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Prompt and Utter Destruction
Prompt and Utter Destruction
On August 6, 1945 Japan and the rest of the world witnessed the most
devastating form of destruction in human history. The orchestration of the
$2 billion Manhattan project for the development of the atomic bomb yielded
President Truman with the greatest destructive power seen so far in human
history. Trumans decision to drop the first atomic bomb on Japan in order to
yield unconditional surrender is still greatly debated among scholars even
today. The brutality and the suicidal defenses of the Japanese military had
shown American planners that there was plenty of fight left in a supposedly
defeated enemy. Senior military and civilian leaders presented Truman with
several options to force the surrender of Japan. The options included the
tightening of the naval blockade and aerial bombardment of Japan, invasion
of Kyushu, a negotiated peace settlement maintaining imperial
establishments, and the use of the atomic bomb on cities of concentrated
population. In the wake of bloody battles such as Iwo Jima and Okinawa,
Trumans ultimate priority was to avoid American casualties as much as
possible while still achieving Roosevelts unconditional surrender policy for
Japan.
By May 7th of 1945 the war in Europe was over. Germany had
surrendered to the Allied forces after suffering from Hitlers suicide and the
overwhelming invasion of Allied Expeditionary forces in Berlin. With the
European front defeated, the U.S, Russian and British governments could
focus their attention on the Pacific War against the relentless Imperial Japan.
Americans also detested the Japanese with special ferocity because during
the war Americans knew more about Japanese atrocities than they did
German ones; the horrors of the Holocaust did not come widespread public
knowledge until after the surrender of the Nazis. Japanese atrocities against
other people such as the rape of Nantking in 1937 and the Bataan death
march of 1942 were well publicized by the U.S government to intensify an
anti-Japanese sentiment of the public that would build support for American
retaliation, despite its heavy casualties. It is likely that this anti-Japanese
sentiment that had been brewing for so long took hold of not only the public
psych but that of Trumans top military advisors as well and thus played an
underlying role in the decision making process of Truman and his advisors.
U.S strategies for forcing the unconditional surrender of JapWillan
where dramatically expanded when President Truman was informed by
Secretary of State, James F. Brynes, of the top secret Manhattan Project only
an hour after the first cabinet meeting of his presidency. In a meeting on
April 25, 1945, Secretary of War Henry Stimson confirmed and elaborated on
the information that Byrnes had provided. Stimson handed Truman a
memorandum that began with a sobering statement: within four months we
shall probably have completed the most terrible weapon ever known in
human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city. However, the
specifics on the practicality of this one bomb were still vague estimations
that could not yet be realistically applied. Whether or not the atomic bomb
could become a deployable weapon was dependent upon the success of the
plutonium bomb test in Los Alamos, New Mexico scheduled to take place on
July 16 of 1945.
On June 18th of 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented their views to
the president on the strategic military methods of gaining the publically
anticipated unconditional surrender from the Japan. General George Marshall,
U.S Army Chief of Staff, recommended that preparations be made to launch
the invasion of Kyushu, the southernmost of the Japanese islands, with a
target date of November 1, 1945. Marshall read from a paper drawn up by
the Joint Chiefs: The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of
strangulation and appears to be the least costly worth-while operation
following Okinawa. When prompted by the president, the Chiefs hedged on
the crucial issue of casualties. They obliquely projected about 31,000
casualties, based on their belief that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not
exceed the price we paid for Luzon (which was roughly 32,000). Though
officially unknown, it is likely that Truman was either unaware of or did not
validate the casualty figure of about 132,500 (killed, wounded, and missing)
proposed by the Joint War Plans Committee. Historian J. Samuel Walker
claimed that, the figure of 31,000 casualties in first thirty days was
apparently the only one that Truman heard before the end of the war.
Without conformation that the atomic bomb was an option, Truman
unknowingly authorized the option with the largest casualties: the invasion of
Kyushu.
In addition to the invasion there were three alternatives that were also
proposed at the meeting on June 18th. The first involved the tightening and
fortification of the preexisting naval blockade around Japan along with
continued bombing of major Japanese cities. While this alternative was
practical, it was not considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be an effective
timely method of forcing Japan to surrender. The second possible alternative
was to wait for the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan, which Stalin
had promised at Yalta and reaffirmed in his talks with Harry Hopkins, in
anticipation that this would produce surrender. American military strategists
viewed Soviet involvement as a means to tie down Japanese troops in
Manchuria so that they could not be shipped home to defend against an
American invasion. By the spring of 1945, however, the dominance of the
U.S Navy in Japanese waters appeared likely to prevent the movement of
troops between Asian mainland and Japan, thus eliminating Americas need
for Soviet involvement. A third alternative met considerable support from
Trumans administration as it called for the softening of Roosevelts
unconditional surrender policy which he felt to be the pertinent outcome for
the European and Pacific wars. Roosevelt justified negative aspects of
unconditional surrender by stating that the policy helped ensure, the
destruction of a philosophy which is based on the conquest and
subjugation of other peoples. This alternative also seemed diplomatically
attractive in that a peace negotiation for the surrender of Japan allowing the
country to retain its emperor would potentially help defend the country from
view of the atomic diplomacy in the Pacific war and are considered by
historians to be the opposite of logic most revisionist views.
Inexperienced politically and by his background as a farmer, Harry S.
Truman faced one of the most critical decisions of World War II. As the Allied
forces claimed victory in the European front and U.S forces met steadfast
opposition from the Japanese expansionist empire, Truman was confronted
with the complex diplomacy of ending a war with armies unwilling to stop
fighting. Faced with a variety of foreign policy options, Truman stuck to his
top two priorities of reducing American fatalities and achieving the shortest
end to the war as possible. It was with this mindset that Truman set forth in
search for the best option in achieving the ultimate goal of unconditional
Japanese surrender. Though historians and scholars may never come to a
consensus, it is likely that a mix of anti-Japanese sentiment in America,
diplomatic benefits in the interference of Soviet influence in East Asia, public
desire for a quick end to the Pacific War in the wake of European victory and
the political desire of Trumans administration to reduce casualties to an
absolute minimum all played a critical part in Trumans decision to use the
atomic bomb. The fateful summer of 1945 not only resulted in the
conditional surrender of Japan, but also unveiled on the most destructive
weapon ever produced to the world as a means of power for good and evil.