Journal of Pragmatics

North-Holland

9 (1985) 83-107

SHARED KNOWLEDGE

Jeanette

K. GUNDEL

83

AND TOPICALITY

The shared knowledge often associated with specific linguistic forms, such as definite descriptions, cleft constructions
and specific intonation contours is shown to be a function of the role of
these constructions
in encoding the topic-comment
structure of a sentence. It is argued that this
explains certain properties
of the relation between shared knowledge
and linguistic form, in
particular: (1) why shared knowledge is associated with some forms and not with others; (2) why
shared knowledge is not consistently
associated even with these forms; and (3) why what is
assumed to be shared is familiarity with a discourse entity and not necessarily belief in the truth
of a corresponding
proposition.

1. Introduction
A great deal of attention
has been devoted to the problem of explicating
differences in the interpretation
of pairs of sentences like those in (la,b)-(4a,b).
(la)
(lb)
(2a)
(2b)
(3a)
(3b)
(4a)
(4b)

The news conference was (not) held yesterday.

A news conference was (not) held yesterday.
What holds the cells together is (not) a molecular glue.
A molecular glue holds/does
not hold the cells together.
Was it my mother who called?
Did my mother call?
The cat scratched the dog.
The cat scratched the dog.

It is generally recognized that a speaker who utters the (a) sentences in (la,
b)-(4a, b) will be understood as taking certain aspects of the meaning of these
sentences for granted. However, these same aspects of meaning will be under* An earlier and shorter version of this paper was presented at the XIIIth International
Congress
of Linguists Workshop
on Shared Knowledge
in Language Use and Communication,
Tokyo,
August 1982.
I would like to thank the participants
for their comments. I am also grateful to Deborah Dahl,
John Hinds, and Gerald Sanders for their comments and suggestions.

J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge

84

and topicality

stood as part of what is asserted or questioned in the corresponding

sentences
in (b).
A number of terms and concepts have been invoked to account for this
distinction.
These include given vs. new information
(e.g., Halliday (1967)
Kuno (1972) Chafe (1976) Clark and Haviland (1977)); presupposition,
both
logico-semantic
and pragmatic (e.g., Strawson (1952) Chomsky (1971) Keenan
(1971) Hutchinson
(1971) Karttunen
(1974) Gazdar (1979)); conversational
implicature
(e.g., Kempson (1975)); conventional
implicature
(Karttunen
and
Peters (1979)) and ordered entailment
(Wilson and Sperber (1979)). However,
none of these has been completely satisfactory. 2
My purpose in this paper is to demonstrate
that an adequate account of the
difference in interpretation
between the (a) and (b) sentences in (la, b)-(4a, b)
follows from independently
needed principles governing the form and function
of topic-comment
structure in natural language. Such an account, moreover,
also explains
corresponding
differences
in conditions
under which these
sentences
can be appropriately
used. The problem
of accounting
for the
distinctions
in question thus reduces to the problem of explicating the relation
between topic-comment
structure and linguistic form.
I will begin in section 2 by distinguishing
two definitions
of topic, one
pragmatic and one structural. In section 3, I establish a pragmatic precondition
for topichood, the topic-familiarity
principle, which serves as the basis for a
connection
between topicality and the facts at issue here. In section 4, two
structural properties of topic are discussed which, taken in conjunction
with
the topic-familiarity
principle, make it possible to explain when the meaning
associated
with a particular
part of a sentence is taken as a background
assumption
and when it is part of the new information
being asserted,
questioned,
and so on. The form that such an explanation
might take is
outlined in section 5. Some advantages of the proposed explanation,
and some
specific advantages over the ordered entailment
model proposed in Wilson an
Sperber (1979) will be discussed in section 6.

2. Pragmatic topic and syntactic topic

The idea that topic--comment
structure should be related to the facts at issue
here is not new. A proposal along these lines was first developed by Strawson
(1964) who suggested that definite descriptions
presuppose
the existence of
their referents only in those cases where the referent is what the sentence (or
rather the statement made by the sentence) is about, i.e., where it is the topic of
the sentence. Despite its intuitive
appeal, however, this idea has not been
Excellent summaries
and Levinson

(1983).

of arguments

against

these various

analyses

can be found in Gazdar

(1979)

J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicaliry

85

widely accepted. It has either been ignored completely in most of the vast
literature on this topic or it has been explicity rejected (cf. Kempson (1975)
and Fodor (1979)). 3 One reason for this, no doubt, has been the terminological confusion and conceptual unclarity associated with the notion topic itself.
Since the publication
of Strawsons work the problem of providing
a more
rigorous definition
of this notion has received a considerable
amount
of
attention in the literature (cf. for example Sgall, HajiEova and BeneSova (1973),
DaneS (1974), Gundel (1974) Bates (1976), Reinhart (1982)). A good deal of
research has also been devoted to the interaction
of topic-comment
structure
with formal properties of individual languages (Dahl(1969)
Kuno (1972,1976),
Gundel
(1978a,1978b,1980),
Li and Thompson
(1976) Bak (1977) Given
(1979a), Dooley (1982) Erkii (1983) Dahl (1984), to mention only a few). 4
While many questions still remain unanswered,
a number of important generalizations have emerged from these works.
Although the definition
of topic is far from being a settled issue, most
authors seem to agree that its primary function is to establish the relevance of
an utterance. It is, in the words of Strawson (1964: 104) what is of current
interest or concern
and, in this sense, it is what the sentence (or more
precisely the speech act) is about. 5 Disagreement
concerning
the notion
centers mainly around its various structural
and pragmatic
properties,
for
example whether it always represents given or shared information,
whether it is
always sentence initial, and so on.
A necessary first step towards a more rigorous treatment
of the notion
topic in linguistic description
is to separate a functional
definition
of this
concept from various pragmatic
and structural
properties
which might be
correlated
with it. A determination
of such properties
thus becomes an
empirical question (see Sanders and Wirth (1985) for some discussion of this
point). I will make a distinction
here between pragmatic topic, a relation that

3 Kempsons arguments are addressed exclusively at Strawsons attempt to relate topicality to

truth value, specifically his claim that presupposition failure results in a truth value gap if the
expression which fails to refer is the topic. Thus, for example, Kempson maintains that this
position is untenable because truth value would now no longer be a relation between a statement
and a state of affairs but between a speaker, a statement and a state of affairs and thus, if meaning
is defined as a set of truth conditions, sentences could no longer be said to have meaning
independent of the context in which they are spoken. Whether or not one considers this to be a
compelling argument against an association of presupposition and topicality depends of course on
ones views concerning the proper definition and description of meaning in natural language. In
any case, the argument does not apply to the proposal put forward in the present work since
background assumptions are not described here in terms of truth conditions.
Deans arguments against Strawsons position will be discussed in section 4.
4 A review and bibliography of earlier work in this area can be found in Dane5 (1974).
5 Agreement on this characterization of the function of topic appears to be independent of
terminological differences. Thus, a similar characterization is given by Halliday (1967) and Kuno
(1972) for the concept these authors refer to as theme.

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J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicality

holds between a speaker and a sentence relative to a context, as defined in (5)

and syntactic topic, a relation that holds between a constituent
and a sentence
which contains that constituent,
and which is defined directly on syntactic
structures, as in (6).
(5) Pragmatic Topic. Def.:
An entity, E, is the pragmatic topic of a sentence, S, iff S is intended to
increase the addressees knowledge about, request information
about or
otherwise get the addressee to act with respect to E.
(6) Syntactic Topic. Def.:
A constituent,
C, is the syntactic
topic of some sentence,
S, iff C is
immediately
dominated by S and C is adjoined to the left or right of some
sentence S which is also immediately dominated by S.
I will assume further that the referent of a syntactic topic is always a pragmatic
topic, but that the converse is not true. An expression which refers to the
pragmatic topic of a sentence thus may, but does not necessarily occur in a
syntactic position reserved for topics. In fact, a pragmatic topic does not have
to have direct expression in the sentence at all. * Unless otherwise specified,
the term topic in this paper will refer to pragmatic topic as defined in (5).
I assume then that part of the successful interpretation
of any natural
language utterance involves distinguishing
between what the speaker intends to
communicate
something about (the topic) and what is actually communicated,
i.e., asserted, questioned,
requested, and so on, with respect to this thing (the
comment).
It is reasonable
to assume, moreover,
that this distinction
determines how an addressee will assess and store information
contained
in an
utterance. Thus, as Reinhart (1982) suggests, information
introduced in a given
discourse is not stored as lists of unrelated propositions.
Rather, it is classified
under referential entries that correspond to topics.

3. The topic-familiarity principle

A common,
though by no means uncontroversial
assumption
concerning
pragmatic preconditions
for topichood is that the topic must be chosen from
6 Although the definition of pragmatic topic given in (5) is similar to the definition of sentence
topic given in Reinhart (1982), the extensions of the two notions are not identical since Reinhart
restricts what she calls sentence topic to expressions
in the sentence. This restriction
seems
inappropriate,
however, given that Reinhart considers sentence topic (as well as what she calls
discourse topic) to be a pragmatic concept. Whether or not a particular
pragmatic
concept has
direct expression in any given sentence should be an empirical question.
I intend this definition to hold at the level of surface syntactic structure. Whether or not it also
applies at a more abstract level of representation
(cf. Gundel(1974),
Chomsky (1977)) is a question
I will not be concerned with here.
* See Gundel (1974) for some justification
of this claim.

J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicality

87

information
which is in some sense already given or shared by speaker and
addressee (cf. Mathesius (1928) Kuno (1972), Sgall, HajiCova and BeneSova
(1973) Gundel
(1974)). This assumption
actually embodies
two separate
claims, stated in (7) and (8).
(7) Topic-Identifiability
Principle
An expression, E, can successfuly refer to a (pragmatic) topic, T, iff E is of
a form that allows the addressee to uniquely identify T.
(8) Topic-Familiarity Principle
An entity, E, can successfuly
serve as a topic iff both speaker and
addressee have previous knowledge of or familiarity with E.
The distinction
between these two principles is especially important
for the
purpose of the present work since an expression can satisfy a uniqueness
or
identifiability
condition
even if the entity it refers to does not satisfy a
familiarity condition. However, previous knowledge of or familiarity with some
entity necessarily implies ablity to uniquely identify it, given an appropriate
description.
Thus, for example, the addressee could uniquely
identify the
referent of the dog in sentence (9) without having any previous knowledge that
the speakers neighbor has a dog. However, if the addressee did have such
knowledge, this would guarantee identifiability.
(9) I didnt
awake.

get much

sleep last night

because

the dog next door

kept

me

This point will be discussed further in section 5.

Given that the topic is what the speaker intends to communicate
something
about and that information
conveyed by a sentence will be assessed and stored
in relation to the topic, it is reasonable
to assume that an utterance will be
felicitous only if the addressee can uniquely identify the topic either from the
discourse context (linguistic or extralinguistic)
or on the basis of some expression in the sentence itself. There is, in addition, empirical evidence from a
number of different and unrelated languages that an expression which refers to
the topic must be definite or generic, i.e., it must be an expression which allows
the addressee to uniquely identify the referent and thus distinguish it from all
other objects. First, it has been observed (cf. Kuno (1972) Gundel (1974), Li
and Thompson (1976), Schachter (1976)) that in languages which have overt
topic markers (e.g., Japanese, Tagalog) a noun phrase can receive such a
marker only when its referent is definite or generic. 9 Second, as shown in
9 I assume here, following Kempson (1975) and others, that identifiability by the addressee, unlike
familiarity, is part of the conventional meaning of definite (including generic) referring expressions.

88

J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicalrty

Gundel (1974) topicalized ia and dislocated NPs (whose referents are always
pragmatic topics) must have definite or generic reference. This is illustrated by
the following examples from English.

(104 I bought the printer.

(lob) (As for) the printer, I bought it.
(1Oc) I bought it, the printer.

(104
(114
(lib)
(llc)
(114
(lie)
(llf)
(124
(12b)
(12c)

(124

The printer, I bought.

I bought a certain printer.
(As for) a (*certain) printer, I bought one.
I bought one, a (*certain) printer.
*(As for) a printer, I bought it.
*I bought it, a printer.
A (*certain) printer, I bought.
I bought something.
*(As for) something, I bought it.
*I bought it, something.
*Something, I bought.

As was noted above, previous knowledge or familiarity implies identifiability

(given an appropriate
description).
Thus, the facts in (lOa-d)-(12a-d)
also
provide indirect support for the claim that the topic must be some entity
already familiar to both speaker and addressee, since these facts would follow
automatically
from such an assumption.
The facts in (lOa-d)-(12a-d)
can not
be taken as providing strong support for the topic-familiarity
principle, however, since they would also follow from the weaker claim that topics must be
identifiable.
Some additional
support for the stronger assumption
comes,
lo The terms

Beans I like.

How do you feel about beans?

(ii) Beans I like.
As can be seen here, these two types of sentences are appropriate
in different discourse contexts.
Since it is only in sentences like (ii) that the sentence initial object functions as the topic of the
sentence (1 would maintain this is true for both pragmatic
and syntactic topic) it is somewhat
misleading to use the term topicalized to refer to both structures. I use the term here to refer only
to structures
like (ii), where the sentence initial NP does not have the primary stress in the
sentence.

J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicality

89

however, from at least two other areas. First, psycholinguistic

experiments
(e.g., Hornby (1972)) have suggested that speakers interpret what the sentence
is about as corresponding
to that aspect of the meaning of a sentence which is
in some sense already assumed or taken for granted. Second, if the function of
topic is to establish the relevance of an utterance, i.e., to hook it up to the
context in some way, this would be most easily accomplished if the addressee is
already familiar with the topic. Previous familiarity would also seem to be a
normal precondition
for the addressee to successfuly assess and store information relative to some topic. Thus, there appears to be ample evidence in favor
of adopting at least the topic-identifiability
principle and probably the stronger
topic-familiarity
principle as well.
Despite the arguments presented above, a number of authors have denied
any absolute connection
between topicality and shared knowledge, or even
between topicality
and identifiability,
maintaining
instead that topics obey
these conditions
only in the most frequent or unmarked
case. For some
authors, this is not even taken to be an empirical question.
It is simply
accepted without argument
because it is necessitated
by other theoretical
assumptions,
for example the claim that the topic (or theme) is always sentence
initial (e.g., Halliday (1967) Chomsky (1965), Allerton (1978)) or that all
sentences must have overtly expressed topics (e.g., Firbas (1964)). However,
other researchers, most notably Reinhart (1982) have adduced a number of
empirical as well as theoretical arguments against the position that topics are
necessarily
chosen from shared information.
The most compelling
of these
involves the grammaticality
of sentences like those in (13)-(16)
where the
dislocated
NP is a specific indefinite
and thus refers to some entity not
assumed to be uniquely
identifiable
by (and therefore also not previously
familar to) the addressee.
(13) A daughter of a friend of mine, she got her BA in two years.
(14) A guy I know, well our principal caught him smoking in the john and
called the police.
(Margretta (1977, ch. 3))
(15) An old preacher down there, they augered under the grave where his wife
was buried.
(Prince, p. 74, in this issue)
Further evidence that the topic-familiarity
from examples like the following.

principle

may be too strong comes

(16) Chris Zupetz went to work as a secretary last week under a new $70
million, state-subsidized
emergency jobs program.
(17) Larry White, president of L.V. White and Sons Construction
Management, her boss, is one of the first private employers to take advantage of
the program.
(First two sentences from an article in the Minneapolis
Tribune, September 18, 1983.)

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J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicality

Since topics are not always overtly marked in English, it is not possible to
determine absolutely whether the subjects of these sentences are also intended
to be their topics. Intuitively, however, it seems that they are. Yet it is clear in
each case that the addressee is not expected to have any previous familiarity
with the referent.
Because of facts like those in (13)-(17)
Reinhart concludes
that shared
knowledge cannot be a necessary condition
for topichood. I2 She proposes
instead a weaker condition which requires that topics be referential. If the term
referential
is being used here in the purely semantic sense to describe any
expression
the existence of whose referent is entailed by the sentence, the
so-called specific or wide-scope existential
reading for indefinites,
then the
condition of referentiality
is clearly too weak as it would not account for any
of the ungrammatical
examples in (lla-f)
and (12a-d). Even if referential is
being used in a pragmatic
sense here to mean any NP whose referent the
speaker is actually intending to refer to (as opposed to simply asserting that the
set of which it is a member is not empty), I3 the condition
is still too weak.
Although
the pragmatically
referential
interpretation
is not preferred
for
examples like those in (lla-f)
and (12a-d), it is still a possible interpretation.
Yet these sentences do not appear to be acceptable on any reading. Furthermore, forcing an interpretation
which is semantically
and pragmatically
referential by adding modifiers like certain or particular does nothing to improve
these examples (but see Margretta (1977) for a different view). I repeat the
relevant examples here for convenience.
(18a)
(18b)
(l&c)

*A certain printer, Mary bought it.

*Mary bought it, a certain printer.
*A certain printer, Mary bought.

Thus, while referentiality

is clearly a necessary condition
for topichood, it is
not a sufficient one. If we abandon
the topic-familiarity,
or even the topicidentifiability
principle in favor of a weaker condition that the topic expression
must be referential, we can account for examples like (13)-(17). However, a
It was pointed out to me by a participant
at the Tokyo conference that when similar sentences
appear in Japanese newspapers the subject receives the topic marker wa even though the reader is
not expected to have previous familiarity with its referent.
* Reinharts other arguments against the claim that topics must be chosen from shared knowledge
are less convincing
since they fail to distinguish
different
senses in which the terms given
information
and new information
have been used. For example, she argues that the claim that
topics are always given, and comments are always new would lead to a contradiction
in the case of
sentences like Felix praised kimserf where topic and comment
have the same referent. This
argument dissolves, however, once it is recognized that newness as it applies to comments is not a
property of the referent but a relation between topic and comment uis b uis some cognitive state of
the addressee (see Gundel (1979) for further discussion).
I3 See Fodor and Sag (1982) for more detailed discussion of the notion referential.

J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicality

91

range of other facts which follow automatically

from the topic-familiarity
principle (given the assumption
that syntactic topics are- always pragmatic
topics) remain unexplained.
In light of the discussion above, I would like to
propose that the topic-familiarity
principle be maintained
with the provision
that it can be suspended,
under certain conditions.
This position
seems
justified for a number of reasons.
First, sentences with topics that refer to non-familiar
entities appear to be
restricted in their distribution
to certain types of sentences. Thus, while left
dislocation of a specific indefinite is sometimes acceptable, as in (13)-(15), the
same is not true for right dislocation, as in (19) and (20) or topicalization,
as in
(21).
(19) *She got her BA in two years, a daughter of a friend of mine.
(20) *The principal caught him smoking in the john, a guy in our school.
(21) *A guy in our school the principal caught smoking in the john.

Furthermore,
while dislocation
is not in general restricted to any particular
type of speech act, dislocated topics whose referents are not already familiar to
both speaker and addressee are restricted to assertions. Compare

(22a) That guy in your school, did the principal catch him smoking in the
john?
(23b) *A guy in your school, did the principal catch him smoking in the john?
(23a) That guy in your school, call him up.
(23b) *A guy in your school, call him up.

Finally, it appears that even in those cases where the referent of the topic
expression is not uniquely identifiable
or familiar to the addressee, the topic
expression is grounded in some entity that is identifiable
and familiar, i.e., it is
usually the case that some explicit or implicit modifier of the topic NP has
definite or generic reference. Compare, for example, mine in (13) and down
there in (15). l4
Thus, although facts like those in (13)-(17) appear at first to argue in favor
of abandoning
the topic-familiarity
and topic-identifiability
principles in favor
of some weaker alternative, when a wider range of data is taken into account, a
theory which incorporates
these principles as well as certain conditions under
which they can be suspended, appears to be preferable. I would like to claim
then that examples like (13)-(17) are exceptional
cases where the speaker

I4 See Erkii (1983) for similar observations

about indefinite

topics in Turkish.

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J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicaliiy

knows the addressee is not in a position to assess the truth or falsity of the
assertion uis b uis the topic, since the latter is not uniquely identifiable,
but he
expects him to behave at least temporarily as if he could. When we consider
that the conditions
in question are pragmatic rather than grammatical,
this
situation is not a surprising one. It is well known that pragmatic conditions,
unlike grammatical
ones, can be suspended in special uses of language and for
the purpose of achieving a special purpose or effect, without any resulting
infelicity. Thus, for example, the condition that the use of a definite pronoun
will be felicitous only if its referent is activated (cf. Chafe (1976) Gundel
(1978b)) i.e., if the speakers and addressees attention
is focused on the
referent, is typically suspended in news writing or in fiction when stories begin
in media
res. Moreover,
suspension
of the topic-familiarity
principle,
like
suspension
of other pragmatic conditions,
appears to be restricted to special
uses of language. Left dislocation is found only in casual, informal speech, and
examples like those in (15) and (17) appear to be restricted to news writing and
fiction.
To conclude this section, we have established that the topic of a speech act
will normally
be some entity that is already familiar to both speaker and
addressee. The meaning of that part of a sentence which refers to the topic will
therefore be interpreted as taken for granted in some sense and the existence of
the referent of such an expression will not be part of what is actually asserted,
questioned, etc. by the sentence. In the next two sections, I will show how this
connection
between topicality and familiarity can be used to predict when the
meaning of a particular linguistic form is interpreted as a background
assumption of the sentence.

4. Some structural properties of topic

Since the topic-familiarity
principle expresses a pragmatic condition on topics,
one which follows from general principles
of successful communication,
we
assume that it is universal, i.e., it holds for all human languages. Structural
properties of topics, on the other hand, differ across languages. For example,
as Li and Thompson
(1976) have argued, languages
can be classified as
relatively more or less topic-prominent,
depending on the importance
of the
topic-comment
relation
in determining
surface
syntactic
structure.
Topic-comment
relations can also be marked in a variety of different ways
I5 The possibility of suspending the topic-familiarity principle in assertions but not in questions or
commands (as illustrated by examples (22) and (23)) is no doubt related to the fact that assessment
by the addressee is essential in order for successful communication
to take place with questions
and commands, but not with assertions. Even in the case of assertions, however, a discourse where
the addressee could never assess the truth of the comment
ois 6 uis the topic would be highly
uncooperative.

.I. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicality

93

across languages.
Some languages, e.g., Japanese and Korean, have special
particles which mark a constituent
as topic. Other languages,
French for
example, rely primarily on syntactic constructions,
like clefts and dislocated
sentences, which make the distinction between topic and comment structurally
explicit. In many languages, English and Russian, for example, position of
sentence stress is the primary marker of topic-comment
relations. Word order
variation
(e.g., in Russian, Turkish), various subject-creating
constructions
(e.g., in English), topicalization
and dislocation (e.g., in English, Russian) also
serve this purpose. Despite these differences, however, there appear to be a
number of universals and universal tendencies relating topic-comment
structure to linguistic form across languages. I will briefly review here two such
structural properties of topics which are relevant to the present work.
4.1. Topic and sentence stress
If position of sentence stress is used to mark topic-comment
relations in a
language, then the primary stress always falls within that part of the sentence
which expresses the comment.
Although the universality of this relationship between topic-comment
structure and sentence stress must be stated with some caution, it nevertheless
seems to hold in a large number
of languages (cf. Gundel (1974,1978a),
Schmerling (1975), Erku (1983), Kiss (1979)). Thus, for example, the following
pragmatically
equivalent sentences in English and Turkish both have stress on
the same constituent
even though the word order is different. (Both sentences
would be appropriate
responses to a question about where Sybil went, for
example.)
(24) Sybil went to the movies.
(25) Sibil sinima-ya
git-ti
movies-Dat.
go-past

Sibil went to the movies.

If we assume that stress is a conventional

means of calling the addressees
attention to some particular part of a sentence as being more important
than
the others, then this correlation between stress assignment and topic-comment
structure is of course not surprising. The speaker will always want to draw the
addressees attention to the comment, since this contains the main point of the
utterance and is always new information
in relation to the topic. A speaker
may, under certain conditions,
also want to call attention
to the topic, for
example if it is a new topic, i.e., when there is a topic shift, or if the topic is
being explicitly contrasted
with some other topic in the discourse. However,
since it is often the case that the addressees attention is already focused on the
topic, the latter does not have to be stressed (see Gundel (1978a) for more
detailed discussion). It follows then that an expression which refers to the topic

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J.K. Gundel / Shared knowledgeand topicalrty

will often be unstressed, and it will never receive the only stress in the sentence.
It must be noted, however, that position of stress alone is not sufficient to
uniquely determine the topic of an English sentence. It can only be used to
delimit the range of possible topics (and thus establish which expressions in the
sentence can not refer to the topic). Consider, for example, (26) and (27) with
so-called neutral stress on the final stressed word in the sentence.
(26) The King of France
(27) The King of France

visited the exhibition.

gave me this gold plated

cake knife.

Fodor (1979) cites these sentences

as evidence against Strawsons
(1964)
position that statements whose topic expression fails to refer lack a truth value.
She notes a similarity between Strawsons concept of topic and the analysis of
presupposition
(vs. focus) proposed in Chomsky (1971). She then goes on to
argue (1979: 212) that Strawsons analysis would make incorrect predictions
about (26) and (27) since these sentences clearly strike one as false. Fodors
argument is invalid, however, since it is based on the erroneous assumption
that sentences with so-called neutral intonation
are necessarily interpreted
as
being about their subjects. While it is true that with neutral, sentence final
stress these sentences both have an interpretation
where the subject is also the
topic, such sentences can also have an interpretation
where the whole sentence
is the comment and there is therefore no expression in the sentence which
refers to the topic (or put in Chomskys (1971) terms, the whole sentence is
focus and the presupposition
is simply that something happened or is the case).
Thus, contrary to Fodors claims, the fact that (26) and (27) strike one as false
rather than lacking a truth value is not inconsistent
with Strawsons analysis
since both sentences can have an interpretation
where the expression which
fails to refer, i.e., the King of France, is not interpreted as the topic. l6
4.2. Topic and word order
If there is a syntactic position in the sentence that is reserved for topics, then
this will be sentence initial or both sentence initial and sentence final. There
appears to be some correlation,
moreover, between sentence-initial
position
and new, not yet established topics and sentence final position and old, already
activated topics (cf. Creider (1975) Given (1979) Tomlin and Rhodes (1979),
Fuller (1981) Erku (1983)) where the term activated is used to refer to some
entity that both speaker and addressees attention is already focused on (see
Gundel (1978a)).
I6 For reasons which are still poorly understood,
the all comment interpretation
is highly unlikely
in sentences with definite subjects and certain one-place stative predicates. These include sentences
like the well known example The presenf King of France is bald. The difficulty (if not impossibility)
of interpreting
such sentences as all comment has also been noted by Kuno (1972) for Japanese.

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J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicality

Whether or not an expression whose referent is the topic of a sentence will

consistently
occupy some syntactic position reserved for topics depends on the
relative topic-prominence
of the language in question (see Li and Thompson
(1976)). In a highly topic-prominent
language like Japanse, for example, topics
are always sentence initial or final (though not all sentence initial or final
constituents
are topics, see Kuno (1972)). On the other hand, in English, which
is relatively low in topic-prominence,
topic-comment
relations do not uniquely
determine syntactic form and syntactic form uniquely determines
interpretation of topic-comment
relations only in a relatively small number of constructions (namely those which have syntactic topics as defined above). Thus,
sentence initial or final position is neither necessary nor sufficient for interpretation of topics in English. Compare, for example, the sentences in (28a-d)
below all of which are equally about the individual named Mary.
(28)

What about

(28a)

I havent

Wb)

Mav
Her

Mary?
Mary
for weeks.
seen
her
1
i

, I havent

(28~) Noone has seen

(284

Mary
She

seen for weeks.

Mary

t her

, for weeks.

hasnt been seen for weeks.

)

Nevertheless, there appears to be a strong tendency even in English for topics

to occur in sentence initial positon. This is especially true in written language,
where variation
in sentence stress is not available as a means of marking
topic-comment
relations. In addition to uniquely topicalizing constructions
such as dislocation and topicalization,
various subject-creating
processes such
as passivization,
subject-to-subject,
raising and object-to-subject
raising are
available in English for placing a topic in sentence initial position by making it
and
a subject. i Thus, assuming that it is not preceded by another constituent
that it meets necessary conditions for topichood, such as definiteness and lack
of primary stress, the subject of a sentence is most likely to be interpreted as its
topic in English.
4.3. Syntactic
tions

form and topic-comment

Given the two structural properties

that relates surface forms in English

structure

in English;

some generalita-

of topics discussed above, a description

to their possible topic-comment
interpre-

I7 It has been suggested (cf. Mathesius (1928)) that the occurrence of such constructions
in English
can be attributed to the fact that word order varation is highly restricted and thus not available for
placing topics in sentence initial position.

J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicaliry

96

tations

will have to accommodate

at least the following

facts.

A syntactic topic (as defined in (6) above) will always be interpreted

as the
pragmatic topic.
II An NP in the sentence which refers to the pragmatic topic will normally be
either definite or generic.

This follows from the topic-familiarity

principle, more specifically,
from the
fact that this principle entails the principle of topic-identifiability
and the fact
that a definite NP is a conventional
means of signalling that the addressee is
expected to be able to identify the referent. (Note, however, that it does not
follow from this that all definite NPs will be topics. This is a necessary
condition, not a sufficient one.)
III An expression which carries the primary stress cannot refer to the topic; it
will always be part of the comment of the sentence.
IV The most likely interpretation
is one in which the subject of the sentence
refers to the topic, i.e., assuming that the subject is sentence initial and that
it does not have some property, e.g., primary stress or indefiniteness,
which
makes it ineligible for topichood.

5. Towards an explanation of background assumptions

Given the facts described in I-IV above and the topic-familiarity
principle
established
in the previous section, we are now able to explain why certain
aspects of the meaning of the sentences in (la-f)-(4a-b)
are interpreted
as
background
assumptions
in the (a) sentences, but as part of what is being
asserted or questioned
in the corresponding
(b) sentences.
I repeat these
sentences here for convenience.
(la)
(lb)
(2a)
(2b)
(3a)
(3b)
(4a)
(4b)

The news conference was (not) held yesterday.

A news conference was (not) held yesterday.
What holds the cells together is (not) a molecular glue.
A molecular glue holds/does
not hold the cells together.
Was it my mother who called?
Did my mother call?
The cat scratched the dog.
The cat scratched the dog.

The noun phrase the news conference in (la) meets the necessary conditions for
topichood, i.e., it is definite and does not have primary stress. Since it is also in
subject position, it is most likely to be interpreted
as referring to the topic.

J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicality

91

Thus, given the topic-familiarity

principle, the referent of this noun phrase is
assumed to be some entity already familiar to the addressee, and the existence
of the news conference in question will not be interpreted
as part of what is
asserted by (la). Similarly, if we assume that the subject of a &z-cleft like (2a),
i.e., a headless relative clause, is a special type of definite referring expression,
the referent of this expression, in this case some entity uniquely identifiable
from the description
x holds the cells together will be assumed to be familiar to
the addressee, and the fact that something holds the cells together will not be
interpreted
as part of what is asserted in (2a). Assuming that the it-cleft is
essentiallly
identical
to the corresponding
wh-cleft except that the relative
clause appears sentence finally rather than in subject position (see Akmajian
(1970) Gundel (1977)) the relative clause in the it-cleft is also a definite
referring expression
and, if it does not receive primary
stress, it will be
interpreted
as a description
of the topic. Thus, using the same reasoning as
above, the information
that someone called will be interpreted as a background
assumption
of (3a) and not as part of what is being questioned.
Finally, our
analysis will predict that the background
assumptions
of the sentences in (4a,
b) will necessarily be different because position of primary stress is different in
the two sentences.
Since primary stress always falls within the comment,
scratched the dog is interpreted
as part of a description
of the topic in (4a),
while the cat scratched x is interpreted
as a description
of the topic in (4b).
Given the topic-familiarity
principle,
someone who utters (4a) will thus be
interpreted
as assuming that something scratched the dog and someone who
utters (4b) will be interpreted as assuming that the cat scratched something.

6. Some advantages
6.1. Wh-clefts

vs. it-clefts

A difference between wh-clefts, like (2a), and it-clefts, like (3a) is that the
expression which refers to the topic is in sentence initial, subject position in the
former construction
but in sentence final position in the latter. It was noted in
4.2 above that sentence final topics typically refer to some entitiy which is not
only familiar to the addressee, but which is also activated, i.e., an entity which
the speakers and addressees attention is already focused on (Prince, p. 66, in
this issue) refers to this as Chafe-given).
This is not necessarily
the case,
however, for sentence initial topics. We would therefore predict that while the
pragmatic properties of wh-clefts and it-clefts are similar, these two constructions will not always be equally appropriate
in the same discourse context. In
particular, we would expect that the wh-cleft can occur at the very beginning of
a discourse when the addressees attention can generally not be expected to be
focused on the topic, but that the corresponding
it-cleft will not be appropriate

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J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicality

in such a context.
following.

ix This

prediction

is borne

out

by examples

like

the

(29) (At the beginning of a lecture)

(29a) What I would like to talk about today is conversational
implicature.
(29b) $Its conversational
implicature
that I would like to talk about today
(where $ indicates inappropriateness
in context, as distinct from ungrammaticality).
(30a) At first meeting, people are always telling Judy Goldsmith
that she
doesnt look the type. What they seem to expect from the president of
the National
Organization
for Women is someone slick, sophisticated,
(Minneapolis Tribune, October 30, 1983)
perhaps a bit strident.
(30b) At first meeting, people are always telling Judy Goldsmith
that she
doesnt look the type.
?Its someone slick, sophisticated,
perhaps a bit strident that they seem
to expect from the president of the National Organization
of Women.
(31) A: Can I help you?
B: (a) Yes, what Im looking for is a printer.
(b) ?Yes, its a printer that Im looking for.
But compare
(32)

A: Are you looking for a typewriter?

B: (a) No, what Im looking for is a printer.
(b) No, its a printer that Im looking for.

where what the speaker is looking for has already been established as a topic.
In addition, since the relative clause in the it-cleft is not a surface subject
(and does not occur in sentence initial position), we would expect that it will
not refer to the topic as consistently
as the relative clause in the w/r-cleft. In
fact, as is well known, the relative clause in the it-cleft is often stressed and, in
such instances, it is interpreted
as part of the new information
asserted or
I8 Prince (1978: 888) arrives at a rather different conclusion maintaining that it is the wh-cleft
which can only be used appropriately
if the speaker can assume that the material inside the
wh-clause is in the hearers consciousness
at the time of hearing the utterance.
This proposed
discourse condition on wh-clefts appears to be incorrect, however, in light of examples like the
following:
(i) A: How am I going to get this spot out of the rug?
B: What my mother always uses is vinegar.
?Its vinegar that my mother always uses.
The discourse of (i) shows that it is the it-cleft and not the wh-cleft whose relative clause
contain material that is already in the addressees consciousness
at the time of utterance.

must

J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicality

questioned in the sentence.

in (33) and (34).

This use of the it-cleft is illustrated

99

by the sentences

(33) It was just about 50 years ago that Henry Ford gave us the weekend.
(Prince (1978: 898))
(34) Wasnt it just yesterday that he said the troops would be out in a few days?
(conversation
overheard, October 26, 1983)
Thus, the structural properties of topics in English outlined in section 4, in
conjunction
with the topic-familiarity
principle established in section 3, allow
us to correctly predict the following facts about the interpretation
of it-clefts
and w&clefts:
(a)

(b)

The relative clause in the w/z-cleft typically refers to the topic (either
activated or unactivated)
and the material in the clause is thus generally
interpreted as a background
assumption.
The relative clause in the it-cleft either refers to an activated topic (if it is
unstressed) or it does not refer to the topic at all (if it is stressed). In the
former case the content of the clause is interpreted
as a background
assumption
which the speakers and addressees
attention
is already
focused on; in the latter case it is interpreted as part of the comment, i.e.
the new information
asserted or questioned in the sentence.

6.2. Suspending background

assumptions

We saw in (33) and (34) that the content of the relative clause in a cleft
sentence is not always interpreted
as a background
assumption
and can be
used to assert or question the existence of some entity not already familiar to
the addressee. Similar observations
have been made about ordinary definite
noun phrases, as in (35)-(40).
(35) The King of Ruritania came to my party. Did you know that Ruritania
had a king?
(Kempson (1975))
(36) Dont come into this house, my friend, or Ill set the dog on you
(Hawkins (1976: 288))
(37) The King of France is bald (as an answer to the question: What bald
(Strawson (1964))
notables do you know?)
(38) This is the frammis; this is the external effluent-collector and this is one of
the lateral lyptographs. (McCawley (1979: 387))
(39) Charles provided a small embroidered
purse, Ernestinas work, and set
three sovereigns on the green desk beside Grogan. (John Fowles, The
French Lieutenants Woman)
(40) The Senate on August 10 voted 50 to 48 to spend $736,400 for a third

100

J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicality

Senate Gymnasium
due to the built in the 137.7 million-dollar
host senate
office building opening in January.
(U.S. News and World Report,
August 3, 1982, p. 9)
Sentences like those in (35)-(40) have been problematic
for theories which
attempt to handle the facts at issue here by directly associating presuppositions
or given information
with definite descriptions.
Such examples, however, are
not only consistent
with the theory proposed in the present work, they are
explained by it. Since the definite noun phrases in question all receive primary
stress in the sentences in (35)-(40)
they cannot be interpreted
as referring to
the topic of the sentence. Thus, we predict correctly that the addressee will not
necessarily be expected to have previous familiarity with the referent. I9
6.3. Entities vs. propositions;

assumed familiarity

vs. shared knowledge

In the previous section we saw that the analysis proposed here has certain
advantages over theories which attempt to explain the facts at issue by directly
associating presuppositions
or given information
with specific linguistic forms.
In contrast to these theories, we were able to predict not only when the
meaning associated with such forms is interpreted
as a background
assumption, but also when it is not. An additional advantage of our proposal concerns
the nature of the background
assumption itself. In the theory put forward here,
what is assumed to be taken for granted (the background
assumption)
is
familiarity with an entity. In a presuppositional
or given information
analysis,
what is taken for granted is a proposition.
(Prince (1981) is a notable exception
here). More specifically, the speaker is assumed to believe, and to assume that
the addressee believes, etc., in the truth of some proposition
associated with the
form in question. For example, such theories would correctly predict that a
speaker who utters the (a) sentences in (la, b)-(4a,
b), repeated here as
(41a)-(44a),
is committed to a belief in the truth of the respective propositions
in (41b)-(44b)
and to an assumption
that the addressee shares this belief.
(41a)
(41b)
(42a)
(42b)
(43a)

The news conference was (not) held yesterday.

There is/was a news conference.
What holds the cells together is (not) a molecular
Something holds the cells together.
Was(nt) it my mother who called?

I9 The existence of the referent of the definite

However, this fact is independent
of background
rules of entailment.
* This term is taken from Prince (1981).

glue.

NP is of course still entailed by these sentences.

assumptions
and would be predicted by the usual

J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicality

101

(43b) Someone called.

(44a) The cat scratched the dog.
(44b) Something scratched the dog.
Examples like those in (35)-(40) above, where the speaker does not assume
that the addressee shares a belief in the existence of the referent of the definite
NP are thus problematic
for such theories. Even more problematic
are examples like the (a) sentences in (45a, b)-(49a, b) below, where the speaker either
explicitly denies a belief in the truth of the proposition
expressed by the
corresponding
(b) sentence or leaves open the possibility
that it may not be
true.
(45a) Though we cannot be sure that anyone was cheating, what we have to
check is whether any law students had books with them in the exam
room.
(Kempson (1975: 194))
(45b) Some students had books with them in exam room.
(46a) Im still not convinced
that anyone called, but I know it wasnt my
mother (who called).
(46b) Someone called.
(47a) You say that someone in this room loves Mary. Well maybe so. But it
certainly
isnt Fred (who loves Mary), and it clearly isnt John.
And.. . Therefore, no one in this room loves Mary.
(Keenan (1971: 52))
(47b) Someone in this room loves Mary.
(48a) If I pull this handle, the explosion is inhibited.
(Gazdar (1979))
(48b) There is/will be an explosion.
(49a) The King of France didnt visit the exhibition, because France has no
King.
(Kempson (1975))
(49b) There is a King of France.
Such examples require no special treatment, however, in a theory in which the
facts at issue here are explained in terms of the topic-familiarity
principle. It is
no doubt true that familiarity with some entity is often based on knowledge or
belief in the truth of a corresponding
proposition.
For example, a speaker who
utters (42a) is likely to be familiar, and to know that the addressee is familiar,
with some entity describable as what holds the cells together on the basis of
a belief in the proposition
that something holds the cells together. However,
while belief in the truth of some proposition
always entails familiarity with an
entity described by that proposition
the converse is not true. Familiarity
with
the entity described by a definite NP, even when that NP refers to the topic,
does not, for example, entail a belief in its existence, as illustrated
by the
example in (50).
(50) A: Where will John, Mary, and their children

sleep?

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J.K. Gundel / Shared knowledgeand topicality

B: John and Mary can sleep in the guest room. As for their children,
thats no problem because they dont have any.
Bs response is perfectly felicitous in the context of As utterance even though
B does not believe that John and Mary have children. What is required in
order for Johns children to serve as a possible topic is that both speaker and
hearer know that at least one of the participants
in the conversation
has
entertained
the possibility that John has children, i.e., that the entity describable as Johns children is a familiar one in the discourse context. By freeing the
facts at issue here from the requirement
of truth or belief in the truth of some
proposition
we can also explain differences in the interpretation
and discourse
distribution
of sentences
like those in (51a-c),
which were discussed
by
Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1971).
(51a) The UP1 reported that Smith had resigned.
(51b) It was reported by the UP1 that Smith had resigned.
(51~) That Smith had resigned was reported by the UPI.
Kiparsky and Kiparsky observe (1971: 366) that (51c), unlike (51a) and (51b)
normally
conveys the meaning that the speaker assumes the report to be
true. It is clear, however, that a person who utters (51~) is not necessarily
committed
to a belief in the truth of the proposition
that Smith resigned.
Moreover, we find exactly the same differences in distribution
and interpretation in sentences like those in (52a, b) where neither the (a) nor the (b)
sentence can be associated with a belief on the part of the speaker that Smith
resigned. (See Gundel and Jacobs (1980) for further discussion.)
(52a) It is unlikely that Smith had resigned.
(52b) That Smith had resigned is unlikely.
What distinguishes
(51~) and (52b) from (51a, b) and (52a) is the assumption
that Smiths resignation
has at least been entertained
in the discourse context
by either the speaker or the addreseee or both, i.e., an assumption
that the idea
that Smith resigned is a familiar one to both speaker and addressee. Since the
clause that Smith resigned is also in subject position in (51~) and (52b), and
thus more likely to be interpreted
as a topic, this is exactly what would be
predicted by the topic-familiarity
principle.
6.4. The ordered entailment model
Before concluding,
I would like to briefly discuss a proposal by Wilson and
Sperber (1979), which appears to share at least some of the advantages of the
analysis proposed in the present work.

J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicality

103

Wilson and Sperber propose to avoid incorporating

a separate notion of
presupposition
(into semantics or pragmatics) by enriching semantic interpretations in such a way that simple pragmatic principles interact with them to
predict the background
assumptions
of a sentence. More specifically,
they
propose that rather than being all on a par (as assumed in standard truth
functional semantics), the entailments
of a sentence be ordered into two sets a foreground set and a background
set. The proposition
obtained by substituting the focused (i.e., primary stressed) constituent
of a sentence by a variable
(cf. Chomsky (1971)) which they refer to as the primary background
entailment, as well as all entailments
of this proposition,
constitute the background
entailments
of the sentence. The propositon
which entails the primary background entailment
constitutes
the foreground.
A pragmatic
principle
then
predicts that all background
entailments
are taken for granted, whereas the
foreground entailment is the main point of saying a sentence.
Thus, to take an illustration,
(53) and (54) have identical entailments;
these
include (55), (56) and (57).
(53)
(54)
(55)
(56)
(57)

My brother will meet you.

My brother will meet you.
I have a brother.
My brother will do something.
Someone will meet you.

However, Wilson and Sperbers model assignes a different order of importance

to the entailments
of (53) and (54). The primary background
entailment
of
(53), with focus on meet, is (56). Since (56) itself entails (55) the fact that the
speaker has a brother is correctly predicted to be a background
assumption
of
(53). The primary background
entailment
of (54) on the other hand, is (57).
Since (57) (unlike (56)) does not entail (55) the fact that the speaker has a
brother will not be interpreted as a background
assumption
of (54).
Since Wilson and Sperbers ordered entailment model depends crucially on
position of sentence stress, a factor which also interacts with topic-comment
structure, it has some of the same advantages as the proposal put forward in
the present work. For example, both analyses would correctly predict that the
existence of the referent of a definite description
will not be a background
assumption
if the definite description
receives the primary
stress in the
sentence, as in (54) above. However, Wilson and Sperbers analysis also
encounters a number of problems which do not arise from our proposal. First
of all, since their model is based on Chomskys (1971) proposal for interpreting
focus and presupposition,
it inherits all the problems associated with that
analysis. (See Gundel (1974) for a summary and discussion of some of these
problems.)
Another drawback of Wilson and Sperbers model involves its dependence

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J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicality

on the semantic notion of entailment.

Since their model predicts that the
background
assumptions
of a given sentence will always be included among
the set of entailments
of that sentence (more specifically the set consisting of
the primary background
entailment
and all the entailments
of the background
entailment
which can be obtained
by the variable substitution
method), it
raises all the same problems that undermine
semantic theories of presupposition (see Levinson (1983)). These include cases involving modal or opaque
contexts where entailments
cannot survive. Thus, since (58) does not entail
(59) the ordered entailment
model incorrectly predicts that (59) cannot be a
background
assumption
of (58).
(58) My brother may meet you.
(59) I have a brother.
Also problematic
for a theory which attempts to handle the facts at issue in
terms of the semantic notion of entailment
are examples like (46a, b)-(50)
where expected entailments
are cancelled or suspended. As was shown above,
such examples are not problematic
if what is assumed to be taken for granted
is the addressees familiarity with an entity rather than truth or belief in the
truth of a proposition.
Finally, it is not clear that the ordered entailment model can handle some of
the most basic facts that it was designed to account for. Consider the sentences
in (60a, b) for example.
(60a) The special news conference will be held tomorrow.
(60b) A special news conference will be held tomorrow.
(60a) and (60b) have identical
(61) There is/will

entailments.

In particular,

they both entail (61).

be a special news conference.

However, assuming so-called neutral, sentence

and Sperbers model will incorrectly
predict
assumption
of both (60a) and (60b).

final stress on tomorrow, Wilson

that (61) is also a background

7. Conclusion
I have argued in this paper that the background
assumptions
inferrable from
certain sentences are not directly built into specific linguistic forms such as
definite noun phrases, w/r-clefts, it-clefts and unstressed parts of a sentence;
rather, they are associated with such forms indirectly as a consequence
of the
role that the latter play in encoding the topic-comment
structure of a sentence.

J. K. Gundel / Shared knowledge and topicality

105

Whether, the analysis I have proposed can be extended to other, so-called

presuppositional
phenomena such as factive verbs for example, is a question I
leave for further study.
A more complete and more formal description
of the complex interaction
between topic-comment
structure and linguistic form in natural languages is
required before we can determine more conclusively
whether this interaction
can provide the basis for a satisfactory explanation
of the facts discussed in
this work. An attempt at such a description should, in any case, provide to be a
fruitful direction for further research.

References
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Bak, S.-Y., 1977. Topicalization
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9(2): 63-88.
Bates, E., 1976. Language and context. New York: Academic Press.
Chafe, W.L., 1976. Givenness, contrastiveness,
definiteness, subjects, topics, and point of view.
In: C.N. Li, ed., 1976. pp. 25-55.
Chomsky, N., 1965. Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge:
MIT. Press.
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N., 1971. Deep structure,
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