1. Russell examines the argument from analogy for believing in other minds. We observe mental states like thinking and feeling in ourselves but not in objects like sticks. We attribute similar mental states to other humans and animals based on their analogous behavior to our own.
2. The behavior of other people is often analogous to our own behavior when experiencing certain mental states. For example, we infer that someone is thirsty if they say "I'm thirsty" in a hot environment. However, belief in other minds requires a postulate beyond what is needed in physics.
3. Russell proposes that the postulate is that if we always observe a mental state A causing a physical behavior B in ourselves, then it is probable that
1. Russell examines the argument from analogy for believing in other minds. We observe mental states like thinking and feeling in ourselves but not in objects like sticks. We attribute similar mental states to other humans and animals based on their analogous behavior to our own.
2. The behavior of other people is often analogous to our own behavior when experiencing certain mental states. For example, we infer that someone is thirsty if they say "I'm thirsty" in a hot environment. However, belief in other minds requires a postulate beyond what is needed in physics.
3. Russell proposes that the postulate is that if we always observe a mental state A causing a physical behavior B in ourselves, then it is probable that
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Russell_ The Argument from Analogy for Other Minds (1948).pdf
1. Russell examines the argument from analogy for believing in other minds. We observe mental states like thinking and feeling in ourselves but not in objects like sticks. We attribute similar mental states to other humans and animals based on their analogous behavior to our own.
2. The behavior of other people is often analogous to our own behavior when experiencing certain mental states. For example, we infer that someone is thirsty if they say "I'm thirsty" in a hot environment. However, belief in other minds requires a postulate beyond what is needed in physics.
3. Russell proposes that the postulate is that if we always observe a mental state A causing a physical behavior B in ourselves, then it is probable that
1. Russell examines the argument from analogy for believing in other minds. We observe mental states like thinking and feeling in ourselves but not in objects like sticks. We attribute similar mental states to other humans and animals based on their analogous behavior to our own.
2. The behavior of other people is often analogous to our own behavior when experiencing certain mental states. For example, we infer that someone is thirsty if they say "I'm thirsty" in a hot environment. However, belief in other minds requires a postulate beyond what is needed in physics.
3. Russell proposes that the postulate is that if we always observe a mental state A causing a physical behavior B in ourselves, then it is probable that