The Southern Journal of Philosophy (1997) Vol.

XXXV

Absolute Processes:
A Nominalist Alternative
Eric M. Rubenstein
Colgate University
A nice way to enter the age-old debate between Platonists
and Nominalists is to see them both as granting t h a t a n acceptable ontology must explain how there can be truths about
other than the singular. There must, in some fashion, be room
for the general. For instance, how can two numerically distinct
particulars be said to be qualitatively identical?
Familiarly enough, the Platonist answers by appeal to a
general entity, one that is at two places at once. The price for
this move is the endorsement of abstracta, a price the Nominalist is unwilling to pay. So i n a n effort to avoid such
abstracta, t h e Nominalist denies such general entities. Of
course, the Nominalist now has the problem of explaining how
two distinct things can be said to have the same quality if
they have no shared constituent, if there is no generality in
the world.
Typically, however, Nominalists have turned to the unsatisfying (and as I shall argue, inadequate) strategy of explaining
such generality by constructing sets of particulars. Trope theorists have recently come t o the aid of the Nominalist project,
but as we will see, they too fall short. As it stands, a successful Nominalist account has yet to be provided.
Despite such difficulties, it is with a Nominalist bent that I
will approach the puzzle. But what I have in mind is a differe n t sort of Nominalism, one t h a t emerges from the texts of
Wilfrid Sellars and his ontology of absolute processes.' From
the Nominalist perspective, what is needed it seems, is an entity t h a t is concrete and yet general. To that end I introduce
a n ontology of absolute processes-entities that are both general and concrete. For as I argue, absolute processes are entities conceived by analogy with stuffs. Stuffs can be i n two

Eric M. Rubenstein is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy at

Colgate University. His most recent publication, on the ontology of color,
appeared in Philosophy. He received his Ph.D. from the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1996.

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Eric M. Rubenstein
places a t once, and thus can be said to be general, but are still
concrete. By assimilating the qualitative aspect of reality to
such absolute processes, and thus to stuffs, the door is open
for an account of generality without abstracta.
In the end, I will recommend conceiving reality in total as
the goings-on of absolute processes. Thus, in an attempt t o secure a n adequate solution to the problem of generality, I end
up rejecting the substance-paradigm t h a t has held sway in
metaphysics. Indeed, my hunch is that only with a n ontology
of absolute processes can we secure a n adequate Nominalist
account of such generality.
I will begin with a few words about Platonism. I shall then
canvas the two most prominent and familiar Nominalist solutions (Class Nominalism and Trope Nominalism), arguing that
they are ultimately unacceptable. Finally, I will bring absolute
processes to center stage a n d see how they fare. Given t h e
complexities of the dialectic and t h a t absolute processes a r e
new t o the ontological scene, this essay can hope only to be an
introduction to a larger project.

I. THE DEBATE
Platonism is said in many ways. Here is how I care to
carve things up. Following one tradition, if one countenances
multi-exemplifiable entities, i.e., repeatables, entities that can
be in two places at once, then one is a Platonist. Additionally,
an ontology is Platonistic if it recognizes abstract entities, i.e.,
non-spatiotemporal ones. These two hallmarks of Platonism,
repeatables and abstracta, are sometimes linked in the literature in the following manner (albeit typically implicitly). The
Platonist speaks of a universal, a repeatable as being in two
places at once. In most ontological discussions i t is assumed
t h a t physical, i.e., non-abstract, entities cannot be i n two
places at once. The Platonist happily replies t h a t the repeatable she has in mind is not spatiotemporal, but is abstract. It
is the sort of entity which, while itself abstract and thus nonspatiotemporal, can manifest itself, via its instances, in two
places a t once.
As I noted, the Nominalist is unhappy with making generality a feature of the world. So to explain how there can be
general truths, the Nominalist has to locate generality elsewhere. A favorite ploy of Nominalists has been to account for
the quality of a n individual, not by reifying the qualifying element a s does the Platonist, but by constructing sets of particulars, whereby particulars a r e collected i n virtue of
resemblance relations-members of t h e s e t resemble each
other more closely than they resemble any non-member. So, xs
being F is accounted for by the fact that x belongs to the set of
F-things. Similarly, t h a t x and y a r e both F is explained by

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their both belonging to the set of F-things. Nelson Goodman,

however, offers two well-known and serious objections to such
a strategy; the problem of coextension, and t h a t of imperfect
communities.2
The problem of coextension begins with the possibility of
there being two constructed sets of particulars that are extensionally equivalent. This would entail t h a t t h e properties
which have been accounted for via this construction are identical. Yet, this may happen i n cases where clearly we do not
want to grant that the properties are the same. Citing a n example from Campbell, were it the case t h a t all and only pandas e a t bamboo, we would be forced t o conclude t h a t being a
panda is the same property as being a bamboo eater, which
clearly it is
The second problem for the Class Nominalist arises when
we wonder about the set construction. To account for x being F
we have to build a s e t with x as a member with other Fthings. It t u r n s out, however, that not all of the members of
the set need be F t o be members of t h a t set. We would have
then explained x being F by recourse to a set with some nonF-things, and thus would not have offered a n explanation at
all. Here is the problem.
According to traditional accounts, the construction of the
set proceeds via the grouping of particulars that resemble each
other. But as we know from Goodman, things resemble each
other, not simpliciter, but only in various respects. From this
observation it follows that particulars can resemble each other
in different ways. Being unable to build the set by fixing on
only those things which are F-since that is the notion to be
explicated-the best we could do would be to begin with a
similarity-based set which might include two things t h a t resemble each other in one respect, include a third thing based
on its resemblance in a different respect, a fourth based on its
resemblance in a n entirely different respect, and so on. The
result would be a set in which some of the members are not F.4
Apparently we have not then explained xs being F.
These standard objections to Class Nominalism should give
us pause, for it seems we have not yet provided a suitable ontological assay of a n entitys character with such a strategy.
There is, in addition, a deeper problem with this approach.
We ask the Class Nominalist: What explains the qualitative
identity of two distinct particulars; How is i t t h a t they a r e
both F? The answer is t h a t they are both F because they belong to the set of F-things. But how does membership in such
a set explain each particulars being F? The Class Nominalist
can answer either that that is all there is to say, or, can tell us
that some particular belongs to the set of F-things because it
is F. As for the latter, this of course was just the original fact
we wanted a n explanation for: How is it that some particular

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has the quality F? The latter option gets us nowhere. As for

t h e former reply, we a r e told t o stop asking questions j u s t
when we feel the need for a n answer most acutely. We a r e
thereby never given a n a d e q u a t e explanation for how s e t
membership can explain facts about a particulars quality.
To avoid Platonism then, the Class Nominalist offers an account that resists explaining the quality of a particular in virtue of a constituent of t h a t particular. Presumably, the Class
Nominalist avoids talk of constituents of particulars for fear
t h a t to do s o is to start on the road t h a t leads to Platonism.
For if x and y both are F in virtue of a n F constituent, we are
now forced t o explain the nature of this shared constituent. Insofar as there looks (at least at first pass) to be one thing in
two places, i n x a n d y , we look t o be endorsing multiexemplifiables and thus embracing Platonism.
In avoiding the move to quality-constituents, however, the
Class Nominalism gives a n unsatisfying response to the question of what makes a thing the way i t is. I t is to avoid j u s t
such worries that the philosophy of tropes has been advanced
by Nominalists. To that theory I now turn.
11. TROPES

A trope is a particular property instance. A trope theorist,

that is, makes properties into particulars. The blue of the sky
then is a particular trope numerically distinct from the blue
trope of my t-shirt, even if the two tropes a r e qualitatively
identical. On such a view, ordinary objects are but bundles or
collections of tropes and a n ordinary object (what might be
called a complex particular) has the character it does in virtue
of having as a member of t h e complex a particular trope,
which is that particular character.
Allegedly, a trope theorist can now explain qualitative identity among distinct particulars without falling prey t o
Platonistic worries, i.e., without abstracta, and without reliance on the Nominalists unhelpful classes. On this view, two
things can be said t o have the same property, but that means
that they really just have two numerically different tropes as
their constituents. As for those numerically different tropes,
their exact resemblance is left as a n unanalyzable relation.
Campbell puts it this way.
What is it about those tropes in virtue of which they are both red
tropes? Their likeness to one another is what makes them tropes
of the same kind .... To the question: What is it for the two objects
to share a common property? the reply must be: There is no such
sharing, except joint membership in a natural kind, which is not a
universal but a collection of tropess

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Now trope theories have been developed with a good deal of

sophistication by such philosophers as Campbell, Armstrong,
and Simons.6 As promising as such a n approach is, there a r e
significant problems that still need to be resolved. Let me illustrate three.
One problem for tropes stems from t h e observation t h a t
each trope is a single property. Recall t h a t this move was
needed to prevent the construction of similarity circles with
imperfect community. If we imagine a square, red spot, the
tropist would have i t t h a t this is a complex particular, comprised of the two tropes red and square. These two tropes are
present in a relation known as compresence. Campbell tells us
that [Elverything spatio-temporal occurs in a compresence tie
with its ~ l a c e . ~
Now we need not worry here over what t o make of places,
whether they themselves are tropes, or over whether we need
endorse an absolute or relative theory of time and space. What
is essential to note is that tropes s t a n d i n this relation of
compresence with one another. And each genuine particular,
each trope, is itself only one quality. Any further qualification
of particular tropes, i.e., their having more than one quality
each would endanger the tropists program. For the tropist,
like the Class Nominalist, relies on similarity circles to explain qualitative similarity across particulars. Again,
[I]f the members of our similarity circle are tropes, the red ones
will form one group, the blue a second, the wooden a third ....
There will not be any similarity circles with hybrid members, and
it is only hybrid members that allow the construction of similarity
circles exhibiting imperfect community. Resemblance theory with
tropes does not manufacture the spurious properties that emerge
from resemblances among concrete particulars.8

What I wish to demonstrate is that the tropist is in fact committed, on pain of nonsense, to endorse multi-qualitied tropes,
and is thereby vulnerable to Goodmans objection. Showing
that would be devastating to the tropist, as a chief goal of the
tropist project is to avoid the problems that plague the Class
Nominalist. The guiding principle of my objection will be,
metaphorically, t h a t form and content are corequisites. That
is, form requires content a n d conversely, content requires
form. The latter is the easier of the two, for it is a more general version of the thesis that everything that is colored is extended. The former is far more controversial as it is a strike
against the geometric-mathematizable model of reality handed
down from Descartes. In other words, that form requires content is a picturesque way of uniting such views as: primary
qualities require secondary qualities (as held by Berkeley), ex-

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tensive magnitudes require intensive ones (Kant), and feeling

must be present in genuine existents (Whitehead).
And while a defense of this thesis t h a t form and content
necessarily go together would require a paper of its own, I can
quickly say some things on its behalf, particularly about the
more difficult of the two conditionals-that form requires content. We never encounter, for example, a shape without t h a t
shape having some color, some filler of the shape which allows
us to tell where t h a t shape ends or begins. What's more, we
take this to be no mere accident or contingency of our experience. There cannot be such experiences as there cannot be
such entities; the only thing that distinguishes where a thing
ends and its environment begins is the content, the nature, of
that thing. It follows that all entities must be somehow-they
must have a qualitative (content) as well as a quantitative dimension (form).
Moving to the easier of the claims about form and content,
t h a t content requires form, how can the tropist handle this
phenomenon? We might expect the tropist to argue that

(1) Everything colored has a shape.

amounts to the claim that
(2)

Wherever t h e r e is a color trope, t h e r e will be a

shape trope compresent with it.

However, (1)is not merely contingently true. For something

can be colored only if there is room or space for it to be colored. Thus, everything colored must be extended, must have
some shape. To preserve the necessity of (1)then, we should
offer up the following.
(2') Necessarily, where there is a color trope there will
be a shape trope compresent with it.

In this way, the trope theorist can apparently explain the necessity of (l), as well as why we cannot even imagine what a
color trope would be like without a shape. The tropist can argue that we cannot imagine what such a trope is like because
we have never experienced one on its own, and the reason is
that there is this necessary relation between shape and color
tropes.
That the tropist would take this line is suggested by our
earlier considerations that require the tropist t o maintain one
tropelone property. But notice what h a s happened. (1)is a
claim about every thing. For the tropist, the things a t issue
a r e tropes. The tropist's basic entities must now include a
square trope and a color trope. But as each thing, each trope,

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is only one quality, the square trope does not have any content
properties, nor does t h e content trope have any structural
properties. In forcing each trope, each individual, to be simply
one property, the tropist has failed t o meet the constraint of
(1).
Now the tropist may respond that his account provides all
that is needed: Everything that is shaped has a color and vice
versa. However, in saying t h a t , the tropist is talking about
complex particulars: they always have different kinds of
tropists present. But what of the particular basic tropes, the
true individuals, in the ontology? They, on their own, have
only one property. Of course, that is what the tropist has been
saying all along. Autobiographically, however, I no longer understand the trope theory.
For my part, I can understand a complex of a shape trope
and a color trope. T h a t would be a color patch. But when
asked t o understand the basic entities, a shape trope or a color
trope, each with only one property, the only recourse for enlightenment is by appeal t o the complex of tropes. And t h a t
does not help, because when we try t o mentally abstract the
shape trope out, we find (as Berkeley did) that we simply cannot. How could there be a thing (a trope) which has, which is,
only this one property? What would it be to be just a shape entity? How could there be a color entity t h a t did not have a
shape?gAt best, it seems, we can understand only the complex
particulars, not the basic particulars. But complexes are built
out of the basics, and as of yet we have no elucidation of the
fundamental items of t h e tropists ontology. And I fear the
tropist has nothing more to offer us here.1
Apparently unable t o further explain the basic entities of
their ontology, the tropist has failed to provide an assay which
truly carves our square, red patch into two tropes: such a carving leaves mysterious the entities on which the whole story relies. The only other option it seems is t o hold that patch itself
to be the basic particular. But that is just t o force the tropist
to concede multi-qualitied particulars; each trope has (at least)
a form and a content, i.e., two properties. And that is t o force
the tropist back into the earlier problems the Class Nominalist
faced. Contra t o the tropists declared view, tropes on this horn
do allow for similarity circles with hybrid members and thus
allow the construction of imperfect communities.
A second problem for tropists turns on reflections of t h e
phenomena of change, and the above discussion of necessary
relations between certain tropes. A tropist typically explains
change of a complex particular by reference t o tropes that either cease t o be part of the complex, or to tropes that come to
join the complex, o r by some combination of these two processes. But if tropes are t o leave the complex, t h a t means
the compresence relation that binds tropes together must be a

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contingent and breakable one. But to capture the necessity

of ( 1 ) from above t h e tropist now has to introduce a second
kind of compresence relation-a necessary and unbreakable
one.
Upon inspection, however, these compresence relations are
most puzzling. If some compresence relations are contingent,
what holds the tropes together in a complex particular when
they are together? How are they bundled, and how can this
bundling be such t h a t some tropes can leave the bundle? As
for the necessary compresence relation, how does it differ from
the contingent one? Why do some tropes have to stay together?
How is this accomplished? What sort of constraints are there
on what can and what cannot come apart?
In short, we have a proliferation of mysteries as we explore
the tropists program. That is not t o say the tropists cannot
answer our questions, but for the time being, such a proliferation strikes me as a count against trope theories.
Here is a final worry for the tropist. Recall t h a t to avoid
Goodmanesque problems over the construction of sets of particulars, the tropist makes each particular but one quality.
And qualitative similarity among distinct tropes is explained
by recourse to a relation of exact resemblance. And as we saw,
such a relation is left as a primitive notion.
There is something unsettling, however, about making such
a relation unanalyzable. How do we account for the qualitative
similarity among complex particulars on the tropist account.
How do we, t h a t is, explain generality? We note, says t h e
tropist, t h a t ordinary macro-objects are really complexes of
tropes and t h a t there can be qualitatively identical but numerically distinct tropes present in each of these complexes.
And, in virtue of t h e fact t h a t such qualitatively identical
tropes are so present, we can explain the qualitative similarity
among the ordinary objects.
But when pressed t o account for the qualitative identity of
these distinct tropes, the tropist resists. The relation, we are
told, is unanalyzable. I t is simply a brute fact t h a t those
tropes are distinct but qualitatively identical. What is puzzling and somewhat disconcerting, is that it is precisely a t the
level of tropes t h a t we expect an account of generality to be
given. After all, trope theories are a form of Nominalism, and
as such, are designed to explain how there can be truths about
other than the singular-to explain the appearance of generality in reality. But what we end up with is the insistence t h a t
t h e qualitative identity across distinct particular is but a
brute fact, not analyzable. In essence then, the tropist solves a
question about the possibility of generality by making i t a
brute fact. As such, the tropist goes to great lengths t o develop
a theory, which in the end offers no real explanation of generality. We are left with qualitative identity as a brute, unex-

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plained phenomenon, triggering the reasonable question: What

then have we really gained with trope theories?

111. ABSOLUTE PROCESSES

Given the shortcomings of Class Nominalism a n d trope
theories in their attempts to explicate the qualities of particulars, and of generality, it would be wise to look elsewhere. In
her Properties as Processes, Seibt makes the intriguing suggestion that Sellars ontology of absolute processes may allow us
to sustain the only consistent and plausible Nominalist solution to this problem. She notes, however, t h a t to cash this
promissory note requires a painstaking analysis of absolute
processes. I think Seibt is right in her suggestion, and thus
will take it up, though I do not think it need be as painful as
she fears. In a n attempt to offer a new solution for the Nominalist, I propose a conceptual revolution of sorts, one that gets
us quality in two places at once without abstracta; something
general but concrete.
The term absolute processes comes from C. D. Broad and
is later put to use by Wilfrid Sellars in his discussions of the
mindhody problem. I will use them in a different role. Absolute processes, as I conceive them, are not objects but events,
events of a special kind. What makes them absolute processes
is that they are pure goings on-there is no object that is involved in the process.
Let me elaborate. Consider the flight of a golf ball, which
itself is a n event or process. ( I am foregoing any distinction
between the two.) In such an event, there is a subject (the golf
ball) undergoing the process, the various changes of position,
temperature, etc. Compare such an event, an object-bound process we might say, with events that lack a proper subject, such
as lightning or thundering, or the sounding of a pure C# from
t h e corner of t h e room. As a grammatical guide, we might
think of absolute processes as picked out by event locutions
with prima facie dummy subjects, such as It lightnings, It is
thundering, There is a C#ing in my ear. Without apparently
genuine subjects in such processes we should countenance as a
distinct category a realm of subjectless events o r absolute
processes.
To put this category to work, I propose we imagine reality
as comprised solely of entities t h a t are like the absolute processes of thundering, lightning, and C#ing. In such a picture,
reality would be truly nothing but a complex of such absolute
processes. There are no objects. The world is a complex tissue
of goings-on. Everything flows.
Before returning to the issue of generality, however, i t is
necessary to say more about what such a world of only absolute processes would be like.
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Imagine a pure C# sounding from the corner of the room.
Focus on the sound itself, regardless of what, if any, object
produced it. As we are presented with that sound, we a r e inclined to think of it as something real, something occurrent. It
does not strike us as a mere disposition, power, or something
mind-dependent. In more traditional terms, I am suggesting
that in our primary experience of the world, secondary qualities have the status of occurrent existences, not mere dispositions. Let us continue t o think this way.
Examining that C# more closely we see it has what may be
called a form and a content. The quality of the sound, its content, is that particular pitch; while its structure is its temporal duration. (Recall our square red patch, where the form is
its shape, its content its color.) Important for our later considerations is t h a t bit of content, that structured amount of C#,
can be understood as being a stuff. As philosophers like Quine
have noted that red is a mass term, signifying a stuff, so too
we might say for our C#. What we encounter in this case is a
portion of that stuff, a n amount of that quality sounding from
the corner of the room.
Here is an important rider. For illustrative purposes I have
been speaking, and will continue to, of secondary qualities as
if they are the genuine qualities of reality. But this is only for
illustrative purposes. The real qualities of nature, as I see it,
will be determined by physics. I do not wish, at least here, to
confine the ultimate qualitative dimension of reality to those
qualities revealed by t h e senses. T h a t would be to tie too
tightly the hands of the physicist.
Just the same, what I say about the reconception of secondary qualities in terms of stuffs goes equally for whatever the
qualities of reality t u r n out to be. We should still think of
them, from the standpoint of categorical ontology, a s modeled
on stuffs, dynamic ones at that.
I am proposing then that the world is nothing but absolute
processes. And these absolute processes are akin to the absolute processes we have been discussing. Alongside of C#ings
then, we will have processes like reddings, bluings, stinkings,
and sweetings. As such, all entities will have a form and a
content. Reality, t h a t is, will have a qualitative dimension as
well a s a mathematical or metrical one. The qualitative dimension will be t h e contents of those absolute processes;
something like the secondary qualities we are at home with in
common sense. The twist is t h a t t h e qualities of the world
thus turn out to be absolute processes, dynamized-structuredquality-stuffs.
Of course, the world is not just a goings-on of simple detached absolute processes, it is complex. We should therefore
consider complex states of affairs within this imagined world
as complexes of absolute processes. Complex particulars, that

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is, may be built out of bundles of individual absolute processes.12
To remove a bit of the strangeness of this picture we might
model absolute processes on the physicists notion of fields.
Roughly, fields may be conceived as fillers of space which, in
virtue of their intrinsic nature, provide the categorical basis
for the dispositional nature of forces. A particle, for instance,
placed i n a field will be subjected to a certain force because
there is an electromagnetic field present in that region.13
With this model in mind we might reconceive reality as
a tissue of fields, of absolute processes, which can interact
and hang together i n ways that free u s from t h e substanceparadigm t h a t plagues even the trope theorist. For we can
model interaction among absolute processes on the sorts of interference t h a t results when different fields a r e overlapped.
We can further imagine process interference; interference
giving rise to differently qualitied processes.
This way of thinking offers an important step in reconceiving our fundamental entities, not as static objects, but as dynamic processes. Matter a n d objects i n t u r n would be b u t
constructions out of the deeper reality, this tissue of goings-on.

IV. GENERALITY AGAIN

With these extremely broad brush strokes in place, we can
now return in more detail to the problem t h a t drives the debate over generality. Take two particulars, two apples say, that
are qualitatively identical. We have seen how a Platonist and
Tropist explain this fact. Here is a first pass at my solution.
From my perspective, the apples are themselves complex particulars; they have as ingredients various absolute processes.
The two apples are qualitatively identical because they have
an absolute process content in common. There is, if you will,
redding present in each. The content, i.e., quality of the absolute process is present in both complex particulars as a n ingredient. On this story, we do not need to link the two complex
particulars by a relation of resemblance, nor by constructing
classes of particulars. We can explain their resemblance by
noting t h a t they contain the same stuff. In short, there is a n
absolute process, with its distinct qualitative content, present
in both places at once.
We can now develop our story by returning to the various
puzzles discussed above. For one, with this picture in mind we
can now tackle our earlier worries over the necessity claims
about shape and color (form and content) and see t h a t absolute processes, as structured stuffs, are immune. For we can
explain the intuition that necessarily, everything colored has
a shape, by noting that this is just a species of one half of the
more general thesis t h a t form and content a r e corequisites;

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namely t h a t where there is content there is form. We can account for t h a t claims t r u t h , without reliance on conjoined,
ontologically unacceptable entities. In our ontology, everything
is just a n absolute process, and thus everything has, by its nature, a form and a content.
As for worries over t h e relation of exact resemblance, no
such relation is called for here. Two numerically distinct absolute processes are qualitatively identical because the content of
one is just a portion of the same stuff that is the content of the
other. We do not need to link the two particulars by a relation
of resemblance. We can link them by noting that they are portions of the same stuff. Without having to appeal t o resemblance we need not start down t h e road t h a t leads to
Goodmans objection and others. We have not been forced to endorse single property entities in order to account for resemblance without the fear of imperfect communities, and t h u s
have not been forced to endorse entities which at bottom a r e
simply mysterious.
We can also apparently answer the question t h a t leads to
Platonism and t o the Nominalist alternatives, i.e., the question,
How can i t be t h a t two complex particulars can both be F?
The answer is straightforward from the absolute process perspective. The content of the absolute process that is in the one
complex particular is the same content, the same stuff, as the
one in the other. That content makes for the particulars having
t h e qualities they do, though t h e r e is only one content
present-present in both places a t once.
Now to flesh t h i s out more fully gets a bit tricky. As i t
s t a n d s , it looks like absolute processes a r e multiexemplifiable-they a r e two places a t once. And as I carved
things out that would make this strategy Platonistic. Of course,
if this account provides a real solution, whether i t is properly
classified as Nominalist or Platonist is immaterial. But there is
a more substantive reason why I want t o reject the assimilation of absolute processes t o universals i n being multiexemplifiable, i.e., repeatables, i.e., being in two places at once.
Here is why.
According t o the theory under development, absolute processes are the building blocks of reality. Each absolute process
is a dynamic structured stuff, and the qualities of reality are to
be conceived as the contents of these absolute processes. With
t h e s e building blocks we can reconceive t h e macroobjects of ordinary experience as bundles of absolute processes.
An apple, we might say, is a complex of a portion of whiting, a
bit of redding, and numerous other qualities. But as a bundle
theory of sorts, one may suspect this view falls prey to a n old
enemy of bundle theories, the Identity of Indiscernibles.
Following many others, I am inclined to deny t h e
Indiscernibility thesis. But given the apparent affinities of my

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view with the Platonist, one may be tempted to wield against
my view a standard objection to the Platonist who also denies
the Identity of 1ndi~cernibles.l~
The objection is simply this. I t is a necessary truth that if
A and B are composed of numerically identical constituents, A
a n d B themselves m u s t be one a n d t h e same. And for t h e
bundle theorist whose ontology is universals, two complex
items, as bundles, a r e what they a r e i n virtue of their constituent universals. But as universals can be in two places at
once, indeed t h a t is the hallmark of a universal, were these
two complex particulars qualitatively identical, they would be
composed of numerically identical ingredients. But from the
necessary t r u t h about ingredients it follows t h a t not only
would they be qualitatively identical, they would be numerically identical. They would be numerically identical because
they are qualitatively identical. And that is to affirm the Identity of Indiscernibles. And t h e objection continues, such a
bundle theory must be false because i t commits one to the Indiscernible thesis, which we have already said is false.
As for a bundle theory of absolute processes of the kind I
have introduced, it would be problematic if absolute processes
are tied too closely to universals, given my stand on the Identity of Indiscernibles. How close then is the connection between absolute processes and universals? Absolute processes
are akin to universals in t h a t there is a sense in which absolute processes are in two places at once. They are modeled, aft e r all, on stuffs. Here is the crux though. If you have two
complex particulars t h a t are qualitatively identical, you have
two absolute processes, one present in each; not one absolute
process in two places at once.
Consider two s q u a r e patches of red. On my view, t h e
square portion of red of one is not numerically identical with
the square portion of red of the other. While the content-the
quality-present in each similarly qualitied particular is the
same content, we should not say t h a t there is a red entity in
two places at once. There are two reddings, I say, two numerically distinct absolute processes. What is in common is their
content, their quality. The quality is in two places at once, but
there are two entities here, not one. Why?
On t h e model of individuation I wish to endorse, w h a t
makes for a n entity is not just a quality, but a quality with a
certain structure. I t is only the structured form of redding
that makes for the proper particulars of my system. Each bit
of structured stuff, on this account, is a particular. Without
the structure you do not have a particular, you j u s t have a
content; one that can be potentially part of a particular, but is
not as such. I n traditional terminology, I follow Aquinas in
making matter under terminate dimensions my principle of
individuation for particular absolute processes.15

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Eric M. Rubenstein
Again, with those red patches, I count two entities, not one
as the Platonist does. What is the same in both of those particulars-those structured bits of redding-is their content.
The redding, as a stuff of sorts, is in both places, but only once
we have not j u s t content, but structured content-form and
content if you like-do we have a particular. As for the issue of
generality, there is a content that is in two places a t once. The
content of each is the same, a quality like a stuff, present in
t w o places, though t h e patches themselves, a s structured
stuffs, a r e distinct particulars. We explain t h e qualitative
identity across the particulars by recourse to the same stuff in
each, though the structured stuff of one is numerically distinct
from that of the other.
Thought of this way, absolute processes are immune t o the
objection t h a t tries to foist upon it t h e Identity of
Indiscernibles. For we do not have two complex particulars
comprised of numerically identical ingredients. We can have
two complex particulars, comprised of numerically distinct ingredients, though their shared content, quality, explains their
qualitative similarity.16
In summary then, the contents of absolute processes can be
in two places a t once, for they are akin to stuffs. Against the
Platonist, such contents are not abstracta. They are spatially
and temporally locatable. As for the tropist, the absolute process theory grants t h a t (suitably structured) properties a r e
particulars. But while the tropist has t o explain the similarity
of complex particulars by recourse t o numerically distinct
tropes and an unanalyzable relation of exact resemblance,
absolute processes explain qualitative similarity by speaking
of one content being structured in different places, as distinct
ingredients in distinct complex particulars.
This l a s t point may be put more fully a s follows. The
tropist accounts for generality, a t bottom, by recourse t o a
primitive relation of exact resemblance. I, on the other hand,
opt for a primitive relation of part/whole. I believe this t o be
superior in that, as we have seen, the tropists opting for a
primitive notion of resemblance is problematic in t h a t what
initially started the dialectic was a concern about similarity,
that is, resemblance. To answer that initial puzzle by ultimate
recourse t o the same sort of notion we began wondering about
is t o offer no real answer. By making t h e relation of part/
whole my primitive, I hope t o have gotten below the level of
qualitative similarity, resting such troubling notions on one
that is perhaps simpler, and one which does not make our account circular.
Of course, a drastic ontological overhaul of the kind I have
been suggesting requires a more in depth exploration of this
and many other topics; including the relation of absolute processes to space and time, and responding fully t o the objection

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t h a t bundle theories force all predication t o be tautologous.

But for now, however, I must plead t h a t the project, like the
entities it introduces, is a dynamic g~ings-on.~

NOTES
Most vividly i n his Carus Lectures: Wilfrid Sellars, Foundations for a Metaphysics of Pure Process, Monist 64 (19811, 3-90. As
readers of Sellars will recall, absolute processes (and elsewhere i n
his corpus, sen s a ) a r e proposed t o solve t h e mind-body problem. I
will p u t them to a different use here. J o h a n n a Seibt too has been
working independently on a similar project, a n d I have been fortun a t e t o have s e e n some of h e r work i n progress. (See, Properties
a s Process: A Synoptic S t u d y of Wilfrid Sellars N o m i n a l i sm
[Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing, 19901).
* Nelson Goodman, The Structure of Appearance (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1951).
Keith Campbell, Abstract Particulars (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
19901, 33.
Goodman, Structure of Appearance, 125.
Campbell, Abstract Particulars, 31-32.
See D. M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), though Armstrong ultimately rejects tropes after a thorough examination.
Campbell, Abstract Particulars, 130.
Campbell, Abstract Particulars, 34.
Were we considering sounds, we would be led to countenance a
duration (form) trope and a pitch (content) trope. We would have, for
instance, a 10-second trope t h a t w a s not t h e 10-seconding of anything. That is even stranger.
lo Now one may claim t h a t tropes a r e abstract particulars, as
Campbell does, meaning that by processes of abstraction we come to
understand the particular entities, i.e., tropes. What I have tried to
show is t h a t when we a t t e mp t such abstraction, we a r e unable to
make sense of t h e entities as proposed by Campbell.
l1 Cf. W. V. 0. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press,
19601, 98.
l2 One inhe r i t s a l l s o r t s of objections i n proclaiming a bundle
view. One particularly nasty view is t h a t bundle theorists seem to be
committed to holding all predication is essential-were there any difference in t h e constituent members of t h e bundle, there would be a
different complex particular. Against this, Peter Simons (Particulars
in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 [ 19941, 553-5751, advances
what h e calls a nuclear theory, whereby certain tropes constitute
t h e essence of t h e bundle, while o t h e r s a r e merely supplemental.
What Simons does not offer is any means for determining which are
the essential members. Rather t h a n face t h a t problem, I a m initially
inclined to simply bite the bullet and hold all members of the bundle
necessary. I think I can explain away t h e intuition t h a t some predication is contingent by resorting to a Humean explanation. A change
in any considerable p a r t of a body destroys its identity; b u t tis remarkable, t h a t where t h e change is producd gradually and insensi-

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bly we a r e less a p t to ascribe to it t h e same effect. The reason can

plainly be no other, t h a n t h a t t h e mind, feels a n easy passage from
t h e surveying its condition in one moment to t h e viewing of it in another ... from which ... it ascribes a contind existence and identity to
t h e object (David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature [Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 19281, 256). And from here, perhaps, we a r e led to
believe t h a t t h e object would have been one a n d t h e s a m e even if
some of its properties were different. So, if a gradual change in color
does not impugn the numerical identity, it is but a small step to mistakenly supposing t h e object would have been t h e s a m e no m a t t e r
w h a t its color. Therefore, we come to think of color as a contingent
property of physical objects.
l3 The historical precedent for t h i s final move comes from Kant.
In short, the intensive magnitudes of the first Critique t u r n out to be
forces: t h e content or qualitative dimension of reality t u r n s out to be
forces, forces which a r e posited as explanatorily useful r a t h e r t h a n
as revealed by t h e senses, forces which a r e only analogically natured
(at best) to the sort of force experienced by the senses. Cf. Immanual
Kant, The Metaphysical Foundations of N a t u r a l Science, i n Philosophy of Material Nature (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1985).
Campbell develops something like this view in t h e later chapters
of his book. The trouble is t h a t t h e earlier portions of the book focus
on tropes as particulars-which cannot be in two places at once, and
which a r e not general in t h e sense we need them to be. This will become clearer as we proceed.
l4 Michael J. Loux, Substance and Attribute (Holland: D. Reidel
Publishing, 1978), presents a version of t h i s argument against t h e
Platonist in Chapter 7.
l5 One remaining puzzle concerns t h e ontological s t a t u s of t h e
form of each entity-its structure which makes a n individual a n individual. In short, is such form another component of the entity? Do individual absolute processes really unfold into two components, a form
a n d a c o n t e n t ? No. For I believe t h a t we c a n m a k e u s e of
Whiteheads method of extensive abstraction to allow us to recover a
metric which can account for t h e form of absolute processes without
any additional ontological baggage. This is done by starting with t h e
notions of p a r t a n d whole a n d t h e relation of overlapping. We can
then imagine regions t h a t overlap other regions, such as rectangles
within larger rectangles, which produce something like a Chinese
box. Geometric points a r e then taken to be the entire converging set
of such overlapping regions. A similar method will yield lines, a n d
t h u s t h e resources for constructing space. Cf. Alfred North Whiteh e a d , The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1971).
l6 Given t h a t it is the content of processes t h a t is doing t h e work,
a n d given t h e parallels between t h e content of absolute processes
a n d stuffs, one may wonder why I do not simply endorse a stuffbased ontology. In a sense, though, I have endorsed a stuff-based ontology. The difference being t h a t I have refined this with dynamized
stuffs, a s i t were. The reason is threefold. Processes, like events, a r e
the sorts of entities t h a t can be said to be in more t h a n one place a t
once. This makes processes good modeling entities for t h e solution I
a m advancing. Second, processes (as opposed to stuffs) allow for useful ways of thinking of the interaction of the basic entities of the pro-

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posed ontology, and how reality might be constructed from such basic
entities. Here I have in mind the useful analogies between processes
and fields mentioned above. Finally, stuffs, a s thing-like, inherit a
persistent problem that has plagued atomists from Democritus to the
present, namely, how do various atoms, or bits of mattedstuff stay
together? The sort of causation and interaction suggested by modeling our entities on fields may provide a way out of this. This again
will have to be worked out subsequently.
l7 Thanks to J a y Rosenberg, Mary MacLeod, and David Bain for
helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Bill Lycan, who
endured numerous versions and discussions, and who offered substantial help throughout. A shortened version of this paper was presented to the North Carolina Philosophical Society, and I would like
to thank the participants for their various comments. Finally, I wish
to thank a referee for the Southern Journal of Philosophy for comments on a n earlier version of this paper.

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