Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

119673, July 26, 1996

FACTS
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC)
were rated X i.e., not for public viewing by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now
MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly
prohibited by law because of petitioner INCs controversial biblical interpretations and its attacks against contrary
religious beliefs.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board
to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed
the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo, and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on
TV of the three series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another
religion. The CA also found the subject TV series indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs. Dissatisfied
with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioners TV program?
(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of
petitioners religious program?
RULING
[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA sustained the action of the respondent Boards Xrating petitioners TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it
sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioners TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.]
1.

YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioners TV program.

Petitioner contends that the term television program [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the respondent Board has
the power to review and classify] should not include religious programs like its program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. A contrary
interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that no law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
[The Court however] reject petitioners postulate. Petitioners public broadcast on TV of its religious program
brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The
Court iterates the rule thatthe exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear
and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more
overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be
seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a
volatile area of concern in our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the
free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For
when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioners
religious program.
[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed
brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for attacking either religions,
especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-called attacks are
mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the
respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent,
contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling
clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. xxx.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse
to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State
to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the
speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most
numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality
of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom
of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the

marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat
of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.
In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule.
In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can
be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled
that . . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare
of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to
avoid the danger.
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is
completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks
against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the
gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already
on ground.
MTRCB v. ABS-CBN G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005
Facts:
Respondent abs-cbn aired Prosti-tuition, an episode of the TV program The Inside Story produced and hosted by
respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees.
PWU was named as the school of some of the students involved and the faade of the PWU building served as the
background of the episode. This caused upsoar in the PWU community and they filed a letter-complaint to the MTRCB.
MTRCB alleged that respondents
1) Did not submit the inside story to petitioner for review
2) Exhibited the same without its permission, thus violating sec 7 of PD 1986 and some sections of MTRCB rules and
regulations
ABS-CBN averred:
1) The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial, its airing is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press
2) Petitioners has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.
After hearing and submission of the parties memoranda, MTRCB investigating committee ordered the respondents to pay
P20,000 for non-submission of the program
MTRCB affirmed the ruling
Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC. RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents,
annulling and setting aside the decision and resolution of the MTRCB anddeclaring and decreeing that certain sections of
PD 1986 & MTRCB do not cover the TV program Inside Story, they being a public affairs programs which can be
equated to a newspaper
Hence, this petition
Issue:
Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the Inside Story prior its exhibition or broadcast by TV.
Held:
Sec 3 of PD 1986 enumerates the powers, functions and duties of the board:
Xxx
b) to screen, review and examine all motion pictures herein defined, TV programs, including publicity materials
The court in INC v. CA rules that PD 1986 gives MTRCB the power to screen, review and examine ALL TV
PROGRAMS
*LESSON* where the law does not make any exceptions, courts may not exempt something therefrom, unless
there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.
Thus, when the law says all TV programs, the word all covers all tv programs whether religious, public affairs, news
docu, etc. It then follows that since the Inside Story is a TV Program, MTRCB has the power to review it
The only exemptions from the MTRCBs power to review are those mentioned in Sec 7 of PD 1986
1) TV programs imprinted or exhibited by Phil govt and/or departments and agencies
2) Newsreels
In a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents content that Inside Story falls under thecategory of newsreels.
MTRCB rules and reg defines newsreels as straight news reporting, as distinguished from analyses, commentaries, and
opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered newsreels.
Clearly, Inside Story is not a newsreel but more of a public affairs program and within petitioners power of review.
Issue related to Consti law:
Petitioners power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to prior restraint.
Ratio:

It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred
status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present, designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs x x x. Yet despite the fact that freedom of religion has
been accorded a preferred status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristos religious program from petitioners
review power.
Respondents claim that the showing of The Inside Story is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of
speech and of the press. However, there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of
expression and of the press has a preferred status.
If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner
MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom The Inside Story which, according to
respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no
preferred status.
The only exceptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986,
such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies,
and (2) newsreels.
Ayer Productions Vs. Capulong Case Digest
Ayer Productions Vs. Capulong
160 SCRA 861
G.R. No. L-82380
April 29, 1988
Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned,
sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the
Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and
other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four
fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David
Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American
historian have developed a script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or
that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial
exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners
proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC
ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating
any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to
Enrile. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.
Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and exhibit
such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of
motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of
freedom of speech and of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private
respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other
words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and
concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were
taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to
privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of
expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must
be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events.
PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989]
Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon
D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the
Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers
along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and
indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo
Pita.

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing
and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said
defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof
claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the
publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an
Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning
of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminaryinjunction. The Court granted the
temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid.
This was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.
Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature
that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene
publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's
sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger
rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately
"whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be
decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The government authorities in the
instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they
were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to
carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the
issuance of a searchwarrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;
1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and
present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a case-tocase basis and on the judges sound discretion;