SMOOTHING OVER THE DIFFERENCES:

PROCLUS AND AMMONIUS ON

PLATOS CRATYLUS AND
ARISTOTLES DE ZNTERPRETATZONE
R.M. VAN DEN BERG
I. Introduction
Ammonius, the son of Hermeias (7 between 517 and 526), was not a prolific author,
unlike his teacher Proclus (412-485). Whereas the latter wrote up to seven hundred lines a
day, the only large work that Ammonius ever wrote was his commentary on Aristotles
De Interpretatione. Remarkably enough, for someone whose entire reputation rests on
his study of Aristotle, he does not claim any credit for its content. His work, he writes at
the beginning, is a record of the interpretations of his divine teacher Proclus. If he too is
able to add anything to the clarification of the book, he owes a great thanks to the god of
eloquence. How much did the god of eloquence allow Ammonius to add? No other
sources of Proclus course on the Int. survive. Yet in one case we are able to study
Ammonius originality or the lack of it: his discussion of Aristotles views on bv6paTa,
a group of words that corresponds roughly speaking to our nouns and which I shall refer to
as names in this paper.
One of the major issues in Greek linguistic thought throughout Antiquity was the
relation between names and their objects. Does there exist some sort of natural relation
between names and their objects or are names just a matter of convention? Plat0 had
discussed the question in his Cratylus, in which he had made a certain Hermogenes the
spokesman of the conventionalist position and the eponymous character Cratylus an
adherent of the naturalist position. In the end, Socrates forces both Hermogenes and
Cratylus to admit that names are partly by nature and partly by convention, hence that
they are both right andwrong. Many scholars, both ancient andmodern, believe that in the
first chapters of Int. Aristotle responded at least in part to the views expressed in the
Cratylus. As it so happens, an excerpt of Proclus lecture notes on that Platonic dialogue
has survived. A first reading of the two commentaries seems indeed to suggest that there is
a substantial overlap between them on the relevant issue, even though Proclus may at
times be critical of Aristotle. As we shall see, this apparent correspondence has even
inspired an attempt to emend Proclus text at one point on the basis of Ammonius
commentary?

On Proclus love for hard work (&Lho.rrovla), see Marinus Proclus 9 22, 29-37 ed. Saffrey-Segonds. On
Ammonius and his writings, see Westerink 1962 in Sorabji 1990,325-328 and Blank 1996,l-6.
Ammonius in Znt. 1,6-11.
On this correspondence, see ,Sheppard 1987; Hadot 1987, 6 and Blank 1996, 5-6; for the emendation
proposed by Sheppard, see the dlscussion of T.8 below.

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GREEK, ARABIC, AND LATIN COMMENTARIES

In this paper I will argue that in fact Ammonius concept of Bvopa is significantly
different from that of Proclus. As Proclus had observed, but as Ammonius tried to
downplay, Aristotle had been arguing against Plato. For Proclus this did not pose any
particular problem. Like all Neoplatonists, Ammonius included, he was convinced that the
divinely inspired Plato had to be right. If Aristotle chose to deviate from Plato and the
truth, that was his p r ~ b l e mProclus
.~
sets Socrates up as a judge (in Crat. $ 10 p. 4, 12)
between the conventionalist Hermogenes and the naturalist Cratylus, a judge who shows
that they are both right and wrong. Aristotle is explicitly counted among the partisans of
Hermogenes. On the whole, one can say that Proclus is very critical of Aristotle in in
Crat.
Ammonius, on the other hand, wanted to show that Plato andkistotle werein complete
harmony with each other, even where this is not evident. He too presents Socrates as a
mediator between Hermogenes and Cratylus (in Znt. 37, l), but this time Aristotle is not
grouped together with Hermogenes, but presented as being of the same mind as Socrates.
As we shall see, Ammonius, when discussing the nature of names, takes his point of
departure from Aristotle. Since Aristotles idea of what a name is differs from Platos,
Ammonius will arrive at a concept of name that is fundamentally different from that of
Proclus, who takes Plato as his starting point. On the assumption that Proclus, who for
the most part appears to be quite consistent throughout his enormous ceuvre, did not
radically change his views when lecturing on Znt., we may thus infer from this that
Ammonius was not slavishly following Proclus. This becomes all the more apparent in
the case of Ammonius interpretation of Cratylus position in the dialogue. In order to
harmonize Plato with Aristotle, Ammonius offers a rather original, albeit not very
convincing reading of that position.
Once we have established the fundamental difference between the two of them, we will
be better able to explain a phenomenon to which Richard Sorabji has recently drawn
attention: the absence of any interest in divine names in Ammonius commentary.
Finally, this case study will allow us to make a more general observation about the
relation between the Athenian and Alexandrian commentators.
11. Plato and Aristotle on names

Before tuming to Proclus and Ammonius ideas about names, let us first see what Plato
and Aristotle themselves have to say on this issue in the Cratylus and Znt. It is, of course,
always risky to assume we find Platos own view presented unproblematically in any
Platonic dialogue. But if we take Socrates to be Platos mouth-piece, as Proclus does in
his commentary on the Cratylus, it appears that for Plato an onoma is, or at least should

On the attitude of Proclus and his teacher Syrianus towards Aristotle, see Saffrey 1987 (quoted here from
Sorabji 1990, 175): Froclus, even more than his teacher, will note the divergence between Aristotle and Plato,
since he will pass the same global judgement on the Physics that Syrianus passed on the Meraphysics, and will
even go so far as to say: As for the great Aristotle, it is my opinion that he arranged as much as possible his
treatise on nature in a spirit of rivalry with the teachings of Plato (Proclus, in Tim. 1,6,21-4 and its whole
development until 7,16), and his commentary on the Timaeus will at every opportunity establish the priority of
Plato over Aristotle.
Proclus in Crat. 5 16 p. 5,28.
Aristotles Peripatetic dialectical methods are childish play in comparison to that of Platos ($2); Aristotle
believes that there are a single rhetorical and a single dialectical technique, whereas Plato more accurately
says that there are two rhetorical and two dialectical techniques ( 5 4); Plato has arrived at a fuller
understanding of the concept of truththan Aristotle has (5 36); Aristotle contradicts himself when he
maintains that names are conventional symbols but argues at the same time that assertoric statements are
receptive of truth and falsity ($ 47); Aristotle wrongly claims that speech does not signify as an instrument but
conventionally ( 5 49); Aristotles syllogism to prove the fact that names are conventional is flawed ( 5 58). In
short, Proclus clearly sees the conflict between Aristotles positionand that of Plato, and he is only too happy to
point out where Aristotle goes wrong.

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193

be, a likeness, an image (EIKC;)~),

of the thing it represents. In this way it is natural. It is
not clear how exactly a word is supposed to imitate its object. At one stage, Socrates
suggests that the meaning of a word (its & h a p s ) should be in harmony with its object.
It does not really matter what sounds are used to express this meaning. The English
pocket-book and French livre du poche may sound different but they are both equally
apt expressions of the type of book that is such that one can easily carry it around in the
pockets of ones coat? From this, both Proclus and Ammonius conclude that for Plat0 the
sound of a word is conventional, unlike its meaning. Not unimportant for what follows is
that Socrates furthermore argues that a word must be like its object since it is a tool
(6pyavou) for giving instruction and dividing being.
Aristotle, on the other hand, equates names with spoken sounds. About these spoken
sounds he writes:

T. 1 Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul and written marks
symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all men,
neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of-affections of
the soul-are the same for all. And what these affections are likenesses of-actual
things-are also the same. These matters have been discussed in the work on the soul
anddo not belong to the present subject. (De Inter. 16a3-9; trans. Ackrill 1963: 43).
Aristotle here opts for the view that names are purely a matter of convention. Whereas
thoughts are likenesses (6poL6paTa) of their objects, and hence in a way natural, names
are merely symbols (ufiFpoXa) of these thoughts, since they are conventional. Any
articulated sound may express any given thought. There is good reason to believe with
many modem scholars that Aristotle takes issue with the Crutylus here, especially when
he writes that every sentence (A6yos) is significant, not as a tool (6pyavov) but by
convention (Znt. 16b33f.).

111. Proclus and Ammonius on Names

111.1 What does a name consist in?
For Proclus a name consists in form and matter (in Crut. 9 10, p. 4, 16-18). He derives
this idea directly from the Crutylus (390a) where it is said that the name-giver embodies
the dSos of a word in syllables. These syllables, which act like the matter of a name,
may differ, just as a blacksmith may put the form of a certain tool like a drill in this piece
of iron or in that one. The shared ~160sexplains why words that mean the same thing
sound differently in various languages, eg. Ylrnos and horse. What is more, Proclus does
not believe that the material component of a name, i.e. sound, is essential to it. He
believes in the existence of a superior type of names on the level of the divine Intellect,
hence above the material realm, from which many of our names originate. This prompts
of course the question of how the gods use these names. According to Proclus, they can as
it were read each others thoughts: they know these intellectually (voqTtKwgs) not
perceptually (uia6-rlTitwgS)? By the same token, when they hear our prayers, they do not
perceive them as sound from without, but they already know what we are going to ask.

Later on in the,di+ogue (426~-427d),Socrates will, rather surprisingly in the light of this description, argue
that sounds too imtate the nature of a thing, the 1 sound for example suggests smoothness and softness.
Despite this, Proclus and Ammonius especially focus on the model which opposes a natural meaning to a
conventional sound.
In Crat. 8 51 pp. 29.21-32, 4.
In Crat. 5 77 p. 31,3-5.
l o In Crat $ 3 5 p. 3525-26.

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Aristotle on the other hand, had defined a name as a spoken sound (cf. T. 1).
Ammonius follows him in this, although he has to concede to Proclus that names
T. 2 ... are not simply vocal sounds, but vocal sounds shaped and formed ... by
linguistic imagination and accepted as symbols of thoughts in the soul (Ammonius in
Int. 22, 33-23, 2; trans. Blank).
As we shall see below, Proclus wants names to be as much like their objects as possible.
By claiming that there is a certain dSos present in the matter of the syllables, it becomes
possible to study that cTs0s through its name. For Proclus names are windows to a
higher metaphysical world. Ammonius on the other hand does not want names to be too
much like their objects. For, although he tries to show that for Aristotle too names are
natural in a sense, he must take into account that Aristotle presents them first and
foremost as symbols.
111.2 What does a name refer to?
Aristotle, in a famous passage in the first book of the Metaphysics (987a29-b10), tells US
how in his youth Plat0 became first acquainted with Cratylus and his Heraclitean notion
that the whole sensible world is always in a state of flux. Under the influence of Socrates
moral philosophy, he subsequently arrived at his celebrated theory of unchanging Forms
after which all sensible things are named. He spells out what is at least suggested by
Socrates at the end of the Crutylus (439a-440d), viz. that the names are primarily names
of the Forms. Proclus likewise assumes that the name-giver should perform his function
when looking to the Forms of the things that are being named. However, a human
name-giver cannot contemplate the Forms directly, but only to the extent that they are
present in us. For, according to Proclus the human soul consists of Xbyoi, emanations of
the Forms. When the soul wants to study these, it projects these on the imagination
(4avTaala) as on a mirror, which receives them as images (in Euclid. 141, 2-9).
Names, so Proclus contends, are produced by this imaginative faculty as copies of the
projected M y o ~ . In
~other words, names are remote images of the Forms themselves.
Ammonius, by contrast, claims on the authority of Aristotle that names refer to our
thoughts of actual, material things (cf. T. 1). Ammonius in Znt. 6 , 4-14, in a discussion
of what Aristotle means by affections in the soul which are likenesses of the actual
things (T. 1), he explains that the imagination (@avraala)takes an imprint of the very
same external things that sense perception knows. Elsewhere, Ammonius position
becomes even more evident. In a discussion of how the name-givers attributed the
appropriate gender to each name, Ammonius explains that they applied the same principles
not only in the case of seas and rivers and the like, but also with regard to the gods
themselves. To the extent that these gods were heavenly bodies, like the sun and the
moon, these name-givers determined the genders of their names in accordance with
astronomical, empirical observations. They even did so in the case of the hypercosmic
entities, seeing with the eyes by which these things were naturally seen, ... even if from
far 0ff.I4 These hypercosmic entities are no doubt a type of superior gods, who are
immaterial and hence can not be studied by the senses. Yet Ammonius persists in
presenting them as external objects far removed from us, which we study by a sort of sixth
Hence for Aristotle (Cut. 4b32) as for Amonius (in Int. 16.28-30) speech is a quantity of sound.
In Crat. 8 81 p. 37,26-27.
l 3 On these A6yo1, see Steel 1997. On the relation between these and names, see in Crat. 5 16 pp. 5, 25- 6, 19
where Proclus ascribes a comparable theory to Pythagoras; in Crat. 5 58 p. 23, 24f.; on this issue. see further
Van den Berg,forthcoming.
Ammoniusinlnt. 36, 13f.:186vres. 01s T u n a b p a ~ ~ IkTt ~ ~ U K Wbwaat ... rr6ppwt)w I&V ...
I

l2

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sense (the Platonic 'eye of the soul'). Compare this to Proclus' description of how we
construct divine names:
T. 3 [human name-givers] work either under divine inspiration or in an intellectual
fashion when they produce moving images of their internal visions (Proclus Theol.
Plat. I29 p. 124,9-11).
The gods too belong to the metaphysical world, so their names are produced in a like
manner. To the extent that these names have not been revealed to us by the gods
themselves, they are images based on internal visions of a higher world, not on (some sort
of) sense perception of external objects.
The imaginative faculty, then, that produces names is the same for Ammonius and
Proclus, but the models after which this faculty produces the names are different.

111.3 How does a name resemble its object?

Both Proclus and Ammonius explain the fact that names are not just a matter of
convention, but also natural, by claiming that names resemble their objects along the
lines that had been suggested by Plat0 in the Cratylus (see $ I1 above). Let us now see
how Proclus and Ammonius describe the resemblance between names and their objects. As
we have seen above ($ III.l), Proclus believes that names refer especially to metaphysical
entities as they are present in us. Names are a kind of portrait-like images of these entities.
This becomes especially clear in the case of divine names. Since names resemble these
metaphysical divine beings, Proclus, like many other Neoplatoni~ts,'~
considers them as
statues (&y&XpaTa) in sound of the gods:

T. 4 And as the telestic art ... fashions statues suitable for the reception of divine
illumination, so too by the same power of assimilation the art of legislation institutes
names as statues (&y&ipaTa) of their objects, when it images ( ~ I T I Z L K O U L < O ~ C ~ ~ )
through echoes of this sort or that the nature of real beings (in Crut. $ 51 p. 19, 1217).
Proclus compares names to statues because he wants names to be as much like their
objects as possible. As we shall see when we discuss the function of names according to
Proclus and Ammonius ($ III.4),Proclus believes that one can derive knowledge about the
entities in the metaphysical world, especially about the divine beings, from the
etymologies of their names, precisely because names resemble their objects so closely.
Ammonius, on the other hand, is reluctant to admit that names are simply statues of
their objects, because in that case he would then run into trouble with Aristotle's
statement that names are symbols, not likenesses of their objects:

T. 5 Likeness differs from symbol in that it wants to image (&rraKouigd3at; cf. T.

4) the very nature of a thing as far as possible and it is not in our power to change it
(for if the painted likeness of Socrates in a picture does not have baldness, snub nose
andbulging eyes, it would not be called his likeness), while a symbol or a sign (the
Philosopher calls it both) is entirely up to us, given that it arises from our invention
alone (Ammonius in Znt. 20, 1-8;trans. Blank).

Is

On the idea of divine names as statues Neoplatonism, see Hirschle 1979.39-61.

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GREEK,ARABIC, AND LATIN COMMENTARIES

The fact that it is indeed in our power to change names, Ammonius observes with
Aristotle (cf. T. 1), is among other things evident from the fact that various languages
may refer to the same thing by means of different sounds.
It comes as a surprise to the reader to be told a couple of pages further down that names
nevertheless are likenesses comparable to painted portraits. Ammonius has to rethink the
issue because now he tries to show that Plato and Aristotle are in concord; since according
to Plato names areimages of their objects, names have to be likenesses of some sort. In
his attempt to show that Plato and Aristotle are in harmony, Ammonius argues as
follows: we should distinguish between natural likenesses and artificial likenesses. Natural
likenesses are the product of nature, like shadows and reflections, whereas artificial
likenesses ( b y o h p a TEXI/TIT~V) are the product of a human art (T&xL~).
Ammonius
denies that names are natural likenesses, for names consist in arbitrary sounds to which
convention has assigned a certain meaning. In this way, Aristotle is right to call them
symbols rather than likenesses. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that names,
however arbitrary their sounds, may be appropriate to the nature of their object. To return
to our previous example of the pocket-bookand the livre du poche (3 II), the sounds are
completely arbitrary and yet these words are equally fit descriptions of the thing they refer
to. These words are not formed at random, but have been constructed on purpose to fit
their objects. Hence they are artificial likenesses. Ammonius draws attention to the fact
that Aristotle too apparently believes that names are descriptive, as is evident from the fact
that he presented etymologies in the same way as Plato had done in the Crutylus in order
to uncover ancient opinions about the matters under discussion. Ammonius concludes
from this that both Plato and Aristotle believe that names are by nature in this sense.I6
When Aristotle calls a name a symbol rather than a likeness he means that a name is
not a natural likeness.
But what about the argument that any given portrait of Socrates must resemble any
other given portrait of Socrates? Ammonius offers the following suggestion:

T. 6 Others say names are by nature since they fit the nature of the things named by
them ... And they too say that names resemble images-not natural ones, but those by
the art of painting (h goypa@4 T~XW),which makes different likenesses of
different models and still strives to copy as well as possible the form ( ~ S O S )...
(Ammonius in Znt. 35, 1-9; trans. Blank)
From the example that Ammonius gives, he has something like this in mind: a king, a
leader, and a commander are not entirely the same. Yet they all share the same d8os in
that they have a mind fit for ruling. So if one wants to give an appropriate name to
someone with such a mind, one may call such a person either Basiliskos (Kinglet),
Agesilaos (Leader of the people), or Archidamos (Commander of the people).
Ammonius probably got his idea from Crat. 393a-b, where Socrates explains that the
names Hectorand Astyanax signify more or less the same thing, since both are names
fit for a king. l7 It is hard to see how this theory might work. It may be that when Chinese
formulate a word for man they are looking at a slightly different model than Greek namegivers, but what about fire? In this case the model is the same for all, so if name-givers
resemble painters (T. 6 ) , and if all portraits of the same person have to look the same
l6 Ammoniusin Int. 37, 15-27; cf. Sedley 1998,143 who makes a comparable observation that the attitude of
Aristotle towards etymologies is in general not that different from that of Plato in the Crufylus, although of
course Aristotle does not claim, as does Ammonius, that all names are like their objects.
l 7 This passage also s e e m to echo a Neoplatonic doctrine of art, famously expressed by Plotinus in Enn. V 8
[31] 1,32-40 (On Intelligible Beauty) who says to those who (like Plato) despise the arts (Ttxwai) since they
merely copy material things which are already themselves copies that they should take account of the fact that
the arts do not simply imitate what they see, but that they run back up to the forming principles (A6roi) of their
models.

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(T. 5), it necessarily follows that the Chinese and Greek words for fire are similar,
which, of course, they are not.
As has been pointed out, the idea that names are conventional as far as their matter is
concerned but natural to the extent that they resemble their objects, is familiar from
Proclus and indeed from Plato. Yet the opposition of natural to artificial likeness seems to
be a device of Ammonius own making, designed to harmonize Plato with Aristotle. This
distinction influences his interpretation of the Cratylus, for he advances the claim that his
distinction can indeed be traced back to the dialogue. Whereas Socrates considers names as
artificial likenesses, Cratylus himself, Ammonius argues, is a representative of the view
that names are natural likenesses:

T. 7 Some of those who think that names are by nature say by nature opining that
they are the products of nature, as Cratylus the Heraclitean thought when he said that a
fitting name had been assigned by nature to each thing ... . For he said that names
resemble the natural images of visible things, like shadows and what usually appears in
water or mirrors, but not the artificial ones (in Int. 34, 22-28; trans. Blank, adapted).
It is a pity for Ammonius, though, that nowhere in the Cratylus does Cratylus suggest
that nature produces names as likenesses of things like shadows and reflections. What is
more, neither does Proclus in his commentary on the Cratylus. It can even be shown that
this is not how Proclus interprets Cratylus position. About the ways in which something
can be called natural, Proclus writes:

T. 8 [tlhe term natural can be understood in four ways: (1) as both the whole
essences of the animals and plants and their parts; (2) as their activities and powers,
like the lightness of fire and its heat; (3) as the shadows and reflections in mirrors; or
(4)as fabricated images which are similar to their archetypes. Adopting the fourth
[MSS: second; Sheppard: third] sense, Cratylus says that the name of each thing is
proper, because it was appropriately put by those who fiist put names skilfully and
knowledgeably (Proclus in Crut. 0 17 pp. 7, 18-8, 4;trans. B. Duvick).
There is a problem with the text as it has been transmitted. The question is whether
Cratylus adopts the third sense or the fourth sense of natural. According to the MSS he
adopts the second sense, but as already noted by Usener, that cannot be correct. He then
suggested the fourth sense. Anne Sheppardlg suggested that, given Ammonius remarks
about Cratylus position, we should assume that Cratylus adopts the third position.
However, according to Proclus, Cratylus believes that this fiist name-givers posited the
names skilfully (&JTCXVWS).
Hence, he believes that names are in the words of
Ammonius artificial likenesses ? Ammonius reading, then, did not originate with
Proclus. In fact the latter has some textual support for his interpretation of Cratylus
position. When asked whether there is a craft (~txl~r))
for name-giving and whether there
are craftsmen who practice it (Crut. 428e6-7), Cratylus agrees whole-heartedly (~Crvu ye).

I* Cf. Blank 1996, 149 n. 160 who points out that Cratylus actually says that the primal names had been
assigned by a more than human power, viz. a god or a daimon.
l9 Sheppard 1987,147-149.
The reason why Proclus brings up the third sense of being natural is probably that for him names are
in our souls. These projections are compared to
vocalised copies of projections on our imagination of the MYOL
mirror images, on which see 5 111.2 above.

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III.4 What is the function of a name?

It should be clear by now that Proclus and Ammonius differ significantly over what a
name is. It will not come as a surprise that they ascribe different functions to the analysis
of names as part of doing philosophy. Plat0 had described names as a didactic instrument
(6pyavov, see 0 11): they are a source of knowledge. Proclus too believes that it is
possible to reach things themselves through the mediation of names. These include such
entities like the Beautiful, and Soul, to cite two examples from Proclus, but also the gods,
who for Proclus coincide with abstract metaphysical entities. Whether or not this is
consistent with Platos intentions, Proclus is especially interested in names as a source of
theological wisdom?1 As we have seen (8 II1.2), Proclus believes that names depend on
our innate My01 which in turn depend on the divine Forms. The study of these names is
supposed to activate the innate knowledge of the metaphysical world we possess thanks to
these Xbyoi, in an unarticulated, passive way. This activation is described in terms of the
Platonic doctrine of recollection (ciudLpvqas). The fact that names are like statues is a
great help. Our souls are incapable of grasping the metaphysical realities in an unmediated
form, andit is only through images such as names that we can contemplate them.22
If names are so constructed as to allow us a glimpse of the metaphysical realm, namegiving should be a task entrusted to expert metaphysicians. As Platos Socrates had
observed in the Crutylus (389a2) the human name-giver is the rarest of craftsmen
(Sqpioupy6s). Proclus connects this craftsman with the Craftsman from the Timueus. For
him, the primal name-giver is the demiurgical Nous who contemplates the Forms. The
human name-giver likewise contemplates the Forms present in himself as Xbyoi .23
For Aristotle, names are only a means for communicating our thoughts to others.
Ammonius follows him in this:

T. 9 Vocal sounds are enunciative of thoughts and therefore are given to us by nature
so as to indicate through them the concepts of our soul, so that we can share with one
another and be part of the same society, man being a social animal (Ammonius in Znt.
18, 30-33; trans Blank).
It goes without saying that for Ammonius names can never be the source of metaphysical
and theological wisdom that they are for Proclus. After all, they refer to particular things
in the outside world that cause likenesses in the soul. There is no divine name-giver in
whose footsteps we follow. What is more, there is no guarantee that names can be trusted
to be correct. Take the names of the gods that are heavenly bodies which we mentioned
earlier on (0 111.2). Ammonius believes that the gender of a name should depend on the
object named. He blames the Egyptians for calling the moon masculine. The Greeks did
better because they claim that it is ma~cufeminine?~
The fact that Ammonius concept of name is so significantly different from Proclus may
help us to explain a recent observation by Richard Sorabji in regard to Ammonius
commentary on De Znterpret~tione.~
Whereas the discussion of divine names takes up a
On this see Van den Berg forthcoming.
as a means to reach the things themselves, see in Crat. 8 9 p. 3, 17-24. For names as source of
knowledge of the divine, see eg. 7heoZ. Plat. I 5, p. 25, 18-23; on the fact that we can only contemplate the
divine through images, see in Cra&8 135, p. 178, 13-22; on this topic further see further Van den Berg,
forthcoming.
23 For the Demiurge as first name-giver, see Proclus in Gat. 8 51 pp. 19, 22-20, 21; Theol. Plat. I 29, p. 124,
12-20.
z4 Ammonius in Int. 35,33-36, 2
R. Sorabji in a paper entitled Ammonius compromise with Alexandrian society: the power of names, read
at the conference The Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity Dublin 27th-30th June 2001; conference
proceedings forthcoming.
21

For names

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199

good deal of Proclus commentary on the Crutylus, Ammonius is nearly completely silent
about them, although one would expect Ammonius to discuss them. The fact that divine
names were effective in rituals was taken to be proof that they were of a divine origin, and
hence in a sense natural. The reason for this silence cannot be that Ammonius was afraid
to run into trouble with the Christian authorities on whom the Alexandrian school
depended for its survival, for Ammonius does not hide the fact that he is pagan. We have
already seen, for instance, that at the beginning of his commentary he invokes the god of
eloquence (0 I) and that he considers the heavenly bodies to be gods (0 III.2). Furthermore,
he explicitly mentions one of the most important deities of the Neoplatonic pantheon,
King Helios (in Znt. 39, 6 ) . His reluctance is rather explained, I think, by the fact that he
does not believe that divine names are a source of profound theological information, as
Proclus believed them to be. Remarkably, when Ammonius briefly discusses the question
whether the fact that names are effective in rituals shows that they are natural, he
associates this position, as Richard Sorabji observes, not with his Athenian teacher
Proclus, but with some otherwise unknown priest from Petra, a certain Dousareios (in Znt.
38, 23-28). This, it seems to me, was a matter of courtesy towards Proclus. Ammonius
Aristotelian conception of names did not allow him to believe in the existence of a
privileged class of divine names. Since he did not want to be seen turning against his own
master, he took aim at the poor unknown priest from Petra instead, thus smoothing over
the differences between Proclus and himself.
IV. Concluding remark: two ways of reading

Since the aim of these proceedings is not just to study the content of the ancient
commentators, but also their methods, let me try to conclude this paper with a more
general conclusion, however tentative, about the methods of the so-called Athenian and
Alexandrian schools. As is well known, K. Raechter in his seminal paper Richtungen und
Schulen im Neuplutonismus argued that the Athenian school of Syrianus, Proclus and
Damascius was distinctively different from the Alexandrian school of Ammonius and his
students. The Alexandrians, weary of the exotic speculations about Platos metaphysics
which were the hallmark of the Athenians, concentrated on sober commentaries on
Aristotle. These days there is a contrary tendency to smooth over the differences between
the Alexandrians andthe Athenians?6 As an example of this, let me cite Ilsetraut Hadots
introduction to the proceedings of the conference on Simplicius heldin Paris in 1985, later
included in an English translation in Richard Sorabjis Aristotle Transformed, where she
explicitly takes issue with Rae~hter.~
Simplicius, it should be noted, was considered by
Raechter as belonging to the Athenian school rather than to the Alexandrian school of
Ammonius and his followers. Mme Hadot starts by pointing out that the commentaries on
Aristotles Metaphysics, written in part by the Athenian Syrianus and in part by the
Alexandrians Ammonius and Asclepius, are extremely similar. She then continues with
two further arguments which bear directly on the material that I have been discussing in
this paper. She points to Anne Sheppards paper, mentioned above, on the relation
between the commentaries of Proclus and Ammonius (0 II1.3). As I have tried to show,
contrary to the claim advanced in that paper, Proclus and Ammonius views on names
were distinct. Hence an examination of this issue does not support the thesis that there
were no fundamental differences between the two institutions, rather the opposite.

For a dissident voice, see Blumenthal 1993,315-325 (ox.p. 323: [s]hould we also accept that there were
:o differences between the philosophical views of the Athenians and Alexandrians? I think the answer is
no, but let me say that at the start that this is one of the many areas in the study of late Neoplatonism that
requires further work before it can be answered definitely.).
*6

* Hadot 1897,3-7 (= Sorabji 1990,275-278)

200

GREEK, ARABIC, AND LATIN COMMENTARIES

Furthermore, Hadot points to the various commentaries on Aristotles Categories.

Contrary to what one would expect, she, Philippe Hoffmann, and Pierre Hadot, having
worked through the f i s t forty pages of Simplicius commentary, did not encounter a
single piece of evidence which favoured Praechters thesis. They were unable to find any
difference between the interpretive tendency of Simplicius commentary on the one hand,
and of the commentaries of Ammonius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus and David on the
other. Now Philippe Hoffmann, however, was able to do so in a richly documented
contribution to these same proceedings on Simplicius on categories and language? He
observes that none of the Alexandrian commentators ever explains the relations between
the things, our notions of them and the names by which we communicate these (the three
elements involved in speech, discussed by Aristotle at the beginning of Znt., see T. l).29
Simplicius, by contrast, sketches what we may now identify as a Proclean model of these
relations: the human soul contains the Forms in a secondary way as M y o ~ ,from which it
derives notions as images of them. Words activate our innate knowledge of the Forms by
means of recollection (&v&pvqo~s)and put us on the way towards the divine?
Simplicius commentary, then, betrays the influence of reflections on language as current
in the Athenian school but not in Alexandria. The case of Simplicius may also serve as an
argument against the possible objection that the differences between Proclus and
Ammonius are due to the context, i.e. that Ammonius is commenting on Aristotle, for so
is after all Simplicius.
Let me end by stressing that these different theories about language probably originate
from two different ways of dealing with texts by Plato and Aristotle. In the case of
Proclus, it is, I think, evident that he orientates his interpretation of the Crutylus toward
his main preoccupation: extracting a theology from Platos dialogues. His interpretation of
names as images of the metaphysical world is motivated by this concern. The names of
the gods are like statues of them, and a source of knowledge about them. He does not care
whether this conception of names squares with Aristotle or not. But Ammonius starts off
from Aristotle, and his immediate concern is with the correct interpretation of Aristotle.
Still, he feels the need to harmonize Aristotle with Plato as the ultimate point of
reference. He reads Plato through an Aristotelian lens which makes him see things in
Plato which simply are not there (eg. Cratylus natural likenesses). This would never have
happened to an Athenian Neoplatonist like Proclus, for he starts from Plato and then
compares him to Aristotle if possible, quite happy simply to note the differences without
developing a strategy to harmonize the tensions between the two. Hence we have here two
different ways of reading Plato in connection with Aristotle, and they do influence the
outcome. Praechters old thesis of opposites obscured the connections between the two
schools. The now popular thesis of similarity may well blind us to the differences3
University of Leiden

Hoffmann 1987.
Hoffmann 1987,8344.
lo Simplicius in Cut. 12, 16-13, 32.
This paper has benefited from various discussions and especially from the detailed criticism of Francesco
Ademollo (Florence). It was written with the financial support of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific
Research.

28

29

VAN DEN BERG PROCLUS AND AMMONIUS

20 1

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