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Loss of HMS Hood Part 3 PDF
Loss of HMS Hood Part 3 PDF
Table III
Table of Armor Penetration of HMS Hood
Total Obliquity = 44 (Beginning of Final Turn)
5" Armor
7" Armor
12" Armor
1,052 fps
321 mps
608 fps
185 mps
none
none
Projectile condition
intact
intact
broken (?)
Plug Weight
269 lbs
122 kg
405 lbs
184 kg
none
none
Plug Velocity
986 fps
301 mps
818 fps
249 mps
none
none
Fragment Weight
48 lbs
22 kg
65 lbs
29 kg
none
none
Exit angle
32
16
none
64
77
none
-2
none
1,295 fps
395 mps
1,092 fps
333 mps
457 fps
139 mps
Projectile condition
intact
intact
intact
Plug weight
269 lbs
122 kg
389 lbs
176 kg
723 lbs
328 kg
Fragment weight
35 lbs
16 kg
48 lbs
22 kg
27 lbs
12 kg
Fragment velocity
1,295 fps
395 mps
1,092 fps
333 mps
457 fps
139 mps
Exit angle
28
27
15
74
74
81
13
13
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It is clear from this information that Hood may indeed have been destroyed due to the action of a
projectile which penetrated her belt. But a shell need not necessarily have penetrated the belt to
destroy her. It might have gone over her armor belts. Or it might have gone under.
Both British Boards of Inquiry considered the possibility that Hood was destroyed by a projectile
which fell slightly short of the target, and, after travelling some distance underwater, penetrated the
hull and then detonated well below the waterline. This hypothesis is often associated with a similar
underwater hit suffered by Prince of Wales in the same action. This damage was not discovered
until the ship was drydocked some time after the action, and therefore the exact time and range at
which the hit was scored is uncertain, although because the projectile apparently entered the hull
from about 45 relative, it seems most probable that the hit occurred shortly after Hood was
destroyed. Prior to that time, Prince of Wales was not under 380mm fire, and shortly after that time
she turned away and presented her stern to the enemy. The hit, caused by a 380mm projectile from
Bismarck, first contacted Prince of Wales about 8.5 meters below the waterline. After piercing the
skin, it penetrated four additional internal light bulkheads before ending up nose forward just
outboard of the ship's main torpedo bulkhead alongside the main engineering spaces. This hit
certainly had the potential to destroy the ship had it exploded, and had it struck adjacent to the
magazines.
Especially because it appears that the Germans made no specific effort to enhance the underwater
capabilities of their projectiles, this represents a truly remarkable performance. Although the
detailed underwater trajectory of any individual projectile remains difficult to predict with any
precision, the general principles governing the underwater trajectories of most standard projectile
types are relatively well understood. The usual tendency of an ogival headed projectile impacting
the water at an angle of fall of about fourteen degrees would be to travel about eighty calibers
submerged in an upwardly curving path, and to re-emerge once again with its velocity greatly
diminished. The projectile would normally penetrate to a depth of about six calibers during its
underwater run, corresponding to a depth of about 2.28 meters for Bismarck's 38cm shells.
Provided the windscreen remained attached, which would be atypical, a mathematical treatment59
yields a trajectory radius of about 110 meters for Bismarck's shells, with a maximum depth of the
trajectory of approximately 2.3 meters (c. 6.1 calibers) and a corresponding run to emergence of
approximately 44 meters (c. 115 calibers). For a projectile of this type, therefore, penetration to a
depth of 8.5 meters, or more than 22 calibers, is remarkable. Only the Japanese "suichu dan"
projectiles, which were designed specifically to maximize their underwater performance, would be
expected to approach this capability - in technical terms their practical lift coefficient seems to have
been only about 0.11, corresponding to a trajectory radius of about 325 calibers. Such a projectile
striking at an angle of fall of 12 would typically be expected to penetrate to a depth of about 18-20
calibers (6.85-7.6 meters) after an underwater travel of about 110 calibers (41.8 meters). At that
point it would be expected to have retained about half of its original striking velocity.
In order to achieve this performance, the suichu dan projectile was designed with a specially
weakened windshield and armor-piercing cap which broke away upon impact with the water and
which presented the flat nose which is typical of projectiles designed for effective underwater
penetration. Although the German projectiles used by Bismarck did not have the special breakaway
windscreen and cap characteristic of the Japanese diving projectiles, they were equipped with a
rather brittle aluminum windscreen and a fairly flat faced 'knob and ring" armor-piercing cap design.
It is therefore quite possible that if the windscreen were removed by water impact, the comparatively
flat armor-piercing cap may have accidentally approximated the effects of the suichu dan design.60
In fact a broken windscreen surrounding a knob and ring cap might by chance have formed what a
hydrodynamicist commonly calls a "stagnation cup" at the nose, a shape well known for its
underwater stability.61
Even had this taken place however, there remains some doubt concerning the action of the
projectile fuze. The fuze delay of the standard German projectiles of the time was approximately
0.035 seconds, which at the range at which Hood was struck corresponds to a distance of only
about 19 meters even if the projectile were traveling in air. Because of the additional retarding
force, the equivalent distance under water would be much less - certainly less than 17 meters, and
probably closer to 13 or 14. At the angles of fall which concern us here, this corresponds to a depth
at detonation of something less than 3.5 meters. Assuming a fuze delay of 0.070 seconds, or twice
the nominal, 62 results in an underwater travel of from about 19.5 to 31.1 meters depending upon
one's (rather arbitrary) assumptions about the shell's underwater behavior. If the trajectory were
relatively straight, this corresponds to a depth of from about 4 to 7 meters. Insofar as Hood's belt
projected only about 960mm below the water line, even a projectile with a "normal" underwater
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trajectory could have easily struck beneath it, and penetrated well into the ship before exploding.
The second board of inquiry obviously considered a penetrating underwater hit a distinct and
dangerous possibility, and prepared a special drawing of Hood showing the wave profile along the
side at a speed of 28 knots. At least in the stern of the vessel, this drawing shows that the effective
"draft" of the ship at any point along the side might range between 10.5 meters just forward of the
mainmast to only 9.5 meters just forward of 'X' turret. The drawing also shows that the main armor
belt, with its lower edge located about 7.75 meters above the keel, would normally be covered by
only from 1.75 to 2.75 meters of water. This was obviously a point of great vulnerability.
The investigators who examined the fuze of the dud projectile which had struck Prince of Wales
found that it had been actuated, probably upon water impact, but that shortly thereafter the powder
train ". . . went out." This is not surprising when one considers that shells not specially designed for
stable water entry quite commonly experience transient yaws exceeding 90 within the first twenty or
so calibers of underwater travel. It is in fact possible (though improbable) that the projectile which
struck Prince of Wales penetrated the water normally, rotated nearly 180 shortly after impact, and
stabilized base first for the remainder of its journey. Such violent rotation would almost certainly
have rendered the fuze inoperative, though after it was completed the flat base might have acted
like a suichi dan nose. The fact that the projectile was recovered nose forward in the bilges tends to
support this somewhat unusual hypothesis.
Provided the fuze operated correctly, however, an underwater hit represents one of the most
plausible explanations for the loss of the ship. Projected upon the ship's cross sections, a projectile
with an angle of fall of 10.6-13.9 striking about 6 meters short could have penetrated the hull just
below the 308mm belt and penetrated almost unimpeded directly to the area of the after
magazines. On the not unreasonable assumption that unarmored ship's structure along the path
would have approximately the same retarding characteristics as water, the nominal fuze delay range
of from 0.035 to 0.07 seconds places the likely point of detonation squarely in the after magazines.
The views below show the areas of vulnerability on Hood at the beginning and end of the turn.
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Magazine Detonation:
Assuming that a penetration to Hood's magazines did in fact occur, it is worthwhile investigating
exactly what the probable effects of a 380mm projectile hit on a 4-in or 15-in magazine might be.
The Admiralty conducted a number of tests to resolve this issue, though it appears that none were
specifically associated with the loss of Hood. The second board of inquiry, for example, took as
evidence the results of trials conducted in 1936. 64 This series of experiments concluded that the
ignition of cordite of Q.F. cartridges by shell splinters would not blow up a Q.F. magazine, and that
one 4.7-in shell detonated in contact with others would not result in a catastrophic explosion. When
a 6-in C.P.C. shell loaded with shellite 65 was fired directly into the magazine however, things were
different. On the first trial, a shell fired into 98 rounds rack stowed resulted in ". . . a short pause
followed by the complete disintegration of the magazine," and on the second trial, a shell fired into
94 rounds "box stowed" started a cordite fire that over a period of 48 minutes completely destroyed
the magazine. In a confined space, a catastrophic explosion would have been probable. Heavy
projectiles by themselves were much less vulnerable. Earlier trials had shown that ". . . The thick
walled A.P.C. type of shell is practically immune from sympathetic detonation or explosion. A shell,
bursting in contact with a pile of shells of this type filled 70/30 shellite and fuzed, may scatter the
pile or even break up some of the shells in the pile without any of them exploding."66
A comprehensive British survey undertaken by the boards of inquiry covering twenty-two cases of
war damage involving magazines, found only one case [4.5%] where the magazines had been
known to explode, i.e., in Hood herself, six others [27.3%] where magazines were suspected to have
exploded and fifteen cases [68.2%] where magazines had not exploded in spite of severe
damage. 67 Coupled with American experience, which seems to have indicated that catastrophic
propellant explosions were rather rare even in cases where shells or bombs had detonated directly
inside magazine spaces, this would seem to indicate that catastrophic explosions were rather rare.
It must be noted however, that British double-based propellants, which contained a substantial
amount of nitroglycerine in their makeup, were significantly more susceptible to ignition than their
single-base American counterparts. In 1945 the U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance conducted
systematic tests to determine the susceptibility of various propellant formulations to accidental
ignition.68 Using a nozzle mechanism capable of generating a reproducible flash, they found that
while British Cordite type propellants would ignite while still some 530mm from the vent, standard
American single base propellants would not ignite until the distance was reduced to 120mm, and the
relatively new U.S. "SPCG" flashless powder, incorporating nitroguanadine, would have to be within
25mm of the nozzle before ignition took place. These are very substantial differences. Assuming
the flame of the explosion to expand in a spherical front, the same explosion which would ignite one
cubic unit of standard American powder, would be capable of igniting almost seventy-five times as
much cordite. In the confined space of a magazine, the relative amounts of gas evolved, and the
ensuing internal pressures could easily spell the difference between disturbance and disaster. Had
Hood carried single base propellant instead of cordite, there is in fact a good possibility that the fatal
explosion might never have occurred. 69
Detonation of Torpedoes:
A number of writers, including some members of the original boards of inquiry, have speculated that
it was an explosion of torpedo warheads which directly or indirectly caused the loss of the ship. The
Second Board of Inquiry itself concluded that though such an event was possible, it was not a likely
scenario. The board concluded:
"Evidence of eye witnesses, REPULSE, and an Officer who had recently served in
HOOD leaves little room for doubt that the mantlet doors were closed. A warhead
could still, however, have been detonated or exploded by a direct hit from
BISMARCK'S shell. There is no direct evidence that such a hit occurred, but it may
have done so on either side of the ship. If a single warhead had gone off one other,
but probably not more than one, the other warhead would also have gone off. . . .
Expert opinion suggested that the explosion of two warheads would produce an all
round almost instantaneous flash. It would not have produced the very high column of
flame of appreciable duration, which was seen by so many witnesses. Nor was the
noise, reported as being heard, compatible with that of a T.N.T. detonation or
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explosion. The consensus of expert opinion was definitely against the characteristics
of the explosion as given in evidence by eyewitnesses being that of T.N.T."70
Sir Stanley Goodall, then Director of Naval Construction, held to a dissenting opinion, however:
"If one or more shells from the 5th salvo burst in this devastated area [where fire was
already burning], where there are eight torpedo heads, four each side, each containing
about 500 lbs of TNT at the base of the mainmast, and if one or more of these
warheads detonated, the result would be an explosion where it was actually observed.
Such an explosion could break the ship's back already weakened in this
neighbourhood by the earlier damage. With the force on the after bulkhead of the
engine room due to the ship's speed of 28 knots and the low reserve of buoyancy of
the after part of the ship, this portion would rapidly sink. The foregoing is an
alternative explanation of the occurrence which is as likely as the explanation in the
finding of the court." 71
Sir Stanley was probably wrong. Although no formal calculations were ever done, the court had
looked long and hard into the issue, and received the testimony of a number of expert witnesses.
Typical of these was Capt. John Carslake, R.N., an explosives expert who testified on Friday, 29
August. After confirming that although he was not an expert on cordite explosions per se, but that
he ". . . knew a fair amount" about high explosive detonations, the court subjected him to a detailed
examination.
"Would a 15-in or 8-in shell striking Hood's side abreast the torpedo tubes detonate a warhead with
a pistol in it?" they asked. His answer, based on trials, was "No, not unless it penetrated and
detonated inside the mantlet. If it detonated outside it would not detonate the warhead." "Would a
direct hit, either from a shell or a splinter detonate a warhead without a pistol in it?" the court
inquired. "If the shell detonated on impact with the warhead, it would detonate the warhead. If the
shell hit the warhead but did not detonate, it would not detonate the warhead . . ." When asked
what would be the probable effects if the warheads detonated, he replied:
"I would expect the mantlet, the ship's side, and the forecastle deck to be nearly
demolished, but that the major venting would have been as I suggested horizontal.
Immediately after the explosion it is anticipated that the observer would have seen a
gap in the ship's side, probably some 15 or 20 ft. radius down to the top of the 12-in
belt. . . . I would expect the boat deck above the tubes also to be blown away.72
B.A. Fraser, Controller, summarized his particular objections to the torpedo scenario in a memo
dated 7th July:73
"D.N.C. has raised the question of whether the above water torpedoes in 'HOOD' were
responsible for the destruction of the ship. I disagree with his view, and accept the
report of the Board of Inquiry for the following reasons:
a) from trials, a 15-in shell burst outside a torpedo tube protected by a mantlet will not
detonate the torpedo.
b) Although a direct hit may detonate one torpedo, it is extremely unlikely that others
will be countermined. In 'KHARTOM' a torpedo was fixed 74 into the after galley by an
air vessel bursting. The head did not detonate but it burnt to detonation in the fire
after a considerable period, about 20 minutes, and in 'HOOD' the interval between the
first hit and the destruction of the ship seems to have been under 3 minutes .
These descriptions are consistent with the results of other experience. To take one example, on 26
December, 1943 the destroyer U.S.S. Brownson (DD-518) was struck by a Japanese bomb which
apparently detonated one or more of the 374kg torpex loaded torpedo warheads in her after
quintuple torpedo mount.75 The resulting explosion removed or completely demolished all ship
structure over a radius of approximately 10 meters. Fifteen minutes later, Brownson sank. Although
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the detonation of a torpedo tube nest could result in the sinking of a destroyer in fifteen minutes, it
is clearly unlikely to have caused the loss of a battlecruiser in three. The chances of a torpedo
explosion near the mainmast detonating even the closest of the ship's magazines twenty-five meters
and two decks away are inconsequentially small.
It would thus appear that the fire on the boat deck, though spectacular, probably played no direct
part in the loss of the ship.
Table IV
Range Table for 20.3cm SK C/34
Projectile Weight = 122kg Initial Velocity = 925 mps
Range
(Meters)
Angle of Fall
(Deg)
Time of Flight
(Sec)
Striking Velocity
(mps)
Prob. Err.
(Meters)
14,000
11.00
21.3
483
64.5
14,500
11.95
22.4
472
65.0
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15,000
12.8
23.4
463
65.5
15,500
13.8
24.5
451
66.0
16,000
14.5
25.7
441
67.0
16,500
15.5
26.9
431
68.0
17,000
16.5
28.1
424
69.0
17,500
17.5
29.5
417
69.5
18,000
18.6
30.6
408
70.0
18,500
19.7
31.9
400
71.1
19,000
21.0
33.2
394
72.5
19,500
22.0
34.6
388
73.2
20,000
23.2
36.0
383
74.0
20,500
24.5
37.3
378
75.0
21,000
25.9
38.7
372
76.0
21,500
27.1
40.1
370
77.5
22,000
28.7
41.5
367
79.5
22,500
30.1
43.0
363
80.4
23,000
31.5
44.6
360
81.0
23,500
32.8
46.2
358
82.8
24,000
34.1
47.8
357
85.0
Speculations concerning Prinz Eugen's shells usually revolve around the idea that although her
projectiles would have had little or no chance of penetrating Hood's belt armor at the specified range
and obliquity, due to their "plunging" trajectory, they might have set off the after magazines after
penetrating Hood's relatively thinly armored decks. In support of this, one article purporting to
reproduce a diagram of the relative trajectories of Bismarck's and Prinz Eugen's guns has been
drawn so as to give an angle of fall exceeding 35 degrees.78 A quick examination of the range
tables, however, shows that such an angle is highly exaggerated, to say the least. In reality, due
largely to the higher initial velocity of Prinz Eugen's guns, at the range at which Hood was engaged
the angles of fall of both Bismarck's and Prinz Eugen's guns were remarkably similar. Over the
ranges of interest, the angle of fall of Prinz Eugen's projectiles was only about 13-19, an angle
which cannot in any meaningful sense be construed as "plunging fire." Further, the striking velocity
of Prinz Eugen's shells could not have exceeded about 460 meters per second. Even assuming that
the shells could have found a spot to hit the deck directly, at the calculated angle of fall the official
German armor penetration curves for this gun, though not reproduced here, allow them a
penetration of only about 40-60mm of homogeneous armor at best. In fact, as was the case of the
380mm gun, the curves for these conditions are effectively "off the graph," strongly implying almost
no possibility of intact penetration at all. Even at the closest possible range, belt armor penetration
at the calculated obliquity of 47 would have only been about 100mm for an intact projectile and
103mm for a broken one, both of which are well under the thickness of even Hood's uppermost and
thinnest belt.
Although a hit from Prinz Eugen could possibly have caused the fire in Hood's after superstructure,
it would have been almost impossible for such a hit to have penetrated to the after magazines. 79
Prinz Eugen may have been able to hurt the Hood, but she would almost certainly be unable to kill
her.
To Part 2 To Part 4
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58 I am indebted to Nathan Okun for this table, who exercised considerable expertise and judgment
in computing and checking the values therein.
59 All normal underwater trajectories are found to develop an upward curvature as the projectile
slows. A rough approximation of this curvature is given by the equation:
R = 2m/p A Cl y where:
R = Radius of trajectory
m = Mass of projectile
p = Density of fluid
A = Area of projectile
Cl = Lift coefficient
y = yaw angle
It is interesting to note that neither the angle of fall nor the velocity of the projectile enters into this
formulation. Of the quantities above, only the yaw angle and the lift coefficient are typically
unknowns, it is therefore convenient to replace these with a single term, CIp, the practical lift
coefficient, which can be selected to match the results of actual observations. For most projectiles,
CIp lies in the range between 0.05 and 3.00 with most underwater trajectories corresponding to a
practical lift coefficient of about 0.33. A comprehensive if complex treatment of practical underwater
ballistics is given in May, Albert, "Water Entry and the Cavity-Running Behavior of Missiles,"
Nav/Sea Hydroballistics Advisory Committee Technical Report 75-2, Silver Springs, Maryland, 1975,
450 pp.
60 It is known for certain that German windscreens could be detached on water impact, as one
fetched up on destroyer Zulu while engaging Bismarck a few days later. This is not surprising when
one considers that the instantaneous load on a windscreen upon typical water impact could well
exceed fifty tons. In fact, during World War II, the U.S. Navy had difficulty with armor piercing
projectile caps and windscreens coming loose through normal handling. A U.S. 16-inch projectile
recovered from Casablanca Harbor in 1960 was found to be missing not only its windscreen but its
armor-piercing cap as well.
61 Other similar nose forms which serve the same purpose are known colloquially as "spades,"
"pickle barrels," and perhaps somewhat more officially as "kopfrings."
62 Evidence from U.S. sources indicates that such an increase in delay would not be unusual. For
example, U.S. Navy specifications for the Base Detonating Fuze Mark 21 considered the fuze action
satisfactory if the detonation occurred between 0.030 and 0.070 seconds after impact when set for a
nominal 0.033 second delay. British experience at the River Plate and elsewhere lead them to
estimate the effective German fuze delay as being about 0.05 seconds.
63 Captain William Weilcose Davies, who had left Hood less than a year before her loss, testified
that the torpedoes would have been stowed with pistols installed if shipped in the tubes, and that
spare torpedoes without pistols but with warheads in place would have been slung above the ready
use torpedoes, with the nose section run into the protective mantlets.
64 "Enclosure 'B' to D.N.O.'s Minute of .6.36 - Trials to obtain the effect of shell fire on 4.7" Q.F.
fixed ammunition R.U. magazines" extracted in ADM 116/4352 pp. 386.
65 "Shellite" was the British term for a mixture of picric acid and dinitrophenol, with approximately
the same explosive power as TNT. See C. B01831 "Memorandum on Armour, Shells, Fuzes and
Aerial Bombs, 1928," ADM 186/174 for more details.
66 CB 1594, "PROGRESS IN GUNNERY MATERIAL, 1921," ADM 1861251 x/L00326. See also
C.B. 01831, "MEMORANDUM ON ARMOUR, SHELLS, FUZED AND AERIAL BOMBS, 1928" ADM
186/174 ERD17626, describing complete trials with essentially the same results.
67 The full list is given and discussed in ADM 116/4351 pp. 116-119. Evidence to support the
second category was characterized as typically "scanty" in nature.
68 Bulletin of Ordnance Information, No.245, pp. 54-60.
69 I am indebted to John Howard Oxley of Halifax, Nova Scotia for bringing to mind the role that
powder characteristics might have played in the disaster.
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