Peacebuilding' in Afghanistan: A Bridge Too Far?

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Peacebuilding in
Afghanistan: A Bridge Too
Far?
Isaac Kfir
Schusterman Visiting Scholar, Maxwell School

of Citizenship / Institute for National Security
and Counterterrorism (INSCT), College of Law,
Syracuse University , NY , USA
Published online: 03 Sep 2012.
To cite this article: Isaac Kfir (2012) Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: A Bridge Too
Far? , Defence Studies, 12:2, 149-178, DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2012.699721
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2012.699721
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ARTICLE
Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: A
Bridge Too Far?1
ISAAC KFIR
The 9/11 attacks organized, led and sponsored by Al-Qaeda irrevocably
altered human history as states and international organizations had to
re-examine their approach to transnational terrorism. Consequently, the
United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted resolutions condemning the attack as well as permitting sovereign states to apply self-defense
in fighting non-state actors.2 The North Atlantic Council reacted by
invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty authorizing the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to support US efforts against
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, an area far removed from the
Euro-Atlantic Zone.3 Beyond altering perceptions, 9/11 had a
tremendous impact on Afghanistan, as not only was the international
community determined to forcefully deal with those responsible for the
attacks, it was going to turn Afghanistan into a stable state that could
provide basic human services security, education, health.4 This commitment was a product of a long discourse whereby the international
community held that when the state failed to provide basic services to
its inhabitants, the international community may intervene - assume the
responsibility - to prevent a humanitarian disaster.
The definition of sovereignty should be broadened to include
responsibility: a state can claim the prerogatives of sovereignty only
so long as it carries out its internationally recognized responsibilities
to provide protection and assistance to its citizens. Failure to do so
should legitimize the involvement of the international community.
Isaac Kfir, Visiting Professor, College of Law, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public
Affairs, Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT), Syracuse University,
NY, USA. Email: ikfir@syr.edu
Defence Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, (June 2012), pp. 149178

ISSN 1470-2436
http://www.tandfonline.com
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2012.699721 2012 Taylor & Francis
150
DEFENCE STUDIES
States that refuse access to populations at risk could expect calibrated

actions ranging from diplomacy to political pressure, sanctions, and,
as a last resort, military intervention.5
Between September 2001 and January 2002, the international community had two objectives concerning Afghanistan: first, capture and/or kill
the Al-Qaeda members responsible for the 9/11 atrocities. Second,
engage in the rebuilding of Afghanistan to ensure that Afghans would
not support the Taliban who had come to power promising security,
order and peace.6 An added reason for the willingness to support the
intervention was a tacit admission that the international community
bore some responsibility for the crisis as once the Soviets withdrew so
did the international community, leading the different mujahidin groups
arguably Western creations to wreak havoc as they fought for
supremacy.7
Two key international meetings laid down the foundation of how
the international community intended to help Afghan reconstruction.
The first held in Bonn in 2001, emphasized that the reconstruction program was to be Afghan-driven. The second meeting, which took place a
month later in Tokyo, outlined the financial commitment of donor
countries. Since those two seminal meetings, the international community has continued to meet to ensure that the reconstruction commitment remains multinational and relevant; at each meeting new targets
are outlined.8 The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
(UNAMA) has the responsibility for supervising, overseeing and coordinating the reconstruction process,9 though every year UNAMAs mandate changes, with more duties and responsibilities falling on its
shoulders.10 However, despite a huge commitment, peace, security and
stability continues to evade Afghanistan, leading to disillusionment
among Afghans and the international community.
The paper examines the peacebuilding efforts of the international
community in Afghanistan, raising the question of whether the operation should continue, as the reconstruction effort appears to be floundering, despite if not because of UN involvement in the country. In
addition, the paper raises the question of whether rebuilding
Afghanistan is simply beyond the capabilities of the international community by challenging the UN methodology of peacebuilding. The
analysis opens with a review of how the international community went
from a philosophy that embraced the notion of keeping the peace to
one in which it seeks to build the peace. The second section analyzes
how the international community approaches peacebuilding in
PEACEBUILDING IN A FGHANISTAN
151
Afghanistan. The focus is on security, reconstruction and reconciliation:

the three pillars of the Bonn agreement. The third section explores the
reasons why peacebuilding has failed in Afghanistan by looking at what
makes Afghanistan a poor candidate for UN-type peacebuilding. The
paper concludes with some preliminary suggestions on how to revamp
the peacebuilding process in Afghanistan.
A Review of Peacebuilding
Before peacebuilding emerged, the international community operating
through the United Nations engaged in peacekeeping a form of international intervention developed by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld and Canadian diplomat Lester B. Pearson, often described as
traditional peacekeeping, as it called for the deployment with the
authority of the Security Council and the consent of at least one of the
parties accepting neutral peacekeepers to help ensure the maintenance
of peace following a the cessation of violence.11 Once deployed, the
Council continues to monitor the situation and if it determines that
there is a threat to international peace and security, it may expand the
mandate to undertake peace-enforcement operations, which means
imposing the peace.12
When the cold war ended, the United Nations embraced the notion
of a New World Order as a way of maintaining international peace
and security.13 An important element in the way the UN approached
the question of intervention is by focusing on humanitarian assistance
beyond providing emergency relief to man-made and natural disasters.
The new approach to intervention encapsulates the promotion of
human rights, political reform and economic and social development.14
These operations allowed the UN as an organization and UN peacekeeping to expand their mandates and area of operations.15 Professor
Edward Newmann has argued:
the role of the United Nations in post-conflict societies has gone
beyond peacekeeping, as a natural extension of the UN becoming
more involved in societal structure, moving away from the idea of
impartiality/neutrality, and recognizing that there is an ethical dimension to peace. The UN is now a conduit for the application of international norms and standards of accountability in countries such as
Guatemala, El Salvador, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone,
and Cambodia.16
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DEFENCE STUDIES
The new approach to peacekeeping stemmed from the dominance of

the liberal peace thesis,17 leading to the adoption of such UN
documents as An Agenda for Peace, which Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali published in 199218 recognizing the new challenge that
the organization faced in lieu of its expanding mandate. Put simply, the
UNs position in the post-Cold War period was that countries emerging
from conflict posed a threat to international peace and security as conflict could spill over, which would undermine peace and security.19 In
addition, there was also a humanist duty to help people suffering from
the violence.20 Thus, the UN approached complex peacekeeping operation as involving sustained efforts to identify and support structures to
consolidate peace and create greater trust and well-being among peoples, without which no peace agreement is likely to endure for long.
In 1993, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali declared:
U.N. operations now may involve nothing less than the reconstruction of an entire society and state. This requires a comprehensive
approach, over an extended period. Security is increasingly understood to involve social, economic, political, and cultural aspects far
beyond its traditional military dimension.21
Thus, as the world celebrated the end of history, the UN took the lead
in engaging in complex peacekeeping operations that involved statebuilding (Mozambique and Cambodia), as well as in reconciliation and
peacemaking (the Chapultepec Accords in El Salvador).22 The chaos in
Somalia, Cambodias descent into authoritarianism, Guatemalas decision to adopt an amnesty program, not to mention prevarication over
President Slobodan Milosevics ethnic cleansing campaign in the Balkans and the escalating costs of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations,
reduced states willingness to support the new generation of peacekeeping, which allowed new actors to assume the lead in complex peace
operations.23 Discussions as to how to expand the role of the United
Nations in international relations continued, leading to major philosophical changes in thinking about international relations24 culminating
in the 2000 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), report, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which challenged thw traditional interpretation of state sovereignty.25 R2P
promoted the principle that the international community had the right
if not the duty to intervene in the domestic affairs in cases of genocide and other international crimes (war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity).26
153
In sum, international intervention in the twentieth-century began

with the development of the concept of UN peacekeeping, which
meant that foreign forces could be placed on the territory of a sovereign
state, as long as the state permitted it. During this period (1950s to the
late 1980s) peacekeeping was a tool in helping maintain international
peace and security, as long as the conflict did not affect the greater
international community or affect the great powers. If the conflict
became a major threat, the Council could choose to become more intimately involved threatening the belligerents with the use of force,
which often compelled negotiations.27 If the threat worked, the Council
could authorize the deployment of foreign troops operating as peacekeepers to prevent the conflict from reoccurring.28 Ultimately, the end
of the Cold War led to an epistemological debate about the duty and
responsibility of states towards people, which over time translated to the
adoption of a set of guidelines, ideals and declarations that reinterpreted
state sovereignty causing a major shift in peacekeeping. R2P embodied
the approach through such documents as In Larger Freedoms and A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibilities that held that states had fundamental duties and obligations towards people, and should the state fail
the international community could assume them until the state was able
to again take charge of these duties.29 From a peacekeeping perspective,
there was also an added buoyancy and urgency in respect to the use and
application of forcer.30 Consequently, the United Nations, through the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations managed complex peace operations in East Timor and Kosovo, with the purpose of making these territories into states that abide by international norms.31 In East Timor
and Kosovo, the UN appointed Transitional Administrators that managed the UN operation (keeping the peace and building the peace) until
it felt that East Timor and Kosovo had the institutional capacity to
assume responsibility.32
The UN and Afghanistan: Applying the Peacebuilding Paradigm
Having been involved in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations in the 1990s,33 the UN felt that peacebuilding, could take
place in Afghanistan. The UNs approach was based on its previous
experiences in conflict and post-conflict environments where first the
belligerents stopped fighting (peacemaking) in respect to Afghanistan,
this arguably occurred in Bonn, as various Afghan groups met and
signed an accord, leading to the adoption of a progressive constitution; a
democratic political system designed on liberal values and economic
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DEFENCE STUDIES
reforms. The Accords encouraged the international community to dispatch, with the permission of Afghans, an international force to help
maintain the peace in Afghanistan (peacekeeping). NATO was entrusted
to lead the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which had
peacekeeping but also having the power to impose the peace should violence arise (peace-enforcing).34 The peacebuilding program was shaped
at the Bonn meeting which Lakhdar Brahimi, an experienced UN diplomat, helped manage. He believed that the international community
had to play a central role in the rebuilding process, but he also acknowledged that Afghans were ultimately responsible for what was to occur in
their country. He stated:
Neither the UN nor anyone else, no matter how sincere, may substitute themselves for the Afghans and solve the problems of Afghanistan for them . . . If the Afghan authorities and their international
partners set realistic objectives; if the international community has
the determination and patience to do what it takes to really help the
situation; if, at the same time, we have the humility to realize that
we are no wiser than Afghans about what is better for Afghanistan,
then there is every reason for optimism.35
The Security Pillar: What was Intended?
The international community recognized that insecurity in Afghanistan
stemmed from the presence of provincial warlords, local powerbrokers,
dissonance between Kabul and the countryside, and many other factors
that had more to do with the nature of Afghanistan and its history than
external actors or the legacy of Afghanistans many wars. The focus was
therefore with human security, which meant that attention was with
building institutions: military, police and justice.36 The security sector
program37 is based on a three-pillar system involving US forces dedicated to capturing or killing senior Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders (Operation Enduring Freedom); an ISAF force that works at promoting
security which has led to ISAF adapting some of the tactics used by the
British in the Malay insurgency: running defensive, offensive and stabilization operations.38 The third pillar deals with helping Afghans develop
their own security institutions by developing a national army to replace
the local militias.39 This demands a strong focus on dismantling the
militias, demobilizing the fighters and reintegrating them into society
through such programs as Partnership for Peace: Afghanistans New
Beginnings Program40).Ultimately, the security sector program was
155
supposed to establish peace and security, both of which are seen as vital
when it comes to reconstruction, as without these two pillars, it is
impossible to build infrastructure, providing the conditions for a stable
economy as well as basic services.
Reconstruction: Designing a Political, Economic and Social Program

Recognizing the importance of physical reconstruction the international
community has spent and continues to spend vast sums on programs to
help Afghanistan move from being in a state of conflict to a post-conflict state. This involves addressing what are seen as the root causes of
conflict: poverty, inequality, and lack of political and civil rights.41 Thus,
Afghan reconstruction began by fixing the Afghan political system:
making it more democratic, as well as establishing a neoliberal, capitalist-oriented economy.42
The 2001 Bonn Accords signed by the four non-Taliban groups set
out a timetable for the political reconstruction process. It began with
the formation of an Afghan Interim Authority (AIA, December 2001 to
June 2002), whose function was to choose a Loya Jirga (Grand Jirga, or
Assembly) to draft the Afghan constitution that led to the establishment
of an Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA, June 2002 to December
2003).43 The approach had two outcomes: first, Afghanistan adopted in
2004 a neoliberal political structure that included a multiparty system, a
National Assembly comprising 351 members, 249 belong to the Wolesi
Jirga (House of the People) and 102 to the Meshrano Jirga (House of the
Elders), as well as a constitution. Second, as the international community found the reforms acceptable, it ensured more aid for reconstruction projects, especially as Afghans appeared supportive of the process
by turning out to vote in 2004.44 This feeds into the neoliberal model,
which sees multiparty elections and a liberal democratic system of governance as paramount in any reconstruction process.
An important element in the physical reconstruction program is the
ISAF-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which are composed
of soldiers, diplomats and civilian experts (the military element is generally dominant in the Afghan PRT45). The Afghan PRT model has a
three-fold agenda: improve security to allow social and economic reconstruction programs to develop, extend the reach of the Kabul-based
Afghan government, and facilitate reconstruction in the provinces.46
Linked to the PRTs and their peacebuilding philosophy is the Afghan
National Development Strategy (ANDS), which reinforces the UNstyle peacebuilding ideology.47 ANDS was officially launched in 2008, at
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DEFENCE STUDIES
Paris (Paris Declaration), with three pillars: security (achieve nationwide

stabilization, law enforcement, and the personal security of Afghans);
political (strengthening the democratic process and democratic institutions, human rights, the rule of law, delivery of public services and
government accountability); and social and economic (reduce poverty,
promote sustainable development through private enterprise, make progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals).48 Thus,
just as PRTs identify the need for civil-military relations, the National
Strategy recognized the connection between the three pillars for
example, building a road will have the triple effect of helping establish a
link between Kabul and the provinces; enhancing economic development and integration; and ending the isolation of a community, leading
to substantial investment in road construction.49
Reconciliation: Dealing with the Past

At the Bonn meeting the reconciliation process was the most difficult
issue to discuss, as it raised many thorny problems for the participants
and the international community. Since 1978, Afghanistan has existed in
a state of severe conflict during which time the laws of armed conflict
were widely ignored. By 2001, a common theme in post-conflict peacebuilding was to demand societies emerging from conflict to engage in
reconciliation, which included prosecuting those accused of international crimes war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.50 In
Bonn, the problem was that the individuals responsible for many international crimes were the ones deemed essential for the reconstruction
and security of Afghanistan, leading Professor Barnett R. Rubin, one of
Lakhdar Brahimis advisers, to observe, the voices calling for accountability for past abuses have been relatively weak and few.51 Professor
Thomas Barfield explains the lack of interest in reconciliation by stating,
Compassion in a country of blood feuds is not exactly well developed,
particularly in a society where it is what you did to somebody, not the
reason that you did it that is most important.52 In addition, the donor
states were disinclined to demand reconciliation as they did not want
knowledge of their own activities in Afghanistan, as well as being concerned that such a process would derail the Bonn arrangements as individuals accused of human rights violations, if threatened with
prosecution, would revert to warlordism or simply opt out of working
with the government. This would undermine the campaign against AlQaeda and the Taliban, as well as reconstruction.53 Consequently, Bonn
only made vague references to the need for reconciliation.
157
In summary, when looking at security, reconstruction and reconciliation, the aim of the international community was clear, end Afghanistans
insecurity by working with Afghans on establishing security, physical
reconstruction and ignore reconciliation.
Understanding the Reasons behind the Peacebuilding Failures
Failure of the Security Pillar Identity and Islam
Establishing security without addressing the underlying causes of
Afghan insecurity meant that ISAF faced a huge challenge even before it
began its operations. There are many issues affecting this pillar, but the
section will only focus on Islam and ethnic identification, which lie at
the epicenter of Afghan society.54 It is important to note that Afghanistan was experiencing major changes prior to the Soviet invasion. King
Zahir Shahs economic reform designed to modernize Afghanistan
placed the younger generations at odds with their elders with the
reforms undermining the traditional Afghan family unit. Young men
became more independent while the older generation became almost
superfluous and in danger of losing their honored position in the family
as they could no longer contribute economically. Professor Louis
Dupree identified this change, pointing out that when a three-generation family moved to the city in search of a better future, the traditional
fabric of the family was challenged as the grandparent usually finds
itself with no role.55
The actors involved in post-Taliban Afghanistan sought to respect
Afghan religious and ethnic sensibilities but also strengthen Afghan
national and Islamic identity. However, these two pillars of Afghan society had irrevocably changed during Afghanistans numerous wars, with
Islam and identity becoming more dogmatic and prominent. From an
Afghan perspective, the war against the Soviets ensured that the assault
on Afghan traditional society continued, as the war enabled a new class
of maliks - white beards (maliks were village elders that manger their
respective community) to emerge. One type of malik was the self-made
malik individuals that returned whether to the refugee camps or to
Afghanistan from Iran or the Gulf States with knowledge of how to
work with government and government officials. These maliks had
money enabling them to assume positions of power in Afghan society,
even if unmerited. The mujahidin were the second new maliks as they
were seen as great warriors and defenders of the Afghan people, while
the traditional maliks lived in the refugee camps.56
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A second important consequence of the war against the Soviets was

that it altered the way Afghans practised Islam and their approach to
Islam. Sir Martin Ewands, a former British diplomat with experience in
the region has noted that in 1980, Pakistan recognized seven mujahedeen groups, all of which embraced Sunni Islam: four were Islamist and
three traditionalists, with the Islamists being more radical in their
outlook and usage of Islamic principles in defining their agenda (the traditionalists saw the war against the Soviets as a war of national liberation). The groups had an ethnic element, as seen with Gulbuddin
Hekmatyars Hezb-i-Islami, which was a Ghilzai Pashtun movement
whereas Burhanuddin Rabbanis Jamiat-i-Islami was mainly Tajik.57 The
development of the mujahidin groups was closely linked to the refugee
camps in Pakistan,58 to which millions of Afghans escaped. These
became a hotbed for Islamic radicalism as the Pakistani government
encouraged Islamist movements from across the world to penetrate the
camps and preach a militarized version of Islam, which encouraged
Afghans to abandon the Hanafi School fors the Hanbali School (specifically the Wahhabi and Deobandi traditions).59 Put simply, the young
men, many of whom were Pashtuns, were fed a diet of poverty, hardship, dogmatic Islam and Afghan nationalism that encouraged them to
move away from a conservative and pragmatic Islam characterized by
cooperation to religious zealotry that viewed the world through the two
lenses of Dar ul-Harb (House of War) and Dar ul-Islam (House of
Islam).60 This afforded them only two options: jihad, or living in an
un-Islamic society, seen by many as worse than death. With these two
elements in mind, these young fighters became a powerful force that in
the post-Soviet period tore the country apart and created conditions
such that Afghanis saw the Taliban as saviors. Graeme Smith saw the
legacy of the Afghan Jihad and civil war when he conducted a survey in
Kandahar in 2007, for which Taliban commanders were interviewed.
When a young Taliban fighter was asked whether it was the killing of
three of his family members by an air strike that propelled him to join
the movement, the young man replied, I would never fight to take
revenge for my family or something else. I am fighting only to remove
the non-Muslims from my country because they are here to destroy
our religion.61 Such a statement illustrates the change in outlook as
prior to the Afghan Jihad the killing of family members62 would have
required vengeance, but in the post-Afghan Jihad period the commitment of the young is to religion.63
A second reason for ISAFs failure to establish security stems from
its mandate, which emphasizes how little understanding there was of
159
Afghan identity and society and how they clash with the neoliberal ideals of peacebuilding.64 This began at Bonn when the international community helped polarize Afghans by empowering ethnic groups at the
expense of others, as seen by the decision to work with the Pashtuns
through Hamid Karzai even though the real power players on the
ground were members of the Northern Alliance (especially the Tajik
element) and members of the Shura-i-Naza.65 A second mistake made
by the international community was to allow the integration of the
warlords into the security mechanism, which has ensured that the
security sector would be rife with discord and tension. In 2001, Afghanistan had no effective government or legitimate opposition beyond the
nefarious Northern Alliance, which is why money and support were
given to people seen to be able to influence policy.66 Thus, in November 2001 the US provided Pacha Khan Zardran, a local militia commander in Patkia province, with $400,000 to train and equip fighters to
patrol the border. However, when Kabul installed a governor that was
more to its liking, Padsha Khan Zadran moved to the mountains and
began shelling the civilian areas to destabilize the new governor. Jason
Burke and Peter Beaumont write that due to this policy
Many Afghans in Khost blame the rising tension on the US. Paying
the warlords for their services has triggered clashes among groups
eager to win patronage from the Americans. In some areas commanders have been told they will receive a top-of-the-range $40,000
pick-up truck a local status symbol if they can prove they have
killed Taliban or al-Qaeda elements.67
The case of Mohammad Qasim Fahim, the Afghan Defense Minister in
2002 is a good example in emphasizing how ethnicity controls government bureaucracy, as Fahim when he was minister made various
appointments based on ethnicity. He appointed Bismillah Khan
Mohammadi, a Tajik and member of the Panjshir militia Shura-i-Nezar
(Coordination Council) as deputy defense minister. By 2004, Fahim
was out of the Ministry, but he was still able to exert influence within
the Ministry because his appointees blocked many of the decisions taken
by the new minister, Rahim Wardak, a Pashtun.68 What is even more
worrying is that, according to an unofficial survey carried out in cooperation with ANA generals, Bismillah Khan when he served as Chief of
Staff of the Army could rely on the loyalty of only about six out of 11
brigade commanders and 12 out of 46 battalion commanders. Giustozzi
writes:
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DEFENCE STUDIES
There is still a tendency perhaps even a growing one among officers to distrust colleagues who come from a different ethnic background. Although few would admit to the existence of an ethnic
bias, political alignments are usually determined along those lines.
This is the result of the existence of rival patronage networks inside
the army, who tend to recruit on ethnic or regional bases.69
The clearest manifestation of identity politics and its centrality in
Afghan society appeared in the 2009 presidential and provincial elections as well as the 2010 parliamentary elections, in which ethnic
identities were crucial. In 2009, Hamid Karzai chose as his vice-president Mohammad Qasim Fahim, a Tajik, despite tremendous domestic
and foreign opposition due to Fahims role during the Afghan Jihad
and afterward. Brad Adams, Asia Director of Human Rights Watch,
claimed that:
To see Fahim in government would be a terrible step backwards for
Afghanistan ... He is one of the most notorious warlords in the country, with the blood of many Afghans on his hands from the civil war.
He is widely believed by many Afghans to be still involved in many
illegal activities, including running armed militias, as well as giving
cover to criminal gangs and drug traffickers. The people of Afghanistan deserve better leadership. The president is insulting the country
with this choice.70
Ultimately, when looking at Islam and ethnic identity, the modernization period and the Afghan Jihad empowered the younger generations
at the expense of the older ones. Currently, the program of the international community seems designed to provoke a re-emergence of traditional types of leadership and organization, as seen with the
proliferation of jirgas (Pashtun) and shuras (non-Pashtun). These are
deemed to be effective tools in administering local communities, resolving conflicts and easing tensions, without really appreciating that the
individuals that run them are individuals that rose during Afghanistans
worse years and had rejected the traditional norms as many had adopted
radical views on ethnicity and Islam. Thus, the appearance of the arbakai
(the term refers to militia forces, but the correct translation is messenger71) is a case in point. The arbakai are local and reflect local identities
and interests but relying on them means working against the campaign
to establish a national police and military force, as they compete with
the security services military and police.72 The arbakai are a
161
consequence of the increasing ethnicization of Afghanistan and the failure of DDR, encouraging young Afghan men to join local militias some
of which are no better than criminal gangs.
Reconstruction: Nurturing a Defunct Political System and its Consequences
The reconstruction effort political, economic and social has been
unsuccessful for many reasons, some endogenous and some exogenous.
In determining why, a bit of selectivity is called for, as one cannot
address all of the issues. Looking at the domestic front, a core aspect of
Bonn and the succeeding meetings was the determination to place
Afghans at the center of the reconstruction process, so that it would not
appear as if the international community was imposing its ideals on a
war-torn community as well as holding to the belief that Afghans know
what their country needed. These two elements are sound epistemologically, as effective reconstruction is not possible when those engaging in
it are perceived as enemies. Realistically, however, the approach had
many shortcomings, which became clear as the reconstruction process
developed.
The Shortcomings of the Afghan Constitution and the Electoral System

A major problem that emerged during the reconstruction was the
Afghan constitution. The international community failed to realize that
by 2001 Afghanistan was more fragmented than it had ever been, and
yet the constitution and the political system that had been designed
for the country, as well as the aid that was going to be funneled into
it, was very Kabul-centric. The international community instead of
designing a political system that acknowledged a strong periphery and
a weak centre, the international community opted for a system that
greatly empowered the centre at the expense of the periphery.73 The
international community appeared to address the centre-prepihery tension by creating the illiusion that power from Kabul is devolved, as
Article 137 of the Constitution requires the Afghan central government to transfer necessary powers . . . to local administrations in order
to accelerate and improve economic, social as well as cultural matters. . . However, because the President has the authority to appoint
governors, rarely do the governors work against him,74 particularly as
some of them are his relatives and/or his political allies. Put simply,
the 2004 constitution ensured that post-Taliban Afghanistan has a centralized, Kabul-centric system even though Afghanistan is a country
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where most of the people live in the countryside and feel nothing but
antipathy and loathing toward Kabul, which they see as corrupt and
decadent.75 Declan Walsh the foreign correspondent for Pakistan and
Afghanistan for The Guardian, points to Ghulam Hazrat, a typical
farmer in Kamah, Nangarhar Province. Hazrat decided to return to
growing poppies because of the lack of support from Kabul. Walsh
quotes Hazrat as saying, When Karzai helps me then I will go for his
jihad. What does he know about my problems?76
The parliamentary electoral system, as opposed to the one used to
elect the president (according to Article 61 of the constitution, the
president is elected by absolute majority vote in a two-round process),
is the rarely used Single Non-transferable Vote (SNTV). The SNTV
is only used in Jordan, Vanuatu and the Pitcairn Islands. Under this
system to which the constitution makes no explicit reference77
Afghans vote for individual candidates rather than political parties,
with each province electing a set number of members, some of whom
must be women (Articles 82109). This means that in a district that
has been allotted four seats, the four candidates with the most votes
will go to the Wolesi Jirga. However, this also means that should one
candidate carry 90 per cent of the vote and three others share 3 per
cent of the vote between them, all four will be elected because they
had more votes than other candidates.78 Thus, Afghanistan has a
poorly constructed electoral system that does not cater for the needs
of the Afghan people nor takes into consideration the nature of the
Afghan state, leading Andrew Reynolds to write that in September
2004, he and Andrew Wilder, the Director of the Kabul-based Afghan
Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), identified the following disadvantages with SNTV: (1) The system will not improve relations
between voters and their representatives, especially in large districts;
(2) It does not strengthen political parties, which arguably are important in establishing a stable political system; (3) It is not very clear,
encouraging a plurality of candidates, especially in large districts; (4) It
gives an advantage to those already in power and does not encourage
new candidates, who will lack political capital in the assembly.79 In
short, the electoral system has helped to promote fragmentation as
well as disillusionment, not to mention rampant corruption. Andrew
Reynolds declares:
By and large, the SNTV electoral system based on large districts did
just what experts had predicted that it would do: It decreased turnout
by confusing voters, it created a fragmented legislature largely
163
unrepresentative of the votes cast, and it diminished the prospects for

legislative-executive cooperation.80
The Effect of International Assistance and its Impact on the Population

In terms of reconstruction aid, there has been a substantial disparity
between what had been promised and what has been given, as well as in the
ways the aid has been used,81 with those connected to the powerbrokers
able to obtain huge benefits. A common occurrence is the consistent
inflation of the cost of projects, leading to corruption and lack of trust in
the state as government officials often abuse their positions. According to
an Afghan official, projects are budgeted through a four-stage process during which money is skimmed off at each level, beginning with the contractors that bid for the project, followed by the granting of permits, the
construction project itself, and ending with the ribbon-cutting ceremony.82
In this respect, the international community is culpable, as it provided aid
and assistance with little accountability. US Special Inspector-General
Arnold Field declared that his offices examination of US reconstruction
aid to Afghanistan found that between 2007 and 2009, the US provided
approximately $18 billion in reconstruction aid to 7,000 contractors. Yet,
despite this vast sum, Arnold said, we dont even know who were giving
money to.83 Braithwaite, a former British ambassador in Moscow from
1988-1992, writes after a visit to Afghanistan in September 2008 that international efforts are not reaching the ordinary people or because the programs are more symbolic than useful. He cites the decision of the British
government to deliver a 200-ton turbine to Kajaki Dam, Helmand Province, involving 5,000 troops as a pointless exercise, since they [British]
now have to bring up the cement on which to build the base for the turbines, and if that succeeds they [British] have to build and protect power
lines through Taliban territory.84
Third, the reconstruction effort is severely undermined by the lack
of an effective centralized taxation system,85 making Afghanistan heavily
reliant on the international community or on various agreements with
local powerbrokers, whether legitimate or not, to provide it with funds.
An Afghan central government that is either dependent on foreign
money or on state-owned minerals will never feel the need to be
accountable to its people.86 In 2007, for example, 70 per cent of the
Afghan revenue system came from customs duties, fixed taxes on
imports/exports and administrative fees while domestic taxes accounted
for only 13 per cent.87 The World Bank has been working towards
improving Afghan revenue collection, but the embryonic tax system is
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DEFENCE STUDIES
undermined by a lack of identification with the Afghan state, seen by

many as corrupt, which discourages Afghans from paying taxes (at least
those who could, as most Afghans live in poverty).
Reconciliation: Failing to Achieve Respect for Basic Human Rights

The reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan have failed mainly because of
the contradiction that lay at the heart of the Bonn process. While
Brahimi on the one hand recognized the horrors that Afghans had suffered, mainly at the hands of their brethren, he also argued the chances
for peace will only increase with the inclusion of a wider cross-section
of Afghan political leadership than was present at Bonn or present in
the process now.88 Gross human rights violators have been able to continue to hold positions of power in Kabul and in the provinces because
the Afghan government lacks the ability to effectively control the country making it reliant on such individuals for its survival. Realpolitik
rules the day in Afghanistan, which is why in 2004 an immunity bill
protecting members of parliament from prosecution for wrongdoing
they may have committed prior to 2004 was passed.89 This was despite
the fact that in a study conducted by the Afghan Independent Human
Rights Commission (AIHRC), a common theme expressed by many
Afghans was that Afghanistan needs reconciliation as well as the prosecution of individuals responsible for crimes committed during Afghanistans decades of violence. What is even more surprising about the
AIHRC study is the support that many people seem to express for
reconciliation and prosecution in a country not known for such
measures.90
A second issue hindering the development of reconciliation in
Afghanistan, whether in the shape of restorative or retributive justice, is
the dilapidated and corrupt judicial system, which increasingly assumes
many of the features corruption, politicization, financially poor, a legacy of manipulation that undermined the branch in the pre-Soviet
days.91 Frank Ledwidge, a barrister and a Justice Advisor to the British
PRT in Helmand, argues that one of the reasons why people at times
revert to customary/tribal and/or sharia law to resolve their differences
is because justice is provided quickly and at less cost.92 As the judicial
system was being designed it came under Italian leadership, with the
aim being that the criminal justice system would project neoliberal
ideals. Unfortunately, there was little recognition of the existence of
competing legal systems Islamic and customary/tribal as well as the
lack of trained lawyers and judges not to mention a weak investigatory
165
system. This made it next to impossible to task the system with more
duties and obligations, which reconciliation would demand. Commenting on shortcomings of the system, Astri Sukrke and Kaja Borchgrevink
write, The Italian expert, who drafted a law closely patterned on the
Italian code, failed to consult with Afghan officials, who strongly
resented the exclusion; they asked President Hamid Karzai not to sign
the draft. The Italian government nevertheless stood by its expert and
threatened to withdraw funding for related projects unless the draft was
approved.93 Thus, the problems with the system become clear when
one looks at the criminal procedure, which reflects the Italian model
rather than an Afghan one, which is why one commentator with firsthand knowledge of Helmand Province notes that:
the formal system in Helmand is what might be termed a legal fiction. Throughout huge swathes of this province it simply does not
apply at all. Over a period of four years, the Provincial Court convicted only 75 persons for serious crimes. Several of these were
released in any event on the payment of bribes for recommendations. For a population of nearly a million either this represents an
extraordinarily low rate of commission of serious crimes or the formal system is missing something.94
A third fundamental reason for the failure of a reconciliation program
stems from the inconsistency of the international community which,
while preaching about human rights and the need to abide by those values, has also chosen to work with the same perpetrators of international
crimes. Afghans scorn this hypocrisy, making them more suspicious of
the international community and its initiatives. Afghans realize that if
the international community recognizes the importance of these men,
ordinary Afghans are not in a position to challenge them; this ensures
that those who have committed international crimes remain free to run
Afghanistan. Thomas Barfield emphasizes this point very clearly:
one great fear I have is with international NGOs coming in; they will
want to see the government make public political statements about
controversial issues to please their audiences in the West. They want
to see all international norms recognized and implemented without
delay. This might be a very hard sell in some areas that the
international community is unaware of. So thats where my concern
is in terms of the consequences of assuming that Western or
international values provide the basis for government policy in
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DEFENCE STUDIES
Afghanistan without appreciating how these policies are likely to be

received by the people there. Why should this cause a problem?
Because the agendas of the people giving the advice are probably different from those of the Afghans.95
Moving Forward Sometimes Means Stepping Back

Fixing Afghanistan in the immediate or even the medium term may
be a bridge too far for the international community, especially at a time
when the world is experiencing its greatest economic and political
upheaval in decades. When looking back at previous peacebuilding initiatives, clearly the international community suffers from attention deficit disorder, as with every passing year states commitment to
Afghanistan diminishes, as they realize the magnitude of the problem,
which is why the mantra appears to be local ownership turning matters to Afghan hands whether they are ready or not.96 Conversely, as
states disengage, the UNs responsibility increases, with UNAMA
receiving more duties and responsibilities, though the resolutions continue to be vague as to what exactly the Council wants achieved
beyond Afghan reconstruction and stability. The shift in attitude also
explains why donor countries appear willing to talk with moderate
Taliban, a polysemous term at best in 2011. Consequently, there are
many different approaches with respect to fixing Afghanistan, ranging
from the utopian (the redrafting of Afghanistans borders to fit with its
ethnic composition) to more practical ones such as recognizing the
shortcomings of Bonn and the subsequent meetings, which would lead
to changing the peacebuilding agenda.
The first necessary change is an epistemological one, by abandoning
the idea that the international community can rebuild the country using
the neoliberal template. Peacebuilding in Afghanistan has to follow a
model more attuned to Afghanistans history, culture and religious systems and evolution.97 This means that instead of working through the
center which was what occurred in Cambodia, Kosovo and East
Timor more attention must be with the villages, towns and provinces.
The international community instead of strengthening local communities has allowed Hamid Karzai to devise ways to expand presidential
control over local communities,98 which alienated them even further
especially as it is at the local level that the real effects of corruption and
malfeasance are felt. A good example of the failure to appreciate the
negative effect of the Kabul government on local communities was the
167
formation in 2007 of an Independent Directorate of Local Governance

(IDLG), designed to ensure the selection of capable provincial and
district governors, as well as local police chiefs and other local officials.
The IDLG in effect has taken power from the Ministry of the Interior
and given it to the President, as the presidency now has a say in choosing local officials.99 This also emphasizes the oddity of Afghanistan
whereby a Directorate can undermine a Ministry. In addition, the chair
of the IDLG is Jelani Popal, a member of Karzais Popolzai clan.100
Focusing on a bottom-up approach that strives to encourage local
empowerment is an established principle in the field of reconstruction
and is very important in Afghanistan, especially as Afghans habitually
harbor animosity towards their government. Ambassador Braithwaite
recalls a conversation with a young man who was discreetly dismissive
of Karzai, seeing the president as a puppet of the foreigners.101 In this
regard, the National Solidarity Program (NSP) has potential because it
seeks to strengthen local government by empowering it through locally
elected councils as well as establishing the conditions for community
managed sub-projects.102 NSP is undermined by corruption as well as
lack of funds, which prevents it from fulfilling its goals, which means
that in time it will either foster resentment or it will be disbanded.
A desperately needed second reform is for the international community to change its philosophical outlook on identity and ethnicity
when engaging in peacebuilding. In the liberal West, multiculturalism
may be lauded and encouraged, but it has come after centuries of
intolerance and violence. It is important to understand that these concepts mean different things in Afghanistan, which is heterogeneous.
Although there appears to be little desire to break up the Afghan state,
the groups work with one another when it serves their purpose. The
quandary is how to enable a strong emphasis on localism and regionalism within the framework of a national Afghan state.103 Recognizing
this paradox is the first step in developing a comprehensive peacebuilding program that appreciates Afghanistans inherent contradictions,
which may mean that programs could be acceptable in one region but
not in another. Although it is impossible to confederate Afghanistan,
what is possible is a moderate and uneven approach to peacebuilding,
which, for example, has a strong focus on broad education in one
region, while in another the education policy will need to be more
limited and designed to work with conservative clerics. This may upset
foreign human rights and gender NGOs, yet is reflective of Afghan
realities, but changing perception based on a generation of ideas takes
a long time.
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DEFENCE STUDIES
A third reform with respect to peacebuilding in Afghanistan is to

reduce the international military presence in Afghanistan to help foster
security. This commitment towards troop reduction must remain even
if the security situation deteriorates, as although the Afghan Army and
the Afghan police force are far from ready to assume their respective
responsibilities, they must learn to shoulder that duty. Waiting until
2014 is simply dangerous, as with every passing day the international
force in Afghanistan is seen more and more as an occupying force, and
instead of fostering security, it accomplishes the exact opposite it feeds
the insurgency.104 In addition to the troop withdrawal, it would be prudent to have a debate on redeployment with a return to the light footprint approach in which there is a greater reliance on Special Forces.105
This demands a rethink with respect to the drone campaign as even
though some argue that Al-Qaeda continues to pose a threat, the use of
drones has proven to be counterproductive owing to the heavy casualties
among Afghan civilians. This does not mean an end to their use, but
the Obama administration must adopt a strategy that calls for drones to
be the very, very last option and only against very senior targets. This
reassessment must also include the drone policy in Pakistan, as reducing
casualty levels in one country will have no effect if they are not reduced
in the other because of the cross border family relations.
A fourth issue is the ability of the Afghan government and the
Afghan people to become self-sufficient, as until Afghanistan develops a
viable tax system and brings to an end the rampant corruption that
undermines the process, the country will not progress. What is more,
taxation is not only about financing the state and its security; it is also a
measure of the trust that people have in their state, as people are more
willing to part with their money if they believe that the state will provide them with services. Scandals such as the Kabul Bank,106 not to
mention the presidential and parliamentary elections, only emphasize
that Afghanistans ruling elite are not accountable. Moreover, even
though President Karzai is repeatedly threatened by donors over corruption, nothing of substance ever comes of the threat.107 The international
community has made the situation worse by supporting such policies as
the Social Outreach Program that aim at developing and enhancing relations between the tribes and Kabul through the payment of a small sum
(approximately $200 per month) to tribal leaders as a way of persuading
them to inform on Taliban movements. The ramifications of this program could be extensive in that it could contribute to the polarization
of Afghan society for short-term gains (i.e. to the perception that
security has improved when in reality the system does not focus on the
169
conditions that caused the insecurity). The Iraqi experience of the

Awakening movement has shown that paying Iraqis to fight an insurgency rarely works, and in fact leaves a legacy of bitterness and
hatred.108 The only way to defeat an insurgency and help Afghanistan
develop is for the international community to rely more on local support rather than on the central government in Kabul.109 To put it simply: Until Afghans themselves decide to get rid of the insurgents, no
amount of money will be enough. Security, reconstruction and reconciliation must lie in the hands of Afghans, as no matter how much good
will the international community has towards Afghanistan, the reality is
that whereas in 2001 the international community could have been the
solution to Afghanistans many woes, by 2010 it had become part of the
problem.
Undoubtedly the international peacebuilding campaign in Afghanistan was motivated by self-interest (making Afghanistan secure and
stable was essential to international security110), as well as a desire to
help Afghans progress beyond the incessant insecurity, violence and
conflict that has cost the lives of over a million Afghans and left
countless others traumatized. However, despite its good intentions, the
international community has made some gigantic mistakes that have
prevented Afghans from moving forward. If it is to put Afghanistan on
the path towards successful post-conflict reconstruction, the international community must first begin by acknowledging its culpability for
Afghanistans current woes, and re-engage in political reconstruction to
devise a system more suitable for Afghans and Afghanistan. For their
part, Afghans must appreciate that the international community must
have the right to pursue those seeking to undermine peace and security,
even if they are within Afghanistans national borders. It is only by progressing slowly and appreciating the limitations of peacebuilding that
Afghanistan can hope to experience real peace.
NOTES
1 I wish to thank Professor William Banks, director of the Institute for National Security
and Counterterrorism (INSCT), Syracuse University, Ms. Shani Ross, Research Fellow
at INSCT and Ms Bonnie Nusser for all of their useful comments, advice and observations.
2 Security Council resolution 1368, 12 Sept. 2001. See also the NAC press statement the
day after 9/11. Statement by the North Atlantic Council, NATO Press Release (2001)
124, 12 Sept. 2001 <www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm>.
3 NATO was created to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact. It was designed to be a defensive alliance for the Euro-Atlantic zone.
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DEFENCE STUDIES
4 On human security see for example United Nations Development Program, New
Dimensions of Human Security (New York: OUP 1994); Gary King and Christopher
L. Murray, Rethinking Human Security, Political Science Quarterly 116/4 (20012002)
pp.585610.
5 Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, Exodus within Borders: The Uprooted Who
Never Left Home, Foreign Affairs 77/4 (1998) p.14; Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, The Economist, 18 Sept. 1999; Ronald Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of
Liberal Internationalism, International Security 22/ 2 (1997) pp.5489.
6 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment
of Permanent Government Institutions <http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/
Documents/Bonn-agreement.pdf]>The 2006 Afghanistan Compact makes clear this
point, as in the Preamble the Compact states that Afghanistan and the international community are determined to strengthen their partnership not only because it would
improve the lives of ordinary Afghans but also because it would contribute to national,
regional and global peace and security. The Afghanistan Compact, The London Conference on Afghanistan, 31 Jan. 31 1 Feb., 2006. </www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/
afghanistan_compact.pdf>.
7 Nick B. Mills, Karzai: The Failing American Intervention and the Struggle for Afghanistan
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 2007); Stephen M. Walt, Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping US
Foreign Policy, International Security 26/3 (20012002) p.62. Thomas Barfield recounts
being in Peshawar in the early 1990s where he met the Afghan shadow minister for agriculture. The man gave Barfield a card that stated Jihad Engineering We Specialize in
Reconstruction. Barfield claims that these mujahidin fighters believed that with the
Soviet exit, the Najibullah regime would collapse and the US and the West would help
Afghans rebuild their state. Thomas J. Barfield, On Local Justice and Culture in PostTaliban Afghanistan, Connecticut Journal of International Law 17/3 (2002) p.438.
8 This becomes very clear when reading Annex I to the Afghan Compact. The Afghanistan Compact, The London Conference on Afghanistan (note 6)
9 Security Council resolution 1401 Calls upon all Afghan parties to cooperate with
UNAMA in the implementation of its mandate and to ensure the security and freedom
of movement of its staff throughout the country. The Council also requested the International Security Assistance Force, in implementing its mandate in accordance with resolution 1386 (2001), to continue to work in close consultation with the Secretary-General
and his Special Representative. Security Council resolution 1401, 28 March 2002.
10 Since 2001, the Security Council has expanded UNAMAs authority so that it acts as the
meeting point for the international assistance program, as well as working to strengthen
cooperation between the ISAF and the Afghan government (Security Council resolution
1806 (2008)). UNAMA also supported the election processes (Security Council resolution 1910 (2010)). For more on UNAMA duties see, Security Council resolution 1386,
20Dec. 2001; Security Council resolution 1413, 23 May 2002; Security Council resolution 1444, 27 Nov. 2002; Security Council resolution 1510, 13 Oct. 2003; Security
Council resolution 1563, 17 Sept. 2004; Security Council resolution 1623, 13 Sept. 2005;
Security Council resolution 1707, 12 Sept. 2006; Security Council resolution 1776, 19
Sept. 2007; Security Council resolution 1833, 22 Sept. 2008; Security Council resolution
1890, 8 Oct. 2009; Security Council resolution 1917, 22 March 2010; Security Council
resolution 1943, 10 Oct. 2010.
11 The Summary Study concludes that as the arrangements for the establishment, implementation and deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) do not fall
under Chapter VII it follows from international law and the Charter that the United
Nations cannot undertake to implement them by stationing units on the territory of a
Member State without the consent of the Government concerned. Summary study of
the experience derived from the establishment and operation of UNEF, Report of the
Secretary-General, 9 Oct. 1958, para. 155, Doc. A/3943.
12 In the 1990s as the Balkans were imploding the Council controversially authorized military action peace enforcement against Serbia due to its inhuman actions in Kosovo.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
171
Christopher Greenwood, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49/4 (2000) pp.
926934; Javier Solana, NATOs Success in Kosovo, Foreign Affairs 78/6 (1999) pp.
114120; Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, The
American Journal of International Law 93/4 (1999) pp.8248; Marrack Goulding, The
Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, International Affairs 69/ 3 (1993) pp.45164.
On how the US interpreted the concept of a new world order see George H. W. Bush
Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 29 Jan.
1991<http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2656&year=1991&month=01->.
Professor Antonio Donini, the former Director of the UN Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (19992002), sums up the change in the field
of humanitarianism as follows: In the past, humanitarian action was at the margins of
international action: it occupied a small, narrow place in conflict situations providing
security and protection to civilians in extremis, mostly in refugee situations outside areas
of conflict. Now, humanitarian action and personnel are at the centre of the international
communitys response to crisis and attract high media visibility. Antonio Donini, Local
Perceptions of Assistance in Afghanistan, International Peacekeeping 14/1 (2007) p.160;
Michael Barnett, Humanitarianism Transformed, Perspective on Politics 3/4 (2005)
p.723; David Chandler, The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human
Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda, Human Rights Quarterly 23/3
(2001) pp.678700.
Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism (note 5); Ronald Paris, At
Wars End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: CUP 2004).
Goulding, The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping(note 12).
Edward Newman, Transitional Justice: The Impact of Transnational Norms and the
UN, International Peacekeeping 9/2 (2002) p.31.
Roger Mac Ginty describes the liberal peace thesis as internationally-sponsored peacesupport and reconstruction interventions . . . marked by its increasingly formulaic, top
down and ethnocentric nature. Roger Mac Ginty, Reconstructing Post-War Lebanon: a
Challenge to the Liberal Peace? Conflict, Security & Development 7/3 (Oct. 2007) p.457.
Law 25/1 (1993) pp.11322; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York:
United Nations Publication 1995); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative, Global Governance 1/1 (1995) pp.311; Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
Global Leadership after the Cold War, Foreign Affairs 75/2 (1996); Jeffrey Haynes,
Democracy in the Developing World: Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001); Jeffrey Haynes, Third World Politics: A Concise Introduction
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1996); Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma 1991); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books 1992).
Boutros-Ghali stated that the goal of the UN in this situation was to forestall a re-emergence of cultural and national tensions which could spark renewed hostilities. BoutrosGhali, Beyond Peacekeeping(note 19) p. 120.
Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (note 19); Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene
ODonnell and Laura Sitea, Peacebuilding: What is in a Name? Global Governance 13/1
(Jan.March (2007) pp.3558; Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, Foreign Affairs 83/1 (2004) pp.13650.
Boutros-Ghali, Beyond Peacekeeping (note 19)p.115 (italics in text).
The Economic Community of West African States took the lead in peacekeeping in
Liberia and Sierra Leone; Haiti became an Organization of American States operation;
and Australia took charge of the International Force for East Timor until the arrival of
UN peacekeepers. Clement E. Adibe, The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN
Partnership, Third World Quarterly18/3 (1997) pp.47188; David Curran and Tom Woodhouse, Cosmopolitan peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: what can Africa
contribute? International Affairs Vol. 83/6 (2007) pp.105570; Nicholas J. Wheeler and
Tim Dunne, East Timor and the New Humanitarian Intervention, International
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25
26
27
28
29
30
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Affairs77/ 4 (2001) pp.80527; James Cotton, Peacekeeping in East Timor: An Australian

Policy Departure, Australian Journal of International Affairs53/3 (1999) pp.23746.
Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty(note 5); Francis M. Deng et. al., Sovereignty as a
Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1996).
Besides the report Responsibility to Protect, there was also the Brahimi Report that
reformed the UNs approach to peacekeeping. Report of the Panel on United Nations
Peacekeeping, Doc. A/55/305S/2000/809, 21 Aug. 2009; Sorpong Peou, The UN, Peacekeeping, and Collective Human Security: From An Agenda for Peace to the Brahimi
Report, International Peacekeeping 9/ 2 (Summer 2002) pp.5168; Nigel D. White, Commentary on the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, (The Brahimi
Report), Journal of Conflict and Security Law 6/ 1 (2001) pp.12746; Gareth Evans, The
Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come. . . and Gone? International Relations22 3 (2008) pp.28398; Feinstein and Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent(note 21).
The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty, Dec. 2001 <www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf>.
The Council threatened Israel and the Arab states with such action in 1948 unless they
stopped fighting. Looking at the various Security Council resolutions adopted throughout
1948, the Council increasingly became more determined to end the conflict in Israel-Palestine. Thus, in Security Council resolution 42 (5 March 1948) the there is an appeal to the
various governments to take all action to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now
occurring in Palestine. SecurityCouncil resolution 50 (28 May 1948) calls upon the governments and authorities to cease all acts of armed force for a month. In resolution 54 (15
July 1948), the Council orders the parties, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter, to desist
from any further military action. Moreover, the Council stated that parties that will not
cease fighting will be in breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39, which may
lead the Council to initiate action under Chapter VII against the offending party.
The 1973 Yom Kippur War offer a good example of this. With the war launched by the
Arab states on 6 Oct. 1973, the Security Council adopted resolution 338 (22 Oct. 22,
1973) calling for a ceasefire, by which point the Israelis had moved from defense to
offense, with Gen. Sharon cutting off the Egyptian Third Army and placing the IDF
approximately 100 kilometers from Cairo. The resolution gave the belligerents 12 hours
to terminate all military activity (Israel and Egypt signed a ceasefire on 24 Oct. 1973).
Three days later the Council authorized the formation of the United Nations Emergency Force to monitor the ceasefire Security Council resolution 340 (25 Oct. 1973).
In Larger Freedoms: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights to all, Report
of the Secretary-General, 25 March 2005, UN Doc. A/59/2005; A More Secure World: Our
Shared Responsibilities: Report of the Secretary-Generals High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change (New York: United Nations 2004); Cohen and Deng, Exodus within Borders(note 5)pp.1216.
Boutros-Ghali argued, when the established rules of engagement for peacekeeping operations are no longer sufficient, UN forces may need authorization to demonstrate a
resolve to use force. If this is not effective, the situation may call for wider rules of
engagement so that UN peacekeepers may react to force and, in some cases, use force to
forestall an escalation in violence. Boutros-Ghali, Beyond Peacekeeping(note 19)
p.120.
Security Council resolution 1272 dealing with East Timor declares that the Council, in
view of what had transpired since the referendum on 30 Aug. 1999, decided to act under
Chapter VII of the Charter and establish a United Nations Transitional Administration
in East Timor (UNTAET), endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of
East Timor and empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including
the administration of justice. Security Council resolution 1272, 25 Oct. 1999. Security
Council resolution 1244, which deals with Kosovo, declares that the Council decided on
the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and
security presences. . . The Council authorized the Secretary-General to establish an
international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for
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34
35
36
37
38
39
40
173
Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing
institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of
Kosovo. Security Council resolution 1244, 10 June 1999.
Alexandros Yanis, Kosovo Under International Administration Survival43/ 2 (Summer
2001) pp.3148; Marc Weller, Kosovo s Final Status, International Affairs84/ 6 (2008)
pp.122343; Katsumi Ishizuka, Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Experience of
UNMISET, International Peacekeeping, 10/ 3 (Autumn 2003) pp.4459; Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, Liberal Peacebuilding in Timor Leste: The Emperors New
Clothes, International Peacekeeping 15 2 (April 2008) pp.185200; Alan Ryan, The Strong
Lead-nation Model in an ad hoc Coalition of the Willing: Operation Stabilise in East
Timor, International Peacekeeping9/ 1 (Spring 2002) pp.2344; Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance in Postconflict Societies, The American Journal of International
Law 95/ 1 (Jan. 2001) pp.7685.
The typology is developed from Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, Understanding
Peacekeeping (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press 2010); Boutros-Ghali, Beyond Peacekeeping(note 19), pp.11322; Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Wars and
Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2008), pp. 1-21; Alex J. Bellamy, The Next Stage in Peace Operations Theory? International Peacekeeping 11/ 1 (Spring 2004) pp.1738; Barnett et al.,
Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?(note 21), pp.3558; Andrew Cottey, Beyond
Humanitarian Intervention: the New Politics of Peacekeeping and Intervention, Contemporary Politics14/ 4 (Dec. 2008) pp.42946; Yasushi Akashi, The Use of Force in a United
Nations Peace-Keeping Operation: Lessons Learnt from the Safe Areas Mandate, Fordham International Law Journal. 19/ 2 (1995) pp.31223.
Security Council resolution 1386 encapsulated the peacekeeping and peace-enforcing elements of ISAF, which were empowered to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the
maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim
Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment. Security Council resolution 1386, 20 Dec. 2001.
Lakhdar Brahimi, Afghanistan: Prospects for the Future, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. 4/ 2 (SummerFall 2003) p.81.
Ellen Laipson, the former Vice-Chairman of the US National Intelligence Council,
claims that security sector reform is for states that aspire to move along the continuum
to democracy; it should not be confused with military modernisation intended to
improve combat effectiveness only. Ellen Laipson, Prospects for Middle East Security
Sector Reform, Survival49/ 2 (2007) p.100.
Owing to the lack of security in Afghanistan, there is a continuous need to redefine and
reshape the security pillar, as seen at the NATO meeting in Lisbon (2010) where some
members of the alliance wanted a definite date for the withdrawal of NATO forces from
Afghanistan while others wanted the withdrawal to be dependent on conditions.
Peter Dahl Thruelsen, The Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: A Localised Insurgency
with a Local Objective, Small Wars & Insurgencies21/ 2 (June 2010) p.261.
The 2002 Military Technical Agreement signed between the Afghan Interim Authority
and ISAF states that ISAFs responsibility in the area of security, law and order means
providing Afghans with protection from insurgents, criminal enterprises and other
threats. ISAF has helped establish an Afghan National Army (ANA) as well as playing a
central role in the development of an Afghan National Police (ANP). International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan
(Interim Administration): Military Technical Agreement, International Legal Materials41/
5 (Sept. 2002) pp.10327.
These programs were to work in conjunction with the construction of the national army,
in addition to the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program, which
involved UNDP working with the Afghan government and UNAMA to deal with
174
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42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
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DEFENCE STUDIES
threats posed by illegal armed groups. The objectives of the program in 2005 were: (1)
To improve security through disarming and disbanding illegal armed groups; and (2) To
provide basic development support to communities freed from threats posed by illegal
armed groups. Accomplishing these objectives will permit social and economic development. Disbandment of illegal armed groups: project document, Government of Afghanistan, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, United Nations Development
Program, 31 July 2005 <[ www.undp.org/cpr/documents/ddr/pro_docs/Project_Doc_
PRODOC_DIAG_Jan._2005_-_June_2006.pdf>.
This is a principal philosophy behind the DIAG program. ibid.
Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment
of Permanent Government Institutions [The Bonn Accords] 5 Dec. 2001<[http://
unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/Bonn-agreement.pdf>.
Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistans Long Reconstruction, Journal of Democracy. 14/ 1 (Jan.
2003) pp.8299; Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan in 2004: Electoral Progress and an
Opium Boom, Asian Survey45/ 1 (Jan.Feb. 2004) pp.8897.
Larry Goodson, who spent time in Afghanistan in 2004, recognizes that there was much to
do, but his review emphasizes the level of optimism that many people felt about the country, especially around the time of the elections. Goodson, Afghanistan in 2004 (note 43).
MajorGeneral Roger Lane, former Deputy Commander Operations ISAF VIII (2005
2006) and Emma Sky, a former advisor to the ISAF Commander (20052006), have stated that a PRT is essentially a military structure but, owing to the complexity of stability operations, a civilian element has been added. Roger Lane and Emma Sky, The Role
of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Stabilization, The RUSI Journal151/ 3 (June/July
2006) p. 48.
Touko Piiparinen, A Clash of Mindsets? An Insiders Account of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, International Peacekeeping 14/ 1 (2007) pp.14357; Matthew Jackson and Stuart Gordon, Rewiring Interventions? UK Provincial Reconstruction Teams and
Stabilization, International Peacekeeping14/ 5 (2007) pp.64761; Nik Hynek and Jan Eichler, The Czech Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan: Context, Experiences
and Politics, Defence Studies10/ 3 (Sept. 2010) pp.40530; Kenneth Holland, The Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team: The Arm of Development in Kandahar Province,
American Review of Canadian Studies. 40/ 2 (June 2010) p.278; George Dimitriu and Beatrice de Graaf, The Dutch COIN Approach: Three Years in Uruzgan, 20062009, Small
Wars & Insurgency21/ 3 (Sept. 2010) pp.42958.
ANDS is closely linked to UNAMA. United Nations Development Assistance Framework: In Support of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 20102013.
<http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Publication/UNDAF%20English.pdf>,
Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 20082013: A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, [<www.embassyofafghanistan.org/
documents/Afghanistan_National_Development_Strategy_eng.pdf>.
Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 20082013, ibid.
Andrew C. Kuchins, Thomas M. Sanderson and David A. Gordon argue that building a
modern Silk Road the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) in which Afghanistan
will be a linchpin due to its geography, could promote security, prosperity, and connectivity within some of the most volatile, impoverished, and isolated nations on the planet.
Andrew C. Kuchins, Thomas M. Sanderson and David A. Gordon, Afghanistan: Building
the Missing Link in the Modern Silk Road, Washington Quarterly 33/ 2 (2010) p.39.
Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions 19741994: A Comparative Study,
Human Rights Quarterly16/4 (Nov. 1994) pp.597655; Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable
Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge
2010).
Barnett Rubin recounts he overheard a telephone conversation between Muhammad
Yunus Qanuni, head of the Northern Alliance delegation in Bonn, and leaders of the
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan who insisted that the paragraph dealing with the prohibition of amnesty be removed from the agreement. Barnett R. Rubin, Transitional Jus-
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
175
tice and Human Rights in Afghanistan, International Affairs79/ 3 (2003) pp.5701. On the
importance of Brahimi in the Bonn negotiation, see Simon Chesterman, Walking Softly
in Afghanistan: the Future of UN State-Building, Survival44/ 3 (2002) pp. 3745.
Thomas J. Barfield, On Local Justice and Culture in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, Connecticut Journal of International Law17/ 3 (Summer 2002) p.442.
As Bonn was taking place, CIA units and US Special Forces were operating with Afghan
warlords to track down, capture and kill senior Al-Qaeda activists and Taliban leaders.
Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, The Attack on bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: A
Personal Account by the CIAs Key Field Officer (New York: Three Rivers Press 2005);
George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: The CIA during Americas Time of Crisis (New
York: Harper Perennial 2008); Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger
(New York: Random House 2003).
Thomas Barfield notes an ethnographic cliche in the region: It is me against my brothers; it is my brothers and me against our cousins; and it is our cousins, my brothers and
me against the world. Thomas J. Barfield, Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in
Afghanistan, Iranian Studies. 37/ 2 (2004) p.266.
Louis Dupree, Settlement and Migration Patterns in Afghanistan: A Tentative Statement, Modern Asian Studies. 9/ 3 (1975) p.411.
Louis Dupree, Afghanistan in 1983: And Still No Solution, Asian Survey24/ 2 (Feb.
1983) p.233.
Oher examples are Yunis Khans Hezb-i-Islami Khalis (Party of Islam), which was Sunni
as well as Ghilzai Pashtun; Addal-Rab al-Rasul Sayyaf led Ittihad-i-Islami Bara-i-Azadi
Afghanistan (Islamic Unity), a Sunni Pashtun based movement. Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History (London: Perennial 2002) pp.213216.
There is less evidence of what occurred in the Afghan refugee camps in Iran, which is
why the issue is not addressed in this paper.
Eden Naby, Islam within the Afghan Resistance, Third World Quarterly10/ 2 (April
1988), pp. 787805; Dupree, Afghanistan in 1983 (note 56)pp.22939; Marvin G. Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (Boulder, CO: Westview Press
1994); Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan (New York:
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux 2003).
Ashraf Ghani, Islam and State-Building in a Tribal Society: Afghanistan: 18801901,
Modern Asian Studies12/2 (1978) pp.26984; Michael Bhatia, The Future of the Mujahedeen: Legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn Afghanistan, International
Peacekeeping. 14/ 1 (Jan. 2007) pp.90107; Ahmed Rashid, Afghanistan: Progress Since
the Taliban, Asian Affairs37/ 1 (March 2006) pp.315.
Graeme Smith, What Kandahars Taliban Say, in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the
New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia UP2009) p.199; Rodric
Braithwaite, Afghan Diary. Survival51/ 1 (Feb.March 2009) pp.99118.
Gen. Stanley McChrystal when he was the commander of ISAF accepted this concept.
See Aryn Baker, TIMEs Interview with General Stanley McChrystal, TIME Magazine,
8 July 2009.
Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, The Taliban troop with an East London cab driver in its ranks,
The Guardian, 25 Nov. 2010; Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, Five days inside a Taliban jail, The
Guardian, 26 Nov. 2010; Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, Talking to the Taliban about life after
occupation, The Guardian, 27 Nov. 2010.
Thomas Barfield, writing about justice in Afghanistan, notes that a common assumption
in modern states is that when a crime occurs it is for the state to try the alleged criminals
and punish them if they are found guilty. This, however, is not the case in Afghanistan,
where local and community loyalties are more important than loyalty to the state. Barfield, On Local Justice and Culture in Post-Taliban Afghanistan(note 52) pp.43841.
Barnett Rubin notes that Lakhdar Brahimi, who chaired the Bonn talks as SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annans Special Representative was more intent on the outcome and less
on the representative aspect, as Brahimi maintained that history would ignore whether
the meeting was unrepresentative and focus on the fact that it fashioned a process that
176
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67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
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DEFENCE STUDIES
led to a legitimate and representative government. Barnett R. Rubin, Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, Journal of Democracy15/ 3 (July 2004) p.7.
Gary Berntsens book on the role that the CIA played in the initial invasion of Afghanistan makes this clear as Berntsen and his team worked with some groups and not others.
Berntsen and Pezzullo, Jawbreaker, The Attack on bin Laden and Al-Qaeda (note 53). Seth
G. Jones, The Rise of Afghanistans Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad, International
Security32/ 4 (2008) pp.740.
Jason Burke and Peter Beaumont, West pays warlords to stay in line, The Observer, 21 July
2002,
<www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jul/21/afghanistan.peterbeaumont>.Another
example of a local powerbroker rising to prominence following the invasion is Gul Agha
Shirzai, the former Governor of Kandahar Province who had also served as Governor of
Nangarhar Province. During the DDR program, Shirzai integrated his militia into the
Afghan National Police, though in reality Shirzai was and remains a local powerbroker
whose interests lie in protecting his own interests. Declan Walsh, Strange victories in
poppy province, The Guardian, 5 Oct. 2006, <www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/oct/05/
worlddispatch.afghanistan>; Jason Burke, Even as the Afghan war rages, the talking starts,
The Guardian, 22 March 2009; Jason Burke, The future of Afghanistan, The Guardian, 14
Aug. 2009, <www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/aug/14/afghanistan-election>.
Antonio Giustozzi, Shadow Ownership and SSR in Afghanistan, in Timothy Donais
(ed.), Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform (Zurich: Lit 2008) pp.21620; Antonio
Giustozzi, Bureaucratic Facade and Political Realities of Disarmament and Demobilisation in Afghanistan, Conflict, Security & Development8/ 2 (2008) pp.16992.
Antonio Giustozzi, The Afghan National Army, The RUSI Journal154/ 6 (Nov./Dec.
2009) p. 39.
Jon Boone, Afghan President Hamid Karzai picks ex-warlord as election running mate
The Guardian.co.uk, 4 May 2009, <www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/04/afghanistanpresident-hamid-karzai-election>.
The duties of the arbakai are three-fold: implement decisions of the Jirga; maintain law
and order; and protect and defend the borders and boundaries of the tribe and the community. Mohammad Osman Tariq, Community-based Security and Justice: Arbakai in
Afghanistan, IDS Bulletin40/ 2 (2009) pp.207.
Richard Norton-Taylor, Leaked Afghanistan files reveal corruption and drug-dealing,
The Guardian, 27 July 2010; Police Perception Survey, 2009: The Afghan Perspective,
Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) Surveys, Kabul,
UNDP (Kabul 2009),<www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/PolicePerceptionSurvey09.pdf>
Article 16 of the Afghan Constitution recognizes Dari and Pashtu as the official languages of Afghanistan, though it also recognizes the Uzbeki, Turkmani, Pachaie, Nuristani, Baluchi or Pamiri languages in areas where these ethnic communities form a
majority. Government of Afghanistan, The Constitution of Afghanistan 2004, [<www.
supremecourt.gov.af/PDFiles/constitution2004_english.pdf>.
Developed from Government of Afghanistan, The Constitution of Afghanistan 2004,ibid.
]; Michael Schoiswohl, Linking the International Legal Framework to Building the Formal Foundations of a State at Risk: Constitution-Making and International Law in PostConflict Afghanistan, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law39/ 3 (May 2006) pp.81963;
Katherine Adeney, Constitutional Design and the Political Salience of Community
Identity in Afghanistan Asian Survey48/ 4 (JulyAug. 2008) pp.53557; Barnett R. Rubin,
Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, Journal of Democracy15/ 3 (July 2004) pp.519.
Rubin, Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistanibid.; Barnett. R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Foreign Affairs 68/5 (1989) pp.15068; Barnett R. Rubin, The
Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan, World Development 28/10 (2000)
pp.17891803.
Declan Walsh, Strange victories in poppy province, The Guardian , 5 Oct. 2006,<www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2006/oct/05/worlddispatch.afghanistan>.
177
77 Article 83 simply states: Members of the House of People shall be elected by the people
through free, general, secret, and direct balloting. Government of Afghanistan, The
Constitution of Afghanistan 2004.(note 73)]
78 Andrew Reynolds, The Curious Case of Afghanistan, Journal of Democracy17/ 2 (April
2006) pp.1056; Antonella Deledda, Afghanistan The End of the Bonn Process, Transition Studies Review. 13/ 1 (2006) pp.15571; Election Guide, Democracy assistance and
elections news from the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening
(CEPPS), <http://electionguide.org/election.php?ID=1174>
79 Reynolds, The Curious Case of Afghanistan, (note 78)pp.10810; Andrew Reynolds
and Andrew Wilder, Free, Fair or Flawed: Challenges for Legitimate Elections in Afghanistan
(Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2004); Deledda, Afghanistan The
End of the Bonn Process (note 78).
80 Reynolds, The Curious Case of Afghanistan(note 78) pp. 11516.
81 See the critique offered by A.A. Jalali, The Future of Afghanistan Parameters36/ 1 (2006)
pp. 419.
82 Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti and Dexter Filkins, Cables depict Afghan graft, starting at
the top, New York Times, 3 Dec. 2010.
83 Karen DeYoung, Crucial audit on Afghanistan contractors, Washington Post, 28 Oct.
2010; SIGAR Sixth Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 30 Jan. 2010, <www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/jan2010/pdf/SIGAR_Jan2010.pdf>.]
84 Braithwaite, Afghan Diary,(note 61) p.103; Ian Sample, British forces thwart Taliban to
deliver turbine, but will it be worth the effort? The Guardian, 4 Sept. 2008.
85 Article 42 of the Afghan Constitution states: Every Afghan shall pay taxes and duties to
the state in accordance with the provisions of the law. Government of Afghanistan, The
Constitution of Afghanistan 2004 (note 73).]
86 On the rentier state see for example, Barnett R. Rubin, Political Elites in Afghanistan:
Rentier State Building, Rentier State Wrecking, International Journal of Middle East Studies24/ 1 (Feb. 1992) pp. 7799; Michael L. Ross. Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World
Politics53/ 3 (April 2001) pp.32561; Donald L. Losman, The Rentier State and National
Oil Companies: An Economic and Political Perspective, Middle East Journal 64/ 3 (Summer 2010) pp.42745.
87 Policy Directions and Strategies for Sustainable Sources of Revenue for Afghanistan,
Afghan Ministry of Finance, May 2007,<www.mof.gov.af/english/tax/pdf/Afghanistan%
20Tax%20Policy%20Strategy%20ReportEnglishchangesonMay2007version.pdf>.
88 Brahimi, Afghanistan: Prospects for the Future(note 35) p.76.
89 Frank Ledwidge, Justice in Helmand The Challenge of Law Reform in a Society at
War, Asian Affairs 40/ 1 (March 2009) p.78.
90 A Call for Justice: A National Conciliation on Past Human Rights Violations in Afghanistan, Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, 2005, <www.aihrc.org.af/
Rep_29_Eng/rep29_1_05call4justice.pdf>.
91 Thomas Barfield, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan, Maine
Law Review60, / 2 (2008) pp.34774.
92 Ledwidge, Justice in Helmand(note 89), pp.7789.
93 Astri Sukrke and Kaja Borchgrevink, Negotiating Justice Sector Reform in Afghanistan,
Crime, Law and Social Change 51/ 2 (2009) p.214.
94 Ledwidge, Justice in Helmand (note 89) p.84; Sukrke and Borchgrevink, Negotiating
Justice Sector Reform in Afghanistan(note 93) pp.21130.
95 Barfield, On Local Justice and culture in Post-Taliban Afghanistan(note 52), p. 441.
96 This is clearly seen in the judicial sector. Matteo Tondini, Justice Sector Reform in
Afghanistan: From a Lead Nation Approach to a Mixed Ownership Regime? Transition
Studies Review15/ 4 (2009) pp.66073.
97 The final point refers to the inclusion in the Afghan Constitution of an article (Article
10) committing the Afghan state to encourage, protect as well as ensure the safety of
capital investment and private enterprises in accordance with the provisions of the law
178
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and market economy. Government of Afghanistan, The Constitution of Afghanistan

2004 (note 73). [
98 This is very typical in Afghan history. Barfield, Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in
Afghanistan(note 54) pp.26393; Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle
and Survival (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004); Ewans, Afghanistan (note 57).
99 A 2009 ICG report states in reference to Independent Directorate of Local Governance
states, It appears to be a continuation of central patronage rather than outreach.
Afghanistan Election Challenge, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 171
(24 June 2009) p.4,<www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/171_
afghanistan_s_election_challenges.ashx>.]
100 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and US Policy
Congressional Research Service, 17 Sept. 2010, p.20 [RL30588]. The British government has supported this expansion in presidential powers by awarding the IDLG 1.5
million. Reconstructing Afghanistan, Fourth Report of Session 2007-2008, International Development Committee, House of Commons, 5 Feb. 2008 [HC-65-I] pp.39
40,<www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmintdev/65/65i.pdf>.
101 Braithwaite, Afghan Diary(note 61) p.103.
102 Robert Zoelick, president of the World Bank, claims that the NSP, which the Bank
launched in 2003, empowered more than 20,000 elected Community Development
Councils to provide grants for local projects and has a rate of return of 20 per cent.
Robert B. Zoelick, The Key to Rebuilding Afghanistan, Washington Post, 22 Aug. 2008.
103 Barfield, On Local Justice and Culture in Post-Taliban Afghanistan,(note 52) pp.437
9; Scott Radnitz, Working with the Warlords: Designing an Ethnofederal System for
Afghanistan, Regional and Federal Studies14/4 (2007) pp.51337.
104 See the collection of essays in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban: Insights
from the Afghan Field (New York: Columbia UP2009).
105 Robert Gates, A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age, Foreign Affairs88/1 (Jan.Feb. 2009) pp.2840.
106 In 2001, Sherkhan Farnood, a well-connected Afghan businessman and poker player,
established the Kabul Bank, which quickly became Afghanistans leading financial institution. The scandal occurred when reports emerged that the banks shareholders were
using depositors money to purchase luxury homes in Dubai, as well as for personal
investments, such as in Pamir airline, owned by Khalilullah Frozi, the banks chief
executive at the time. They also invested in cement factories owned by Mahmoud Karzai, a shareholder in the bank and a brother of Hamid Karzai. Jon Boone, Afghanistan
tries to prevent run on its biggest bank, The Guardian, 2 Sept. 2010.
107 Karzai expressed his disregard for the international community when he fired Fazel
Ahmed Faqiryar for investigating well-connected Afghans, and when he appointed Zarar
Ahmed Moqbel as Minister of Counter-narcotics, leading one British law and order official who had worked in Afghanistan when Moqbel was Minister of Interior to describe
the appointment as an absolute travesty. Jon Boone, Karzai fired anti-corruption lawyers after top official stung, The Guardian, 31 Aug. 2010; Jon Boone, Karzai selects sacked
minister for key post in Afghanistans new Cabinet, The Guardian, 11 Jan. 2010.
108 See for example Tim Arango, Iraqi Sunnis frustrated as awakening loses clout, New
York Times, 4 May 2010.
109 This does not mean empowering local militias, but rather encouraging local communities to trust state institutions.
110 See for example an interview given by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATOs Secretary-General, to Robert E. Hunter at the Council on Foreign Relations in 2004, in which Scheffer argued that NATO is operating in Afghanistan to stop terrorism from coming to
Europe. A Conversation with Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Council on Foreign Relations,
(11 Nov. 2004), <www.cfr.org/publication/7534/conversation_with_jaap_de_hoop_
scheffer.html>.

Peacebuilding' in Afghanistan: A Bridge Too Far?

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This article was downloaded by: [Mr Sarwar Minar]

On: 05 March 2015, At: 20:12

Schusterman Visiting Scholar, Maxwell School

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or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in

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Defence Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, (June 2012), pp. 149178

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States that refuse access to populations at risk could expect calibrated

Afghanistan. The focus is on security, reconstruction and reconciliation:

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The new approach to peacekeeping stemmed from the dominance of

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In sum, international intervention in the twentieth-century began

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Reconstruction: Designing a Political, Economic and Social Program

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Paris (Paris Declaration), with three pillars: security (achieve nationwide

Reconciliation: Dealing with the Past

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A second important consequence of the war against the Soviets was

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The Shortcomings of the Afghan Constitution and the Electoral System

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unrepresentative of the votes cast, and it diminished the prospects for

The Effect of International Assistance and its Impact on the Population

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undermined by a lack of identification with the Afghan state, seen by

Reconciliation: Failing to Achieve Respect for Basic Human Rights

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Afghanistan without appreciating how these policies are likely to be

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Moving Forward Sometimes Means Stepping Back

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formation in 2007 of an Independent Directorate of Local Governance

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A third reform with respect to peacebuilding in Afghanistan is to

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conditions that caused the insecurity). The Iraqi experience of the

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Affairs77/ 4 (2001) pp.80527; James Cotton, Peacekeeping in East Timor: An Australian

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and market economy. Government of Afghanistan, The Constitution of Afghanistan

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