Philosophy and Phenonienological Research

Vol. LXVI, No. 2, March 2003

The Epistemic/Ontic Divide

BARBARA MONTERO

Georgia State University

A number of philosophers think that, while we cannot explain how the mind is physical,
we can know that it is physical, nonetheless. That is, they accept both the explanatory
gap between the mental and the physical and ontological physicalism. I argue that this
position is unstable. Among other things, I argue that once one accepts the explanatory
gap, the main argument for ontological physicalism, the argument from causation, looses
its force. For if one takes physicaVnonphysica1 causation and ontological physicalism to
be equally mysterious, as physicalists who accept the explanatory gap are inclined to do,
there is little justification for accepting ontological physicalism rather than rejecting the
causal closure of the physical.

It is not at all unusual these days to hear philosophers claim that while they
have no idea how the mind could be physical, they do not doubt that it is
physical. As Joseph Levine has said, I am prepared to maintain that materialism must be true, though for the life of me I dont see how. These philosophers are pessimistic physicalists: they are pessimistic about our ability
to explain consciousness physically, yet think that consciousness is physical,
nonetheless. Put differently, they are pessimistic about our ability to close
the explanatory gap between mind and body yet confident that physicalism is
true, confident, as it were, that there is no ontological gap. I want to look at
why there should be such confidence in light of such pessimism. For i t
seems to me, if one accepts that the explanatory gap is uncloseable, i t
becomes difficult to explain why the ontological gap is not uncloseable as
well.
It is important to note that the type of physicalism at issue here is supposed to be entirely ontological. For if physicalism were taken to be a theory
about what we can explain-that is, the theory that everything can be completely explained in physical terms-pessimistic physicalism would be contradictory. What, then, is ontological physicalism? The question I take to be
at stake is whether mentality is a fundamental feature of the world. Thus,
ontological physicalism (with respect to the mental) is the theory that mentality is not a fundamental feature of the world, or as Levine puts it, that

404

Levine (1998), p. 475.

BARBARA MONTERO

only non-mental properties are instantiated in a basic way.2 This way of

understanding physicalism has the ontological force pessimistic physicalists
want, and it avoids the problems that beset definitions of the physical in
terms of what physics tells us, or can in principle tell us, about the world.
For such definitions turn physicalism into either a theory we cannot believe
(when the physical is defined over current physics) or a theory that fails to
exclude dualism (when the physical is defined over a future or a final
physic^).^ But let me say no more about what ontological physicalism is
supposed to be-most of what I have to say does turn on accepting this particular notion of physicalism-and turn to the issue of pessimism.

1. Pessimism about Closing the Explanatory Gap

While all pessimistic physicalists are pessimistic about closing the explanatory gap, not all are pessimistic in the same way. Some hold that though
there is, in some objective sense, a physical explanation of consciousness, i t
is one we cannot now fathom (though possibly someday
Others,
while they agree that such an explanation from a Gods eye point of view
exists, think that we will never comprehend this explanation; we are as
Collin McGinn puts it, cognitively closed to any explanation of mind i n
terms of matter. And still others hold that the call for an explanation of consciousness in physical terms is misguided: it is just a brute fact that consciousness is a physical process and so there is no explanation of consciousness that would make this intelligible to US.^ My concern, here, is with only

Levine (2001). p. 21. 1 should add that if there happens to be no fundamental level,
physicalism is the view that there is no mental infinite decent. For further discussion o f
taking physicalism to be a theory about the fundamentally nonmental, see Montero (2001)
and Levine (2001). If the terminology were not so awkward, I would, as I d o in (2001),
refer to the position as fundamental nonmentalism, rather than physicalism. This would
emphasize that the debate is not about whether physics will ultimately account for or provide the dependence base for mentality. And it would also emphasize that the debate is
about the nature of the mental, in particular. and not about what would count for anything
at all to be physical. (I actually d o not think that there is a useful notion of what it is to be
physical in general.)
As I see it. the reason why the physical as defined over future or final physics fails to
exclude dualism (and panpsychism) is that dualists (and panpsychists) can accept that
something like Wigners hypothesis (i.e. that pure acts of consciousness are required in
order to collapse the wave function) could be part of future or final physics. This would
be a situation in which physics accounted for consciousness (in as much as it accounts for
any other fundamental feature of the world) yet consciousness would be a fundamental
feature of the world (hence, physicalism, as Ive defined it, would be false). Moreover,
if we take final physics to be a physics that accounts for everything, then. if consciousness exists, consciousness will be accounted for by a final physics even if it is a fundamental feature of the world. For further criticisms of defining the physical over the posits
of physics see Crane and Mellor (1990) and Montero (1999).
See Nagel (1974) and (1998). and Levine (2001).
See McGinn (1989), Loar (1997) and (1999) and. Hill and McLaughlin (1999).
See Block and Stalnaker (1999).

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the former two positions since if one does not think that an explanation of
how physicalism could be true exists, the lack of explanation does not provide reason to question it. In contrast, if one thinks that if physicalism is
true, it would have an explanation, then our inability to arrive at this explanation should be at least a prima facie reason to question physicalism.
Why are pessimistic physicalists so pessimistic about our ability to
understand how physicalism could be true? Their motivation comes primarily
from the patent difficulty in seeing how anything physical could have experiences, the difficulty of seeing how one could get from the nonmental to the
mentaL7 As McGinn expresses it: How could the aggregation of millions of
individually insentient neurons generate subjective awareness? William
Seager has dubbed this problem the generation problem, and according to
pessimistic physicalists, we cannot even conceive of the basic shape a solution to it would take.
Often pessimists (physicalists or otherwise) argue for their pessimism
with a battery of thought experiments. The zombie argument, the inverted
spectrum argument, the knowledge argument and the modal argument are all
part of the artillery. But as I see it, our intuitions about these thought
experiments all ultimately depend on our intuitions about the generation
problem: if you find it puzzling how a physical brain could generate consciousness, zombies will seem possible, as will inverted spectra, as will
Marys lamentable condition. On the other hand, if you are an optimistic
physicalist and do not find the generation of consciousness from insentient
matter puzzling, the thought experiments that are supposed to elicit antiphysicalistic intuitions will not have their desired effect.
Dualists, of course, also think that the generation problem is unsolvable;
yet pessimistic physicalists are not dualists. To be sure, it would be impossible to solve the generation problem if insentient processes did not generate
consciousness, that is, if physicalism were false. But pessimistic physicalists
point out that this implication holds only in one direction: the falsity of
physicalism does not necessarily follow from the impossibility of solving
the generation problem. For according to the pessimistic physicalist, the generation problem is unsolvable because of our peculiar epistemic situation
with respect to the relation between mental and physical properties. That is to
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I focus on the qualitative side of the mind-body problem since this is where pessimistic
physicalism is most likely to arise. Though one could be a pessimistic physicalist about
intentionality: pessimistic about explaining intentionality in a way that does not already
presuppose the notion yet, nonetheless, think that intentionality is not a rock-bottom
feature of the world.
McGinn (1989), p. 349.
See Seager (1998) for a discussion of this problem. As he points out, it is important to
bear in mind that generateshould not be interpreted as cause. The relation might be
realization, instantiation, constitution etc.
See Chalrners (19%) for a discussion of these arguments.
BARBARA MONTERO

say, according to the pessimistic physicalist, the generation problem lies on

the epistemic side of the epistemic/ontic divide.

2. The Leap from Pessimism to Physicalism

Pessimistic physicalists sometimes assume that once we see what is wrong
with the main arguments against physicalism, we should embrace physicalism with open arms. And since the generation problem embodies the central
idea behind these arguments, once we see that it does not give us reason to
deny ontological physicalism, we can all be physicalists. But a further step is
required to take us from having no reason to deny a view to accepting a view.
For it is one thing to claim that the generation problem is merely epistemic
and quite another to claim that physicalism is correct, to claim, as McGinn
puts it, that with respect to the physical nature of the mind, there is no
tnetaphysicaf problem.
An analogy proffered by Nagel highlights the difficulty of taking this further step. The analogy is intended to illustrate our epistemic situation with
respect to physicalism, but it also indicates how very difficult the justificatory project may be. According to Nagel, at the present time the status of
physicalism is similar to that which the hypothesis that matter is energy
would have had if uttered by a pre-Socratic philosopher.* This may be so.
However, if the widely shared view that the mind is physical actually does
have the same status today as the view that matter is energy would have had
over 2000 years ago, our belief in physicalism would not be justified at all.
Given what the pre-Socratics knew about the world, they would have had
little hope of justifying the view that matter is energy. And unless pessimistic physicalists have some further argument for believing in physicalism, i t
is not clear that their view fares any better. In other words, without at least
some reason to believe in physicalism, the explanatory gap seems to leave us
with an ontological chasm.
How, then, can one accept the epistemological gap and at the same time
deny the ontological gap? What reasons do pessimistic physicalists give for
thinking that, despite our inability to understand how consciousness could be
physical, it is physical, nonetheless? Optimistic physicalists can argue that

I?

McGinn (l989), p. 363. I should note that while McGinn does not refer to himsclf as a
physicalist. he does claim that it is in virtue of .some natural property of the brain that
organisms are conscious and also rejects radical emergence of the conscious with
respect so the cerebral (p. 353). I see this analogous to the claim that since it is in virtue
of certain properties of molecules that some substances are liquid, liquidity is a higherlevel feature of these molecules that have those properties and not a fundamental feature
of the world. Consciousness, it would thus seem, according to McGinn. is a higher-level
feature of the brain and not a fundamental feature of the world. And thus. given how I
understand physicalism, McGinn would count as a physicalist.
Nagel (1974). p. 447. I should emphasize that Nagel does not intend this to be a justification of physicalism, just an illustration of what our situation may be.

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we should accept physicalism because physicalism makes sense and appears

to be correct. That is, one reason to think that rn is ontologically p is that we
can explain how rn is p and thus understand how rn could be p . However,
pessimistic physicalists are quite adamant about our inability to understand
how the mind could be physical: physicalism according to Nagel, is a
position we cannot understand because we do not at present have any conception of how it might be true.13 And according to McGinn, we are permanently locked from forming a concept of what accounts for [the mind-brain]
link. Given this, it is difficult to see what motivates these philosophers to
accept physicalism.
In an interesting twist, some pessimistic physicalists appear to try to justify their ontological conclusion by actually arguing for the explanatory gap,
specifically by providing reasons for why we should expect such an explanation to be impossible.15That is, they appear to argue from the impossibility
of closing the explanatory gap to the truth of physicalism. Sometimes this
argument is only implicit, while at other times it appears to be explicitly
used to defend physicalism. For as McGinn puts it, the solution [to the philosophical mind-body problem] is to recognize that the sense of a miracle
comes from us and not from the world.16 But how can showing that the philosophically puzzling aspect of the mind-body problem is epistemic constitute a defense of physicalism?
To be sure, sometimes a psychological account of why someone believes
p (when p is not actually the case) can play an important role in our explanation of what actually is the case. For example, Jim might believe that he
communicated with his dead father. However, we may be fairly certain that
such communication is not possible and so explain Jims mistaken beliefs
away by citing certain facts about his psychological makeup: his strong
desire to make amends with his father, and so forth. But this type of explanation would have little force if we had no reason to question communication
with the dead in the first place. Even more, if we thought that it was a mystery how this communication could have failed (as pessimistic physicalists
think it a mystery how the mind could be physical), the explanation of the
sons psychological state would do little, if anything, to convince us that he
was mistaken. For example, if Jim had been speaking to his (live) father via
a highly reliable telephone system, his overwhelming desire to communicate
~~

l3

l4
l5

16

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Nagel (1974). p. 446.

McGinn (1989). p. 360.
For example, Hill and McLaughlin (1999) claim to explain the a posterioricity of
psychophysical identities (emphasis added) by arguing that because of the distinction
between physical concepts and sensory concepts, sensory states and their nomologically
correlated physical states will always seem to us to be distinct (even thought they are
not).
McGinn (I989), p. 363.
See Strouds (2000) discussion of what he calls unmasking explanations.
BARBARA MONTERO

with his father would not in any way lead us to question whether the communication was successful. Pessimistic physicalists, then, must tell us
something more.
Clearly one lesson pessimistic physicalists want us to learn is that in trying to understand the mind, epistemology and metaphysics ought to be kept
distinct. As Levine says, ones ideas can be as clear and distinct as you like,
and nevertheless not correspond to what is in fact possible. And certainly
in some sense this is correct: how things are, is one thing; what we know
about them, is something else. But maintaining this distinction typically
leads to agnosticism rather than to positive views about the world. For
example, if we assume that we will never know what color the dinosaurs
were, we should withhold our assent to any claim about their color-for
instance, we should not assert that they were all purple. To do so, of course,
would be absurd. Yet pessimistic physicalists, at least without further argument, seem to be making a similar mistake. For pessimistic physicalists
think that we cannot understand how consciousness could be physical yet are
not at all agnostic about whether it is physical. While it may be, as Christopher Hill and Brian McLaughlin tell us, that a sensory state and its
nomologically correlated brain state would seem contingently related even if
they were necessarily one, this is no more of a defense of the identity theory,
which they accept, than the claim even if the world was created five minutes
ago we would still think that it was very old, is a defense of the view that
the world was created five minutes ago.l9In other words the mere fact that we
are barred from understanding the relation between sensory phenomena and
neural phenomena lends no support to the view that sensory phenomena are
physical .
There may be certain situations, however, in which we can justifiably
assert p even though it is entirely mysterious how p could be true. Here is an
example that Nagel uses to illustrate this point. Imagine that a person unfamiliar with insect metamorphosis places a caterpillar in a sealed room and
upon returning a few weeks later finds a butterfly its place. It would seem,
Nagel suggests, that this person would have reason to believe that the caterpillar had turned into a butterfly even if how it might have done this would
be utterly mysterious. And the thesis of physicalism, Nagel thinks, may have
a similar status.
Upon reflection, however, given that our caterpillar collector is truly perplexed by the notion of metamorphosis, we can see that he should not be so
18

l9

20

Levine (1992).
Hill and McLaughlin (1999), p. 449.
Chalmers (1999) presents a related criticism. He argues that it may be that given the way
mathematical concepts are formed, 1+1 would seem to be 2 even if it were 3. But this
would, in no way, justify the claim that 1+1=3. And similarly, the claim that the mind is
physical is in no sense justified by our inability to see that the mind is physical.

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confident. For it would seem that upon opening the safe, his belief that the
caterpillar had turned into a butterfly would be justified only if he could
eliminate a number of other plausible explanations of what took place, or at
least show that these explanations are less plausible than an explanation that
relies on metamorphosis. For example, perhaps the room was not hermetically sealed, or perhaps the caterpillar escaped and a butterfly flew in right at
the moment he was opening the door, or perhaps, as Nagel himself points
out, the caterpillar contained within it a tiny butterfly parasite that devoured it
and grew to its present size. If the idea of metamorphosis were actually
utterly mysterious, accepting one of these alternatives would seem to be more
reasonable. But, of course, this tale about metamorphosis is only an analogy
to an argument that is supposed to show that physicalism, despite its unintelligibility, is true. So let us turn to the argument for physicalism itself; for i t
could be that it is actually in better standing.

3. The Causal Argument for Physicalism

When Nagel claims that we may have reason to believe that the mind is
physical without being in a position to understand how this could be so, he
is alluding to Davidsons argument for physicalism, roughly, the argument
that since 1) there are causal relations between the mental and the physical
(e.g. my desire for water and my belief that there is water nearby causes me to
go search for water), 2) causal relations must be backed by strict laws and 3)
there are no strict psycho-physical laws, the mental must be physical.
Davidsons argument, aimed as it is at intentional states, does not address the
pessimistic physicalists main concern: experiential states. But Nagel thinks
that we also have reason to believe experiential states are physical, without,
as he says, being in a position to understand how.22And the argument that
many would now say shows this is a close relative of Davidsons argument,
what has variously come to be known as the causal exclusion argument or
the argument from causal closure or what Ill simply call the causal
As with Davidsons argument, it purports, in
argument for physicali~m.~~
general, to show that the reason to believe in physicalism is that if the mind
were not physical, the causal relevance of the mental would be unintelligible.
Differences from Davidsons argument, however, show up in the details. In
its standard form, the argument is this: since 1) mental causes have physical
21

22

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410

See Davidson (1970). Also see Heil and Mele (1995) for a discussion of Davidsons
argument. A much earlier argument for physicalism based on causal considerations
between the mental and the physical is found in Lucretius de Rerum Narura, Book I l l
where he argues, when [the mind and soul] is seen to push the limbs, rouse the body
from sleep, and alter the countenance and guide and turn about the whole man, and when
we see that none of these effects can take place without touch nor touch without body,
must we not admit that the mind and the soul are of a bodily nature?
Nagel (1974). p. 448.
See, for example, Kim (1996), Papineau (1993), Levine (2001), among many others.
BARBARA MONTERO

effects, 2) the physical world is causally closed (i.e. every physical effect that
has a sufficient cause at time has a sufficient physical cause at that time) and
3) there is no systematic causal overdetermination (i.e. effects that have
sufficient causes do not, systematically, have additional causes), we conclude
that the mental is physical.24 Does this argument give the pessimistic
physicalist what he needs?
It seems that, as with the metamorphosis example, there are alternative
routes one can take. And if the ontological nature of the mental as physical is
as mysterious to us as pessimistic physicalists claim, arguments for physicalism that are based on causal claims about the mental and the physical
would be successful only if physicalism-as mysterious as it is-is nevertheless shown to be more probable than the failure of any one of the causal
arguments premises. For the pessimistic physicalist, however, this is no
easy task since they think that the generation problem is at least primafacie a
very compelling reason to reject physicalism.
One alternative route is epiphenomenalism. Epiphenomenalists reject the
first premise: they think that mentality is real but that it causally affects only
other mental states2 And systematic causal overdetermination at least seems
possible-something pessimistic physicalists will claim is not true of physicalism; for as they see it, physicalism seems impossible (despite the fact that
it is actually true).26To be sure, epiphenomenalism as well as systematic
overdetermination may be implausible. But it is not yet clear why the pessimistic physicalist accepts physicalism rather than rejects either of these
premises.
Premise 2, the causal closure of the physical, is often taken to be inviolable; as Levine says, interactionism. . .does seem to be out of the quest i ~ n . ~But
what, according to pessimistic physicalists, makes the failure of
premise 2 less probable than the failure of physicalism? It is interesting to
note that arguments for the causal closure often rely on a notion of the physical that dualists need not accept. For example, Jaegwon Kim argues that if
the physical world were not causally closed complete physics would in principle be impossible, even as an idealized
Similarly, John Heil
defends the causal closure of the physical by claiming, modern science is
premised on the assumption that the material world is causally a closed sys~~

24

25

26
27

~~

See Lowe (2000) for a discussion of the difficulty in specifying what exactly counts as
being causally overdetermined There is also a question about what counts as systematic if occasional mental properties were epiphenomena1 with respect to their apparent
physical effects, there may not be sy~lemaricoverdetermination, yet the mental need not
be physical
See, for example, Chalmers (1996). Jackson (1982), and Huxley (1901)
Crane (1995) and Mellor (1995). for example, accept systematic overdetermination
Levine (2001), p 22 However, see Baker (1993) for an argument against the causal
closure of the physical
Kirn(1996),p 147
THE EPlSTEMlC/ONTlC DIVIDE

41 1

But these arguments for the causal closure of the physical work only
if the physical is taken to mean something like whatever is accountable for
by science or physics. Yet dualists can and should reject this notion of the
physical since their main claim is that mentality is a fundamental feature of
the world, a feature that, for all we know, could be accounted for by an ideal

physic^.^'
Physicalist, thus, need to argue, not that whatever is accountable for by
science or physics is causally closed, but that the fundamentally nonmental is
causally closed. And some have tried to do this. For example, Spurrett and
Papineau claim that to deny [the causal closure of the physical] is to suppose that some non-mental effects are due to irreducibly mental causes and
while they think that this is possible, they also think that we have good
reason to reject it.3 The reason is roughly that we have good nonmental
causal explanations of many physical effects and it seems likely that fundamentally mental causes will not be needed. But even if there are good reasons
to accept the causal closure of the physical as well as the other premises of
the argument, pessimistic physicalists would then only be faced with a choice
between two mysteries: the mystery (as they see it) of physicalism or the
mystery (as they see it) of causal interaction between a non-physical mind and
a physical body? For the pessimistic physicalist thinks that causal considerations lead to physicalism and that the generation problem leads to dualism or
panpsychism. What, then, is their motivation to accept physicalism? One
might think that their motivation comes from the relative strength of the
arguments for physicalism over the arguments against it. But the fact that
pessimistic physicalists do not accept this is precisely what makes them pessimistic. For the pessimistic physicalist typically thinks that the central
arguments for dualism (the generation problem, as well as the knowledge
argument, the zombie argument, and the modal argument) are extremely
compelling. And so the pessimistic physicalist must find a way to tip the
balance.32
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30

3
32

412

Heil (1998).
For physics is in a state of flux and while we may be able to foresee some of the general
properties that any future physics will have, dualists need not exclude the possibility that it
may progress in such a way so as to take the mental to be fundamental. Moreover, if
certain versions of the anthropic principle are part of current physics, physics already
posits mentality as a fundamental feature of the world. Again, for further discussion of
this way of understanding the notion of the physical, see Montero (2001).
Spurrett and Papineau (1999). Also see Levine (2001). For a criticism of this approach
see Gillett and Witmer (2001).
Some invoke a variation of the causal argument: the argument from the conservation of
energy. It is sometimes argued that since I ) energy is conserved, 2) causation requires
the transfer of energy, and 3) anything with energy is physical, it follows that the mental
(if it is not epiphenomena])must be physical or else it would violate the conservation of
energy. But here, too. the premises, or at least the latter two, can be questioned: a number
of philosophers reject the view that causation requires the transfer of energy and if
BARBARA MONTERO

4. Arguing for Physicalism by Arguing for the

Explanatory Gap
There is one strategy that, if successful, could allow pessimistic physicalists
to retain their pessimism while still affirming physicalism. And the strategy
is this: to argue that we should accept physicalism because we have reason to
think that we cannot understand physicalism (even if it is true) while we have
no reason (or at least less reason) to think that we could not understand dualism (even if it were true).33In other words, to justify their acceptance of
physicalism they can argue that while the generation problem may lead us to
think that physicalism i s false and causal considerations lead us to think
physicalism is true, we should accept physicalism because even if physicalism were true, it would not seem true; moreover, if dualism were true, i t
would seem true.
The first half of the strategy, then, requires pessimistic physicalists to
provide a reason for why we cannot understand physicalism. And they cannot
simply say that doing so would allow us to see why there might be an
explanatory gap without an ontological gap. For if one is trying to defend
ones choice to accept the mystery of physicalism rather than the mystery of
physical-nonphysical causal interaction, one cannot simply claim that the
reason for thinking that we cannot understand physicalism is that doing so
allows us to make this very choice. Rather, pessimistic physicalists need to
provide an independent reason to think that epistemology is not a guide to the
status of physicalism.
This part of the strategy is being pursued by a number of pessimistic
physicalists. Nagel, Loar, McGinn and others have theories about why we
cannot understand physicalism. Sometimes the theory, as it seems to be in
Loars case, is intended to present only a possible account of our cognitive
structures that would, if true, show that we would not be able to understand
physicalism. While others, such as McGinn. are bolder and assert that not
only could we be cognitively structured in such a way as to be blocked from
understanding physicalism but also that we are so blocked. In some form or
other, however, it seems that a theory of our cognitive limitations is an
essential component of pessimistic physicalism. And so it may not be so
absurd after all to argue for physicalism by actually arguing for the explanatory gap. Though, while not absurd, i t is not obviously successful either.

33

panpsychism is true, having energy would not suffice to make something physical. But
furthermore. there is something odd about this argument since given that the mental is
causal, and that causation requires the transfer of energy, the premise asserting the conservation of energy is superfluous.
To be more precise, I should be referring to not just dualism, but dualism and
panpsychism since physicalism is opposed to both of these theses. This should be understood in what follows.

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One concern is that, while there is much disagreement among pessimistic

physicalists about why we are (or at least may be) blocked from understanding physicalism, at least one approach seems to leave us with the same problem it was intended to solve since it seems to posit concepts that are fundamentally phenomenal. This approach involves distinguishing the kinds of
concepts we employ when thinking about qualitative states, such as pain, us
qualitative states and the concepts we employ when thinking about neural
states, such as c-fiber stimulation (to use the standard example), as neural
states. On this view, these two kinds of concepts-the former being, as Loar
puts it, couched in experiential terms, the latter in physical terns-are
merely psychologically distinct and do not pick out distinct proper tie^.^^ And
it is the structure of our concept forming mechanism (rather than the structure
of the things these concepts are of) that prevents us from seeing that the two
concepts pick out the same thing, in other words, from seeing that pain is
physical. Thus the door to physicalism, argues the pessimistic physicalist, is
open: because of the nature of these concepts, the way in which the phenomenal is physical will be unintelligible, yet both pain and c-fiber stimulation could be concepts of the same thing. The explanatory gap is real, the
ontological gap, illusory.
Now there are many layers to this argument, which involve, among other
things, explaining just why there should be this type of conceptual distinction. But let me stay at the topmost layer since it seems to me that the very
positing of phenomenal concepts may be problematic. For even if we accept
that there are these two distinct kinds of concepts that pick out one and the
same physical property, the way in which we are acquainted with the phenomenal concept seems to be fundamentally phenomenal. Or at least, there
seems to be just as much reason to think that phenomenal concepts do not
supervene on the physical, as there originally was to think that the physically
problematic properties that this strategy was supposed to make physically
acceptable do not supervene on the physical.
Let us look at our dear friend, Mary. On this view, ensconced in her black
and white environment Mary possesses the full physical concept of red but
lacks the phenomenal concept of red. And indeed, it is thought, in this environment Mary cannot acquire the phenomenal concept of red. Rather, to
acquire this new concept she must leave her black and white environment and

~~

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Loar (1997), p. 599. I should note that McGinns (1989) approach to explaining why we

cannot understand how physicalism could be true does not fit this model and that he in
fact explicitly rejects this approach. For, as he puts it, he sees no reason for why we
should not be able 10 recognize intelligible connections between concepts (or properties) even when those concepts (or properties) are necessarily ascribed using different
faculties (p. 15).

414

BARBARA MONTERO

experience red.35 When she does this she merely acquires a new concept for
something physical. But what sort of concept is this? It seems that a dualist
would be just as skeptical about how something entirely physical, such as
the physical changes in her brain that occur when she leaves the room, can
account for this new concept-a concept that provides Mary with knowledge
of wlzat if is like to see red-as she is about how an entirely physical being
can have experience at all. For if phenomenal concepts are experiential ways
of conceiving, as Loar puts it, it seems that a physical duplicate of me
would not be privy to this special class of concepts.36Or rather, I should say
that this conclusion seems just as reasonable as the antiphysicalists original
view that a physical duplicate of me would not be a phenomenal duplicate of
me, an argument which the invocation of phenomenal properties is supposed
to counter. So my concern, here, is that even if this approach succeeds in
showing how the state picked out by m y everyday concept of pain picks
could be identical to the state picked out by the neurologists concept of pain,
it would seem that the property of having a phenomenal concept now fails to
supervene on the physical. And if this is so, physicalism is in no better
shape than before.37
Pessimistic physicalists may have a way around this objection. But even
if they do and can thus show, in a physically acceptable way, that we are
blocked from understanding how the mind is physical, this is only the first
half of my suggested strategy. For if pessimistic dualists (that is, dualists
who claim dualism must be true, though for the life of me I dont see how)
can show that we are blocked from understanding how there could be (nonphysical) mental to physical causation, pessimistic physicalists-even if they
can explain why we cannot understand physicalism in a perfectly physicalistic
manner-would still have no more reason to accept physicalism than to reject
it.3n

Here is an indication of how this might be done. Both physicalists and

dualists agree that we do not currently have a complete picture of the causal
chain that leads from mental causes to physical effects, say, from the feeling
of pain to the movements of my vocal cords when I say, ouch. Physicalists, however, say that given that we have found no gaps that require positing
a purely mental cause, there is no reason to think that such gaps will be
found in the future. The pessimistic dualists, however, could claim that what
3s
36
37

38

Of course, she need not see something red-she could dream in red or hallucinate red,
etc. But she must in some sense experience red.
Loar (1999). p. 468.
Levine (2001) expresses a similar concern (pp. 85-86).
To be more precise, this follows given that the reason to reject dualism is the causal
argument for physicalism. Since this is the reason pessimistic physicalists typically give
for rejecting dualism, I take the pessimistic dualists strategy that I limn to be of significance.

THE EPISTEMIC/ONTIC DIVLDE

415

leads us to assume that the chain is actually complete is that in thinking

about causation we need to think about it from either a first person point of
view or from a third person point of view and that since a third person perspective leaves no room for a first person perspective we are led to think that
the neurological is a sufficient cause of my behavior when, in fact, it is only
a partial cause. Of course, our understanding of the mind and brain may progress to a point where such speculations would be revealed as misguided. But,
as both sides agree, we are not there yet. And if such an explanation of why
we are blocked from understanding how dualism could be true is as convincing as the explanation the pessimistic physicalist gives of why we are
blocked form understanding how physicalism could be true, pessimistic
physicalists should convert from physicalism to agnosticism.
Of course, since I have merely hinted at how a pessimistic dualist might
present his view, until the details are worked out (if they could be worked
out) the burden of proof would seem to lie with the pessimistic dualist.
Moreover, while pessimistic physicalists typically reject dualism because of
the causal argument, there are other arguments against dualism that perhaps
cannot be pushed over to the epistemic side of the epistemic/ontic divide. So
pessimistic physicalism, for all I have said, may still be justifiable. Nevertheless, in the end I suspect that neither pessimistic physicalism nor pessimistic dualism will provide the ultimate solution to the mind-body problem.
For I suspect that any ontologically satisfying solution to the mind-body
problem will need to be epistemically satisfying as

39

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2001 Eastern Division APA. and I
would like to thank my commentator, Joseph Levine, and the audience members for their
questions and comments. I would also like to thank the two anonymous referees from PPR
as well as Michael Forster, Pete Mandik, Collin McGinn, Marya Schechtman, Elizabeth
Vlahos. and William Wimssatt for their comments.

416 BARBARA MONTERO

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