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Jen and Li in The Analects
Jen and Li in The Analects
Jen and Li in The Analects
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Kwong-loi Shun
Associate Professor,
Departmentof
Philosophy,University
of California
at Berkeley
nfHpil
PhilosophyEast& West
Volume 43, Number3
July 1993
457-479
? 1993
by Universityof
HawaiiPress
457
tUt
PhilosophyEast&West
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Kwong-loiShun
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PhilosophyEast& West
I now describe two opposed interpretations of Confucius' conception of the relation between jen and li, which I will label the instrumentalist and the definitionalist interpretations. The distinction between
them is intended as a heuristic device for highlighting certain apparently
conflicting elements in the Analects, thereby preparing the ground for
introducing my own interpretation. Given the heuristic nature of the
distinction, I will set up the two interpretations in a way that is probably
more elaborate and extreme than any of the interpretations actually
proposed in the literature.
On the instrumentalist interpretation, Confucius regards the observance of li as standing in a mere instrumental relation to the ideal of jen.
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over, this identity is supposed to follow from the concept of jen. Admittedly, the observance of li has to be accompanied by the right spirit,
however having the right spirit is to be interpreted. Still, unlike the instrumentalist interpretation, jen is no longer regarded as a state of mind
distinct from and intelligible independently of the general observance of
li, and the observance of li can no longer be regarded as a means to
cultivating or expressing jen. Two consequences follow from the identity
of jen with the general observance of the actually existing li rules, distinguishing the definitionalist from the instrumentalist interpretation. First,
jen no longer has an evaluative priority over li. Indeed, since li can be
characterized independently of jen but not vice versa, one may even
regard li as having an evaluative priority over jen. That is, it is the observance of li which has ultimate value, from which the value of being the
kind of person who generally observes li is derived. Second, jen no longer
provides a standard against which one can assess the justifiability of
revising or departing from a rule of li, in the way just described for
the instrumentalist interpretation. Furthermore, since the ideal is just
generally to observe those rules of /i which actually exist, this conception
of the relation between jen and li is conservative in spirit in that it is
opposed to any revision of or departure from the existing li rules.
The distinction between the two interpretations is not intended as an
exhaustive classification of interpretations found in the literature. In section IV, I will consider other interpretations found in the literature which
do not lie close to either of these two interpretations. For now, to show
that these two interpretations are not totally unrelated to the literature,
I will mention examples from the literature of ways of interpreting Confucius which lie close to one or the other of the two interpretations.
Something close to the instrumentalist interpretation is put forward
by Hsu Fu-kuan and LinYu-sheng. According to Hsu Fu-kuan, one of the
most important innovations of Confucius is the discovery of the ideal
inner life which he characterizes in terms of the jen ideal. Confucius gives
the traditional li rules a justification in terms of the jen ideal, thereby
giving jen evaluative priority over /i." And, according to Lin Yu-sheng,
jen is an ideal inner life which has ultimate value, while li derives its value
from jen through the instrumental role it plays in the cultivation and
development of jen. Accordingly, jen has evaluative priority over /i, and
provides a perspective from which one can justify the revision of a li
rule. 2
This way of interpreting Confucius contrasts sharply with that proposed by Chao Chi-pin and Ts'ai Shang-szu, which lies close to the
definitionalist interpretation. According to Chao Chi-pin, Confucius regards the content of jen as determined by li, and the observance of the li
practices of his time as providing the sole criterion for distinguishing
between the possession and lack of jen. In doing so, Confucius has given
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li a priority over jen. Furthermore, since the ideal is just to observe the
existing li practices, this conception of the relation between jen and li is
opposed to any revision of or departure from the existing li practices.13
Ts'ai Shang-szu proposes a similar interpretation. According to him, li is
the most important concept in Confucius' moral thinking, and it is li
which distinguishes human beings from other animals. Observance of
li is the criterion for the possession of jen, and Confucius' conception
of the jen person is just the conception of someone who follows the
existing li rules in all areas of life.14
These two very different ways of interpreting Confucius are made
possible by the fact that each seems to have some textual support. For
each of the two interpretations, there are two observations about Confucius' conception of jen and li which can apparently be more easily
accommodated by one interpretation than by the other and, furthermore, the observations appear to have textual support. In what follows, I
will state these observations and describe how certain passages can be
read as supporting the observations. In doing so, I am not myself endorsing the proposed readings of the passages. Although I do regard
them as possible and in some cases plausible readings, my sole purpose
is to report how each passage can be read in a way that appears to
provide support for something close to one of the two interpretations.
The first observation favoring the instrumentalist over the definitionalist interpretation is that there are passages in which Confucius
seems to regard li as playing an instrumental role with regard to jen. For
example, in 3.3, he asks:
A man who is not jen, what has he to do with li (ju li ho)?
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Again, the instrumentalist would say, the observance of li is here regarded as a means to putting rightness into practice.15
A second observation favoring the instrumentalist interpretation is
that there are passages in which Confucius speaks as if there is a justification for the revision of or departure from an existing rule of /i. As mentioned earlier, a conception of jen as defined in terms of the observance
of the existing li practices is opposed to such revision or departure. In
2.23 and 3.9, Confucius describes changes in li from the Hsia to the
Shang and then to the Chou dynasty, and in 3.14 he advocates the /i
practices of Chou over those of Hsia and Shang. These passages do not
yet imply a justification for the changes or for Confucius' preference
for Chou /i. However, the instrumentalist would argue that a justification
is implied in 9.3, where Confucius says:
Usinga linen cap is li.Today,blacksilkis used instead.Thisis more economical, and I follow the majority.Bowingbefore ascendingthe steps is li.Today,
people bow after ascending them. This is presumptuousand, although it is
contraryto the majority,I follow the practiceof bowing before ascending.
According to the instrumentalist, Confucius is here not just advocating
the retention of or departure from a rule of li, but is also giving reasons
for doing so. He cites economic consideration in favor of replacing the
linen ceremonial cap used in rituals with one made of black silk. Economic consideration cannot be the only relevant consideration, since
otherwise it would have justified the elimination of the ceremonial cap
altogether. Presumably, it can justify departure from a li rule only when
the efficacy of the li rule in serving its purpose remains unaffected. This
explains why Confucius rejects departure from the traditional li rule of
bowing to the prince before ascending the steps to the upper hall. This li
rule serves as a means of paying homage to the prince, and to depart
from the rule without good reason shows disrespect for the prince, thereby defeating the purpose of the rule. Following this line of thought, the
instrumentalist would argue that Confucius regards li rules as a means
to expressing emotional dispositions and attitudes of certain kinds, and
would accept revision of or departure from a li rule on the basis of such
considerations as economic consideration only if the efficacy of the rule
in serving its purpose is unaffected.16 As further evidence, the instrumentalist may cite 3.4:
Lin Fang asked about the basis of li. The Master said, "A great question
indeed.With regardto li,it is better to be economical than to be extravagant.
With regardto mourning,it is better to have grief than to observe every
formality."
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can be justified. And Confucius' observation that grief is what is important to mourning suggests that he regards grief as the basis to the li rules
governing mourning-so long as such grief is present and appropriately
expressed, it is not necessary to observe every formality, and we may
depart from or revise li rules in light of economic consideration.
While the two observations described above seem to fit in better
with the instrumentalist interpretation, there are two observations about
Confucius' attitude toward li which seem to fit in better with the definitionalist interpretation. The first is that, although Confucius sometimes
speaks as if observing li is a means to cultivating jen, he also speaks of it
as constitutive of jen. Take, for example, the passage 12.1:
Yen Yuan asked about jen.
The Master said, "K'o chi fu li constitutes jen. If a person can for one
day k'o chi fu i, all under Heaven will regardhim as havingjen. The attainment of jen comes from oneself, and not from others."
Yen Yuan said, "MayI ask about the items of this?"
The Master said, "Do not look if it is contraryto li; do not listen if it is
contraryto li; do not speak if it is contraryto ii; do not act if it is contrary
to ii."
Depending on whether we take "k'o" to mean "subdue" or "succeed in,"
and whether we take the object of "k'o" to be "chi" (oneself) or "chi fu
li" (aligning oneself with li), the expression "k'o chi fu li" can be translated as "subduing oneself and returning to the observance of /i," or as
"succeeding in aligning oneself with ii."However we read the expression,
the definitionalist will take Confucius to be saying that the observance of
li is, at least in part, constitutive of jen. This reading the definitionalist will
regard as supported by the rest of the passage, in which Confucius
explains what he has in mind in terms of the general observance of li in
all areas of life.'7 As further evidence that Confucius regards the observance of li as constitutive of jen, the definitionalist may also cite 12.2,
in which Confucius explains jen in terms of //i-like behavior and attitudes. The definitionalist may also cite 1.2, where Confucius describes
filial piety as a basis (pen) of jen, in the sense that it is an essential
component of and a starting point for cultivating jen, along with 2.5,
where Confucius explains filial piety in terms of the observance of li.
Taken together, the two passages are supposed to show that Confucius
regards the observance of li as standing to jen in a much closer relation
than that of a mere instrumental relation.
A second observation apparently favoring the definitionalist interpretation is Confucius' generally conservative attitude toward li as evidenced throughout the Analects. For example, he presents himself as an
advocate of traditional Chou li (3.14) and as someone who loves and
transmits ancient culture (7.1, 7.20). He emphasizes adherence to tradi- Kwong-loiShun
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tional i practices (for example, 3.1, 3.17), showing that the departure from
li he occasionally advocates (for example, 9.3) is only a departure against
the background of a general adherence to li. Now, if participation in li is a
mere means for cultivating and expressing jen, we would expect more
room for the revision of existing li practices. On the other hand, if jen is
defined in terms of the general observance of existing li practices, this
would explain why there is no room for such revision. So, Confucius'
conservative attitude toward li appears to support the definitionalist
interpretation.
As mentioned earlier, although I think the ways of reading the relevant passages described above are possible readings, I am not myself
endorsing these readings. A passage cited in support of one interpretation may be given an alternative reading on which it no longer supHlUM2_ ports that interpretation. Forexample, in 15.18, the expression "liyi hsing
chih," which the instrumentalist takes to mean that observing li is a
means to putting rightness into practice, can also be read as saying that
observing liis the manner in which (rather than the means by which) one
puts rightness into practice, in which case the passage no longer provides support for the instrumentalist interpretation. Still, even if we take
the possible alternative readings of the relevant passages into consideration, I believe it is not possible to come up with a way of reading allthe
relevant passages that is not artificial but that makes all the passages
compatible with one of the two interpretations.
Consider, for example, how the instrumentalist may try to accommodate the passages usually cited in support of the definitionalist interpretation. The instrumentalist can account for Confucius' conservative
attitude toward li by appealing to Confucius' optimism that the existing li
practices do perform well the function of cultivating and expressing jen,
and by citing the fact that some kind of stability is needed for them to
perform this function.18 Still, he will have difficulty making sense of 12.1
and the other passages cited in support of the observation that Confucius sometimes speaks as if observing li is (at least in part) constitutive
of jen.19 On the other hand, while the definitionalist may dispute the
reading of some of the passages cited in support of the instrumentalist
interpretation, such as 15.18, which has just been considered, he will
have difficulty accommodating all the passages. Forexample, it is difficult
to see how it can accommodate Confucius' endorsement in 9.3 of a
departure from an existing rule of i, without introducing an artificial
reading of the passage.20
Suppose we grant that, for each of the two interpretations, there are
passages which fit in better with that interpretation than with the other.
This may seem to show that there is a conflict between different parts of
the Analects, a conflict which may be explained in terms of either an
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West
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inconsistency in Confucius' thinking or the inauthenticity of certain parts
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role.22
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Let us return to the relation between jen and li. We saw earlier that
there appears to be a conflict between two pairs of observations describing Confucius' attitude toward the relation, all of which appear to have
some textual basis:
(1) that observance of li is a means to cultivating and expressing jen;
(2) that revision of or departure from an actually existing li rule can be
justified by economic or some other consideration, as long as this
does not affect its efficacy in performing the function described
in (1);
and
(3) that the general observance of li is, at least in part, constitutive of
jen;
(4) a generally conservative attitude toward the existing ii practices.
The first pair of observations can be more easily accommodated on the
instrumentalist than on the definitionalist interpretation, while the reverse is true of the second pair of observations. Since the two interpretations are opposed, this appears to show that the two pairs of observations are in conflict.
The apparent conflict can be resolved if we regard jen and li as
related by the kind of relation just described. The point can be illustrated
by a comparison with the relation between mastery of a concept and
mastery of a corresponding linguistic practice. Take a concept of the
kind mastery of which is dependent on mastery of a corresponding linguistic practice, and suppose that the concept is expressed by a certain
linguistic practice in a certain community. The following are four plausible observations concerning how mastery of the concept and mastery of
the linguistic practice are related. First,within the community, the latter
is both necessary and sufficient for the former, and it is inconceivable
that a member of the community should have one but not the other of
the two capacities. So, there is a sense in which the mastery of the
linguistic practice is constitutive of mastery of the concept. Second,
although mastery of the concept is constituted by mastery of the linguistic practice, it is not defined in terms of it as the concept can be shared
by other linguistic communities. Since mastery of the concept 'transcends' mastery of the linguistic practice in this way, there is a sense in
which observing the linguistic practice can be described as a means to
acquiring and later expressing that concept. Third, since mastery of the
concept 'transcends' mastery of the linguistic practice, it provides a perspective for assessing revision of the linguistic practice. Having mastered
the concept through having been brought up in the linguistic practice,
members of the community can propose revisions to simplify the existing
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practice as long as this does not affect its efficacy in expressing the
concept. Fourth, although revisions may be justified by such considerations as simplicity, there is a constraint on the extent of the revision at
any particular time. Since the concept itself is made available to members of the community by the existing linguistic practice, any revision has
to proceed against the background of a general acceptance of the existing practice, thereby ruling out the possibility of a more comprehensive
revision. This accounts for a generally conservative attitude toward the
linguistic practice actually in existence.
These four observations parallel respectively the third, first, second,
and fourth of the four observations about the relation between jen and
i. This shows that, if we regard the possession of jen and the general
observance of li as related in a similar manner, we will be able to resolve
the apparent conflict between the four observations. To develop this
suggestion, let us first try it out in the case of sacrificial rites, the kind of
practices to which the character "li" originally refers.
Such sacrifices can be directed toward other objects, but, to simplify
discussion, let us confine our attention to sacrifices to ancestors. One
may conduct such sacrifices with the belief that ancestral spirits literally
exist as intelligent beings who are able to respond to sacrifices by bestowing good fortune. While this may describe the way these sacrifices
have been conducted in times earlier than that of Confucius, I take it that
this is not the kind of rationale Confucius sees in such sacrifices. For him,
the importance of such sacrifices derives from their association with a
certain attitude toward ancestors. Roughly, the attitude can be described
as a sense of dependence on or indebtedness to one's ancestors for one's
present existence and the present conditions of one's existence, this
sense of dependence or indebtedness leading to a reverential attitude.23
Now, a similar attitude of indebtedness and reverence can be directed
toward one's living parents. In this case, the attitude may admit of nonconventional expression, that is, expression in behavior the suitability
of which for expressing the attitude is not dependent on the existence of
appropriate conventional practices. For example, the attitude may be
expressed in one's providing support for parents and in one's general
obedience to their wishes. A similar attitude toward a recently deceased
parent also admits of nonconventional expression. For example, one may
continue to act in conformity with their wishes and avoid doing what
would have been displeasing in their eyes if they were alive. However, in
the case of long-deceased ancestors with whom one had no previous
personal contact, no such nonconventional expression may be available,
as one may have no idea of what their wishes may be. In this case,
the only channel for expressing one's indebtedness and reverence may
be through conventional practices such as rites of sacrifice.
Consider a member of a community in which there is no conven-
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tional practice associated with such an attitude or, if the community has
such a practice, a member who does not engage in the practice. As there
is no nonconventional manifestation of the attitude, and as this individual does not engage in some appropriate conventional practice manifesting the attitude, there will be no basis for our ascribing to this person
the attitude of indebtedness and reverence toward ancestors. That is,
given that there is no nonconventional manifestation of the attitude
under consideration, our conception of the attitude is the conception of
something manifested in the observance of some appropriate conventional practice, and we cannot correctly ascribe the attitude to an individual unless that person belongs to a community in which some such
practice exists and unless he or she is generally disposed to observe such
a practice. This, however, leaves it open that the attitude may be manifested in the observance of different conventional practices in different
communities.
In ancient Chinese society, there was an established practice of sacrifices to ancestors (to be conducted with the proper spirit)associated with
such an attitude, a practice to which the character "li" originally referred.
If we look at the relation between the attitude and the corresponding
practice in the manner just described, the following four observations
follow. First, within the community, general participation in sacrificial
rites (with the proper spirit)is both necessary and sufficient for one's having an attitude of indebtedness and reverence toward ancestors. Moreover, within the community, we cannot conceive of one of the two
obtaining without the other, and so there is a sense in which general
participation in sacrificial rites is constitutive of one's possessing the attitude under consideration. Second, the attitude is not defined in terms of
general participation in the sacrificial rites actually existing in this community, for it can be instantiated in other communities with different
conventional practices associated with the attitudes. So, possession of
the attitude 'transcends' participation in the actually existing sacrificial
rites, and thereby provides a sense in which participation in such rites is
a means to cultivating and expressing the attitude. Third, given that
possession of the attitude 'transcends' participation in the rites, it provides a perspective from which revision of the existing ritual practices
can be assessed. For example, having come to acquire the attitude
through having been brought up to participate in such rites, members of
the community can propose revisions in the rites on the basis of economic consideration, as long as this does not affect the efficacy of the
revised practices in cultivating and expressing the attitude. Fourth, although revision can be justified in the manner described, it has to proceed against the background of a general acceptance of the existing
practices, since it is the existing practices which make available to members of the community the attitude under consideration. There is reason Kwong-loiShun
471
to oppose any change initiated without good reason; the relevant practices have to be relatively stable to perform their function, and any
arbitrary departure would demonstrate a lack of seriousness. This explains why, as long as the relevant attitude is regarded as desirable within
the community, there will be a generally conservative attitude toward
the existing ritual practices.
While the character "/i" originally referred to sacrificial rites, its use
has gradually expanded to include traditional norms governing human
conduct in other areas of life.24 As the next step in working out our
proposal, imagine that, along with the expansion of the scope of li, the
kind of emotional dispositions and attitudes associated with li have also
broadened to include not just the attitude of indebtedness and reverence toward ancestors, but also various emotional dispositions and attitudes (such as respect for elders) directed toward other people with
whom one's relations are governed by traditional norms. What results is
a cluster of emotional dispositions and attitudes which stand to the
traditional norms in the same kind of relation in which the attitude of
indebtedness and reverence originally stood to sacrificial rites. Jen comprises this cluster of emotional dispositions and attitudes, and li, in the
expanded sense, comprises the various norms governing human conduct. We therefore see how jen and li may be related in the way in which
the relevant attitudes toward ancestors and sacrificial rites were related.
Moreover, the four observations concerning the latter relation also hold
true of the relation between jen and li, and this shows how the apparent
conflict between the two pairs of observations about the relation between jen and li can be resolved on this interpretation of the relation. Its
ability to resolve the apparent conflict provides support for this alternative interpretation, as against the instrumentalist and definitionalist
interpretations.
IV
PhilosophyEast& West
On the instrumentalist interpretation, jen is an ideal which is intelligible and can be shown to have a validity independent of li; li is a means
to realizing this ideal and is to be evaluated in terms of its efficacy in
performing this function. On the definitionalist interpretation, a jen person is just someone who generally observes the actually existing li practices, and advocacy of the jen ideal is linked to an extreme conservatism
toward li. My proposed interpretation lies between the two extremes. On
this interpretation, the ideal of jen is shaped by the actually existing li
practices in that it is not intelligible and cannot be shown to have a
validity independent of li. However, it is not totally determined by li since
advocacy of the ideal allows room for departing from or revising an
existing rule of ii.
Although Confucius does not advocate an unconditional observance
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NOTES
Kwong-loiShun
475
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David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), p. 84.
Kwong-loiShun
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