Issue: 01/2014

Dear Colleagues,
As we celebrate the 40th year
of the inception of Anglo
Eastern Ship Management,
we all stand tall with pride of
being part of the Anglo family.
I take this opportunity to take
forward the theme of the year
Proud to be Mariner. I look
forward to another successful
year with combined efforts
from us all.
Weakness in bridge team
organization and management
has been cited as a major
cause for marine casualties
worldwide. This issue alerts
us all towards complacency
and neglect of basic practices
of a bridge team which can
lead to severe consequences.
It has become more important
in todays electronic age to
redefine the ways and means
of vigilance.
Wishing you safe voyages.

Pradeep Chawla

Bridge Team Management

Bridge Team Management is the
effective management and utilization
of all resources, human and technical,
available to the Bridge team to ensure the
safe completion of the vessels voyage.
Accidents are frequently caused by team
management errors. Proper Bridge team
management reduces the risk of maritime
casualties by helping a ships bridge crew
to anticipate and correctly respond to the
ships changing situations.
Bridge team relationship with the pilot is
most crucial for the safe passage of vessel
within congested and confined waters
of a port. Below are some guidelines to
ensure the two complement each other in
keeping the vessel safe.
Master-Pilot information exchange
is very critical. Besides the Pilot being
informed about the vessels details and
intentions using the Pilot card, the Master
must also receive information from the
Pilot regarding the plan he intends to
follow till completion of pilotage.

informed that the Bridge Team Management

exchange would Tips from the Trainer ECDIS
be
completed Fire Door
later
when Regulation Updates
situation
eases. Shipboard Concentrated
All
information QHSE Campaign No. 3
required for safe
navigation must be sought politely but
firmly.
If ships plan is in variance with Pilots
plan, own plan should be amended
only after discussion and being
convinced that Pilots plan is safe to
be executed.
Minimum depth available if agreed
plan is followed.
At times Pilot may have latest
information which may not be charted
as yet. Here it will be good to have the
Pilots response example: the buoy
shown on the chart has been removed
temporarily.

Following are examples of some points

besides those covered in C/L D-07
that should be clearly discussed. The
discussions should be done near the
VDR microphone to keep a record of your
master/pilot exchange.
Handing over of Pilot Card with all the
relevant details.
At times it may not be possible to
complete the information exchange
soon after boarding due to traffic
or sea room constraints. In such
circumstances after carrying out
minimal
exchange
soon
after
boarding the Pilot should be politely

Plan the port approaches

[Contd. on page 2]

[Contd. from page 1]

Pilots often do not follow prescribed channel limits

strictly mainly taking advantage of vessels draft which
may be less than maximum allowed. The Pilot should
discuss this in the initial stage and if not discussed or
there are any concerns, same must be raised.
Tugs often inform Pilot that they are not able to develop
full power. Any conversation regarding this is important
and must be documented and discussed.
Any concern raised regarding excessive speed of
vessel.
Condition of fenders at berth.
Tugs making heavy contact.
Heavy contact of vessel with berth or speed concerns
while berthing.
Contact or suspected contact with any navigational
mark or suspected touching bottom.
Speed limitation while passing close to other vessels
at berth.
Any other concern raised with Pilot regarding safety of
vessel and personnel.
BTM meetings are also important and must be given due
importance.
SBP 3.5.1 specifies that such meetings are to be held prior
entering into congested locations, port arrival/departure,
heavy weather etc. or whenever he deems necessary &
should be discussed clearly.
When short port stay is expected, the arrival/departure
meeting could be held before arrival provided that there
is not going to be any change in the team due to officers
signing off/on.
During the meetings we need to discuss:
Passage plan with particular reference to navigation in
the approach areas this will include Watch Keeping
manning level, traffic density expected, tide/current at
time of passage, UKC expected, the alignment of the
approach channel and navigation aids to be used for
transiting the channel.
Brainstorm and confirm that the plan is correct and
follows the recommendations given in navigation
publications.
Any details regarding moorings and berthing received
from ashore.
If specific details are needed to be discussed with Pilot
for the passage from POB position onwards a short
note must be made of same.
Restrictions, if any due to machinery problems.
Length of passage.
Keep in mind that during the time ship is being finally
secured, opportunity should be taken to discuss with the
pilots, the outward plan generally followed. Inputs received
could be used for departure plan.
Contributed by
Capt K.S Sodhi

Tips from the Trainer ECDIS

README.TXT File
The AVCS Base
and Update disks
contain a README.
TXT
file
which
includes important
safety information.
The file is located
in the ENC_ROOT
folder on each disk
and contains the following information:
Specific charting practices of some ENC
producers which may be significant to navigation.
Specific updating practices of some ENC
producers such as delays between the issue of
paper NMs and
ENC updates.
Identified overlaps between ENCs which may
cause problems in display systems.
ENCs which have been withdrawn from service
for any reason and which should not be used
(permits will not normally be issued for these
ENCs).
Specific license and disclaimer text required by
some ENC producers.
The README.TXT file is updated every week and
changes are highlighted in a Latest Corrections
section at the beginning. The file should be read
as part of the weekly ENC update process to
ensure that all relevant changes are understood.

Fire Door
Why do we really need Fire doors on board ships?
When did they begin to be applicable on board
ships?
Lets have a look to the history briefly which brought
about the existence of fire doors:
In 1914 Maritime states developed the first global safety
agreement for shipping, the International Convention for
the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS).
In 1934 Fire on board the RMS Morro Castle resulted in
the introduction of fire retardant materials, automatic fire
doors and ship wide fire alarms.
1974 SOLAS tightened fire safety provisions for tankers
and defined minimum standards for construction and
equipment to be carried on ships.

Purpose of fire doors

A fire door is a door with a fire resistance rating and used
as part of a passive system to reduce the spread of fire
or smoke between compartments. Thus fire door does a
function to stop spread of fire and to break up ship into
various fire zones. Thus fire protection bulkheads and the
use of passageway doors will prevent smoke spreading.

The bulkheads divide the ship into various fire zones

such as:
Class A: Subdivided into A60, A30, A15, A0.
Class B: Subdivided into B15, B0.
Class C.
Fire resistance of doors and doorframes fitted to
bulkheads and decks is to be, as far as is practicable,
at least equivalent to the bulkhead or deck in which they
are fitted

Maintenance/Inspection
A fire door cannot perform on its own. Its task relies on
the correct operation of other components such as the
door frame, hinges, closers, seals and glazing systems
which must be compatible with the door and which make
up the fire door assembly. Hence regular inspection and
maintenance of the fire doors is required.
The following points should be checked for Fire Doors:
1. Each fire door should be properly marked as FIRE
DOOR and with proper ID number.
2. Check condition of door for corrosion, buckling or any
other damage.

3. Check hinges of the doors to ensure same are not

damaged or bent.
4. Ensure doors are not blocked.
5. Ensure that fire doors (except self closing doors)
are never kept permanently open and there is no
permanent arrangement to keep the door permanently
open.
6. All unauthorized holdbacks must be removed.
7. Test all fire doors located in main vertical zone
bulkheads for local operation.
8. Check operation of the self closing device.
9. Ensure that all doors can be closed efficiently and
correctly. Grease all closing mechanism and hinges
of the doors if required.
10. Test all remotely controlled fire doors for proper
release.
11. Check and ensure that the Fire Retardant packing at
the door is in good condition.
Contributed by

Capt Ashwani Kumar

QHSE Superintendent

Hole in Fire Door sill of

Engine room

Fire door packing is missing

Unauthorized hold back

for the Fire Door

Additional packing
in use for the fire
door. The door does
not seal properly.

Damaged
packing

Signs showing
misalignment
of the door

Be sure to check the Fire Training Manual Chapter5 on Fire Doors and
Fire Maintenance Manual Chapter 10 on Fire door maintenance

Regulation Updates
1st January 2014: Tokyo MoU on Port State Control
(PSC) introduced a New Inspection Regime (NIR) from
1st January 2014, replacing the existing ship target factor
system. (RU-78). See SQ/MSG/034AS/14- Tokyo MoU:
New Inspection Regime - Ship Risk Profile Calculator
for determining the Ship risk profile
1st January 2014: The amendment to the FSS code
adopted by the resolution MSC.327(90) on 25th May 2012
entered in force. The amendments include amendment
to Chapter 6 Fixed foam fire-extinguishing systems and
Chapter 8 Automatic sprinkler, fire detection and fire alarm
systems. (RU-88)
14th January 2014: AK-APC-NTV operating procedures
for Cargo and Passenger Non Tank vessels were issued
to vessel. In case the vessel is operating in Alaska
waters or is in transit within the boundaries of U.S.
EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) while calling to or
from a US port, the vessel will require to be enrolled
with Alaska Alternative Planning Criteria for Non Tank
vessels. (US-65- SQ/MSG/009AS/14 refers)

Shipboard Concentrated
QHSE Campaign No. 3
Summary of deficiencies noted in the campaign
conducted from July to Oct 2013 Prevention of
Injuries and Heat Stress management

Prevention of Injuries
1. On some vessels the entire mooring area has
not been painted with non skid paint, to prevent
mooring crew slipping on deck. (SBP 7.2.1)
2. Some portable ladders were found not fitted with
rubber stoppers at lower end in order to prevent
shifting. (H & S 7.1.4.1)
3. It was observed that in some cases the ship staff
did not keep one hand free to grasp the handrail
when using stairs and companionways. (H & S
7.1.9, COSWP 14.2.6)
4. The One Minute Hazard Identification Guide
and PPE slide guide are not used by some crew
members for carrying out a risk assessment for
routine tasks. (H & S 3.6.3 and H & S 6.1.2.14)
5. It was observed that on some vessels the correct
type of gloves was not selected for the type of work
being undertaken or when a particular substance is
being handled. (H & S 6.1.2.4)
6. The booby hatch covers were not secured using all
securing pins when opened.
7. Some cases were observed where the ship staff
had overloaded the electrical socket with a multiple
plug point. (H & S 5.6.2.2)

Heat Stress Management

1. Some ship staff were found not aware of the heat
illnesses and Heat Stress Management guidelines.
(H & S 8.2)
2. It was observed that on some vessels that adequate
supply

of

Oral

rehydration

salts/electrolyte

replacement liquid was not placed in areas where it

Heat Stress Management booklet published by AESM Ensure you
have a copy and use the guidance to your benefit

can easily be accessed. (H & S 8.2.1)

Anglo Eastern Group

23/F, 248 Queens Road East, Wanchai, Hong Kong
Tel: (852) 2863 6111 Fax: (852) 2861 2419
Email: aeqa.hkg@angloeasterngroup.com
Website: www.angloeasterngroup.com