RULE 102: WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

(9)Writ of Habeas Data

ISSUE and HELD

Whether the Petition for Habeas Corpus was validly granted. NO.

(1)GO v. DIMAGIBA Has no relation to Habeas Data whatsoever.

FACTS
Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13)
checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment
on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason account closed.[6] Dimagiba
was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 [7] under
separate Complaints filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in
Baguio City.[8] After a joint trial, the MTCC (Branch 4) rendered a Decision on
July 16, 1999, convicting the accused in the 13 cases. The

RATIO
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
in which individuals are deprived of liberty. It was devised as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically,
to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful
custody.[31] It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances
under which a person is detained.

RTC denied the appeal and sustained his conviction. [11] There being no further
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the RTC issued a Certificate of Finality of
the Decision. Thus, on February 14, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order directing
the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his sentence as a result of his
conviction. The trial court also issued a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil
liability.
On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC
Order. He prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of
the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment
also, should have been imposed on him.
The MTCC denied the Motion for Reconsideration and directed the issuance of a
Warrant of Arrest against Dimagiba.[16] On September 28, 2001, he was arrested
and imprisoned for the service of his sentence.
On October 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition [17] for a writ
of habeas corpus. The RTC issued an Order directing the immediate release of
Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him to pay a fine ofP100,000 in lieu of
imprisonment.
In justifying its modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC invoked Vaca v.
Court of Appeals[21] and Supreme Court Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 122000,[22] which allegedly required the imposition of a fine only instead of
imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or a
habitual delinquent. The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied
in favor of Dimagiba. It further noted that (1) he was a first-time offender and
an employer of at least 200 workers who would be displaced as a result of his
imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability had already been satisfied through the
levy of his properties.
SPECIAL

The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial
process or by virtue of a valid judgment. However, as a post-conviction remedy,
it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the
following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the
court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty
has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess. [34]
In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on
the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly prescribed the
imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Respondent
sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the
penalty imposed on him for being excessive. From his allegations, the Petition
appeared sufficient in form to support the issuance of the writ.
However, it appears that respondent has previously sought the modification of
his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration [35] of the MTCCs Execution Order
and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution. [36] Both were
denied by the MTCC on the ground that it had no power or authority to amend a
judgment issued by the RTC.
In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same arguments that he
had invoked in the said Motions. We believe that his resort to this extraordinary
remedy was a procedural infirmity. The remedy should have been an appeal of
the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which he should have prayed that the
execution of the judgment be stayed. But he effectively misused the action he
had chosen, obviously with the intent of finding a favorable court. His Petition
for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had
already become final and executory. Such an action deplorably amounted to
forum shopping. Respondent should have resorted to the proper, available
remedy instead of instituting a different action in another forum.

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The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to support the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders NULLIFIED.
Respondents Petition for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED. Let this
case be REMANDED to MTCC of Baguio City for the re-arrest of
respondent and the completion of his sentence.

(2)VICENTE V. MAJADUCON A.M. No. RTJ-02-1698, June 23, 2005

Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court applies only to cases where the
applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal
charge against him and not in an instance, as in the case involved in the
present controversy, where the applicant is serving sentence by reason of a
final judgment. The only exception to the above-cited provision (sec. 24, rule
114) of the Rules of Court is when the convict has applied for probation before
he commences to serve sentence, provided the penalty and the offense are
within the purview of the Probation Law.
FACTS
In a letter-complaint, Dante Vicente charged respondent Judge Jose S.
Majaducon of the RTC with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority
and manifest partiality, praying that he be administratively disciplined and
terminated from the service.
This administrative complaint stemmed from a series of criminal cases involving
Evelyn Te (People of the Philippines vs. Evelyn Te). In the said criminal case,
Evelyn Te was found guilty of 4 counts of the violation of BP22 and sentenced
her to 2 months of imprisonment on each count.
Te filed a motion for reconsideration, which she prayed be also considered as a
petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Citing Vaca v. Court of
Appeals, in which the sentence of imprisonment of a party found guilty of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was reduced to a fine equal to double the amount of the
check involved, Te prayed that her sentence be similarly modified and that she
be immediately released from detention.

of the trial courts resolution which was denied.

It also denied due course to Tes notice of appeal on the ground that there was
no necessity for the appeal to the CA because it had already ordered that the
whole records be forwarded to this Court pursuant to Rule 102, 14.
In the present case, complainant (Dante Vicente), a station manager of Radyo
Bombo, General Santos City, alleges that while Te was in prison, respondent
judge allowed her to be released and confined at a local hospital in the guise
that she was suffering from certain illnesses. Complainant further alleges that
respondent judge approved Tes application for bail as part of habeas corpus
proceedings even though no petition for habeas corpus in favor of Te was filed
and docketed. In addition, complainant alleges that in a separate case,
respondent judge allowed the release of the accused without the posting of the
necessary bail. On the basis of the above allegations, complainant prays that
respondent judge be investigated and if warranted, be terminated and removed
from service.
In his Comment, respondent judge submitted the following contentions:
2. Evelyn Tes counsel filed not only a motion for reconsideration denying our
previous order denying her motion for release from detention but also a petition
for Habeas Corpus in the same cases; 4. that the court had discretion to allow
her to be released on bail, based on Sec. 14, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of
Court; 5. it was a better judgment to release her from bail on a writ of habeas
corpus, because, Evelyn Te might be right in her contention that she is
considered to have served her sentences simultaneously. If we denied her
petition for Habeas Corpus, and on appeal, she could get a favorable decision
from the Supreme Court, surely, she could return and charge us with a graver
offense of ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion; 8. Mr. Vicente has no
personality as a third party; 9. Mr. Vicente is trying to pre-empt our move to
charge his radio station for libel or cite the announcer for indirect contempt of
Court when his radio station and announcer had been reviling and attacking us
for many days on the air for having allowed Evelyn Te to be treated and
confined in a hospital upon recommendation of a government doctor and for
having allowed her release from imprisonment on bail.

Trial court denied Tes petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that Te was detained by virtue of a final judgment. Trial court approved
Tes bail bonds in the reduced amount of P500,000.00 and ordered her release.

In its Resolution, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) resolved to order
the said court to give due course to Evelyn Tes notice of appeal from the Order
denying her petition for habeas corpus and from the Order requiring her to post
bail in the amount of one million pesos for her release from detention. This
Court made the following pronouncements:

Assistant City Prosecutor Marie Ellengred L. Baliguiat moved for reconsideration

Rule 102, 14 provides:

SPECIAL

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When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and when let to bail. If it

appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and
specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable
by death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully
imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so
punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in
the discretion of the court or judge. If he be admitted to bail, he shall
forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court or judge deems reasonable,
considering the circumstances of the prisoner and the nature of the offense
charged, conditioned for his appearance before the court where the offense is
properly cognizable to abide its order or judgment; and the court or judge
shall certify the proceedings, together with the bond, forthwith to the proper
court. If such bond is not so filed, the prisoner shall be recommitted to
confinement.
The foregoing provision, however, applies to cases where the applicant for
the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against
him, not where, as here, he is serving sentence by reason of a final
judgment. Indeed, Rule 102, 4 disallows issuance of the writ where the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
The certification of a case under Rule 102, 14, moreover, refers to cases
where the habeas corpus court finds that the applicant is charged with the
noncapital offense in another court. Thus, the certification of this case to this
Court is clearly erroneous.
On the basis of the above-quoted Resolution and the provisions of Section 24,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, the OCA, in its Report in the present case, found
respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he
be fined in the amount of P20,000.00.
ISSUE
Whether the release of Te upon filing of the bond was proper. Whether
Rule 102 is applicable.
HELD
Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of law. Rule 102 is not applicable in
the case at bar.

The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA except for the recommended
penalty.
Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the
grant of bail after conviction by final judgment and after the convict has started
to serve sentence. It provides:
SEC. 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. An accused shall not be
allowed bail after the judgment has become final, unless he has applied for
probation before commencing to serve sentence, the penalty and the offense
being within the purview of the Probation Law. In case the accused has applied
for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail, but if no bail
was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his
release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the
community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced
to serve sentence.
The only exception to the above-cited provision of the Rules of Court is when
the convict has applied for probation before he commences to serve sentence,
provided the penalty and the offense are within the purview of the Probation
Law.
In the case of Evelyn Te, the judgment finding her guilty of violation of BB22 on
four counts and imposing upon her the penalty of imprisonment for two months
on each count has already become final and executory. She did not apply for
probation. At the time respondent judge granted her bail she was already
serving her sentence.
From the foregoing, it is evident that Te is not entitled to bail. Respondent judge
contends that under Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, he has the
discretion to allow Te to be released on bail. However, the Court reiterates its
pronouncement in its Resolution of February 19, 2001 in G.R. Nos. 145715-18
that Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court applies only to cases where the
applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal
charge against him and not in an instance, as in the case involved in the present
controversy, where the applicant is serving sentence by reason of a final
judgment.
The Court agrees with the observation of the OCA that respondent judges
ignorance or disregard of the provisions of Section 24, Rule 114 and Section 14,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court is tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and
procedure.

RATIO
SPECIAL

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Complainants allegation that no petition for habeas corpus was filed does not
hold water. As borne by the records, the Certification issued by one Atty. Elmer
D. Lastimosa, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City,
shows that Evelyn Tes petition for habeas corpus was incorporated in the
pleadings she filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 9456-9460, although no docket fees
and other charges were paid. There is no showing that respondent should be
held administratively liable for the non-payment of docket and other lawful fees.
At any rate, the matter may be considered in the appeal taken by Te, as earlier
adverted to in G.R. Nos. 145715-18.
Court finds respondent judges act of allowing the temporary confinement of Te
in the hospital as justified. (presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty)
The Court now determines the proper imposable penalty. Considering that
respondent can no longer be dismissed or suspended, the Court is left with no
recourse but to impose the penalty of fine.

(3)IN THE MATTER OF...ALEJANO V. CABUAY

On 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior
officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments
(Oakwood), an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of
Makati City. Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government
emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier
planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive
to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers
to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place while military and
civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers involvement in the Oakwood
incident.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup detat
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers
involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The trial court later issued the
Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV
(Trillanes) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP.
On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service
Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command
SPECIAL

who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who
were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.
On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with
the Supreme Court. On 12 August 2003, the Court issued a
Resolution, which resolved to:
(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;
(b) require respondents to make a RETURN of the writ on
Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the Court of
Appeals;
(c) refer the case to the Court of Appeals for RAFFLE
among the Justices thereof for hearing, further
proceedings and decision thereon, after which a REPORT
shall be made to this Court within ten (10) days from
promulgation of the decision.
Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing
respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the
persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for
hearing and further proceedings.
Pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their Return of
the Writ and Answer to the petition and produced the detainees before the Court
of Appeals during the scheduled hearing.
On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing
the petition. Nonetheless, the appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in
charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold
faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations
Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to
his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the detainees right
to exercise for two hours a day.
ISSUE
Whether a petition for the writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate
remedy in this case, where petitioners do not question the legality of
their detention, but question merely the regulation of visiting hours and
the opening and reading of letters addressed to Trillanes and
Maestercampo NO.

RATIO
Petitioners claim that the Supreme Courts 12 August 2003 Order granted the

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petition and the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals only for a
factual hearing. Petitioners thus argue that the Courts Order had already
foreclosed any question on the propriety and merits of their petition.
Petitioners claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 Order
shows that the Court referred to the Court of Appeals the duty to inquire into
the cause of the junior officers detention. Had the Court ruled for the
detainees release, the Court would not have referred the hearing of the petition
to the Court of Appeals. The Court would have forthwith released the detainees
had the Court upheld petitioners cause.
In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court
is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition. The respondent must
produce the person and explain the cause of his detention. However, this order
is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters
covered by the remedy. Thus, the Courts order to the Court of Appeals to
conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy
of habeas corpus.
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily
includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the
alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release
the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals
found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the
hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that
the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the
proper remedy to address the detainees complaint against the regulations and
conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has
one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The
purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally
deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is
illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the
detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings
terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ
of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.
Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writs application to circumstances
where there is deprivation of a persons constitutional rights. The writ is
available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or
more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due
process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also
SPECIAL

unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has

later become arbitrary.
However, a mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not
sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the
following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b)
the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an
excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the
excess. Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold
remains high. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to
void the entire proceedings.
Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the detention of the
detainees. Neither do they dispute the lawful indictment of the detainees for
criminal and military offenses. What petitioners bewail is the regulation
preventing petitioners as lawyers from seeing the detainees their clients any
time of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the detainees right to
counsel and violates RA 7438. Petitioners claim that the regulated visits made it
difficult for them to prepare for the important hearings before the Senate and
the Feliciano Commission.
Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center
violated the detainees right to privacy of communication when the ISAFP
officials opened and read the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo
Maestrecampo. Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP officials violated the
detainees right against cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP officials
prevented the detainees from having contact with their visitors. Moreover, the
ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron grills of the
detention cells, limiting the already poor light and ventilation in the detainees
cells.
Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement.
However, the fact that the detainees are confined makes their rights more
limited than those of the public. RA 7438, which specifies the rights of detainees
and the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the power of the
detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the
safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. Section 4(b) penalty clause of
RA 7438 provides:
b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member
of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister or by his
counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any

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member of his immediate family with him, or from examining and treating
him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or,
in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four
thousand pesos (P4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security
officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner
may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to
secure his safety and prevent his escape
True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from
visiting a detainee client at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the
night. However, the last paragraph of the same Section 4(b) makes the
express qualification that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4(b), the
detention officer has the power to undertake such reasonable measures as may
be necessary to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape.
The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a clear standard. The
regulations governing a detainees confinement must be reasonable measures x
xx to secure his safety and prevent his escape. Thus, the regulations must be
reasonably connected to the governments objective of securing the safety and
preventing the escape of the detainee. The law grants the detention officer the
authority to undertake such reasonable measures or regulations.

The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the

detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the
detainees. The detainees right to counsel is not undermined by the
scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano
Commission,petitioners were given time to confer with the detainees, a fact that
petitioners themselves admit. Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their
right to counsel.
Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their
visitors and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to
unusual and excessive punishment. The fact that the restrictions inherent
in detention intrude into the detainees desire to live comfortably does
not convert those restrictions into punishment.It is whenthe
restrictions are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to
punish. Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be
related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive
in relation to that purpose. Jail officials are thus not required to use the least
restrictive security measure. They must only refrain from implementing a
restriction that appears excessive to the purpose it serves.
An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to
suffer some harm or disability, and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish
the inmate. Punishment also requires that the harm or disability be significantly
greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.

The schedule of visiting hours does not render void the detainees indictment for
criminal and military offenses to warrant the detainees release from detention.
The ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees right to
counsel. The purpose of the regulation is not to render ineffective the right to
counsel, but to secure the safety and security of all detainees. American cases
are instructive on the standards to determine whether regulations on pre-trial
confinement are permissible.

In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the
detainees from their visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact
visits. The iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct
physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal
and limited physical contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly
restrictive. The limitation on the detainees physical contacts with visitors is a
reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns.

While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that
the detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily
basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of detainees right to counsel.
Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are regular business hours,
the same hours when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law offices.
Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness. Moreover, in
urgent cases, petitioners could always seek permission from the ISAFP officials
to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours.

The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the ISAFP
Detention Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to
prevent the detainees from passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to
another. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime
within the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are but
discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments
on the detainees.

SPECIAL

We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions in
the ISAFP Detention Center are not inhuman, degrading and cruel. Each

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detainee, except for Capt. NicanorFaeldon and Capt. Gerardo Gambala, is

confined in separate cells, unlike ordinary cramped detention cells. The
detainees are treated well and given regular meals. The Court of Appeals noted
that the cells are relatively clean and livable compared to the conditions now
prevailing in the city and provincial jails, which are congested with detainees.

We now pass upon petitioners argument that the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center violated the detainees right to privacy when the ISAFP officials
opened and read the letters handed by detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo to
one of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out that the letters were not
in a sealed envelope but simply folded because there were no envelopes in the
ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners contend that the Constitution prohibits the
infringement of a citizens privacy rights unless authorized by law. The Solicitor
General does not deny that the ISAFP officials opened the letters.
The opening and reading of the detainees letters in the present case
did not violate the detainees right to privacy of communication. The
letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded
letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening
of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not
confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who
received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely
acting as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he
received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were
not confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Centercould read the
letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters
but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens
privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not
to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those
detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations
inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished
expectation of privacy rights.
The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300
soldiers in committing coup detat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua.
SPECIAL

The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood
incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the
financial district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the
detainees are subject to the Articles of War. Moreover, the junior officers are
detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus,
we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing
the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in a
better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior
officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the
appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks involved, we should
defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of
patent arbitrariness.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and
convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances.
Regulations and conditions in detention and prison facilities that violate the
Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the
courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or
damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane
conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question
conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is
challenged is the fact or duration of confinement.

(4)IN THE MATTER OF...KUNTING

Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal Security
Act and was turned over to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to
warrants for his arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City.
Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious
Illegal Detention with the RTC under separate Amended Informations, Petitioner
was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp
Crame for booking and custodial investigation.
Atty. Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent and Chief of the Legal Affairs Division,
PNP-IG, informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already
in the custody of the PNP-IG. Atty. Danipog requested for Kuntings temporary
detention at the PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City due to the high security
risks involved and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding commitment
order. The response stated that Kunting shall be brought to Isabela. RTC issued
an Order directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division,
PNP-IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an
Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation. Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief State

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Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting for

representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the venue of the trial
from Isabela stating several security reasons. The DOJ has failed to render a
resolution to this and the trial court has reiterated its order to turn over Kunting
to the court. The Police Inspector requested that this be suspended until a
decision has been made on the transfer of venue. Kunting, by counsel, filed this
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus will prosper NO.
RATIO
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus
extends to all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto. The remedy of habeas corpus has one
objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and if found illegal,
the court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven
lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize
the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in
the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the
RTC. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, QC, was thus authorized
by the trial court. The writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged
since he has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals
holds that once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
However, the court orders urgent action on the order of the trial court.
(5)SALIENTES V. ABANILLA KAREN

Facts:
Loran Abanilla and Marie Antoinette Salientes are the parents of minor Lorenzo
Emmanuelle Abanilla. They lived at Salientes house but because Abanilla does not get
along with his in-laws, he suggested to Marie Antoinette that they move out. The latter
refused so Loran alone moved out of the house and was thereafter prevented from seeing
his son. Loran filed a petition for habeas corpus and custody with the rtc of muntinlupa.
RTC granted the petition and the Salientes are ordered to produce minor Lorenzo in court.
Petitioners moved for MR, denied by the court. CA dismissed their petition for certiorari.
It stated that there was no awarding of custody that has been decided yet and it was
simply asking for the minor to be presented in court as standard procedure. Petitioner
moved filed for and MR which was denied hence this appeal by certiorari asserting that CA
erred in dismissing the petition to have RTCs decision set aside.
Issue: Is the decision of the CA and RTC contrary to article 213 of the family code which
states that no child shall be separated from the mother under seven years of age as
argued by the Salientes?
Held: NO, petition without merit. As CA stated, the petition for habeas corpus merely
granted that the body of the minor be presented in court.
Ratio:
Petitioner posits the theory that the proper action that should have been filed by Loran is
a simple action for custody and not habeas corpus and that because there was no
involuntary restraint of the minor, there was no need for her to show cause why she
should have custody over the minor.
But as correctly pointed out by the CA, the RTC did not grant custody of the minor to any
of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain
why they are restraining his liberty. The order in question is interlocutory and is
precedent to the trial courts full inquiry into the issue of custody.A n interlocutory order
is not appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under
Rule 65.
Habeas corpus on the other hand, may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is
withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Art 211 of the Family Code, respondent
Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and
consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue
of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of
custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the
present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his
child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
As for Article 213 of the Family Code as an argument, it deals with the judicial
adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the
court. This can be raised as a counter argument for private respondents petition for
custody but is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child.

Salientes vs Abanilla
SPECIAL

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SPECIAL

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