Semester II, AY2013-2014

NUS Business School

BSP1005 Managerial Economics

Lecture Notes 10
GAME THEORY AND STRATEGIC THINKING II:
Game Theory in Dynamic Settings
and
Strategic Moves

By Jo Seung-Gyu
1

Outline

Introduction: Sequential Games

Equilibrium Concepts

Backward Induction/Subgame Perfection

Centipede Game
21 flags from Survivor?

Strategic Moves

Credibility and Importance of Commitment

Chicken Game and Strategic Moves
Brinkmanship as a Commitment
Extra Capacity as an Entry Deterrence
Strategic Trade Policy in Air War between Airbus
and Boeing

Repeated Games and Folk Theorems

sequential game Game in which players move in turn,

responding to each others actions and reactions.
2

Introduction
We now extend our analysis to include dynamic features of the strategic
decision.
Example:
You are one of a few global chipmakers competing for market shares. You
threaten your rivals:
I am going to double my supply, so youd better reduce yours!
-

Would they listen to you?

How would you make your threat credible?

To formalize such situations, we need to model a game in a sequential way

and incorporate the following factors:
-

Different timing in moves

Thinking out how your rival will react to your actions
How to manipulate your rivals choice to your favor
3

Introduction-cont

Sequential (or Extensive Form) Games: Dynamic Games

Sequential games or extensive form games are useful when players move
sequentially or a player moves multiple times.
Extensive form games are represented through a game tree as the following
examples illustrate:

EXAMPLE : HIJACKING GAME

Payoffs are (Pilots, Hijackers)
(- , - )
Explode
HIJACKER
Schiphol
Give In
PILOT
Cuba

(1 million, - 100)
(- 100, 1 million)

Outline
Introduction: Sequential Games

Equilibrium Concepts

Backward Induction/Subgame
Perfection

Centipede Game
21 flags from Survivor?

Strategic Moves

Credibility and Importance of Commitment

Chicken Game and Strategic Moves
Brinkmanship as a Commitment
Extra Capacity as an Entry Deterrence
Strategic Trade Policy in Airwar between
Airbus and Boeing

Repeated Games and Folk Theorems

Equilibrium Concepts in Sequential Games

Nash Equilibrium?
Nash equilibrium concept is still valid in extensive form games.
However, in many instances, Nash equilibrium is not unique.
If we are trying to predict as accurately as possible how the
players will behave, we will need a new equilibrium selection
mechanism for the most reasonable one among the multiple Nash
equilibriums.

Equilibrium Concepts in Sequential Games

(You had better see the game in a strategic form always to solve for Nash
equilibrium):

(- , - )
Explode

HIJACKER
Explode
Give In

HIJACKER
Schiphol

Schiphol

Give In

(100, - 50 )

( -100, 10 m)

( -100, 10 m)

PILOT

PILOT
Cuba

(- , - )

(100, - 50)

Cuba

(- 100, 10 million)

Two Nash equilibriums: (Schiphol, Give In) and (Cuba, Explode).

(Cuba, Explode) is a poor predictor of how the players behave since it

incorporates a non-credible threat of Hijacker.
Pilots choice of Cuba is justifiable only when the airplane is to be exploded if
Pilot dares to head to Schiphol. But Give In is in Hijackers best interest in
this case. That is, Hijackers threat to explode is simply not credible. Knowing
this, with mutual rationality assumed, Pilot will head to Schiphol. And then
Hijacker Gives in.

In conclusion, (Schiphol, Give in) makes more sense than (Cuba, Explode).
7

 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium

Many refinements usually extremely complicated both conceptually and
technically of Nashs concept exist in the game theory literature and each
one has its own contribution both theoretically and practically
Among others, backward induction was the most important refinement of
the Nash equilibrium

(- , - )
Explode

(Schiphol, Give in) can be selected when

we start from the Hijackers decision node
and move backward to Pilots decision
node.
Play forward but think backward!

HIJACKER
Schiphol

Backward induction is about ruling out the

Give In
PILOT
Cuba

(100, - 50)

actions that players would not play if they

were actually given a chance to choose.
-

(- 100, 10 million)

This is how backward induction

rules out non-credible
threats/promises, thereby
eliminating bad Nash equilibrium.
8

Backward Induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrilum cont.

In applying the backward induction principle to dynamic

games, we start with the last period first and work
backwards through successive nodes until we reach the
beginning of the game.
What if the game doesnt have the end?
Professor Reinhard Selten formalized this idea by
inventing the concept of a subgame and the solution
concept called subgame perfection, which can be applied
to a game of infinite horizon as well. This contribution
awarded him the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1994 together
with John Nash and John Harsanyi.
Subgame Perfection requires players
rationality at all subgames.
Simply describing, subgame perfection is
similar to backward induction, extending the
sequential rationality to infinite games.
Note that all subgame perfect equilibrium is a
Nash equilibrium but the reverse is not true

Outline
Introduction: Sequential Games
Equilibrium Concepts

Backward Induction/Subgame Perfection

Centipede Game

21 flags from Survivor?

Strategic Moves

Credibility and Importance of Commitment

Chicken Game and Strategic Moves
Brinkmanship as a Commitment
Extra Capacity as an Entry Deterrence
Strategic Trade Policy in Airwar between
Airbus and Boeing

Repeated Games and Folk Theorems

10

 Experiment: Centipede Game

Rosenthal (1981, Journal of Mathematical Psychology),

R
(8,6)

(2, 0)

(1, 3)

D
(4, 2)

D
(3, 5)

D
(6, 4)

D
(5, 7)

= As moves
= Bs moves
Payoffs: (As, Bs)

How would you play the game if you were A? How about B?

11

Centipede Game cont.

Remarks on Centipede Game:

.
Sophisticated thinkers (like chess grandmasters) took the down step
in the first round.
But at the same time, experiments show that people actually chose R
many times rather than D.
- Altruistic?
-

Reputation-building incentive?

Irrationality or calculation errors (a players own irrationality and a

players expectation on the opponents irrationality)

A repeated play of the game can unravel the situation, making a

cooperative outcome evolve. (This result is known as folk
theorem.)

12

 Experiment: 21 Flags in Survivor

13

Outline
Introduction: Sequential Games
Equilibrium Concepts

Backward Induction/Subgame Perfection

Centipede Game
21 flags from Survivor?

Strategic Moves
Credibility and Importance of
Commitment

Chicken Game and Strategic Moves

Brinkmanship as a Commitment
Extra Capacity as an Entry Deterrence
Strategic Trade Policy in Airwar between
Airbus and Boeing

Repeated Games and Folk Theorems

14

STRATEGIC MOVES
Credibility and Importance of Commitment
You often want to influence threat or promise your competitors choice in a
manner favorable to yourself.

But talk is cheap! Just telling that you are going to act in this or that way
wont work if your threat or promise is non-credible (i.e. empty).

A strategic move refers to an action in game theory that influences other players
expectations about how you will behave.
It involves a commitment from the player and the commitment has to be
credible, meaning that once employed it must be in the interest of the
player to follow through with the move.
Such concept was first introduced by Thomas Schelling, one of the two Nobel
Prize laureates in Economics in 2005.
15

STRATEGIC MOVES cont.

WAL-MART STORES PREEMPTIVE INVESTMENT STRATEGY

How did Wal-Mart Stores succeed where
others failed? The key was Wal-Marts
expansion strategy. To charge less than
ordinary department stores and small retail
stores, discount stores rely on size, no
frills, and high inventory turnover.
Through the 1960s, the conventional wisdom held that a discount store could
succeed only in a city with a population of 100,000 or more. Sam Walton
disagreed and decided to open his stores in small Southwestern towns.
The stores succeeded because Wal-Mart had created 30 local monopolies.
Discount stores that had opened in larger towns and cities were competing
with other discount stores, which drove down prices and profit margins. These
small towns, however, had room for only one discount operation. There are a
lot of small towns in the United States, so the issue became who would get to
each town first. Wal-Mart now found itself in a preemption game of the sort
illustrated by the payoff matrix below.
16

WAL-MART STORES PREEMPTIVE INVESTMENT STRATEGY-cont.

Jo Brothers

Enter
Wal-Mart
Dont enter

Enter

Dont enter

10 , 10

20, 0

0, 20

0, 0

This game has two Nash equilibria: (0, 20) and (20, 0)

Which equilibrium results depends on who moves first.

The trick, therefore, is to preempt - to set up stores in other small towns quickly, before
Company Jo Brothers can do so: (20,0) is the only Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium.

That is exactly what Wal-Mart did. By 1986, it had 1009 stores in operation and was
earning an annual profit of $450 million. And while other discount chains were going
under, Wal-Mart continued to grow. By 1999, Wal-Mart had become the worlds largest
retailer, with 2454 stores in the United States and another 729 stores in the rest of the
17
world, and had annual sales of $138 billion.

Outline
Introduction: Sequential Games
Equilibrium Concepts

Backward Induction/Subgame Perfection

Centipede Game
21 flags from Survivor?

Strategic Moves
Credibility and Importance of
Commitment

Chicken Game and Strategic

Moves
Brinkmanship as a Commitment
Extra Capacity as an Entry Deterrence
Strategic Trade Policy in Airwar between
Airbus and Boeing

Repeated Games and Folk Theorems

18

GAME OF CHICKEN AND STRATEGIC MOVES

Game of Chicken
Two players (say, teenage boys) decide to settle a dispute (over a girl) by
way of near-death experiences. Each speeds an automobile towards a
cliff (or at each other, in later adaptations).

A simple rule governs the challenge: the first to jump out of his automobile
is the chicken and, by universally accepted social convention, concedes
the object in dispute. The second to jump is victorious, and, depending on
context, becomes the winner (gang leader or prom king etc).

19

Not only boys play the game. Check out the girls real story below. In their
case, even the winners lose. (Winners Curse)
Teens Run Over During Game of 'Chicken' (The Lufkin Daily News,
October 12, 2005)
HUDSON, Texas Two Hudson girls, age 13 and 14, were attending a
slumber party Friday night at a house along state Highway 103 west of
Hudson when they decided to lie in the road. The two were the first girls
to play the game, lying along the center stripe on the highway 103,
according to another family member, who asked not to be identified.
Just before 9 p.m., a dark-colored SUV with chrome wheels passed,
running over both girls.
The girls remained in Lufkin hospitals Tuesday, one suffering internal
injuries, the other having a broken collarbone and several lost teeth,
Bass said. Updated information on the girls' conditions was not
available. State police are withholding the girls' names because they
are juveniles.

20

 Chicken Game in Broadway Musical

Recall a scene from West Side Story, in which two gangsters are to
race their cars toward each other and the first one to chicken out loses.
Lets assign numerical payoffs as below:
Gang B
Straight

Swerve

Straight

(-100, -100)

(10, -2)

Swerve

(-2, 10)

(0,0)

Gang A

21

Chicken Game in West Side Story cont.

Gang B
Straight

Swerve

Straight

(-100, -100)

(10, -2)

Swerve

(-2, 10)

(0,0)

Gang A

How many (pure strategy) Nash equilibriums do we have here?

-

We have two Nash equilibriums, in which one player swerves

and the other doesn't (lower left and upper right).

What actually happens when this game is played?

- It is hard to say. Under Nash theory, either of the two equilibrium
points is an equally rational outcome.
22

Chicken Game in Broadway Musical cont.

What can you do to win?

(i) Create your own fog.
Put a weirdo in the driver seat than a smart member
(The key is randomizing your behavior so that your rivals cannot
outguess yourself.)

An irrational rationally irrational player has the upper hand

in chicken game.

Gang B
Straight
Swerve
Straight

(-100, -100)

(10, - 2)

Swerve

(- 2, 10)

(0,0)

Gang A

23

Chicken Game in Broadway Musical cont.

What can you do to win?

(ii) Reduce temptation
Life as a chicken is like no life
(The key is reducing your own payoff from the options you
might be tempted to.)
Gang B
Straight
Swerve
Straight

(-100, -100)

(10, - 2)

Swerve

(- 2, 10)

(0,0)

Gang A

Gang B
Straight
Swerve
Straight

(-100, -100)

(10, -2)

Swerve

(-101, 10)

(0,0)

Gang A
24

Chicken Game in Broadway Musical cont.

What can you do to win?

(iii) Add carrots to the options you want to be committed to
Ill die for the honor of my family.
(The key is increasing your own incentive to play the options
you want to be committed to.)
Example: Put a suicidal guy in the driver seat.
Gang B
Straight
Swerve
Straight

(-100, -100)

(10, - 2)

Swerve

(- 2, 10)

(0,0)

Gang A

Gang B
Straight
Swerve
Straight

(-1, -100)

Swerve

(- 2, 10)

(10, - 2)

Gang A
(0,0)

25

Chicken Game in Broadway Musical cont.

What can you do to win?

(iV) Remove your own options you might be tempted to play
Tie up your steering wheel.
(The key is getting rid of the options you might be tempted to play.)
More options are not necessarily better. Fewer options might be better
sometimes.
Gang B
Straight
Swerve
Straight

(-100, -100)

(10, - 2)

Swerve

(- 2, 10)

(0,0)

Gang A

Gang B
Straight
Swerve
Gang A

Straight

( -100 -100)

(10, - 2)
26

 Chicken Game in Film: Rebel Without a Cause

The game of chicken has been featured in many films.
Remember Jimmie (acted by James Dean) and
Buzz in Rebel Without A Cause? Probably it has
set the standard.
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u7hZ9jKrwvo)

Jimmie (James Dean), to

settle a dispute with Buzz,
the leader of a local gang,
agrees to a "Chickie Run."
Both race stolen cars
towards the edge of a cliff.
The first to eject out of his
car is branded a "chickie."

Seconds into the race,

Buzz discovers that his
jacket is stuck on the door
handle, making jumping out
of the car somewhat
difficult. Jimmie jumps out
an instant before the cars
reach the edge of the cliff.

Buzz, still unable to free

his jacket from the door
handle, fails to escape.
While he won't be
branded a "chickie," he
suffers a worse fate.
27

 A Textbook Example: Production Choice Problem

Race Car Motors

Far Out
Engines

Small cars

Big Cars

Small engines

3, 6

3, 0

Big engines

1, 1

8, 3

Two Nash equilibriums if simultaneous game: (Small, Small) and (Big, Big).
If Race Car moves first: (Small, Small).
What can Far Out do then?
o threat to produce Big Engines but it is non-credible
o Thus, need to make its threats credible.
Example: destroying (shutting down) small engine production capacity
28

Outline
Introduction: Sequential Games
Equilibrium Concepts

Backward Induction/Subgame Perfection

Centipede Game
21 flags from Survivor?

Strategic Moves
Credibility and Importance of Commitment

Chicken Game and Strategic Moves

Brinkmanship as a Commitment
Extra Capacity as an Entry Deterrence
Strategic Trade Policy in Airwar between Airbus and
Boeing

Repeated Games and Folk Theorems

29

 Brinkmanship as a Commitment
Brinkmanship is the maneuver of pushing a situation to the verge of disaster
brink, as the term reads in order to achieve the most advantageous outcome.
This might be achieved by creating the impression in rivals mind that one is
willing to use extreme methods rather than concede, thereby forcing the rival to
back down and make concessions

Examples:

During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear

force was often used as a measure. Creating
powerful nuclear weapons is more efficient in
avoiding nuclear war than destroying them.
(Kim Jeong Eun from North Korea is the real
example.)

Burning ships when Spanish Conquistador

Hernando Corts attacked the Aztec Empire in
16th century. (Note: Sometimes you need to
build bridges for the enemies to retreat.)

30

Examples of Brinkmanship - cont

Canals surrounding the European fortress

Doomsday Machine in Kubricks movie

Dr. Strangelove.
The Russians sought to deter American
attack by building a "Doomsday Machine," a
device that would trigger world annihilation if
Russia was hit by nuclear weapons.

Dr. Strangelove says, Deterrence is

the art of producing in the mind of the
enemy the fear to attack.)
31

Outline
Introduction: Sequential Games
Equilibrium Concepts

Backward Induction/Subgame Perfection

Centipede Game
21 flags from Survivor?

Strategic Moves
Credibility and Importance of Commitment
Chicken Game and Strategic Moves
Brinkmanship as a Commitment

Extra Capacity as an Entry

Deterrence
Strategic Trade Policy in Airwar between
Airbus and Boeing

Repeated Games and Folk Theorems

32

STRATEGIC MOVE IN ENTRY-DETERRENCE

Extra Capacity as a Entry Deterrence
(Avinash Dixit, The role of investment in Entry Deterrence, The Economic Journal 90)

Consider a pricing game for the Incumbent facing a potential

entrant. Entrant decides first and Incumbent decides later, but the
latter can behave strategically to deter the entry.
Potential Entrant

Incumbent

Enter

Stay out

High price (accommodation)

100, 20

200, 0

Low price (warfare)

70, 10

130, 0

Incumbent has a dominant strategy of high price.

But if the incumbent follows its dominant strategy, then entrant will enter (because 20 >
0) with the outcome of (100, 200). But incumbent wants to (200, 0).

A simple threat of I will charge low if you enter will not work. It is an empty threat.

Incumbent needs to introduce a self-constraining idea to manipulate Entrants decision

to incumbents own favor. Lets consider some options below:
33

Extra Capacity as a Entry Deterrence cont.

Potential Entrant

Incumbent

Enter

Stay out

High price (accommodation)

100, 20

200, 0

Low price (warfare)

70, 10

130, 0

Strategy 1: Side Payment

What if the incumbent pays the entrant 20 (the most it could earn if it entered) to stay out
and make 180 for itself? Not a bad idea, but illegal.
Strategy 2: Merge?
.
What about a merge with the potential entrant? This is truly an option yet all the relevant
costs and benefits will have to be considered. (Its a shame that we dont have time for the
economics of M & A.) Plus, it might be illegal again because of its anti-competitive effects
Strategy 3: Build a Reputation
We already have seen a case for the incentive to brink. Building a reputation for being
irrational may be another strategy by which you can manipulate rivals choices to your
advantage. (Let them believe you can do any crazy thing.)

34

Extra Capacity as a Entry Deterrence cont.

Strategy 4: How about making an irrevocable commitment that will force

you to charge Low Price in case entry occurs?
Suppose that the incumbent makes a capacity investment - like extra
production facility etc of, say, $50.

This will lower the profit in the High Price situation since at high price the sales
is low and the new capacity investment is just waste of money.

But at the Low Price choice, the extra capacity becomes useful giving you a
marginal cost advantage over the entrant and helps to shift profits away from
the entrant. You can increase your profits while Entrants may lose more.
Potential Entrant
Enter

Stay Out

High Price
(Accommodation)

(10050=)50, 20

(20050=)150, 0

Low Price
(Warfare)

(7050+60=)80, 20 (13050+50=)130, 0

Incumbent

Entrant stays out. The equilibrium is (150, 0).

Note that the extra capacity is solely for a strategic move and is
going to be idled at the equilibrium.
Sometimes you want to constrain yourself to win.

35

Extra Capacity as a Entry Deterrence cont.

Real Life Application?

Chicken Game in Semiconductor Rivalry and Capacity Commitment

36

Outline
Introduction: Sequential Games
Equilibrium Concepts

Backward Induction/Subgame Perfection

Centipede Game
21 flags from Survivor?

Strategic Moves

Credibility and Importance of Commitment

Chicken Game and Strategic Moves
Brinkmanship as a Commitment
Extra Capacity as an Entry Deterrence

Strategic Trade Policy in Air War

between Airbus and Boeing
Repeated Games and Folk Theorems

37

STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY

(Air War between Airbus and Boeing)

Background:

LCA industry is under significant economy of scale and large scale of

production is critical for survival as well as profitability.
US enjoyed de facto monopoly in the LCA industry until 1970s. The Airbus
consortium created in 1969 and started competing effectively in the 1980s.
US concerned about the alleged subsidies by European govts
Europe concerned about indirect subsidies through NASA and US
defense programs
Mutually fatal damage was forthcoming without a coordination, leading to
rounds of trade negotiations.
10

Air War- continued

In late 1970s and early 1980s, (American) Boeing and (European

consortium based) Airbus were each considering developing a new aircraft.
The situation can be simplified as below, in which the typical Chicken Game
situation emerges
Airbus
Produce
Dont Produce

Produce

-10, -10

Dont Produce

0, 100

100, 0

Boeing

Now, what if Airbus is subsidized?

Produce

0, 0

Airbus
Produce Dont Produce
-10, 10

100, 0

0, 120

0, 0

Boeing
Dont Produce

It shows how strategic trade policy can transfer profits from foreign country
to home.
39

Air War- continued

But retaliation is likely: If mutual subsidization:

Airbus
Produce Dont Produce
Produce

10, 10

Dont Produce

0, 120

120, 0

Boeing
0, 0

Prisoners Dilemma again.

o Mutually destructive trade was is likely, leading all countries to be worse off.
o Implication: Both produce but subsidy expenditure may outweigh profits.

How to get out of the dilemma then?

o Its a cooperative game: Trade negotiations
Bilateral agreement under Uruguay round 1992 government support is
limited
Multilateral level agreement associated with the Uruguay failed and remains
under 1979 Tokyo GATT round context.
40

Air War- continued

Real feature?

The United States initiated WTO dispute procedures then about subsidies to the
European aircraft industry. In response, the EU launched similar proceedings
against the US criticizing NASAs subtle procurement practice etc.

New 3-4 new players are expected in the next decade (such as Commercial
Aircraft Corporation of China Ltd), and the game is to be more complicated.
(For a recent update:
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6140280,00.html)

41

Outline
Introduction: Sequential Games
Equilibrium Concepts

Backward Induction/Subgame Perfection

Centipede Game
21 flags from Survivor?

Strategic Moves
Credibility and Importance of
Commitment
Chicken Game and Strategic Moves
Brinkmanship as a Commitment
Extra Capacity as an Entry Deterrence
Strategic Trade Policy in Airwar between
Airbus and Boeing

Repeated Games and Folk

Theorems

42

REPEATED GAMES AND FOLK THEOREM

Firm 2

Firm 1

Low price

High price

Low price

10, 10

100, 50

High price

50, 100

50, 50

Consider the above pricing game: the inability to reach a cooperative

agreement leads to a second-best outcome of (10,. 10).

What if the firms are interacting more than once? We call this a repeated
game.
- If games are to be played many times, cooperative behavior may be
fostered even if firms are competing in a non-cooperative way, leading
to the cooperative outcome of (50, 50).
- The result is knows as Folk Theorems.
43

REPEATED GAMES AND FOLK THEOREM-cont.

Folk Theorem
A cooperative outcome can be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of a repeated game usually infinitely repeated. (Such result may
hold for a finitely repeated game as well, if rarely.)
(It has got its name of folk theorem because the result is fairly obvious common
sense. Formal statements and proofs can be quite complex, but the intuition is clear
and obvious; cooperation of a given sort is to help together by a threat to punish
those who transgress. As long as the future looms large relative to the present time,
such threatened punishments are effective. Because this result is something that
game theorists feel they knew all along, it is part of the folk wisdom of the subject.
No one was brash enough to claim authorship of the general idea.)

44

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND MANGERIAL IMPLICATIONS

The best way to learn how to use game theory as a management tool is to
practice. Here is a seven step guide to using game theory in settings.
STEP 1: Calculate your profit as a function of what the other player(s) might do
You = f(Others Actions)
STEP 2: From your best guesses about your competitors demand and cost
curves, calculate her profits as a function of what you might do
Opponent = g(Your Actions)
STEP 3: Ask the question: Can we legally cooperate? Ask your lawyers; can we
write a legally binding agreement to any deals we might do? If the answer is
yes, then you want to make use of cooperative game theory. That is the theory
of bargaining and negotiationsthat is trying to write mutually advantageous
contracts. If the answer is no, then you want to make use of non-cooperative
game theory. That is, the stuff we have been discussing in the last few game
theory lectures.
STEP 4: Create the games payoffs in a form that helps you to understand the
strategic interactions.(Normal form or Extensive form)
45

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND MANGERIAL IMPLICATIONS - cont.

STEP 5: Can you recognize your game? Now you must pick your strategies.
(Nash, Dominance, Maximin, Subgame Perfection, Repeated Interaction etc)
STEP 6: Can you change the game? To commit or not to commit? (Strategic
Moves)

STEP 7: Make your moves: be cool!

Remember, if you get killed you still did the best you could, given the
information you had. Being good at game theory doesnt guarantee you will
make money, prevent a nuclear attack, or win at poker on Friday nights. You
still need a good product and good information about your firm and your
competitors demands and costs. But game theory will help you get the most
of what are available.

46

Puzzle: How good is your game theoretic imagination?

Conversation between a dad a son...

47

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