#13

LORENZO MENDOZA, petitioner,

vs.
GORGONIA PARUNGAO, Honorable EDUARDO GUTIERREZ DAVID, Judge of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
GABRIEL BELMONTE, sheriff ex-officio of Nueva Ecija, and
Honorable MANUEL V. MORAN, Vacation Judge of First Instance of the
Court of Nueva Ecija, respondents.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FACTS:
On August 7, 1925, the RTC, where herein respondent Gorgonia Parugao was
plaintiff and the herein petitioner Lorenzo Mendoza defendant, declared the
marriage between the two null. Thereafter, Antonio Buenaventura, the first
husband of the respondent Gorgonia Parugao, died.
Said judgment annulling the marriage being on appeal, on September 14, 1925,
the said respondent Gorgonia Parugao brought an action, against the petitioner
Lorenzo Mendoza in which she alleged the existence of certain conjugal property
acquired during her marriage with the said petitioner, and asked for a settlement
of the same and the sum of P300 as alimony during the pendency of the suit. The
court found in favor of the Parungao and issued multiple orders and writs of
execution which were not complied with. The defendant and sheriffs were called
to the court to show cause why they should not be held in contempt.
On July 10, 1926, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija issued an order
denying the motion of the defendant praying that the writs of attachment of the
dates of January 20th and March 23rd of 1926, respectively, be cancelled.
In its decision of July 23, 1926, this court affirmed the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija declaring null and of no effect the marriage
contracted by the petitioner Lorenzo Mendoza and the respondent Gorgonia
Parugao on February 14, 1916.1
ISSUE:
W/N the writ of execution was proper in the case at bar.
RULING: NO.
In the case now before us, the order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija of
November 27, 1925, may be considered as an order for the payment of P50
monthly as an advance payment on account of such share of the conjugal
property as may be found from the liquidation to belong to Gorgonia Parugao.
This order, however, being of an interlocutory character and not final (sec. 123,
Act No. 190) no writ of execution can be issued thereon (sec. 443, Act No. 190; 23
C. J., 314); but its unjustified disobedience may constitute contempt of court and,
after the proper proceedings prescribed by law in such cases, may be punished as
such.
The issuance of the writs of execution on January 20 and March 23, 1926, and the
order of June 8, 1926, to show cause in connection with the noncompliance of said
writs of execution, constitutes an excess of jurisdiction, which is the proper
subject-matter of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

For the foregoing and not considering it necessary to order the forwarding of the
record to this court, the remedy applied for is granted, declaring void the writ of
execution of March 23, 1926, and all the proceedings had therein and making the
preliminary injunction issued by this court absolute, with the costs against the
respondents. So ordered.
#14
TERLYNGRACE RIVERA vs. FLORENCIO L. VARGAS
G.R. No. 165895, June 5, 2009
NACHURA, J.:
ACTION: Petition for Review on Certiorari
FACTS:
On February 24, 2003, respondent Florencio Vargas (Vargas) filed a
complaint against petitioner and several John Does before Branch 02 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, for the recovery of a 150
T/H rock crushing plant located in Sariaya, Quezon. Vargas claims ownership of
the said equipment, having purchased and imported the same directly from Hyun
Dae Trading Co., in Seoul, South Korea. The equipment was allegedly entrusted to
petitioners husband, Jan T. Rivera, who died sometime in late 2002, as caretaker
of respondents construction aggregates business in Batangas. According to
Vargas, petitioner failed to return the said equipment after her husbands death
despite his repeated demands, thus forcing him to resort to court action. The
complaint was accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin and
the necessary bond amounting to P2,400,000.00.
Summons was served upon petitioner through her personal secretary on
April 28, 2003 at her residence in Paraaque City. Interestingly, however, the writ
of replevin was served upon and signed by a certain Joseph Rejumo, the security
guard on duty in petitioners crushing plant in Sariaya, Quezon contrary to the
sheriffs return stating that the writ was served upon Rivera.
Rivera filed her answer, manifestation, and motion for the acceptance of
petitioners redelivery bond. In her answer, petitioner countered that the rockcrushing plant was ceded in favor of her husband as his share following the
dissolution of the partnership formed between Jan Rivera and respondents wife,
Iluminada Vargas (Iluminada), while the partnerships second rock-crushing plant
in Cagayan was ceded in favor of Iluminada. She further averred that from the
time that the partnership was dissolved sometime in 2000 until Jan Riveras death
in late 2002, it was petitioners husband who exercised ownership over the said
equipment without any disturbance from respondent.
RTC disapproved petitioners redelivery bond application for failure to
comply with requirements under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.
RTC faulted petitioner for her failure to file the application for redelivery bond
within five (5) days from the date of seizure as provided in the Rules of Court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was also denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the redelivery bond was validly denied?
RULING:
No, the redelivery bond was not validly denied.

The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of

Rule 60 is unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior
to the taking of the property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party
(petitioner, in this case) together with the application, the affidavit of merit, and
the replevin bond.
Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the
constitutional guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against
unreasonable searches and seizures. If the writ was not served upon the adverse
party but was instead merely handed to a person who is neither an agent of the
adverse party nor a person authorized to receive court processes on his behalf,
the service thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid, running afoul of the
statutory and constitutional requirements. The service is likewise invalid if the writ
of replevin was served without the required documents. Under these
circumstances, no right to seize and to detain the property shall pass, the act of
the sheriff being both unlawful and unconstitutional.
In the case at bar, petitioner avers that the writ of replevin was served
upon the security guard where the rock-crushing plant to be seized was located.
The signature of the receiving party indicates that the writ was received by a
certain Joseph Rejumo, the guard on duty in a plant in Sariaya, Quezon, where the
property to be seized was located. The sheriffs return, however, peremptorily
states that both the writ of replevin and the summons were served upon Rivera.
Nine (9) days after the writ was served on the security guard, petitioner filed an
answer to the complaint accompanied by a prayer for the approval of her
redelivery bond which was denied for having been filed beyond the five-day
mandatory period prescribed in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60. But since the writ
was invalidly served, petitioner is correct in contending that there is no reckoning
point from which the mandatory five-day period shall commence to run.
The writ or order of replevin must comply with all the requirements as to
matters of form or contents prescribed by the Rules of Court. The writ must also
satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective. Consequently, a trial court
is deemed to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction with respect to the
ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains a personalty on the basis of a
writ that was improperly served, such as what happened in this case.
At the outset, petitioners proper remedy should have been to file a motion
to quash the writ of replevin or a motion to vacate the order of seizure.
Nevertheless, petitioners filing of an application for a redelivery bond, while not
necessary, did not thereby waive her right to question the improper service. It
now becomes imperative for the trial court to restore the parties to their former
positions by returning the seized property to petitioner and by discharging the
replevin bond filed by respondent. The trial, with respect to the main action, shall
continue. Respondent may, however, file a new application for replevin should he
choose to do so.
#15
G.R. No. L-61464 May 28, 1988
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AUGUSTO YULO, LILY YULO (doing
business under the name and style of A & L INDUSTRIES), respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:
On July 1, 1975, private respondent Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the
petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he
signed in his own behalf and as representative of the A & L Industries. Respondent
Yulo presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife,
respondent Lily Yulo, who manages A & L Industries and under whose name the
said business is registered, purportedly authorizing Augusto Yulo to procure the
loan and sign the promissory note. About two months prior to the loan, however,
Augusto Yulo had already left Lily Yulo and their children and had abandoned their
conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto Yulo
failed to pay the same.
The trial court issued the writ of attachment prayed for thereby enabling the
petitioner to attach the properties of A & L Industries. Apparently not contented
with the order, the petitioner filed another motion for the examination of
attachment debtor, alleging that the properties attached by the sheriff were not
sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by it
in the case. This was likewise granted by the court.
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitioner's
complaint against the private respondent Lily Yulo and A & L Industries and
ordering the petitioner to pay the respondent Lily Yulo P660,000.00 as actual
damages; P500,000.00 as unrealized profits; P300,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P30,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
The petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
except for the exemplary damages which it reduced from P300,000.00 to
P150,000.00 and the attorney's fees which were reduced from P30,000.00 to
P20,000.00.
ISSUE:
W/N the attachment on the properties was proper.
RULING:
Petitioner assails the award of actual damages according to the petitioner, both
the lower court and the appellate court overlooked the fact that the properties
referred to are still subject to a levy on attachment. They are, therefore, still
under custodia legis and thus, the assailed decision should have included a
declaration as to who is entitled to the attached properties and that assuming
arguendo that the attachment was erroneous, the lower court should have
ordered the sheriff to return to the private respondent the attached properties
instead of condemning the petitioner to pay the value thereof by way of actual
damages.
The question before us, therefore, is whether the attachment of the properties of
A & L Industries was wrongful so as to entitle the petitioner to actual damages
only or whether the said attachment was made in bad faith and with malice to
warrant the award of other kinds of damages. Moreover, if the private respondent
is entitled only to actual damages, was the court justified in ordering the
petitioner to pay for the value of the attached properties instead of ordering the
return of the said properties to the private respondent Yulo ?
Both the trial and appellate courts found that there was bad faith on the part of
the petitioner in securing the writ of attachment. We do not think so. "An

attachment may be said to be wrongful when, for instance, the plaintiff has no
cause of action, or that there is no true ground therefore, or that the plaintiff has a
sufficient security other than the property attached, which is tantamout to saying
that the plaintiff is not entitled to attachment because the requirements of
entitling him to the writ are wanting. (7 C.J.S., 664)" (p. 48, Section 4, Rule 57,
Francisco, Revised Rules of Court).
Although the petitioner failed to prove the ground relied upon for the issuance of
the writ of attachment, this failure cannot be equated with bad faith or malicious
intent. The steps which were taken by the petitioner to ensure the security of its
claim were premised, on the firm belief that the properties involved could be
made answerable for the unpaid obligation due it. There is no question that a loan
in the amount of P591,003.59 was borrowed from the bank.
We, thus, find that the petitioner is liable only for actual damages and not for
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Respondent Lily Yulo has manifested
before this Court that she no longer desires the return of the attached properties
since the said attachment caused her to close down the business. From that time
she has become a mere employee of the new owner of the premises. She has
grave doubts as to the running condition of the attached machineries and
equipments considering that the attachment was effected way back in 1975. She
states as a matter of fact that the petitioner has already caused the sale of the
machineries for fear that they might be destroyed due to prolonged litigation. We,
therefore, deem it just and equitable to allow private respondent Lily Yulo to
recover actual damages based on the value of the attached properties as proven
in the trial court, in the amount of P660,000.00. In turn, if there are any remaining
attached properties, they should be permanently released to herein petitioner.
#17
G.R. No. 148132

January 28, 2008

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
REGINA M. ASTORGA, respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 151079

January 28, 2008

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
REGINA M. ASTORGA, respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 151372

January 28, 2008

REGINA M. ASTORGA, petitioner,

vs.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. and ANN MARGARET V.
SANTIAGO, respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:

Regina M. Astorga (Astorga) was employed by respondent Smart Communications,

Incorporated (SMART) on May 8, 1997 as District Sales Manager of the Corporate
Sales Marketing Group/ Fixed Services Division (CSMG/FSD). She was receiving a
monthly salary of P33,650.00. In February 1998, SMART launched an
organizational realignment to achieve more efficient operations. SMART abolished
the CSMG/FSD, Astorgas division. SNMI agreed to absorb the CSMG personnel
who would be recommended by SMART. SMART then conducted a performance
evaluation of CSMG personnel and those who garnered the highest ratings were
favorably recommended to SNMI. Astorga landed last in the performance
evaluation, thus, she was not recommended by SMART. Despite the abolition of
the CSMG/FSD, Astorga continued reporting for work. But on March 3, 1998,
SMART issued a memorandum advising Astorga of the termination of her
employment on ground of redundancy, effective April 3, 1998. Astorga received it
on March 16, 1998.7
The termination of her employment prompted Astorga to file a Complaint8 for
illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries and other benefits with prayer for moral
and exemplary damages against SMART and Ann Margaret V. Santiago (Santiago).
She claimed that abolishing CSMG and, consequently, terminating her
employment was illegal for it violated her right to security of tenure. She also
posited that it was illegal for an employer, like SMART, to contract out services
which will displace the employees, especially if the contractor is an in-house
agency.9
In the meantime, on May 18, 1998, SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding
that she pay the current market value of the Honda Civic Sedan which was given
to her under the companys car plan program, or to surrender the same to the
company for proper disposition.11 Astorga, however, failed and refused to do
either, thus prompting SMART to file a suit for replevin with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati (RTC) on August 10, 1998. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 98-1936 and was raffled to Branch 57.12 Astorga filed a motion to dismiss the
same.
Pending resolution of Astorgas motion to dismiss the replevin case, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a Decision14 dated August 20, 1998, declaring Astorgas
dismissal from employment illegal and ordering her reinstatement and payment of
backwages.
Subsequently, on March 29, 1999, the RTC issued an Order 16 denying Astorgas
motion to dismiss the replevin case. Astorga filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the RTC denied it on June 18, 1999.18
Astorga elevated the denial of her motion via certiorari to the CA, which, in its
February 28, 2000 Decision,19reversed the RTC ruling. Granting the petition and,
consequently, dismissing the replevin case, the CA held that the case is
intertwined with Astorgas complaint for illegal dismissal; thus, it is the labor
tribunal that has rightful jurisdiction over the complaint. SMARTs motion for
reconsideration having been denied,20 it elevated the case to this Court, now
docketed as G.R. No. 148132.
Meanwhile, SMART also appealed the unfavorable ruling of the Labor Arbiter in the
illegal dismissal case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In its
September 27, 1999 Decision,21 the NLRC sustained Astorgas dismissal. Astorga
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it on December 21,
1999.23
Astorga then went to the CA via certiorari. On June 11, 2001, the CA rendered a
Decision24 affirming with modification the resolutions of the NLRC. Astorga filed a

motion for reconsideration which was granted and SMART was ordered to pay her
backwages.
Astorga and SMART came to us with their respective petitions for review.
ISSUE:
W/N the dismissal of the replevin case by the CA is proper.
RULING: NO.
Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of
goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has
wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels.
It is designed to permit one having right to possession to recover property in
specie from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the property. 30 The term
may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the
provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the
property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the
action.31
In reversing the RTC ruling and consequently dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction, the CA made the following disquisition, viz.:
[I]t is plain to see that the vehicle was issued to [Astorga] by [Smart] as
part of the employment package. We doubt that [SMART] would extend [to
Astorga] the same car plan privilege were it not for her employment as
district sales manager of the company. Furthermore, there is no civil
contract for a loan between [Astorga] and [Smart]. Consequently, We find
that the car plan privilege is a benefit arising out of employer-employee
relationship. Thus, the claim for such falls squarely within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiters and the NLRC.32
We do not agree. Contrary to the CAs ratiocination, the RTC rightfully assumed
jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorgas
motion to dismiss. SMARTs demand for payment of the market value of the car
or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It
involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer
relations.33 As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante,34 this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC over
the replevin suit, explained:
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession
in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein is the return of the
property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary
statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of
personal property. The question of whether or not a party has the right of
possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the
adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said property as to
require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor
tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.
xxxx
The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin
Case. The respective issues raised in each forum can be resolved

independently on the other. In fact in 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the

case before it had issued an Injunctive Writ enjoining the petitioners from
blocking the free ingress and egress to the Vessel and ordering the
petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the controversy is
properly settled under the Labor Code. So also with petitioners right to
picket. But the determination of the question of who has the better right to
take possession of the Vessel and whether petitioners can deprive the
Charterer, as the legal possessor of the Vessel, of that right to possess in
addressed to the competence of Civil Courts.
In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining
avenues of jurisdiction as laid down by pertinent laws.
The CA, therefore, committed reversible error when it overturned the RTC ruling
and ordered the dismissal of the replevin case for lack of jurisdiction.