The Royal African Society

The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa

Author(s): Denis M. Tull and Andreas Mehler
Source: African Affairs, Vol. 104, No. 416 (Jul., 2005), pp. 375-398
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society
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AfricanAffairs,104/416, 375-398

doi:10.1093/afraf/adi034

Presson behalfofRoyalAfrican
reserved
Society.Allrights
? The Author[2005].PublishedbyOxfordUniversity

THE HIDDEN COSTS OF POWER-SHARING:

REPRODUCING INSURGENT VIOLENCE
IN AFRICA
DENIS M. TULL AND ANDREASMEHLER

ABSTRACT

Thisarticle
violthespreadofinsurgent
analyzessomefactors
underlying
ence in Africa.It focuseson theimpactexternal
haveon power
factors
oftheseis theunsteady
on thecontinent.
The first
struggles
supportfor
fromWestern
donors,whichhas impededmorefar-reaching
democracy
domesticchangesin muchof Africa.Secondare widerchangesin the
international
thatdramatically
enhanced
theinternational
setting
standing
ofarmedmovements
in thepost-1989period.The articlearguesthatthe
ofbothfactors
has inducedwould-beleadersto conquerstate
interplay
thannon-violent
means.This becomesparticupowerbyviolentrather
in regardto Western
efforts
to solveviolentconflict
larlyevident
through
The hypothesis
is putforward
thattheinstituagreements.
power-sharing
tionalization
ofthispracticeforthesakeof'peace',i.e. providing
rebels
witha shareofstatepower,has important
demonstration
effects
across
thecontinent.
It createsan incentive
structure
would-beleaderscanseize
on theinsurgent
uponbyembarking
pathas well.As a result,and irreoftheireffectiveness
inanygivencase,power-sharing
spective
agreements
tothereproduction
ofinsurgent
violence.
maycontribute
SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR INSURGENCIES HAVE DOMINATED the range

ofviolentconflicts
in Westand centralAfricaand havebecomea criticalelementin rapid social changein most of the continent'ssub-regions.Aside
fromtheirquantitativeexpansion,the significance
of insurrections
is also
at
the
level.
For
one
vast
stretches
ofAfricahave
noteworthy
qualitative
thing,
been 'governed'by insurgency
movementsforsustainedperiodsand, more
forthepurposeofthisarticle,an increasing
numberofinsurgents
important
findthemselvesin the government
of the statetheyseek to coneventually
quer. Overthepast decade,forexample,in bothLiberiaand theDemocratic
wereeitherdisplaced
RepublicofCongo (DRC), twosuccessivegovernments
orwereforcedto sharepowerwiththeirrebelfoes.
byinsurgents
The steadyrecurrenceofinsurrections
in a numberof countries,as well
as theirincreasingly
thus seems to
frequentinclusioninto governments,
DenisM. Tull (denis.tull@swp-berlin.org)
is a research
associateat theGermanInstitute
for
International
Affairs
andSecurity
inBerlin.AndreasMehleris thedirector
oftheInstitute
of
African
Affairs
is Hamburg.
375

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376

AFRICAN
AFFAIRS

indicate that would-be leaders have some reason to conceptualize the

organizationof violence as a viable path to occupyingat least parcels of
statepower.Taking thisassumptionas a startingpoint,thisarticleaims to
of insurgenexploreunderlyingfactorsthatcontributeto the proliferation
cies as well as theiroftensuccessfuloutcomes- success being definedas
the takingof statepower or partsthereof.Ratherthan analyzingthe root
causes ofrebellion,itprobescontextualfactorsthatbear on therationaleof
warfare.
politicallyambitiousleadersto startinsurgency
To date, carefulanalysisof the significanceof the insurgencyphenomenon has been an exception.' Arguably,this is to some extentdue to the
analysisin politicalscience and its
deeplyrootedtraditionof state-centred
then,the weakeningof state capabilities
sub-disciplines.2Unsurprisingly,
has been identifiedas a major explanatoryfactorof highlevels of internal
in Africa.3It is beyonddoubt thatthelimitedmilconflictand insurrection
itarycapacitiesofmanyAfricanstateslowerthe costsofformingsuccessful
insurgencies.Other commentatorshave emphasized economic aspects,
factorhelping
notablythe availabilityof naturalresourcesas a facilitating
While both factorsare important,we
to set up and sustaininsurrections.4
conflictsin Africais incomargue that an analysisof insurgency-related
factorsrelatingto shiftsin
external
consideration
into
without
taking
plete
the way outside actors seek to
the post-1989 internationalenvironment,
solve violentconflictin Africaand the impactthese changeshave on the
calculus ofwould-beleadersin organizingviolence.
overthepast fifteen
Our argumentis straightforward:
years,power-sharing
and insurgentshave emerged
incumbents
embattled
between
agreements
as the West's preferredinstrumentof peace-makingin Africa.In almost
every countryin which insurgentleaders mustered sufficientmilitary
powerto attractthe attentionof foreignstates,theywere includedin 'govof this
ernmentsof nationalunity'.We argue thatthe institutionalization
practicedemonstratesWesternwillingnessto providepoliticalpay-offsfor
whichturnthe
insurgentviolence and therebycreatesincentivestructures
rebel path into an appealing option in the pursuitof otherwiseblocked
politicalaspirations.If valid, thishypothesisshould have importantimpli1. See, forexample ChristopherClapham (ed.), AfricanGuerillas(JamesCurrey,Oxford,
1998).
2. Douglas Lemke, 'Africanlessons for internationalrelationstheory', WorldPolitics56
(2003), pp. 114-38.
Herbst and Greg Mills, The FutureofAfrica:A neworderin sight?Adelphi Paper
3. Jeffrey
361. (InternationalInstituteof StrategicStudies, London, 2003), p. 40; CrawfordYoung,
on changingAfricanpoliticaldynamics',
'The end ofthepost-colonialstatein Africa?Reflections
AfricanAffairs103, 410 (2004), pp. 43-6.
stillmostfrequently
4. Amonga growingbody ofliterature,
quoted is Paul Collierand Anke
Hoeffler,Greedand Grievancein Civil War (World Bank, Washington,DC, 2001); equally
goes to war:methodological
burgeoningare thecritiques,e.g., ChrisCramer,'Homoeconomicus
30, 11
individualism,rationalchoice and the politicaleconomyof war', WorldDevelopment
(2003), pp. 1845-64.

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THE HIDDEN COSTS OF POWER-SHARING

377

towardsAfricaand their
cationsforthe policies of Westerngovernments
statedobjectiveof conflictprevention.
of the bigThe firstsectionof the articlebrieflysketchesthe trajectory
gest insurgencymovementof the Congo war, the Rassemblement
congolais
(RCD), whichwill illustratehow the currentdebate on
pourla dkmocratie
of insurgengreedand grievanceneglectsthe extentto whichthe strategies
cies are significantly
environment
and strategies
shapedby theinternational
of extraversion.
Sectiontwo addressesthe politicalinconsistencies
ofWesternpoliticalengagement
in Africa.We shallarguethatpartsoftheprofound
politicalmalaisein much of the continentstemfromthe ambiguousstance
thattheWesthas adoptedin regardto both democracyassistanceand conflictresolution.We examinetheextentto whichthesepolicieshave contributedto ever-more
violentpoliticson thecontinent.
As we shallanalyzein the
thirdsection,theseinconsistencies
havepushedsome Africancountriesinto
a vicious cycle that corroboratesthe reproductionof insurgency-induced
violence.We developthehypothesis
thattheWest'spreferred
instrument
of
conflict
resolution- power-sharing
turns
the
rhetoric
of
conagreements
flictprevention
on itshead in thatitinadvertently
encourageswould-beleaders elsewhereto embarkon theinsurgency
path.Finally,in the conclusion,
we attemptto formulate
thatmayhelp to overcomethe
policyprescriptions
dilemmabetweenconflictresolutionand conflictprevention.
ThecaseoftheRassemblementcongolaispour la d6mocratie
In spite of militarysupportfromNamibia, Angola and Zimbabwe,the
ofPresidentLaurentKabila provedunableto crushtherebellion
government
oftheRwandan-backed
RCD thatbeganin August1998. A yearlater,significantpressurefromregionaland Westerngovernments
resultedin the
Lusaka agreementwhich foresawthe holdingof a nationaldialogue,the
envisagedoutcomeofwhichwas a 'new politicalorder'forthe Congo. This
so-calledinter-congolese
dialoguewas based on theprinciplethatall theparticipantsin the negotiations'shall enjoy equal status'.5Aftersignificant
thedialoguewas finally
condelays,and theemergenceoffurther
rebellions,
cludedin late2002. In accordancewithitsraisond'tre,theforumresultedin
a comprehensive
formulawhichprovidedthe RCD withone
power-sharing
ofthefourvice-presidencies
as wellas numerousothergovernment
posts.In
theremainder
ofthissectionwe shalloffer
a broadsketchoftheRCD rebellion,
itsleadershipand objectivesand itsinterplay
withtheinternational
arena.
For a start,it seems difficult
to categorizethe RCD in termsof either
ideologyor greed.In regardto ideology,forexample,the RCD leadership
5. Lusaka CeasefireAgreement,
AnnexA, Chapter5, Arts5.1 and 5.2.b. availableat http://
www.usip.org/library/pa/drc/drc_07101999_toc.html

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378

AFRICANAFFAIRS

a coherent
wasfartooheterogeneous
to patchtogether
political
programme.
desforces
Kabila'sAlliance
Muchlikeitsforerunner,
pourla liberacdmocratiques
ofconvenience'6
thatcontained
somestrange
tion(AFDL), itwasa 'coalition
RCD
of
four
the
was
bedfellows.
groups:first,
composed
Roughly
speaking,
ofRwandophone
fromtheKivus,including
former
AFDL lieutenants
origin
Former
followers
of
BizimaKaharaandAzariasRuberwa.
MoiseNyarugabo,
and
Lunda
made
Alexis
Thambwe
thelatePresident
Bululu,
Mobutu,notably
nucleuswasconstituted
oftheinitial
up a secondgroup.A thirdcomponent
suchas Professor
Ernest
academicsand professionals
by somewell-known
Z'ahidi
UnitedNations(UNESCO) official
Wambadia Wambaandformer
meantto provide
ofthesepersonalities
was arguably
Ngoma.The inclusion
in an effort
to shieldit
renowned
theRCD withinternationally
figureheads
A fourth
ofbeinga foreign
accusation
from
thepredictable
groupconproxy.
ormarginalized
sistedofvarious
individuals
byKabila,including
disappointed
EmileIlungaandJoseph
Mudumbi,
amongothers.7
and the
initialleadership,
of themovement's
Giventheheterogeneity
well-known
(Wamba,Ngoma)harboured
disgustitsleadingintellectuals
forformer
'Mobutists',some of whomwereto becomeRCD founding
thatthismotleycrewofwould-be
itseemsalmostinconceivable
members,
hidtheimpetusofa thirdparty's
without
could
have
assembled
insurgents
den hand,i.e. Rwandaand Uganda. It was Rwandathatprovidedthe
to conquerstatepower.
RCD leaderswithan opportunity
that
The storyoftheRCD seemsto underscore
Clapham'ssuggestion
from
blocked
derive
Contrary
politicalaspirations'.8
basically
'insurgencies
rebelleaders,at leastin theDRC, the
to theirfootsoldiers,
contemporary
CentralAfrican
Republic,Chad and theRepublicofCongo,areno social
a termintroof'elite-recycling',
outcasts.Instead,theyarea manifestation
ofthe
in
context
the
elites
renewalofpolitical
ducedto describethelimited
had
served
leaders
all RCD
period.Virtually
post-1990democratization
in seniorgovernment
positionsunderMobutuand Kabila and
formerly
As such,theydid
ofthepoliticalestablishment.9
members
weretherefore
thembut in orderto reintegrate
notfightto addresssocietalgrievances
fromwhichtheyhadbeenexcluded.Formerministers
selvesintoa system
underMobutu,LundaBululuandThambwe,as wellas
orprimeministers
followers
Kabila'sformer
amongothKahara,Mudumbiand Nyarugabo,
These personalities
possesstheconnections
ers,all fallintothiscategory.
their(re-)incluas a meansto enforce
to organizea rebellion
andresources
to transform.
sionintoa politicalsystemwhichtheyhavefewincentives
6. Filip Reyntjens,La guerredes GrandsLacs (L'Harmattan,Paris, 1999), p. 220.
7. Gauthierde VillerswithJeanOmasombo and Erik Kennes, Guerreetpolitique:Les trente
moisde L.D. Kabila (InstitutAfricain,Tervuren,2001), p. 49.
derniers
8. ChristopherClapham, 'Introduction',in Clapham,AfricanGuerillas,p. 5.
9. A point also made by William Reno, 'The politics of insurgencyin collapsingstates',
and Change33, 5 (2002), pp. 841f.
Development

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THE HIDDEN COSTS OF POWER-SHARING

379

rootedin well-established
What is more,theirstrategiesare firmly
postcosuch
as
clientelism.
lonialpoliticalpractices
underitscontrol
The RCD's poor recordofgovernancein theterritories
underscoresthelack of an agenda forpoliticalrenewal.10In fact,the single
most importantfactorto explainthis outcome was its largelyexternallyinducedcreationand itsmilitary
dependenceon Rwanda. Kigali's policyof
was by and largeincompatiblewiththemore
imposingitssecurityinterests
politically-oriented
approach advocated by the RCD's firstpresident,
Wamba. The latter'sdismissalwas indeed a resultof these conflicting
interests.His successors,likewiseappointedby Kigali, were both unable
and unwillingto rid themselvesof these outside constraints."Perhaps
theresultinglack of Congolese politicalownershipofthe insurinevitably,
rectionwas an obstacle to the RCD buildingup a measure of political
let alone fosteringlocal constituencies.Its lack of a political
credibility,
programme,however,does not invalidatethe hypothesisthat its leaders
wereseekingto 'unblock'politicalaspirationsthroughviolence.
As forthepoliticaleconomyoftheinsurgency,
thestrategies
ofthe RCD
as
as
well
its
with
its
relations
Rwandan
asymmetrical
leadership
power
godfathersthroughoutthe war sit uneasilywith the currentdiscoursethat
describesinsurgency
movementsas essentially
While thereis
greed-driven.
no shortageofevidencethateconomicshas playeda powerful
rolein extendto
ing and exacerbatingthe war in the DRC,12 it is much more difficult
maintainthatgreedwas theprimary
motiveofthe RCD. To be sure,RCD
elitesdid seizeopportunities
to acquiresignificant
resourcesthroughtaxrevenues and the marketingof mineralriches.But this is simplystatingthe
obvious,i.e. thatwarfaregeneratesresourcesforviolentelites.It does not
allow a mechanisticreadingto the effect,forinstance,thatthe top RCD
leadershiphas soughtto prolongthe war foreconomicpurposes.For one
of resource
thing,it is debatablethatthe RCD was the main beneficiary
exploitationin easternCongo. As the UN Panel of Expertsobservedwith
regardto miningbusinesses,Rwanda 'perennially
deprivedits juniorpartsharein resourcesand prerogatives'
and
ner,RCD-Goma, of anysignificant
'administrators
havefrequently
out
that
were
unable
to
pointed
they
manage
theirarmywithoutsufficient
resources'.13For another,the RCD followed
a consistentpolicythroughoutthe war intenton accessingstatepower in
Kinshasa,a goalwhichfinally
paid offbywayofthepower-sharing
agreement
10. Denis M. Tull, 'The reconfiguration
ofpoliticalorderin Africa:a case studyfromNorth
Kivu (DR Congo)', (InstituteofAfricanAffair,
Hamburg,2005), chap. 3-5.
11. InternationalCrisis Group, The Kivus: Theforgotten
crucible
oftheCongoconflict
(IGG,
Brussels/Nairobi,
2003), pp. 14-22; De Villerset al., Guerreetpolitique,
pp. 65-76.
12. United Nations,Final ReportofthePanel ofExpertson theIllegalExploitation
ofNatural
Resources
and OtherFormsof WealthoftheDemocratic
RepublicoftheCongo(UN, New York,
2002).
13. Ibid,para. 78.

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380

AFRICANAFFAIRS

ofDecember 2002.14This objectivewas, ofcourse,linkedto theperspective

of acquiringresourcesderivingfromsovereignty,15
but 'thisis no morethan
to say thatwar is verysimilarto politics,withthe crucialadditionof a high
degree of explicitviolence'.16One can thereforeconclude that a regime
goal therebellionsoughtto achieve.
changewas theonlyidentifiable
We would suggestthat the RCD leadership's readiness to subjugate
itselfto Rwandan interests,as well as its use of violence,was an entirely
rationalapproachin the pursuitof politicalpower.Withoutboth of them,
it would
access to statepowerwould have remainedclosed. Furthermore,
have matteredlittlehad the RCD respectedhumanrightsor soughtto garner local supportin easternCongo in a 'Maoist fashion'.RCD leadersdid
not ignorelocal hostilitytowardstheirmovement,but theyhad fewincenOnce the militarydeadlock prevented
tivesto mend thisstateof affairs.17
realmthat
it was in the international
an outrightvictoryon the battlefield,
the gatheringof support and respectabilitymatteredmost; and, consequently,the RCD put much emphasison its externalrelations.
Thus, in additionto the use ofviolenceas a bargainingchip,the second
factorfacilitating
insurgencyleaders' access to statepower is international
As
we
shall explain in the followingsection,the West's willrecognition.
with
to
deal
insurgentshas dramaticallyincreasedsince the end of
ingness
to bolthe Cold War. In response,insurgentshave expanded theirefforts
ster externalties; that is, to seek formalinternationalrecognitionthat
mareitherprovidesdiplomaticsupportat the expense of internationally
in
brokered
their
inclusion
or
facilitates
incumbents
externally
ginalized
Frequently,the energyinvestedby insurgents
governments.
power-sharing
in warfareis onlymatchedby diplomaticefforts,
therebypushingdomestic
intothebackground.
politicalagendas even further
The RCD's preoccupationwithinternational
recognitionas a legitimate
contenderfor Congolese state power was arguablythe veryreason why
intellectualslikeWamba weregrantedformalleadershipof the movement.
the RCD hiredlobbyingfirmsto representits
Mimickingotherinsurgents,
Valuable help came fromPresidentKabila himinterestsin Washington.18
self,whose erraticrule and close relationswithso-called rogue stateslike
14. Initially,however,it had hoped foran outrightmilitary
victory.
and theviolentreproduc15. PierreEnglebert,WhyCongoPersists:Sovereignty,
globalization,
tionofa weakstateQueen ElizabethHouse WorkingPaper No. 95 (Queen ElizabethHouse,
Oxford,2003).
Politicsand Society2
16. Stephen Ellis, 'The old roots of Africa'snew wars', International
(2003), p. 34. [http://www.fes.de/ipg/IPG2_2003/ZEITSCHRIFTE.HTM]
17. We do not findMkandawire'sexplanationforthis,e.g. the urban malaise, compelling,
not least because a good numberof the most violentacts by rebel movementshave taken
place in citieslike Bangui,Monrovia or Brazzaville.See Thandika Mkandawire,'The terrible
toll of postcolonial "rebel movements"in Africa:towards an explanationof the violence
againstthepeasantry',JournalofModernAfricanStudies40, 2 (2002), pp. 181-215.
28 October 1999.
du continent,
18. 'Etats-Unis/Congo-K:Emile Ilunga', La lettre

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THE HIDDEN COSTS OF POWER-SHARING

381

Libya and North Korea had compromisedhim in Westerneyes. ConseregardedKabila 'as itsbest asset'.19
quently,theRCD justifiably
Not onlyin Africadid the RCD make rapid diplomaticinroads,hailed
it also achievedde
by Vice-PresidentNgoma as 'the startofrecognition'20;
in
facto recognition the Westerncapitals (Paris, Brussels,Washington)
whichseveralRCD delegationsvisitedat an earlystageoftheinsurrection.21
Aftera tripto Paris,Ngoma was reportedto have:
countries
werereacting
andtheFrenchpositionon the
.. welcomedthewayWestern
circlesin Paris:
He admitted
havinghad contactsin government
disputein particular.
'It is myjob... France is a countrythathas understoodwhatwe are about,I am
eventsis a good sign[a referpleasedto say.The factthatitis keepingoutofcurrent
ence to Paris'sstrainedrelationswiththeRCD's Rwandanbackers].Of course,we
fortheinternational
to adopt
arelabel[1]edrebels,whichmakesitdifficult
community
forus to see that,in Africaas elsewhere,
we are not
a stance,but it is encouraging
aloneinthisbattle'.22

to the conventions
Ngoma's commentsare remarkablefortheirsensitivity
more
of juridical statehood and,
an understandingof its
importantly,
realmoverthepast decade.
changedoperationalnaturein theinternational
In thecase at hand,forexample,thethenUS assistantsecretary
ofstatefor
Africanaffairs,Susan Rice, held talkswithRCD officialsin Kigali shortly
contact
afterthestartoftherebellion(November1998) - 'thehighest-level
and the rebels.23Given past diployet' betweenthe US administration
matic practices,the talksin Kigali were a spectacularact of recognition.
international
conventionsbenefitinsurgenThey underlinedhow shifting
cies, whereas incumbentgovernmentsare no longer the privileged,let
alone sole interlocutors
of outsidepowers.
assistance
and conflict
Democracy
management
The ambiguitiesofWesternengagementin sub-SaharanAfricaand even
thelack of clearpoliticalstrategies
help to explaintheexacerbationofmilitarizedpoliticsoverthepast fifteen
years.
The politicalinconsistencies
ofWesterngovernments
havebeenparticularly
in
the
field
of
most
Western
damaging
democracy.Initially,
governments
19. 'Entrenched
andoverstretched',
9 October1998.
Africa
Confidential,

20. 'Africanforeignministersmeet rebel leaders in Goma', BBC Monitoring,

20 August

1998.

21. See the followingBBC Monitoring

reports:'Rebel leader says Kabila sellingoffthe
nationalheritage',2 October 1998; 'Ministers,rebel counterpartspeaks to Belgian paper
about health situation',6 October 1998; 'Rebel leader leads delegationto Washington',

19 October1998.
22. 'RebelleaderNgomapraisesFrench,Western
stanceon rebellion',
BBC Monitoring,
20 August1998.
23. 'US envoySusanRiceholdstalksin RwandawithDR Congorebels',BBC Monitoring,
6 November1998.

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382

AFRICANAFFAIRS

reforms
and embracedliberalpoliticalreform
as a
democratic
supported
as
and
Wiseman
forceforchangeon the continent.
However, Clapham
was
predictedin 1995, Westernpressurefordemocratization
correctly
cases
of
foul
for
a
few
boundto be ephemeral.24
egregious
Except
play,
to penalizereform-resistant
Westerncountriesshowedlittleinclination
In theformer
in one wayor another.
Zaire,forexample,the
governments
for
a
exercise
of
liberalization
(1990-96) proved frustrating
period political
alimentaires
to
Mobutucreateddozensofpartis
theopposition.President
donorssuspended
an alreadyfragmented
undermine
Although
opposition.
falforthedemocracy
movement
aid,initialWestern
support
development
endured.
teredthelongerthedomestic
powerstruggle
remainedthe exception.
of politicalconditionality
Strictenforcement
of
the1990s,thiswasevidenced
bythefactthattheevolution
Throughout
borelittlerelation
to theirsystem
African
countries
aid levelsofindividual
such as France'sclientsin C6te
Some governments,
of government.25
d'Ivoire,Togo and Cameroon,wereevenrewardedfortheirdemocratic
increased
bilateral
aid intheearly1990s.26
withsharply
recalcitrance
What
comstatesreceivedscantrewardforundertaking
is more,reform-minded
of
the
democratic
and
democratic
extensive
engineering,
quality
paratively
had no measurableimpacton aid levels.27
Hence,theparagovernance
embraced
as a
countries
that
Western
of
many
digm politicalconditionality
thanactual.
wasmorerhetorical
factor
ofaid allocation
determinant
tobe the
forinternational
thebattleground
proved
respectability
Ultimately,
fieldof electoralpoliticsthatWesterndonorsturnedinto the ultimate
ofthe
of democratic
However,theheavydominance
governance.
yardstick
of
and
state
executive
andtheoften
ruling
generally
blending
party
pervasive
counofpolitical
choicein manyAfrican
theoverallfreedom
circumscribed
to
these
or
tackle
a
revealed
actors
tries.
Western
strong
unwillingnessinability
the
frauduand
concomitant
of
behaviour
patterns political
deeplyingrained
findit
incumbents
As a consequence,
lentelectioneering.28
pastandpresent
while
electoral
formoreappropriate
demands
procedures,
easyto satisfy
fairly
a
conclusion.29
isinmanyinstancesforegone
oftheopposition
thedefeat
24. ChristopherClapham and JohnA. Wiseman, 'Conclusion: assessingthe prospectsfor
the consolidationof democracy',in JohnA. Wiseman (ed.), Democracyand PoliticalChangein
Sub-SaharanAfrica(Routledge,London, 1995), p. 228.
25. Nicolas van de Walle, AfricanEconomiesand thePoliticsofPermanent
Crisis,1979-1999
Press,Cambridge,2001), p. 268.
(CambridgeUniversity
inAfrica(Cambridge
26. Michael Brattonand Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic
Experiments
Press,Cambridge,1997), p. 241.
University
27. Van de Walle,AfricanEconomies,
pp. 268f.
and development
28. See, forexample,RichardSandbrook,ClosingtheCircle:Democratization
inAfrica(Zed Books, London, 2000), pp. 26-32.
29. Althoughusefulrecommendationswere formulatedby experts:see TimothyD. Sisk,
in Timothy
'Electionsand conflictmanagementsin Africa:conclusionsand recommendations',
D. Sisk and AndrewReynolds(eds), Electionsand Conflict
ManagementinAfrica(US Institute
forPeace, Washington,DC, 1998), pp. 145-71.

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THE HIDDEN COSTS OF POWER-SHARING

383

itis telling
industry,
Keepinginmindtheriseoftheelectionmonitoring
their
efforts
from
theoutthatmanyruling
influencing
partieshaveshifted
to thepre-election
comeofpollson electiondayitself(e.g.ballotstuffing)
of opposition
and theirsupthe intimidation
politicians
periodthrough
voters'listsor thebanningofopposition
manipulating
posedsupporters,
on groundsof
in the election(morerecently
figuresfromparticipation
as blockingopposition
accessto
Such techniques
'dubiousnationality').
in favouroftheincumthemediaand themassiveuse ofstateresources
ofelectoral
monas thefinalstatements
bentmayno longergo unnoticed,
Butoutsiders
bodiesroutinely
equally
itoring
pointtoseriousirregularities.
inthedira majorstepforward
affirm
thattheelections
represent
routinely
was issued,
Evenin instances
whereseverecriticism
ectionofdemocracy.
as was recently
thecase inNigeria,Rwanda,Zambiaand Malawi,donors
actionto upholdthecredihaveshiedawayfromtakinganyconsequential
withpoor
of
African
Many
governments
bility politicalconditionality.
international
credentials
arethusableto maintain
democratic
respectabilaid flow.
ityand,hence,a continued
thethirdwaveofdemocratization
In summary,
producedfewtangible
in
the
rules
of
the
changes
politicalgame.Perhapsworse,thesealofinterclaimundertheguiseof
thatincumbent
front-runners
nationallegitimacy
has createdimmensefrustration
electoraldemocracy
amongopposition
Fromtheirperspective,
it is a bitterironyof
leadersacrossthecontinent.
thepost-1989periodthattheirchancesto accessstatepowerwereonly
while'formerly'
authoritarian
incumbents
areableto
enhanced,
marginally
as electeddemocrats.
Allofthisis nottodenythattremencastthemselves
dousdemocratic
hasbeenachievedinsomeAfrican
but
countries,
progress
thispertainsmainlyto basic rights,a factorthatmayto some extent
remains
volatile.30
In a
fairly
explainwhypublicopinionaboutdemocracy
numberof African
one witnesses
theriseof soconsiderable
countries,
a euphemism
calledilliberal
forelectoral
where
democracies,
autocracies,
forelectoral
effective
non-existent.31
opportunities
changearesimply
of reasonsexplainWesternreluctance
to challengebad old
A variety
habitsin electoralautocracies.
One ofthemis thebeliefthataddedpressureon incumbents
to thisview,
mayprovecounterproductive.
According
strict
enforcement
ofpoliticalconditionality
further
destabilize
may
fragile
fuelviolenceby contenders.
politiesand potentially
Keepingthelid on
African
countries
incumbent
bytacitlysupporting
governments
maynot
30. In a briefing
andElectoral
Alternation:
paperbyAfrobarometer
(Democracy
Evolving
African
tendto declinewiththepasattitudes,
April2004), it is arguedthatdemocraticcommitments
sage of time, but can be reinvigoratedby an electoral alternationof power. See http://
www.afrobarometer.org/AfrobriefNo9.pdf.
31. There were ten democraciesin Africain 2002. See MontyG. Marshalland Ted Gurr,
Peace and Conflict2003: A globalsurveyof armedconflicts,
and
movements,
self-determination
ofMaryland,MD, 2003), p. 25.
democracy
(College Park,University

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384

AFRICANAFFAIRS

but thereis littledoubt thatthisapproachis still

qualifyas a viablestrategy,
statestowardsAfrica.This attitude,howof
Western
the
guiding
policies
calculationsof would-beleaderswho see
influence
the
ever,may strongly
littlechance to effecta turnoverof government
throughelections.Perceivin
a
situationwhere,at least in
the
to
state
as
blocked
path
power being
ing
created
the
should
be
has
it
widespreadsentimentamong
open,
theory,
are
a
that
they fighting futilepoliticalbattle.
oppositionpoliticians
towarddemocratization
stance
of
Westerngovernments
The ambivalent
of oppositiongroups securingelectionto
and the perceivedimpossibility
officesends powerfulsignals.Not mincinghis words,Jean-Frangois
Bayart
has accused theEuropean Union and itsmemberstatesofhaving
... generallyblocked the political revolutionsthat alone would have led to the transformationof the productivetextureof societies. In so doing, Europe has condemned

ofa paraintheform
ofcivilwarsandinterventions
turmoil
tofurther
Africa
military
colonialor proto-colonial
typebysomeSub-Saharanstates.32

thisobservation.33
in C6te d'Ivoireseemto confirm
The recentdevelopments
Front
the
the
1990s,
populaireivoirien(FPI)
oppositionparties
Throughout
were
and Rassemblement
(RDR)
exposed to all sorts
dcmocratique
rdpublicain
Internationalreactionsto the
of electoralmanipulationby thegovernment.
obviouslyriggedelectionsin both 1990 and 1995 werelukewarmat best.34
in the
France's rhetoricof democracybonuses and politicalconditionality
wake ofPresidentMitterrand'sLa Baule speechmusthave sounded particularlyhypocriticalin that country.When, at the end of 1999, a mutiny
turnedintoa coup againstthe ailingBedie regime,both oppositionparties
wereallegedlypreparingtheirown coups d'&tat,indicatingthatrecourseto
thatboth partieswere contemplating
violencewas alreadyan instrument
unsurprisingly.35
In early2000 the FPI and the RDR wererepresentedin the transitional
governmentof the coup leader General Guei, certainlyas a recognitionof
theirpoliticalweight,but perhapsalso oftheir'spoilingcapacities'.Subsequentlythe RDR was excluded fromgovernmentand its leader,Alassane
Ouattara,was barredfromstandingas a candidatein the 2000 presidential
elections. Rumours circulatedof coup preparationsby militaryofficers

32. Jean-Frangois
Bayart,'Commentary:towardsa new startforAfricaand Europe', African
Affairs103, 412 (2004), p. 456.
206 (2003) 'Dossier C6te d'Ivoire' and
33. See the special issues of AfriqueContemporaine
PolitiqueAfricaine89 (2003) 'La C6te d'Ivoire en guerre';on French involvementsee espede la C6te
a
cially Stephen Smith, 'La politique d'engagementde la France l'apreuve
89 (2003), pp. 112-26.
d'Ivoire',PolitiqueAfricaine
34. One of the presentauthorsservedas an electionmonitorin an ill-definedobservation
mission to C6te d'Ivoire in 1995 and can attestto this. The professionalstandardof, for
example, EU election observationmissions improvedin the late 1990s. However, more
importantis thepoliticalwillto use thefindingsand reportsofthemissions.
in Abidjan,February2000.
35. Source: interviews

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THE HIDDEN COSTS OF POWER-SHARING

385

close to theRDR, and thepolarizationof the country'spoliticalsystemset

the stageforfurther
politicalviolence.
involvementof externalactors,or
A second aspect of the involuntary
rathertheirinaction,is important.The governmentin Crte d'Ivoire did
not have substantialdefence capacities by the end of the 1990s. The
nationalarmywas alwaysless important
forthe securityoftheregimethan
the presenceof Frenchtroops.This meantthatnecessaryinvestments
in
thenationalarmyor thegendarmerie
werenevermade.36The coincidence
of France's relativedisengagement- in Africaas a whole and in C6te
- and thedeep internalcrisisprovedto be an importd'Ivoirein particular
ant factoraggravating
the conflict:thehastyrecruitment
ofyoungsoldiers,
sometimesinformally,
led to the creationof uncontrollableunitsand to a
less discriminateuse of violence in the period between 2000 and 2002.
The September2002 rebellionmet littleresistanceby the securityforces
and only a late and half-hearted
reactionby the French militarywhich,
thatthe
however,saved the Gbagbo regime.It was onlyin the aftermath
- again at a highly
regimeexpanded its militarycapabilitiessubstantially
problematicpace and by verysuspectmeans. On balance, the long-lasting
but decliningmilitary
tutelageby an outsideforceprovedto be detrimental
to a peacefulsettlement
of the crisiswhichhad arguablybeen preparedby
France's ambivalentpoliticalrolein the countrythroughout
the 1990s.
The case of C6te d'Ivoirelends supportto thefindingthatstatesunderi.e. statesgovernedby hybridregimes,are six timesmore
goingtransition,
than
democracies
and two and a halftimesmorelikelythanautocralikely
cies to witnessoutbreaksof societalwars.37 Needless to say,thisdoes not
establish a causal relationshipbetween Western ambivalence towards
(flawed)democratization
processes,on theone hand,and theriseofinsurgencymovements,on the other.And, of course, insurgenciesoftentake
place in countriesthatdo notevenqualifyas electoralautocracies.However,
manyinternalconflictsoriginatein failedexperimentsin democratization
as, forexample,the cases of Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi,Congo-Brazzaville
or theDRC suggest.
As a result,most Westerngovernments
and organizationsshiftedtheir
prioritiesin Africafromsupportof democracyto thefieldsof conflictprenotionsof'stability'
vention,conflictmanagementor back to Cold war-type
in the course of the 1990s.38 Still Africaremainsthe continentwiththe
36. An interesting
account is givenby the Franco-CanadianjournalistGuy-AndreKieffer,
who 'disappeared' in C6te d'Ivoire in 2004: 'Arm6eivoirienne:le refusdu d6classement',
PolitiqueAfricaine78 (2000), pp. 26-44. See also the anonymousarticle(CDG), 'L'armbe
ivoirienne:de la marginalisation
193 (2000), pp.
iala prisedu pouvoir',AfriqueContemporaine
9-12.
37. See Marshalland Gurr,Peace and Conflict
2003, p. 17.
38. For the case of the European Union, see Gorm Rye Olsen, 'Promotingdemocracy,
Politics39 (2002), pp.
preventingconflict:the European Union and Africa',International
311-28.

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386

AFRICANAFFAIRS

forthis
highestincidenceofviolentconflict.Even thoughtheresponsibility
be
fact
should
not
attributed
to
outside
it
remains
actors,
disturbing
solely
nonethelesstruethatthe foreignpolicies of Westerncountriescontinueto
have an appreciableimpacton politicalprocesseson the continent.What
explainsthe highnumbersof conflicts,in spite of the purportedattempts
of the West to solve or even preventthem?As alreadynoted, inconsistent
supportfordemocracyis one possible explanationforthisoutcome. Furthermore,thepervasivenessof conflictsin Africamaybe linkedto conceptual weaknessesunderlying
Westernpolicyshiftsfromdemocracysupport
to conflictmanagementand prevention,notablytheneglectedrelationship
betweendemocracyand violentconflict.Finally,thefailureto preventviolent conflictmay be attributedto a bias for conflictmanagementat the
expenseofprevention.For all theprideofplace thathas been givento conremainsas salientas ever.All of
flictprevention,reactivedecision-making
this seems to underscorethe harsh verdictthat there 'is no discernible
project that the West somehow seeks to impose on Africa.Rather,the
Westernpostureis one of seekingto be engagedat low cost.'39
Westernattemptsat resolvingongoingconflictsare characterizedbylimeffective
ited engagement.Confrontedwithincreasingly
pressurefromthe
human rightsgroupsto 'do something',standing
media and international
back and lettingconflictsrun theircourse is not an optionwhichWestern
At the same time,theWest is demcan easilycontemplate.40
governments
sucked in to Africanconflicts,parto
be
an
reluctance
obvious
onstrating
after
the
disastrous
experiencesin Somalia and Rwanda. Crisis
ticularly
countries
turn
of eventsin insurgency-affected
the
to
influence
diplomacy
has become the option of choice to finda compromisebetweenthe counand consequentiality.
tervailing
logicsof appropriateness
This reactivebehaviourhas typicallytaken the formof power-sharing
A specific
and insurgencies.41
agreementsbetweenembattledgovernments
are
instrumentof conflictmediation,power-sharingagreements
usually
brokeredin stalled conflictswhere neitherside has the militaryclout to
decisivelydefeatthe other.They include the negotiatingof a peace settlement between incumbentsand rebels that provides for the partitionof
power withina governmentof national unity.This is followedby provisions for a political transitionwhose end-pointis multipartyelections.
Peace settlementsare oftenaccompanied by the deploymentof a United
Nations peacekeeping mission to support the transition.The logic of
power-sharingrests on the assumptionthat the accommodation of the
39. Herbstand Mills, 'The futureofAfrica',p. 40.
40. See, forexample,the evolutionof the 'public pressurecurve' thatrose in regardto the
Ituriconflictand the ethniccleansingin Darfur.
41. Ian S. Spears, 'Understandinginclusivepeace agreementsin Africa:the problemsof
21, 1 (2000), pp. 105-18.
sharingpower', ThirdWorldQuarterly

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THE HIDDEN COSTS OF POWER-SHARING

387

demands
ofanti-regime
movements
hasthepotential
to demilitarize
the

political context.Likewise,it is believed that power-sharinginstitutions

'promotemoderateand cooperativebehaviouramong contendinggroups
a positive-sum
by fostering
perceptionofpoliticalinteractions'.42
To date,therecordofpower-sharing
agreementsappearsto be mixedat
mediatorshave assumedthattheirjob
best,not leastbecause international
is all but finishedwiththe signingceremonyof peace accords.43This article cannotoffera criticalsurveyofthe effectiveness
ofinternationally
brokered power-sharingagreementsin regard to the restorationof peace.
Rather,it seeks to outline some of the fallaciesand unintendedconseas a generalpracticeof
quences thatoutsiders'promotionofpower-sharing
peacemakingmay unfold.We shall startwithan overviewof the changed
international
contextin whichcontemporary
are operating.
insurgents
Conquestbypower-sharing
The role ofinsurgency
movementsin worldpoliticsunderwentdramatic
in
the
Cold
changes
post
War-period,enhancing their international
Prior
to
the
standing.44
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the superpowers regardedinsurgencymovementsas useful instrumentsto wage
proxybattlesin manypartsof the southernhemisphere.While strategic
intereststherefore
lentinternational
weightto rebelgroups,the exigencies
of a bipolar international
and
international
conventionsstillput a
system
premiumon the incumbentgovernmentof a sovereignstate. Since even
Cold War competition
was framedbyjuridicalsovereignty,
externalsupport
forinsurgents
facedcertainlimits,and staterulers- thosecontrolling
the
capital- wereclearlyin an advantageousposition.Their incumbentstatus
guaranteedan access to outsideresources(military,
economic,diplomatic)
farsuperiorto thoseavailableto theirrebelchallengers.
These mechanismshave undergonea major shiftsince the end of the
Cold War, even as the 'negativesovereignty'
associatedwithThird World
politiescontinuesto protectthe stateas a juridicalentity.In the process,
the state'ssovereignty
appears to have been somewhatde-linkedor even
separatedfromthoseclaimingto representit,i.e. incumbentgovernments.
42. Caroline Hartzell and MatthewHoddie, 'Institutionalizing
peace: power sharingand
post-civilwarconflictmanagement',American
JournalofPoliticalScience47, 2 (2003), p. 318.
43. See StephenJohnStedman,Donald Rothchildand ElizabethM. Cousens (eds), Ending
Civil Wars: The implementation
of peace agreements
(Lynne Rienner,Boulder, CO, 2002);
Occasional
TimothyD. Sisk, Peacemakingin Civil Wars: Obstacles,options,and opportunities
Paper (The JoanB. Kroc InstituteforInternationalPeace Studies,South Bend, IL, 2001);
Roland Paris, At War's End: Buildingpeace aftercivil war (Cambridge UniversityPress,
Cambridge,2004).
44. The introduction
to thissectionreliesheavilyon ChristopherClapham's work.See his
Africaand theInternational
System(CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,1996), chap. 9,
and 'Degrees of statehood',ReviewofInternational
Studies24 (1998), pp. 143-57.

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388

AFRICANAFFAIRS

The impositionof economic conditionalities

and
by Westerngovernments
the international
financialinstitutions
as well as theirincreasingcollaboration withnon-stateactors (primarily
NGOs), indeed the sideliningof the
in
the
of
field
state,notably
'development',presentsa vividillustrationof
thischange.45
The most spectacularmarkerof this shiftrelatesto internationalattitudes towardsinsurgencymovementssince 1989. As a rule,theirinternationalstatusreached even higherlevelsoverthe last decade or so, but this
rise occurred for reasons that differedgreatlyfrom those factorsthat
underpinnedtheimportanceofrebelmovementsduringthe Cold War era.
Since internalconflictswereno longerdefinedas a functionof superpower
competition,the raisond'itreof wagingproxywars was no longerclear.
wars (overthe incumbentgovRatherthanseekingto win insurgency/civil
ernmentallied withtherivalsuperpower),outsiders,and Westernstatesin
particular,espoused at least a rhetoricalcommitmentto bringinginternal
warsto an end.
A sharp decline of vitalinterestsand changes at the internationallevel,
the domesticlevel,or sometimesboth (forexample,France), was accompanied by the rollingback of Westerninvolvementin the domesticaffairs
thiswas also the case in countriesthatwitof Africanstates.Significantly,
nessed armed conflictsor the emergenceof insurgencies.As a result,the
verysame reasons that inclined outside powers to abjure fightingproxy
warsalso meantthatstrongpoliticalengagementto preventand solve violent conflictin Africawas unlikely.This developmentsignalledan important departure from previous external attitudes, to the extent that
incumbentsno longerenjoyedsolid access to outside supportand hence
guaranteesof politicalsurvival,even on judicial groundssuch as incumbency or sovereigntywhich had given them a distinctadvantage in the
Cold War context.Conversely,armed non-statemovementswere more
relationsof sovereignstatesas outreadilyintegratedintothe international
sidersattemptedto solve violentconflictin war-torncountries.Because of
ofpower-sharing
Westernactorsturnedto theinstrument
limitedinterests,
therecogan approachthatrequiresby definition
to terminatethefighting,
nitionof all the warringparties,includingthe insurgents.Thus, it entailsa
major adjustmentin the domesticbalance of power,since externalactors
in favourof insurgentsat the expense of
level the politicalplaying-field
stateleaders:
Instead of regardingone partyas representingthe state, and the othersas opposing it,
external mediators came to conceive all the parties as subsisting on a more or less
equal footing; their function in turn was no longer to protect those who could
45. Firoze Manji amd Carl O'Coill, 'The missionaryposition:NGOs and developmentin
78, 3 (2002), pp. 578-80.
Africa',International
Affairs

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THE HIDDEN COSTS OF POWER-SHARING

389

to achievea political
settlement
thestate,butrather
.to represent
through
claim..,
ofallthecompeting
parties.46
recognition
This is notto saythatoutsiderswerealwayswillingto engagewithinsurwas in everyinstancea
gents on politicaltermsand that power-sharing
thattheneighbouring
counforegoneconclusion.However,it is significant
countriesin Africaoftenshowedmorehostility
triesofinsurgency-affected
thantheWestern-ledinternational
towardsinsurgencies
community.Such
ofSenegalin Guineainterventions
cases include,forexample,themilitary
Bissau (1998) and the jointintervention
by South Africaand Botswanain
were drivenby concernsabout politLesotho (1998). These interferences
in theirimmediateneighbourhood(Lesotho),
ical and economicinstability
the imminentdisplacementof friendly
regimesby insurgentssuspectedof
in
rebels
the
intervening
country(insurgentGeneralMane and
supporting
the Casamangaisrebelsin Guinea-Bissau/Senegal)and, last but not least,
theprospectof a presumedeasymilitary
victoryovertheinsurgencies.
In anotherset of cases, sub-regionalresponseswere less resolute.In
Liberia, the Economic Communityof West AfricanStates peacekeeping
forceECOMOG preventedCharles Taylor's military
victoryin 1990 but
showedlittleinclinationto givePresidentDoe decisivesupport.Even less
help came fromDoe's formerkeyally,the United States. Given its sharp
dropofinterestsin Liberiaafter1989, it did no morethanevacuateitsresidentsfromMonroviaalthoughthedeploymentof 2,000 Marineshad creAftera dozen unsuccessfulattemptsto brokera
ated otherexpectations.47
theAbuja accordsusheredin a transitional
peace settlement,
arrangement.
Verysimilarresponsesoccurredin SierraLeone. First,the international
communityrefusedto recognizethe Koroma regimethathad overthrown
PresidentKabbah in May 1997. Likewise,ECOMOG troopsdislodgedthe
United Front (RUF) insurgentsfromFreetownin January
Revolutionary
1999. Even so, theNigeriangovernment
was unwillingto extendthepresence of its ECOMOG troopsin the countryafterthe 1999 Nigerianelections, althoughit was commonlyknownthat the RUF was not a spent
force.Nigeriaas well as theUS urgedKabbah to negotiatewiththerebels,
a movethatresultedin theLome agreement.48
The insurrection
thattoppled PresidentPatasse in the CentralAfrican
Republic in 2003 was condemnedby the AfricanUnion but was quickly
et monetaire
de l'Afrique
centrale
recognizedby the Communauti
economique
(CEMAC). The French(technical)supportforthe CEMAC peacekeepers
who did not interveneto save Patass6was a clearindicationthatthe rebels
46. Clapham,'Degrees ofstatehood',p. 153.
47. StephenEllis, TheMask ofAnarchy:Thedestruction
dimension
ofLiberiaand thereligious
of
an Africancivilwar (Hurst& Co, London, 1999), p. 4.
48. William Reno, 'The failureof peacekeepingin Sierra Leone', CurrentHistory(May
2001), pp. 220f.

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390

AFRICANAFFAIRS

offormerchiefof staffFrangoisBoziz6 had securedthenecessarydegreeof

intervention
in C6te d'Ivoirein 2002 was
outsidesupport.France's military
characterizedby similarambiguities.Paris preventedthe military
victoryof
theinsurgency,
but it refusedto takesideswiththeGbagbo government.
The 'containmentapproach'to internalconflictsrequiresnot onlyexternal recognitionof insurgents.By puttinga premiumon violence,it also
leaves civilianoppositionpartiesin an uneasyposition.Irrespectiveoftheir
in negotiations,
participation
theyare eitherforcedto takea pro-government
position(and riskbeingdealtwithas a negligiblepartner)or a pro-rebellion
position(exposingthemselvesto all sortsof accusations).49
oftheWest,theonlywayto overcometheconundrum
Fromtheperspective
has been a low-keyengageoflimitedinterests
and theurge'to do something'
insurrections
are conceivedof as legitimate
effective
ment,wherebymilitarily
in domesticpowerstruggles.
stakeholders
Regardlessof theiroftenappalling
international
consideration.
humanrights
record,theirpowerwarrants
Perhaps the most infamouscase is that of the RUF rebels in Sierra
of nationalunityfollowLeone, who wereincorporatedinto a government
ing the July1999 Lome peace agreement.Similarprocessesare currently
takingplace in Burundi,whereWesternactorscontinueto pressforincluand disturbingly
sivepeace talksat anycost.Most recently,
so, theEuropean
Union allegedlycontinuedto urgethe Forcesnationalesde liberation
(FNL)
to join peace talkseven in the immediatewake of the assault on a refugee
camp in August2004 whichleftsome 160 people dead and forwhichthe
FNL had claimedresponsibility.50
Early and recurrentexamples of a rathersuccessfulstrategyto profit
from foreign-sponsored(but nationally-brokered)
power-sharingagreemovementspromentsare to be foundin Chad. There, politico-military
vide illustrationsof violent rent-seeking,inasmuch as the change from
civilianpartyagent to rebel leader (and back again) is common. Both of
the country'smostprominentpoliticians- PresidentIdrissDeby and the
chairmanof the National Assembly,'General' AbdelkaderKamougue wereat one point're-civilized'warlords.The tworebelmovements,Comit?
de sursautnationalpourla paix et la dimocratie
(underMoise Kette) and its
were recognizedas
the Forcesarmeespour la republique
fgdkrale,
offspring,
rankbefore
ministerial
politicalpartiesin 1994 and 1998.51 Kett6 enjoyed
succeeded wherethe RDR
49. In the case of C6te d'Ivoirethe northernrebellioneffectively
Marcoussispeace accord in January2003 addressedboththe
had failed:theFrench-brokered
main structuralcauses of the conflictand the northerngrievances.But the equally Frenchat the followingK16bersummit(withthe entryof rebel
brokeredpower-sharing
arrangement
as puttinga premiumon violence(and
ministersintothe government)was widelyinterpreted
discreditedthe Frenchmediationin the eyesof some majorplayers).
50. 'UN weighssituationin Burundifollowingmassacre',Reuters,15 August2004. On the
Burundianpeace process,see thereportingoftheInternationalCrisisGroup.
51. However,in the case ofFARF thishappened onlyafterthe murderofitsleaderLaokein
Bard6 who was probablybetrayedby his own followers.

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THE HIDDEN

COSTS OF POWER-SHARING

391

slippingout of the sinecuresystemand foundinga new rebel movement

(beforebeingmurderedin 2001). This is thepurestformofpolitico-militin that it entailsblackmailingsinecuresby military
ary entrepreneurship
means.
Strategiesof shiftingfrompeaceful to violent opposition (and back
again) can be veryhelpfulto provea certainnuisancecapacityas thebasis
rentsofviolence,namelyinclusionin government.
The comforattracting
plementforlowerranksis theforcingofmaterialrewardsin theframework
The bill is usuallypaid by some donor
of demobilizationprogrammes.52
in vain - to contributeto sustainable
organizationshoping- frequently
fospeace. The oppositemightbe actuallycloserto thetruth:rent-creating
behaviour.While spoilerscan hardlybe ignored,it is
ters rent-seeking
highlydangeroussimplyto rewardthem.
By the same token,thethreemutinies(1996-97) in the CentralAfrican
Republiccan be partlyexplainedby the 'rentsofviolence'syndrome.The
ended by forminga coalitiongovernment
crisiswas temporarily
including
all politicalcamps and the rebels.Formerheads of stateand chairmenof
politicalpartiesDacko and Kolingbareceivedsubstantialstatepensionsto use it.53In a couninducementsto renounceviolenceafterthreatening
where
recurrent
from
France,is necessaryto pay
try
budgetaryaid, mainly
of
the
arrears
in
the
civil
service
salary
(at one point peakingat 29
part
of
months unpaid salaries), this arrangementamounted to a foreignsponsoredsubventionforthesetwoleaders,whereasthemaincauses ofthe
conflictwerehardlyaddressed.
In summary,significantchanges in Western foreignpolicies toward
Africahave emergedsince the early1990s. These relatefirstto the somewhattacitpressurefordemocratization
beyondthelevelofelectoralprocedures and, second, to the internationalrecognition of insurgency
of embattledgovernments
ofweak statesand
movements,to the detriment
ofthecivilianopposition.Both aspectstouchupon domesticprocessesthat
have arguablydominatedpoliticaleventsover the last 15 years:political
reformand violent conflict.The relationshipwe hypothesizebetween
flaweddemocracyand violentconflictis thatthe road to statepower in
electoralautocraciesis usuallyclosed to non-violentpoliticalactors.The
struggleforaccess to statepowerby oppositionpoliticians,oftenpursued
at greatpersonalrisk,cannotpay off.At the same time,oppositionpoliticians and otherwould-beleadersobserveradicallydifferent
responsesfrom
Western governmentsto violent political action in insurgency-affected
52. See, forexample,Mike Crawley,'Fewerguns,buttensionspersistin Liberia',TheChristian
ScienceMonitor,28 October2004.
53. AndreasMehler,'Meutereider Armeeund Tribalisierung
von Politikin der "demokratisiertenNeokolonie" Zentralafrikanische
Republik (ZAR)', in Heidrun Zinecker (ed.),
Unvollendete
in Nichtmarktikonomien
Demokratisierung
(Fakultas,Amsterdam,1999), p. 208.

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392

AFRICAN
AFFAIRS

on the rebelpathimposethemwherestrongmen
countries,
embarking
theWestis usuallywillingto
facts
which
selvesby establishing
political
effective
tactics
to
Western
insurgencies
engagemilitarily
buy-in
accept.
theirincorporation
theirdemandsbyadvocating
into
andto accommodate
to
forthe sake of 'peace' amountto an incentive
nationalgovernments
haverecourseto violenceto conquerstatepower,or at leastto receivea
Overthepast15 years,thislogicwasatwork
seatatthebargaining
table.54
the
in Burundi,Rwanda,
DRC, SierraLeone, Liberia,C6te d'Ivoire,
Sudan,CentralAfrican
Republicand Chad.
is partly
ofwould-beleadersturnedinsurgents
thebehaviour
As a result,
estabthatoutsideactorsareunwittingly
structures
a responseto incentive
usedto assertnewclaims
Thisis partoftheextraversion
strategies
lishing.
whichare farfrombeingthe privileged
on resourcesand to authority
thatthehypothesized
This observation
domainofstaterulers.55
suggests
with
betweenthe insurgent
path and Westernengagement
relationship
Whatcouldprovidemore
actorsis farfromspeculative.
violentnon-state
evidencethanthefactthatinsurgents
go to greatlengthto set
compelling
internawith
relations
international
and
maintain
foreign
governments,
up
Shouldthehypothesis
tionalNGOs andtransnational
actors?56
concerning
andinsurgent
violencebe valid,it
incentives
betweenexternal
theinterplay
ill
fortheprevention
that
bodes
reflects
a troubling
politicaldevelopment
inAfrica.
ofconflicts
casessetforwould-beleadindividual
effects
Beyondthedemonstration
whether
itis also questionable
ersin othercountries,
agreepower-sharing
of peace insidewar-torn
mentsare trulyconduciveto the establishment
seem
countries.First,some factionleaderstakingpartin negotiations
conclusive
inachieving
Rather,
theyparticipagreements.
barelyinterested
most
forthesakeofmaterial
endlessnegotiations
ateinseemingly
benefits,
leadersofarmedgroupshave
in Somalia,wherethemostpowerful
notably
ofa Somalian
heldpeacetalksformanyyearseventhoughtheresurrection
stateis clearlynotin theirinterest.57
Second,evenwherepoliticalsettlementsare achieved,any chanceto returnto some degreeof normality
allowmanyrebelleadersto
formulas
seemsto be remote.Power-sharing
the
muchas inwartime
behaveinoffice
(i.e. Sankoh,Taylor),thustapping
54. Reno, 'The failureofpeacekeeping'.
55. RobertLatham,Ronald Kassimirand Thomas M. Callaghy,'Introduction:
transboundary
order,and authority',in Thomas M. Callaghy,Ronald Kassimir,
formations,intervention,
in Afri'ca(Cambridge University
and Transnationalism
Robert Latham (eds), Intervention
Bayart,'Africain the world:a historyof extraPress,Cambridge,2001), p.13; Jean-Frangois
99, 395 (2000), pp. 217-67.
version',AfricanAffairs
56. See CliffordBob, 'Marketingrebellion: insurgentgroups, internationalmedia, and
Politics38 (2001), pp. 311-34.
NGO support',International
57. MartinDoornbos, 'State collapse and freshstarts:some criticalreflections',
Development
and Change33, 5 (2002), p. 807.

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THE HIDDEN COSTS OF POWER-SHARING

393

rentsas well as
combined revenuesderivingfrompeace and sovereignty
war economies.
defy
Third, some agreementsare so complicatedthat theyeffectively
implementation.Without significantand long-termexternal backing,
theseagreementsare bound to collapse and ignitea returnto war. Fourth,
runs
the notionof inclusionthatunderpinsthe conceptof power-sharing
the riskof generatingevermoreinsurgentgroupsthatare not includedin
oftheRCD
anygivensettlement.
Again,the Congo warand thetrajectory
insurgencyare revealingin thisregard,forthe Lusaka accord conveyeda
powerfuland unanimousmessage to some partiesto the conflict.While
insurgenciesmaybe proneto defections,it is no coincidencethatas soon
transitionalgovernment)
as the politicaltermsof Lusaka (power-sharing,
had been established,the defectionsfromthe RDC and the proliferation
of smallerinsurgenciesstartedin earnest,includingthe RCD-National
even furtherinto facand the RCD-ML whichprogressively
fragmented
tions led by Wamba, Tibasima, Nyamwisi and Lubanga, strivingto
become rebel leaders in theirown right.Given the underlyinglogic of
power-sharing
agreementsaccordingto whichall armedinsurgentsare to
be included in negotiations,these personalitiesunderstandablyexpected
to be treatedaccordinglyby the mediators;indeed, thiswas the veryreason the new rebel groupswere created.58By stickingto the principleof
inclusive
negotiationsforthe sake ofpeace, the mediatorswereconfronted
with the problem of accommodatingthe demands of an ever growing
numberof factions.In the end, protracteddiscussionswere requiredto
decide whetherand how the new factionsshould be included.Given that
only a small minorityof embattledgovernmentsis confrontedby one
insurgencymovementalone, the proliferationof rebel groups amidst
ongoinginternalwars may well be an indirectresultof loomingpowersharingaccords.
Conclusion
In the early1990s, therewas much talkboth inside and outsideAfrica
to theeffectthatviolenttakeoversof statepowerwould no longerbe permitted.Bodies such as the Organizationof AfricanUnityeven declared
that putschleaders would no longer be granted outside recognition.
Intended to discourage army officersfromstagingcoups d'&tat, such
laudable discoursesnow seem to be outdated,to the extentthatviolence
remainsan effectiveinstrumentto access state power in Africawhichis

58. A similarpointis made by Kidane Mengisteab,'Africa'sintrastateconflicts:relevance

and limitations
ofdiplomacy',AfricanIssues32 (2004), pp. 37f.

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394

AFRICANAFFAIRS

subsequentlylegitimizedby externalactors in theirhapless attemptsto

limitthe damage.59
It is our conclusion that externaleffortsto terminateinternalwarfare
maybe as much partof the problemas theyare partof the solution.Like
emergencyassistance and developmentaid, conflictmanagementis an
in whichmoralambitions
immenselycomplexfieldofpoliticalintervention
to createdesiredoutcomes.60This is so because the
alone are not sufficient
ofpeaceuse ofpower-sharing
indiscriminate
agreementsas an instrument
makingbringsunintendedbut potentiallydangerousconsequences. The
for
of power-sharingcreatesa degree of predictability
institutionalization
Falling shortof outrightmilitaryvicpoliticallyambitiousentrepreneurs.
tory,insurgentscan reasonablyexpectto receiveparcels of statepower in
returnfor'peace'. A host of power-sharing
agreementsin Africasince the
early1990s has set numerousprecedentswhichhave createdan opportunelsewhere.Neglectingthis contexitystructureforviolententrepreneurs
tual dimensioncarriestheriskofunnuancedreporting,
wherebyinsurgents
are eitherportrayedas 'freedomfighters'or, more often,as 'greed-driven
warlords'.Making sense of contemporary
insurgenciestherefore
begs the
considerationof the nexus of internaland externalfactorsand its bearing
on the motives,trajectoryand outcome of any giveninsurgency.Perhaps
attemptsat conflictresolutionhave thus undermined
counter-intuitively,
theperspectiveof conflictprevention.
As a result,outside actors keen to resolveviolentinternalconflictsin
Africaface a profounddilemma.To overcomeit,two ratherbold solutions
come to mind: first,let conflictsrun theircourse; second, alwaysprovide
support (diplomatically,militarily)to incumbent regimes attacked by
insurgents.The firstone echoes Luttwak's (in)famousproposal to 'give
war a chance', which argues that inept meddlingby outsidershas often
One
postponed peace and perpetuated war and human suffering.61
2004
of
November
the
events
before
observeroftheIvoriancrisis even
in
this
kind
reiteratedthisreasoningin the followingterms:'Interposition,
of case, is a guarantee for lasting crisis. [France] should have either
crushedtherebellionor let it go on.'62
59. In accordance with its protocol, the Economic Communityof West AfricanStates
(ECOWAS) decisivelyintervendedto reversethe coup d'etat in Togo and to re-establishthe
orderin early2005. Intriguingly,
constitutional
however,even beforethe resultsof the April
electionswereannounced,thechairmanoftheAfricanUnion, OlusegunObasanjo, conveneda
meetingbetweenFaure Gnassingb6and oppositionleader GilchristOlympioin Abuja in the
ofthe
ofnationalunityin Togo irrespective
ofa government
vainhope to brokertheformation
outcomesofthepresidential
polls.
60. On emergencyassistance,see MaryB. Anderson,Do No Harm:How aid can support
peace
or war (Lynne Rienner,Boulder, CO, 1999); on developmentaid, see Peter Uvin, Aiding
in Rwanda (KumarianPress,WestHartford,CT, 1998).
Violence:Thedevelopment
enterprise
78 (1999), pp. 36-44.
61. Edward N. Luttwak,'Give war a chance', ForeignAffairs
Le Figaro,15 October2004.
62. Quoted in 'Une crisetestpour les relationsFrance-Afrique',

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THE HIDDEN COSTS OF POWER-SHARING

395

Luttwak'sargumentis somewhatcomAlthoughthelogicunderpinning
pelling,itslimitsare numerous.Most notablyit neglectsthefactthatmany
'civilwars' are not - strictly
speaking- internal,a pointwhichaccounts
character(forexample,Angola,
fortheirdurability
and evenself-sustaining
Sudan). Lettingthem'bleed out' hardlypasses forthe trulyhumanitarian
thingto do. Again invokingthe recentcase of C6te d'Ivoire,it is by no
means a foregoneconclusionthat an eventualcaptureof Abidjan by the
would have ended thewar.As forprovidingexclusivesupportto
insurgents
incumbentgovernments,
it is self-evident
that such a policy will almost
inevitablyentrenchautocraticregimes,in turnforestalling
any chance of
promotingpositivepoliticalchange.
Outsideactorsneed to recognizethattheshort-term
quellingofconflicts
in theguiseofpower-sharing
is not to be confoundedwithpeace. In Sierra
Leone as well as Liberia, forexample,power-sharing
agreements(Lomb
and Abuja) resultedin each case in a disastrousand unsustainable'warlord's peace' whichtriggered
further
insurgentviolence.63Given the gross
humanrightsabuses the rebelscommittedduringthe war,
and systematic
itwas short-sighted
to presumethattheywould changetheirattitudesonce
were
offices.
they
occupyinggovernment
Since more conflictswill surelyerupt and peace settlementsin some
formor anotherwill invariablybe brokered,we therefore
put forwardtwo
external
brokers
need
to
the
raise
thresholdwhichgrants
proposals.First,
a place at thenegotiating
table.As such,it is imperative
to think
insurgents
beyond violence as the primarymeasure of political inclusion. Armed
serioushumanrights
groupspreyingon local communitiesand committing
abuses should be disqualifiedas negotiatingpartners.By contrast,some
rebels provide some measure of order or even collectivegoods such as
receivea politicalpremiumin negotiasecurity,and theyshould therefore
out functions
thata government
tions,fortheycome at leastcloseto carrying
is supposed to fulfil.
Needless to say,efforts
to promoteaccountability
and legitimacyin the
fieldof conflictresolutionwillnot preventviolententrepreneurs
fromconqueringstatepower,but theyare at least a stepto limitingthelawlessness
and impunitythat characterizesinsurgency-affected
countrieseven after
the conflictis terminated.One wayto promoteaccountability
even during
conflictswould be the institutionalization
of criminalinvestigations
to be
undertakenby internationally
sanctionedjuridicalbodies (for example,
special courtssuch as in SierraLeone; or theInternationalCriminalCourt
in the case ofthe DR Congo) in the wake of or even amidsteveryinternal
63. Amos Sawyer,'Violent conflictsand governancechallengesin West Africa:the case
of the Mano River basin area', Journalof ModernAfricanStudies42, 4 (2004), p. 451;
AdekeyeAdebajo, 'Liberia: a warlord'speace', in Stedman etal., EndingCivil Wars,pp.
599-630.

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396

AFRICAN
AFFAIRS

criminal investigations
conflict.64The threat of internationally-backed
to
restrain
the
worst
abuses. It should
all
against warringpartiesmayhelp
to gain
send a messageto would-beleadersthatrawpoweris not sufficient
as
in
national
stakeholders
international
powerstruggles.For if
recognition
live
to
certain
or
to
are
unable
standards,it is safe to
unwilling
up
they
assume that theywill be unlikelyto play a constructivepart in the postconflictperiod.
All of thisdoes not releaseWesternactorsfromthe necessitymore generallyto rethinktheirpolicies towardsAfrica.In lightof both the poor
recordof conflictresolutionas well as post-conflict
peace-buildingwhere
significantresources and energyare ineptlyused and, perhaps worse,
investedonlyafterthe fact,thisshould be an urgenttask.65Power-sharing
agreementsare not the place to start.There is a need to bringdemocracy
formutuallyacceptablewaysto
back in or at least to promotea framework
access power. Governmentsand civilianoppositionpartiesshould receive
creditforrespectingaccepted rules and not forbendingthem.This holds
forintrusiveneighbourstoo. A less technicaland morepolitically-informed
Westernapproach to promotingaccountabilityin the fieldsof the rule of
reform
law, electionmonitoring,democracyassistanceand administrative
would be helpfulin thisregard.The centraldilemmaofoutsidersis not the
degreeto whichtheyseem to exhibittoo much willingnessto engagewith
to promotedemocraticpoliticson
insurgentsand too littledetermination
thecontinent.The keychallengeis thedevelopmentofa qualitativekindof
the servisionsurmounting
politicalengagementthatespouses a long-term
that
contradictions
even
mutual
and
inconsistencies
ious
have, by and
and support
resolution
to
conflict
large,characterizedWesternapproaches
fordemocracy.
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COSTS OF POWER-SHARING

397

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