PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981, January 15 2004.

People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their first
year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always
quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk,
he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who
testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the
appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of
a gun. The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by
beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating
circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the
Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the
examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for purposes of the
automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists
and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the
case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome
plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the battered woman syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were
presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman syndrome as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the battered woman
syndrome.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered
women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a
battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive
relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman.
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence, which has three
phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent)
phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. First,
each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between
the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed
probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of selfdefense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the relationship of
Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least
another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient
evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill
her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the
rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must
be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of selfdefense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack
-- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the
testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal
attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom.
During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he
posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not
arise from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon
appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was
analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion
and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an
uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the
crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the
aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act
without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute
battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months
pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her
reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence of two (2)
mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as
appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of
Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless
she is being held for some other lawful cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Women
and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the
courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"
CSC v Belagan (2004, Sandoval-Gutierrez)
FACTS:
2 separate complaints for sexual harassment and various malfeasances were filed against Dr.Belagan,
the Superintendent of DECS
1st (MAGDALENAs): She was applying for a permit to operate a pre-school and during the inspection of
the pre-school,Belagan placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheeks. When she
followed up her application, Belagan replied, Mag-date munatayo.
2nd (LIGAYA ANNAWI): She alleged in her complaint that on four separate occasions, respondent
touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her from behind and pulled her
close to him, his organ pressing the lower part of her back.

DECS joint investigation: Belagan denied sexual harassment accusations. Presented evidence against
admin acts.
DECS Sec: GUILTY of 4 counts of sexual indignities or harassments committed against Ligaya; and
two (2) counts of sexual advances or indignities against Magdalena; DISMISSED from service.
Absolved of admin malfeasance and dereliction of duty.
CSC: affirm DECS Sec but dismissed complaint of Ligaya. Transgression against Magdalena constitutes
grave misconduct.
CA: dismissed Magdalenas complaint, reversed CSC Resolutions.Magdalena is an unreliable witness,
her character being questionable. Magdalena was previously charged with 22 offenses before MTC
Baguio and 23 complaints before brgy captains of BrgySilang and Hillside in Baguio.Given her
aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, she is not one whom any male would attempt to steal a
kiss.

ISSUE
1. WON Magdalena is a credible witness
2. WON Belegan is guilty of grave misconduct.
HELD
1. YES
Rules on character evidence provision pertain only to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. Even if
it is applicable to admin cases, only character evidence that would establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged may be proved. Character evidence must be limited to the traits and
characteristics involved in the type of offense charged. In this case, no evidence bearing on Magdalenas
chastity. What were presented were charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation,
physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her.
Regarding Magdalenas credibility as a witness, the charges and complaints against her happened way
back in the 70s and 80s while the act complained of happened in 1994, thus, the said charges are no
longer reliable proofs of Magdalenas character or reputation. Evidence of ones character or reputation
must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in question. In other words, what is to be
determined is the character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at
a period remote from the commencement of the suit.
It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the path of moral righteousness can never
retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable to change or reform.
The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a
witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or
confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility. This view has usually been based upon one or
more of the following grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against the witness does not
logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c)
that one accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a
witness may not be impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct.
2. YES
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior,
especially by a government official.To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or
be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave
misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave
misconduct consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his
station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the
rights of others.
This is apparently present in respondents case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but also a demand for
a "date," an unlawful consideration for the issuance of a permit to operate a pre-school. Respondents act
clearly constitutes grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal.

We are, however, not inclined to impose the penalty of dismissal from the service. Respondent has served
the government for a period of 37 years, during which, he made a steady ascent from an Elementary
Grade School Teacher to Schools Division Superintendent. In devoting the best years of his life to the
education department, he received numerous awards. This is the first time he is being administratively
charged. He is in the edge of retirement. In fact, he had filed his application for retirement when
Magdalena filed her complaint. Considering the mitigating circumstances brought by the respondents
length of service, unblemished record in the past and numerous awards,the penalty of suspension from
office without pay for one (1) year is in order.