Science, Technology and Experiments; The Natural versus the Artificial

Author(s): Peter Kroes

Source: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association,
Vol. 1994, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1994), pp. 431-440
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
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Science Technology and Experiments;

the Natural Versus the Artificial1
Peter Kroes
University of Technology, Eindhoven
1. Introduction
Against the traditional 'discovery-view' of experiments, Hacking has maintained
that in experimental practice naturalphenomena are created, not discovered. By intervening in the world with the help of technology, we create and at the same time come
to know phenomena. This claim, together with the one that scientific entities are tools
for intervening in the world, undermines the classic distinction between the natural and
the artificial, more particularly,between science and technology: phenomena become
artifactsjust as technological products and scientific entities become tools for doing.
Hacking's view raises the question whether it can still be said that science studies natural phenomena, and if so, in what sense. Are we not forced to give up the distinction
between the natural and the artificial, between science and technology, altogether?
Recently, for instance (Lelas 1993) has argued that science is a form of technology.
I shall argue 1) that experimentalists do indeed create phenomena, but in a specific
sense which does not undermine the distinction between the natural and the artificial,
2) that scientific entities are used as tools instead of being tools, and 3) that Hacking's
view on experiments may be reconciled with the traditional view, on condition that
the concept of nature be reinterpreted. I shall suggest a reinterpretationin terms of
constraints imposed on action.
The paper starts with a brief discussion of the distinction between the natural and
the artificial (sect. 2), followed by a description of the traditional view of the natural
and artificial in experiments (sect. 3). Then I will criticize Hacking's claims that
phenomena are created and that scientific entities are tools (sect. 4). The paper ends
with a proposal for interpreting nature as constraints imposed on action (sect. 5).
2. The natural versus the artificial
A general dividing line between the natural and the artificial is difficult to draw.2
Within the present context it will be sufficient to indicate some of the most salient
differences between natural objects/processes as generally conceived within the physical sciences, and artificial objects/processes3 produced by technology.4
The moder physical sciences lack a clear conception of nature and natural objects. The still widespread idea that nature is composed of objects with certain intrinsic properties and interactions between those objects is hardly compatible with mod-

PSA 1994, Volume 2, pp. 431-440

Copyright ? 1995 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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432

em phys
theories.
es But whatever may be the prec
character of the (u
(ultimate)
t mate)
physical
ca theor
precise
se characterof
constituents
const
tuents of the wor
enti-artificial
f c a ent
natural ent
world,
d itt iss assumed that
that, contrary to art
entities,
t es natura
tties
es and the
theirr behav
behavior
or are not man-made
man-made. Accord
theories
es itt
According
ng to moder phys
physical
ca theor
some goa
function
on to natura
natural objects (at
attribute
butesome
goal or funct
makes, moreover
makes
moreover, no sense to attr
n phys
notions
ons do not ffigure
least,
east these not
gure in
theorizing).
z ng)
physical
ca theor
Artificial
Art
f c a objects
ntenobjects, on the contrary
contrary, are man-made; they are the outcome of intenttional
ona human act
Technoaction.5
on 5 I sha
shall concentrate here on techno
artifacts.6
facts 6Technotechnological
og ca art
radioo or a TV-set
TV-set, perform a pract
artifacts,
facts such as a b
logical
og ca art
bicycle,
cyc e a penc
practical
ca
pencil, a rad
basiss of a human des
function
funct
on on the bas
design.
gn In techno
design
gn iss taken to be a
technology,
ogy a des
scheme or p
realized.
zed Techno
function
on may be rea
Technological
og ca
plan
an that shows how a part
particular
cu arfunct
which
ch obey
artifacts
art
facts have a dua
nature. On the one hand
dual nature
hand, they are phys
physical
ca objects wh
n a non-te
non-teleoeothe laws
theirr behav
behavior
or can be exp
aws of nature; as phys
explained
a ned in
physical
ca objects the
embodiment
ment of a des
hand, they are the phys
design
gn that has
logical
og ca way
way. On the other hand
physical
ca embod
ntended to perform a pract
a te
wholee construct
construction
on iss intended
practical
ca
teleological
eo og ca character; the who
without
thout takfunction.
funct
on Th
Thiss funct
function
on iss an integral
technological
og ca artefact and w
ntegra part of a techno
understood.
artifact
factcan
can not be proper
nto account
account, a techno
properlyy understood
ing
ng itt into
technological
og ca art
natural and the art
artificial
f c a iss pr
distinction
st nct on between the natura
Thus, the d
Thus
geneticc
primarily
mar y a genet
nvent on creat on: natudifference
fference between d
one.77 Para
one
Parallel
e to itt runs the d
discovery
scovery and invention/creation:
nventartificial
f c a objects to be inventral objects (re
ra
said
d to be d
discovered,
scovered art
(relations)
at ons) are sa
discovers
scovers what iss aalready
ew ho
holds
ds that sc
science
ence d
ed/created.
ed
created The common vview
ready present
nvents new th
and that techno
things.8
ngs 8
technology
ogy invents
n exper
natural and the art
artificial
f c a in
ew of the natura
traditional
t ona vview
3 The trad
experiments
ments
with
ththe
the representat
science
ence has been preoccup
Traditional
Trad
t ona ph
representation
on(conceppreoccupied
edw
philosophy
osophyof sc
between theory and
with
th he re
relation
at onbetween
basiss of data
data,part
tualization)
tua
zat on)of rea
reality
ty on the bas
particularly
cu ar yw
and the use of techno
facts (Hack
experimentation
mentat onandthe
1983, 149 ff)
ff). Theory
technology,
ogy has
Theory,not exper
(Hacking
ng 1983
with
th the grow
n the ph
science.
ence More recent
been the focus of most work in
beenthe
recently,
yw
growing
ng
philosophy
osophyof sc
n the exper
interest
nterestin
science,
ence part
(Hacking
ng 1983;
physics
cs (Hack
particularly
cu ar yof phys
experimental
menta aspects of sc
n sc
science
ence has bethe rolee of techno
Franklin
Frank
n1986;Ga
son 1987; Le Grand1990)
1990), thero
1986; Gallison
technology
ogy in
use iss made of techno
extensive
veuse
n most exper
nce in
come a top
technology.9
ogy 9
discussion,
scuss on ssince
experiments
mentsextens
topicc of d
In the trad
ew of exper
traditional
t ona vview
onlyy a means to generate new
technology
ogy iss on
experiments,
ments techno
sci-real sc
ts part and the rea
data: once the new data are produced
data:once
played
ayed its
technology
ogy has p
produced, techno
of
the
to
contribute
contr
bute
entific
ent
f c work
work, theor
generation
generat
on
may
Technology
Techno
ogy
may
begin.
beg
n
theorizing,
z ng
n two d
different
fferent ways:
new data in
n human percept
m tat ons in
perception
on by
1) itt may he
mperfect ons and limitations
help
p to overcome imperfections
refine
ne our sensory
s itt may extend and ref
measuring
ng equ
providing
prov
d ng measur
equipment,
pment that is,
1985, 127)
127), or
apparatus (Ackermann 1985
behavior
or of phys
physical
ca systems under
studying
ng the behav
2) itt may prov
provide
de equ
equipment
pment for study
nature.
n nature
occur
not
do
which
wh
ch
conditions
cond
t
ons
artificial
art
f
c
a
spontaneously
spontaneous
y in
very spec
special,
a
with
th the underscience
ence iss an act
thiss vview,
ew sc
primarily
mar yconcerned w
activity
v ty that iss pr
According
Accord
ng to th
which
wh
ch data
and
means
The
nature.
nature
of
by
processes
technological/artificial
techno
og
ca
art
f
c
a
standing
stand
ng
n that understand
1993, 423-424;
obtained
ned p
about nature are obta
aboutnatureare
(Lelas
as 1993
understanding
ng(Le
play
ay no part in
n
n exper
Tiles
T
es 1992
unproblematic
emat cin
course, the use of techno
1992, 99)
experiments
ments iss not unprob
technology
ogy in
99). Of course
tellss us what nadelivers
vers the facts or te
mp y de
the sense that the techno
equipment
pment ssimply
technological
og ca equ
ncorrect hand
fail due to ma
ke Many exper
handling
ng of
ooks like.
ture looks
malfunctioning
funct on ng or to incorrect
experiments
ments fa
ot of techno
technological
og ca
requires
res a lot
usuallyy requ
experiments
mentsusua
equipment
equ
pment and the performance of exper
therefore the evdominated
nated by theory and thereforethe
ke sc
skills.
sk
s Moreover
science,
ence techno
Moreover, like
technology
ogy iss dom
ot of
nvo ve the use of a lot
results
ts of exper
and interpretation
aaluation
uat onand
experiments
ments may involve
nterpretat onof the resu
n exper
evidence
dence (facts
creation
on of exper
practice
ce iss
(facts, data) in
experimental
menta pract
experimental
menta ev
theory. The creat
theory
affair.
r But when proper
experi-thus not a stra
nterpreted exper
performed and interpreted,
properlyyperformed
straightforward
ghtforwardaffa
constitute
tute the
with
th the he
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ab e facts w
will de
deliver
ver re
ments w
help
p of techno
technology.
ogy These facts const
world.
d
about the phys
theories
es aboutthe
evidence
ev
dence for deve
physical
ca wor
evaluating
uat ng theor
developing
op ng and eva

Th

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o STOR T m nd Cond on

433

natural and the art

Thiss trad
Th
traditional
t ona vview
ew iss based on a str
strict
ct separat
artificial
fca
separation
on of the natura
in
n exper
which
ch nature iss observed and the cond
conditions
t ons
experimenting.
ment ng The equ
equipment
pment through wh
under wh
which
ch itt iss stud
and/or
or processes stud
studied
ed are art
studied
ed beartificial,
f c a whereas the objects and
have natura
n sp
theirr art
artificial
f c a env
theirr natura
naturalpropnaturallyy in
environment,
ronment and thus show the
spite
te of the
erties.
ert
es Though not man-made
themselves
ves throughman-made
through man-made equ
man-made, they show themse
equipment
pment
and under man-made cond
conditions.
t ons Whereas aall techno
nvo ved in
n an
technological
og ca objects involved
basiss of a des
notions
ons of funcexperiment
exper
ment perform a part
particular
cu arfunct
function
on on the bas
design,
gn the not
n the exper
studied
ed in
design
gn do not app
ttionality
ona ty and des
applyy to the objects
objects/processes
processes stud
experiment.
ment
Whilee a m
Wh
function,
on itt makes no
designed
gned so as to perform a part
microscope
croscope iss des
particular
cu arfunct
sense to say that an eelectron
ectron iss based on a des
ntr ns c funct
functionality.
ona ty
design
gn or has an intrinsic
Given
G
ven th
thiss trad
traditional
t ona concept
scientist
ent strema
remains
ns essent
conception
on of exper
essentially
a ya
experimenting,
ment ng the sc
naturewho w
with
th the aaid
d of techno
passive
pass
ve spectatorof naturewho
technology
ogy ga
gains
ns access to parts of nature
that would
thatwou
d otherw
otherwise
se rema
hidden
ddenbecause
remain
nh
because of human shortcom
shortcomings
ngsor of cont
contingent
ngent
n ourun
conditions
t ons preva
our universe.
verse The task of techno
boundarycond
prevailing
ng in
technology
ogy iss to remove any
obstaclee between the observerand
obstac
observer and naturewh
naturewhich
ch iss wa
there to be d
discovered.
scovered
waiting
t ng thereto
Thiss d
Th
distinction
st nct on between the natura
natural and art
artificial
f c a at the object level
eve iss ref
reflected
ected at
the level
eve of data
data. It iss qu
quite
te common among exper
experimentalists
menta sts to speak of art
artifacts
facts of
the measurement equ
equipment
pment or of the exper
experimental
menta setup
setup. They thereby refer to results
su
ts that are generated by the art
artificial
f c a surround
artificial
f c a means of observat
observation
on
surrounding
ngor art
of the natura
natural phenomenon under study (Frank
called
ed 'artifacts',
1986, 3)
art facts
(Franklin
n 1986
3). Data are ca
as opposed to genu
nformat on about the object of study
data, when they carry no information
genuine
ne data
study,
but on
tell us someth
n the exper
onlyy te
something
ng about the equ
equipment
pment used in
experiment.
ment
nstruments produce art
nstance the ear
artifacts;
facts; for instance
telescopes
escopes
Many measur
measuring
ng instruments
earlyy te
colored
ored fr
chromaticc aberrat
aberration.
on The spec
conditions
t ons under
produced co
fringes
nges due to chromat
specific
f c cond
which
wh
ch an object iss observed too may produce art
nstance a st
stick
ck that iss
artifacts;
facts; take for instance
held
he
d part
water. The st
stick
ck looks
ooks broken
thiss effect iss caused by the cond
condi-broken, but th
partlyy under water
ttions
ons under wh
which
ch the st
stick
ck iss observed; th
thiss property of the st
stick
ck iss an artefact
artefact.
real and not an illusion
n the observat
us on in
observation
on context
context, iss does not
Although
A
though the artefact iss rea
tse f
say anyth
anything
ng about the object itself.
It is,
n exper
discriminate
scr m nate between art
arti-s of course
course, of pr
prime
me importance
mportance in
experiments
ments to d
facts and genu
results
ts that conta
contain
n rea
real information
nformat on about the natura
natural system that iss
genuine
ne resu
studied.
ed The resu
results
ts of an exper
natural objects
ways the outcome of natura
being
be
ng stud
experiment
ment are aalways
with
th an art
artificial
f c a env
ter
environment,
ronment and therefore itt iss aalways
interacting
nteract ng w
ways necessary to ffilter
out the component in
n the resu
results
ts that te
tellss us someth
n pracnature. A
something
ng about nature
Although
though in
ttice
ce th
thiss may be extreme
nvo ve long
ntr cate cha
chains
ns of readifficult,
ff cu t and may involve
extremelyy d
ong and intricate
traditional
t ona vview
ew ma
n exper
maintains
nta ns that itt iss aalways
ways poss
results
ts
soning,
son
ng the trad
possible
b e in
experimental
menta resu
to eeliminate
1VThere ex
m nate aall that iss due to the use of techno
n other words
exists,
sts in
words, an
technology.
ogy 1VThere
ratioos "a set of strateg
epistemology
ep
stemo ogy of exper
experiment,
ment that is,
strategies
es that are used to prov
provide
de rat
nal be
na
n an exper
belief
ef in
result.
t These strateg
valid
d obserexperimental
menta resu
strategies
es d
distinguish
st ngu sh between a va
vation
vat
on or measurement and an art
artifact
factcreated
created by the apparatus"(Frank
1986, 192)
n 1986
192).
apparatus"(Franklin
Thiss trad
Th
traditional
t ona vview
ew of exper
rolee of techno
n sc
science
ence has beexperiments
ments and of the ro
technology
ogy in
come underf
under fire
re from d
different
fferent d
directions.
rect ons The most far reach
criticism
t c sm comes from
reaching
ng cr
constructivists
v sts quarters
construction
on
(social)
(soc
a ) construct
(social)
a ) construct
quarters,where nature iss interpreted
nterpretedas a (soc
which
wh
ch iss the outcome of a sc
scientific
ent f c pract
ts object
practice,
ce not its
object. The outcome of an exper
experi-ment iss taken to be a soc
social
a construct
resultt of negot
construction;
on; itt iss the resu
negotiation
at on processes between aall actors involved.
nvo ved In these itt iss not poss
nature as an indepenpossible
b e to appea
appeal to natureas
ndependent arb
arbiter.
ter The outcome of an exper
determined
ned by the interests
nterests of
experiment
ment iss u
ultimately
t mate y determ
the actors involved.
nvo ved Nature itself
tse f becomes a soc
social
a construct
construction
on and thus an artefact
artefact.
Thiss pos
Th
untenablee for at least
east the fo
reasons. In the ffirst
rst
following
ow ng two reasons
position
t on appears untenab
n pr
n the way d
difference
fference at aall in
discussions
scuss ons
place,
p
ace itt implies
mp es that there iss in
principle
nc p e no d
about the acceptab
aws and state laws
aws are conducted
conducted, nor
acceptability
ty of respect
respectively
ve y phys
physical
ca laws
in
n the way these d
discussions
scuss ons come to an end (that is,
s how consensus comes about)
about).

Th

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434

Secondly, if scientific knowledge, particularly the outcomes of experiments, are social

constructions conditioned by power structuresand interests of actors, how is it possible to explain the successful operation of technological artifacts designed on the basis
of that knowledge? The answer, that the successful operation of technological artifacts
is itself a social construction, is in my opinion not very convincing.11
In the following I will discuss Hacking's criticism against the traditional view of
experiments, which is of a more moderate nature.
4. Hacking's view of experiments
In his famous book Representing and intervening Hacking claims that phenomena
are created. He rejects the idea that experimental scientists simply discover phenomena in the world. "To experiment" in his own words "is to create, produce, refine and
stabilize phenomena" (Hacking 1983, 230), a phenomenon being "something public,
regular, possibly law-like, but perhaps exceptional" (Hacking 1983, 222). Discussing
the example of the Hall effect, he states that this effect was not found by Hall simply
because it did not exist before Hall succeeded in producing this effect in the laboratory. It was literally created by him,12 because this effect does not exist without the
appropriateexperimental setup. If science should have taken another historical path,
the Hall effect might never have been created (Hacking 1989, 21).
The idea that phenomena are created does not imply, according to Hacking, some
sort of subjectivism or relativism in the sense that all is possible. The experimentalist
cannot create phenomena at will. In his interaction with the world, he is subjected to
all kinds of constraints: relativism is barredby the fact that the world seldom does
what the experimentalist wants (Hacking 1989, 22).
Hacking uses the creation of phenomena in experiments to defend a 'hard-headed' scientific realism about unobservable or theoretical entities. In his opinion it is not
because we can perform successful experiments on them that such entities are real.
They become real as soon as they can be manipulated to produce new phenomena
(Hacking 1983, 262 & 274):
Experimental work provides the strongest evidence for scientific realism. This is
not because we test hypotheses about entities. It is because entities that in principle cannot be 'observed' are regularly manipulated to produce a new phenomena
and to investigate other aspects of nature. They are tools, instruments not for
thinking but for doing. [...] Hence, engineering, not theorizing, is the best proof of
scientific realism about entities.
of
According to this line of thought, the best evidence for, for instance, the existenceelecelectrons is the common television set using a cathode ray tube (CRT). In a CRT
trons are produced by an electron gun, accelerated and deflected so as to hit appropriate
spots on the TV-screen, where they cause a phenomenon known as electrolumlnescence: the electrons hit a substance that starts to produce light of a certain wavelength.
Here, indeed, electrons have become an element of engineering and from an engineering point of view they are as real as the directly observable deflection coils in a CRT.
Hacking's ideas on experiments throw a new light on the role of technology in science. Two differences with the traditional view emerge:
1) with the help of technology the experimentalist does not just disclose or discover phenomena but he creates them; and
2) engineering and technology, rather than theory, determine what is real; thus
technology is not a mere instrument for science that leaves no trace at all.

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435

examine
ne the
theirr consequences for the
We w
will d
discuss
scuss these two po
ose y and exam
points
nts more cclosely
distinction
d
st nct on between the natura
natural and the art
artificial.
fca
55. Creat
Creation
on versus d
discovery
scovery
a m wh
which
ch iss meant to be
From Hack
a m that phenomena are created -a cclaim
Hacking's
ng s cclaim
ke the objects of
taken literallyconclusion
us on may be drawn that
obvious
ous conc
that, just like
tera y- the obv
domain
n of the art
artificial;
f c a ; they are the product of
technology,
techno
ogy phenomena be
belong
ong to the doma
intentional
ntent ona human act
natura phenomena
would
d be a contraactivity.
v ty The express
phenomena' wou
expression
on 'natural
dictio
d
ct o in
n term
terminis.
n s If phenomena are art
science
ence apparent
artifacts,
facts then sc
nvest gates an
apparentlyy investigates
artificial
art
f c a wor
nvented by exper
traditional
t ona
world,
d created or invented
experimentalists.
menta sts Contrary to the trad
natural and
vview,
ew itt wou
would,
d therefore
therefore, no longer
distinguish
st ngu sh between the natura
onger make sense to d
the art
n exper
artificial
f c a in
experiments.
ments
I sha
shall argue that Hack
oser to the traew of creat
Hacking's
ng s vview
creating
ng phenomena iss much ccloser
ditional
d
t ona vview
ew than the above suggests
thiss we have to take a ccloser
oser look
ook at
suggests. To see th
Thiss express
nterto create phenomena
Hacking's
Hack
ng s use of the express
expression
on 'to
expression
on can be interphenomena'. Th
n a weak and a strong sense
sense. In the weak sense itt means that the exper
experimentalmenta preted in
ist
st creates the proper cond
conditions
t ons for a phenomenon to take p
place,
ace but does not create
its
ts spec
characteristics.
st cs In the strong sense he not on
specific
f c character
onlyy causes the occurrence of the
so creates the spec
tse f
phenomenon, but aalso
phenomenon
specific
f c features of the phenomenon itself.
In my op
opinion,
n on there can be no doubt that Hack
Hacking
ng uses the express
expression
on 'creating
creat ng
n the weak sense
sense. In the ffirst
n
rst p
a m that phenomena are created in
phenomena' in
phenomena
place,
ace to cclaim
the strong sense wou
would
d eeither
ther lead
n wh
ead to "some sort of u
ultimate
t mate idealism
dea sm in
which
ch we make
the phenomena"
scientific
ent f c rea
which
ch
relativism,
at v sm wh
realism,
sm or to re
phenomena",13
13whereas Hack
Hacking
ng defends sc
he ru
rules
es out on the ground thatthe
that the wor
world
d imposes
with
th
constraints
ntson
on our interaction
nteract onw
mposes constra
it.14
t 14 Second
science
ence may deve
different
fferent h
historical
stor ca paths
develop
op aalong
Secondly,
y Hack
Hacking
ng states that sc
ong d
paths,
in
n each of wh
which
ch d
different
fferent phenomena m
created because other exper
might
ght be createdbecause
experimental
menta
would
d be used or be ava
available.
ab e Thus
Thus, itt iss poss
techniques
techn
ques and equ
equipment
pment wou
possible
b e to imagine
mag ne
that the Ha
Hall effect wou
would
d never have been created
nce itt can on
n some type
created, ssince
onlyy occur in
of apparatus
thiss phenomenon iss caused by the exper
apparatus.The occurrence of th
experimentalist
menta st who
builds
bu
ds and operates the necessary apparatus
therefore, means that
apparatus.Creat
Creating
ngphenomena
phenomena, therefore
the exper
conditions
t ons for the phenomenon to occur
occur.
experimentalist
menta st creates the rright
ght boundary cond
Hall effect can not be created in
n the strong sense
sense, because Hack
Finally,
F
na y the Ha
Hacking
ng states
that itt cannot be ru
ruled
ed out that the same effect occurs spontaneous
n nature
nature, i.e.,
e that
spontaneouslyy in
itt iss created by nature itself
tse f (1983
n naturethere
nature there iss such an ar(1983, 226): "If anywhere in
with
th no intervening
Hall effect occurs
occurs."
"
causes, then the Ha
rangement, w
rangement
nterven ng causes
If we accept the weak interpretation
nterpretat onof Hack
Hacking's
ng s express
creat ng phenomeexpression
on 'creating
Hall effect itself,
conclude
ude that the Ha
character of the regu
na', then we may conc
na
tse f the characterof
regularity,
ar ty iss
not created by man and therefore iss not an artefact
artefact. Cons
Consider
der another examp
example:
e: the
fall w
with
th the same speed in
n vacuum
vacuum. C
phenomenon that aall objects fa
Clearly,
ear y Hack
Hacking
ng iss
n cclaiming
thiss phenomenon was created; itt d
did
d not ex
exist
st before man was
rright
ght in
a m ng that th
ablee to create a vacuum
ab
vacuum. Neverthe
Nevertheless
ess we are dea
with
th a natura
natural phedealing
ng here w
nomenon in
n the sense that th
thiss phenomenon expresses a constra
constraint
nt on the free fa
fall of
bodies
bod
es wh
which
ch iss not itself
Thiss constra
constraint
nt iss d
dictated
ctated by
tse f created by the exper
experimentalist.
menta st Th
the rea
n wh
real wor
world
d in
which
ch we live.
ve That iss the reason why itt iss ca
called
ed a natura
natural phenomenon.15
non
15 Hack
Hacking's
ng s use of the term 'creating'
creat ng iss m
misleading,
s ead ng because itt suggests that
n the same way a scu
statue.
phenomena are created in
sculptor
ptor creates a statue
If indeed
ndeed Hack
ntends to cclaim
a m that phenomena are created in
n the weak sense
sense,
Hacking
ng intends
than the d
distinction
st nct on between the natura
natural and the art
artificial
f c a can be uphe
upheld,
d and then
ew iss much ccloser
oser to the trad
ew of exper
traditional
t ona vview
rolee
Hacking'
Hack
ng vview
experiments
ments (and on the ro
of techno
rst ssight,
tension
on between the
therein).
n) At ffirst
technology
ogy there
ght there seems to be a strong tens
traditional
trad
t ona vview
ew that phenomena are d
discovered
scovered and Hack
a m (1983
(1983, 225) that
Hacking's
ng s cclaim
discovscovGod'ss hand
handiwork,
work wa
phenomena are created and are not "partof God
waiting
t ng to be d
ered". However
ered"
realize
ze that the trad
ew that phenomena are d
disstraditional
t ona vview
However, we have to rea

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436

covered does not exclude that it may take a lot of work and ingenuity to get an experiment going, that is, to let phenomena occur. The experimentalist indeed creates phenomena in the sense that he causes phenomena to occur by producing the proper
boundary conditions. To claim that phenomena are discovered does not imply that the
phenomena occur spontaneously. There can be no doubt that in complex experiments
the occurrence of phenomena is caused by the experimentalist.
Neither does the claim thatphenomena are discovered imply "thatthe phenomena
have always been there, waiting to be discovered"(Hacking 1983, 226). This claim may
also be interpretedas saying that a particularfeatureof our world is disclosed or revealed.
Here the expression 'our world' is crucial:the phenomenon is a specific feature of our
world with its specific experimentaltechniques and equipment,not of all possible worlds.
In otherwords, the phenomenon does not exist apartfrom the appropriateapparatusand
thereforeit can be said to be created by us in our world. Nevertheless, the phenomenon is
discovered in the sense that an objective featureof our world, and of all worlds in which
the appropriateboundaryconditions are realized, is broughtto light.
Thus, Hacking's idea that phenomena are created may be interpreted along lines
that bring his view close to the traditional view on experiments. The distinction between the natural and the artificial, which is the core of the traditional view, appears
n the weak sense
sense.
to be compatible with the cclaim
a m that phenomena are created in
n that sense
dea of a pre-exsense, the idea
However, iff we accept that phenomena are created in
However
n
ew of the ro
rolee of techno
nature has to be abandoned
abandoned. Moreover
Moreover, our vview
technology
ogy in
isting
st ng naturehas
modified.
f ed Techno
science
sc
ence has to be mod
ndeed creates phenomena
creating
ng
phenomena, but by creat
Technology,
ogy indeed,
universe.
verse
discloses
sc oses object
objective
ve features of our un
phenomena, itt d
phenomena
kind
nd of concept
The d
discussion
scuss on of the quest
might
ght be comquestion,
on what k
conception
on of nature m
will be postponed unt
until after the
dea of creat
with
th Hack
Hacking's
ng s idea
pat b e w
patible
creating
ng phenomena
phenomena, w
entities
t es are too
toolss for do
a m that sc
scientific
ent f c ent
examination
exam
nat on of Hack
doing.
ng
Hacking's
ng s cclaim
toolss
66. Sc
Scientific
ent f c ent
entities
t es as too
scienencharacterizes
zes sc
ke Hack
realist
st like
It iss interesting
Hacking
ng character
nterest ng to note that a hard-headed rea
real-nstrumentsnot
not for th
t f c ent
tific
entities
t es as too
Here, rea
tools,
s that is,
s as instruments
doing.
ng Here
thinking
nk ng but for do
real because they turn out to
ose together: objects are rea
ism
sm and instrumentalism
nstrumenta sm come cclose
Machian
an
kind
k
nd of Mach
some
is
s
not
nstruments! But Hack
be effect
effective
ve instruments!
defending
defend
ng
Hacking
ng
which
ch iss based on economy of thought (Hack
instrumentalism
nstrumenta sm wh
1983, 263):
(Hacking
ng 1983
E ectrons are no longer
Electrons
saving
ng the phenomena
organizing
z ng our thoughts or sav
onger ways of organ
n some other doobserved. They are ways of creat
that have been observed
creating
ng phenomena in
tools.
s
Electrons
ectrons are too
nature. E
main
ma
n of nature
n the wor
world.
d Such a
toolss for do
entities
t es are too
scientific
ent f c ent
For Hack
nterven ng in
doing,
ng for intervening
Hacking
ng sc
science
ence
entities
t es iss remarkab
of sc
scientific
ent f c ent
characterization
character
zat onof
east; itt br
remarkable,
e to say the least;
brings
ngs sc
nce an important
ose to techno
design
gn and
technology
ogy iss the des
aspect of techno
mportantaspect
technology,
ogy ssince
very cclose
artifacts
facts based on a human des
toolss are art
tools.
s But techno
design.
gn
technological
og ca too
production
product
on of too
artifacts
facts
tools?
s? Are they art
conceived
ved as too
scientific
ent f c ent
Does the same app
entities,
t es when conce
applyy to sc
characterized
zed by a human des
that may be character
positive
t ve answer
functionality?
ona ty? A pos
design
gn and a funct
natural and the
distinction
st nct on between the natura
undermine
ne the d
course, comp
would,
wou
d of course
completely
ete y underm
distinction
st nct on beshall argue that itt iss not necessary to ggive
artificial.
art
f c a Aga
ve up the d
Again,
n I sha
characterizazaartificial
f c a prov
natural and the art
tween the natura
Hacking's
ng s character
modify
fy Hack
provided
ded that we mod
n an important
entities
t es in
scientific
ent f c ent
ttion
on of sc
way.
mportantway
conceived
ved as too
scientific
ent f c ent
tools,
s
will ffirst
rst address the quest
We w
entities,
t es conce
question
on whether sc
ectrons On Hack
Consider
der aga
Hacking's
ng s
are necessar
again
n eelectrons.
design.
gn Cons
necessarilyy based on a human des
n
theirr causa
causal propert
real because we know how to exp
ectrons are rea
properties
es in
exploit
o t the
construal, eelectrons
construa
tools.
s May we
effective
ve too
ts funct
function
on we
well;; they are effect
building
bu
d ng equ
equipment
pment that performs its
conclusion
us on does
so based on a human des
thiss that they are aalso
conclude
conc
ude from th
design?
gn? That conc

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437

man-made. To cclarify
not fo
this,
s
tool, does not mean itt iss man-made
follow;
ow; us
ar fy th
using
ng an object as a too
hammer. Its use as a hammer iss based on a
consider
cons
der a stone be
primitive
m t ve hammer
being
ng used as a pr
Thiss property makes itt posts inertia.
nert a Th
stone, name
namelyy its
physical
ca property of the stone
specific
spec
f c phys
without
thout aaltering
nto an object w
with
th a spec
ssible
b e to turn the object into
ter ng the
specific
f c funct
functionality,
ona ty w
hammer.
tse f Thus the object itself
tse f iss not art
artificial,
f c a yet itt may be used as a hammer
object itself.
dual nature of any techno
The cruc
crucial
a po
technological
og ca
recognition
t on of the dua
point
nt here iss the recogn
functionaliona carrier
erof
of a (soc
(socially
a y constructed) funct
object: itt iss a phys
physical
ca object that iss the carr
n others the
natural objects
carried
ed by natura
objects, in
ty. In some cases the funct
ty
functionality
ona ty may be carr
man. A stone
carrier
erof
of the funct
specifically
f ca y constructed by man
physical
phys
ca carr
functionality
ona ty must be spec
scissors
ssors
ts inertial
nert a mass; for a pa
basiss of its
pairr of sc
may be used as a ssimple
mp e hammer on the bas
ectrons as too
constructed. To use eelectrons
a spec
tools,
s therefore
therefore,
specific
specif
f c phys
physical
ca object has to be constructed
embodiment
ment of a human des
does not imply
ectrons are the embod
design.
gn
mp y that eelectrons
entities?
t es? If they are too
scientific
ent f c ent
What about the funct
tools,
s they ought to
functionality
ona ty of sc
physical
ca object iss not based on a
possess a funct
underlying
y ng phys
functionality.
ona ty Even when the under
certain
n
achieve
eve certa
with
th the he
toolss we can ach
human des
toolss posses a funct
function;
on; w
help
p of too
design,
gn too
sci-tool. Therefore
ends. W
ends
Without
thout that funct
Therefore, to say that sc
function,
on the object iss sure
surelyy not a too
functiononentific
ent
f c ent
entities
t es are too
tools,
s as Hack
does, implies
ntr ns c?) funct
ascribing
b ng an ((intrinsic?)
Hacking
ng does
mp es ascr
natural objects
with
th a funct
entities.
t es As objects w
objects.
functionality,
ona ty they are not natura
aality
ty to those ent
artificial
f c a iss endangered
natural and the art
distinction
st nct on between the natura
endangered.
Again,
Aga
n the d
account. The
think
nk we have to adaptHack
To get out of th
thiss pred
ng s account
adapt Hacking's
predicament,
cament I th
n the rea
entities
t es because they can be
scientific
ent f c ent
fact that we become to be
believe
eve in
reality
ty of sc
a ms I guess that when
used as too
tools,
s as Hack
tools,
s does not imply
Hacking
ng cclaims.
mp y that they are too
nm
mind
nd natura
natural objects
scientific
ent f c objects as be
characterizes
zes sc
tools,
s he has in
being
ng too
Hacking
Hack
ng character
"causal powers" as he
theirr propert
that can funct
function
on as too
toolss on the bas
basiss of the
properties,
es or "causa
n eng
causal propert
1983, 274):
t; these causa
(Hacking
ng 1983
exploited
o ted in
engineering
neer ng (Hack
puts it;
properties
es are exp
nferred ent
The best k
kinds
nds of ev
evidence
dence for the rea
entity
ty iss
reality
ty of a postu
postulated
ated or inferred
causal powers
that we can beg
otherwise
se understand its
ts causa
begin
n to measure itt or otherw
powers. The
n turn
best ev
thiss k
kind
nd of understand
evidence,
dence in
turn, that we have th
understanding
ng iss that we can
will work fa
set out
build
d mach
machines
nes that w
out, from scratch
scratch, to bu
fairly
r y re
reliably,
ab y tak
taking
ng
thiss or that causa
causal nexus
nexus.
advantage of th
n a CRT
certain
n propert
Consider
Cons
der aga
ectron in
CRT. As a sc
scientific
ent f c ent
entity
ty itt has certa
properties,
es for
again
n an eelectron
will show certa
instance
nstance charge; to say that itt has charge iss to say that itt w
certain
n types of
et
causal behav
causa
behavior
or or causa
causal nexus may be used by eng
behavior.
or That causa
causal behav
engineers
neers to let
n produc
the eelectron
ectron perform a certa
certain
n funct
function
on in
producing
ng another phenomenon
phenomenon. In other
n a CRT
ectron can be used as a too
tool in
CRT.
words, the eelectron
words
In the above way
scientific
ent f c enavoid
d ascr
functionalities
ona t es to sc
ntr ns c) funct
ascribing
b ng ((intrinsic)
way, we can avo
entities
t es rescientific
ent f c ent
ew of the
theirr causa
causal propert
ttities;
t es; from the po
properties
es or powers
powers, sc
point
nt of vview
sci-main
ma
n natura
theirr use as too
natural objects
tools,
s they acqu
objects. Through the
functionality;
ona ty; qua sc
acquire
re a funct
nc denta and therefore not the subject
entific
ent
f c ent
entities,
t es however
however, that funct
functionality
ona ty iss incidental
enti-scientific
ent f c ent
reconcilee Hack
a m that sc
matter of sc
scientific
ent f c inquiry.
Hacking's
ng s cclaim
nqu ry It iss hard to reconc
n sc
n the vocabu
science
ence
rolee in
with
th the fact that funct
functions
ons p
tties
es are too
toolss w
vocabulary
ary used in
play
ay no ro
for descr
world.
d Ta
Talk
k about funct
functions
ons is,
s of course
course, part and parce
parcel of
describing
b ng the phys
physical
ca wor
the vocabu
n so far as he iss descr
equipponlyy in
describing
b ng the equ
vocabulary
ary of the exper
experimentalist,
menta st but on
ts object of study
ment emp
n an exper
study.
employed
oyed in
experiment,
ment not its
am
neither
ther Hack
a m that phenomena are created
created, nor the cclaim
Summing
Summ
ng up
up, ne
Hacking's
ng s cclaim
n my op
distinction
st nct on bethat sc
scientific
ent f c ent
entities
t es are used as too
tools,
s implies
mp es in
opinion
n on that the d
science
ence iss taken to
tween the natura
artificial
f c a must be abandoned
abandoned. Even when sc
natural and the art
n the wor
n wh
ntervent on in
world
d through exper
be a form of pract
which
ch intervention
experiments
ments p
plays
ays a
practice
ce in
different
fferent k
kinds
nds of act
remain
n two d
crucial
cruc
a ro
science
ence and techno
activities,
v t es dea
role,
e sc
dealing
ng
technology
ogy rema
entities.
t es
with
w
th d
different
fferent k
kinds
nds of ent

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7. Discussion:natureas constraintsin action

In the foregoing,I havearguedthatHacking'scriticismagainstthe traditionalview
of experimentsdoes not renderthe distinctionbetweenthe naturalandthe artificialobsolete. A reconsideration
of the conceptof nature,however,seemsnecessary.I will put
forwarda tentativesuggestionfor interpreting
naturefromtheperspectiveof scienceas
a formof experimentalpractice.Hackinghimselfgives an interestingclue.Heclearly
of his claimthatphenomenaare
recognizesthe dangerof a relativisticinterpretation
created.To avoidthe conclusionthatthey arecreatedat will, he pointsout thatexperimentalistsexperienceall kindsof constraintswheninterveningin the world.I will take
the notionof constraintas the startingpointfor suggestinga reinterpretation
of nature.
Sciencein the formof theoryor representation
is usuallya formof ontology;it tells
whatreallyexists (Lelas 1993,425). Correspondingly,
natureis describedas consisting
of some sortof entitieswhose behavioris governedby naturallaws. If we considerscience as a formof practiceor action,anotherconceptionof nature,in termsof restrictionson ouractions,seems moreappropriate.
Wecannottransformor intervenein our
environmentin any way we like. We experienceall kindsof constraints.Naturemight,
therefore,be conceivedas the totalityof constraintsimposedon ouraction.
This characterization
of natureis, however,clearlyinadequate.Varioustypes of
constraintsareoperativein ourinteractionwith the world.Constraintsmay find their
originin the individualinvolvedin an action,or may be biologicalor culturalin origin. Othersare due to ourlimitedtechnologicalcapabilities.These are not the object
of studyof the physicalsciences;they arenot consideredto be naturalconstraints.
Whatkind of constraints,then,arenaturalconstraints?This is a difficultquestion.
At first sight, one mightbe temptedto answerthatnatureas the objectof science consists of those constraintsthatarevalid in ourinteractionwith the materialworld
independentlyof any specific context(decontextualizedconstraints),thatis, natural
constraintsareuniversalconstraints.Suchconstraintsareusuallycalled naturallaws.
But this answerwill not do; it is muchtoo restrictive.Takethe law of free fall, Ohm's
law or the Hall effect; they imposerestrictionson the way we may interactwith our
physicalenvironment(we cannotpreparea systemsuchthatobjectsin vacuumwill
not fall at the same speed etc.16).They are,however,only valid in highly specific,
idealizedcontexts (whichmakethose constraintsamenableto mathematicaltreatment).17WithHackingI agreethatthese constraintsarecreatedto the extentthatthey
appearonly withinthosecontexts;theseconstraintsdo not exist apartfromthese contexts, but are neverthelessnaturalconstraints.
Naturalconstraintsmightalso be characterizedas constraintsthatcannotbe overcome, no matterhow we intervenein ourphysicalenvironment;they transcend
humanpower.For instance,the law of conservationof energyforbidsthe creationof
energyfromnothing.This proposalsoundspromising,but also raisesproblems.Only
constraintsthatcannotin principlebe overcomequalifyas naturalconstraints,not
those thatin a given historicalsituationdefacto cannotbe overcome.This bringsus
to the problemof distinguishingbetweentechnologicalandnaturalconstraints.
Technologicalconstraintshave a contingentcharacter;they changeover time. Let
me illustratethis pointwith the exampleof the traditionallight microscope.The firstmicroscopeshadonly a limitedresolutionpower.Thatwas not due to physicalconstraints,butdue to technologicalimperfections.Therewas still scope for considerable
technicalimprovementby usingbetterlenses etc. Nowadays,however,the resolution
power of thesemicroscopeshas reacheda certainlimit:given theirdesignand the behaviorof light, an improvementof resolutionpoweris no longerpossible.Withregard
to this type of microscopewe may say thattechnologyhas runup againsta natural
constraint.Note thatthe designof the microscopeplays a crucialrole:by changingthe
designof the light microscope(andby exploitingotherpropertiesof light), the resolu-

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439

tion power of light microscopes may still be improved. Apparently, light has certain
properties which makes it in principle impossible to improve on the resolution power
of this type of microscope and that is the reason why we call them naturalproperties.
Other examples may be added, for instance the efficiency of steam engines. By removing technological constraints, their efficiency may be improved, but not beyond a
certain physical limit described by the second law of thermodynamics. Such examples
make clear that technological constraints depend upon human capacities (skills and
knowledge) to intervene in the environment. But there is a class of constraints which
are not conditioned by human capacities and that is precisely the reason why we call
them 'natural' or 'physical' constraints.

Notes
1I thank Guy Debrock, Andries Sarlemijn, Marc de Vries and Menno Hulswit for
their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.
2It changes in the course of the history of science and it depends upon the available technology and our understanding of that technology; see Tiles (1993).
3In the following we will restrict ourselves primarily to objects.
4For a more extensive discussion of the distinction between the natural and the artificial, see Feher (1993).
5It is doubtful whether the reverse is true; not every object or state of affairs that is
the outcome of intentional human action has to be an artifact. Breeding animals may
be a counter example.
6Not all artifacts are technological artifacts (e.g., a painting or sculpture).
7Note that the above distinction between the natural and the artificial presupposes
that in some respect man is not part of nature.
8This schematic characterization of the difference between the natural and the artificial is not without problems. In biology, the difference between the natural and the
artificial is rather intricate, as recent discussions about the patentability of the Harvard
mouse demonstrate. Furthermore,in biology the notion of functionality is also applied
to natural objects (the function of the eye or stomach). Finally, from an evolutionary
point of view it may be very difficult to draw in general a clear cut borderline between the natural and the artificial. We will leave these problems aside; for our purposes, the above characterization is sufficient.
9Not all experiments involve technology; for instance, the real performance of
Galilei's alleged experiment of the tower of Pisa would not require any specific technological equipment.
10The traditional view maintains that "anything artificial can be extracted, and its
traces erased so that the natural shines out in its full splendour to the glassy essence of
scientific apparatuses" (Lelas 1993, 432).
11Thisrejection of constructivismdoes not imply that I think that science is free of
any constructivistelements. On the contrary,the work of Poincare, Duhem and the logical
positivists (in particularReichenbach), have shown that there is much room for conventions (that is, social constructions)in science, because there is no unique correspondence
between sets of data and theories (known as the 'underdeterminationof theory by facts').

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440

12See Hacking (1989, 21), where he says that the creation of phenomena has to be
taken literally.
13See Hacking (1983, 220). If we assume that creating is a stronger notion than
making, it seems to me that Hacking contradicts himself; on the same page (p. 220)
he says that on the one hand scientists create phenomena, on the other that we do not
make the phenomena.
14See Hacking (1989, p. 22); the following remarkby Hacking, however, suggests a
possibly relativistic position (1983, 228): "But the phenomena of physics-the Faraday
effect, the Hall effect, the Josephson effect - are the keys that unlock the universe.
People made the keys-and perhaps the locks in which they turn" (the italics are ours).
15See also Galilei's definition of naturally accelerated motion (Galilei 1974, 153);
note that Galilei admits that this kind of motion does not occur in nature (Galilei
1974, 223)!
16Here, of course, we have to add the ceteris paribus clause.
17Of course, given those contexts, the constraints are universally valid. But that is
not the point here; the constraints, like the laws of nature, are considered to be
universally valid in any context, but because of all kinds of interfering processes, they
do not show up in pure form or not at all. Cfr. Nancy Cartwright's idea that the laws
of physics lie (Cartwright, 1983).

References
Ackermann, R.J. (1985), Data, instruments and theory. Princeton: Princeton
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Cartwright, N. (1983), How the laws of physics lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Feher, M. (1993), "The natural and the artificial", Periodica Polytechnica; humanities and social sciences (Technical Univ. of Budapest, Budapest) 1: 67-76.
Franklin, A. (1986), The neglect of experiment. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Galilei (1974), Two new sciences. transl. S. Drake, Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press.
Gallison, P. (1987), How experiments end. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
le Grand, F.E. (ed.) (1990), Experimental inquiries. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and intervening. Cambridge: Cambridge University
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_ __ ___. (1989), "Filosofen van het experiment", Kennis en Methode XIII: 11-27.
Lelas, S. (1993), "Science as technology", Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 44: 423-442.
Tiles, J.E. (1992), "Experimental evidence vs. experimental practice?", Brit. J. Phil.
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____ (1993), "Experiment as intervention", Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 44: 463-475.

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