People vs.

Maceren
79 SCRA 450
FACTS:
On 7 March 1969, Jose Buenaventura and four others were accused of having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No.
84-1, a ban against electro-fishing devices in fresh waters by a constabulary investigator in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The
municipal court quashed the complaint and the Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the dismissal as well. The lower
court held that electro- fishing couldnt be penalized because electric current is neither obnoxious nor poisonous as
contemplated in Sec.11 of the Fisheries Law and that is not substance. Furthermore, since the law does not clearly
prohibit electro- fishing, the executive and judicial department cannot consider it unlawful. Section 76 of the same law
penalizes the person who uses such with a fine not less than P500 or more than P5000 and imprisonment for not less
than 6 mos. nor more than 5 years. As provided it does not expressly punish electro- fishing. Due to this, the Secretary of
Agriculture and National Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No.
84 which prohibit electro- fishing in all Philippine waters. Accordingly, on the same year, 1967, the secretary and
commissioner amended Sec.2 of AO No.84 to Fisheries Administrative Order No.84-1 restricting the ban against electrofishing to fresh waters fisheries. The penalties prescribed thereof for electro- fishing by the Secretary and Commissioner
was lesser than the original penalty provided in Sec.76.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries have the right to
penalize electro- fishing with administrative order.
HELD:
Yes, he exceeded his authority. It was said that the penalty fixed in Sec.83 to AO No.84-1 by the Secretary and the
Commissioner, exceeded their authority in promulgating such, for the reason that the Fisheries Law does no expressly
prohibit electro- fishing. It is not banned. Under the law, the Secretary and the Commissioner are powerless to penalize it
for it is devoid of any legal basis. Nowhere in AO No.84 punishes electro- fishing or it be contemplated therein as `other
Violation' which does not all mean the same. The law making body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to
declare what acts should constitute a criminal offense. A mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to penalize
electro- fishing. Administrative agencies are clothed with the rule making powers upon which the regulations should
conform to the standards that the law prescribes. It must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into the effect the law as it has been enacted. Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity
with the law have the force of law. As he exercises the rule- making power by delegation of the law making body, it is a
requisite that he should not transcend to the bounds demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power, otherwise,
he would be improperly exercising legislative authority in his own right and not as a surrogate of the law- making body.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, SECRETARY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
G.R. No. 98472 August 19, 1993

FACTS: Petitioners herein filed a petition for prohibition against Executive Order No. 450 lifting the ban on new
applications for licenses to operate recruitment agencies subject to guidelines and regulations the Secretary of Labor may
promulgate. They contended that the said E.O. is contrary to the Letter of Instruction issued by deposed President Marcos
withholding the grant of new licenses to operate agencies for overseas employment effective 1 January 1982 except as he
may otherwise direct as the latter was issued when President Marcos was holding dual powers, that of the executive and
legislative, and that the latter has the force of law and the former, which is merely an administrative order, is subordinate
thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 450 may repeal a LOI 1190 issued by then President Marcos while he was
still exercising legislative and executive powers
HELD: As we view it, LOI 1190 simply imposes a presidential review of the authority of the Minister of Labor and
Employment to grant licenses, hence, directed to him alone. Since this is undoubtedly an administrative action, LOI 1190
should properly be treated as an administrative issuance. Unlike Presidential Decrees, which by usage have gained
acceptance as laws promulgated by the President, Letters of Instruction are presumed to be mere administrative
issuances except when the conditions set out in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile exist.
Consequently, to be considered part of the law of the land, petitioners must establish that LOI, 1190 was issued in
response to "a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the

regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter." The conspicuous absence of any of these
conditions fortifies the opinion that LOI 1190 cannot be any more than a mere administrative issuance.
There is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to revoke the LOI by way of an EO in view of our
finding that LOI 1190 is a mere administrative directive, hence, may be repealed, altered or modified by EO 450, and must
consequently be upheld.
AMPATUAN v. PUNO
June 7, 2011 (G.R. No. 190259)
FACTS:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, then President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato
under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the
Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places. Under AO 273,
she also delegated to the DILG the supervision of the ARMM.
The petitioners claimed that the Presidents issuances encroached the ARMMs autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid
exercise of emergency powers, and that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially
in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. They want Proc.
1946 and AO 273 be declared unconstitutional.
The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and
order in subject places. It is pursuant to her calling out power as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need to
exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.
The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any
way. The delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings
ISSUE:
WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and
suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
HELD: NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
ISSUE (2): WON there is factual basis on the calling out of the Armed Forces.
HELD: Yes. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power
vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual
bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave
abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment.

YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners, vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY,
TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in the Philippines.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration alleging that they are the
children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful
wife of the deceased whom he married in China.
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Calooocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and personal
properties here in the Philippines. Private respondents (Aida Sy-Gonzales et al.,) filed a petition for the grant of letters or
administration alleging that they were the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. Petition was opposed by herein
petitioners (Yao Kee et al.,) alleging that they were the legitimate family. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the
opposition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat
to Yao Kee as not been proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Hence, both parties moved for reconsideration
to which the Supreme Court granted.
ISSUE:
Was the fact of marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee in China proven as a custom?

HELD:
Custom is defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule,
legally binding and obligatory. The law requires that a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence. [Article 12, Civil Code] On this score the Court had occasion to state, a local custom as a source of right
cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any
other fact. The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom. Construing this
provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely 1) the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and 2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. In the case
at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The
testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching (brother) cannot be considered as proof of Chinas law or custom on marriage not only
because they are self-serving evidence; but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the
subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance
with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. However, as
petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of China, they cannot be
accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children; it
appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one
another. [See Art. 269, Civil Code] And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiats recognition
of Sze Sook Wah and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood. Private
respondents on the other hand are also the deceaseds acknowledged natural children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina
with whom he lived for 25 years without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their fathers acknowledgment,
evidence by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the CFI wherein Sy
Kiat not only acknowledged them as his children by Asuncion Gillegom, but likewise made provisions for their support and
future inheritance.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.