ASIAN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION vs.

CA
FACTS:
The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) issued an Explanatory
Bulletin wherein it clarified that employees are entitled to 200% of their
basic wage on April 9, 1993, whether unworked, which, apart from being
Maundy Thursday, is also Araw ng Kagitingan. Despite the explanatory
bulletin, petitioner Asian Transmission Corporation opted to pay its daily paid
employees only 100% of their basic pay on April 9, 1998. Respondent Bisig
ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU) protested. The controversy was
submitted for voluntary arbitration. The Voluntary Arbitrator decided in favor
of BATLU. In the assailed decision, the CA upheld the findings of the
Voluntary Arbitrator. Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
ISSUE:
W/N the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by Asian Transmission
Corporation will prosper?
HELD:
No. The appeal from a final disposition of the CA is a petition for review
under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court which was filed by the petitioner.
Rule 45 is clear that the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any
case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding involved, may
be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Under Rule 45
the reglementary period to appeal is fifteen (15) days from notice of
judgment or denial of motion for reconsideration.
For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 to issue, a petitioner must show that
he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
against its perceived grievance. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and
adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects
of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. In this case,
appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.
The petition is DISMISSED.

NEW FRONTIER SUGAR CORPORATION vs. RTC

FACTS:
New Frontier Sugar Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of raw sugar milling. Foreseeing that it cannot meet its obligations
with its creditors as they fell due, petitioner filed a Petition for the
Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with Approval of Proposed
Rehabilitation Plan under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation (2000. The RTC issued a Stay Order appointing Manuel
Clemente as rehabilitation receiver.
One of petitioners creditors, the Equitable PCI Bank, filed a
Comment/Opposition with Motion to Exclude Property, alleging that
petitioner is not qualified for corporate rehabilitation, as it can no longer
operate because it has no assets left. The RTC dismissed the case. Petitioner
filed an Omnibus Motion but this was denied by the RTC. Petitioner then filed
with the CA a special civil action for certiorari, which was denied by the CA
contending that since petitioner no longer has sufficient assets and
properties to continue with its operations and answer its corresponding
liabilities, it is no longer eligible for rehabilitation. The CA also ruled that
even if the RTC erred in dismissing the petition, the same could not be
corrected anymore because what petitioner filed before the CA was a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an
ordinary appeal. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it as
"improper," appeal being an available remedy?
HELD:
No. The CA also correctly ruled that petitioner availed of the wrong remedy
when it filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
Certiorari is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. It is an original and independent action that was not part of the
trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained
of. More importantly, since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for
certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court
prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
However, it should be noted that the Court issued A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC on
September 14, 2004, clarifying the proper mode of appeal in cases involving
corporate rehabilitation and intra-corporate controversies. It is provided

therein that all decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim
Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall
be appealed to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court to be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision
or final order of the RTC.
The petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
CENTRO ESCOLAR UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND ALLIED WORKERS
UNION INDEPENDENT vs. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner union has existing CBAs with the university that granted both the
teaching and the non-teaching staff increases in their compensation.
Petitioner asserts that the integrated Incremental Proceeds granted in the
CBAs should not be deducted from the personnels 70% share in the IP.
Petitioner contended that the deduction of the IP integration from the 70%
share of tuition fee increase is illegal and contrary to the CBA, as the IP
integration in the salary is considered a CBA-won increase, hence, may not
be deducted from the 70%.
Respondent university averred that there are two kinds of salary increases in
the CBAthe CBA-negotiated increase taken from the university fund, and
the increase as a result of IP integration which, by its nature, is taken from
the 70% share of the school personnel in the IP. It further argued that it
would not be feasible to grant additional IP to teachers with overload or
permanent substitution assignments, as the IP is distributed among all
employees of the school, whether teaching or non-teaching.
The Voluntary Arbitrator upheld the position of respondent university and
dismissed the case. Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. The appellate court dismissed the petition on the
ground that petitioner used a wrong mode of appeal. It held that petitioner
should have filed an appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The CA also denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in holding that petitioner used a wrong remedy when it
filed a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65?
HELD:
NO. The CA did not err in holding that petitioner used a wrong remedy when
it filed a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an appeal
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

A petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is adopted to correct

errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency,
or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of such court or
agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the error is not
one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake of judgment, the
proper remedy should be appeal. In addition, an independent action for
certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. There was no
question of jurisdiction involved in the decision of the voluntary arbitrator.
What was being questioned was merely his findings of whether the
universitys practice of sourcing the integrated IP in the CBA from the 70%
share of the personnel in the IP violates the provisions of the CBA. Such is a
proper subject of an appeal. The petition is DENIED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to
(1) set aside the Resolution dated January 31, 2002 issued by the Special
First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic
of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al., and (2) reinstate its earlier
decision dated September 19, 2000 which forfeited in favor of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) the amount held in escrow in the
Philippine
National
Bank
(PNB) in the
aggregate
amount
of
US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002.
Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to RA
13791. In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the Swiss deposits
that are in escrow in the PNB as ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
The petition also sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in
treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful
income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury
notes are frozen at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze
order issued by the PCGG.
ISSUE:
W/N the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65 is proper?
HELD:
No. At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an
exception to the general rule governing petitions for certiorari. Normally,
decisions of the Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under Rule 45,
not Rule 65. But where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public

interest, public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed

notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal.

ISSUE:
W/N the filing of the petition for certiorari is the proper remedy?

The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB is dependent solely
on the decision of this jurisdiction that said funds belong to the petitioner
Republic. What is important is our own assessment of the sufficiency of the
evidence to rule in favor of either petitioner Republic or respondent
Marcoses. In this instance, despite the absence of the authenticated
translations of the Swiss decisions, the evidence on hand tilts convincingly in
favor of petitioner Republic.

HELD:
No. The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison
detre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being
exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a
court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would
be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would
not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom
or legal soundness of the decision --- not the jurisdiction of the court to
render said decision --- the same is beyond the province of a special civil
action for certiorari.

The petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan

dated January 31, 2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were
transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National
Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of
January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines.
ALFREDO O. ESTRERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Venus Kavoori is employed with the Philippine Postal Corporation as
POSTMAN II while Estrera is the Regional Director, Region 10 of the PPC. In
2001, BOMBO RADYO, DXIF, Cagayan de Oro City aired about the alleged
pilferage and/or loss of PVAO checks and foreign mail matters and other
alleged anomalies.
The Regional Office issued an order creating an investigation team to look
into the said allegations. Estrera filed a formal charge against Kavoori. He
also issued an order reassigning Kavoori from the Cagayan de Oro City Office
to the Motor Transport Section, Mail Distribution Center. Kavoori filed a
motion to quash claiming that the complaint was only signed by Alfredo
Estrera and not the Postmaster General. Petitioner denied the same. A
motion for reconsideration was filed but it was likewise denied.
Feeling no more other recourse, Kavoori came to the RTC and filed a petition
for prohibition, injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order and damages. The RTC ruled in favor of Kavoori.
RTC also ruled that Estrera may however, refile again the formal charge.
Estrera no longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing RTC
Order and proceeded to file a petition for certiorari with the CA but it was
dismissed. Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration of the
foregoing Resolution and instead filed another petition for certiorari with the
CA.
Again,
it
was
dismissed.
Petitioner
then
filed
his
Manifestation/Explanation and his Motion for Reconsideration but it was
denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

In the case at hand, the issues alleged are only possible errors of judgment,
questioning the correctness of the CAs rulings. Hence, since the issues
involved do not affect the jurisdiction of the CA, the writ of certiorari cannot
be availed of by petitioner. Moreover, the CA acted properly in dismissing
Estreras petition for failure to comply with the requirements provided by the
Rules of Court.
INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY vs. CHED
FACTS:
CHED received a letter from the Chairman of Professional Regulatory
Commission inquiring whether Indiana Aerospace already acquired university
status in view of its advertisement as such in Manila Bulletin. Upon
investigation, it was verified from SEC that Indiana School of Aeronautics
failed to amend its Articles of Incorporation to change its name to Indiana
Aerospace University. Thus, CHED ordered it to desist from using the term
University.
Prior thereto, Indiana Aerospace filed a complaint for damages with a prayer
for Writ of Preliminary Injunction. CHED, on the other hand filed a motion to
Dismiss. The lower court dismissed the Motion to Dismiss and Granted
Indianas prayer for Preliminary Injunction. CHED filed with CA a petitioner
for certiorari arguing that RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying its Motion to Dismiss and in declaring it in default despite its filing
an Answer. Indiana claims that the Petition for Certiorari of CHED should
have been dismissed by CA because it was filed out of time and was not
preceded by a motion for reconsideration in the RTC.
ISSUE:
Was the certiorari petition properly and timely filed?

HELD:
Yes. CHEDs Petition for Certiorari was seasonable filed.
timeliness, what should have been considered is the
respondent received the Order declaring it in default. In
CHED was able to comply with the 60-day reglamentary
Petition for Certiorari.

In computing its
date when the
the case at bar,
period to file its

As to its contention that a motion for reconsideration should precede the

petition for certiorari, the general rule is that the lower court should be given
the opportunity to correct itself and thus a motion for reconsideration should
precede a petitioner for certiorari. However, exception to such are: a) when
issues are purely legal; b) public interest is involved; c) extreme urgency; d)
special circumstances so warrant. In the case at bar, regulation of
educational institutions is invested with public interest; thus there is no need
to resort first to a motion for reconsideration.
Lastly, an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory; the proper
remedy is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is
not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling, it is resorted
only to correct grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, there was no
grave abuse of discretion in the lower courts denial of the Motion to Dismiss
since the acts of CHED such as declaring in a newspaper that Indiana was
ordered closed for illegal advertisement, undermined the public's confidence
in Indiana as an educational institution. This was a clear statement of a
sufficient cause of action.
MICROSOFT
CORPORATION vs. BEST DEAL COMPUTER CENTER
CORPORATION
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for Injunction and Damages with Ex Parte
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and the Provisional Measure of
Preservation of Evidence against Best Deal Computer Center Corporation,
Perfect Deal Corporation and Marcos Yuen doing business as Perfect Byte
Computer Center. It alleged that defendants without authority or license
copied, reproduced, distributed, installed and/or loaded software programs
owned by Microsoft into computer units sold by them to their customers in
violation of its intellectual property rights. The Las Pias trial court set
petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order for hearing but at the
same time denied its application for an ex parte order. The court a quo also
opined that petitioner's application partook of a search and seizure order
available only in criminal cases. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the
same was denied. In the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
petitioner submits that the court a quo gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the law does

not allow an ex parte provisional remedy of seizure and impounding of

infringing evidence.
ISSUE:
W/N the instant petition for certiorari would prosper?
HELD:
No. In the complaint filed before the court a quo, petitioner averred that it
incurred no less than P750,000.00 in attorney's fees, investigation and
litigation expenses and another P2,000,000.00 by way of moral damages.
Clearly, the above amounts fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC because the
value exceeds P200,000.00. Also, the complaint was properly lodged in the
RTC of Las Pias considering that one of the principal defendants was
residing thereat.
A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of
discretion is manifested. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law. Even assuming
that the orders were erroneous, such error would merely be deemed as an
error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. As long as the
respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the
exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment
which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. The distinction is
clear: A petition for certiorari seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction while
a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the
court. Errors of judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes in the
court's findings. Where a court has jurisdiction over the person and subject
matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise
of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of
such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a
remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. Petitioner's rights can be more appropriately addressed in the
appeal. The instant petition is DISMISSED.
CUEVAS vs. BACAL
FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Josefina Bacal, CESO III, was designated by the Secretary of
Justice as Acting Chief Public Attorney and her appointment was confirmed
by then Pres. Ramos. During the term of then Pres. Estrada, petitioner Carina
Demaisip was appointed chief public defender now Chief Public Attorney, a
position held by Bacal. Then Pres. Estrada issued another appointment paper
designating Demaisip to the said position and appointing Bacal as Regional
Director of the Public Defenders Office. Petitioner Secretary of Justice was
notified of the appointments of petitioner Demaisip and respondent.

Bacal filed a petition for quo warranto questioning her replacement as Chief
Public Attorney but it was dismissed. Respondent brought her case in the CA
which ruled in her favor. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, but their
motion was denied. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for quo warranto?
HELD:
Yes.
Respondent Bacal is a CESO III and that the position of Regional Director of
the PAO, to which she was transferred, corresponds to her CES Rank Level III
and Salary Grade 28. This was her position before her appointment to the
position of Chief Public Attorney of the PAO, which requires a CES Rank Level
I for appointment thereto.
As respondent does not have the rank
appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that
position cannot be considered permanent, and she can claim no security of
tenure in respect of that position.
On the other hand, Justice Puno makes much of the fact that petitioner
Carina Demaisip is not a CES eligible. Suffice it to say the law allows in
exceptional cases the appointment of non-CES eligibles provided that the
appointees subsequently pass the CES Examinations.
On the other hand, as respondent herself does not have the requisite
qualification for the position of Chief Public Attorney, she cannot raise the
lack of qualification of petitioner. As held in Carillo v. CA, in a quo warranto
proceeding the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office
allegedly held unlawfully by another.
Absent that right, the lack of
qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial. Indeed, this
has been the exacting rule since it was first announced, 95 years ago, in
Acosta v. Flor. As at present embodied in Rule 66, 5 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the rule is that a person claiming to be entitled to a public office
or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an
action therefor in his own name.
The decision of the CA is REVERSED and the petition for quo warranto filed
by respondent is DISMISSED.