Indian Muslims: The Varied Dimensions of Marginality

Author(s): Rowena Robinson

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 10 (Mar. 10-16, 2007), pp. 839-843
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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entrepreneurclass of the community have

shrunk. Their political space has
been conspicuouslyabridged.This has been
compounded by physical and social insecurity. Without ensuring social security
and citizenship in letter and spirit, our
concern for equity is more rhetorical than
sincere. In several parts of the country
Muslims constantly face insecurity of life.
A series of planned events of communal
violence, an ineffective and partisan system that has failed to deliver justice to the
victims, and an unchecked "hateMuslim"
campaign alienate them from the mainstream. Such insecurity breeds fear and
forces them to ghettoise. The worst sufferers are women. The political system,
irrespectiveof the parties in power, has so
far failed to take up the issue squarely. In
the currentpolitical scenario in India, the
neighbouring countries and world over,
determined action on the part of the political class to strengthen secular forces
seems to be a distant dream, though we
have to constantly strive for such an
objective.
Several administrativemeasures recommended by the committee to correct the
situationhave to be looked atin this political
context. I only wish that the Sachar Committee could have critically examined why
some of the well meaning administrative
measures like the formation of NMDFC,
NBCFDC, Prime Minister's 15-Point
Programme,JNVs, etc - in the past 15 years
have not helped Muslims. In this context
the measures suggested like (a) constant
monitoringandevaluationsystemofprogrammes, and (b) building of a data bank are
useful. Though the committee has dealt
with the issue of reservation at length, it
has refrainedfrom making a recommendation for reservationfor the Muslim community as a whole. This is perhaps because it
is a contentious issue on the one hand, and
a large number of Muslims communities
are already covered as part of the OBCs
on theother.Some backwardgroups which
have been left out are either from the state
lists or the central list or both, and have
maderepresentationto the BackwardClass
Commission for their inclusion.
In my view, two otherrecommendations
are very importantand may evoke a consensus across the political spectrum. One
of the important measures is to form an
Equal Opportunity Commission to look
into the grievances of the deprived groups.
Besides providing a remedial mechanism
for different types of discrimination, it is
hoped that this would reassure Muslims
Economic and Political Weekly

thatanyunfairactionagainstthemwould
"invitethevigilanceof thelaw".Thesecond
recommendation
is to provideincentives
to colleges anduniversities- privateand
public - that have a "higherdiversity
and able to sustain it". Similarly, the

governmentshouldfind ways andmeans

to provideincentivesto buildersof housing complexes to have a more diverse
populationamong its occupants.Bi3
Email:gshahl8@hotmail.com

Muslims: The
Indian
Vared
Dimensionsof Marginality
The Sachar CommitteeReportbrings togethera wealth of
data of immensevalue with respect to the developmentand
marginalisationof differentsocio-religious groups, the Muslims
in particular, in the country.Thisarticle examinesthe social,
political and economicprofile of IndianMuslimsemergingfrom
the SCR; its regional, genderedand other variations;and the
implicationsthereof.
ROWENA ROBINSON

rT

he Rajinder Sachar Committee

Report(SCR)is of greatbenefitto
scholarsand policymakers.Until
recently,academicsbemoanedthefactthat
so little data was available on Indian
minorities in general and Muslims in
particular.It is indeedpossiblethat,with
respectto Muslims,theghostof the"communal"hung so much over politics that
sanctionfor such documentation
was not
available. While some attemptsat the
collectionandanalysisof datahadbegun,
the SCR bringstogethera wealthof data
for the whole countrythatis of immense
value for those seriouslyconcernedwith
questions of the development and
of differentsocio-religious
marginalisation
groups.l
Thispaperexaminesthesocial,political
and economicprofileof IndianMuslims
as availableto us in the SCR in termsof
its regional,genderand othervariations
andits broadersociologicalimplications.
Thisarticlealsoattemptsto relatetheSCR
data and otherdocumentsto the human
security and developmentconcerns of
IndianMuslimcommunities.Withinthis
framework, questions of affirmative
actionare also raised.
Population Distribution
Of the 593 districtsin Indiaonly nine
are predominantlyMuslim (over 75 per
cent of the populationis Muslim).These

includeLakshadweepand eight districts

in JammuandKashmir.Only 11 districts
have a Muslimpopulationof 50 percent
to 75 percent.Thesearein Assam,Jammu
and Kashmir,West Bengal, Keralaand
Bihar.However,only 13percentof Indian
Muslimslive in thesedistricts(SCR:30).
Against this data, the extent to which
Muslims can and have been taken for
grantedin publicpolicymakingbecomes
a little less astonishing.
Thirty-eightdistricts have a Muslim
populationbetween25 and 50 per cent.
Thesedistrictsaccountfor 22 per cent of
IndianMuslimsand are in statessuch as
WestBengal,Kerala,Assam,
UttarPradesh,
andDelhi.In182districts,
Bihar,Jharkhand
Muslimsconstitutebetween10 and25 per
cent of the populationand47 per cent of
all Muslimsreside in these districts.As
manyas 77 districtshaveless thanone per
cent Muslims.The mainareasof Muslim
concentration,therefore,are in the IndoGangetic plain, Jammu and Kashmir,
Kerala, Assam and south-centralIndia
(SCR: 30-31).
Muslimsare clearlyon the marginsof
the structuresof economic, social and
politicalrelevancein India.Thus it was
that many Muslim groups in Mumbai
realisedwith a startafterthe violenceof
1992-93thatthe lackof theirrepresentationin thehierarchies
of powermadethem
vulnerableto attack.Thisdata
particularly
also sensitisesus to thesenseof insecurity
of Muslimsin Gujarat,for instance,who,
constitutejust 9 per cent of the state's

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839

groups.However,in 2004-05,theMuslim
enrolmentratehadimprovedsignificantly.
It was still lower thanthe averageenrolmentrate,butwasnowslightlyhigherthan
that of the OBCs.
The data shows the increasinginterest
of Muslims in education.As mentioned
earlier, the invisibility of Muslims at
levels of power and influencestruckthe
communityforcefullyafterthe ferocious
Mumbai violence of 1992-93. The
realisationgave rise to severaleffortsat
the grassrootsto drawMuslimsof capability out of poverty into the services,
professionsand variouslevels of governmentandpublicsectoremployment.Similareffortsnowappearto be comingto light
in Gujaratas well.
In higher education, the differences
between Muslims and others stand out
evenmoresharply.Thedisparityin graduationattainmentlevels hasbeenwidening
since the 1970sbetweenMuslimsandall
othersin bothruralandurbanareas.In the
initialphasesof planning,Muslimshada
Education
highergraduateattainmentratethanSCs
The CommitteeReportshows clearly and STs. That has now changedand the
thatthe literacyandeducationalstatusof latterhaveovertakentheMuslims.Muslim
Muslimsis particularlylow. The literacy disadvantagemustbe relatedto a number
rate among Muslims is far below the of factorsincludingtheireconomicstatus
nationalaverageandthisgapis greaterin andgenerallylow educationlevels.It may
urbanareasandforwomen.Nevertheless, also be in partdue to the lack of employregionaldifferencesdo alsoemerge.In 10 mentopportunities.This is partiallysupout of 21 selectedstates,theliteracyrates portedby the data,which shows thatthe
rateamongMuslimgraduamongMuslimsis foundto be higherthan unemployment
the state average. These states include ates is the highestamongsocio-religious
TamilNadu, communities,both poor and not poor. It
AndhraPradesh,
Maharashtra,
Gujaratand Karnataka.In Kerala, the is furthersupported
bythefactthatMuslims
differencebetweenliteracyratesof socio- do not see educationas necessarilytransreligiouscommunitiesis minimal.On the lating into formalemployment.Muslims
whole, Muslimsare doing betterin this are badly representedin formalemployrespectin the southandin the west of the mentandthereis, moreover,a perception
thatthey will be discriminatedagainstin
country.
Thereis a significantdisparitybetween securingsalariedjobs(SCR:15).Thus,the
theeducationalstatusof Muslimsandthat low perceived returns from education
of othersocio-religiouscategories(except do not help the cause of retention of
SCsandSTs).BothMeanYearsof School- Muslimsin theeducationsystem.Theother
ing (MYS) and attendance levels of strikingsupportingdata comes from the
Muslimsarelow in absolutenumbersand veryhighconcentration
of Muslimsinselfin comparisonwith othersocio-religious employmentactivities.
The probabilityof Muslims and SCs
groups.Again, there are regionalvariations. The MYS of Muslimsis lowest in and STs completinggraduationis lower
statessuchas WestBengal,UttarPradesh, than for all other socio-religiousgroups
AssamandUttaranchal.
However,Muslim especially in urbanareas and for men.
childrenhavemoreyearsof schoolingthan However,the pool of eligible population
SCs and STs in states such as Kerala, forhighereducationis increasingfaster
Bihar,Jharkhand,
Karnataka,
Maharashtra, for SCs and STs thanfor Muslims.This
AndhraPradeshand Gujarat.However, mustbe relatedpartlyto affirmativeaction
Muslimenrolment
ratesareshowingsteady and the higher perceived returnsfrom
increase.In 1999-2000,Muslimshadthe education for these groups. Being
lowestenrolmentrateof allsocio-religious Muslim reducesthe chanceof achieving

(SCR: 39). Total fertility rate (TFR)

figuresshow that among the four large
socio-religiousgroupsfertilityis lowest
among the Sikhs, preceded by the
Christians.It is the highest among the
Muslims.Thevariousestimatesshowthat
MuslimTFRis higherthantheaverageby
0.7 to one point.
By treatingmigrationas the residual,as
the
differencebetweenactualandnatural
Health, Fertility and Population
(birthsminus deaths), the SCR
growth
Growth
triesto makean assessmentof the impact
While the sex ratio in India as a whole of international
migrationon the overall
is lower than 1000, it is not altogether Muslimgrowthin India.Thefiguresshow
surprisingthat Muslims show a better sex thatmortalityamongMuslimsis lowerand
ratio as compared to other socio-religious the fertility rate higher than average.
groups (though why this ratio has been Detailedanalysesshow thatthe contribusteadily improving may need further ex- tion of migrationto growthof Muslims
ploration). Further, Muslims have the is due largely to higher fertility and
highest child sex ratio of any social group thensecondarilyto lower mortality.The
in the country (SCR: 33-38). A combina- contributionof migrationto the growth
tion of factors including religious ideology differentialbetweenHindusandMuslims
and particularly kinship and marriage is small (SCR:41).

population and are scattered across villages and districts and after 2002 systematically hounded out and not allowed to
return.It was as a result of this insecurity
that the Muslim Relief Committees made
specific attemptsto re-housescatteredrural
households only in the relative safety of
gated community complexes.

practices might be working together to

ensure that the high devaluation of daughters common among Hindus and many
other groups is diminished among the
Muslims. In keeping with this data, infant
and child mortality is also lower than
average among Muslims and is definitely
farlowerthanamongHindus.These figures
persist despite economic disadvantageand
lower levels of female schooling among
Muslims.
In part, as I have suggested, these
features may be due to the close kinship
networks and marital circles of Muslims,
contributing somewhat to the greater
physical (and social) security of the
children. The possibility of "within-kin"
marriage practices and lower marriage
payments might also ensure that the girl
child is not considered so much of a
burden. For Muslim women who marry
in more tight-knit circles and more often
among kin, the supportof the natal family
in childcare and in the care of the new
mother may be of some importance in
adding to the survival-chancesof the child,
including the girl child. Even so, poverty
and disadvantage must be partly responsible for thatfact thatthe Muslim child has
a higher risk of being underweightin comparison to a child from another socioreligious community.
Fertility rates reveal that fertility varies
among the Muslims as among othergroups
in accordance with social, economic and
regional factors. Thus one speaks here of
average fertility rather than in any sense
of a "fertilitynorm"for or among Muslims

840

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educationat the secondaryand then at

higherlevels. This meansthatsustained
and targeted programmesto increase
arerequired
enrolmentandensureretention
for Muslims.
Too muchhasbeenmadeof themadrasa
issue.It is commonlyandfalselybelieved
thatMuslimsbeingconservativepreferto
send their childrento madrasas,where
theyacquirereligiousandothereducation.
At the all-Indialevel, a mere 3. per cent
of allMuslimchildrenof school-goingage
are enrolledin madrasas.Manychildren,
in addihowever,mayattend"maktabs",
tion to theirregularschool. The maktab
gives a religiouseducationandas studies
have shown,is a complementto, rather
formainstream
education.
thana substitute
While the numberof childrenwith Urdu
as their mothertongue necessitatesthe
provisioningof educationthrough this
mediumin differentstates,Muslims are
not averse to sendingtheir children to
mainstreamschools. Further,my own
ethnographic research has shown an
increasingnumberof Muslimswho want
an English-mediumeducationfor their
children.

differently. Thus, Muslim women are disadvantaged not by religion alone but by
a complex of forces including the play of
class and gender.
Further, the concentration of Muslim
workers in self-employment- street vending, small trades and enterprises- ensures
perhaps that the community as a whole is
far more exposed to the disruptions and
damage caused by urban conflict and
violence. As I have suggested elsewhere,
the immense fragility of Muslim participation in the economy and the low level
of their asset accumulation in general
further intensify their vulnerability to the
displacements, physical and economic,
caused by situations of continual communal strife [Robinson 2005].
As employees, Muslims generally work
as casual labour and they are very poorly
represented in regular, salaried employment. In this respect, they are even more
disadvantagedthanSCs andSTs for whom
affirmative action may have improved
standards. Only about 27 per cent of
Muslim workers in urban areas are engaged in regular work, while the share of
such workers among SCs and STs, OBCs
and Hindu UCs is 40, 36 and 49 per cent
(SCR: 93). The participation
respectively
and
Income
Employment
of Muslims in formal sector employment
Workerpopulationratiosare lower for is farless thanthe nationalaverage.Muslim
Muslims than any other socio-religious men are over-representedin streetvending
communityandthisis moreso in therural (more than 12 per cent as opposed to the
areas.Muslimwomenfareeven worsein national average of less than 8 per cent),
both ruraland urbanareas;their lowest while women tend to work from home to
show up in a much larger degree (70 per cent) than
figuresfor workparticipation
urbanareas.Statewisefiguresforwomen's the average (51 per cent).
As suggested by the SCR, traditional
arenot analysedin the
workparticipation
SCR,but we can placeits dataalongside barriers to women's mobility as well as
the recentMuslimWomen'sSurveycon- childcare and other household responsiductedbyHasanandMenon(2004),which bilities may play a big role in keeping
sampleddatafrom40 districtsspanning Muslim women within the confines of their
12 states.The socio-economicstatus of homes and close to the neighbourhood.
Muslimhouseholdswas comparedwitha However, there are also other possible
sample of the Hindupopulationbroken reasons that need to be explored. Muslims
down by caste, using a relativedevelop- live in certain areas in the cities and feel
ment index.While the data underscored "safer" in doing so leading to their
the dismal numbersof women in the ghettoisation. Urban ethnic conflict and
workforce,the reasonswere seen to be the threat of violence tend to result in the
complex.Forone,in ruralareas,low work confining or huddling of Muslims into
in agricul- community-dominated enclaves. For
ratesparticularly
participation
turelinkupwiththelow ratesof ownership women in particular,there is a great sense
of landby Muslimsas a whole. Further, of fear in going outside of these commuthere is considerabledifference across nity-bound neighbourhoods. Their securegions, the rates in the south being rity, and that of their children, is felt to
higher than in the northernor central be better assured within the ghettos.
states.Thissuggeststhattherearevarying
Since large numbersof Muslims areselfstructures of opportunity in place in employed, developing skills and extending
different regions, which constitute credit should be the focal points of any
Muslimparticipation
in thelabourmarket positive initiatives for the community.
Economic and Political Weekly

theprovisionof socialsecurityand
Further,
social safety nets becomes important
for such self-employedworkers.At the
macro-level,sectorswhich are important
for Muslimssuch as apparel,auto-repair
and electricalmachinery,are potentially
high-growthsectorsandpolicy initiatives
focusingon themmayyield employmentrelated dividends for Muslims (SCR:
101-3).On the whole,moreMuslimsthan
othersareto befoundinproduction-related
activitiesand transportequipmentoperation. About 34 per cent of Muslims are
engaged in such occupationsas against
21 per cent of all workers.
Again,Muslimsaremorehighlyrepresentedthanothersin sales relatedwork;
Muslimparticipation
is relativelylowerin
professional,technical,clericalandmanagerial work, particularlyin urbanareas.
Muslim participationis lower than the
workersof othersocio-religiousgroupsin
regular salaried jobs especially in the
governmentor in largepublicandprivate
sectorenterprises.Further,it is foundthat
theytendto be moreinsecureandvulnerable in termsof conditionsof work.This
is not only becauseof their.sizable presencein informalsectoremployment,but
also becausetheirjob conditions(length
of contract,socialsecuritybenefitsandthe
like) even as regularworkersare poorer
thanthoseforothersocio-religiousgroups
(SCR: 108).
Muslimsareverypoorlyrepresented
in
defenceandsecurityrelatedactivities.This
is a matterof some concernbecauseit is
cruciallylinkedto the senseof well-being
and security about life and assets perceived by the community.The shareof
Muslimsin "publicorderandsafetyactivities" at the Centrallevel is just about
6 percent,whilethatof Hinduuppercastes
is 42 percent.At the statelevel, the share
of Muslimsis barelyhigher,at 7 percent.
Only 4 per cent of Muslimsare engaged
indefence-related
activities.Severalreports,
including the Srikrishna Commission
Reporton the 1992-93 riots in Mumbai,
havestatedthatthepoliceareoftenbiased
againstMuslimsand that specialefforts
are neededto recruitmorepersonsfrom
minoritybackgroundsas well as to decommunalisethe police. Diversityin the
police forces has a place in producing
andpromotingthetrust
greaterimpartiality
of citizens.
In thecurrentLokSabha,thereareonly
36 Muslimsof 543 candidates.Thereare
only 3 per cent Muslimsin the IAS, 1.8
percent in the IFS and a mere4 percent

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841

in theIPS.Thereare4.5 percentMuslims
intherailwaysandtheyareoverwhelmingly
at the lowerlevels. In the postalservices
andbanks,Muslimsare very poorlyrepresented.
Evenintheuniversities,thereare
only4.7 percentMuslims(SCR: 165-7).
Thereare state-wisedifferences;Andhra
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and
do somewhatbetterthanother
Kamataka
states.Thereis a crucialneed to enhance
inpublic
Muslimpresenceandparticipation
spaces and increasetheir role in public
policymaking.

improved as much as the other socioreligiouscommunities.

Conclusion

on par with the SCs. They suffer from

stigma and social exclusion due to their
status. Such groups experience cumulative
disabilities. The SCR has recommended
these groups be treated as most backward
classes and several measures including
reservation be made available to them. It
would perhaps be more pertinentto argue
thatthese groupsshould be includedamong
the list of SCs. SC Christiansand Muslims
have been struggling to be accorded the
same benefits that are granted to SCs
professing the Hindu, Sikh, and neoBuddhist religions. SC Christians and
Muslims are not recognised as such under
the law and are not eligible for the benefits
of positive discrimination.
The Constitutional Orderof 1950 listed
SCs and STs using the list employed by
the Government of India (Scheduled
Castes) Order of 1936. The 1950 Order
specifies that no person professing a religion otherthanHinduism may be deemed
SC status. The limitation has been understood in terms of the logic that religions
such as Islam or Christianity claimed the
principle of human equality and therefore
there could strictly not be any "Scheduled
Castes" in these communities. Apart from
all its other problems, such an argument
cannot any longer be defended since the
Order has already been amended in 1956
to include Sikh Dalits and again in 1990
to include Buddhist Dalits. These are
both religions that espouse the idea of
equality.
In the light of these amendments,it would
appearthatthe continuedexclusion of Dalit
Christians and Dalit Muslims from the
benefits of reservations amounts to religion-based discriminationandcontravenes
constitutional principles prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of religion,
race, caste, sex or place of birth. The idea
of quotas for SC Muslims or affirmative
action for other sections of the community
should not be considered religion-based
decisions. The relevant facts are that
Muslims are among the most deprived of
India's social groups and communities and
their social, occupational and economic
profile is appalling. Marginalisation, discrimination, violence and social exclusion
have furtherdepressed Muslim aspirations
and pushed down levels of achievement.
A very large section of the Indian population is being left behind in the drive
towards development and this can bode no
good for the nation. [13

On the whole it is clear thatMuslims

suffer from deprivationon almostevery
front.Whiletheyaredoingsomewhatbetter
in certain respects in some states (for
instancein the south),they are generally
andliveintheshadow
extremelybackward
of vulnerabilityand poverty.It has been
suggested that the relatively better-off
positionof Muslimsin southIndiais partly
relatedto thefactthatsomeof thesestates
Infrastructure and Poverty
have remainedlargely undisturbedby
It is disturbingto notethatwith respect communalrioting.Indeed,whilecommuto othersocialandphysicalinfrastructure nalviolencemaynotbea causeforMuslim
thereis some evidenceto
aswell,Muslimsarepoorlyserved.Muslim backwardness,
concentrationvillages, as the Census of argue that the expectationof recurring
2001 shows, are not well served with violence may play a very importantrole
"pucca"
approachroadsorlocalbusstops. in depressingfortunes,fosteringinsecuA largenumberof Muslimconcentration rity and increasingsocial and economic
villages in states such as West Bengal, vulnerability[RazzackandGumber2002;
UttarPradesh,Bihar,Assam, Jharkhand MishraandSingh2002; Robinson2005].
andJammuand Kashmirlack postaland
Demographictransitionis also undertelegraphservices. Several of these are way amongMuslimsas amongothers.In
states with a high Muslim population. manypartsof the world,thereappearsto
thereis a clearinverseassociation be a tendency towards higher fertility
Further,
in small villages betweenthe proportion amongethnicminority.Promotingsecuof Muslimpopulationandthe availability rityandwell-beingcoulddomoretodepress
ofeducational
infrastructure.
Inmoststates, fertility rates than any panic reactions.
the proportionof Muslim concentration Moreover,thestrengthsof Muslimkinship
villages with medical facilities is lower and family patternsshouldnot be overthan the proportionof all villages with lookedas they seem to betterinfantsursuchfacilities(SCR:139-49).Thesefacts vival rates and the sex ratio. A proper
of Muslimfamilialandkin
regardingeducation,physical infrastruc- understanding
tureandhealthfacilitiesindicatea distinct relations may be central to promoting
health
bias in public service provisioning in familyplanningandchild-oriented
Muslimconcentrationareas.
measures.
Muslimshavepooraccesstobankcredit.
A veryimportantaspectbroughtout by
The averagesize of creditis meagerand thedatais thecleardiscrimination
against
low comparedto other socio-religious Muslimsin the sphereof stateprovision
groups. The percentageof households of public services of all kinds. There is
availingbankfacilitiesis muchlower in urgent need to rectify this imbalance.
villages where the Muslimpopulationis Among Muslims, some groups are
high and this could be partlybecauseof worseoff thanothers.Apartfromregional
non-availabilityof such facilities. This differences,class, caste andgenderwork
amounts to the financial exclusion of to producefurtherinequalitiesof access
Muslims and has far-reachingconse- and achievement.MuslimOBCs constiquences for a community already tutejustover40 percentof thetotalMuslim
economicallyvulnerable
andeducationally population.Muslimsas a wholelagbehind
backward.Forthoseprimarilyengagedin HinduOBCs and the MuslimsOBCs are
self-employedwork,access to creditis a worseoff thanthe generalMuslimpopucrucialinput.In sum, the datashows that lation.This suggeststhat the benefitsof
Muslimsface high levels of povertyand entitlementsfor the backwardclasses are
theirconditionis only slightlybetterthan not reachingthe MuslimOBCs.The SCR
thatof SCs andSTs. Relativedeprivation recommendsthatthe MuslimOBCsneed
of Muslims is much higher in urban additionalattention.
ratherthan rural areas. The economic
There are also several Muslim castes
conditionsof urban Muslims have not socially, educationallyand economically Email:rw@hss.iitb.ac.in
842

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Note

References

1 The 2001 Census had collected data on the

socio-economic condition of religious groups
andthis is invaluable.Priorto that,the NSS and
NHFS surveys offered sample data. The work
of Abusaleh Shariffand the National Council
forAppliedEconomicResearchwasnoteworthy.
Much of their data came out in the India
DevelopmentReportof 1999. Again, a recent
survey of Muslim women by Zoya Hasan
and Ritu Menon (2004) provided some
revealingdata.

Hasan, Zoya and Ritu Menon (2004): Unequal

Citizens:A Studyof MuslimWomenin India,
Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
Mishra,V andS K Singh(2002):StatusofMinorities
in South Asia, Authors Press, Delhi.
Differentials
Razzack,AzraandAnilGumber(2002):
in HumanDevelopment:A Casefor EmpowermentofMuslimsinIndia,NCAER,New Delhi.
Robinson,Rowena (2005): Tremorsof Violence:
MuslimSurvivorsof EthnicStrife in Western
India, Sage, New Delhi.

Lives?
Conditioned
Given the disparitiesin Indiansociety which affect Indian
Muslims- some built-indue to various reasons and some created
by the stepmotherlytreatmentmetedout by the state - the
governmentshould show the will to implementthe various
recommendationsof the Sachar Committee.
M A KALAM

'-

he Muslims of India as well as

others looked forward to the
release of the SacharCommittee

report.l The quite transparentand lucid

write-updone witha high degreeof candidnessand in a forthrightmannercame

as a big surpriseto many given the kid
gloves with in whichmost commissions,
highlevel, or whatever,set upby the state
dealwiththe issue(s)concerned.In terms
of datacollationand puttingtogetherall
these in one single volume,the effort is
so, as dataof the
unparalleled.
Particularly
kindthatthiscommitteeobtainedhasnever
beenattemptedin Indiain herhistory,not
evenafterindependence
andnotevenwhen
the GopalSinghCommitteewas set up in
the 1980s.Butunfortunately
nothingcame
upasa resultof theGopalSinghCommittee
recommendations.
And, to say the least,
those thoughtsdo recurwhen one thinks
of the findingsand recommendations
of
the presentcommittee.Commissionsand
reports,sadto say,canneverbe a substitute
for politicalwill; politicalwill thatoften
refusesto rise above electoralequations,
and is guided by coalitioncalculations.
Thoughthe armyrefusedto give informationaboutemploymentof Muslimsin
its ranks,the navyandthe airforcedidso.
Thatin itselfis remarkable
on theonehand
while it is also disappointingthat,one of
thelargestarmiesin a democraticcountry
andwhichhas impeccablecredentialsfor

being confined to the barracksand has not

delved into the political arena as has
happenedin othercountries with whom we
share borders,did not deem it fit to let the
people know how many Muslims fight for
the country. It is another matter that the
Sachar Committee in its own wisdom, or
otherwise, decided not to use the data that
was supplied by two of the three wings of
our defence forces. On the other hand, an
institution like the Union Public Service
Commission (UPSC) which has been
negotiating to keep itself out of the right
to informationorbithas given datathatwas
not available in the public domain. The
public sector units (PSUs), banksandsome
private sector orgnisations too have provided data that is immensely revealing.
However, a valid criticism that has been
levelled againstthe committee by different
quartersand at different levels is that it did
not have a single woman member. The
committee attempts to pre-empt this when
it says:
During the committee's interactionwith
women's groups, some of them seriously
articulateda grievancethatit did not have
any womanmember.The committeetried
to make up for this by convening a halfa-day meeting with women's groupsduring its visits to the states. In addition to
that,women social activistsin large numbersattendedthemeetingsof all thegroups
and expressed their points of view and
apprehensions in an open and frank
manner.Their input was intensive and to
the point about the various matters like

education, medical facilities, Anganwadi

etc. The committeealso held
requirements,
one full day meeting in Delhi in July 2006
exclusively for women fromall over India
(p xiii).
While it is possible to appreciate or even
sympathisethe way the committee defends
itself on this count, no justification could
be adequate for not having at least one
(full) woman member on the committee.
It is imperative, one feels, to have a woman
member as the way proceedings take
place, interviews are conducted and sensitivity is given to data that is collected
could be qualitatively different due to the
positive gender bias that goes into such
an exercise.

Islands of Utter Neglect

Before we get into an analysis of some
of the micro-level data, it is pertinent to
note that at no level can the charge of
minorityappeasementhold any waterafter
one goes through the Sachar Committee
Reporteven cursorily.Delimitation of constituencies in Muslim majority areas or
where the Muslim presence is substantial
and earmarking such constituencies for
scheduled castes, is one of the ways in
which Muslim participationin the electoral
process of contesting for different posts
has been thwarted. It is doubly distressing
to note that many such constituencies do
not even have significant scheduled caste
habitations/population!Banks have overtly
earmarkedMuslim-dominatedareasas nonrecovery or red and danger zones as regards advancing loans to Muslims and
these same banks have enough evidence
with them to the contraryin what they have
designated as "negative geographical
zones". Comparedto the generalpopulation
or any other section of the population,
Muslims, in fact, have defaulted much less
in clearing their debts and have paid back
in a better manner.
Areas with significant Muslim population suffer on many counts: no pucca
approach roads, hardly any bus stops, no
basic services, no physical infrastructure,
fewer schools, and so on. Such a state of
affairs is not confined to a particular
district or state but has been replicated in
all areas where there are large numbersof
Muslims. How is it that there is such
remarkable consistency in creating and
recreating islands of utter neglect? The
report says, "Compared to the Muslim
majority areas, the areas inhabiting fewer
Muslims had better roads, sewage and

Economicand PoliticalWeekly March 10, 2007843

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