Consti 3

MERCADO VS MANZANO
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS
MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS,respondents.
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for

disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the
office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998
elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent
is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of
Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent
admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632
DECISION
and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in
1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the
MENDOZA, J.:
United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955,
and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not
B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in lose his Filipino citizenship.
the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza
III. The results of the election were as follows:
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent
Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he
Eduardo B. Manzano
103,853
holds dual citizenship.
Ernesto S. Mercado
100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III
54,275[1]
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is

disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding
view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local
Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a position.
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2] the Second Division of
the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent
on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the
Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELECs Second Division said:
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent

Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for ViceMayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration.[3] The motion remained pending even until after
the election held on May 11, 1998.
Constitution Law I | Rellie | 1
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated

May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated
the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the
proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case
for disqualification.[4] Petitioners motion was opposed by private
respondent.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet
final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes
among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one
hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes
over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one
hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a
margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959)
votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand
two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election
laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice
than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private
international law which may well be settled before the highest
court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998,

the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with
one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the
ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent
qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11,
1998 elections.[5] The pertinent portions of the resolution of the
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the
COMELEC en banc read:
resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998,
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in ordering the cancellation of the respondents certificate of
San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship candidacy.
by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be
principle of jus soli.
QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at
the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of
to the Philippines using an American passport as travel Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and
document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the
Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss
of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United of canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed
States.
private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the
majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of
US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no Makati City. Petitioner contends that
longer had U.S. citizenship.
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be
when he:
adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
1.
He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age . . . .
of majority when he was already 37 years old; and,
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a
2.
He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) motion for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the
registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the
1995 and 1998.
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is
Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City
effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even
assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and
executory judgment.
elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by
private respondent Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has
personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an
original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto
Mamaril nor was petitioners motion for leave to intervene
granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of

the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that
petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring
this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to
intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an action or
proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or
proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to
intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time

petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the
COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of
the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the
basis of which petitioner came out only second to private
respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no
proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has,
an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time
he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,[6] reiterated
in several cases,[7] only applies to cases in which the election of
the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who
placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the
winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion
for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely
to have private respondent disqualified from running for [an]
elective local position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto
Mamaril
(who
originally
instituted
the
disqualification
proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to
bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati
candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less
because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998,
after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice
mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:
II. DUAL
CITIZENSHIP
DISQUALIFICATION
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be

disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant
or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the
Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case, contends that
through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons
possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in

proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet
been no final judgment rendered.
AS
GROUND
FOR
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being

sought under 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160), which declares as disqualified from running for any
elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship. This
provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. [8]
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual

allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. [9] For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents
are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of
the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners

motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion,
justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As
the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the
present petition properly deals not only with the denial of
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
petitioners motion for intervention but also with the substantive countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
issues respecting private respondents alleged disqualification on
the ground of dual citizenship.
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private citizens of that country;
respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters

country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the

Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative
Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia
including some European and Latin countries were represented,
which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in
Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of that Overseas Council.
another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this
unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close
to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday,
including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the
allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about
Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the minority claims on our natural resources.
national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision
was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to
Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows: Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already
[10]
happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown
Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow
dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas when we have to endure a capital famine which also means
Committee according to which a dual allegiance and I reiterate economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.
a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that of
mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly
never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed consider incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the
marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL
ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT
double citizenship at all.
WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the
constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For
example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus: [11]
the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which
consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a . . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their
Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a double
fact that the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who
Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant
to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to

citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere
in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations
exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to
rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of
this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national
security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the
fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the
decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these
naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10;
and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of
allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the
spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen
Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine
and deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk
of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and
national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this
could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But
considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the
security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great
numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time
that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern
of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per
se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the
phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No.
7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates
of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive

members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual
citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no
control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize
a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a
citizen of another country is something completely beyond our
control.[12]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same
time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are
also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It
may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its
laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on
40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification
of line 41, page 17: Any person with dual citizenship is
disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the
present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother
is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is
a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no
requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching
the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine
citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports,
one belonging to the country of his or her father and one
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a
situation disqualify the person to run for a local
government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means
that at the moment when he would want to run for public
office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport
but the country of origin or the country of the father claims
that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to
renounce. There are such countries in the world.
the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is
satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive
prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If
does not require an election. Under the Constitution, a the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read
person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our
birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a
foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of
citizenship.
course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will
Under the Gentlemans example, if he does not renounce and power of the people of this Republic.
his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to
question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing
he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that:
I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of
Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one
citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or
her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he
exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges
other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this
disqualification.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San

Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino
parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli,
the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of
the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC
en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992,
1995, and 1998, private respondent effectively renounced his
U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now he is solely a
Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking

part
in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for
naturalization must renounce all allegiance and fidelity to any renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation
foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty [14] of which at the was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it
time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age
of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. of majority.
Republic,[15] it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an
oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private

respondent renounced his American citizenship, the COMELEC must
have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
United States, which provided that A person who is a national of the

United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his
nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state
or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the
sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure this provision was
declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v.
Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate
foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when
he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private
respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998,
contained the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR
NATURALIZED)
NATURAL-BORN
....
10.
I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747A,
BARANGAY
SAN
LORENZO,
CITY/MUNICIPALITY
OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11.
I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR
IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12.
I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED. I
WILL
SUPPORT
AND
DEFEND
THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN
TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL
OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES
PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I
IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY,
WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF
EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED
HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was

held:[17]
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an
American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively
give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code would disqualify him from running for any elective
local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is
cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time
he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for
governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenshiplong
before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the

interimwhen
he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but

before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December
19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his
American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992,
and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long
before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by
Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are
conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the
oath of allegiance contained in private respondents certificate of
candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his American
citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners contention that, to be
effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private
respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the
election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent
admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport

which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22,
1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of
candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts
attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his
American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship. What
this
Court
said
in Aznar
v.
COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the
case at bar:
through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. DefensorSantiago,[19] we sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation
of his Philippine citizenship.
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino DISMISSED.
and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is
CALILUNG VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he
Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still
Republic of the Philippines
a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
SUPREME COURT
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of
Manila
Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied
renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the
renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express,
EN BANC
it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine
citizenship when there is no renunciation, either express or
G.R. No. 160869
May 11, 2007
implied.
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he

SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR
is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant
GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner,
of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of
vs.
the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as
does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as
the Secretary of Justice,Respondent.
the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as
DECISION
a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the QUISUMBING, J.:
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth
and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
of his election of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to
undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are implement laws governing citizenship.1 Petitioner prays that a writ
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing
Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent,
Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As
Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act
No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of
the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether

legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of
age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity
of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship

Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003."
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must

meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
"The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other
existing laws;
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain
or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
August 29, 2003, reads:
following conditions:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the

State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of
this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines

shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office
as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and
swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their
assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their
oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any
public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or
extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the
oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath
(b) are in the active service as commissioned or taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and
noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant
taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of
country which they are naturalized citizens.
the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of
3
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act his undivided loyalty to the Republic.
is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision
In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the
not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.
deliberations of Congress is necessary to determine the intent of
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law. During the
regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow
dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record
repealed or modified accordingly.
of the legislative deliberations reveals the following:
SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen
(15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) x x x x
newspapers of general circulation.
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure,
In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been two situations exist - - the retention of foreign citizenship, and the
raised: (1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional? (2) Does this reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this case, he observed
that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He
Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?
pointed out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical
to public interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of
We shall discuss these issues jointly.
dual allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a
citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, violation of the Constitution
together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner
maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or
naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine
citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3
permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born
citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by
simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign
allegiance.2 The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual
allegiance is inimical to the national interest.
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to

address the constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as inimical
to public interest. He said that the proposed law aims to facilitate
the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means.
However, he said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of
dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He explained
that the problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the
Philippines to the foreign country because the latest oath that will
be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He
merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who
added that this is a matter which the Philippine government will Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance
have no concern and competence over.
is created wherein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes
an oath of allegiance to another country and in that oath says that
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's he abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country
of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original
concern, when dual allegiance is involved.
Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure,
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the he clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the last he
original version of the bill, which did not require an oath of utters is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that the
allegiance. Since the measure now requires this oath, the problem problem of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of the
4
of dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign Philippines but of the other foreign country. (Emphasis supplied.)
country concerned, he explained.
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that
the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do
xxxx
away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become
did not denounce his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225
allegiance to the foreign government, and at the same time, owes does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who
his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there is now have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual
a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance.
allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic,
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly,
the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem
citizenship. However, he said that this is not a matter that he of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue
wishes to address in Congress because he is not a member of a of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a
foreign parliament but a Member of the House.
concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
xxxx
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although

Congress has not yet passed any law on the matter of dual
allegiance, such absence of a law should not be justification why
this Court could not rule on the issue. He further contends that
while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance,
the Supreme Court, through Mercado v. Manzano, 6 already had
drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual allegiance from
dual citizenship.7
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual
allegiance contrary to national interest should be dealt with by
law. However, he said that the dual allegiance problem is not
addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the
bill which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that all citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is
recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV
of the 1987 Constitution, dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law.
citizenship.
Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the
Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

regarding dual allegiance.8
Associate Justice
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a WE CONCUR:
declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The
legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections
2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with
dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law
that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual
allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the
judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues
pertaining to dual allegiance.
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law
is not needed since the case of Mercado had already set the
guidelines
for
determining
dual
allegiance.
Petitioner
misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what
constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between
dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,11 we said that the courts
must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders
and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is
right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in
determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with
the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and
act with caution and forbearance. 12 The doctrine of separation of
powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting
the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the
Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining
what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by
Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
CO VS HRET
TECSON VS COMELEC
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,
JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER,respondents.
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY
POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.,respondent.
[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN
AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the
state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious
heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition, [1] that cannot be
taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those
who dispute it.
SO ORDERED.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which

raise a single question of profound importance to the nation. The
issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of
a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our
people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated
breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one
of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino
or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with
Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich
heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion
resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no
less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando
Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled
"Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on
Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel
his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was
a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie
Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed,
Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19

January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several
documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ,
2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by
Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for
bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley,
3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified
photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a
certification issued by the Director of the Records Management
and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record
in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided
or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from
the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives to the effect that no available information could be found
in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F.
Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary
pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a
certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division
of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of
births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the
Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives
that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe
and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of
Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of
Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643,
No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of
the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported
marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h)
a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office
during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally
destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003
for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier
filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06
February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004,
petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824,
likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the

finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824,
would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson,
and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X.
Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe,
Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting
that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to
have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of
candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e.,
that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner
Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or
to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in
Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on
Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon
it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge
of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which
would authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to
deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance
candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 [2] in an action
for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also
reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its

Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days
from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case
or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the
rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution
provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law which power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No.
161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance
of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our
people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make
a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the
highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.
R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in
urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they
directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited
reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The
omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any
tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential
contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,
[4]
as not (being) justiciable controversies or disputes involving
contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted

Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An
Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to
Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the
President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and
Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the
subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government
under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected
Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would
now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7,
of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to
a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an
election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct
remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the
winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in
Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on
18 April 1992, would support this premise Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the
filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against
the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not
include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo
warranto shall not include an election protest.
Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for
President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the
second or third highest number of votes may contest the election
of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing
a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the
winner.
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal
over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates"
for
President
or
Vice-President. A quo
warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office.[5] In such context, the election contest
can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a

registered candidate who would have received either the second
or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would
not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C.
Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want
of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief
historical background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that
given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described
the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of
justice and in the holding of an office. [6] Aristotle saw its
significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State,"
which he described as being composed of such persons who would
be adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. [7] The
concept grew to include one who would both govern and be
governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and
loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights
and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant
obligations, on the other.[8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was active
in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private
interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the
centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and
large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary
for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty
and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to
include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to
participate in the exercise of political power. [10]The 20th century
saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which
laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being
and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained
expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed
in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in
keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be

the internationalization of citizenship.[12]
The Local Setting - from Spanish
Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the
Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In
church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low
regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on
citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but
their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive
law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made
to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly
extended by Royal Decrees.[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima
Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to
whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be
the subject of differing views among experts; [15] however, three
royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in
the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,
[16]
the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the
political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, [17] and
finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was
expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree
of 13 July 1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the
Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89,
according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which
this country was included, would be governed by special laws. [19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this
jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first
categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. (a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they
were born outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization
papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become
domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
Monarchy.[20]
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine
history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was
forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world
power, the United States. An accepted principle of international

law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an
abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect
on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898
between Spain and the United States. [21] Under Article IX of the
treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants
of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined
by its Congress "Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory
over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove
therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property,
including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its
proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their
industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they
remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year
from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a
declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default
of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to
have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined
by the Congress."[22]
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the
United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of
the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did
not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be
"aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the
protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the
first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to
as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive
legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines ".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to
reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of
April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens
of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of
the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve

their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and
ninety eight."[23]
Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who
was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the
11th day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include
1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the
Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period
no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given
to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that
the common law principle ofjus soli, otherwise also known as the
principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and
England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within
that period.[25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the
following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 "Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein."[26]
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of
"Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word
"Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor
General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in
his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the
Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated
virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so
amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children
born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected
to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen

hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since
become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if
residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the
Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11
April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2)
residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not
a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether
or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935
Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law,
by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as
being the basis of Filipino citizenship Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens
of the Philippines (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken
together with existing civil law provisions at the time, which
provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino
citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in
discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women
from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate
children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to
still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully
cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to
men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of

the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens
of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further
provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains
her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is
deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the
1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to
correct
the
irregular
situation
generated
by
the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and
write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship."[27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20

August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through
its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus
soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only
two, i.e., jus soli andjus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs.
Collector of Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by
birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to
indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was
his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the
father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had
not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however,
identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos,
Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11
September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan
F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol
father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta
Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a
supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on
16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was
stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino
citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried,
and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would
disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a
Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an
American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the
veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of
respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty
from the documents would be that 1.
The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley;
2.
FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3.
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each
other on 16 September, 1940;
4.
The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5.
At the time of his death on 11 September 1954,

Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish
the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of
FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of
public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents
have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties
during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for
petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate
of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for
respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted
by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents
were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility
thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they purported
to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of
marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate
relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San
Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had
utilized those material statements in his argument. All three
documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself, except in
the following cases:
x x x
xxx
xxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public office or is recorded in a public office.
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth
certificate
of
FPJ, constitute prima
facie proof
of
their
contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by
a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given
to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of
official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the
penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the
routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4)

the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure
of such errors as might have occurred.[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he
died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos,
Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born
sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony
of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the
Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902
considering that there was no existing record about such fact in
the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner,
however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other
place during the same period. In his death certificate, the
residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the
place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the
Records Management and Archives Office would have had
complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to
1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation
(relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or
paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of
an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son
according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must
be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the
Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30
August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect,
acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or
paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or
voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible
only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a
public document.[32] Complementary to the new code was Act No.
3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall
be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only
by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not
be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the

father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified.
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove
voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate
was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of
such requirement rendered the same useless as being an
authoritative document of recognition. [33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,
[34]
the Court ruled "Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was
enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth
certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the
registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having
been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment,
may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both
parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone
swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For
all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of
them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil
register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in
the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a
natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131.
True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement
in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her
own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both
parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe
found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown
to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other
proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public
document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could
constitute
such
a
document
as
proof
of
voluntary
acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public
documents, those executed by private individuals which must be
authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public
officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out
in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be
made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly
made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of

record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took
place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate
child
who
was
recognized
or
judicially
declared
as
natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded
generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to
prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would
last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally
to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment,
however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the
presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral
argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for
purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or
indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public
instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to
be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172,
Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
Art. 172.
The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
Art. 173.
The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by
the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the
heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years
within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
x x x
xxx
x x x.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate

filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied;
Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256.
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals, [36] the Court has
ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural
child should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary
recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this
Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body
of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be
given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an
attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well
apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family
in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The
provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal
affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also
affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the
State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in
the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of
private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly "Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose
the organization of the family and the regulation of property. It
has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine
and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience
among members of a family, and those which exist among
members of a society for the protection of private interests."[37]
In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the
laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they

reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of
a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of
the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their
support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the
rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal
property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in
general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons
and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed
exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is
best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad" that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of
the Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship
is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the
Civil Code,[39] such as on successional rights and family relations.
[40]
In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered
the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as
their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define
his rights under civil law[41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against
illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the
Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the family,
provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate
children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution
and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to
bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines
uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were
codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination
survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source
of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and
should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly
impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining
his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from
and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law
purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of
filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive

effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The
ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For
instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded
from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and
the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates
when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of
the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the
declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a
person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the
person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be
made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship
between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in
question must be shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley
Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20
before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan
F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living
together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent
FPJ) in one house, and as one family "I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently
residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in
accordance with law do hereby declare that:
1.
I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2.
Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3.
Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of
Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the
Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4.
Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939
at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
x x x
xxx
xxx
7.
Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and

became engaged while they were students at the
University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also
introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that
same year.
8.
Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their
first child in 1938.
9.
Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first
three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and
Fernando II, and myself lived together with our
mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now
Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of
Manila in 1945, except for some months between
1943-1944.
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were
blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald
Allan Poe.
x x x
xxx
xxx
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact
that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born
Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of
Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day
of January 2004.
Ruby
Kelley
Mangahas
Declarant
DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing "Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless
we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately,
we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based
on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique,
the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented,
since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For
Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to
respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to
petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on
July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez,
making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and
respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed
certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence
introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a
birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his
parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino
father and an American mother who were married to each other a
year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents
would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as
an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother,
Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling
of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de
Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus
curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states "We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in
each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus
sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a
decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But
if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the
pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the
Court to look closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate
child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a
stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese

father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the
naturalization
of
the
stepfather. Nothing
about jus
sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the
naturalized stepfather.
Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the
illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of
a father who had become Filipino by election to public office before
the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the
1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate
son of a Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was
already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be
naturalized. There is nothing there about invidiousjus sanguinis.
Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The
case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of
Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was
the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from
Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no
valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina
mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not
Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son
Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino
but was not even a Filipino.
The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed
with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio,
Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino
because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin,
based on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely
unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and
simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
x x x
xxx
xxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no
textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but
twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a
legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would
make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a
Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was
established long ago by People vs. Cayat. [47] I would grant that the
distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children

rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not
justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction
for one purpose but not for another purpose.
x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to
elective public service? What possible state interest can there be
for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public
officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit
liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for
no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding
an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of
his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if
there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the
distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be
reprobated.
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former
member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin
Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of
petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should
indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking
after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the
child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate
child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother
had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty
to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to
prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant
consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law
prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ,
can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions
nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of
the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines. There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe
conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum 1)
The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No.
161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of
the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing,
for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed
for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the
position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his

certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines.
(2)
The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and
prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634
both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latters
capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vicepresidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the
primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after,
not before, the elections are held.
(3)
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave
abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is
necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ
is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or
not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been
a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill
had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether
such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4)
But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate
in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case
before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to
the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove
whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which,
as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,[48] must not only
be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS

VELASCO, JR.,
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and
NACHURA,
Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections,
REYES,
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X.
LEONARDO-DE
Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
CASTRO, and
Antonio
Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald
Allan
Kelley
BRION, JJ.
Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Promulgated:
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan
Respondent.
July 16, 2008
Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission
--x
on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
DECISION
NO COST. SO ORDERED.
CARPIO, J.:
MACIAS VS COMELEC
The Case
These consolidated petitions[1] seek to annul Resolution No.
SEMA VS COMELEC
7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district
EN BANC
of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.[2]
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA,
G.R. No. 177597
The Facts
Petitioner,
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
- versus apportioned
two
legislative
districts
for
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists
and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN,
of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.[3] Maguindanao forms
part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM),
Respondents.
created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as
x------------------------x
amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).[4]Although under
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ,
G.R. No. 178628
the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first
Petitioner,
legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII,
having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite
Present:
held in November 1989.
PUNO, C.J.,
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM
QUISUMBING,
Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, [5] enacted Muslim Mindanao
CARPIO,
Autonomy
Act
No.
201
(MMA
Act
201)
creating
the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuancomposed
of
the
eight
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
municipalities
in
the
first
district
of
Maguindanao.
MMA
Act
201
CORONA,
provides:
CARPIO MORALES,
Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira,
- versus AZCUNA,
Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog,
TINGA,
Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are
hereby
separated
from
CHICO-NAZARIO,
the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a
distinct and independent province, which is hereby

created, to be known as theProvince of Shariff
Kabunsuan.
xxxx
Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this
province shall commence upon the appointment by
the Regional Governor or election of the governor
and majority of the regular members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The incumbent elective provincial officials of
the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to serve
their unexpired terms in the province that they will
choose or where they are residents: Provided, that
where an elective position in both provinces
becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent
elective provincial officials shall have preference for
appointment to a higher elective vacant position
and for the time being be appointed by the Regional
Governor, and shall hold office until their successors
shall have been elected and qualified in the next
local elections; Provided, further, that they shall
continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at
the time of the approval of this Act until the new
readjustment of salaries in accordance with
law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no
diminution in the number of the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province.
Except as may be provided by national law,
the existing legislative district, which includes
Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.
Later, three new municipalities[6] were carved
out of the original nine municipalities constituting
Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of
municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of
Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its
second legislative district. Cotabato City, although
part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not
part of the Province of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans
creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the
COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the

conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular
province under MMA Act 201.
In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status
quo withCotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-0407,
which adopted the recommendation of the COMELECs Law
Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,
[7]
provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the
recommendation
of
the
Law
Department
that pending the enactment of the appropriate law
by Congress, to maintain the status quo
with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in
the
First
Legislative
District
of
Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the
COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845
stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed
only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.[8]
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902,
subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by
renaming
the
legislative
district
in
question
as
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly
First
District of Maguindanao with CotabatoCity).[9]
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14
May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan
with CotabatoCity, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the
votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that
Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress
under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution [10] and Section 3
of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.[11] Thus, Sema
asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the
status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the
COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating
Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanaos
reapportioned first legislative district.[12] Sema further claimed that
in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress
power to create or reapportion legislative districts.
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), chose not to reach the merits of the case
and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of
certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the
COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not
quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ of
prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation
of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1
June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that
Sema is estopped from questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007,
Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of
Shariff
Kabunsuan
includingCotabato City. Respondent
Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is
constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for
Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in
Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanaos first legislative
district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC
could not reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to
make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to
reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not
to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum
population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city. [13]
Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters
raised in respondents Comments and reiterating her claim that
the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902.
In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required
the parties in G.R. No. 177597 to comment on the issue of whether
a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such new province. The parties submitted
their compliance as follows:
(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the
following grounds: (a) the Court in Felwa v. Salas[14] stated that
when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district comes into existence neither by authority of
that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by
apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA
7160) affirms the apportionment of a legislative district incident
to the creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of

the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in
newly created provinces.
(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG,
apparently abandoned its earlier stance on the propriety of issuing
Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema,
contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is selfexecuting. Thus, every new province created by the ARMM
Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in
the House of Representatives even in the absence of a national
law; and
(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the
negative on the following grounds: (a) the province
contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one
that is created by an act of Congress taking into account the
provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3,
Article IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to enact measures relating to national elections, which
encompasses the apportionment of legislative districts for
members of the House of Representatives; (c) recognizing a
legislative district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly
creates will lead to the disproportionate representation of the
ARMM in the House of Representatives as the Regional Assembly
can create provinces without regard to the requirements in Section
461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of
less than 250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House
of Representatives.
On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in
G.R.
No. 177597 in oral arguments on the following issues:
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is
constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province
created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a
national law creating a legislative district for such new province. [15]
In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November
2007, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 filed their respective
Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral arguments. [16] On the
question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following
positions:
(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054

is constitutional (a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM
of the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of
the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through their
organic acts, legislative powers over other matters as may be
authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people of the region and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA
7160.[17] However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant
in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional
Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those
mandated in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. [18] Thus, Sema proposed
that Section 19 should be construed as prohibiting the Regional
Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not comply with
the minimum criteria under RA 7160.[19]
(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional on the following
grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not among those
granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of
RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to
prescribe standards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of
RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and
(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with
respondent Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the position
the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the Resolution of 4
September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and
Section 6,[20] Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to
create provinces was withheld from the autonomous regions under
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
On the question of whether a province created under
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative
in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and
respondent Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions
they adopted in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4
September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit
its position on this issue considering its stance that Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional.
The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was
disclosed during the oral arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus,
in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the Court ordered G.R.

No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in
G.R. No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC
acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution
No. 7902 depriving the
voters of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of
Representatives. In
its
Comment
to
the
petition
in
G.R.
No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG,
maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a
temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the
appropriate law.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as
representative
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted
the
petition in G.R. No. 177597.
(B) On the merits
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to
the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the
ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such province.
II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status
quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City]), despite the creation of the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding
Cotabato City).
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities;
(2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is

void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate
to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave
abuse of discretion by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[21] On the other hand, the writ
of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person to perform an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty.[22] True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution
No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
[23]
Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to
exclude from canvassing the votes cast in CotabatoCity for
representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition
in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance of
the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as
proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and
regulations.[24]
Respondent Dilangalens Proclamation
Does Not Moot the Petition
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent
Dilangalens proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections
for
representative
of
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City
mooted
this
petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalens
election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act
201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the
outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether
the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City will be included in
the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence
is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel
issues raised here. The Courts ruling in these petitions affects not
only the recently concluded elections but also all the other
succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the
power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future
additional provinces.
On the Main Issues
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly

Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
The creation of local government units is governed by
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units
province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three
conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must
follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second,
such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant
of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers,
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to
create local government units, subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the
Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards,
and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays
within their jurisdiction,[25] subject to compliance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite
requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However,
under the Local Government Code, only x x x an Act of Congress
can create provinces, cities or municipalities.[26]
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated
to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress
made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because
the power to create local government units is not one of the
express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional
legislative bodies.[27] In the present case, the question arises
whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the
power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with

the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create
municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and
cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, Any
province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to
at least one Member x x x.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative
district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of
250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative
district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a
population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a
legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of
less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district
because once the citys population reaches 250,000, the city
automatically becomes entitled to one representative under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create
a province or city inherently involves the power to create a
legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a
province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the
power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is,
can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create legislative districts for the House of
Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned
Only by an Act of Congress
Under the present Constitution, as well as in
past[28] Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion
legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,

who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as
far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of
every
census, the
Congress shall
make
a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in
Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4)
empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power
to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power
to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress
exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts,
and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies
enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives
can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be
created,
only
through
a
national
law
passed
by
Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,[29] we held that the power of
redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of
Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in
Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive
power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical.
Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable
membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation
of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only
Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for
regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion
legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An
inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body,

cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative
powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not
divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative
districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic
Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
provides:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction
and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous
regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1)
Administrative organization;
(2)
Creation of sources of revenues;
(3)
Ancestral
domain
and
natural
resources;
(4)
Personal,
family,
and
property
relations;
(5)
Regional urban and rural planning
development;
(6)
Economic,
social,
and
tourism
development;
(7)
Educational policies;
(8)
Preservation and development of the
cultural heritage; and
(9)
Such other matters as may be
authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes
autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or
reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054
amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, The Regional
Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the
following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x. Since the
ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws
relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district
whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever
Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first
representative is always elected in the next national elections
from the effectivity of the law.[30]
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to

Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the
House of Representatives, is a national official.[31] It would be
incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers
extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district
representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its
occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent
limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional
legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices,
respectively, and it can never create a national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national
office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the
ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X
of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the
Regional Assemblys legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction x x x.
The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff
Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress power to
create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from
creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of
MMA Act 201 provides that:
Except as may be provided by national law,
the existing legislative district, which includes
Cotabato
City
as
a
part
thereof,
shall
remain. (Emphasis supplied)
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative
district because the Constitution mandates that each province
shall have at least one representative. Thus, the creation of the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is
unconstitutional.
Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section
5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far
as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution,
which states:
Any province that may hereafter be
created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately

following election to at least one Member or such
number of Members as it may be entitled to on the
basis of the number of its inhabitants and according
to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section
5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of
Members apportioned to the province out of which
such new province was created or where the city,
whose
population
has
so
increased,
is
geographically located shall be correspondingly
adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such
adjustment shall not be made within one hundred
and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis
supplied)
serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan, created on 29 October 2006, is automatically entitled
to one member in the House of Representatives in the 14 May
2007 elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner
invokes the statement in Felwa that when a province is created
by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into
existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot
provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of
the Constitution, without a reapportionment.
The contention has no merit.
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether
Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and
providing for congressional representation in the old and new
provinces, was unconstitutional for creati[ng] congressional
districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution.
The Court answered in the negative, thus:
The Constitution ordains:
The House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than
one hundred and twenty Members
who shall be apportioned among the
several provinces as nearly as may be
according to the number of their
respective inhabitants, but each
province shall have at least one
Member. The Congress shall by law
make an apportionment within three
years after the return of every
enumeration, and not otherwise. Until

such apportionment shall have been
made, the House of Representatives
shall have the same number of
Members as that fixed by law for the
National Assembly, who shall be
elected by the qualified electors from
the present Assembly districts. Each
representative district shall comprise
as far as practicable, contiguous and
compact territory.
Pursuant to this Section, a representative
district may come into existence: (a) indirectly,
through the creation of a province for each
province shall have at least one member in the
House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation
of several representative districts within a
province. The
requirements
concerning
the
apportionment of representative districts and the
territory thereof refer only to the second method of
creation of representative districts, and do not apply
to those incidental to the creation of provinces,
under the first method. This is deducible, not only
from the general tenor of the provision above
quoted, but, also, from the fact that the
apportionment therein alluded to refers to that
which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when
a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district, comes into existence neither
by authority of that statute which cannot provide
otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation
of the Constitution, without a reapportionment
There is no constitutional limitation as to the
time when, territory of, or other conditions under
which a province may be created, except, perhaps,
if the consequence thereof were to exceed the
maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed
in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the
legislation under consideration. As a matter of fact,
provinces have been created or subdivided into
other provinces, with the consequent creation of
additional
representative
districts,
without
complying with the aforementioned requirements.
[32]
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695

because (1)
it
validly
created
legislative
districts
indirectly through a special law enacted by Congress creating a
province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not
result in breaching the maximum number of legislative
districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not
apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces
were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here,
the new province was created merely by a regional law enacted by
the ARMM Regional Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative
district by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress power
to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress power
to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative
district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is
created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution
provides that each province shall have at least one
representative in the House of Representatives. This does not
detract from the constitutional principle that the power to create
legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely
prevents any other legislative body, except Congress, from
creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a
province such legislative body must have the power to create
legislative districts. In short, only an act of Congress can trigger
the creation of a legislative district by operation of the
Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or
trigger the creation of, a legislative district.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a
legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will
leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative
district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute
a legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in
2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato
City alone as the surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao
will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which
requires that [E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least one representative.
Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition
and independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section
19,[33] Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can
create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard
to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum
annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory
of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.

[34]
The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
(1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM
Regional Assembly can create 100 or more
provinces and thus increase the membership of a
superior
legislative
body,
the
House
of
Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of
250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law
provides otherwise)
(2) The proportional representation in the
House
of Representatives
based
on
one
representative for at least every 250,000 residents
will be negated because the ARMM Regional
Assembly need not comply with the requirement in
Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province
created must have a population of at least 250,000;
and
(3)
Representatives
from
the
ARMM
provinces can become the majority in the House of
Representatives through the ARMM Regional
Assemblys continuous creation of provinces or
cities within the ARMM.
The following exchange during the oral arguments of the
petition in G.R. No. 177597 highlights the absurdity of Semas
position that the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces:
Justice Carpio:
So, you mean to say [a] Local Government
can create legislative district[s] and pack
Congress with their own representatives [?]
Atty. Vistan II:[35]
Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows
that.
Justice Carpio:
So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM
can create and create x x x provinces x x
x and, therefore, they can have thirty-five
(35) new representatives in the House of
Representatives without Congress agreeing
to it, is that what you are saying? That can
be done, under your theory[?]
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual

circumstances.
Justice Carpio:
Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can
create thirty-five (35) new provinces, there
may be x x x [only] one hundred thousand
(100,000) [population], x x x, and they will
each have one representative x x x to
Congress without any national law, is that
what you are saying?
Atty. Vistan II:
Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your
Honor, that is what we are saying.
xxxx
Justice Carpio:
So, they can also create one thousand (1000)
new provinces, sen[d] one thousand (1000)
representatives
to
the
House
of
Representatives without a national law[,] that
is legally possible, correct?
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting
the provisions in Article X on regional autonomy, [37] nor Congress
in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous
consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of
government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create
or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by
Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the
ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or
reapportion
legislative
districts,
not
the
regional
assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which
states, [A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall
be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member, refers to a province created by Congress itself through a
national law. The reason is that the creation of a province
increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives,
an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the
present 14th Congress, there are 219[38] district representatives out
of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since
party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership
of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available

in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed
winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district representatives,
much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus,
there is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable
membership of the House, even before Congress can create new
provinces.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions
cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of
regional assemblies are limited [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction
and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national
laws, x x x. The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054)
itself states that the ARMM Government is established within the
framework of the Constitution. This follows Section 15, Article X
of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM shall be
created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic
of the Philippines.
The present case involves the creation of a local
government unit that necessarily involves also the creation of a
legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays
that does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of
RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
because the creation of such municipalities and barangays does
not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the
resolution of this issue to an appropriate case.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5
of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well
as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only
Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot create a province without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative
district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a
law creating a national office like the office of a district
representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the
ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial
jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the

Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the
ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff IMELDA MARCOS VS COMELEC
Kabunsuan, is void.
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution
SUPREME COURT
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902,
Manila
preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely
complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of
EN BANC
the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic
Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
vs.
the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we
declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that
MONTEJO, respondents.
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 isVALID.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it
effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is
aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for
election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for
a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
election." 2 The mischief which this provision reproduced
verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the
possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the
latter, from an elective office to serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995,
providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate
TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City
ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in
filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that
candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation
she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban
and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging
City and run for Congress in the First District of
that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended
residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
registration by writing a letter stating that "she is
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement
not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot,
for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of
Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a
declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month
3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an
actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition
order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling
with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa
the certificate of candidacy." 7
from the First District to the Second District and
pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his
purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected
opponent in the congressional election in the First
Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to
8
District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte
"since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. On the
Congressmen, seeking the creation of another
same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed
legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out
petitioner that:
of the First District, to achieve his purpose.
However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the
failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the
aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the
instant petition for the same objective, as it is
ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for
obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
the filing of the same having already lapsed on
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the
March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate
electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest,
of Candidacy should have been filed on or before
9
orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8,
the March 20, 1995 deadline.
1995.12
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate
of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros,
Manila
on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in
SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same
day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an
"honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on

Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13came up with a
Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off
petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March
31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity
of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of

the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's
compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second
Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her
Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was
a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment
should subsequently be allowed. She averred that
she thought that what was asked was her "actual
and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence
of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District,
to which she could have responded "since
childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated
that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of
the First District, to which she always intended to
return whenever absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she
tried
to
discredit
petitioner's
theory
of
disqualification by alleging that she has been a
resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte
since childhood, although she only became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven
months. She asserts that she has always been a
resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to
her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced
that she would be registering in Tacloban City so
that she can be a candidate for the District.
However, this intention was rebuffed when
petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not
to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa
and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and
instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in
Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest

misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the
Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE.
Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite
aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets
to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite
Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her
explanation that she thought what was asked was
her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not
easy to believe because there is none in the
question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item
no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly
of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to
be elected immediately preceding the election."
Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be
persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an
honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is
devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an
amendment may be made, she cited the case
of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of
respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The
case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations
which cannot affect the result of the election, or
deviations from provisions intended primarily to
secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The
Supreme Court in that case considered the
amendment only as a matter of form. But in the
instant case, the amendment cannot be considered
as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation.
The change in the number of years of residence in
the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a
substantial
matter
which
determines
her
qualification as a candidacy, specially those
intended
to
suppress,
accurate
material
representation in the original certificate which
adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended

certificate is to condone the evils brought by the
shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the
detriment of the integrity of the election.
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing

discussion, it is clear that respondent has not
complied with the one year residency requirement
of the Constitution.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven

(7) month period of her residency in order to prolong
it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an
untruthfulness to be committed before this
Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7
months residency the respondent indicated in her
certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her
entry
in
her
Voter's
Registration
Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects
that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for
6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex
A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by
her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List
of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or
transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of
these three (3) different documents show the
respondent's consistent conviction that she has
transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from
Metro Manila only for such limited period of time,
starting in the last week of August 1994 which on
March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The
Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to
believe in the respondent's contention that it was an
error.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always

been considered as synonymous with "domicile"
which imports not only the intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in-that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for
like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon
vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTCTacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case,
when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the
residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan,
Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed
to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
xxx xxx xxx

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this
Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
This Division is aware that her claim that she has

been a resident of the First District since childhood
is nothing more than to give her a color of
qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally
disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the
facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit.
Except for the time that she studied and worked for
some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her
husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided
in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a
registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel,
Manila where she was again a registered voter. In
1978, she served as member of the Batasang
Pambansa as the representative of the City of
Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro
Manila. She could not have served these positions if
she had not been a resident of the City of Manila.
Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of
candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she

claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent
wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan,
Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her
registration in the permanent list of voters that she
may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City
since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a
resident of many places, including Metro Manila.
This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack
of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She
registered as a voter in different places and on
several occasions declared that she was a resident
of Manila. Although she spent her school days in
Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such
place when she chose to stay and reside in other
different places. In the case of Romualdez
vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how
one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must
concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3)
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other
words
there
must
basically
be animus
manendiwith animus
non
revertendi.
When
respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in
Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by
registering as a voter there and expressly declaring
that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to
have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not

sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative
of such intention. Respondent's statements to the
effect that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to
prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice
of residence. Respondent has not presented any
evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior
the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban.
Worse, what was evident was that prior to her
residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of
Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was
not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since
childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have
not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for
more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out
that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a
voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In
doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration
Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa
for a period of six months. This may be
inconsequential as argued by the respondent since
it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But
her failure to prove that she was a resident of the
First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa
leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had
been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995
elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her
not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The
Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration,

the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new
substantial matters having been raised therein to
warrant re-examination of the resolution granting
the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing
petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show
that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same
day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second
Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of
votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred
that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the
congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995
based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass
showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the
36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said
Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running
for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the
public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation,
petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental
Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general
areas:
II. The Jurisdictional Issue

a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the
period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said
Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction
over the question of petitioner's qualifications after
the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division
reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts
of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC
seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the
purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile,
the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the
concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not
intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's
qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as
required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the
purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a
settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil
rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of
natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
elections.
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning
there permanently.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is
synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place,
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena
presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which President
of
Dumaguete,
Negros
Oriental.Faypon
the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue
for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of
leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election
thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent
single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a
abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. loss or change of domicile.
In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence
There is a difference between domicile and qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond
residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, wit:
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A
man may have a residence in one place and a
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but
that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there
domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
was an attempt to require residence in the place not
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but
less than one year immediately preceding the day of
one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but
the elections. So my question is: What is the
he may have numerous places of residence. His
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for
place of residence is generally his place of domicile,
the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
but it is not by any means necessarily so since no
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
length of residence without intention of remaining
will constitute domicile.
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the
regular members of the National Assembly are
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts
among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
the district for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in effect It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or
given to it was domicile. 29
not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material
only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to
xxx xxx xxx
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate
7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of
the same point that "resident" has been interpreted candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an
residence.
honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided
for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the
consider at the proper time to go back to actual period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of
residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the
residence rather than mere intention to reside?
space provided. These circumstances and events are amply
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
difficulty especially considering that a provision in resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when
the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in
Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District,
So, we have to stick to the original concept that it private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that
should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30 petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner
then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District,
31
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, this which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down
Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate
obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for
election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for
residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election
domicile. 32
thus:
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda
Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated
by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance
is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy
stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as
seven (7) months?
7. RESIDENCE
Tolosa, Leyte
(complete
Address): Brgy.
POST
OFFICE
ADDRESS
FOR
PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Olot,
ELECTION
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does
TO
not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained
BE
ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING
THE residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating,
ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.
implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes.
The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semiof actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the
domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a
stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed
in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
second requiring domicile coupled with the circumstances many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this
surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and
led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra,
be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be we stressed:
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such
fact were established by means more convincing than a mere
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a
entry on a piece of paper.
person who has his own house wherein he lives with
his family in a municipality without having ever had
the intention of abandoning it, and without having
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
lived either alone or with his family in another
municipality, has his residence in the former
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not
municipality, notwithstanding his having registered
possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the
as an elector in the other municipality in question
COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains
and having been a candidate for various insular and
that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for
provincial positions, stating every time that he is a
some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously
resident of the latter municipality.
lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as
indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any
place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959,
resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for
voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the
"greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve
Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as
his lot, and that, of course includes study in other
a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the
places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not,
business. When an election is to be held, the citizen
have served these positions if she had not been a resident of
who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire
Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion
to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for
lies.
professional or business reasons, or for any other
reason, he may not absent himself from his
professional or business activities; so there he
registers himself as voter as he has the

qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up
or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who
are to run the government especially in national
elections. Despite such registration, the animus
revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence
of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the
explanation why the registration of a voter in a
place other than his residence of origin has not been
deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or
loss of such residence. It finds justification in the
natural desire and longing of every person to return
to his place of birth. This strong feeling of
attachment to the place of one's birth must be
overcome by positive proof of abandonment for
another.
she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late

speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the
House of Representatives. In 1954, she married exPresident Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a
congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as
a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of
the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a
voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she
lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered
as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her
family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu,
Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to
Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate
of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a
resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited

statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible
to run for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various
places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not
only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC,
the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
different purposes during the last four decades. None of these
purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner
establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile
from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood
there and eventually established residence in different parts of the
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over country for various reasons. Even during her husband's
8 years old, she established her domicile in presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers,
Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by
Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and
when she graduated from high school. She pursued other important personal milestones in her home province,
her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province
Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her
degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through
Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or
consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are

part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power
in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S
Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what
the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent

plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince
this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a
domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment
requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of
her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was

not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there
until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place
in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many
years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by
merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not
agree.
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost

her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For
there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code
concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that
the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation
of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code
acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo
spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile
was not established only when her father brought his family back
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference
to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
between domicile and residence. Both terms imply
relations between a person and a place; but in
residence, the relation is one of fact while in
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a
domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
necessity of physical presence. 40
1. An actual removal or an actual change of
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria,
the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with
evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change
of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and
one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of

the family. But the court may exempt the wife from
living with the husband if he should live abroad
unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts
of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon
marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female
spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the
husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish

Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde
quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin
embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta
obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia
a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in
the
aforequoted
article,
which
means
wherever
(the
husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article
clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a
positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this
interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el
marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which
means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring
to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or
place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be
understood
to
refer
to
domicile
which
is
a
fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility
of transferring from one place to another not only once, but as
often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a
circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual
residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony
with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family,
recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the
marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for
the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the
husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title
V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article
109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to

live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity
and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and
wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations
where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of
their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order
that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that
Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we
shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile
while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one
of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word
"residence" as used with reference to particular
matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question
of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be
made from a consideration of the purpose and
intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they
are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring
to the physical presence of a person in a place. A
person can have two or more residences, such as a
country residence and a city residence. Residence is
acquired by living in place; on the other hand,
domicile can exist without actually living in the
place. The important thing for domicile is that, once
residence has been established in one place, there
be an intention to stay there permanently, even if
residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the

husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad
principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a
common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized
certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to
live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to
maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for
obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart
from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina
vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may
acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband
during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given
cause for divorce."44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to
obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an
event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil
Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new
residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held
that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on
pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court
held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are
convinced that it is not within the province of the
courts of this country to attempt to compel one of
the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal
rights to, the other. Of course where the property
rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for
restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we
are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may
be entered to compel the restitution of the purely
personal right of consortium. At best such an order
can be effective for no other purpose than to compel
the spouses to live under the same roof; and he
experience of those countries where the courts of
justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of
married people shows that the policy of the practice
is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly
the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the
restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either

husband or wife; and if the facts were found to
warrant it, that court would make a mandatory
decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case
of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to
live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet
this practice was sometimes criticized even by the
judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and
in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir
James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and
Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice,
expressed his regret that the English law on the
subject was not the same as that which prevailed in
Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent
to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in
England, could be obtained by the injured spouse,
but could not be enforced by imprisonment.
Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment
against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act
(1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment;
though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights
can still be procured, and in case of disobedience
may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an
order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the
character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United
States, only one court, so far as we can discover,
has ever attempted to make a preemptory order
requiring one of the spouses to live with the other;
and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to
follow and live with her husband, who had changed
his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision
referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was
based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana
similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was
decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently
has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana.
In other states of the American Union the idea of
enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in
rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision
recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a
of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to
return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may
upon her failure to do so, to make a particular mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite
disposition of certain money and effects then in her another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as
possession and to deliver to her husband, as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted
rents, and interest which might accrue to her from to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived
the property which she had brought to the marriage. from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
(113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her
this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not
domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than a domicilium necessarium.
the consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a
does not appear that her disobedience to that order new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to
would
necessarily
have
been
followed
by choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts
imprisonment for contempt.
following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not
only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This
Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the
of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's
residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and
Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family
Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of to have a home in our homeland." 47Furthermore, petitioner
these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while
assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary
conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.
actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it
was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in
domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or
jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female
between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new
drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly
illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original

domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of
selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence
of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different
from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile
enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that
the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the

interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of
thirty (30) days within which a decree may be
entered without the consent of counsel, it was held
that "the statutory provisions which may be thus
departed from with impunity, without affecting the
validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those
which relate to the mode or time of doing that which
is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the
Legislature or some incident of the essential act."
Thus, in said case, the statute under examination
was construed merely to be directory.
II. The jurisdictional issue

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should
have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in
the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in
the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then
refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed
to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already

lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on
April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation
of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner
contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of
members of the House of Representatives in accordance with In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646
in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the
Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881
judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be even after the elections.
merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not
invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed
intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's
difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that
made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House
that: 51
of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House
The difference between a mandatory and directory of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
provision is often determined on grounds of jurisdiction over the question.
expediency, the reason being that less injury results
to the general public by disregarding than enforcing It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the
1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make
the letter of the law.
distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a
petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a

ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of
election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during
the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including
the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established
principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she
justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn
ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179817
June 27, 2008
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner,

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
vs.
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN.
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN.
25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
OBEA, respondents.
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300
heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation
of the President and key national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of
rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion.1 A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and
eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant
soldiers that evening.
TRILLANES VS JUDGE PIMENTEL
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood

Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with
his comrades, with coup detat defined under Article 134-A of the
Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784, "People v.
Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in

detention,2 threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in
the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30,
2007.3
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007,
petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus
Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions
and Related Requests"4 (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests
were:
(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official
functions of the Senate (whether at the Senate or
elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session, and
to attend the regular and plenary sessions of the Senate,
committee hearings, committee meetings, consultations,
investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses,
staff meetings, etc., which are normally held at the Senate
of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center,
Pasay City (usually from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00
a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);
(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of
detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort
Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer
and the appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a
telephone line and internet access) in order that he may be
able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings or
hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in
session. The costs of setting up the said working area and
the related equipment and utility costs can be charged
against the budget/allocation of the Office of the accused
from the Senate;
(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said
working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig,
Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at
reasonable times of the day particularly during working
days for purposes of meetings, briefings, consultations
and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able to

assists (sic) him in the performance and discharge of his
duties as a Senator of the Republic;
(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his
comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press or the
media regarding the important issues affecting the country
and the public while at the Senate or elsewhere in the
performance of his duties as Senator to help shape public
policy and in the light of the important role of the Senate in
maintaining the system of checks and balance between the
three (3) co-equal branches of Government;
(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the
accused and his custodians, to be allowed to receive, on
Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the
media who may wish to interview him and/or to get his
comments, reactions and/or opinion at his place of
confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila,
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly when there are no
sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the
Senate is not in session; and
(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and
election of officers of the Senate and related activities
scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July
2007 at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS
Financial Center, Pasay City.5
By Order of July 25, 2007, 6 the trial court denied all the requests in
the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which
he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim
them down to three.7 The trial court just the same denied the
motion by Order of September 18, 2007.8
Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two
Orders of the trial court, and for prohibition andmandamus to (i)
enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff, resource
persons and guests from meeting with him or transacting business
with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct respondents to

allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests
and permit him to attend all sessions and official functions of the
Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of
the status quo ante of having been able hitherto to convene his
staff, resource persons and guests9 at the Marine Brig.
THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A

QUO IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE
BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
A.
UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE
JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY CONVICTED AT THE
TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE,
ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED
AND, THEREFORE, STILL ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION
OF INNOCENCE;
Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP

Chief of Staff, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Esperon); Philippine
Navys Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag;
Philippine Marines Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino;
and Marine Barracks Manila Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo
Obea (Obea).
B.
Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that
he has, since November 30, 2007, been in the custody of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial Center following the
foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel 10 the day before or
on November 29, 2007.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS

CHARGED WITH TWO (2) COUNTS OF STATUTORY
RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS,
CRIMES
INVOLVING
MORAL
TURPITUDE.
HEREIN
ACCUSED/PETITIONER
IS
CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF "COUP DETAT", A
CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A
POLITICAL OFFENSE;
Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of

the action as against the above-named military officersrespondents. The issues raised in relation to them had ceased to
present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination thereof
would be without practical value and use. Meanwhile, against
those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for
reliefs from this Court.11 Petitioner did not, by way of substitution,
implead the police officers currently exercising custodial
responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily show that
they have adopted or continued the assailed actions of the former
custodians.12
Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those
previously raised in his Motion for Reconsideration filed with the
trial court:
I.
C.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED
TO FLEE PRIOR TO BEING ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/
PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO THE
AUTHORITIES
AND
AGREED
TO
TAKE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT OAKWOOD;
II.
GEN.
ESPERON
DID
NOT
OVERRULE
THE
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE BRIGS COMMANDING
OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATE
SESSIONS;
III.
type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and

other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability
ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE of Jalosjos.14
PEOPLE, IN THEIR SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO
THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE REPUBLIC PROVIDES A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.
THE PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO
WORK AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the
pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a
- AND reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
IV.
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.15
MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW
LIBERAL TREATMENT OF DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken
HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF FORMER into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less
PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP" ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM than the Constitution provides:
GOV. NUR MISUARI.13
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
The petition is bereft of merit.
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was
Excessive bail shall not be required. 16 (Underscoring
pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioners
supplied)
Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention
prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital
rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
offense,17 or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
18
involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.
counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup
detat which is regarded as a "political offense."
detat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua,19 is
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated
causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to
the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.
charged.
In sum, petitioners first ground posits that there is a world of
difference between his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioners

application for bail and for release on recognizance was
denied.20 The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong,
whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail 21 or
imported from a trial courts judgment of conviction, 22 justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to
provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of
the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the
criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its
underlying rationale of public self-defense 23 applies equally to
detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisonersappellants like Jalosjos.
in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one month after Maceda,

the Court recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish
legislative results.27
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is

arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the
law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that
he may be bound to answer for the commission of the
offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of
the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court
to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed
that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or
serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor
engage in any business or occupation, or hold office,
elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a
necessary
consequence
of
arrest
and
26
detention. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to

evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered
to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous
times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.
The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of

innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and
political rights.
Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the

application of the presumption of innocence during the period
material to the resolution of their respective motions. The Court
in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of innocence no
longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review on
As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,24 it is impractical to appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a
draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for promulgation of final conviction is made, the constitutional
the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial mandate ofpresumption of innocence prevails.28
detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon
confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that
limited than those of the public.
petitioner neither denied nor disputed his agreeing to a consensus
with the prosecution that media access to him should cease after
The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25
his proclamation by the Commission on Elections.29
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed

Orders augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went
past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the
courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The
account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident," 30 proves
that petitioners argument bites the dust. The risk that he would
escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause
for foreboding became real.
These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find
only to the extent that confinement restrains the power of relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail
locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting that and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail. 31 In cases involving
non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of comments of the detention officers provide guidance on security
whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same
it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.
discretion.32
Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal
33
Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo to buttress justification to allow him to serve his mandate, after the people, in
his plea for leeway because unlike petitioner, the therein their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that
petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, 34 was able to office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying the
rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu dignum is peoples will, repudiating the peoples choice, and overruling the
this Courts pronouncement therein that "if denial of bail is mandate of the people.
authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof
being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, Petitioners contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law
rather than face the verdict of the jury." 35 At the time Montano was that "a
public
official
can
not
be
removed
indicted, when only capital offenses were non-bailable where foradministrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since
evidence of guilt is strong, 36 the Court noted the obvious reason his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officers
that "one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
strong temptation to flee."37 Petitioners petition for bail having remove him therefor."42
earlier been denied, he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his
requests which are akin to bailing him out.
The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not
administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of.
Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial courts findings, In a plethora of cases, 43 the Court categorically held that the
Esperon did not overrule Obeas recommendation to allow him to doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election,
attend Senate sessions. Petitioner cites the Comment 38 of Obea or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a
that he interposed no objection to such request but recommended criminal charge. Petitioners electoral victory only signifies
that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms with pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they
adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
deeming that Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only
performance of petitioners duties, flatly rejected all his requests, such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
when what Esperon only disallowed was the setting up of a confines of prison."44
political office inside a military installation owing to AFPs apolitical
nature.39
In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument, 45 it is
opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of
The effective management of the detention facility has been duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany
recognized as a valid objective that may justify the imposition of of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention. 40 The officer with jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the
custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake such overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the
reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all
and prevent the escape of the detainee. 41 Nevertheless, while the under the rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by

public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of
the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts
that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention
the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x
x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner
into a different classification from those others who are
validly restrained by law.46 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners position fails. On the generality and permanence of his

requests alone, petitioners case fails to compare with the species
of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:
x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more
in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to
that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system.51
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded SO ORDERED.
certain detention prisoners who have also been charged with nonbailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former
Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social
functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more
serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner
harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.
In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment
of detention prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he
intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of
being placed under Senate custody or house arrest, 47 yet he at the
same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment
are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or
upon court orders.48 That this discretion was gravely abused,
petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously
allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his
certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14,
2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of
office49 on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the
hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete
turn-around,50 petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him
and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
OSMENA VS PENDATUM
SUPREME COURT
Manila
substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition

that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House
should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the
pertinent portions of which reads as follows:
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17144
October 28, 1960
SERGIO OSMEA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA,
FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO
DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G.
xxx
TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES
ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House
Resolution No. 59, respondents.
Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla San Andres
Ziga in their own behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to
this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman
Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House
Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on
the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he
also asked, principally, that said members of the special
committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it,
particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable

Sergio Osmea,
Jr.,
Member of the House of
Representatives from the Second District of the province of
Cebu, took the floor of this chamber on the one hour
privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia;
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman
from the Second District of Cebu stated the following:.
xxx
xxx
The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly

reports that under your unpopular administration the free
things they used to get from the government are now for
sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are for
sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a
criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever
from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome
dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect
badly on the kind of justice that your administration is
dispensing. . . . .
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second
District of Cebu, if made maliciously or recklessly and
without basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious
assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of 37 3
the President, which is the one visible symbol of the
sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would expose said
office to contempt and disrepute; . . . .
Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special
committee of fifteen Members to be appointed by the
Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate

the truth of the charges against the President of the
Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmea, Jr., in his
privilege speech of June 223, 1960, and for such purpose it
is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio Osmea, jr., to
appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to
issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to require
the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of
pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmea,
Jr., fails to do so to require him to show cause why he
should not be punished by the House. The special
committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings
and recommendations before the adjournment of the
present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception

of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and
Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this
Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to
discipline its members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution
No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress
having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committeewhose
members are the sole respondentshad thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmea, in a privilege

speech delivered before the House, made the serious imputations
of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No.
59 and that he refused to produce before the House Committee
created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such
imputations. There is also no question that for having made the
In support of his request, Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof,
Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary he was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a
immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour.
constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly
objectionable speech and words, the House took up other Resolution No. 175 states in part:
business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that
if other business has intervened after the member had uttered
WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by
obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor
virtue of Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8, 1960, found
nor be subject to censure by the House.
Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr., guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour for making without basis in truth and
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of
in fact, scurrilous, malicious, reckless and irresponsible
petitioner's cause of action and the Court's jurisdiction, the
charges against the President of the Philippines in his
majority decided to hear the matter further, and required
privilege speech of June 23, 1960; and
respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction.
Evidently aware of such circumstance with its implications, and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that
pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the
they affronted and degraded the dignity of the House of
legislative session, the special committee continued to perform its
Representative: Now, Therefore, be it
talk, and after giving Congressman Osmea a chance to defend
himself, submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding said
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That
congressman guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on
Representative Sergio Osmea, Jr., be, as he hereby is,
such report, the House approved on the same daybefore closing
declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . .
its sessionHouse Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as
recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months. As previously stated, Osmea contended in his petition that: (1)
the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and
so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned;

(20 that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which
he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned
and discipline therefor, the House had lost the power to do so
because it had taken up other business before approving House
Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional position (4) that
the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of
its members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any
speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the
House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other
place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of
Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the
provision has always been understood to mean that although
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in
Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be
questioned in any other place" than Congress.
But is does not protect him from responsibility before the

legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member
thereof. In the United States Congress, Congressman Fernando
Wood of New York was censured for using the following language
on the floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most
infamous of the many infamous acts of the infamous Congress."
(Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen
were censured for employing insulting words during debate. (2
Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of Congress
was summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate,
but invoked his parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected
his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of

Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison 3,
even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to
this decision amply attest to the consensus of informed opinion
regarding the practice and the traditional power of legislative
assemblies
to
take
disciplinary
action
against
its
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It
invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a foreign
country.
member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of
the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose
"is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of
every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense."2 Such immunity has come to this country from
the practices of Parliamentary as construed and applied by the
Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain
no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without
fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before
the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949,

suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives
provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the
United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its
proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no
longer take action against me, he argues, because after my
speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up
other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was
unanimously approved by the House, that such approval
amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to
standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of
the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, for
renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.
which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House
approved the resolution, despite the argument that other business
The situation might thus be compared to laws 4 extending the had intervened after the objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds'
period of limitation of actions and making them applicable to Precedents pp. 799-800.)
actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States
has upheld such laws as against the contention that they impaired On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief
vested rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmea may
(Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced.
views. At any rate, court are subject to revocation modification or We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." 5 And it has constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution
been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter
with their observancem, the courts have no concern. They may be depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House
waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for
"mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if
the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea
number of members have agreed to a particular measure."6
conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have
assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government.
The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this
court of Tennessee:
Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere.
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of
and it is uniformly held that it is within the power of all matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. The
business, and as security against hasty action.
principle is well established that the courts will not assume
(Bennet vs. New
Bedford,
110
Mass,
433;
a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the
Holt vs. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of
judicial department with the legislature since each
Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte
department is equally independent within the power
Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280;
conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . .
Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. e.
977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of
Corinth vs. Sharp,
107
Miss.
696,
65
So.
888;
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause
McGraw vs. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632;
the courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclusively
Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S.
legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is
W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case of
given the power to example a member, the court will not
Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter,
review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair
p. 584.]
decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in
Ours.].
our opinion emphasize the principles controlling this litigation.
Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to
The above statement of American law merely abridged the other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar:
landmark case of Clifford vs. French.7 In 1905, several senators the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to
who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having interfere.
taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel
reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as
a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of subconscious hesitation due to discovery of impermissible course
bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere , of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we
explaining in orthodox juristic language:
merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions
which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of
Under our form of government, the judicial department has comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of
no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair governing principles and/or episodic illustrations, we found the
action of the legislative department, or of either house House of Representatives of the United States taking the position
thereof, taking in pursuance of the power committed upon at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon the Chief
exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has Executiveconstitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of
been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an orders.8 And in several instances, it took action against
express provision conferring the power, every legislative offenders, even after other business had been considered.9
body in which is vested the general legislative power of the
state has the implied power to expel a member for any Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to
cause which it may deemsufficient. In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino
Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months
says, in substance, that this power is inherent in every because he had assaulted another member of the that Body or
legislative body; that it is necessary to the to enable the certain phrases the latter had uttered in the course of a debate.
body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging
safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view
and that the legislative body must necessarily be the sole of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the
judge of the exigency which may justify and require its Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the
exercise. '. . . There is no provision authority courts to Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension
control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under
house of the power to expel a member. These powers are which the Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no power
functions of the legislative department and therefore, in to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The
the exercise of the power this committed to it, the senate Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its
is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of
legislature, or either house thereof, in the exercise of the two-thirds votes, expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note
power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative particularly the word "elective."
functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.
The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor

General to appoint "without consent of the Senate and without
restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion,
best represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one
appointive Senator.
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the

district's representation can not be more weightly in the matter of
suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet
deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one
of their members to jail.12
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that

"suspension deprives the electoral district of representation
without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that
vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer
particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected
party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty
to represent the Twelfth District and maybe the view of the
Government of the United States or of the Governor-General, who
had appointed him.
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition

intended to prevent the Special Committee from acting tin
pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary
injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task,
reported to the House, and the latter approved the suspension
order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has
ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should
be dismissed for having become moot or academic. 13 Of course,
there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings to
include all members of the House as respondents, ask for
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable cause. Most
had only those power which were granted to it by the Jones Law 10; probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a
whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as in Vera vs.
preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Avelino14 andAlejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15
Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the Court
reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important
Senate the power it then exercisedthe power of suspension for questions of political law, the Court thought it proper to express at
one year. Whereas now, as we find, the Congress has the inherent this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed relevant
legislative prerogative of suspension11 which the Constitution did and decisive.
not impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate
suspended a Senator for 12 months in 1949.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So
ordered.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary,
subject only to such limitations are found in the Republic's Paras, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David,
Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the
Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides
otherwise. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,

vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista, Ramon Diokno
and Lorenzo M. Taada for respondent.
Teehankee, Fernando, Sunico & Rodrigo; Vera, Montesines &
Navarro; Felixberto M. Serrano and Vicente del Rosario as amici
curiae.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six
justices against four resolved to deny the petition.
Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion,
this is now written briefly to explain the principal grounds for the
denial.
The Court believes the following essential facts have been
established:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo
M. Taadare quested that his right to speak on the next session
day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was
approved.
AVELINO VS CUENCO
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2821
March 4, 1949
On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session

Senator Taada and Senator Taada and Senator Prospero Sanidad
filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating
charges against the then Senate President and ordering the
investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute
a quorum were at the Senate session hall at the appointed time
(10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said
petitioner delayed his appearance at the session hall until about
11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended the rostrum, he did not

immediately open the session, but instead requested from the
Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted by Senators Taada
and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he read slowly and
carefully said resolution, after which he called and conferred with
his colleagues Senator Francisco and Tirona.
recognized by petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of

session, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned
conspiracy to muzzle Senator Taada.
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of

the session and this opposition was seconded by herein
respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the submitted to a vote. Another commotion ensued.
petitioner finally called the meeting to order. Except Senator Sotto
who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein
United States, all the Senator were present.
respondent also reiterated his opposition to the adjournment and
again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a
Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that vote.
the roll call be dispensed with, but Senator Tirona opposed said
motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the
petitioner and his partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to Chair hurriedly walked out of the session hall followed by Senator
prevent Senator Taada from delivering his privilege speech. The David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the
roll was called.
rest of the senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio
Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, urged by those senators
Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
with the reading of the minutes, but this motion was likewise
opposed by Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record it
pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy.
was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by
the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President ProBefore and after the roll call and before and after the reading of tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to
the minutes, Senator Taada repeatedly stood up to claim his right continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the
to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then Senate.
presiding, continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of
the minutes, Senator Taada instead on being recognized by the Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that
Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of respondent be designated to preside over the session which
any senator who would speak without being previously recognized suggestion was carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon
by him, but all the while, tolerating the actions of his follower, took the Chair.
Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator Sanidad
"Out of order!" everytime the latter would ask for recognition of Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio
Senator Taada.
Abad was appointedActing Secretary, because the Assistance
Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.
gallery, as if by pre-arrangement. At about this same time Senator
Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, was
Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then

finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator
Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68),
and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was
unanimously approved.
affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should

abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer
affect only the Senators themselves who are at libertyat any
time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if,
as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the
Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.
Chair, after the respondent had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad
introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on
the position of the President of the Senate and designated the the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis, even
Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change
Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved.
the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding
citizens. And we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into
a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should characterized
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
judicial deliberations.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the
The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among
respondent as acting president of the Philippines Senate.
other reasons, the situation is not where two sets of senators have
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked constituted themselves into two senates actually functioning as
the Court to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines such, (as in said Werts case), there being no question that there is
presently one Philippines Senate only. To their credit be it recorded
senate and oust respondent.
that petitioner and his partisans have not erected themselves
The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and into another Senate. The petitioner's claim is merely that
respondent has not been duly elected in his place in the
believes that these are the crucial points:
same one Philippines Senate.
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy
(Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.,
192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional
grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which
power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if
the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the

Chief Executive to the respondent makes it advisable, more than
ever, to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court
in matters of similar nature.
The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was
the session of the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the
session validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the
morning of February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there aquorum in that
session? Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it
useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held,
as they do, that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What
follows is the opinion of the other four on those four on those sub- Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator
questions.
Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the
rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the
view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of
the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may not, that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any
by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to
passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here
The answer might be different had the resolution been approved about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve
senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify
only by ten or less.
all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, doubt.
was it validly constituted? In other words, was there the majority
required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to
the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, dismiss the petition. Without costs.
firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the
beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators
including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in
view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor
twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each
House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all"
the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the
House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239).
There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter ARROYO VS DE VENECIA
requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute
EN BANC
majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23),
constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of
[G.R. No. 127255. June 26, 1998]
a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the
twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA,
arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so
WIGBERTO E. TAADA, and RONALDO B.
arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator
ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA,
Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there
RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE,respondents.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted
with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who
may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days
immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioners seek a rehearing and reconsideration of the Courts
decision
dismissing
their
petition
for certiorari and
prohibition. Basically, their contention is that when the Majority
Leader (Rep. Rodolfo Albano) moved for the approval of the
conference committee report on the bill that became R.A. No.
8240, leading the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) to ask if there
was any objection to the motion, and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo asked,
What is that, Mr. Speaker?, the Chair allegedly ignored him and
instead declared the report approved. Petitioners claim that the
question What is that, Mr. Speaker? was a privileged question or
a point of order which, under the rules of the House, has
precedence over other matters, with the exception of motions to
adjourn.
Indeed, the transcript of the proceedings of November 21,

1996[1] shows that after complaining that he was being hurried
by the Majority Leader to finish his interpellation of the sponsor
(Rep. Javier) of the conference committee report, Rep. Arroyo
concluded and then sat down. However, when the Majority Leader
moved for the approval of the conference committee report and
the Chair asked if there was any objection to the motion, Rep.
Arroyo stood up again and, without requesting to be recognized,
asked, What is that, Mr. Speaker? Apparently, the Chair did not
hear Rep. Arroyo since his attention was on the Majority
Leader. Thus, he proceeded to ask if there was any objection
and, hearing none, declared the report approved and brought
down the gavel. At that point, Rep. Arroyo shouted, No, no, no,
wait a minute, and asked what the question was. Only after he
had been told that the Chair had called for objection to the motion
for approval of the report did Rep. Arroyo register his objection. It
is not, therefore, true that Rep. Arroyo was ignored. He was simply
not heard because he had not first obtained recognition from the
Chair.
The contention has no merit. Rep. Arroyo did not have the
floor. Without first drawing the attention of the Chair, he simply
stood up and started talking. As a result, the Chair did not hear
him and proceeded to ask if there were objections to the Majority
Nor is it correct to say that the question (What is that, Mr.
Leaders motion. Hearing none, he declared the report
approved. Rule XVI, 96 of the Rules of the House of Speaker?) he was raising was a question of privilege or a point of
order. Rule XX, 121 of the Rules of the House defines a question
Representatives provides:
of privilege as follows
96. Manner of Addressing the Chair.- When a member
SEC. 121. Definition. - Questions of privilege are those
desires to speak, he shall rise and respectfully address
affecting the duties, conduct, rights, privileges, dignity,
the Chair Mr. Speaker.
integrity or reputation of the House or of its members,
collectively or individually.
The Rules of the Senate are even more emphatic. Rule XXVI,
59 says:
while a point of order is defined as follows
59. Whenever a Senator wishes to speak, he shall rise
Points of order or questions of order are legislative devices
and request the President or the Presiding Officer to allow
used in requiring the House or any of its Members to
him to have the floor which consent shall be necessary
observe its own rules and to follow regular or established
before he may proceed.
parliamentary procedure. In effect, they are either
objections to pending proceedings as violative of some of
If various Senators wish to have the floor, the President or
those rules or demands for immediate return to the
Presiding Officer shall recognize the one who first made
aforementioned parliamentary procedure.[2]
the request.
Petitioners further charge that there was a disregard of Rule

XIX, 112 and Rule XVII, 103 of the Rules of the House which
require that the Chair should state a motion and ask for the
individual votes of the members instead of merely asking whether
there was any objection to the motion. As explained already in the
decision in this case, the practice in cases involving the approval
of a conference committee report is for the Chair simply to ask if
there are objections to the motion for approval of the report. This
practice is well-established and is as much a part of parliamentary
law as the formal rules of the House. As then Majority Leader
Arturo M. Tolentino explained in 1957 when this practice was
questioned:
MR. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a
unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of
procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I
came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure
in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate
follows and after the debate, then the voting comes in.
....
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman
from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is now on his
point of order. I should just like to state that I believe that
we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The
Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or
constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance,
to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the
vote by saying Is there any objection? and nobody
objects, then the Chair announces The bill is approved on
second reading. If there was any doubt as to the vote,
any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that
motion is not presented, we assume that the House
approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial
compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the
House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can
announce how many are in favor and how many are
against.[3]
At all events, Rep. Arroyo could have asked for a

reconsideration of the ruling of the Chair declaring the conference
committee report approved. It is not true he was prevented from
doing so. The session was suspended, obviously to settle the
matter amicably. From all appearances, the misunderstanding was
patched up during the nearly hour-long suspension because, after
the session was resumed, Rep. Arroyo did not say anything
anymore. As the Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House
shows, the session was thereafter adjourned.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate, and certified by the
respective secretaries of both houses of Congress as having been
finally passed. The following day, the bill was signed into law by
the President of the Philippines.
Finally, petitioners take exception to the following statement
in the decision that The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present
for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. [4] They
contend that, following this ruling, even if only 10 members of the
House remain in the session hall because the others have gone
home, the quorum may not be questioned.
That was not the situation in this case, however. As noted in
the decision, at 11:48 a.m. on November 21, 1996, Rep. Arroyo
questioned the existence of a quorum, but after a roll call, it was
found that there was one. After that, he announced he would
again question the quorum, apparently to delay the voting on the
conference report. Hence, the statement in the decision that the
question of quorum cannot repeatedly be raised for the purpose of
delaying the business of the House.
In sum, there is no basis for the charge that the approval of
the conference committee report on what later became R.A. No.
8240 was railroaded through the House of Representatives. Nor is
there any need for petitioners to invoke the power of this Court
under Art. VIII, 1 of the Constitution to determine whether, in
enacting R.A. No. 8240, the House of Representatives acted with
grave abuse of discretion, since that is what we have precisely

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,
done, although the result of our review may not be what
FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA
petitioners want. It should be added that, even if petitioners
V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS
allegations are true, the disregard of the rules in this case would
OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.
not affect the validity of R.A. No. 8240, the rules allegedly violated
being merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than D E C I S I O N
constitutional requirements for the enactment of laws. It is well
settled that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for non- VITUG, J.:
compliance with internal rules.
The Court is called upon to review the act of the
WHEREFORE, the motion for rehearing and reconsideration is Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering the preventive
DENIED with FINALITY.
suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago,
in connection with pending criminal cases filed against her for
SO ORDERED.
alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Narvasa C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Kapunan, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., concur
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of
employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
Vitug, J., I reiterate my separate (concurring) opinion (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged
promulgated with the decision.
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
investigating panel, that took over the case from Investigator
Gualberto dela Llana after having been constituted by the Deputy
Panganiban, J., former counsel of a party.
Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioners request, came up with a
resolution which it referred, for approval, to the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his
Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the Ombudsman directed the
OSP to file the appropriate informations against petitioner. On 13
May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for
clearance; approved, forthwith, three informations were filed on
PAREDES VS SANDIGANGBAYAN
even date.
MIRIAM SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANDBAYAN

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001]
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan,

petitioner was indicted thusly:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSORSANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions,

did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization of the stay of the following aliens:
Jhamtani Shalini Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting,
Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan,
Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Quiu, Wu Hong Guan Qui
@ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go Xu Yin Yin Kua, Hong
Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu Se
Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang Xiu
Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin
Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez, Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan,
Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong,
who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of
Executive Order no. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the
legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said
aliens are disqualified, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said
aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully legalized by
said accused.[1]
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash

bond and prayed that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a
recognizance.
On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition
for Certiorari with Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction before the
Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 and
a motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her
arraignment. The Court taking cognizance of the petition issued a
temporary restraining order.
The Sandiganbayan, thus, informed, issued an order deferring
petitioners arraignment and the consideration of her motion to
cancel the cash bond until further advice from the court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision

dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary restraining
order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of petitioner proved unavailing.
Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing
94555 and no. 91-94897.
petitioners intention to accept a fellowship from the John F.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan,
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for the
arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand
(P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for
physical appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries
sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her
provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition
would warrant her physical appearance in court. Upon
manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was
able to come unaided to his office on 20 May 1991,
Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment on 27 May
1991.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the

Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner from leaving
the country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case and
to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to
inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction with the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90. At the
same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars with the
Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens whose
applications she purportedly approved and thereby supposedly
extended undue advantage were conspicuously omitted in the
complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the

On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the
Sandiganbayan to reset petitioners arraignment not later than testimony of one Rodolfo Pedellaga (Pedellaga). The presentation
five days from receipt of notice thereof.
was scheduled on 15 September 1995.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed
with the Sandiganbayan a motion to admit thirty-two amended
informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32
informations. The court, in its 11th March 1993 resolution, denied
her motion to dismiss the said informations and directed her to
post bail on the criminal cases, docketed Criminal Case No. 1837118402, filed against her.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file

her opposition to the 31st July 1995 motion for the prosecution
within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order

directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena to cease and desist from
sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing the 11 th March 1993
resolution ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32
amended informations, and from proceeding with her arraignment
on 12 April 1993 until the matter of his disqualification would have
been resolved by the Court.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the
motion under consideration and hereby suspends the accused
Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines and from any other government
position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her
suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only and shall take effect
immediately upon notice.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R.

109266, directed the OSP and Ombudsman to consolidate the 32
amended informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32
informations were consolidated into one information under
Criminal Case No. 16698.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto

Maceda, Senate President, Senate of the Philippines, Executive
House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon. Secretary of the Senate,
for the implementation of the suspension herein ordered. The
Secretary of the Senate shall inform this court of the action taken
thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the

Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration of its 03 rd August
1995 order which would allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The
incident, later denied by the Sandiganbayan, was elevated to the
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled Miriam
Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 109266, assailing the Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, docketed G.R. No. 123792.
03rd March 1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved
not to disqualify its Presiding Justice, as well as its 14 th March 1993
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the
resolution admitting the 32 Amended Informations, and seeking motion of the prosecution to suspend her. On 25 January 1996,
the nullification thereof.
the Sandiganbayan resolved:
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to

Redetermine probable Cause and to dismiss or quash said
information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the
prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion
to issue an order suspending petitioner.
The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date
of implementation of the suspension order as well as the expiry of
the ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be lifted at the
time.[2]
Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority

of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive
suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines, from any government position, and
furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the
implementation of the suspension order.
xxx xxx
xxx
The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons

indicted upon a valid information under the Act, whether they be
appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary
employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service. [4]
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court
suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity
of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to
jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an
order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be
SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public no ifs and buts about it.[5] Explaining the nature of the preventive
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid suspension,
the
Court
in
the
case
of
Bayot
vs.
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Sandiganbayan[6] observed:
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or
public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all which he failed to receive during suspension.[7]
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the
and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal
in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the
against him.
Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to
decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already before it.
been separated from the service, has already received such
benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the
Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982).
public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office
where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, [3] the been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word
Court reiterated:
office would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer
charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under
The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended --- treating of which he stands accused.[8]
the suspension pendente lite of an accused public officer --- may
no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this
En passan, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic
Court.
or self-operative as the validity of the information must be
determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be
rule as to the conduct thereof. It has been said thatestablished in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the
merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
x x x No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against
hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not
and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him, e.g. that he has not been threat to the safety and integrity of the records an other evidence
afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive
for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the
provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or
revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not
from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the
motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting
his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic
for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court x x x.
Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any
of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules
xxx xxx
xxx
on Criminal procedure.[10]
Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his
prosecution on the ground that the acts for which he is charged do
not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on
bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a
motion to quash the information on any other grounds provided in
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings
on the ground that the acts for which the accused is charged do
not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of
the provisions on bribery of the revised Penal Code, should be
treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal
proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground provided in
Paragraph (a), section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a
resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal
proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry
whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically
admitted, constitute the elements of an offense punishable under
Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal
Code.[9]
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident

relating to petitioners case before the Sandiganbayan has been
brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been
called upon the resolve several other matters on the
subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez,[11] petitioner sought to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal case No.
16698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs.
Vasquez,[12] petitioner sought the nullification of the hold departure
order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a Motion to Restrain the
Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with
Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for
Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs. Garchitorena,[13] petitioner sought the
nullification of the resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal
Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to
declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena disqualified from acting in
said criminal case, and the resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which
deemed as filed the 32 amended informations against her; and
(4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, [14] petitioner
assailed the denial by the Sandiganbayan of her motion for her
reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order allowing the
testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these cases,[15] the Court The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the
declared:
offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.[16]
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before
us involving Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290;
G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to
raise the issue of the delay in the preliminary investigation and the
filing of the information against her in those petitions. A piecemeal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is
self-defeating.
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information

filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its
mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive
suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019
is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks
under the Constitution which provides that each-
Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not

charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019
x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings,
because the official acts complained of therein were authorized
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel
Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy
a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
exceed sixty days.[17]
unmarried, minor children of qualified aliens even though they
had arrived in the Philippines after December 31 1983. She
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional
concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as
the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in its resolution in
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr., vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., [18] the
allegations of fact in the information (People vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by
603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her the
Sandiganbayan,
despite
his
protestations
on
the
motion that:
encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The
Court ruled:
(1) She was a public officer;
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the
Constitution which deals with the power of each House of
stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after
Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
January 1, 1984;
and suspend or expel a Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of
suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension
spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that
the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a
(5) She acted in evident bad faith and manifest partiality
Member of the House of Representatives.
in the execution of her official functions.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be

deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress from
Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply
recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit
coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively
prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs
of either branch.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No.

16698 has been decided by the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein
petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it appropriate to
render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue
raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE,
the
DISMISSED. No costs.
instant
petition
for certiorari is
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1,

SO ORDERED.
Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, empowers the Court to act
not only in the settlement of actual controversies involving rights
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza,
which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also in the Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynaresdetermination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The provision
allowing the Court to look into any possible grave abuse of
discretion committed by any government instrumentality has
evidently been couched in general terms in order to make it
malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging
milieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply an
arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question,
however, pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the
Executive, the Court subscribes to the view [19] that unless an
infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby
inheres the Court should not deign substitute its own judgment
over that of any of the other two branches of government. It is an
impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept
or provision that can unbolt the steel door for judicial
intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be,
responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court,
who must promptly react in the manner prescribed by the Charter
itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the
members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did
not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.
ASTOGA VS VILLEGAS

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of
Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, THE
HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his
capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in
his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his
capacity as City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE
SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR
LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS
YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO
MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO
MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO
OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE
VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their capacities as
members of the Municipal Board, respondents.
Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D.
Baizas and Associates for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for
respondent Mayor of Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc.,
et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor
Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive Secretary
and Commissioner of Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill
No. 9266, which became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the
Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila,
Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of
Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended,
Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application,
was filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on
third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the
bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to
the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments
and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee
favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment,
suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it
be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should
succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as
Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second
reading on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to Section
1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those
amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The
amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in
the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the
House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been
passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments."
Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which
was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino
amendments which were the ones actually approved by the

Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its
approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies
thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then
certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of
Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16,
1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of
the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his
signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill
thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public
denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew immediate
reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press
statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed
into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of
the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody
the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate
floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through the
Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to
the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy
of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as
well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly
approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the
enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated
July 21, 1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation by
the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which
his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate
and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had
signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to
the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing them
that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his
signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned to the
Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would be untenable
and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually
approved by the two Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas,

issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of
the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or
managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the
provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the
Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who
had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority
of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then ViceMayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on
September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition
with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel
respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the
Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the
Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to
comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065
never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the
Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the
enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was
then going abroad on an official trip, this Court issued a restraining
order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio
Astorga from exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor
purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the socalled Republic Act 4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said
Vice-Mayor under any other law until further orders from this
Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been
succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila. Attorneys Fortunato
de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court,
appeared as amici curiae, and have filed extensive and highly
enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities,

principally decisions of United States Federal and State Courts,
have been submitted on the question of whether the "enrolled bill"
doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this
jurisdiction. A similar question came up before this Court and
elicited differing opinions in the case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez
Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil. Reports 1. While the majority
of the Court in that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it
cannot be truly said that the question has been laid to rest and
that the decision therein constitutes a binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both
Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the (1935)
Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called
parity rights provision) had been passed by "a vote of threefourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred
in by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M.
Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which
was not within the province of the judiciary in view of the principle
of separation of powers in our government. The "enrolled bill"
theory was relied upon merely to bolster the ruling on the
jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that "if a political
question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the
political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds
the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by
Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had jurisdiction to
resolve the question presented, and affirming categorically that
"the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are
conclusive upon us," specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190,
as amended by Act No. 2210. This provision in the Rules of
Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure appears indeed to be
the only statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It
reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of

any legislative body that may be provided for in the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may be proved)
by the journals of those bodies or of either house
thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or
by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed
by their order; provided, that in the case of acts of
the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is in existence a copy signed
by the presiding officers and secretaries of said
bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions
of such acts and of the due enactment thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly
approved by both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their
respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of
the approved bill. 2 It has been held that this procedure is merely a
mode of authentication, 3 to signify to the Chief Executive that the
bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress
and is ready for his approval or rejection. 4 The function of an
attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is
considered approved after it has passed both Houses. Even where
such attestation is provided for in the Constitution authorities are
divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such
that their absence would render the statute invalid. 5 The
affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect giving the
presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself is a strong
argument to the contrary 6 There is less reason to make the
attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill where the
Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers
should sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution
required the presiding officers to sign a bill and this provision was
deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was
considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment. 7 Another
case however, under the same circumstances, held that the
enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence. 8 But in the case of Field
vs. Clark, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the signatures of the
presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the

Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities
in the United States are thus not unanimous on this point.
so authenticated,
Constitution.
is
in
conformity
with
the
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case "the respect due to coequal and independent departments," which
of Field vs. Clark as follows:
requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed
Congress, all billsauthenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has
The signing by the Speaker of the House of also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent
Representatives, and, by the President of the and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the
Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for
official attestation by the two houses of such bill as proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion
one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by reached in a number of decisions, 10 although they are silent as to
the two houses, through their presiding officers, to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of
the President, that a bill, thus attested, has the presiding officers is present.
received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof
him in obedience to the constitutional requirement of due enactment of a bill. It does not require the presiding officers
that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the
to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his following provisions:
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its
authentication as a bill that has passed Congress
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As
proceedings, and from time to time publish the
the President has no authority to approve a bill not
same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment
passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody
require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any
of the Secretary of State, and having the official
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the
attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Members present, be entered in the Journal."
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and
of the President of the United States, carries, on its
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof
executive departments of the government, charged,
in its final form furnished its Members at least three
respectively, with the duty of enacting and
calendar days prior to its passage, except when the
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.
President shall have certified to the necessity of its
The respect due to coequal and independent
immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill
departments requires the judicial department to act
no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the
upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
question upon its passage shall be taken
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
immediately
thereafter,
and
manner stated; leaving the courts to determine,
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
when the question properly arises, whether the Act,
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers

of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required,
it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the
Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid
and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his
signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been
approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be
accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated,
which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable
in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct
in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a
mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends
when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification
does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already
present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by
Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is
essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e] very bill
passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented
to the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court
of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State
Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the
indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill,
otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding
officer, of the proof that it has "passed both houses" will satisfy
the constitutional requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory
but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President,
granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there
was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the
statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would
remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would
limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the
attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the
statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such
attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there
being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to

determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such
a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no
ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that
the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill
No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed
by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor
and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the
printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is
not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law,
which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the
bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This
We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the
face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by
the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this
Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification
and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and
the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT DEFINING
THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE
CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR
HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to
have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The
temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made
permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz Palma

and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., is on leave.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

Consti 3

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MERCADO VS MANZANO

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for

Gabriel V. Daza III

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 1

Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated

The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998,

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 2

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 3

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual

The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 4

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters

recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 5

to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to

different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 6

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking

In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 7

United States, which provided that A person who is a national of the

might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was

before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the

he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 8

Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he

Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 9

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether

SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 10

Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 11

Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 12

Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 13

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which

In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 14

preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 15

President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted

can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a

Constitution Law I | Rellie | 16

keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be

power, the United States. An accepted principle of international