Potential Impacts of The Energy East Pipeline On City of Winnipeg

Potential Impacts
of the Energy
East Pipeline on
The City of
Winnipeg
DM LeNeveu
2/1/2015
CONTENTS
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 2
Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 3
Properties of Dilbit........................................................................................................................ 4
The Likelihood of a Pipeline Spill .................................................................................................. 5
Causes of Pipeline Failure ............................................................................................................. 5
Internal Corrosion .................................................................................................................... 6
External Corrosion ................................................................................................................... 6
Inspection Methods ................................................................................................................. 7
Spill Volume and Consequence ............................................................................................... 8
Hydrogen Sulphide in the Pipeline ............................................................................................. 11
Explosion and Fire....................................................................................................................... 12
Pressure Surges .......................................................................................................................... 13
Contamination of the Food Chain .............................................................................................. 14
Contamination of Drinking Water .............................................................................................. 15
Liability........................................................................................................................................ 17
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 18
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................... 19
Review ........................................................................................................................................ 19
References .................................................................................................................................. 21
EXECUTIVE SUMM ARY

The Energy East Pipeline will carry diluted bitumen, also called dilbit, and other crude oil
products. The main component of the dilbit will be bitumen extracted from the tar sands in
Alberta.
Energy East intends to repurpose a natural gas line that is about forty years old to carry dilbit
and other crude oil products. There are six natural gas lines operated by TransCanada Pipelines
running in a corridor from the Saskatchewan border to Ile-des-Chenes, where they split with
three lines continuing eastward through Manitoba to near West Hawk Lake. One of these
6
would be the Energy East line. The pipelines are subject to corrosion and wear and have
ruptured four times in Manitoba in the last twenty years: at Rapid City in 1995, St. Norbert in
1996, Brookdale in 2002, and Otterburne 2014.
A major cause of the stress in the pipeline is the variation of pressure experienced during batch
operation. Approximately 300 compression/decompression cycles are forecast per year.
Corrosion fatigue was deemed responsible for the rupture, explosion of the line in Rapid City in
1995. The initial rupture and explosion in one line caused the second line to fail and explode.
In the Energy East submission, there is a detailed discussion of ultrasonic and electromagnetic
inspection sensors placed on smart pigs to inspect the lines at assumed intervals of five
years. The results of these tests indicate that the risk of failure from stress corrosion cracking
could be substantial despite inspection.
Leak history and list of probable causes show that spills will occur in the future. A major
determining factor of the consequence is the spill volume. The spill volume could be limited by
judicious valve placement and prompt shut off in the event of a spill. There is no information in
the Energy East submission on the location of shut off valves and especially those around
water crossings. This lack of information could be considered a major deficiency. A report
commissioned by the Ontario Energy Board found that 16,800 barrels or 2 million litres could
be spilled before valve shut-off.
One of the worst spills of dilbit occurred on the Kalamazoo River in 2010. The spill was 3.3
million litres and affected about 60 kilometres of river. The diluent portion of the dilbit floated
and emitted toxic fumes that required the evacuation of residents along the river. The bitumen
portion of the dilbit sank in water and mixed with sediments making clean-up next to
impossible. After four years of cleanup at a cost of one billion dollars, it is now recognized that
the spill cannot be completely remediated.
Any breach of the line near Winnipeg could reach the Red River via the LaSalle, Seine or
Assiniboine River drainage basins. Minor waterways, ditches and drains are all connected in
these drainage basins. Gravity drainage along with the pressure from diluents that would flash
to gas could empty much of the contents of the line between valves and could cause a spill
many times the volume of what occurred in the Kalamazoo River.
The relatively large amount of sulphur in dilbit can form hydrogen sulphide (H 2S) in the line
from thermal decomposition and microbial action. Hydrogen sulphide is extremely toxic. One
breath over 1000 ppm can kill instantly. Lower concentrations can cause permanent health
damage. The H2S concentration in the pipeline would likely increase from thermal
decomposition of sulphur compounds and from microbial action as the dilbit moves down the
line. The Trans-Alaska pipeline was subject to formation of hydrogen sulphide from the sulphur
content in the line verifying the extent of this hazard. There has been no mention of measures
to combat microbial action in the Energy East Line.
There is a significant risk of rupture and explosion of the Energy East line from the nearby
natural gas lines. An explosion of one line rupturing and exploding a second has occurred in
1995 in Rapid City. The explosion of a natural gas line in Otterburne in 2014 created a crater 10
metres in diameter and 3 metres deep, large enough to endanger an adjacent pipeline. An
explosion and black toxic smoke plume from a dilbit fire could easily be larger than occurred at
Lac Megantic where 5.7 million litres of crude oil spilled in 2014.
As determined earlier, the spill volume from an Energy East rupture could easily be larger than
occurred at Lac Megantic. The smoke plume from such an explosion and fire could necessitate
the immediate evacuation of the entire population of Winnipeg should it occur nearby.
Most large pipeline companies have computer programs to model and predict the pipeline
pressure, temperature and flow conditions in the line. These models can help to mitigate the
effects of pressure surges associated with oil pipelines through placement of pressure relief
valves and through restrictions on operating pressures and pumping rates. There is no mention
of pressure relief valves or modeling for pressure surges in the Energy East submission.
The drinking water supplies in the province are likely at much greater risk of contamination
from the pipeline than is Winnipegs supply. Many communities draw their water from rivers
that the pipeline directly crosses including Portage La Prairie, Starbuck, Stanford, Kenton,
Rivers, La Salle Rivers, Brandon, Selkirk and Sioux Valley. In the event of loss of water supply
for one or more of these communities Winnipeg might be pressed into supplying water. Some
of these communities such as Sanford have water treatment plants that service a wide
surrounding area impinging on Winnipeg.
Energy East, a wholly owned subsidiary of TransCanada, bears the spill liability for the pipeline.
The Energy East subsidiary seems to have been created in part to protect the assets of
TransCanada. It is unknown if Energy East has enough assets of its own to cover the cost of a
large spill clean-up. In the event of a default the cost may revert to the City of Winnipeg and
the province. The City could also be liable to claims for spill compensation.
INTRODUCTION
The potential impacts of the Energy East pipeline that passes through St. Norbert and crosses
both the Seine and Red Rivers at the south end of Winnipeg include:
contamination of city waterways including the Red, Seine and La Salle Rivers;
evacuation due to fire, explosion and airborne toxic plumes including deadly
hydrogen sulphide;
lengthy clean-up of rivers and affected soil;

contamination of drinking water especially in nearby communities such as Sanford,
Starbuck and La Salle, Kenton, Portage, Selkirk, Rivers, Sioux Valley, and Brandon;
temporary or long term loss of the sport fishery;
devaluation of river bank property;
loss of commercial activity on the river such as boat tours and water taxis;
compromised recreational activities in river walkways and parks due to tar balls and
other lingering sources of contamination;
contamination of the local food chain;
contamination of sources of irrigation;
contamination of two major surface aquifers, the Assiniboine Delta and Sandilands
whose damage could have a detrimental impact on the economy of the province and
of Winnipeg;
litigation and liability incidents flowing from property and health damage due to
inadequate resources of Energy East and inadequate planning and execution by the
City of emergency measures and spill remediation.
PROPERTIES OF DILBIT
The Energy East Pipeline will carry diluted bitumen, also called dilbit, and other crude oil
products. The main component of the dilbit will be bitumen extracted from the tar sands in
Alberta. The bitumen is either mined or steamed out of the ground. The bitumen itself is a
complex mixture of long chain hydrocarbons that contain about 5% sulphur by weight. The
treatment process to form dilbit leaves some sand and silt in the mixture as well as some
water, sulphate salts, heavy metals, other contaminants, and all the sulphur. Up to 30% of the
dilbit will be composed of a diluent, a mixture of light end hydrocarbons from a variety of
1,2,3
sources such as natural gas condensate
that is added to enable the dilbit to flow. The exact
composition of the diluents will vary from batch to batch depending on the availability of
diluents. A main constituent of the diluent is expected to be pentane at about 9% of dilbit
overall. A typical composition of dilbit, Christina dilbit blend, as determined by
CrudeMonitor.ca is listed in Table 1.
Constituent
Sulphur (wt%)
Sediment ppm by weight
Nickel mg/L
Vanadium mg/L
C3 (propane) vol %
Butane vol %
Pentane vol %
Hexane vol %
Octane vol %
Nonanes vol %
Decanes vol %
Benzene vol %
Toluene vol %
Ethyl benzene vol %
Xylenes vol %
Amount- 5 year average

3.85
93
70.7
182.4
0.04
0.71
8.73
6.44
2.24
1.09
0.50
0.27
0.44
0.05
0.32
The light end hydrocarbons, propane, butane, pentane, hexane, octanes, nonanes and
decanes, are volatile and explosive. The flash point of dilbit is -35 C and the boiling point is
2,61
about 35 Celsius.
If the proposed Energy East line were warmer than 34 C, as would occur
in summer, the light ends would flash to gas. The temperature of the adjacent natural gas
4
lines regularly reaches 50 C in summer. The temperature of the dilbit line would be higher
than the natural gas lines due to the higher viscosity and frictional heating of the dilbit.
THE LIKELIHOOD OF A PIPELINE SPILL
5
Energy East intends to convert a natural gas line that is about forty years old to carry dilbit
and other crude oil products. There are six natural gas lines operated by TransCanada Pipelines
running in a corridor from the Saskatchewan border to Ile-des-Chenes where they split with
three lines going south to the USA and three continuing eastward. One of these would be the
6
Energy East line. The pipelines are subject to corrosion and wear and have ruptured four
times in Manitoba in the last twenty years: at Rapid City in 1995, St. Norbert in 1996,
7
Brookdale in 2002, and Otterburne 2014. Table 2 lists failures of TransCanada pipelines across
8
Canada.
Table 2 TransCanada Pipeline Failures
Date
1979
1985
1985
1985
1986
1989
1990
1991
1991
1992
1992
1994
1994
1995
1995
1996
1996
1997
2002
2002
2003
2003
2009
2009
2009
2011
2013
2013
2014
2014
Location
Englehart Ontario
Northern Ontario
Ignace Ontario
Lowther Ontario
Callander Ontario
Brandon Manitoba
Marionville Ontario
Cochrane Ontario
Cardinal Ontario
Tunis Ontario
Potter Ontario
Latchford Ontario
Williamston Ontario
Vermillion Bay Ontario
Rapid City Manitoba
La Salle Manitoba
Stewart Lake Ontario
Cabri Saskatchewan
Brookdale Manitoba
Peace River Mainline Alberta
Grande Prairie Alberta
Grande Prairie Alberta (2nd)
Peace River Mainline
Swastika Ontario
Marten River Ontario
Beardmore Ontario
Wabasca Alberta
Boyle Alberta
Otterburne Manitoba
Rocky Mountain House Alberta
CAUSES OF PIPELINE F AILURE
In Alberta the causes of crude oil pipeline failure from 1990 to 2012 are illustrated in figure 1.
Figure 1. Causes of oil pipeline failures in Alberta from 1990 to 2012
In the Energy East submission, the documented causes of a pipeline failure include internal and
10
external corrosion, over pressurization and geotechnical causes.
INTERNAL CORROSION
The Energy East Submission identifies internal corrosion as a topic of concern due to the
potential for water separation and sediment deposit as the pressure drops during the batch
11
operation of the line.
EXTERNAL CORROSION
One major potential cause of rupture discussed in the Energy East submission and in an expert
12
report commissioned by the Ontario Energy Board is external stress corrosion cracking (SCC).
The section of pipe through the prairies, constructed mainly in 1971 and 1972, has the original
asphalt tape exterior coating that is acknowledged to have deteriorated in some areas to the
13
extent that it no longer is protective against stress corrosion cracking.
A major cause of the stress in the pipeline is the variation of pressure experienced during batch
14
operation.
The Energy East line is considered to be subject to cyclic half of the maximum operating
pressure (MOP) load variation as the line would be shut down and restarted for batch
operation up to 300 times per year. This continual pressure cycling can induce corrosion
fatigue. It is estimated that an equivalent corrosion rate of 0.1 mm a year could be expected
15
from corrosion fatigue in the Energy East line.
This corrosion fatigue was deemed responsible for the rupture and explosion of the line in
16
Rapid City in 1995 put in service in 1971. The NEB accident report for the pipeline rupture at
Rapid City in 1995 stated that the MOP for the line based on hydrostatic tests in 1968 was 880
psig or 6069 kPA. This is 77% of the maximum allowable yield strength. The pipelines at Rapid
City were 7 meters apart but are normally 9 meters. The initial rupture and explosion in one
line caused the second line to fail and explode. The nominal wall thicknesses of the ruptured
17
lines were 9.42 mm and 8.74 mm.
At an estimated corrosion rate of 0.1 year and a wall thickness of 9.42 mm, after 44 years of
operation to date the pipe thickness could be compromised by stress corrosion cracking and
fatigue by 47%. However excavation and visual examination of 609 meters of pipeline revealed
two cracks that have penetrated to 79% of the pipe thickness illustrating that stress corrosion
60
can be much worse than estimated. The safety allowance from MOP to rupture is only 23%.
These data show that the entire prairie line is likely in danger of failure from corrosion fatigue.
INSPECTION METHODS
The stated prevention of ruptures due to stress corrosion cracking in the Energy East
submission is to inspect the lines often enough to catch potential weak spots before they fail.
In the submission there is a detailed discussion of ultrasonic and electromagnetic inspection
sensors placed on smart pigs to inspect the lines at assumed intervals of five years. Sections
of the line between 2 and 40 meters were excavated and inspected to determine the
18
effectiveness of the inspection methods. A total of 690 meters of pipe were excavated and
inspected. Of the 27 excavations, 11 contained a total of 15 cracking features or linear features
in the weld region identified by the electromagnetic inspection (EMAT) tool. The tool is
capable of detecting cracks bigger than 40 mm in length and 1 mm in depth. Of the 41 stress
corrosion cracking colonies identified in the excavations and not reported by the EMAT tool,
one met the crack detection specification of 40 mm by 1 mm (40 mm by 1.7 mm). For 16
cracks over the specified detection limit, one undetected crack is consistent with the specified
EMAT detection failure rate of 10%.
The actual depth of the cracks with dimensions over 40 mm by 1 mm as determined by visual
inspection ranged from 2.2 mm to 7.6 with a mean depth of 3.69 mm and a standard deviation
59
of 1.79 mm. The thickness of the pipeline is 9.42 mm. Cracks over 5 mm in depth are slated
for remediation within one year. Assuming a normal distribution of crack depths and an
average of 16 cracks detected every 0.69 km there will be a remediation rate of 5.39 per km
and a through penetration rate of 0.0158 per km. Over the 940 km length of prairie line these
data predict an astonishing 5067 cracks would require remediation and 15 cracks would
penetrate all the way through causing rupture or leakage. At a detection failure rate of 10%,
these data indicate 2179 cracks over 40 mm by 1 mm would be undetected by EMAT. Of these
undetected cracks 507 would have required remediation with one being a through crack. This
may be an overestimation if observed cracks in the 690 metres of excavation were not
representative but this preliminary analysis indicates that the stress corrosion cracking
phenomenon is severe.
A large number of smaller cracks were not detected by the EMAT tool. There is no information
on the crack size that will result in failure. The sections where SCC is suspected from the EMAT
tests will be inspected again after conversion with a Shear Wave Ultrasonic crack tool, which
can detect smaller cracks. This is likely to improve the crack detection rate, however no
information is available on how much this improvement would be and leaks could occur before
the shear wave tests are completed. The results of these tests indicate that the risk of failure
from SCC could be substantial despite inspection. The remediation for detected defects could
16
be specified pressure reduction in a section of line or repair of the affected sections.
Repair might not necessarily be done immediately upon detection. For instance the Energy
East submission states some sections of the line will not be remediated until the conversion
19
activities begin.
This information would indicate that defect inspection alone will not likely prevent line failure.
This is borne out by the failure record. Other mechanisms of failure not detected by inspection
such as geotechnical events described earlier add to the risk.
Geotechnical hazards include landslides and collapsible expandable soils, seismic events and
river bank erosion. The failure at Brookdale Manitoba in 2002 was considered in part to be
due to its being at the junction of two different soil types that were subject to varying ground
water levels and inadequate cathodic protection.
56
The failure near the town of La Salle in 1996 was caused by river bank instability. The
western most portion of the pipeline crosses that Manson oil field in Manitoba where
hydraulic fracturing is been done. Hydraulic fracturing is known to generate seismic events
21
that could rupture the line, albeit relatively far from Winnipeg.
SPILL VOLUME AND CONSEQUENCE
8
The leak history and list of probable causes suggest that spills will occur in the future. A
major determining factor of the consequence is the spill volume. The spill volume could be
limited by judicious valve placement and prompt shut off in the event of a spill. CSA standard
for pipelines Z662-11, clause 4.4.8 requires valves to be installed on both sides of major water
crossings and at other locations appropriate for the terrain in order to limit damage from
22
accidental discharge.
There is no information in the Energy East submission on the location of shut off valves around
water crossings. This lack of information could be considered a major deficiency.
A report commissioned by the Ontario Energy Board stated that the time to valve shut off from
the time of leak onset would be up to 22 minutes provided all detection protocols and shut off
12
13
systems were not compromised. At a pipeline flow rate of 1.1 million barrels per day 16,800
barrels or 2 million litres could be spilled before valve shut-off.
One of the worst spills of dilbit occurred on the Kalamazoo River in 2010. The spill was 3.3
million litres and affected about 60 kilometres of river. The diluent portion of the dilbit floated
31
and emitted toxic fumes that required the temporary evacuation of residents along the river.
The bitumen portion of the dilbit sank in water and mixed with sediments making clean-up
next to impossible. After four years of clean-up at a cost of one billion dollars, it is now
24, 25, 26
recognized that the spill cannot be completely remediated.
Any breach of the line within a radius around Winnipeg that could be travelled by a spill could
reach the Red River via the LaSalle, Seine or Assiniboine River drainage basins. Minor
waterways, ditches and drains are all connected in these drainage basins as illustrated in
27
Figure 2.
Figure 2 Drainage pattern in southern Manitoba adjacent to the proposed Energy East pipeline
27
Every township and section has roads with ditches that drain to streams or the drains that
have been constructed around Winnipeg. This means that valve closure on a major water
crossing would not necessarily be effective as a rupture on a minor water crossing could drain
into Winnipeg. The existing valves on the natural gas lines are 30 km apart as shown in Figure
3.
Figure 3. Shut-off Valves around Winnipeg (orange circles outlined in black)
28
The volume of dilbit between valves would be up to 23 million litres. Upon rupture, the line
pressure would fall to atmospheric. The major constituent of the diluent, pentane would form
29
a gas above 37 C. The vapour pressure of pentane is twice atmospheric at 58 Celsius. The
next major constituent with a lower boiling point than pentane is butane that would form a gas
above - 0.5 Celsius upon rupture. The vapour pressure of butane is twice atmospheric at 18.8
29
Celsius. An excess pressure of one atmosphere is equivalent to a height of the dilbit of 11
3
meters for a dilbit density of 940 kg/m . Therefore the vapour pressure of gas in line could
overcome gravity and force dilbit to drain uphill for a portion of the pipeline below the rupture
site and enhance drainage for the pipeline portion above the rupture.
Gravity drainage along with the vapour pressure from diluents that would change phase from a
liquid to a gas and could empty much of the contents of the line between valves and could
24,25,26
cause a spill many times the size of what occurred in the Kalamazoo River.
The chemicals benzene, toluene, xylene and ethyl benzene (BTEX) found in dilbit are well
known environmental contaminants that are sparingly soluble and can be both airborne and
30
waterborne.
The volatile organics would float to the surface of a waterborne spill and could necessitate
31
evacuation of the population along the banks as occurred in the Kalamazoo river spill.
There are many sections in the Energy East submission devoted to crude oil spill clean-up
32
methods; however, there is no information related to dilbit that has been shown to adhere
strongly to soil and sediment. There is no mention about the location of spill remediation
equipment and resources and no indication the City of Winnipeg has been consulted in spill
32
response plans.
10
HYDROGEN SULPHIDE IN THE PIPELINE
The relatively large amount of sulphur in dilbit can form hydrogen sulphide in the line from
34-38
thermal decomposition and microbial action.
Hydrogen sulphide is a colourless gas with a
density greater than air that has a characteristic odor of rotten eggs. It is highly toxic,
corrosive, flammable and explosive. One breath over 1000 ppm can kill instantly. Lower
58
concentrations can cause permanent health damage. The dilbit can contain hydrogen
sulphide at the point of entry in the tar sands, especially dilbit with bitumen from Cold Lake
where steam extraction has been used. The heat from the steam extraction can cause thermal
decomposition of sulphur in bitumen to form hydrogen sulphide. One report gives the
33
hydrogen sulphide content of dilbit from Cold Lake Alberta to be 300 ppm.
The H2S concentration in the pipeline would likely increase from thermal decomposition of
sulphur compounds and from microbial action as the dilbit moves down the line. The
TransAlaska pipeline was subject to formation of hydrogen sulphide from the sulphur content
34,35,36,37
in the line verifying the extent of this hazard.
There has been no mention of measures
to combat microbial action in the Energy East Line.
Experiments on bitumen cores from the tar sands illustrate that substantial thermal
decomposition will occur from the sulphur compounds found in the bitumen at the elevated
38, 39
temperatures expected in the pipeline as illustrated in figure 4.
Figure 4 Thermal decomposition of bitumen core samples from the tar sands
39, 62
11
There has been no detailed thermal analysis modelling studies or data presented in the Energy
East submission to determine the maximum temperature of dilbit in the line. The five natural
40
gas lines parallel to the dilbit line have been reported to reach 50 C in the summer. The dilbit
line would be hotter due to the higher viscosity. The adjacent natural gas lines could contribute
to the heat of the dilbit.
CSA standard, CSA Z662-11, Clause 16.2.1(b) defines sour service for pipeline systems not
containing a gas phase (gas-free liquid pipeline systems), such as the Energy East Pipeline,
as "service in which the effective hydrogen sulphide partial pressure exceeds 0. 3 kPa at
the bubble point absolute pressure" and requires that the hydrogen sulphide content of the
41
line be monitored. An audit of the Keystone pipeline by the NEB in 2012 states :
Based on the fact that TransCanada has not monitored the H 2S content of the different
batches of products it carries on the Keystone Pipeline, and based on the fact that
TransCanadas planned practice is not to monitor the H 2S content of the different
batches of products it carries, or will carry in the future, on the Keystone Pipeline,
TransCanada is not in compliance with the requirements of this audit sub-element and
CSA Z662-11, Clause 3.2.
In the US, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has approved requests from oil pipeline
42
companies to restrict H2S content in oil to 5 ppm to protect workers.
The concentration of hydrogen sulphide released in a spill would be unknown as would the
extent of evacuation required. Determination of the hydrogen sulphide concentration in the
line would be next to impossible as it would vary with location, composition of dilbit batches,
temperature and other variables. Air monitoring and measurement at a spill site would likely
arrive too late to be effective. The only means to ensure protection from adverse exposure to
hydrogen sulphide gas from a spill would be to remove the sulphur from the bitumen before it
61
goes in the pipeline as is done in upgrader facilities in the tar sands .
EXPLOSION AND FIRE
Five natural gas lines run parallel to the proposed Energy East line through Manitoba from the
43
western border to the Ile-des-Chenes pumping station as shown in figure 5.
Figure 5. Parallel natural gas lines
43
12
There is a significant risk of rupture and explosion of the Energy East line from a nearby natural
gas line. An explosion of one line rupturing and exploding a second has occurred in 1995 in
17
Rapid City. The lines are only about 9 metres apart. The explosion of a natural gas line in
Otterburne in 2014 created a crater 10 metres in diameter and 3 metres deep, large enough to
44
endanger an adjacent pipeline.
An explosion and black toxic smoke plume from a dilbit fire could easily be as large or larger
45,46
than occurred at Lac Megantic where 5.7 million litres of crude oil spilled in 2014.
As
determined earlier, the spill volume from an energy east rupture could easily be larger than
occurred at Lac Megantic.
The smoke plume from such an explosion and fire could necessitate the immediate evacuation
of the entire population of Winnipeg should it occur nearby. There is no mention of danger of
explosion, toxic plumes and evacuation in the Energy East submission and no emergency
evacuation plans. This is a clear and dangerous omission.
Even without ignition from a natural gas explosion, a dilbit spill could be ignited from any other
2
source of ignition given that the flash point is -35 Celsius.
PRESSURE SURGES
Pressure surges occur regularly along oil pipelines especially during pump shut down and start
up in batch lines, such as the proposed Energy East line, during valve failure or sudden closure,
pump trips, and emergency shut-down. In an oil pipeline the resulting pressure surges can be
more than twice normal pipeline pressure and could exceed the maximum allowable operating
pressure causing pipeline failure. Most large pipeline companies have computer programs to
model the pipeline to mitigate the effects of pressure surges through placement of pressure
47
relief valves and through restrictions on operating pressures and pumping rates. There is no
mention of pressure relief valves or modeling for pressure surges in the Energy East
submission. Figure 6 shows a typical pressure surge profile with and without surge protection.
13
Figure 6 Pressure surges in the pipeline
47
Computational methods for determination of pressure surges and valve placement have been
48-51
developed over a long time and are readily available.
Relief valves vent automatically to relieve the pressure releasing gases and or oil into surge
tanks and into the air. These valves are typically located downstream of pump stations where
pressure is the highest and at vulnerable locations such as down slopes. Toxic volatile
hydrocarbons and hydrogen sulphide gases would be vented to the atmosphere from surge
tanks or directly from the relief valves at random intervals. Venting could expose workers or
nearby public to toxic and potential deadly hydrogen sulphide gas. There are no known relief
valves near Winnipeg; however, the Red and La Salle River banks, where the pipeline crosses,
are candidate locations as is the pumping station at Ile-des-Chenes just east of Winnipeg.
CONTAMINATION OF THE FOOD CHAIN
In the tar sands contamination of the food chain has been documented from toxins released
during bitumen recovery operations.
The food chain could be similarly affected from a dilbit spill near Winnipeg. This could have an
impact on the commercial fishery, livestock and farming operations, hunting and first nations
52
harvesting in and around Winnipeg.
14
CONTAMINATION OF DRI NKING WATER

The Energy East pipeline runs just north of Falcon Lake. A pipeline rupture near here would
likely contaminate Falcon Lake as occurred on the Kalamazoo River spill. The Falcon River
drains from Falcon Lake into Shoal Lake which is the source of Winnipegs water supply. There
has been concern that the Citys water supply could be contaminated by a pipeline rupture
near Falcon Lake. The Citys public works committee has set aside one million dollars to study
53
this problem.
In fact, the concerns of contamination reaching the drinking water inlet on Shoal Lake are likely
overblown. The Falcon River meanders about 20 kilometres through low swampy land and
54
provides only about 15% of the positive water balance for Shoal Lake.
It should be possible to intercept the surface portion of the spill at the entrance to the river.
Dissolved toxins will be diluted and filtered through the swamps and bogs on the Falcon River.
The portion of the dilbit that sinks will not likely get out of Falcon Lake. A dam on Indian Bay
and a narrow diversion channel, shown in Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10 have been built to protect the
Shoal Lake aqueduct inlet from undesirable drainage from the Falcon River, which is already
55
responsible for the boil water advisory for the Shoal Lake Indian Reserve #40.
Figure 7. Shoal Lake Drainage Basin
54
15
Figure 8. Falcon River
63
Figure 9. Shoal Lake Dam and Diversion Channel
16
Figure 10. Shoal Lake First Nation
55
Any toxins from dilbit would have to pass through the narrow man made channel into the
larger Shoal Lake body. At this point toxins could be measured and removed if necessary.
We should question why the City should spend scarce resources on a problem not of its
making. Funds should be made available through the NEB process to address this issue.
Certainly the aqueduct contamination problem should be studied; however, there appears to
be a focus by the City only on this aspect to the exclusion of consideration of other detriment
from Energy East pipeline failure. This tunnel vision can lead to neglect of more dangerous
consequences such as explosion, fire, required evacuations, contamination of river bank
property owned by the city, and contamination of Winnipegs rivers and Manitobas aquifers.
The drinking water supplies of other communities in the province are likely at much greater
risk of contamination from the pipeline than is Winnipegs supply. Many communities draw
their water from rivers that the pipeline directly crosses including Portage La Prairie, Starbuck,
Stanford, Kenton, Rivers, La Salle Rivers, Brandon, Selkirk and Sioux Valley. In the event of loss
of water supply for one or more of these communities Winnipeg might be pressed into
supplying water. Some of these communities such as Sanford have water treatment plants that
service a wide surrounding area impinging on Winnipeg.
LIABILITY
Energy East, a wholly owned subsidiary of TransCanada, bears the spill liability for the pipeline.
Energy East subsidiary seems to have been created in part to protect the assets of
TransCanada. It is unknown if Energy East has enough assets of its own to cover the cost of a
large spill clean-up. In the event of a default the cost may revert to the City of Winnipeg and
the province.
17
The spill cleanup would be disruptive and detrimental to the residents and businesses on the
river bank and activities on the river itself. Large scale dredging equipment would be needed to
attempt to retrieve toxins in dilbit that sink and mix with river sediment. Deployment of booms
and other surface equipment to contain the diluent potion of the spill that floats would be
disruptive. There would likely be a long term impairment of the sport fishery and loss of
irrigation water for golf courses, market gardens and other uses due to toxins from the dilbit.
Liability issues would flow from this damage and impairment.
Evacuation of residents and businesses could well open the City to litigation for personal injury
and property damage. City employees working in buildings near rivers where the spill occurred
could be required to evacuate. In the Kalamazoo River spill 150 homes were permanently
25
relocated due to spill damage. City and privately owned buildings could be similarly
permanently damaged. Energy East is primarily responsible for such loss and damage;
however, resources and emergency personnel employed by the City and Province would be
57
required to participate and therefore could be culpable for compensation claims.
The Energy East submission details methods of cleanup of land from a conventional crude oil
spill but contains no information on evacuation procedures. No mention is made of the
location or availability of remediation equipment and resources or how the City would be
involved in the liaison and deployment of these resources. The City could be held liable
especially for a lack of planning and coordination leading to compensation claims related to
57
spill damage and necessary evacuation.
A proper exclusion distance should be enforced based on scientific studies of plume dispersion
from venting of toxic volatile hydrocarbons and deadly hydrogen sulphide gas from pressure
relief valves in the vicinity of Winnipeg. Since there have been no such studies both Energy
East and the City could be liable for harm relating to venting of toxic gases as both bodies are
aware or should be aware of this hazard. Should relief valves not be placed in areas susceptible
to pressure surges, such as along the down slopes to the river crossings of the La Salle and Red
Rivers, ruptures could occur due to lack of adequate protection.
Winnipeg and/or the province could be held liable for compensation claims from
contamination of the food chain in the event of insufficient funds from Energy East and/or by
57
lack of due diligence and preparedness of Winnipeg to address such eventualities.
A dilbit fire and explosion and the potential ensuing massive toxic black smoke plume could
cause extensive injury and loss of life and could require the immediate emergency evacuation
57
of the entire city. The City could be held partially liable for such indelible tragedy.
Of particular concern is the focus of the City on the potential contamination of the water
supply and neglect of other spill contingencies such as water and airborne toxins from a spill
and or fire and explosion. This tunnel vision and lack of adequate attention to the plethora of
other risks could expose the City to liability.
CONCLUSION
From this analysis it appears that Winnipeg has much to lose from the pipeline crossing in its
area and nothing to gain. It also appears that Winnipeg should apply due diligence to address
18
the wide array of potential detrimental effects outlined here and not focus solely on the likely
minimal risk of contamination of its water supply.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author acknowledges the editing of this document by members of the Manitoba Energy
Justice Coalition, in particular, Mary Robinson, Alex Paterson and Alana Lajoie-OMalley. A peer
review of the technical content has been completed by J. G. Hayles.
REVIEWERS COMMENTS
Dennis LeNeveu has prepared this work from public documents using his considerable
understanding of science and technology. Dennis has added his broad and deep understanding
in the physics and chemistry of manmade and natural materials and phenomena into this
work. The list of 63 references with links to the actual document, and section, in many cases, is
impressive. No one person has an intimate understanding of all the phenomena described here
but Dennis is probably as close as anyone. I have known and worked with Dennis, on and off,
for over twenty years and I know his attention to detail and truth in modelling complex
physical phenomena is exemplary.
There are far more conventional fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) on Earth than humanity
dares to burn. We should be alarmed by Canadian industry developing an unconventional fossil
fuel like the tar sands. Why would you develop a resource that you really dare not use, without
first having global agreements on carbon in the atmosphere, and propose to ship it across
Canada in such a risky fashion? We need to hold industry and governments to account. Experts
in atmospheric physics and chemistry demand an 80% reduction in fossil fuel use by 2050.
Theres not much time left to correct this problem. Our children are watching.
John G. Hayles B. Sc. Geological Engineering, Queens University 1970; M.Sc. Geophysics, UBC
1973; P.Eng. P.Geo. (MB) FEC
(Retired exploration geophysicist)
Selkirk, Manitoba
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
D.M. LeNeveu, M.Sc. Biophysics, Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario; B. Sc. (Hons) Physics,
University of Manitoba; B.Ed. Queens University Kingston Ontario
Dennis LeNeveu worked for twenty years at the Atomic Energy of Canada Research Centre in
Pinawa, Manitoba in the area of Radiation and Industrial Safety and Nuclear Fuel Waste
Management. He was one of the authors of the Environmental Impact Statement for the LongTerm Environmental Assessment of the Canadian Concept for the Disposal of Canadas Highlevel Nuclear Fuel Waste. He has written numerous peer reviewed papers and research reports
on the disposal of nuclear fuel waste. Subsequently he worked as an environmental consultant
in many projects including the long term assessment of the risk of storage of carbon dioxide
for the IEA GHG Weyburn CO2 Monitoring and Storage Project. He has also authored several
19
peer reviewed scientific papers on the risk of carbon dioxide and acid gas underground
disposal.
20
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25

Potential Impacts of The Energy East Pipeline On City of Winnipeg

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EXECUTIVE SUMM ARY

lengthy clean-up of rivers and affected soil;

Amount- 5 year average

CAUSES OF PIPELINE F AILURE

Figure 1. Causes of oil pipeline failures in Alberta from 1990 to 2012

Figure 3. Shut-off Valves around Winnipeg (orange circles outlined in black)

HYDROGEN SULPHIDE IN THE PIPELINE

Figure 5. Parallel natural gas lines

Figure 6 Pressure surges in the pipeline

CONTAMINATION OF DRI NKING WATER

Figure 7. Shoal Lake Drainage Basin

Figure 8. Falcon River

Figure 9. Shoal Lake Dam and Diversion Channel

Figure 10. Shoal Lake First Nation

6) TransCanada Corporation Pipelines Limited, Maps, 450 - 1St. SW Calgary, AB Canada,T2P

9) Alberta Energy Regulator, Report 2013-B: Pipeline Performance in Alberta,19902012

31) Michigan Department of Community Health, Evaluation of Air Contamination Kalamazoo

55) The Council of Canadian Winnipeg Chapter Blog

63) Department of Natural Resources Canada, CanMaps

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