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GCSP Policy Paper N°11: The Arab Revolt: Roots and Perspectives
GCSP Policy Paper N°11: The Arab Revolt: Roots and Perspectives
February 2011
Key Points
The wave of Arab revolt, which started in Tunisia and then Egypt and Libya, is spreading at
an unprecedented speed. This is the result of not only modern internet-based technologies of communication, but also the deep socio-economic crisis of the region coupled
with autocratic regimes that are not qualified to address the needs of the new generation.
The socio-economic malaise in the region is deep. Youth unemployment, degradation of
natural resources, and demographic explosion are among the driving forces. Corruption
and economic autocracy went hand in hand. There is a need for a complete socio-economic overhaul. Toppling autocracies is a necessary first step, but the success of the current will also depend on the possible creation of new political institutions, and a reformist
agenda.
It is curious to see the different reaction of the West compared to the wave of the Color
Revolutions a decade earlier. Western leaders, who closely collaborated with the autocratic regimes for decades, and did not come to the support of pro-democracy militants,
need to revise their approach. They should also revise their policies towards the national
questions of the region, including the situations in Palestine and Iraq. Lastly, for a stable
Middle East and North Africa, the West, and especially Europe, needs to revise the position of the region on the global economic map, as oil-based economies of the region have
failed to create the necessary jobs and sustainable development.
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) is an international training centre for security policy based in Geneva. An
international foundation with over 40 member states, it offers courses for civil servants, diplomats and military officers
from all over the world. Through research, workshops and conferences it provides an internationally recognized forum for
dialogue on issues of topical interest relating to security and peace policy.
he Arab revolt that started in Tunisia and overthrew the reign of Zein El-Abedeen Ben Ali is
taking the form of a huge wave. The regime of
Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, the central state of the Arab
World, followed suit. Uprising in Libya continues, in
spite of attempts by the Kaddhafi regime to kill it in
blood and fire. Ali Abdallah Saleh of Yemen declared
that he will not seek a new mandate, a concession
which only emboldened both opposition and youth
revolt. King Abdallah of Jordan sacked the unpopular
government of Samir Rifai, and named Maruf Bakhit
as the new prime minister and asked him to bring
true political reforms. In a word, the entire Arab
World is facing an unprecedented wave of revolt.
The contestation has already scored a number of victories: the 23 year-old autocrat of Tunisia promptly
left the country to exile in Saudi Arabia; in Egypt,
Hosni Mubarak abandoned long brewing plans to
install his son Jamal in his seat, and was forced to
abdicate, handing power over to the military, after
trying to bring his loyal chief of the mukhabarat, or
the secret services, Omar Suleiman, to the post of
vice president.
The West
Western political leaders have remained perplexed,
to put it mildly, in front of the popular revolutions
in North Africa, and the spread of popular mobilization elsewhere in the Middle East. The first reaction in
Brussels, Paris or Washington was the fear of losing
a long standing and reliable partner in Ben Ali, Mubarak, and in some cases even with the Colonel Kaddhafi. The other preoccupation of Western leaders
has been to avoid a bloodbath as the popular movement spreads to proportions not seen in decades, and
where the old repressive policies are not enough to
contain dissent. But unlike during the popular, prodemocratic revolutions in Eastern Europe, the West
did not clearly articulate support to the legitimacy of
the popular movements.
And for cause: the US administration developed over
the last three decades very close military, political and
economic cooperation with regimes like that of Hosni Mubarak. In the wake of 9/11, the US administration developed close security cooperation, including
illegal kidnappings and torture, with the Egyptian secret services then headed by Omar Suleiman, the current acting president.9 If anything, European politicians were in a worse position to support democratic
movements in North Africa. Former French Foreign
Minister Michle Alliot-Marie vacationed in Tunisia
and enjoyed the hospitality of a Tunisian businessman close to the Ben Alis family, including the usage
of his private jet for personal reasons, weeks before
his downfall;10 during the same vacation period the
French Prime Minister Franois Fillon in his turn benefited from the largesse of the Egyptian president,
enjoying free holidays on The Nile. The former colonial power which exerts much influence over North
Africa and the Middle East not only could not support the popular movements, nor see them coming;
its key policy makers were personally indebted to the
old dictators and are passing their energy to justify
their wrong acts.11
But Western responsibility is deeper than security cooperation with the police states of Ben Ali, Mubarak,
and the others in the region. We have learned that
Mubarak has a net worth of 40 to 70 billion USD.12
This colossal amount was accumulated illegally, and
although it is good news that Switzerland and the
EU are trying to block Mubarak family accounts, the
question remains whether Western leaders are serious in combating such massive corruption. European
countries should do more to establish much needed
social justice among its southern borders, help these
countries in developing their economies and create
the much needed jobs for the youth. The EU imposed liberal economic policies did not help in job
creation in North Africa; on the contrary, it destroyed
numerous small and mid-sized enterprises unable
to compete with European counterparts.13 The oildependent economies of the region failed to bring
development, modern governance, or even stability.
The current wave of protest is a clear sign that the
region needs to move beyond its oil dependency if it
wants to provide a future to its youth. Here too Europe has a role to play and a responsibility to assume.
What Next?
How far and how deep will the North African revolt
spread is still to be seen. Yet, the future stability of
the region will depend on the kind of reformist energy policy and political institutions the current popular mobilization will bring about. If it fails, then we
will once again have the necessary conditions for the
emergence of radical, nihilist political movements;
whether these movements have Islamist outer crest
or not is not all that important. But today, at the
dawn of a new and unprecedented popular mobilization all across the Arab World, the time should be for
optimism, and it is the task of Europe not to doubt
the final result of the political changes taking place,
but to understand the depth of changes and try and
help the Arab youth to succeed in their transition to
achieve democratic political institutions necessary for
deeper social and economic reforms.
NB: The views expressed in this paper are entirely and
solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the GCSP.
Endnotes
1 See Al-Jazeera English service, February 2, 2011: http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2011/02/201121165427186924.html and Deutsche Welle, February 4, 2011: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,14817149,00.html
2 See Vicken Cheterian, The Arab crisis: food, water, energy, justice, Open Democracy, January 26, 2011: www.opendemocracy.net/
vicken-cheterian/arab-crisis-food-energy-water-justice
3 Arab Human Development Report, United Nations Development Programme, 2009, p. 10.
4 Al-Hayat, January 11, 2010:
http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/96492
5 Eric Glodstein, A Middle Class Revolution, Foreign Policy, January 18, 2011:
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/18/a_middle_class_revolution
6 Eileen Byrne, Tunisia appeals for aid to protect democracy, Financial Times, February 6, 2011.
7 Al-Hayat, January 17, 2011: http://international.daralhayat.com/portalarticlendah/229374
8 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 6, 2011: http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=607014&issueno=11758
9 Jane Mayer, Who is Omar Suleiman?, The New Yorker, January 29, 2011: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/01/who-is-omar-suleiman.html
10 Le Monde, Michle Alliot-Marie et la Tunisie, retour sur une polmique, February 7, 2011: http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2011/02/07/michele-alliot-marie-et-la-tunisie-retour-sur-une-polemique_1476436_823448.html
11 Le Monde, Voyage en Egypte: Franois Fillon dit avoir respect les rgles, February 9, 2011: http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/
article/2011/02/09/conflit-d-interets-fillon-annonce-un-projet-de-loi-dans-les-prochaines-semaines_1477334_823448.html
12 Philipp Inman, Mubarak family fortune could reach $70bn, say experts, The Guardian, February 4, 2011: www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2011/feb/04/hosni-mubarak-family-fortune
13 See the interview of Qantara with Werner Ruf: http://en.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-1444/i.html
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