10/17/2014

Doctrine of graduated escalation - The Hindu

Opinion Lead
Published: October 15, 2014 01:33 IST | Updated: October 16, 2014 01:03 IST

Doctrine of graduated escalation

Brahma Chellaney
Narendra Modis cautious, measured start has masked his discreet gradualism. Border and other provocations are moulding his policy
approach, founded on the premise that preventing hostile actions hinges on Indias capacity and political will to impose deterrent costs
as a response

The India-Pakistan peace process has produced a lot of process over the decades but no peace. While India is a
vibrant, buoyant nation, Pakistan remains a notion in search of a national identity. Yet, given Pakistans foundational
loathing of India, many among Pakistani strategic elites still pine for Indias unravelling or at least Balkanisation.
In this light, the Pakistani military has again escalated border tensions with India. Since the deadly 2008 Mumbai
attacks it scripted, it has initiated intermittent exchanges of fire along the Line of Control (LoC), including this summer
and then in recent days. This months artillery exchanges along the LoC were unusual in terms of their ferocity and the
sudden eruption in violence, resulting in the highest single-day death toll in over a decade.
Difficult road to peace
In provoking a second series of firing duels along the LoC since Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office, the
Pakistani military establishment which includes the rogue Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was doing more than
using gunfire as cover to allow Pakistan-trained militants to infiltrate into India. It was also testing the resolve of
Indias new government while simultaneously undermining Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and derailing any
prospect of a rapprochement with India.
Every time a Pakistani leader wishes to build better ties with New Delhi, his effort is undermined by the military
masterminding a serious cross-border attack or terror strike. Indeed, it was during Mr. Sharifs previous stint in office
that a major Indian peace initiative as symbolised by then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayees bus diplomacy
collapsed spectacularly, with the bus itself getting hijacked allegorically to Kargil, triggering a war. This has served as a
cautionary lesson on how the pursuit of peace can lead to war when one sides military is not answerable to the civilian
government.
The Pakistani military actually sought to test Mr. Modi soon after he won the national election. On the eve of his
inauguration, ISI-backed militants stormed the Indian consulate in Afghanistans western city of Herat. The Pakistani
plan was to take some Indians hostage and bring India under siege just as Mr. Modi took office. The plan, however,
went awry as Indian security guards at the consulate heroically killed all the attackers.
The U.S. blamed the Herat attack on the same ISI front organisation it held responsible for the 2008 Mumbai strikes
the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The LeTs leader, Hafiz Saeed, remains the Pakistani militarys darling, with his public life
mocking Americas $10-million bounty on his head and the U.N.s inclusion of him on a terrorist list.
The daring attack in Herat, 1,000 kilometres from Pakistan, must have had the ISIs nod. The ISIs S branch tasked
specifically with aiding and abetting acts of terrorism in India and Afghanistan handles the LeT, the Jalaluddin
Haqqani network and other terror organisations. This shows that the ISI is itself a terrorist entity.
The ISI is searching for new tools and methods to bleed India. In this context, is this fountainhead of transnational
terror now using Osama bin Ladens close associate, Ayman Zawahiri? The aging Zawahri, who U.S. officials say is
hiding in Pakistan, announced the formation of an Indian branch of al-Qaeda in a videotaped message released early
last month. The 55-minute video, in which Zawahiri threatens terrorist strikes across India, indicates that he is not
holed up in some mountain cave but ensconced in a safe house, as bin Laden was.
Pakistans internal dynamics
The ISIs war by terror is a reminder that the scourge of cross-border terrorism emanates more from Pakistans whiskysipping generals than its rosary-holding mullahs. The real jihadists are the self-styled secular generals, who have
reared the forces of jihad and fathered the LeT, the Taliban and other terror groups. In fact, Pakistans descent into a
jihadist dungeon occurred not under civilian rule but under two military dictators one (Zia ul-Haq) who nurtured
and let loose jihadist forces, and another (Pervez Musharraf) who took his country to the very edge of the precipice.
Another reminder is that India-Pakistan relations will be shaped largely by Pakistans internal dynamics, especially its
civil-military relations. Although it is in Indias interest to help strengthen Pakistani civilian institutions, Pakistans
civil society remains too weak to influence the direction of ties with India. In the absence of a structural correction to
Pakistans historically skewed civil-military power equation, a peace dialogue with India only encourages the Pakistani
military to carry out cross-border shootings, ambushes and acts of terror.
Mr. Modi and Mr. Sharif come from the political right and enjoy parliamentary majority. Both are business-oriented
and eager to revive flagging economic growth at home. Yet the expectations raised by Mr. Sharifs presence at Mr.
Modis inauguration proved false because they failed to factor in the role of a powerful, meddling third party the
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10/17/2014

Doctrine of graduated escalation - The Hindu

Pakistani military, which holds virtual veto power over any fundamental change to the India-Pakistan dynamic. This
party is simply not ready to allow better bilateral relations because that will undermine its extraordinary power and
privilege in Pakistan.
It is not an accident that this months border provocations by Pakistani forces followed a power struggle in Pakistan
that culminated with Mr. Sharifs wings being clipped and the military reasserting authority in foreign policy. Mr.
Sharif has emerged as a diminished figure and the main loser from a crisis triggered by street protests that were tacitly
backed by the army and the ISI. With the military back in the driving seat without staging an overt coup, Pakistans
democratic transition has again been disrupted.
Such has been Mr. Sharifs weakening that he not only had little say in the recent appointment of the new ISI chief, but
also his government, at the behest of the military, has sought to re-internationalise the Kashmir issue. The intensity of
ceasefire violations indeed was designed to help shine an international spotlight on Kashmir and also demonstrate as to
who is in charge of Pakistans foreign policy.
Mortar-for-bullet response
Mr. Modis cautious, measured start has masked his discreet gradualism. Border and other provocations are moulding
his policy approach, founded on the premise that preventing hostile actions hinges on Indias capacity and political will
to impose deterrent costs in response to any aggression. In Mr. Modis policy of graduated escalation, pressure on the
adversary begins at low levels and then progressively increases in response to the targets continued provocations and
aggression.
There was no Indian reprisal to the Herat attack, and Indias response to the summertime border shootings was
circumspect. But, in keeping with the doctrine of graduated escalation, this months Pakistani machine-gun fire along
the LoC brought a heavy response, including retaliation with 81-mm mortars, which have a range of up to five
kilometres. Mr. Modi wasnt exaggerating when he said publicly, Pakistan has been taught a befitting lesson.

A peace dialogue
between India and
Pakistan only
encourages the
Pakistani military
to carry out crossborder shootings,
ambushes and acts
of terror

The mortar-for-bullet response suggests that Indias policy of appeasement since

2003 is officially over. Indeed, to underscore that times have changed, the Modi
government was quick to scrap Foreign Secretary-level talks in August after the
Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi defiantly met Kashmiri secessionists. For
Islamabad, meeting Pakistan-backed Kashmiri separatists was business as usual,
but for Mr. Modis government, such interaction was simply unacceptable.
Mr. Modi is showing he is no Vajpayee, whose roller-coaster policy on Pakistan
traversed through Lahore, Kargil, Kandahar, Agra, Parliament House and Islamabad,
inviting only greater cross-border terrorism. And Mr. Modi is clearly no Manmohan
Singh, whose peace-at-any-price approach was founded on the naive belief that the
only alternative to do nothing in response to terror is to go to war. So, whether it was
the Mumbai attacks or a border savagery, such as a captured Indian soldiers
beheading, Dr. Singh responded by doing nothing.
The real choice was never between persisting with a weak-kneed policy and risking
an all-out war. Indeed, that was a false, immoral choice that undermined the
credibility of Indias own nuclear deterrent and emboldened the foe to step up
aggression.

The Modi government, by building a range of options, including to neuter Pakistans nuclear blackmail, is indicating
that Pakistani aggression will attract increasing costs. If the ISI is planning new attacks in India, with the intent to fob
them off as the work of al-Qaedas supposed new India franchise, it can be sure that it will invite an Indian response
imposing serious costs on the entire Pakistani security establishment.
Mr. Modi is clearly signalling that Indias response to the Pakistani strategy to inflict death by a thousand cuts will no
longer be survival by a thousand bandages, but punitive so as to bolster deterrence and mend conduct. Given that the
do nothing approach allowed India to be continually gored, prudent gradualism has been a long time coming.
(Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author, most recently, of Water, Peace, and War.)
Keywords: Narendra Modi, India-Pakistan border issues, Narendra Modi policies, Modi government, LeT, Taliban, LoC
tensions, Pakistan military
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