000 might rent for twice as much as a
building on the outskirts of the city which cost P100,000. Thus it is clear that the cost of
construction cannot be used as a basis for determining the value of property.
In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the same
considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private parties. The
inquiry, in such cases, must be what is the property worth in the market, viewed not
merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but with reference to
the uses to which it is plainly adapted, that is to say, What is it worth from its availability
for valuable uses?
So many and varied are the circumstances to be taken into account in determining the
value of property condemned for public purposes, that it is practically impossible to
formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all cases. Exceptional circumstances will
modify the most carefully guarded rule, but, as a general thing, we should say that the
compensation of the owner is to be estimated by reference to the use for which the
3.
Whether the perfection of the location of a mining claim has the effect of a grant
of exclusive possession with right to enjoyment of the surface ground as well as
of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, which right may not be infringed
Whether or not in expropriation proceedings, an order of condemnation may be
entered by the court before a motion to dismiss is denied
FACTS
In 1976, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the CFI of Iloilo to expropriate 2
parcels of land in the municipality of Barotac, Iloilo, owned by Sebastian Cosculluela and Mita
Lumampao, for the construction of the canal network of the Barotac Irrigation Project.
Viejo Irrigation Project, the same was duly authorized, with the corresponding funds
appropriated for the payment of expropriated land and to pay for equipment, salaries of
personnel, and other expenses incidental to the project. The NIA officials responsible for the
project have to do plenty of explaining as to where they misdirected the funds intended for the
expropriated property.
In the present case, the Barotac Viejo Project was a package project of government. Money
was allocated for an entire project. Before bulldozers and ditch diggers tore up the place and
before millions of pesos were put into the development of the project, the basic responsibility
of paying the owners for property seized from them should have been
met.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Another distinction lies in the fact that the NIA collects fees for the use of the irrigation system
constructed on the petitioner's land. It does not have to await an express act of Congress to
locate funds for this specific purpose. The rule in earlier precedents that the functions and
public services rendered by the state cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects (Commissioner of Public
Highways v. San Diego, supra, at p. 625) is not applicable here. There is no showing of any
public service to be disrupted if the fees collected from the farmers of Iloilo for the use of
irrigation water from the disrupted property were utilized to pay for that property.
We must emphasize that nowhere in any expropriation case has there been a deviation from
the rule that the Government must pay for expropriated property. In
the Commissioner of Public Highways case, the Court stressed that it is incumbent upon the
legislature to appropriate the necessary amount because it cannot keep the land and dishonor
the judgment.
This case illustrates the expanded meaning of "public use" in the eminent domain clause.
(Constitution, Article III, Section 9.) The petitioner's land was not taken for the construction of a
road, bridge, school, public buildings, or other traditional objects of expropriation. When the
National Housing Authority expropriates raw land to convert into housing projects
for rent or sale to private persons or the NIA expropriates land to construct irrigation systems
andsells water rights to farmers, it would be the height of abuse and ignominy for the agencies
to start earning from those properties while ignoring final judgments ordering the payment of
just compensation to the former owners.
Just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is
made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made
to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his
loss.